labor 2 jogger

LABOR 2 JOGGER: LUCIANO, NOEL

LABOR RELATIONS POLICYI. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY

A. Constitution1. Art. III, Sec. 8

a. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

2. Art. XIII, Sec. 3 a. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,

and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

b. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

c. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

d. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.

II. STATUTORYA. Methods of Dispute Settlement

1. LC 211 (a) – Declaration of Policya. To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations as

modes of settling labor or industrial disputes(1) This includes: Voluntary arbitration, mediation, conciliation

2. LC 211(b) – Declaration of Policya. To promote free trade unionism as:

(1) An instrument for the enhancement of democracy, and (2) Promotion of social justice and development

3. LC 263 (g) – Strikes, Picketing, and Lockoutsa. Secretary of Labor may assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute

(1) WHEN in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout

(2) WHERE: In an industry indispensable to national interest (3) HE MAY:

(a) Decide it, or(b) Certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration

b. Effect of assumption or certification: Automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the order(1) If one has already taken place at time of assumption or certification:

(a) All striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work(b) Employer shall:

(i) Immediately resume operations(ii) Readmit workers under same terms and conditions before

c. Secretary or Commission may see assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance

d. Strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics, and similar medical institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided(1) WHY? National concern and highest respect to right of patients to life and health

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(2) All serious efforts be exhausted to substantially minimize, or avoid their adverse effects (a) BY labor, management, and government

(3) In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation:(a) It shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and

maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical/health personnel whose movements shall be unhampered to protect its patients and in emergency cases

(4) In these cases, the Secretary SHALL:(a) Immediately assume jurisdiction or certify the same to NLRC for compulsory

arbitration (b) WHEN: Within 24 hours from knowledge

(5) Parties are strictly enjoined to comply with the orders, prohibitions or injunctions issued by the Secretary or the NLRC(a) Otherwise, immediate disciplinary action

e. The President shall not be precluded from:(1) Determining the industries that are indispensable to the national interest(2) Intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to

settle or terminate the same

4. LC 124 (5 th par.) – Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixinga. In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized labor unions:

(1) Employer and workers shall endeavor to correct such distortions(2) Disputes arising therefrom: Settled through the National Conciliation and Mediation

Board(a) If it remains unsolved after 10 days of conciliation, then it shall be referred to the

NLRC (i) NLRC SHALL conduct continuous hearings and decide the dispute within

20 calendar days from the time it is submitted for compulsory arbitration

5. LC 99 – Regional Minimum Wagesa. Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards shall set the minimum wage rates for:

(1) Agricultural and non-agricultural employees(2) Workers in each and every region of the country

6. Cases:a. Kiok Loy v. NLRC (1983)

Summary: The Company, in its petition before the SC alleges violation of due process when it was precluded from presenting further evidence in support of its stand and when its request for further postponement was denied. LA and NLRC’s finding that it was guilty of ULP for refusal to bargain is unfounded. SC dismissed the petition. The Company refuses to bargain in good faith when it refused to make counter proposals to the proposed CBA.

Doctrine: Collective bargaining, which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement is designed to stabilize the relation between the labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual obligation. However, the employer is not under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation. Collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present:(1) Possession of status of majority representation of employees’ representative in

accordance with the means of selection or designation by LC(2) Proof of majority representation (3) Demand to bargain under Art. 251(a), LC

b. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union v. CA (2004)Summary: Despite the Union’s petition for certification election, it sent a letter to the Company requesting for CBA negotiations which the Company did not honor in light of the denied petition for certification. Strike followed and the Labor Sec. assumed jurisdiction over the case and certified it to the NLRC. In said Order the Labor Sec. reinstated the strikers in the payroll instead of actual reinstatement. The Union went to the SC on Rule 65. SC imputed GAOD on the part of the Labor Sec. Actual reinstatement is proper, not payroll reinstatement.

Doctrine: In UST v. NLRC, the order of payroll reinstatement was proper because the school could not immediately reinstate them since it would be impracticable and detrimental to the

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students to change teachers mid-sem. In this case, there is no showing that the facts call for payroll reinstatement as an alternative remedy.

GENERAL RULE: A voluntary mode of dispute settlement is the general rule per LC 211 echoing the general policy under Art. XIII, Sec. 3, Constitution.

EXCEPTION: LC 263 (g) which allows the Labor Sec. to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an industry indispensable to the national interest where a prolonged strike or lockout is inimical to national economy. This finds basis in police power.

All workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Thus, actual reinstatement only. It is not for labor, nor is it for management. It is for the State’s interest.

B. Trade Unionism1. LC 211 (b) – Declaration of Policy

a. To promote free trade unionism as:(1) An instrument for the enhancement of democracy, and (2) Promotion of social justice and development

2. LC 211 (c) – Declaration of Policya. To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong united labor movement

C. Worker Enlightenment 1. LC 211 (d) – Declaration of Policy

a. To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union members and as employees

2. LC 277 (h) – Miscellaneous Provisionsa. In establishments where no legitimate labor organization exists:

(1) Labor management committees may be formed voluntarily by workers and employers for the purpose of promoting industrial peace

(2) DOLE shall endeavor to enlighten and educate workers and employers on their rights and responsibilities (a) Through labor education with emphasis on policy thrusts of LC

3. LC 241 (o) – Rights and Conditions of Membership in a Labor Organizationa. No special assessments, attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may

be checked off from any amount due to an employee(1) EXCEPTIONS:

(a) Those for mandatory activities under the LC(b) Individual written authorization duly signed by employee. Authorization should

state:(i) Amount (ii) Purpose(iii) Beneficiary of deduction

4. Case: Victoria v. Inciong (1988)Summary: Victoria was an employee of Far East Broadcasting Company. Victoria organized an employees association which was not recognized by the Company because it is a non-profit, non-stock corporation which is beyond the coverage of the Industrial Peace Act. The employees waged a strike which was declared illegal by the CFI. Then, the Company dismissed Victoria. Victoria assails the dismissal for failure of the company to secure clearance from the Labor Sec. SC denied the petition. There was substantial compliance

Doctrine: The purpose in requiring prior clearance from the Labor Sec. in cases of shutdown or dismissal of employees, is to afford the Secretary ample opportunity to examine and determine the reasonableness of the request (LC 267). But there was substantial compliance when the Labor Sec was apprised of the intention to terminate the services of the petitioner in 2 Orders.

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As union leader, petitioner must see to it that the policies and activities of the union in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law and any deviation from the legal boundaries are imputable to the leader.

As a strike is an economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution and the law at that time, a resort thereto by the laborers shall be deemed to be a choice of remedy peculiarly their own, and outside of the statute, and as such, the strikers must accept all the risks attendant upon their choice.

D. Machinery Dispute Settlement 1. LC 211 (e) – Declaration of Policy

a. To provide an adequate administrative machinery for expeditious settlement of labor or industrial disputes

THE NLRC

2. LC 213 – National Labor Relations Commissiona. There shall be an NLRC

(1) Attached to the DOLE solely for program and policy coordination only (2) Chairman and 23 members:

(a) 8 members – chosen only from nominees of workers and employers organizations respectively (i) Upon assumption, members nominated here shall divest themselves of any

affiliation with or interest in the federation or association to which they belong

(b) Chairman and 7 members – shall come from public sector(i) Latter preferably chosen from among incumbent LAs

b. NLRC may sit en banc or in 8 divisions of 3. (1) NLRC sits en banc ONLY for:

(a) Purposes of promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases before any of its divisions or regional branches

(b) Formulating policies affecting administration and operations (2) NLRC shall exercise adjudicatory and all other powers, functions, and duties through its

divisions (a) Of the 8 divisions:

(i) 1st to 6th Divisions to handle cases from NCR and Luzon (ii) 7th Division for cases from Visayas(iii) 8th Division for cases from Mindanao

(b) NLRC en banc may allow cases within the jurisdiction of any division to be heard and decided by any other division PROVIDED:(i) On temporary or emergency basis(ii) Division allows the additional workload(iii) Such transfer will not expose litigants to unnecessary additional expense

(c) Divisions shall exercise EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION over cases within their respective territorial jurisdiction

c. Concurrence of 2 Commissioners of a division shall be necessary for pronouncement of a judgment or resolution (1) When membership not complete AND concurrence of two cannot be obtained, Chairman

shall designate such number of additional Commissioners from other divisions as may be necessary

d. Conclusions on any case shall be reached in consultation before case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion (1) MANDATORY for division to meet for purposes of consultation (2) Certification to this effect is signed by the Presiding Commissioner and shall be issued

(a) Copy attached to the record and served upon parties

e. Chairman shall be Presiding Commissioner of the 1st Division(1) 7 other members from public sector shall be the Presiding Comm of the 2nd-8th

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(2) In case of effective absence or incapacity of Chairman, Presiding Comm of the 2 nd Div shall be Acting Chairman

f. Chairman shall have EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION over the Commission, its regional branches, personnel, LAs(1) Aided by NLRC Executive Clerk

g. Commission in en banc shall be assisted by the same Executive Clerk (1) When acting thru its Divisions:

(a) Executive Clerk assists the 1st Div(b) 7 other Deputy Exec Clerks shall assist the 2nd – 8th

(2) Same functions as that of Clerk of Court and Deputy Clerks of the CA

h. Commission and its 8 divisions shall be assisted by the Commission Attorneys in its appellate and adjudicatory functions(1) Coterminous with the Commissioners with whom they are assigned (2) The Commission Attorneys shall be:

(a) Members of the Bar(b) With at least 1 year experience or exposure in the field of labor management

relations (c) SG 26

(3) There shall be as many Commission Attys as may be necessary but in no case shall there be more than 3 assigned to the Office of the Chairman and each Commissioner

i. No LA shall be:(1) Assigned to perform the functions of a Commission Attorney, nor(2) Detailed to the office of any Commissioner

3. LC 214 – Headquarters, Branches, and Provincial Extension Unitsa. Main offices:

(1) Metro Manila – for 1st – 6th Division(2) Cebu City – for the 7th Division (3) CDO – for the 8th Division

b. NLRC shall establish as many regional branches as there are regional offices of the DOLE, sub-regional branches or provincial extension units

c. There shall be as many LAs as may be necessary for effective and efficient operation

4. LC 215 – Appointment and Qualificationsa. The Chairman and other Commissioners shall be:

(1) Members of the Philippine Bar(2) Engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines for at least 15 years (3) With at least 5 years of experience or exposure in the field of labor-management

relations (4) Preferably be residents of the region where they hold office

b. The Labor Arbiter shall be:(1) Member of the Philippine Bar (2) Engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines for at least 10 years(3) With at least 5 years of experience or exposure in the field of labor-management

relations

c. Chairman, Commissioners, LAs shall hold office during good behavior (1) UNTIL they reach 65 years(2) UNLESS:

(a) Sooner removed for causes as provided by law, or (b) Become incapacitated to discharge duties of office

(3) President may extend their services (a) Max age of 70 years (b) Upon recommendation of NLRC en banc

d. Chairman. Division Presiding Commissioners, and other Commissioners shall be appointed by the President

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(1) Appointment to any vacancy in a specific division shall come only from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor

e. Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President(1) Upon recommendation of the NLRC en banc to a specific arbitration branch preferably in

the region where they are residents(2) Subject to CSL rules and regulations(3) LAs presently holding office in the region where they are residents shall be deemed

appointed thereat

f. Chairman and Commission shall appoint the staff and employees of the Commission and its branches as the needs of the service require(1) Subject to CSL rules and regulations (2) Also to upgrade their current salaries, benefits, and other emoluments in accordance

with law

5. LC 216 – Salaries, Benefits, and Emolumentsa. Chairman and members of the Commission shall have, similar to a Presiding Justice and

Assoc. Justice of the CA respectively:(1) Same rank(2) Receive same allowances, retirement, and benefits

b. LAs shall have the same rank, receive annual salary equivalent to and be entitled to the same allowances, retirement and other benefits and privileges as those judges of the RTC

NOTES:- The NLRC sits en banc (24 Commissioners) only in 4 instances:

a. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of casesb. To formulate policies affecting administration and operationsc. To allow cases within the jurisdiction of any division to be heard and decided by another

division d. To recommend appointment of LA

- Each division has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases appealed from the LAs within their respective territorial jurisdictions

- But the NLRC also has original jurisdiction:a. Petitions for injunction b. Certified Cases

NLRC JURISDICTION, POWERS, DUTIES

6. LC 217 – Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commissiona. The LAs shall have EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases

involving ALL workers, agricultural or non-agricultural WITHIN 30 CALENDAR DAYS after submission for decision WITHOUT extension(1) ULP Cases(2) Termination disputes(3) If accompanied with claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving

wages, rates of pay, hours of work, other terms and conditions of employment (4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-

employee relationship (5) Cases from violation of Art. 264 (now Art. 278)

(a) Including questions involving legality of strikes and lockouts (6) All other claims arising from employment relationship Involving an amount exceeding

P5,000 REGARDLESS of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement(a) INLCUDING those of persons in domestic or household service (b) EXCEPT claims for:

(i) Employees Compensation (ii) Social Security (iii) Medicare(iv) Maternity Benefits

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b. NLRC shall have EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION over all cases decided by LAs

c. The following shall be disposed of by the LA by referring to grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in the agreements:(1) Interpretation of CBAs(2) Interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies

NOTES:- Compulsory arbitration is done by the LA

Proceedings after the LA decision is brought to the NLRC but this cannot be considered as part of arbitration because on appeal, NLRC merely reviews the LA’s decision of errors of fact or law. It does not duplicate proceedings.

The NLRC also conducts compulsory arbitration but only in national interest cases as certified or referred to it by the DOLE Sec.

- Add the following under jurisdiction:a. Money claims arising out of employment involving OFWs including claims for damages b. Wage distortion disputes in unorganized establishments not voluntarily settled by parties (Art.

124 New LC)c. Enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non-compliance (Art. 233 new LC)d. Other cases as may be provided by law

- NOTE that any of the cases may be presented to and decided by a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators BY AGREEMENT of parties under Art. 273 and 274 new LC)

- If the employee is CBA-covered and terminated for alleged violation of personnel policy the dispute should be resolved by VA But if the CBA or personnel policy is NOT involved, the case should be brought to the LA In any case, the parties may agree to bring the case to VA

- VENUE:a. File in the RAB having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant b. But for cases involving OFWs, complainant has the option of filing with the RAB where:

(1) Complainant resides, or (2) Principal office of employer is situated

7. LC 218 – Powers of the Commissiona. The Commission shall the power and authority:

(1) Promulgate rules and regulations governing those for hearing and disposition of cases, those for internal functions, and those necessary to carry out the LC

(2) Administer oaths, summon parties, issue subpoenas, and others as may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation, to testify in any investigation or hearing conducted pursuant to LC

(3) Conduct investigation; Proceed to hear and determine; Conduct proceedings in public or private; Adjourn hearings; Refer technical matters; Direct parties to be joined or excluded in proceedings; Correct, amend, waive, any error, defect or irregularity; Such direction as necessary for dispute determination; Dismiss any matter or refrain from further hearing or determining dispute

(4) Hold any person in contempt and impose penalties (5) To issue injunctions and TROs

(a) No temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving labor dispute shall be issued EXCEPT after hearing the testimony of witnesses with opportunity to cross-examine and the Commission determines that:(i) Prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed

unless restrained, or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained

(ii) Substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow (iii) As to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon

complainant by the denial of the relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by granting relief

(iv) Complainant has no adequate remedy at law (v) Public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are

unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection (b) For TROs:

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(i) Complainant must allege that unless a TRO shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will be unavoidable

(ii) TRO shall issue upon testimony under oath (iii) Effective for 20 days and shall be void at expiration (iv) Complainant must file an undertaking with adequate security to be fixed

by the NLRC

8. LC 219 – Ocular Inspectiona. WHO: The Chairman, any Commissioner, LA, or their duly authorized representativeb. POWERS:

(1) Conduct ocular inspection on any establishment, place, material, equipment, etc.(2) Ask any employee or person for any information or data relative to investigation

c. WHEN: Any time during working hours

NOTES:- The powers of the NRLC may be summed up into:

a. The power to make rules and regulations pertaining to its functionsb. Power to administer oath and issue subpoenas and summons c. Power to investigate, hear, and decide disputes within its jurisdiction d. Power to hold persons in contempte. Power to issue restraining orders and injunctionsf. Power to conduct ocular inspection g. Power to decide appealed cases

- The issuance of TROs ex parte is not per se prohibited but the law requires that it be clearly justified by considerations of extreme necessity

9. LC 220 – OMITTED; REPEALED BY BP 130

10. LC 221 – Technical Rules Not Binding and Prior Resort to Amicable Settlementa. In any proceeding before NLRC or LA, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity

shall not be controlling (1) It is the spirit and intention of the LC(2) They shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain facts (3) Without regard to technicalities of law or procedure

b. In any proceeding before the NLRC or LA, parties may be represented by legal counsel(1) Duty of the Chairman, Pres. Comm., or Comm., or any LA to exercise complete control

over proceedings in all cases c. LA shall exert all efforts towards amicable settlement of labor dispute within his jurisdiction

on or before first hearing (1) Same rule for NLRC in exercise of its original jurisdiction

NOTES:- A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process. Its

requirements are satisfied when parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain - NLRC 2011 Rules state that on or before the date set for conciliation or mediation conference,

respondent may file MTD based only on the following grounds:a. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter b. Improper venue c. Prescription (see Art. 304, 305, 306 new LC on the various periods)d. Forum shopping

- Amicable settlements are encouraged. LAs are to preside over mandatory conciliation and mediation conferences. It is only upon the failure of the conference when parties are required to submit position papers

- LA to decide the case within 30 days after submission for decision WITHOUT extension NOTE that for cases involving OFWs, the decision shall be rendered within 90 days AFTER filing

of the complaint

11. LC 222 – Appearances and Fees

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a. LC 222 (a) – Non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or LA ONLY:(1) If they represent themselves, or (2) The represent their organization or members thereof

b. LC 222 (b) – No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees, or similar charges of any kind from CB negotiations or conclusion of CBA shall be imposed on any union member (1) Attorney’s fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by

the parties (2) Agreement to the contrary NULL AND VOID

NOTES:- Obligation to pay attorney’s fees belongs to the union and cannot be shunted to the individual

workers as direct responsibility Contrary agreement VOID

APPEALS

12. LC 223 – Appeala. Decisions, awards, orders of LA are final and executory

(1) UNLESS appealed to the NLRC within 10 calendar days from receipt (2) Grounds for appeal:

(a) Prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of LA(b) Decision, order, award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and

corruption (c) On purely questions of law(d) Serious errors in the finding of facts are raised which would cause grave or

irreparable damage or injury to appellant

b. In case of judgment of monetary award, appeal by employer perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond(1) Bond must be issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC(2) Amount: Equivalent to the monetary award

c. Decision of LA ordering reinstatement, insofar as this aspect is concerned, shall be immediately executory (1) Even pending appeal (2) Employee shall be:

(a) Admitted back to work under same terms and condition prior to dismissal (b) Or be reinstated in the payroll, at the option of employer

(3) Posting of bond shall not stay execution of reinstatement

d. To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, NLRC or LA shall impose penalty upon erring parties

e. In all cases, appellant to furnish copy of memorandum of appeal to other party (1) Other party shall file answer not later than 10 calendar days from receipt

f. NLRC to decide all cases within 20 calendar days from receipt of answer of appellee (1) Decision of NLRC final and executory after 10 calendar days from receipt

g. Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by Labor Sec. or NLRC in enforcement

NOTES: - Requisites for perfection of appeal

a. Must be filed within reglementary periodb. Verified by appellant following Sec. 4, Rule 7, ROCc. In the form of Memorandum of Appeal

(1) Contents:(a) Grounds relied upon and relief prayed; date of receipt of decision (b) Supporting documents

(2) Accompanied by a CNFS, proof of service on other party, proof of payment of appeal fee, cash or surety bond

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- NOTE: Calendar days, not working days. If last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or Legal Holiday, it may be filed in the next working day

- If the decision contains an order of reinstatement, the LA issues partial writ of execution. Employer must submit a report to LA on its compliance; otherwise, contempt Actual reinstatement – employee goes back to work Payroll reinstatement – employee does not work but still gets paid

- NLRC limits itself to reviewing those issues which are raised on appeal. Issues raised on appeal shall be open for review

- Under the NLRC 2011 Rules, amicable settlement is preferred even in appeal stage - Remedies:

a. From a decision, order, resolution of NLRC: File an MR Within 10 calendar days from receipt Ground: Palpable or patent errors Must be under oath No 2nd MR allowed

b. From an adverse resolution of the MR: Petition for Certiorari to CA, R65 Only on GAOD; errors of jurisdiction Where to file: Follow St. Martin Ruling: To the CA following hierarchy of courts; SC has

concurrent jurisdiction Under the NLRC 2011 Rules, the petition for certiorari shall NOT stay the execution of the

NLRC decisiono UNLESS: A restraining order is issued by the CA or SC o NOTE: Appeal to LA to NLRC stays execution except for the part on reinstatement

13. LC 224 – Execution of Decisions, Orders, or Awardsa. Labor Sec., or any Reg. Director, the NLRC, or LA, or Med-Arb, or Voluntary Arb may issue a

writ of execution (1) Motu proprio or on motion of interested party (2) Within 5 years from the date it becomes final and executory

b. Responsible officer shall separately furnish immediately the counsel of record and the parties with copies of said decision, order, award (1) Failure to comply: Admin sanctions

NOTES:- If not executed within the 5-year period, decision can only be enforced through an independent

action within 10 years from finality of decision - GENERAL RULE: No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of

another court with concurrent jurisdiction possessing equal power of injunctive relief- EXCEPTION: The rule does not apply when a third-party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank v.

IAC) The third-party claimant may vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil

court which may stop the execution on property not belonging to the judgment debtor

14. LC 225 – Contempt Powers of the Secretary of Labora. In the exercise of his powers under the LC, Labor Sec may hold any person in direct or

indirect contempt and impose penalties

THE BUREAU AND VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION

15. LC 226 – Bureau of Labor Relationsa. BLR and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of DOLE shall have ORIGINAL

AND EXCLUSIVE authority to act, in its own initiative or upon request of parties, on:(1) All inter-union and intra-union conflicts(2) All disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management

relations in all workplaces(a) EXCEPT: Those arising from implementation or interpretation of CBAs which shall

be subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitrationb. BLR shall have 15 WORKING days to act on labor cases before it

(1) Subject to extension by agreement of parties

NOTES:

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- A Med-Arb refers to an officer in the DOLE Regional Office or in the BLR who is authorized to hear and decide:a. Representation cases – proceedings to determine which union should be officially designated or

certified as exclusive representative of the employees in collective bargainingb. Inter-Union Disputes – Conflict between legitimate labor unions involving representation

questions for collective bargaining, or between legitimate labor unionsc. Intra-Union Disputes – Conflict between members of union d. Related labor relations disputes – Conflict between a labor union and the employer or any

individual, or entity, or group that is not a labor organization or worker’s association (1) EXCEPT: Cancellation of union registration cases

- VENUE:a. File with DOLE Reg. Off if it involves an independent union, chartered local, or a workers’

associationb. File with BLR if complaint involves federation or an industry/national union

- Appeal Decision may be appealed o Bureau Director within 10 days from receipt From Bureau Dir. Appeal to Office of Labor Sec within same period

16. LC 260 – Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitrationa. Parties to CBA shall include provisions ensuring mutual observance of terms and conditions.

They shall establish machinery (GM) for adjustment and resolution of grievances from:(1) Interpretation or implementation of CBA(2) Interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies

b. Grievances not resolved by GM within 7 calendar days from date of submission shall automatically be referred to VA prescribed in the CBA

c. Parties shall name and designate in advance a Vol-Arb or a panel of Vol-Arbs or include a procedure for selection preferably from a listing of qualified Vol-Arbs duly accredited by the Board (1) If parties fail to select, the Board shall designate the Vol-Arb or panel, as may be

necessary, pursuant to procedure in the CBA

NOTES:- The following shall be compulsorily subjected to the GM, those arising from:

(1) Implementation or interpretation of CBA(2) Interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies

- Grievance is defined as any question by either the employer regarding the interpretation or application of CBA or company personnel policy or any claim by either party that there is a violation of CBA or such policy

- Grievance procedure is a MUST in every CBA Without it, CBA is non-registrable

- Before or at any stage of Compulsory Arbitration, parties may opt to submit to VA VA = Contractual proceedings where parties to a dispute select a judge of their own choice and

by consent submit their controversy for determination Judge in VA is an arbitrator (NCMB has a list of accredited Vol-Arbs) while it is the LA in ComA

- Arbitration may be initiated by:a. Submission Agreement, and/or b. Demand or Notice invoking a collective agreement arbitration clause

17. LC 261 – Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitratorsa. The Vol-Arbs of Panel shall have ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION to hear and

decide all unresolved grievances from:(1) Interpretation or implementation of CBA(2) Interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policy

b. Violations of CBA shall no longer be treated as ULP and shall be resolved as grievances under the CBA(1) EXCEPT: Those violations which are gross in character

(a) These are flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of the CBA

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c. The NLRC, DOLE Reg. Offices and Reg. Dir shall NOT entertain disputes, grievances, matters under the jurisdiction of Vol-Arbs or panel(1) Immediately refer to the Vol-Arb or Panel

18. LC 262 – Jurisdiction over other Labor Disputesa. The Vol-Arbs or Panel shall also hear and decide all other disputes

(1) Upon agreement of parties(2) Including ULP and bargaining deadlocks

NOTES:- Violations of CBA are likewise cognizable by a Vol-Arb if not resolved through GM

But if violations ae gross, these are to be treated as ULP which are to be heard and decided by LA Yet in gross violations, LC allows parties to submit ULP to VA

- Same in employee dismissal where the SC in SMC v. NLRC held that it may be submitted to VA, but in the absence of such agreement, it should be lodged with the LA

19. LC 277 (i) – Miscellaneous Provisionsa. To ensure speedy labor justice, periods within which to decide cases shall be MANDATORY

(1) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by the rules

(2) Upon expiration of the period, a certification stating why a decision or resolution has not been rendered shall be issued and a copy served upon parties

(3) Case should be decided without further delay

20. Sec. 23, Title VII, Admin Code – The National Conciliation and Mediation Boarda. NCMB shall absorb conciliation, mediation, and VA functions of the BLR

(1) NCMB Composition: Administrator and 2 Deputy Admin(a) Appointed by the President upon recommendation of Labor Sec

(2) Attached agency under the administrative supervision of the Labor Sec.

b. There shall be as many Conciliators-Mediators as the needs of public service require(1) Must have 3 years experience in handling labor relations(2) Appointed by Labor Sec.

c. NCMB shall have its main office in Metro Manila. NCMB Admin shall exercise supervision over Con-Meds and all its personnel(1) As many branches as there are admin regions with as many Con-Meds as necessary (2) Each branch to be headed by an Executive Con-Med

d. Functions of NCMB:(1) Formulate policies, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and

guidelines pertaining to effective mediation and conciliation of labor disputes;(2) Perform preventive mediation and conciliation functions;(3) Coordinate and maintain linkages with other sectors or institutions, and other

government authorities concerned with matters relative to the prevention and settlement of labor disputes;

(4) Formulate policies, plans, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and guidelines pertaining to the promotion of cooperative and non-adversarial schemes, grievance handling, voluntary arbitration and other voluntary modes of dispute settlement;

(5) Administer the voluntary arbitration program; maintain or update a list of voluntary arbitrations; compile arbitration awards and decisions;

(6) Provide counselling and preventive mediation assistance particularly in the administration of collective agreements;

(7) Monitor and exercise technical supervision over the Board programs being implemented in the regional offices; and

(8) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Secretary.

e. Tripartite Voluntary Arbitration Advisory Council

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(1) Attached to NCMB(2) Advise NCMB on matters pertaining to promotion of VA as preferred mode of dispute

settlement

(3) TVAAC shall consist of presidential appointees serving 3-year terms without compensation(a) the NCMB Admin as Chairman (b) 1 member from government (c) 2 members representing labor (d) 2 members representing management

E. Industrial Peace1. LC 211(f) – Declaration of Policy

a. To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace

2. LC 273 – Study of Labor-Management Relationsa. Labor Sec. shall have the power and it shall be his duty to inquire into:

(1) Existing relations between employers and employees in PH(2) Growth of employee associations and its effect upon employment relationship(3) Extent and results of collective bargaining (4) Methods tried for maintaining satisfactory relations(5) Desirable industrial practices(6) Possible ways of increasing the usefulness and efficiency of collective bargaining (7) Possible adoption of practical and effective methods of labor-management cooperation (8) Aspects of employment relations concerning promotion of harmony and understanding (9) Relevance of labor laws and relations to national development

b. Labor Sec shall also:(1) Inquire into causes of industrial unrest and take all necessary steps to alleviate it(2) Recommend enactment of remedial legislation for maintenance and promotion of

industrial peace

F. Worker’s Participation in Decision Making 1. Art. XIII, Sec. 3, Constitution

a. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.




2. LC 211 (g) – Declaration of Policy a. To ensure participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting their

rights, duties, welfare

3. LC 255 - Exclusive Bargaining Representation and Workers’ Participation and Decision-Makinga. The LO designated or selected by majority of employees in an appropriate CBU shall be the

exclusive representative of employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining (1) An individual or group of employees shall have the right AT ANY TIME to present

grievances to employer

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b. Workers shall have the right to participate in policy and decision-making processes insofar as it will directly affect their rights, benefits, and welfare(1) Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding and subject to rules and

regulations of Labor Sec.(2) For this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management councils

(a) Representatives of workers in the LMC shall be elected by at least majority of all employees

NOTES:- Employees’ participatory right is guaranteed under the Constitution and the LC- Extent of right:

It does not carry management rights. No power to approve or disapprove a policy or a managerial decision

It gives an opportunity to suggest. It is a right of expression, not a power to decide- The LMC reserves the right of an individual or group of employees to present grievances, with or

without CBA, with or without the EBR Law allows, but it does not require, the creation of LMC It is a communication mechanism, short of a CBA

4. LC 277(g) – Miscellaneous Provisionsa. DOLE shall promote and gradually develop labor-management cooperation programs at

appropriate levels of the enterprise(1) With the agreement of LOs and employers(2) Based on shared responsibility and mutual respect in order to ensure industrial peace,

improvement in productivity, working conditions, quality of work life

5. LC 277 (h) – Miscellaneous Provisionsa. In establishments where no legitimate labor organization exists:

(1) Labor management committees may be formed voluntarily by workers and employers for the purpose of promoting industrial peace

(2) DOLE shall endeavor to enlighten and educate workers and employers on their rights and responsibilities (a) Through labor education with emphasis on policy thrusts of LC

6. Cases:a. Philippine Airlines Inc. v. NLRC (1993)

Summary: PALEA filed a complaint for ULP before the NLRC against PAL for the latter’s unilateral implementation of its Code of Discipline. PALEA contends that they should have participated in the crafting of the Code and that there was violation of due process when employees were dismissed because of alleged violations in the Code.

Doctrine: The exercise of managerial prerogatives is NOT unlimited. It is circumscribed by limitations found in law, a CBA, or the general principles of fair play and justice. It must also be established that the prerogative is clearly a managerial one.

A line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affects the rights of the employees. In the latter, management should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes of action.

A close scrutiny of the objectionable provisions of the Code reveals that they are not purely business-oriented as employees’ right to security to tenure are affected.

A provision in the CBA may not be interpreted as cessation of employees’ right to participate in the deliberation of matters which may affect their rights and the formulation of policies relative thereto (like a Code of Discipline). Industrial peace cannot be achieved if employees are denied their just participation in the discussion of matters affecting their rights.

b. Manila Electric Co. v. Quisumbing (2000)

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Summary: This is a Resolution on the MR filed by the parties to a decision rendered by the SC in a case which started from the renegotiation of the parties’ 1992-1997 CBA insofar as the last 2 period thereof is concerned.

Doctrine: The employer is allowed to contract out services for 6 months or more. However, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of employees.

Hiring of workers is within the employer’s inherent freedom to regulate and is a valid exercise of its management prerogative subject only to special laws and agreements on the matter and the standards of justice.

While there should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what management decides. Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, Court will not interfere with said judgment. Jurisprudence also lays out limitations such that the employer must be motivated by good faith and the contracting out should not be resorted to circumvent the law or must not have been the result of malicious or arbitrary actions.

G. Wage Fixing 1. LC 211 (b) – Declaration of Policy

a. To promote free trade unionism as:(1) An instrument for the enhancement of democracy, and (2) Promotion of social justice and development

7. LC 263 (g) - Strikes, Picketing, and Lockoutsa. Secretary of Labor may assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute

(1) WHEN in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout

(2) WHERE: In an industry indispensable to national interest (3) HE MAY:

(a) Decide it, or(b) Certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration

b. Effect of assumption or certification: Automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the order(1) If one has already taken place at time of assumption or certification:

(a) All striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work(b) Employer shall:

(i) Immediately resume operations(ii) Readmit workers under same terms and conditions before

c. Secretary or Commission may see assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance

d. Strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics, and similar medical institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided(1) WHY? National concern and highest respect to right of patients to life and health (2) All serious efforts be exhausted to substantially minimize, or avoid their adverse effects

(a) BY labor, management, and government (3) In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation:

(a) It shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical/health personnel whose movements shall be unhampered to protect its patients and in emergency cases

(4) In these cases, the Secretary SHALL:(a) Immediately assume jurisdiction or certify the same to NLRC for compulsory

arbitration (b) WHEN: Within 24 hours from knowledge

(5) Parties are strictly enjoined to comply with the orders, prohibitions or injunctions issued by the Secretary or the NLRC

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(a) Otherwise, immediate disciplinary action e. The President shall not be precluded from:

(1) Determining the industries that are indispensable to the national interest(2) Intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to

settle or terminate the same

8. LC 99 - Regional Minimum Wagesa. Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards shall set the minimum wage rates for:

(1) Agricultural and non-agricultural employees(2) Workers in each and every region of the country

2. LC 124 – Standards/Criteria for Minimum Wage Fixinga. Regional minimum wages to be established shall:

(1) Be as nearly adequate as is economically feasible to maintain the minimum standards of living within the framework of national economic and development program

(2) Consider the following factors, among others:(a) Demand for living wages(b) Wage adjustment vis-aJ -vis CPI(c) Cost of living and changes or increases(d) Needs of workers and family (e) Need to induce industries to invest in countryside(f) Improvements in standard of living (g) Prevailing wage levels (h) Fair return on capital and capacity to pay of employers (i) Effects on employment generation and family income (j) Equitable distribution of income and wealth

(3) Be the standard prevailing minimum wages in every region (4) Include wages varying within industries, provinces, localities if such differentiation is

necessary

b. Any person, company, partnership, other entity engaged in business shall file and register annually with the appropriate Regional Board, NLRC, NSO an itemized listing of their labor component

c. When application of any prescribed wage increase results in wage distortion:(1) Employer and union shall negotiate to correct distortions(2) Dispute arising from wage distortions:

(a) Resolved through GM under the CBA(b) If still unsolved, submit to VA

(i) To be decided within 10 calendar days from referral UNLESS otherwise agreed by parties in writing

d. In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized labor unions:(1) Employer and workers shall endeavor to correct such distortions(2) Disputes arising therefrom: Settled through the National Conciliation and Mediation

Board(a) If it remains unsolved after 10 days of conciliation, then it shall be referred to the

NLRC (i) NLRC SHALL conduct continuous hearings and decide the dispute within

20 calendar days from the time it is submitted for compulsory arbitration

e. Pendency of dispute arising from wage distortion shall not delay applicability of any increase pursuant to the law or Wage Order

f. Wage distortion = Increase in prescribed wage rates result in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure

g. All workers paid by result shall receive not less than the prescribed wage rates per 8 hours work a day or a proportion thereof for working less than 8 hours

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h. All recognized learnership and apprenticeship agreements shall be considered automatically modified insofar as their wage clauses are concerned to reflect prescribed wage rates

NOTES:- Wage Distortion – If the pay advantage of a position over another is removed or significantly

reduced by a pay adjustment required by a wage order, such pay advantage should somehow be restored Law does not require full elimination of salary differences, severe contraction is enough

- Employer is obliged to try to correct wage distortion; law says SHALL- Previous pay advantage is the aim but not necessarily to the last peso

H. Labor Injunction1. LC 254 – Injunction Prohibited

a. GENERAL RULE: No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity

b. EXCEPTION: As otherwise provided in:(1) LC 218 (Art. 225) – Powers of the NLRC (2) LC 264 (Art. 278) – Prohibited Activities in the course of Strike or Lockouts

NOTES:- No-Injunction Policy; Labor disputes should, as much as possible, be resolved by the parties

themselves; government intervention is the exception - Issuance of injunction has to follow the stringent procedure in Art. 225(e) or LC 218- NOTE: For national interest cases, injunction may be issued automatically by the Labor Sec even

when none of the parties asked for it This is meant for public welfare

2. LC 218 (e) – Powers of the Commissiona. NLRC may issue injunction

(1) No injunction shall be issued EXCEPT:(a) After hearing the testimony of witnesses(b) With opportunity to cross-examine (c) With testimony in opposition thereto, if offered (d) A finding of fact by the NLRC to the effect that:

(i) Prohibited acts have been threatened or will be committed unless restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained

(ii) Substantial or irreparable injury to complainant will follow(iii) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted

upon complainant by the denial of the relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by granting relief

(iv) Complainant has no adequate remedy at law (v) Public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are

unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection (2) Hearing shall be held after due and personal notice has been served to all known persons

against whom relief is sought as well as to public officials of the locality charged with duty to protect complainant’s property

b. For TROs, complainant must allege that unless a TRO shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will be unavoidable(1) TRO issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient if sustained, to justify the NLRC in

issuing a TRO upon hearing after notice (2) Effective for no longer than 20 days, void at expiration

3. LC 264 – Prohibited Acts in Strikes and Lockouts

4. Sec. 22, RA 8791 – GBL on Strikes and Lockouts a. Banking industry is declared as indispensable to the national interestb. Any strike or lockout involving banks, if unsettled after 7 calendar days, shall be reported by

the BSP to the Labor Secretary

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(1) Labor Sec, may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or decide it or certify the same to the NLRC for ComArb

(2) President may at any time intervene and assume jurisdiction over such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same

I. Tripartism1. LC 275 – Triparitsm and Tripartite Conferences

a. Tripartism in labor relations is declared a State policy (1) Workers and employers shall be represented in decision and policy-making bodies of

government, as far as practicable

b. Labor Sec or his duly authorized representatives may from time to time call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite conference of representatives of government, workers, employers (1) For consideration, adoption of voluntary codes of principles designed to promote

industrial peace based on social justice(2) To align labor movement relations with established priorities in economic and social

development

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DEFINITION OF TERMSI. STATUTORY REFERENCE

A. LC 212 – Definitions B. Rule 1, Sec. 1, Book V, Implementing Rules - Definition of Terms

II. SIGNIFICANCE – “Means” and “Includes”A. Feati University v. Bautista (1966)

Summary: This is a consolidation of 3 cases which stemmed from the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club wherein the latter staged a strike and the matter was certified by the President to the CIR. One of the issues raised by the University is its claim that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter because RA 875 is not applicable to the University as it is an educational institution and not an industrial establishment. As such, it cannot be considered an “employer” in contemplation of said Act. The University likewise argues that RA 875 is not applicable to the members of the Faculty Club because the latter are independent contractors and, therefore, not employees within the purview of said Act. The SC laid down the rule that the IPA is applicable to any organization or entity – whatever may be its purpose when it was created – that is operated for profit or gain.

Doctrine: It will be noted that in defining the term “employer” the Act uses the word “includes,” which it also uses in defining “employee”, “representative”. It does not use the word “means” as used in defining “court”, “labor organization”, “legitimate labor organization”, “company union”, “unfair labor practice”. “supervisor”, “strike” and “lock out”. This could not have been the product of oversight. In using the word “includes” and not “means”, Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of “Employer” but rather that such definition should be complementary to what is commonly understood as employer.

A similar manner is used in defining “employee.” The definition of employee uses the term “include.” It embraces not only those who are usually and ordinarily considered as employees, but also those who have ceased as employees as a consequence of a labor dispute. The term “employee” is not limited to those of a particular employer.

III. COMMON TERMS

A. Employer1. LC 212 (e) – EMPLOYER

a. Includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly b. Shall NOT include any LO or any of its officers or agents

(1) EXCEPT when acting as employer

2. Cases:a. Feati University v. Bautista (1966)

Summary: This is a consolidation of 3 cases which stemmed from the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club wherein the latter staged a strike and the matter was certified by the President to the CIR. One of the issues raised by the University is its claim that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter because RA 875 is not applicable to the University as it is an educational institution and not an industrial establishment. As such, it cannot be considered an “employer” in contemplation of said Act. The University likewise argues that RA 875 is not applicable to the members of the Faculty Club because the latter are independent contractors and, therefore, not employees within the purview of said Act. The SC held that it is an employer.

Doctrine: As used in the IPA, an employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include any LO (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or any one acting the capacity or agent of such LO.

In using the word “includes” and not “means”, Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of “Employer” but rather that such definition should be complementary to what is commonly understood as employer. Congress intended the term to be understood in a broad

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meaning because: (1) the statutory definition includes not only a principal employer but also a person acting in the interest of the employer, and (2) the Act itself specifically enumerated those who are not included in the term “employer.” Hence, we use the term as commonly used.

b. NYK International Knitwear v. NLRC (2003)Summary: Publico was hired as a sewer paid on a piece-rate basis by NHK. NHK dismissed Publico allegedly for abandonment of work. Publico filed a case of illegal dismissal. LA and NLRC both held that Publico was illegally dismissed. NYK was ordered to reinstate Publico with backwages and held NYK and its manager, Cathy Ng, solidarily liable. CA dismissed the subsequent Rule 65 petition on technical grounds. SC affirmed the LA and NLRC.

Doctrine: As held in AC Ransom Labor Union – CCLU v. NLRC, since a corporation is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the person acting in the interest of the employer. A corporation, in the technical sense only, is the employer. Corporate officers of the employer corporation were held solidarily liable for the monetary award.

In this case, Cathy Ng admitted that she is the manager of NYK. Thus, she falls within the meaning of “employer” as contemplated by LC 212(e) who may be held solidarily liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.

c. Alba v. Yupangco (2010)Summary: Alba and De Guzman filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal and payment of retirement benefits against YL Land Corp and Ultra Motors Corp. Yupangcoo was impleaded in his capacity as President of both corporations. Upon consolidation, LA rendered judgment in favor of petitioners which was affirmed by the NLRC. After a series of unserved writs of execution, Yupangco moved to quash the 3rd alias writ which was denied by the LA and NLRC. The CA set aside the decisions and held that the execution beyond the 1/3 share of Yupangco was GAOD. The SC agreed and held that the obligation of Yupangco was not solidary.

Doctrine: There is solidary liability when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides, or when the nature of the obligation so requires.

As held in MAM Realty Dev. Corp. v. NLRC, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of employees done with MALICE or BAD FAITH.

In this case, there is no finding or indication that petitioners’ dismissal was effected with malice or bad faith. Thus, Yupangco’s liability can only be joint.

d. Aliling v. Feliciano (2012)Summary: Aliling filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries, and damages against WWWEC wherein he alleged that at the time of his engagement he was not informed of the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee. WWWEC countered by saying that Aliling received a Memo from HR detailing the standards and that Aliling was terminated for failure to meet job performance standards. LA and NLRC found the dismissal unjustified. The CA modified by holding that WWWEC and its 3 officers are solidarily liable to Aliling.

Doctrine: LC 281 and Sec. 6, IR of Book VI, Rule VIII-A specifically require the employer to inform the probationary employee of the reasonable standards at the time of his engagement, not any time later; else, the latter shall be considered a regular employee.

An employee’s failure to meet sales or work quota falls under the concept of gross inefficiency, which in turn is analogous to gross neglect of duty that is a just cause for dismissal under LC 282. However, in order to be considered a valid productivity standard and thereby validate a dismissal, management’s prerogative of fixing the quota must be exercised in good faith.

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The ruling in NYK International v. NLRC was overturned in Alba v. Yupangco. To hold corporate officers solidarily liable, there must be a showing of malice or bad faith. In this case, there is no showing that the officers acted in bad faith or with malice in effecting the termination of Aliling. Hence, the corporate officers cannot be held solidarily liable with the company.

e. Allied Free Workers Union v. Compania Maritima (1967)Summary: AFWU filed a complaint against Maritima for ULP when the latter failed to answer the proposal of AFWU to bargain collectively. Maritima argues that it cannot entertain the proposal because no employment relationship exists. The Court of Industrial Relations dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. AFWU appeals to the SC. SC found in favor of Maritima. AFWU was an independent contractor. No employment relationship exists following Viana v. Al Lagadan.

Doctrine: The duty to bargain collectively arises only between the employer and its employees. Where neither party is an employer nor an employee of the other, no such duty would exist. Where there is no duty to bargain collectively, the refusal to bargain violates no right. There being no duty to bargain collectively, to hold certification elections would be pointless.

An independent contractor is not an employee. AFWU is the employer of the laborers. There is no impediment for a union to be an employer.

B. Employee1. LC 212 (f) – EMPLOYEE

a. Includes any person in the employ of an employer b. Shall NOT be limited to the employees of a particular employer

(1) UNLESS LC expressly states c. Includes any individual whose work has ceased

(1) As a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute, or (2) Because of any ULP if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular

employment

2. Cases:a. Producers Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC (1998)

Summary: The Bank was placed under conservatorship by the BSP. The Union sought the implementation of the CBA provisions which the conservatorship denied. The Union, after a 6-month deadlock, filed a UP case against the Bank for CBA violation. The LA dismissed the complaint. The NLRC reversed. SC agreed with NLRC.

Doctrine: A conservator cannot rescind a valid and existing contract. The CBA is the law between the parties. Thus, the conservator had no authority to disallow the implementation of the CBA, especially considering that the ideals of social justice and protection of labor are guaranteed not only by the LC, but more importantly by the fundamental law of the land.

The retirement of an employee does not, in itself, affect his employment status especially when it involves all rights and benefits due to him, since these must be protected as though there had been no interruption of service.

While the individual complainants are the real party in interest, in issues involving monetary claims and benefits, the union is not denied its right to sue on behalf of its members ( Esso Philippines, Inc. v. Malayang Mangagawa sa Esso)

b. PAL v. PALEA (1967)Summary: Employees in this case sought the execution of the Court of Industrial Relation’s decision awarding them Christmas bonuses, accumulated sock leave, and transportation allowances, after a finding that their dismissal was illegal. PAL argues that these were not specifically mentioned in the CIR Resolution. The SC debunked PAL’s arguments.

Doctrine: The court ordered the reinstatement and the payment of backwages during the period of their lay-off – thus referring necessarily to a period of time preceding their

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reinstatement – and the retention of their seniority and or other rights and privileges. These rights and privileges clearly refer to the time of their dismissal.

Reinstatement with back wages for the lay-off period, coupled with the seniority or other rights and privileges attached to the status of the employees when they were dismissed. Thus, the CIR treated said employees as if they had not been absent from work and had been uninterruptedly working during the lay-off period

C. Labor Orga nization1. LC 212 (g) – LABOR ORGANIZATION

a. Any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part or purpose of:(1) Collective bargaining or (2) Dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment

2. Rule 1 (ccc), Book V, Workers Assoc. Implementing Rules a. “Workers’ Association” refers to an association of workers organized for the mutual aid and

protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining

3. Case: Airline Pilots Association v. CIR (1977)Summary: Due to strained relations in an on-going labor dispute, the Union amended its constitution and by-laws which retains union-membership of members forced to resign or retire. The CIR held that this amendment was illegal because it includes non-employees as members. The SC disagreed and held that the amendment was proper.

Doctrine: The Court cannot subscribe to the restrictive interpretation made by the lower court of the term “labor organization.” Sec. 2(e), RA 875 defines it as “any union or association of employees which exits, in whole or in part, for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.” There is no condition in said law that limits the organization to employees of a particular employer.

Sec. 2(h), RA 875 (Industrial Peace Act) likewise defines “representative” as including a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom he represents.

Likewise, under Sec. 2(j), a labor dispute can exist regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

It is perfectly within the powers and prerogatives of a labor organization, through its duly elected officers, to authorize a segment of that organization to bargain collectively with a particular employer, particularly where those constituting the segment share a common and distinguishable interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union members, on matters that directly affect the terms and conditions of their particular employment.

D. Legitimate Labor Organization 1. LC 212 (h) – LLO

a. Any LO registered with DOLEb. Includes any branch or local thereof

2. Case: Cebu Seamen’s Assoc. Inc. v. Calleja (1992)Summary: The case sprung from an intra-union dispute where two sets of officers claim to be entitled to the release of union dues. In consonance with the CBA between Aboitiz and SAPI, union dues have been remitted to the union officers. A group headed by Gabayoyo claims that they are the new set of officers of the union and requested that the union dues be remitted to them. However, another group headed by Nacua filed a complaint against the CSAI as represented by Gabayoyo. Gabayoyo argues that they are the lawful officers and that the CSAI and SAPI are one and the same union. The Arbiter found in favor of Nacua, the SAPI being the legitimate labor organization.

Doctrine: The CSAI was organized under the SEC as a non-stock corporation. The very same group registered the organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations as SAPI. Thus, it is the registration with the BLR and not the SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with rights and

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privileges granted under the LC. As far as the rights under the LC are concerned, CSAI is not the same as SAPI. Hence, it is SAPI, as the legitimate labor organization that is entitled to the release and custody of union fees.

Expulsion from the corporation does not affect membership with the labor union.

E. Company Union 1. LC 121 (i) – COMPANY UNION

a. Any LO whose formation, function, or administration has been assisted by any act defined as ULP

2. LC 248 (d) – Unfair Labor Practices of Employera. To initiate, dominate, assist, or otherwise interfere with formation or administration of any

LO(1) Including the giving of financial or other support to it/s organizers or supporters

F. Labor Dispute 1. LC 212 (l) – LABOR DISPUTE

a. Any controversy or matter concerning:(1) Terms or conditions of employment, or (2) Association or representation of persons negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or

arranging, terms and conditions of employment b. REGARDLESS of whether disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee

2. Cases:a. Feati University v. Bautista (1966)

Summary: This is a consolidation of 3 cases which stemmed from the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club wherein the latter staged a strike and the matter was certified by the President to the CIR. One of the issues raised by the University is its claim that there is no labor dispute in this case thus the Presidential certification was unwarranted. The SC held that there is a labor dispute and that the certification was proper.

Doctrine: The term “labor dispute” is defined in RA 875. It includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee.

The test of whether a controversy comes within the definition of “labor dispute” depends on whether the controversy involves or concerns “terms, tenure, or condition of employment” or “representation.”

b. Nestle Philippines Inc. v. NLRC (1991)Summary: Employees of Nestle filed complaints for illegal dismissal, appeals to the NLRC are still pending. Meanwhile, Nestle filed a case before the RTC for recovery of possession of motor vehicles which were subjects of car loan policies extended by the company to said employees for failure to settle their loan or return the motors. The NLRC granted injunction. This injunction was assailed by Nestle before the SC. SC finds in favor of Nestle. Nestle’s demand for payment of the amortizations or the return of the car is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relationship, not employer-employee.

Doctrine: The power of the NLRC to issue writs of injunction is found in LC 218 which can only be exercised in labor disputes. Labor dispute is defined in LC 212(1): “includes any controversy or matters concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee.”

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The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under these contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.

c. SMC v. Bersamira (1990)Summary: SMC entered into contracts for merchandising services with independent contractors. The Union now contends that it represents workers from these contractors who are performing services that are neither casual nor seasonal, thus demanding their regularization. For failure of SMC to act favorably, a notice of strike was issued and parties went into conciliation. Upon failure of conciliation, the strike started. SMC then filed a suit for Injunction and Damages before the RTC. RTC granted injunction. The Union assails the decision in this petition which the SC granted. What the Union seeks is the regularization of contractual workers which dwells on the working relationship between the employees vis-aJ -vis SMC.

Doctrine: The existence of a labor dispute is not negative by the fact that parties do not stand in proximate relation of employer and employee, per LC 212(1). There is a labor dispute provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a change or arrangement thereof.

Terms, tenure, and conditions of employment and the arrangement of those terms are present in this case which brings the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Likewise, the matter of representation for purposes of negotiating conditions of employment are involved. Whether or not these claims are valid are irrelevant as these issues call for the application of labor laws.

As the case is linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs with labor tribunals. The claim of SMC for damages cannot vest jurisdiction to the regular courts. The damage claim is interwoven with a labor dispute and would have to be ventilated before the admin agency established for these disputes. To grant otherwise would be to sanction split jurisdiction.

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WORKERS’ RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATIONI. BASIS OF RIGHT

A. Case: SS Ventures International v. SS Ventures Labor Union (2008)Summary: SS Ventures Labor Union filed with the DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election. SS Ventures then filed a petition to cancel the union’s certificate of registration invoking the grounds in LC 239(a) on alleged instances of fraud and misrepresentation committed by the Union in securing its registration. The DOLE cancelled the registration of the Union which was reversed by the BLR and this reversal was affirmed by the CA. SC denied the Company’s petition.

Doctrine: The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII, Sec. 8, Constitution and such right, according to Art. III, Sec. 8 shall not be abridged. The procedure for acquiring or losing union membership and the determination of who are qualified or disqualified to be members are matters internal to the union and flow from its right to self-organization.

Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered an LLO endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to such organization. While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be cancelled or the union is divested of the status of LLO. These grounds are in LC 239. One of the grounds is fraud. There must be showing that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the application for registration and supporting documents, The nature of the fraud must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.

B. Constitution 1. 1987 Constitution:

a. Art. III, Sec. 8 - The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

2. Art. XIII, Sec. 3 a. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,

and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.




3. 1935 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 6 - The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

4. 1973 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 7 - The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

C. Statutory 1. LC 243 – Coverage and Employees’ Right to Self-Organization

a. All persons employed in:

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(1) Commercial, industrial, and agricultural enterprises, and(2) Religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions(3) Whether operating for profit or not

b. SHALL have the right to:(1) Self-organization(2) Form, join, or assist LOs of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining

c. The following may form LOs for their mutual aid and protection:(1) Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers(2) Self-employed people (3) Rural workers (4) Those without any definite employers

NOTES:- Unlike in the Industrial Peace Act, employees of non-profit firms are allowed to unionize- All persons may organize for a lawful purpose but not all persons may form labor unions

2. LC 244 – Rights of Employees in the Public Servicea. Employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have

the right to:(1) Organize, and(2) Bargain collectively with their respective employers

b. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to:(1) Form associations not contrary to law

NOTES:- Government employees may organize, may unionize, and may negotiate collective negotiation

agreements (CNAs) or MOAs with employers These have to be registered with CSC and DOLE Governing law is EO 180

Applicable to all government employees EXCEPT:

(a) AFP(b) Police officers and policemen(c) Firemen(d) Jail guards

But for government corporations organized under the Corporation Code and registered with the SEC, governing law is LC, not EO 180

High level employees doing policy-making, managerial, or confidential duties are not eligible to join the RAF organization

- Right of government employees not as expansive They cannot negotiate terms and conditions fixed by law Only those not otherwise fixed by law are negotiable

3. LC 245 – Ineligibility of Managerial Employees to Join Any Labor Organization; Right of Supervisory Employeesa. Managerial employees:

(1) Not eligible to join, assist, or form any labor organization b. Supervisory employees:

(1) Not eligible to for membership in the CBU of the RAFE(2) But may join, assist, or form a separate CBU and/or LLOs of their own

c. RAF Union and the Supervisor’s union within the same establishment may join the same federation or national union

4. LC 245-A – Effect of Inclusion as Members of Employees Outside the Bargaining Unita. Inclusion as union members of employees outside the bargaining unit SHALL NOT be a

ground for the cancellation of registration of the union b. Said employees are automatically removed from the list of members

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5. LC 269 – Prohibition Against Aliens; Exceptionsa. All aliens, natural or juridical, as well as foreign organizations:

(1) Are strictly prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in all forms of trade union activities (a) WITHOUT prejudice to normal contacts between Philippine labor unions and

recognized labor centersb. Aliens working in the country may exercise the right of self-organization and join or assist

LOs of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining, PROVIDED:(1) They have valid permits issued by DOLE(2) They are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino

workers

6. Cases:a. UST Faculty Union v. Bitonio (1999)

Summary: Private respondents filed the instant petition before the Med-Arb seeking injunctive relief and the nullification of the union elections where petitioners were elected as the new set of union officers. They contend, in the main, that the election was conducted in violation of the union’s CBL. The Med-Arb and the BLR both held that the election was null and void for non-compliance with the union’s CBL. In fact, non-union members were allowed to vote in said election which cannot be countenanced. The petitioners went to the SC on petition for certiorari. The SC affirmed the BLR decision and upheld the nullification of the elections for violation of the union’s CBL.

Doctrine: Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code. Employees have the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining or their mutual aid and protection (Art. 244, LC). Whether employed for a definite period or not, any employee shall be considered as such, beginning on his first day of service, for purposes of membership in labor union (Art. 277(c)).

ILO Convention No. 87, Art. 3 provides that workers’ organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitution and rules and to elect their representatives in full freedom, free from any interference from public authorities. A union’s CBL is the fundamental law that governs the relationship between and among the union members. This is where the rights, duties, and obligations, powers, functions, and authority of the officers as well as the members are defined. It should be upheld, as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals, or public policy.

b. National Union of Bank Employees v. Minister of Labor (1981)Summary: The Union filed a petition to be directly certified as collective bargaining agent of the RAFE of the Company. The Company failed to submit the required payroll and list of RAFE. The Med-Arb then issued an order holding a certification election. The Company moved to suspend the proceedings in light of the pending petition for cancellation of Union’s petition for allegedly engaging in prohibited and unlawful activities (illegal strikes). By agreement, DOLE assumed jurisdiction and ordered investigation. The DOLE ordered the holding of certification elections and sustained the stand of the Company to exclude certain employees citing 18 CBAs of different banks. The BLR sustained the order. Issue in this case is whether a certification election should be held despite the pendency of the petition to cancel the Union’s certificate of registration. The SC ruled in the affirmative.

Doctrine: The pendency of the petition for cancellation for the registration certificate of the Union is not a bar to the holding of a certification election, because there is no order directing such cancellation. The petition for cancellation of registration of certificate has not yet been finally resolved (Dairy Queen Products Company of the Phils., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations).

The court takes a liberal approach in matters of certification election (AFWU – PSSLU v. Noriel). Certification election is crucial to the institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance to the principle of majority rule as one of the basic concepts of a democratic policy (National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna).

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Under Sec. 8, Rule II, Book V, of LC, cancellation of registration certificates MAY be imposed on the following instances: (1) Violation of LC 234, 238, 239; (2) Failure to comply with LC 237; (3) Violation of LC 242; (4) Any violation of this Book. But this must be read in relation to LC 273. From these, the cancellation of registration certificate is not the only resultant penalty in case of LC violation. The penalty must be commensurate with the gravity of the offense.

D. International Instruments1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights

a. Preamble Whereas, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas, disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas, it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas, it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas, the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

Whereas, Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Whereas, a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore, the General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

b. Art. 2 (1) Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without

distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

2. ICESCRa. Art. 2

(1) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.

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(2) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

(3) Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.

b. Art. 8(a) - The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:(1) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject

only to the rules of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;

3. ICCPRa. Art. 22

(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

(2) No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.

(3) Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention.

4. ILO Convention No, 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention of 1984a. Art. 2 – Freedom of Association

(1) Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation.

b. Art. 11 – Protection of the Right to Organize(1) Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in

force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organise.

c. Case: Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confesor (2004)Summary: During the renegotiation of the CBA, the Union and the Bank failed to decide on the economic provisions of the suggested amendments to the CBA. As such, the Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. The Bank then filed a ULP case against the Union for its alleged failure to bargain in good faith and its violation of the no-strike-no-lockout policy during negotiations. The Labor Sec. assumed jurisdiction and directed the parties to execute a CBA according to the decision and dismissed the ULP case against the Union. The Union filed a certiorari petition before the SC. SC dismissed the petition. There is no evidence to support the allegation that the Bank committed unlawful interference and surface bargaining. The Union did not commit blue-sky bargaining.

Doctrine: ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize and Art. 2 of the ILO Convention No. 98 pertaining to the Right to Organize and

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Collective Bargaining are incorporated in LC 243 on Coverage and Employees’ Right to Self-Organization and LC 248 and LC 249 on ULP.

Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts or interference by each other or each other’s agents or members in their establishment, functioning or administration. (Art. 2(1), ILO Con. No. 98)

In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers’ organizations under the domination of employers or employers’ organizations or to support workers’ organizations by financial or other means, with the object of placing such organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations within the meaning of this Article. (Art. 2(2), ILO Con. No. 98)

The ILO Conventions were ratified on Dec. 29, 1953. However, even as early as 1935 Constitution, the State had already expressly bestowed protection to labor as part of the general provisions.

II. WORKERS QUALIFICATIONA. LC 277(c) – Miscellaneous Provisions

1. Any employee, whether employed for a definite period or not, shall, beginning on his first day of service, be considered an employee for purposes of membership in any labor union

B. Case: UST Faculty Union v. Bitonio (1999)Summary: Private respondents filed the instant petition before the Med-Arb seeking injunctive relief and the nullification of the union elections where petitioners were elected as the new set of union officers. They contend, in the main, that the election was conducted in violation of the union’s CBL. The Med-Arb and the BLR both held that the election was null and void for non-compliance with the union’s CBL. In fact, non-union members were allowed to vote in said election which cannot be countenanced. The petitioners went to the SC on petition for certiorari. The SC affirmed the BLR decision and upheld the nullification of the elections for violation of the union’s CBL.

Summary: To become a union member, an employee must not only signify the intent to become one, but also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is usually embodied in the union’s CBL. An employee who becomes a union member acquires the rights and the concomitant obligations that go with this new status and becomes bound by the union’s rules and regulations.

Union election v. Certification Election - Union election is held pursuant to the union’s CBL, and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. Compare this with certification election which is the process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in a bargaining unit. In certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled to vote in the election. But a member of the collective bargaining unit cannot vote in a union election if he is not a member of said union.

III. EXTENT AND SCOPE OF RIGHTA. LC 243 - Coverage and Employees’ Right to Self-Organization

1. All persons employed in:a. Commercial, industrial, and agricultural enterprises, andb. Religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutionsc. Whether operating for profit or not

2. SHALL have the right to:a. Self-organizationb. Form, join, or assist LOs of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining

3. The following may form LOs for their mutual aid and protection:a. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workersb. Self-employed people c. Rural workers

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d. Those without any definite employers

B. LC 246 – Non-Abridgment of Right to Self-Organization1. It shall be unlawful for any person to restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly interfere

with employees and workers in their exercise of the right to self-organization 2. Such right shall include the right to:

a. Form, join, or assist LOs for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, and

b. Engage in lawful concerted activities for:(1) The same purpose, or (2) Their mutual aid and protection

3. Subject to the provisions of LC 264 (now Art. 278, LC)

NOTES:- The organization does not have to be a union, it may be an association; it does not have to be for

collective bargaining, it may be for mutual help; in any case, right is protected- Any act intended to weaken or defeat the right is regarded by law as ULP

C. Cases:1. Heritage Hotel, etc. v. Pinagising, etc. (2009)

Summary: HHE Union filed a petition for certification election which the Company opposed on the ground of misrepresentation. Company alleged that the HHE Union omitted to disclose that it was affiliated with NUWHRAIN. The Med-Arb granted the petition. The Labor Sec. denied the appeal and MR of the Company. On appeal to the CA, the CA issued injunction. However, a new union, PIGLAS, was formed and petitioned for certification election. HHE Union dissolved. The Company opposed alleging that the PIGLAS union is just the same as the HHE Union formed to circumvent the CA injunction. The DOLE-NCR denied the petition to cancel PIGLAS’s registration. BLR sustained. CA dismissed the Company’s petition, hence, the latter went to SC. SC affirmed by ruling that PIGLAS did not commit fraud or misrepresentation.

Doctrine: The charge that the LO committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious charge and deserves close scrutiny because once such charge is proved, the labor union acquires none of the rights accorded to registered organizations.

The fact that some of PIGLAS’s members were also members of the old union is not a ground for cancelling the new union’s registration. The right of any person to join an organization also includes the right to leave that organization and join another one.

2. Reyes v. Trajano (1992)Summary: In a certification election between two competing LOs, TUEU-OLALIA and TUPAS, 141 of the 248 votes were challenged and excluded in the counting. These 141 votes pertained to votes from the Iglesia Ni Kristo employees who voted for NO UNION (compared to the 95 votes of OLALIA union). The INK employees filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it was not fair. TUEU-OLALIA opposed and contended that the INKs have no personality to protest because they are not members of either unions because their religion prohibits them from joining or forming LOs. Med-Arb dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the BLR. SC granted the petition. INKs, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense of the term, do have the right to self-organization. When they voted “NO UNION,” they were simply exercising said right in its negative aspect.

Doctrine: The right to self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which of 2 or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities. Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from LO, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate, or assist. Just as no one should be denied the right to exercise a right granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right.

If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and no union may properly be

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certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer.

The plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote in a certification election to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of LO or not.

3. Pan-American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan-American Employees Assoc. (1960)Summary: The Union maintained a strike against Pan-Am. The President certified the case to the CIR because of national interest. The Union is of the position that it will not resume work unless its officers were likewise included in the return-to-work order. Pan-Am refused contending that the Union officers can cause damage to the operations. The CIR ordered Pan-Am to accept the Union officers pending resolution on the merits of the legality of the strike. Pan-Am appealed to the SC. Fears of Pan-Am are purely speculative.

Doctrine: Pan-Am betrayed an inexcusable lack of confidence in the responsibility of union officials and ultimately in the validity of the collective bargaining process itself. Implicit in the concept of collective bargaining towards industrial peace is the confidence that must be displayed by management in the sense of responsibility of union officials to assure that the two indispensable elements in industry and production could work together. The moment management displays unwarranted distrust in the union officials, then integrity of the collective bargaining process is called into question.

There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of their interests vis-aJ -vis their employers. Their freedom to form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own leaders to speak on their own behalf and to bargain for them. The result of the petitioner’s demand is to call into question the undeniable right of workers to choose their leaders, who must be treated as such with all respect to which they are legitimately entitled.

4. Union of Supervisors (RB) NATU v. Sec. of Labor (1981)Summary: The Union filed a ULP case against the Bank for the latter’s order of suspension and subsequent dismissal against an employee, Mr. Luna, who was a Branch Manager and then Administrator of the Provident Fund. The case stemmed from a heated argument in one of the PF Board meeting where Luna expressed disagreement to the proposal of the bank to invest the fund in money market operations. The Bank argues that its dismissal was based on just grounds due to Luna’s grave misconduct and insubordination. NLRC found that the termination was with just cause. On appeal, the Labor Sec. affirmed the clearance for termination. SC found that the dismissal was unjustified. The communication was privileged and protected.

Doctrine: Luna’s remarks at the meeting are privileged in nature as a valid exercise of his constitutional freedom of expression. His remarks was intended to protect employees’ interests from what he honestly believed was a risky venture on the part of the management on the PF which was created by virtue of a CBA.

His protests could even be treated as union activity by the Industrial Peace Act, which assures employees’ right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist LOs of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection (Sec. 3, RA 875). Luna’s membership in the Board was by viture of his being president of the Union of Supervisors.

His actuations should therefore be considered as a legitimate exercise of the employee’s right to self-organization and as an activity for their mutual aid and protection.

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IV. WORKERS WITH RIGHTS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION

A. Provisions:1. Sec. 8, Art. III, Constitution 2. Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution

B. ALL EMPLOYEES1. LC 243 - Coverage and Employees’ Right to Self-Organization

a. All persons employed in:(1) Commercial, industrial, and agricultural enterprises, and(2) Religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions(3) Whether operating for profit or not

b. SHALL have the right to:(1) Self-organization(2) Form, join, or assist LOs of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining

c. The following may form LOs for their mutual aid and protection:(1) Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers(2) Self-employed people (3) Rural workers (4) Those without any definite employers

3. LC 212(f) - EMPLOYEEa. Includes any person in the employ of an employer b. Shall NOT be limited to the employees of a particular employer

(1) UNLESS LC expressly states c. Includes any individual whose work has ceased

(1) As a result of or in connection with any current labor dispute, or (2) Because of any ULP if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular

employment

4. Non-Profit Organization a. FEU-Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation Inc. v. Trajano (1987)

Summary: The Union filed a Petition for Certification Election. The Company opposed on the ground that a similar petition involving the same issues and the same parties is pending resolution before the SC. The Union admitted that it filed a similar petition previously but was denied because the company is a non-stock non-profit medical institution as such, under LC 244, its employees cannot organize a union. However, with the amendment of LC 244 removing such restriction, the Union files this second petition. The Med-Arb and DOLE Dir granted the petition. The Company raises the issue to the SC. SC denies the petition.

Doctrine: Under the amendment of BO 70 to Art 244, there is no doubt that RAFE of non-profit medical institutions are now permitted to form, organize, or join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective bargaining. Since the Union has complied with all the requisites for calling of certification election, it was incumbent upon the DOLE Dir to conduct said election to ascertain the bargaining representative of the employees,

C. MEMBERS – RELIGIOUS GROUP1. Victoriano v. Elizalde Workers Union (1974)

Summary: Victoriano filed a complaint for injunction against the Company and Union from dismissing him. The threat of dismissal came from a letter of the Company, upon notification by the Union, that by virtue of the closed-shop provision and union security clause in the CBA, the resignation of Victoriano in the Union because of his religious convictions is a ground for his separation considering that membership in the union is made a condition on continued employment. The trial court granted injunction. The Union appealed directly to the SC on pure questions of law. The Union also assails RA 3350 which amends RA 875 by excluding members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any LO from the operation of an agreed closed-shop provision in the CBA. The SC upheld the validity of the law.

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Doctrine: What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the right to form or join associations. It is the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership at any time.

The legal protection granted to the right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop. But RA 3350 provided an exception. RA 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sect which prohibit affiliation with LOs. This merely means that in spite of the closed-shop agreement, members of such sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the union. It still leaves to the members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not, with labor unions.

The primary effects of the exemption is the protection of these employees against the aggregate force of the CBA, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment.

2. Kapatiran sa Meat and Canning Division v. Calleja (1988)Summary: TUPAS was the sole EBR of the Company with a 3-year CBA. Within the freedom period prior to expiration of the CBA, TUPAS waged a strike which was enjoined by the court upon injunction application by the Company. Then, a NEW ULO filed a petition for certification election with the BLR alleging that it has the majority of the RAFE. TUPAS moved to dismiss on the ground that most of the members were INC sect members who refused to affiliate with any labor union. The Med-Arb and the BLR granted the petition. TUPAS went to SC on Rule 65. SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Doctrine: In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, the SC upheld the right of the members of the INC sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs. But this does not bar the members of a sect from forming their own union. Recognition of the tenets of the sect should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization.

The fact that TUPAS was able to renegotiate a new CBA within the freedom period, does not foreclose the right of the rival union to file a timely petition for certification election.

D. GOVERNMENT CORPORATION EMPLOYEES1. LC 244 – Rights of Employees in the Public Service

a. Employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to:(1) Organize, and(2) Bargain collectively with their respective employers

b. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to:(1) Form associations not contrary to law

E. SUPERVISORS 1. LC 245 - Ineligibility of Managerial Employees to Join Any Labor Organization; Right of Supervisory

Employeesa. Managerial employees:

(1) Not eligible to join, assist, or form any labor organization b. Supervisory employees:

(1) Not eligible to for membership in the CBU of the RAFE(2) But may join, assist, or form a separate CBU and/or LLOs of their own

c. RAF Union and the Supervisor’s union within the same establishment may join the same federation or national union

2. LC 212 (m) – Definitionsa. Managerial employee is one who is vested with the power or prerogatives to:

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(1) Lay down and execute management policies, and/or(2) Hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign, or discipline employees

b. Supervisory employees(1) Those who, in the interest of employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions(2) The exercise of such authority:

(a) Must not be merely routinary or clerical in nature(b) But requires use of independent judgment

c. Rank-and-File employees(1) All employees not falling within any of the above definitions

NOTES:- Managerials and Supervisors are differentiated in LC 212(m)

The power to decide and do managerial functions belong to the managers The power to recommend those managerial acts belong to the supervisors NOTE: It is the power of the position, not the title, that is determinative

- To make a supervisor, the power to recommend must not be merely routinary or clerical The recommendation is:

(1) Discretionary or judgmental(2) Independent (3) Effective (meaning given particular weight)

If the power to recommend is absent, then not a supervisor - Managerial functions relate to policy decisions or personnel decisions - Confidential employees do not constitute a distinct category for purposes of organizational right

By itself, it cannot be the basis of exclusion from union coverage because confidentiality may attach to any employee

Philips Industrial Development v. NLRC – Court sustained the exclusion of confidential RAFE from the RAF Union Doctrine of necessary implication was applied where court extended prohibition against

managers to confidential employees Same ruling in Metrolab Industries v. Roldan-Confesor, et al, were the SC excluded the

confidential employees not only from union membership but from the RAF bargaining unit itself

3. Test:a. Paper Industries Corporation v. Laguesma (2000)

Summary: PBSTSEU instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP. Med-Arb issued an order granting the petition and the holding of a certification election with 4 choices (3 unions, 1 no union choice). This was upheld by the Labor Sec. During pre-election conference, PICOP objected to the inclusion of certain employees. PICOP maintains that Section Heads and Supervisors, who have been designated as Section and Unit managers, were converted to managerial employees under the decentralization and reorganization program. The Med-Arb excluded these employees. The Labor USec reversed and ordered their inclusion. PICOP appeals. SC dismissed the petition. A close observation reveals that the employees are supervisors as they do not lay down company policies. Their powers are merely recommendatory and does not exercise independent judgment as required by law.

Doctrine: As held in United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Leguesma, Court held that managerial employees are ranked as:(1) Top and Middle Managers – authority to devise, implement, and control strategic and

operational policies; these are the managers per se (2) First Line Managers – to ensure that such policies are carried out by the RAFE; these are

the supervisors

The mere fact that an employee is designated as “manager” does not ipso facto make him one. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, Here, the employees do not exercise independent judgment in their job.

b. Samson v. NLRC (2000)Summary: Samson filed an illegal dismissal case against SPC. Samson was allegedly terminate due to his conduct during a Sales and Marketing Christmas gathering. Samson allegedly uttered insulting and offensive words to the management, acts inimical to the interests of the

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company. LA found that the dismissal was illegal as the conduct is not so serious as to warrant dismissal. NLRC reversed and found just cause for dismissal, holding that in terminating employment of managerial employees, employer is allowed wider latitude. Hence, this appeal by Samson. The SC held that the conduct was not of such gravity as to warrant dismissal. Samson is NOT a managerial employee (he does not possess the 3rd

element below)

Doctrine: As a ground for dismissal, “trust and confidence” is restricted to managerial employees. To be a managerial employee:(1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are

employed or of a department or subdivision thereof(2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein(3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their

suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.

It is the nature of the functions, not the nomenclature or title given, which determines whether he has a RAF, Supervisory, or Managerial Status

c. Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union – PTGWO (2003)Summary: The Union filed its petition for certification election before the Med-Arb. The Company opposed on the main ground that the list of the union members submitted was defective and flawed as it included signatures of supervisors, resigned, terminated, and AWOL employees. The Med-Arb ordered the holding of the certification election and held that the inclusion or exclusion of employees should be held in a pre-election conference. On appeal, the DOLE ordered the removal from the Union’s roster supervisory employees. The CA affirmed the DOLE resolution. SC dismissed the Company’s petition.

Doctrine: The statutory authority for the exclusion of supervisory employees in a RAF union, and vice-versa, is LC 245. However, the LC does not provide what would be the effect if a RAF union counts supervisory employees among its members, or vice-versa.

The Company failed to present substantial evidence that the assailed employees are actually occupying supervisory positions. There is nothing mentioned about the supervisors’ respective duties, powers, and prerogatives that would show that they can effectively recommend managerial relations which require the use of independent judgment.

After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be the subject to collateral attack. There must be a separate petition for cancellation. The grounds for cancellation are provided in LC 239. The inclusion of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud under Sec. (a) and (c) of LC 239.

4. Righta. United Pepsi Cola v. Laguesma (1998)

Summary: The Union is a union of supervisory employees. It filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers of Pepsi. However, this was denied by the Med-Arb and the Labor Sec. on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and ineligible for union membership under LC 245. The SC Division sustained the denial but the Union filed an MR and the case was referred to the SC en banc. The SC ruled that the route managers are managerial employees based on 2 previous cases and the findings of the Labor Sec. Route managers are responsible for the success of the company’s main line of business through management of their respective sales teams. They do more than recommend.

Doctrine: Managers can be classified into 3 groups:1. First-Line Managers – responsible for the work of others; direct operating employees

only and do not supervise other managers; these are the supervisors2. Middle Managers – direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of

operating employees; they direct the activities that implement their organization’s

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policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of subordinates

3. Top Managers – responsible for overall management; establishes operating policies and guides the organization’s interactions with its environment

What separates them from RAF is that they act in the interest of the employer. Managerials may be said to fall into two distinct groups:1. Managers per se – the Top and Middle group who have the authority to devise,

implement, and control strategic and operational policies2. Supervisors – the First-Line group whose task is to simply ensure that policies are

carried out by the RAF

Under LC 212(m), supervisory employees merely recommend.

From the ConCom deliberations, it can be seen that the ConCom intended the absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees, and security guards, to be constitutionally guaranteed under Art. III, Sec. 8. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top and mid-level managers. As to them, the right of self-organization may be regulated and even abridged.

The ban under LC 245 against managerial employees forming a union does not infringe on the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Sec. 8 because such right is subject to the condition that its exercise should not be contrary to law. There is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees, as said in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. NLRC. The Union may not be assured of the loyalty of these managers in view of the evident conflict of interests.

b. FilOil Refinery Corp. v. FilOil Supervisory and Confidential Employees Assoc. (1972)Summary: FEWA is the union of the company’s RAFE. Both entered into a CBA which excluded from its coverage the supervisory and confidential employees. These employees then organized to form FSCEA. FSCEA then filed with the CIR a petition for certification as EBA of all supervisory and confidential employees. CIR denied a motion to dismiss filed by the Company and the case went to investigation. The CIR excluded executive personnel handling personnel matters from the bargaining unit and included, against the objections of the company, confidential employees. Eventually, the CIR declared FSCEA as the EBA of the company. The Company argues before the SC that supervisors form part of management and are not considered as employees entitled to bargain collectively. SC discarded the company’s contentions.

Doctrine: The Industrial Peace Act explicitly provides that employees, including supervisors, shall have the right to self-organization. Supervisors may even form separate organizations of their own. Thus, supervisors are entitled to engage in union activities and any discrimination against them constitutes ULP. The arguments of the company ignores the dual status of supervisors as a representative of management AND as an employee.

c. Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc. (2007)Summary: During the CBA renegotiation, the Union insisted that representatives from Alyansa ng ma Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down and observe the meetings. The Company refused because the members of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit and is not a registered LO. Following this impasse, the union waged a strike. The Company then filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal. The LA, NLRC, and CA all held that the strike was illegal for non-compliance with legal requirements.

Doctrine: For a strike to be valid, the following MANDATORY procedural requisites in LC 263 must be followed:(1) A notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before intended date, or 15 days in case of

ULP(2) Strike vote approved by majority of total union membership in the bargaining unit

concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose(3) Notice given to DOLE of the results of the voting at least 7 days before intended strike

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The law makes a distinction between union members and union officers:(1) Union member – for merely participating in the strike, he cannot be terminated. It is only

when he commits illegal acts during a strike may he be declared terminated from employment

(2) Union officer – for knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, he may be terminated

F. ALIENS1. LC 269 - Prohibition Against Aliens; Exceptions

a. All aliens, natural or juridical, as well as foreign organizations:(1) Are strictly prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in all forms of trade union

activities (a) WITHOUT prejudice to normal contacts between Philippine labor unions and

recognized labor centersb. Aliens working in the country may exercise the right of self-organization and join or assist

LOs of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining, PROVIDED:(1) They have valid permits issued by DOLE(2) They are nationals of a country which grants the same or similar rights to Filipino

workers

G. SECURITY GUARDS

NOTES:- Security guards used to be barred from joining RAF LO. But this disqualification has been removed.

They may join LO of the RAF or that of Supervisors, depending on their rank.

1. Manila Electric Co. v. Sec. of Labor (1991) Summary: STEAM-PCWF, an LO of staff and technical employees of MERALCO filed a petition for certification election seeking to represent regular employees of MERALCO who are: (1) non-managerials with Pay Grades VII and above, (2) employees excluded from the current CBA between MERALCO and MEWA. The Med-Arb granted the petition and held that since the employees are excluded from the current CBA, they have the right to form a union of their own, except those performing managerial functions. FLAMES filed a similar petition seeking to represent employees with Pay Grades VII to XIV, since there is no other supervisory union at MERALCO. The Labor Sec affirmed the Med-Arb and called for the certification election. MERALCO questions, among others, the inclusion of security guards in the representation by the unions arguing that RA 6715 disqualifies supervisory employees and security guards from membership in an LO of a RAF. SC dismissed MERALCO’s contentions and held that FSCEA and FLAMES are representing supervisory employees only and are the options in the certification election. Security guards have the right to organize.

Doctrine: RA 6715 was passed which reorganized the employee-ranks by including a 3 rd group, or the supervisory employees, and laying down the distinction between supervisors and managers in LC 212 (m), depending on whether the employee has the power to lay down and execute management policies (managers) or merely to recommend them (supervisors).

EO No. 111 eliminated LC 245 on the disqualification of security guards. What was retained was the disqualification of managerial employees. With this elimination, security guards are thus free to join a RAF organization. The 2nd sentence of LC 245 disqualifies supervisory employees from membership in LO of the RAFE. It does NOT include security guards in the disqualification. The IRR of RA 6715, insofar as they disqualify security guards, is null and void. As such, security guards may thus join a RAF or Supervisory union, depending on their rank, in recognition of their constitutional right to self-organization. However, the SC expressed its concerns on the possible effects in case security personnel go on strike.

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WORKERS WITH NO RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

I. MANAGERIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES A. LC 212(m) - Definitions

1. Managerial employee is one who is vested with the power or prerogatives to:a. Lay down and execute management policies, and/orb. Hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign, or discipline employees

2. Supervisory employeesa. Those who, in the interest of employer, effectively recommend such managerial actionsb. The exercise of such authority:

(1) Must not be merely routinary or clerical in nature(2) But requires use of independent judgment

3. Rank-and-File employeesa. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions

B. LC 82 – Coverage; 2nd paragraph:1. Managerial Employees refer to:

a. Those whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof, and

b. Other officers or members of the managerial staff

C. Test:1. Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Asia Brewery (2010)

Summary: In the CBA between Asia Brewery and its EBA, BLMA-INDEPENDENT, the confidential and executive secretaries as well as the Purchasing and Quality Control Staff, among others, are excluded from the bargaining unit. Since the Union stopped deducting union dues of these employees, the latter objected. BLMA took their side and submitted the matter to the grievance machinery. Upon failure to amicably settle, the dispute was submitted to the NCMB where the parties agreed to submit to VA. The Vol-Arb sustained BLMA’s contention and held that the positions of the subject employees belong to the RAFE. The CA reversed the Vol-Arb. The Union appeals. SC agrees with the Union. A perusal of the job descriptions of these 2 sets of employees reveal that their assigned duties and responsibilities involve routine activities of recording and monitoring and little to no access of confidential information.

Doctrine: Although LC 245 limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any LO to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records. Confidentials are thus excluded from the RAF BU. The rationale is similar to the inhibition for managerials. Having access to confidential information, confidential employees may also become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either party to a CBA.

Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The 2 criteria are cumulative and must be met. Here, there is no showing that the employees assisted or acted in a confidential capacity to managerial employees and obtained confidential information relation to labor relations policies. As such, they cannot be excluded from the bargaining unit.

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2. Standard Chartered, etc. v. Standard Chartered Bank (2008)Summary: Following a deadlock in CBA renegotiations, the Union filed a Notice of Strike which prompted the Labor Sec. to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. DOLE directed the parties to execute a CBA and dismissed the ULP charges. The CBA provisions in dispute are the exclusion of certain employees from the appropriate bargaining unit and the adjustment of remuneration for employees serving in an acting capacity for one month. The CA dismissed the Union’s petition. Hence, this recourse to the SC. SC denied the petition. DOLE properly disqualified the bank cashiers, assistant cashiers, personnel of the Telex Dep and HR staff.

Doctrine: While LC 245 limits the ineligibility to join, form, and assist any LO to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.

3. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors v. Laguesma (1997)Summary: The Union filed a Petition for Direct Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of 3 SMC plants. Med-Arb ordered the election. SMC appealed, imputing error on the part of the Med-Arb in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature. The Labor Sec. agreed with the contention of SMC and excluded said employees from the election. SC ruled that Supervisory Employees 3 and 4 do not fall within the term “confidential employees” who may be prohibited from joining a union. The employees’ access to labor relations information are as technical and internal business operations data.

Doctrine: Confidential employees are those who: (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met of an employee is to be considered a confidential employee. The confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

The broad rationale behind the confidential employee rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving potential conflict of interests. Same rationale as for managerial employees.

An important element of the confidential employee rule is the employee’s need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the employees’ necessary access to confidential labor relations information.

EXCEPTION: However, when the accessed to labor relations information is merely incidental to his duties and knowledge thereof is not necessary in the performance of such duties, said access does not render the employee a confidential employee

4. Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc. v. Laguesma (2000)Summary: The Union filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory employees of the Bank. This was opposed by the Bank in a Motion to Dismiss contending, among others, that the members of the Union were in fact managerial or confidential employees. This was denied by the Med-Arb and the Labor USec. Hence, this petition. The SC held that the employees are not managerial employees. It also held that the employees are not confidential employees because the Bank failed to specify which employees perform tasks connected to labor relations.

Doctrine: Managerial employees are defined in LC 212(m). Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies, specifically in the field of labor relations.

LC 245 does not directly prohibit confidentials from engaging in union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of managerials equally applies to confidentials. The confidential employee rule justifies exclusion of confidentials because in the

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normal course of their duties they become aware of management policies relating to labor relations. However, when the employee does not have access to confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.

5. Samson v. NLRC (2000)Summary: Samson filed an illegal dismissal case against SPC. Samson was allegedly terminate due to his conduct during a Sales and Marketing Christmas gathering. Samson allegedly uttered insulting and offensive words to the management, acts inimical to the interests of the company. LA found that the dismissal was illegal as the conduct is not so serious as to warrant dismissal. NLRC reversed and found just cause for dismissal, holding that in terminating employment of managerial employees, employer is allowed wider latitude. Hence, this appeal by Samson. The SC held that the conduct was not of such gravity as to warrant dismissal. Samson is NOT a managerial employee (he does not possess the 3rd element below)

Doctrine: As a ground for dismissal, “trust and confidence” is restricted to managerial employees. To be a managerial employee:

(1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof

(2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein(3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their

suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.

It is the nature of the functions, not the nomenclature or title given, which determines whether he has a RAF, Supervisory, or Managerial Status

6. Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines v. Laguesma (2000)Summary: PBSTSEU instituted a Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory and technical staff employees of PICOP. Med-Arb issued an order granting the petition and the holding of a certification election with 4 choices (3 unions, 1 no union choice). This was upheld by the Labor Sec. During pre-election conference, PICOP objected to the inclusion of certain employees. PICOP maintains that Section Heads and Supervisors, who have been designated as Section and Unit managers, were converted to managerial employees under the decentralization and reorganization program. The Med-Arb excluded these employees. The Labor USec reversed and ordered their inclusion. PICOP appeals. SC dismissed the petition. A close observation reveals that the employees are supervisors as they do not lay down company policies. Their powers are merely recommendatory and does not exercise independent judgment as required by law.

Doctrine: As held in United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Leguesma, Court held that managerial employees are ranked as:

(1) Top and Middle Managers – authority to devise, implement, and control strategic and operational policies; these are the managers per se

(2) First Line Managers – to ensure that such policies are carried out by the RAFE; these are the supervisors

The mere fact that an employee is designated as “manager” does not ipso facto make him one. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, Here, the employees do not exercise independent judgment in their job.

D. Prohibition and Rationale:

1. Metrolab Industries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor (1996)Summary: The Labor Sec. issued an Assumption Order after the Union filed its Notice to Strike following the deadlock in CBA negotiations. The Labor Sec. ordered resolved the dispute and ordered the parties to execute a new CBA. Union filed MR. During pendency, Metrolab laid off 94 RAFE. Labor Sec. declared the dismissals illegal. Metrolab filed MR. During its pendency, the parties executed a new CBA. Metrolab then laid off 73 employees. The Labor Sec. denied its MR

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and also declared the dismissals illegal. The Labor Sec. also included Executive Secretaries as part of the bargaining unit of RAFE. The SC agreed that the lay-offs were illegal. SC held that the Labor Sec. erred in including the executive secretaries in the BU of RAFE. Confidential employees cannot be considered RAF because of the nature of their employment.

Doctrine: Jurisprudence extended the prohibition under LC 245 to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.

Confidential employees may become the source of undue advantage as they may act as spies of either party in CBA negotiations. In the CBA process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees are themselves union members. If confidential employees could unionize in order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motive rather than the interest of the employers.

2. Pepsi Cola Products v. Secretary of Labor (1999)Summary: The first case stems from the petition filed by PEPSI to Set Aside, Cancel, and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union contending that the members of the Union were managers and that a supervisor’s union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include RAF unions of the same company. The Labor Sec denied the petition. In the second case, PEPSI attacks the Med-Arb’s order calling for the certification election of the Union. Even if the issue in the first case is rendered moot following the withdrawal of the union from the federation, the SC held that it was improper for a supervisor’s union to join a federation of RAF unions. In the 2nd case, the SC excluded the confidential employees from membership in a supervisors’ union.

Doctrine: The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a RAF union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of RAFE. The intent of the law is clear especially where the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.

Unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act in the interest of the employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they are duty bound to protect.

II. WORKER/MEMBER OF COOPERATIVE

A. Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Calleja (1989)Summary: BWLU filed a petition for direct certification as the EBA of BENECO. This was opposed by BELU, contending that it was certified as the EBA of the workers pursuant to an order issued by the Med-Arb. On the other hand, BENECO filed its motion to dismiss arguing that it is a non-profit electric cooperative and that the employees sought to be represented by BWLU are not eligible to form, join, or assist LOs because they are members and joint-owners of the cooperative. The Med-Arb granted the election but limited it among RAFE who are non-members of the cooperative, totaling 37 employees. Upon the conduct of the election, BENECO raised the issue before the SC and argued that the election was null and void because it allowed employees not eligible to form and join unions were allowed to vote. The SC granted the petition

Doctrine: The right to collective bargaining is NOT available to an employee of a cooperative who at the same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect to employees who are neither members nor co-owners of the cooperative, they are entitled to exercise the rights of self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiation.

As members of the cooperative, they are co-owners thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his-owners. The fact that member-employees do not participate in the actual management of the cooperative does not make

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them eligible to form, assist, or join LOs for the purpose of collective bargaining. It is the fact of ownership, and not the involvement in the management thereof, which disqualifies a member from joining any LO within the cooperative.

B. Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor (1991)Summary: The Union wrote to CENECO a proposal to negotiate a new CBA. CENECO rejected the offer on the ground that members of a cooperative are not allowed to form or join a union. The Union members issued a Resolution to the effect of withdrawing their membership with the cooperative. CENECO did not recognize the withdrawal as this was against a standing Board Resolution of the cooperative. Due to the company’s refusal to renegotiate, the Union filed a petition for direct certification. CENECO moved to dismiss. The Med-Arb and the DOLE granted the petition. Hence, this petition. The SC disagrees. Nowhere in the Batangas I Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young is it stated that member employees are prohibited from withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join a union. The AI and BL of CENECO even provide procedures for membership withdrawal.

Doctrine: The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. The resignation of the member employees is an expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the member a right to vote during the annual meeting becomes too trivial and insubstantial vis-aJ -vis the primordial and more important constitutional right of an employee to join a union of his choice.

NOTE: The direct certification as originally allowed under LC 257 has been discontinued as a method of selecting the EBA of the workers by virtue of EO 111 which became effective on March 4, 1987

C. Republic v. Asia Pro Cooperative (2007)Summary: Owners-members of the cooperative requested Stanfilco – an entity with which the cooperative has an existing Service Contract – to register with the SSS as self-employed and to remit their contributions. SSS replied by saying that the cooperative is a manpower contractor, an employer of its owners-members, and to register itself as an employer. Then, the SSS filed with the SSC a petition against the cooperative and Stanfilco to compel them to register as an employer and to report the owners-members as covered employees. The SSC denied the MTDs filed by the parties. The cooperative filed certiorari before the CA. The latter granted the petition and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition before the SC. The SC held that the owners-members are employees of the cooperative and that SSC has jurisdiction over the petition.

Doctrine: The four-fold test was met in this case:a. First, it is expressly provided in the Service Contract that it is the Coop which has the

exclusive discretion in the selection and engagement of the owners-members.b. Second, the weekly stipends or the so-called shares in the service surplus given by the

Coop to its owners-members were in reality wages. c. Third, it is the Coop which has the power to investigate, discipline, and remove the

owners-membersd. Fourth, it is the Coop which has the sole control over the manner and means of

performing the services under the Service Contract with Stanfilco as well as the means and methods of work

The declaration in Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City Inc v. Ferrer-Calleja was made in the context of whether an employee who is an owner-member of a cooperative can exercise the right to bargain collectively with the employer who is the cooperative wherein he is the owner-member. Obviously, an owner-member cannot bargain collectively with the cooperative because the owner cannot bargain with himself. In the instant case, there is no issue regarding the right to collective bargaining. The question here is the existence of the employment relationship.

The question on the existence of an EER for the PURPOSE of determining the coverage of the SSS is explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC and falls within the jurisdiction of the SSC which is primarily charged with the duty of settling disputes arising under the SS Law (see LC 217(a)(6)).

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III. NON-EMPLOYEES

Republic Planters Bank v. Laguesma (1996)Summary: Petitioner filed a petition for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular employees outside the bargaining unit of the Bank. This proposed unit consist of employees considered as contractual employees by the Bank. This was opposed by the Bank. The Med-Arb dismissed the petition on the ground that there is already a certified EBA representing the appropriate bargaining unit within the bank. On appeal, Labor USec reversed the Med-Arb decision. However, on reconsideration, the Labor USec declared some employees as regular and ordered their inclusion in the existing EBA. Both parties appealed. SC held that the petition was premature because it was filed outside the 60-day period immediately before the expiration of the standing CBA.

Doctrine: In Trade Unions of the Philippines v. Laguesma, the SC held that when LLO has been certified as the SEBA, it means that it shall remain as such during the existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other LLOs, and no petition questioning the majority status of said incumbent SEBA or any certification election be conducted outside the 60-day freedom period immediately before expiry of the CBA.

In Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Drilon, the SC held that if the union members are NOT employees, no right to organize for purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as bargaining agent can be recognized. Since the persons involved are not employees of the company, SC held that they are not entitled to the constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining.

In La Suerte Sugar and Cigarette Factory v. Dir. Of Labor Relations, the SC held that it is important in the determination of who shall be included in the proposed bargaining unit because, it is the sine qua non, the fundamental and essential condition that a bargaining unit be composed of employees. Failure to establish this juridical relationship between the union members and the employer affects the legality of the union itself. It means the ineligibility of the union members to present a petition for certification election as well as to vote therein.

PARTY PROTECTEDMactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz (1972)Summary: Cebu Shipyard is employing laborers and employees belonging to two rival unions (MWU and ALU). The Company entered into a CBA with ALU which provided for, among others, a profit-sharing scheme where 10% of the net profits are to be delivered to ALU for distribution to ALL employees of the company. The members of MWU did not get their shares for the 2nd installment because they did not like to go to the ALU office to collect their shares. Upon warning of ALU, the Company did not deliver the amounts intended for MWU to ALU. Instead, the Company delivered the money to the Labor Administrator. MWU sues for the recovery of the amount. The CFI ordered the Company to remit the money to ALU for distribution to MWU employees. ALU intervened and interposed an appeal. SC affirmed the decision of the CFI.

Doctrine: The terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to court for redress. Nor does it suffice as a defense that the claim is made on behalf of non-members of the EBA. It is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA extend to the laborers and employees in the CBU, including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining unit.

In United Restauror’s Employees and Labor Union v. Torres , the SC held that the right to be the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate CBU is vested in the labor union designated and selected for such purpose by the majority of the employees in the unit concerned.

The labor union that gets the majority vote as EBA does not act for its members alone. It represents all the employees in such a bargaining unit.

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NON-ABRIDGMENT OF RIGHTI. PROVISIONS

A. LC 246 - Non-Abridgment of Right to Self-Organization1. It shall be unlawful for any person to restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly interfere

with employees and workers in their exercise of the right to self-organization 2. Such right shall include the right to:

a. Form, join, or assist LOs for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, and

b. Engage in lawful concerted activities for:(1) The same purpose, or (2) Their mutual aid and protection

3. Subject to the provisions of LC 264 (now Art. 278, LC)

A. LC 248(a) – Unfair Labor Practices of the Employer1. To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization

B. LC 249 (a) – Unfair Labor Practices of Labor Organizations – It shall be ULP for a LO, its officers, agents, or representatives:1. To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organizaion

a. However, LO shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition and retention of membership

C. LC 288 – Penalties1. Any violation of the provisions of the LC declared to be unlawful or penal in nature:

a. Shall be punished with:(1) Fine of not less than P1,000 nor more than P10,000, or(2) Imprisonment of not less than 3 months nor more than 3 years, or(3) Both at the discretion of the court

b. EXCEPT:(1) As otherwise provided in the LC, or (2) The acts complained of hinges on a question if interpretation or implementation of

ambiguous provisions of an existing CBA

2. In addition to such penalty, any alien found guilty:a. Shall be summarily deported upon completion of service of sentence

3. Any criminal offense punished in the LC shall be under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal or City Courts and the CFIa. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding

D. LC 290 – Offenses1. Offenses penalized under the LC and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto

a. Shall PRESCRIBE in 3 years2. All ULP arising from Book V:

a. Shall be filed with the appropriate agency within 1 year from accrual of such ULP(1) OTHERWISE, forever barred

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LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, IN GENERALI. POLICY

A. LC 211(b) - Declaration of Policy1. To promote free trade unionism as

a. An instrument for the enhancement of democracy, and b. Promotion of social justice and development

A. LC 211(c) - Declaration of Policy1. To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong united labor movement

B. LC 211(d) - Declaration of Policy1. To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union

members and as employees

II. LABOR ORGANIZATION – UNIONS

A. Definitions1. LC 212(g) - LABOR ORGANIZATION

a. Any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part or purpose of:(1) Collective bargaining or (2) Dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment

2. LC 212(h) - – LLOa. Any LO registered with DOLEb. Includes any branch or local thereof

3. Casesa. UST v. NLRC (1990)

Summary: UST terminated the employment of 16 union officers and directors of the Faculty Union on the ground that in publishing or causing to be published libelous and defamatory attacks against the Father Rector , they have committed grave misconduct and serious disrespect as well as conduct unbecoming of a faculty member. The Union then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Sec issued a return-to-work order and ordered the NLRC to proceed with dispatch. The NLRC ordered the readmission of the faculty members. UST appeals and argues that its grant of substantially equivalent academic assignments instead of actual reinstatement is just and valid. SC held that what the UST did was not proper. NLRC should not have ordered the alternative remedy of payroll reinstatement.

Doctrine: The NLRC’s duty was to implement the RTW Order of the Labor Sec. Since the Sec.’s order specifically provided that the dismissed faculty be readmitted under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the dispute, the NLRC should have directed actual reinstatement. It erred in granting the alternative remedy of payroll reinstatement.

The grant of substantially equivalent academic assignments cannot be sustained. It cannot be considered as reinstatement under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. LC 263(g) contemplates actual reinstatement or return of actual teaching loads to the dismissed faculty members. LC 263(g) was devised to maintain status quo.

b. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (1977)Summary: Due to strained relations in an on-going labor dispute, the Union amended its constitution and by-laws which retains union-membership of members forced to resign or retire. The amendment was in anticipation of the fact that they may be forced to reign or retire because of union activities. The CIR held that this amendment was illegal because it includes non-employees as members. The SC disagreed and held that the amendment was proper.

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Doctrine: The Court cannot subscribe to the restrictive interpretation made by the lower court of the term “labor organization.” Sec. 2(e), RA 875 defines it as “any union or association of employees which exits, in whole or in part, for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.” There is no condition in said law that limits the organization to employees of a particular employer.

Sec. 2(h), RA 875 (Industrial Peace Act) likewise defines “representative” as including a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom he represents.

Likewise, under Sec. 2(j), a labor dispute can exist regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

It is perfectly within the powers and prerogatives of a labor organization, through its duly elected officers, to authorize a segment of that organization to bargain collectively with a particular employer, particularly where those constituting the segment share a common and distinguishable interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union members, on matters that directly affect the terms and conditions of their particular employment.

c. Sta. Lucia East v. Secretary of Labor (2009)Summary: Following the denial of the Med-Arb of a previous petition for certification due to the inappropriateness of the bargaining unit, the CLUP-SLECC re-registered to cover only RAFE on SLECC as SLECCWA and filed a petition for certification. This was opposed by the Company in an MTD on the ground that it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as the EBA. Ultimately, a CBA was entered into between the Company and SMSLEC. The Med-Arb dismissed SLECCWA’s petition on the ground of contract bar rule. Labor Sec. and CA reversed and held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA could not bar SLECCWA’s petition. SC found no error and held that the voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was valid.

Doctrine: LC 212(g) defines LO as any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of the employment. Any application LO shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to LLOs upon issuance of certificate of registration.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with the equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

In determining the appropriate CBU, the following factors are fundamental:(1) Globe doctrine – the will of the employees(2) Substantial Mutual Interests Rule – affinity and unity of the employees’ interests, such as

substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions

(3) Prior collective bargaining history; But this alone is neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit

(4) Similarity of employment status

Employees of two corporations CANNOT be treated as a single bargaining unit even if the businesses of the two corporations are related.

d. Dunlop v. Secretary of Labor (1998)Summary: The Union filed a Petition for Certification before the DOLE. The Company filed its MTD arguing that the union is comprised of supervisory and RAFE employees and thus cannot form a single bargaining unit. The Union replied by alleging that it is made up of monthly paid supervisory employees and other personnel who cannot be classified as RAFE. The Med-Arb and the Labor Sec. granted the petition. Hence, this recourse to the SC. SC granted the petition. A perusal of the duties of the members reveal that 27 are supervisory, 6 are managerial, 1 confidential, and 26 RAFE. As such, this is an inappropriate bargaining unit.

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The positions cannot be considered as supervisory for they do not carry the authority to act in the interest of the employer or to recommend managerial actions.

Doctrine: A bargaining unit is a legal collectivity for collective bargaining purposes whose members have substantially mutual bargaining interests in terms and conditions of employment as will assure to all employees their collective bargaining rights. A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.

Due to the irreconcilability of their interests, the SC held in Toyota Motor Phils v. Toyota Motors Phils. Corp. Labor Union, that an organization composed of both RAFE and supervisory employees is NO LO at all. Not being one, it cannot possess any of the rights of a LLO, including the right to file a petition for certification election.

e. San Miguel Corp., etc. v. San Miguel, etc. (2007) – Trade Union Center cannot create a local or chapter thru chartering Summary: Respondent is a registered chapter of PDMP which filed 3 separate petitions for certification election to represent the 3 division of SMC. This was dismissed for fragmenting a single bargaining unit. Petitioner, as the incumbent EBA of SMC, filed with DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent’s registration and its dropping from the rolls of LLOs on the ground, among others, that PDMP is not a LLO but a trade union center (TUC) and cannot create a local or chapter. DOLE-NCR revoked the certification but on the basis of non-compliance with the 20% membership requirement. This was reversed by the BLR and the CA. The petitioner raises the issue of the respondent’s personality as LLO before the SC. SC granted the petition. It held that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter. Thus, respondent must comply with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.

Doctrine: LLO is defined as any LO duly registered with the DOLE, and includes any branch or local thereof.

LC mandates strict compliance with the requirements on registration because LLO is entitled to specific rights under the LC and are involved in activities directly affecting matters of public interest. The acquisition of these rights depends on whether the LO has attained the status of an LLO.

Procedure for registration of a local or chapter of LO is provided in Book V IRR.(1) The procedure enunciates a two-fold procedure:

(a) First is the affiliation of an in independent union with a federation or national union or industry union

(b) Second, the direct creation of a local or chapter through chartering (2) The local or chapter may be directly created by a federation or a national union by

submitting two copies of the following:(a) Charter certificate issued by the federation or national union (b) Names of officers, addresses, principal office of local/chapter (c) Its constitutions and by-laws

(3) The issuance of the certificate of registration is not the operative act that vests legal personality upon a local or chapter. Such is acquired from the filing of the complete documentary requirements

The procedure in LC 234 is different because it applies to the registration of an INDEPENDENT labor organization, association, or group of unions or workers. This is different from the creation of a branch, local, or chapter. An applicant for registration of an independent union is mandated to comply with the 20% membership requirement which is not required for a local, branch, or chapter.

A TUC is any group of registered national unions or federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social and employment policies, standards, programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE (DO No. 9)

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While a “national union” or “federation” is an LO with at least 10 locals or chapters or affiliates, each of which must be a duly certified or recognized collective bargaining agent; a TUC is composed of a group of registered national unions or federations. DO No. 9 mentions two LOs which is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering – duly registered federation or a national union. DO No. 9 defines “chartered local” as an LO in the private sector operating at enterprise level that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate issued by a duly registered federation or national union.

Under the pertinent status and applicable IRs, the power granted to LOs to directly create a chapter or local through chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a TUC is without authority to charter directly.

B. Legitimate Labor Organization 1. LC 212(h) - – LLO

a. Any LO registered with DOLEb. Includes any branch or local thereof

1. Cases:a. Sta. Lucia East v. Secretary of Labor (2009)

Summary: Summary: Following the denial of the Med-Arb of a previous petition for certification due to the inappropriateness of the bargaining unit, the CLUP-SLECC re-registered to cover only RAFE on SLECC as SLECCWA and filed a petition for certification. This was opposed by the Company in an MTD on the ground that it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as the EBA. Ultimately, a CBA was entered into between the Company and SMSLEC. The Med-Arb dismissed SLECCWA’s petition on the ground of contract bar rule. Labor Sec. and CA reversed and held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA could not bar SLECCWA’s petition. SC found no error and held that the voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was valid.

Doctrine: SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SECC was a LLO at the time of SLECC’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC even if it covered an inappropriate bargaining unit. SMSLEC and SLECC cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-SECC and its Affiliates represented an appropriate bargaining unit.

The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, UNLESS such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud under the circumstances in LC 239 (a) to (c).

It having been issued a certificate of registration, it should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate registration and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition proceedings.

b. Progressive Dev. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor (1992)Summary: KILUSAN-TUCP filed with the DOLE a petition for certification election among the RAFE pf the petitioner company alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter was issued charter certificate. The Company moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of non-compliance with registration procedure. The Company is of the view that such local or chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of submission of a duly subscribed constitution and by-laws (which was lacking in this case) and due recognition or acknowledgment accorded by the BLR. The BLR and Labor USec held that there was substantial compliance by the mere issuance of the charter certificate. The SC held that the failure of the Secretary of the KILUSAN to certify the required documents UNDER OATH was fatal to the acquisition of legitimate status. Decision of the BLR and USec reversed.

Doctrine: While LC 257 directs the automatic conduct of certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification election be filed by an LLO. An LO acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR under LC 234. Moreover, the IRR requires that the application:(1) Be signed by at least 20% of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit

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(2) Accompanied by a sworn statement that there is no certified bargaining agent or, where there is one, the application is filed during the last 60 days of the CBA

But where an unregistered union becomes a branch, local, or chapter of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements are no longer required. Sec. 3(a) of Rule II, Book V IRR refers to a local or chapter of a federation which did not undergo registration while Sec. 3(b) refers to an independently registered union which affiliated with a federation.

Implicit in the foregoing differentiation is the fact that a local or chapter need not be independently registered. Thus, the following requirements that are otherwise required for union registration are omitted:(1) 20% member certification (2) Submission of officers’ addresses, LO’s principal address, minutes of organizational

meetings, list of workers who participated (3) Submission of minutes of the adoption or ratification of the CBL and list of participating

members

The intent of the law in imposing a lesser requirement in the case of a branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with the federation or national union in order to increase the local union’s bargaining powers.

A local or chapter becomes an LLO only upon submission of the following to the BLR:(1) Charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national

union; and (2) CBL, a statement on the set of officers, books of accounts, all of which MUST BE certified

under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, as attested to by its president. This is protection against fraud.

c. Coastal Subic v. DOLE (2006)Summary: The RAF Union (RAFU) and Supervisory Union (SU) both filed separate petitions for certification election. The RAFU insists that it is an LLO having been issued a charter certificate by ALU, and the SU by the APSOTEU. The Company opposed alleging that the unions were not LLOs. The Med-Arb dismissed the petitions on the ground that the ALU and APSOTEU were one and the same federation; thus, the unions were affiliated with only one federation. The Labor Sec. and the CA reversed the Med-Arb decision. Hence, this petition. SC held that APSOTEU was an LLO and can validly issue a charter to SU. It also held that since there is no cancellation of title, the federations and their chapters are separate and distinct entities.

Doctrine: LC 235 provides that applications for registration shall be acted upon by the Bureau, meaning the BLR and/or the Labor Relations Division of the DOLE-RO. The new implementing rules explicitly provide that applications for registration of LOs shall be filed either with the RO or with the BLR. Even with the amendments, the rules did not divest the RO and the BLR of their jurisdiction over applications for registration by LOs. The amendments to the IRs merely specified that when the application was filed with the RO, the application would be acted upon by the BLR.

Once a union attains the status of an LLO, it continues as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked. It cannot be collaterally attacked. In the absence of any independent action for cancellation of registration against either federations and unless and until their registrations are cancelled, each continues to possess a separate legal personality.

A chartered local union acquires legal personality through the charter certificate issued by a duly registered federation or national union, and reported to the RO in accordance with the IRRs. A local union does NOT owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does NOT divest it of its own personality. Local unions are the principals, while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent.

A word of caution, to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the RAF or where the supervisors’ labor union would represent conflicting interests, a local supervisors’

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union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of unions of RAFE where that federation actively participates in the union activity within the company. Hence, the prohibition under the law extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of RAFEs.

d. Cebu Seaman’s Association, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja (1992)Summary: The case sprung from an intra-union dispute where two sets of officers claim to be entitled to the release of union dues. In consonance with the CBA between Aboitiz and SAPI, union dues have been remitted to the union officers. A group headed by Gabayoyo claims that they are the new set of officers of the union and requested that the union dues be remitted to them. However, another group headed by Nacua filed a complaint against the CSAI as represented by Gabayoyo. Gabayoyo argues that they are the lawful officers and that the CSAI and SAPI are one and the same union. The Arbiter found in favor of Nacua, the SAPI being the legitimate labor organization.

Doctrine: The CSAI was organized under the SEC as a non-stock corporation. The very same group registered the organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations as SAPI. Thus, it is the registration with the BLR and not the SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with rights and privileges granted under the LC. As far as the rights under the LC are concerned, CSAI is not the same as SAPI. Hence, it is SAPI, as the legitimate labor organization that is entitled to the release and custody of union fees.

Expulsion from the corporation does not affect membership with the labor union.

C. Company Union

1. LC 212(i) – COMPANY UNIONa. Any LO whose formation, function, or administration has been assisted by any act defined as

ULP by this Code

2. LC 248(d) – Unfair Labor Practices of Employersa. To initiate, dominate, assist, or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of

any LO, (1) Including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters

3. Cases:a. Oceanic Air Products v. Court of Industrial Relations (1963)

Summary: The Complainant Union (CU) filed a ULP case against the company and the Respondent Union (RU). CU alleged that after it sent repeated written demands to the management to improve working conditions, the management dismissed union members and officials and that other CU officers disaffiliated and transferred to RU. The CIR held that the dismissal was due to union activities and that the RU is a company dominated and assisted union. Hence, this appeal. The SC agreed with the CIR. The company is guilty of union-busting when it dismissed the union members and officials after their demands. The RU was also company-dominated.

Doctrine: Facts show that the employees joined the RU because the treasurer and manager of the company forced them to sign a blank form, presumably an application in RU, under pain of dismissal. It also appears that officials of the company were present during the election of the RU officials. No RU member or official was dismissed during the company’s alleged retrenchment policy after years of loss.

b. Kapisanan v. Hamilton Distillery (1962)Summary: The Worker’s Union (WU) and the company entered into a CBA with a closed-shop provision. As such, the company issued notices to its employees requiring them to join the WU or else be dismissed. When the company learned that NAFLU was being organized, its manager called its president and ordered the dissolution of NAFLU. When the NAFLU President refused he was dismissed. NAFLU members who had not joined WU were likewise dismissed. As such, they instituted a complaint for ULP before the CIR. The CIR dismissed the complaint and a subsequent petition for certification. Hence, this appeal. SC held that the WU

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was a company union and that the employees cannot be dismissed on the strength of the closed-shop provision.

Doctrine: The following circumstances show that WU was a company dominated, or at least, a union patronized by the company: (1) the registration date and the date of the notice to join WU both bear the same dates; (2) its President was the company’s time-keeper exercising supervision and could yield pressure over others; (3) its treasurer was the brother of the time-keeper; (4) the CBA was in a private document. These circumstances show that they were in a hurry to bargain with the WU in order to beat NAFLU.

In the absence of manifest intent to the contrary, closed-shop provisions in a CBA apply only to persons TO BE hired or to employees who are NOT YET members of any LO and that said provisions of the agreement are NOT applicable to those ALREADY in the service at the time of its execution.

D. Workers Association

1. For mutual aid and protection or for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining 2. Implementing Rules, Book V, Rule 1(ccc)

a. “Workers’ Association” refers to an association of workers organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining

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UNION FUNCTION AND RATIONALEI. See RA 9481

II. Cases:A. United Seaman’s Union of the Philippines v. Davao Shipowners Association (1967)

Summary: USUP presented a set of demands to the Company on employment benefits. The Company called USUP’s attention to an existing CBA with another union, the Association. USUP filed a notice of strike. The DOLE-RO called the parties and agreement was executed between them respecting the status quo and the current CBA. As such, USUP filed a petition for certification election. However, the Company terminated the employment of around 64 employees who were members of USUP. USUP also filed a ULP case against the company predicated upon the dismissal of the USUP members. USUP also went on strike. The CIR dismissed the ULP complaint and declared the strike illegal. Hence, this petition. SC agrees. The strike was illegal and unjustified.

Doctrine: An LO is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of promoting the interests of labor without the unnecessary labor disputes. That is why it is given personality and recognition in concluding collective bargaining agreements. But if it is made use of as a subterfuge, or as a means to subvert valid commitments, it defeats its own purpose, for it tends to undermine the harmonious relations between management and labor. The situation does not deserve any approving sanction from the Court.

B. Guijarno v. Court of Industrial Relations (1973)Summary: ULP cases were filed against the Company and the Union by employees who were dismissed by virtue of a closed-shop provision. These laborers became employees of the company even before the execution of the CBA containing the closed-shop provision. The CIR found their dismissal justified under said provision. The SC reversed and held that a closed-shop provision should not be given retro-active effect. It applies only to persons who are to be hired and who are not yet members of any labor organization.

Doctrine: The union is the means of assuring that such fundamental objectives would be achieved. It is the instrumentality through which an individual laborer who is helpless as against a powerful employer may, through concerted effort and activity, achieve the goal of economic well-being. Workers unorganized are weak; workers organized are strong. Necessarily then, they join labor unions.

It is well-settled that a closed-shop provision in a CBA is NOT to be given a retroactive effect so as to preclude its being applied to employees already in the service. In order that an employer may be deemed bund, under a CBA, to dismiss employees for non-union membership, the stipulation to this effect must be so clear and unequivocal as to leave no room for doubt thereon (Confederated Sons of Labor v. Anakan Lumber Co.)

Closed-shop agreement authorized under Sec. 4(a)(4) of the Industrial Peace Act should apply to persons to be hired or to employees who are NOT yet members of any LO. To hold otherwise, the employees in a company who are members of a minority union may be compelled to disaffiliate from their union and join the majority or contracting union. This would render nugatory the right of all employees to self-organization and to form, join, or assist LOs of their own choosing ( Freeman Shirt Manuf. Co. Inc. v. CIR)

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UNION REGISTRATION PROCEDUREI. Union Registration and Procedure

A. Union registration and the statutory guarantee of freedom of association 1. Philippine Assoc. of Free Labor Unions v. Sec. of Labor (1969)

Summary: The Registrar of Labor Organizations cancelled the certificate of registration of SSSEA for its violation of Sec. 23, RA 875 (non-submission of documentary requirements like financial statements and non-subversive affidavits of officers). The Union filed an MR but before this could be resolved, it filed certiorari and prohibition before the SC arguing, among others, that Sec. 23 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association. SC upheld the constitutionality of the law.

Doctrine: The registration prescribed by the law is NOT a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without said registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by LOs, associations, or unions and the possession of the rights and privileges granted by law to LLOs.

Registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, and imposters. These affect public interest which should be protected. The obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for non-cancellation of registration, is a reasonable regulation.

The existence of the union would not be affected by said cancellation, although its juridical personality and its statutory rights and privileges – as distinguished from those conferred by the Constitution – would be suspended thereby.

B. Requirements and Rationale 1. LC 234 – Requirements of Registration

a. A federation, national union or industry, or trade union center, or an independent union:(1) Shall acquire legal personality AND shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted

by law to LLOs(2) UPON issuance of certificate of registration (3) Based on the following requirements:

(a) P50 registration fee(b) The:

(i) Names of its officers(ii) Addresses of officers (iii) Principal address of the LO(iv) Minutes of the organizational meetings(v) List of workers who participated in such meetings

(c) If the applicant is an independent union, names of its members comprising at least 20% of all employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate

(d) If applicant has been in existence for 1 or more years, copies of its annual financial reports

(e) The following: (i) 4 copies of CBL of applicant union (ii) Minutes of its adoption or ratification (iii) List of members who participated in it

NOTES: This incorporates the amendments of RA 9481 which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 The 20% initial membership is required only if the applicant is an independent union, not a

chapter created by a federation

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2. LC 234-A – Chartering and Creation of a Local Chaptera. Duly registered federation or national union MAY directly create a local chapter

(1) By issuing a charter certificate indicating the establishment of the local chapterb. Chapter shall acquire legal personality:

(1) ONLY for purposes of filing a petition for certification election (2) FROM the date it was issued a charter certificate

c. The chapter shall be entitled to all other rights and privileges of an LLO(1) ONLY upon the submission of the following documents

(a) Charter certificate (b) Names of the chapter’s officers(c) Officers; addresses (d) Principal office of the chapter (e) Chapter’s CBL

(i) Where the chapter’s CBL are the same as that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly

(2) The additional supporting requirements shall be:(a) Certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer of the chapter, and(b) Attested by its president

NOTES:- Every employee, even temporary ones is eligible for union membership beginning on the employee’s

first day of work Except as provided for in Art. 254 The existence of an EER is essential for the exercise of the right of self-organization for purposes

of collective bargaining. Absence of such relationship affects the legality of the union itself (La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory, 1983)

- On LLOs Not every LO is a union (e.g. a worker’s association is not a union) Not every union is an LLO

It is the fact of being registered with the DOLE that makes an LO legitimate in the sense that it is clothed with legal personality to deal with the employer in representation of its members

Once it is an LLO, it acquires the rights enumerated in LC 242 Non-registration does not make the LO “illegitimate” or illegal

Freedom of association is constitutionally guaranteed Effect of non-registration: It does not possess the rights in LC 242

- Creation and Registration Methods: The IRR, as modified by DO No. 40-03, segregates the requirements for:

(1) Independent union, (2) Local/Chapter (3) Federation or national union (4) Workers’ association

Union at the enterprise level may be created either by:(1) Independent registration

Obtained by the union organizers in an enterprise through their own action Has a legal personality of its own; an independent union But it may later affiliate with a federation, national or industry union; it becomes an

affiliate (2) Chartering

Takes place when a duly registered federation or national union issues a charter to a union in an enterprise and registers the charter with the RO or the BLR

The local/chapter/chartered local has no legal personality of its own as long as it has not availed itself of independent registration

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- On Registration Requirements for Independent Labor Union The application for registration of an independent union shall be accompanied by the following

documents:(1) Name of applicant labor union, its principal address, the name of its officers and their

respective addresses, approximate number of employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, with a statement that it is not reported as a chartered local of any federation or national union

(2) Minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of employees who participated in the said meetings

(3) Name of all its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit (4) Annual financial reports if the applicant has been in existence for one or more years, unless

it has not collected any amount from the members, in which case a statement to this effect shall be included in the application

(5) Applicant’s CBL, minutes of its adoption and ratification, and list of members who participated in it. The list of ratifying members shall be dispensed with where the CBL was ratified or adopted during the organizational meeting. In such a case, the factual circumstances of the ratification shall be recorded in the minutes of the organizational meetings.

20% of CBU At least 20% of the CBU should sign up as members of the applicant union This requirement does not apply to a chapter created by a federation or national union

- Union’s CBL A union’s CBL governs the relationship between and among its members The union’s CBL cannot disregard the laws!

3. LC 237 – Additional Requirements for Federations or National Unionsa. If the applicant for registration is a federation or national union, it shall submit:

(1) In addition to the requirements of LC 236(2) The following documents:

(a) Proof of affiliation of at least 10 locals or chapters(i) Each of which must be a duly recognized collective bargaining agent in the

establishment or industry in which it operates (ii) Supporting the registration of such applicant federation or national union

(b) Names and addresses of companies where locals or chapters operate (i) AND the list of all members in each company involved

NOTES:- Federation of National Union

The distinction between the two has vanished considering that they have the same requirements Originally though, a grouping of local unions was called a national union while a

grouping of national unions was called a federation Registration requirements are the same with that of an independent union, except:

(1) The 20% requirement is not needed(2) It should have as affiliates at least 10 local unions, each of which is a bargaining agent in

its enterprise

- Chartered Local The local union created in an enterprise is called a chartered local or local or chapter To facilitate its growth, their creation must be simple and easy:

(1) No more 20% requirement (2) Can adopt its own CBL (3) Submission of books of accounts, which previously was a registration requirement, has

been done away with

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- Revocation of Charter The federation or national union may revoke the charter issued to the local or chapter

This is done by:(a) Serving on the local or chapter a VERIFIED NOTICE of revocation (b) Copy furnished the BLR (c) On the ground of disloyalty or such other grounds as may be specified in the

federation’s CBL Revocation will divest the local/chapter of its legal personality upon receipt of the notice by the

BLR UNLESS in the meantime, the local/chapter has acquired independent registration

- Affiliation An independent union who wants to affiliate with a federation or national union submits the

issue to its members If majority of them vote affirmatively, a resolution or request to affiliate is presented to the

chosen federation or national union If the latter accepts the affiliation, it offers a CONTRACT of affiliation Affiliation does NOT cause the local union to lose its legal personality

- Disaffiliation The affiliate MAY disaffiliate but the terms of the contract of affiliation have to be observed It is believed that disaffiliation cannot absolutely be prohibited, but it can be restricted by the

contract of affiliation

- Substitutionary Doctrine The substitutionary doctrine holds that the employees cannot revoke the validly executed

collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent

Ex: If Union A negotiated a CBA with the employer but was replaced by Union B, the latter must respect the contract Employees cannot renege on the CBA by changing their collective bargaining agent But the latter may negotiate with the management for the shortening of the CBA

4. ICESCR, Art. 8(b) – The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:a. The right of trade unions to establish national federations or confederations and the right of

the latter to form or join international trade-union organizations

5. ICESCR, Art. 8(c) - The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:a. The right of trade unions to function freely subject to no limitations other than those

prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others

6. ILO Convention No. 87, Art. 7 a. The acquisition of legal personality by workers’ and employers’ organizations, federations,

and confederations shall NOT be made subject to the conditions of such a character as to restrict the application of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, and 4

7. ILO Convention No. 87, Art. 8a. In exercising the rights provided for in this Convention workers and employers and their

respective organizations, like other persons or organized collectivities, shall respect the law of the land.

b. The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for in this Convention

8. Cases:

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a. Mariwasa v. Sec. of Labor (2009)Summary: Mariwasa Siam Ceramics Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration against the Union for alleged violation of LC 234 for not complying with the 20% requirement due to the disaffiliation of 102 members who executed affidavits recanting their union membership. The Company also alleged massive fraud on the part of the Union in violation of LC 239. DOLE –RD granted the petition and cancelled the Union’s certification. This was reversed by the BLR on appeal which was affirmed by the CA. SC dismissed the Company’s petition. It held that the affidavits were standardized and pro forma and thus no probative value. It also held that the Union’s failure to be mathematically precise with its membership is of no moment because it met the 20% requirement.

Doctrine: Even assuming the veracity of the affidavits of recantation, the legitimacy of the union as an LO must be affirmed. While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the union’s application for registration, the affiants were members of the union and they comprised more than the required 20% members for purposes of registration as an LO. The LC does not require that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence. It merely requires it during its application for union registration.

NOTE: In La Suerte Cigar v. BLR Director, the SC made a distinction: Withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing evidence to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary,

b. SS Ventures v. SS Ventures, etc. (2008)Summary: SS Ventures Labor Union filed with the DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election. SS Ventures then filed a petition to cancel the union’s certificate of registration invoking the grounds in LC 239(a) on alleged instances of fraud and misrepresentation committed by the Union in securing its registration. The DOLE cancelled the registration of the Union which was reversed by the BLR and this reversal was affirmed by the CA. SC denied the Company’s petition.

Doctrine: Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered an LLO endowed with the right and privileges granted by law to such organizations. It cannot be overemphasized that the registration or recognition of a labor union after it has submitted the corresponding papers is NOT ministerial on the part of the BLR. After an LO has filed the necessary registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under LC 234 have been sedulously complied with.

If the union’s application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the application and its attachments, a union should be denied recognition as an LLO.

c. San Miguel Corp. v. Mandaue (2005)Summary: The Union filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE-RO attaching the required documents. The Company filed a motion to dismiss on the sole ground that the Union is not listed or included in the roster of LLOs per DOLE Certification. The Union then submitted the documents to BLR arguing that these documents were submitted in compliance with the requirements for the creation of a local/chapter. The DOLE then certified the Union. The Company, in its Comment to the Position Paper, argued that the Union was not an LLO at the TIME of the filing of the petition. Med-Arb agreed with the Company. On appeal, the DOLE and the BLR reversed the Med-Arb’s decision. SC held that strictly speaking, at the time it filed the petition it did not yet possess any legal personality. However, there are peculiar circumstances which justifies the finding that it had legal personality anyway.

Doctrine: (DO No. 9 in force) The issuance of the certificate of registration by the BLR is not the operative act that vests legal personality upon a local/chapter. Such legal personality is acquired from the filing of the complete documentary requirements.

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In regular order, it is the federation or national union, already in possession of legal personality, which initiates the creation of the local/chapter. It issues a charter certificate indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter. It then submits this charter certificate, along with the names of the local/chapter’s officers, constitution and by-laws to the Regional Office or Bureau. It is the submission of these documents, certified under oath by the Secretary or Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested by the President, which vests legal personality in the local/chapter, which is then free to file on its own a petition for certification election.

In this case, the federation in question, the FFW, did not submit any of these documentary requirements to the Regional Office or Bureau. It did however issue a charter certificate to the putative local/chapter (herein respondent). Respondent then submitted the charter certificate along with the other documentary requirements to the Regional Office, but not for the specific purpose of creating the local/chapter, but for filing the petition for certification election.

NOTE: The procedure for registration of a local/chapter is found in the IRR as amended by DO No. 9 of 1997 and then by DO 40 of 2003. Since the petition was filed in 1998, the case was decided under DO No. 9

NOTE: Under DO No. 9:(1) Sec. 1 of Rule VI prescribes the documentary requirements:

(a) Charter certificate (b) Names of local/chapter officers, their addresses, principal office of the local/chapter(c) CBL; state if the same as that of the federation or national union

(2) Independent union seeking registration is further required to submit the number and names of the members, and annual financial reports

(3) Under Sec. 3, a local/chapter acquires legal personality from the date of the filing of the complete documentary requirements, and not from the issuance of a certification by the DOLE-RO or the BLR

(4) On the other hand, an LO is deemed to have acquired legal personality only on the date of the issuance of certificate of registration, which takes place only after the BLR or its RO has undertaken an evaluation process lasting up to 30 days.

NOTE: The ruling in Progressive Dev v. Laguesma is still good law under DO No. 9. The duty of the BLR to recognize the local/chapter upon the submission of the documentary requirements is not ministerial, insofar as the BLR is obliged to adjudge the authenticity of said documents. However, in ascertaining whether or not to recognize and register the local/chapter, the BLR should not look beyond the authenticity and due execution of the documentary requirements. Since all that is necessary to recognize the local/chapter is the documentary evidence, it is beyond the office of the BLR to deny on other grounds.

NOTE: Under DO No. 40, the procedure was made easier. DO No. 40 does not use the term local/chapter, but now uses “chartered local.” A “Chartered Local” is defined as an LO in the private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal personality through the issuance of a charter certificate by a duly registered federation or national union, and reported to the DOLE-RO. Under this rule:(1) The chartered local is issued a charter certificate by the duly registered federation or

national union (2) The federation or national union is then obliged to report to the DOLE-RO the creation of

such chartered local, attaching thereto the charter certificate it had earlier issued.

Also, under DO No. 40, a chartered local acquires legal personality upon the issuance of the charter certificate by the duly registered federation or national union. However, it also requires that the federation or national union report the creation of the chartered local to the RO.

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d. Coastal Subic v. DOLE (2006)Summary: The RAF Union (RAFU) and Supervisory Union (SU) both filed separate petitions for certification election. The RAFU insists that it is an LLO having been issued a charter certificate by ALU, and the SU by the APSOTEU. The Company opposed alleging that the unions were not LLOs. The Med-Arb dismissed the petitions on the ground that the ALU and APSOTEU were one and the same federation; thus, the unions were affiliated with only one federation. The Labor Sec. and the CA reversed the Med-Arb decision. Hence, this petition. SC held that APSOTEU was an LLO and can validly issue a charter to SU. It also held that since there is no cancellation of title, the federations and their chapters are separate and distinct entities.

Doctrine: LC 235 provides that applications for registration shall be acted upon by the Bureau, meaning the BLR and/or the Labor Relations Division of the DOLE-RO. The new implementing rules explicitly provide that applications for registration of LOs shall be filed either with the RO or with the BLR. Even with the amendments, the rules did not divest the RO and the BLR of their jurisdiction over applications for registration by LOs. The amendments to the IRs merely specified that when the application was filed with the RO, the application would be acted upon by the BLR.

e. San Miguel Corp., etc. v. San Miguel, etc. (2007) Summary: Respondent is a registered chapter of PDMP which filed 3 separate petitions for certification election to represent the 3 division of SMC. This was dismissed for fragmenting a single bargaining unit. Petitioner, as the incumbent EBA of SMC, filed with DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent’s registration and its dropping from the rolls of LLOs on the ground, among others, that PDMP is not a LLO but a trade union center (TUC) and cannot create a local or chapter. DOLE-NCR revoked the certification but on the basis of non-compliance with the 20% membership requirement. This was reversed by the BLR and the CA. The petitioner raises the issue of the respondent’s personality as LLO before the SC. SC granted the petition. It held that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter. Thus, respondent must comply with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.

Doctrine: The mandate of the LC is to ensure STRICT COMPLIANCE with the requirements on registration because an LO is entitled to specific rights under the LC, and are involved in activities directly affecting matters of public interest. Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the LO for illegitimate ends.

The acquisition of rights by any union or LO, particularly the right to file a petition for certification election depends on whether or not the LO has attained the status of an LLO.

f. Progressive Dev. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor (1992)Summary: KILUSAN-TUCP filed with the DOLE a petition for certification election among the RAFE pf the petitioner company alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter was issued charter certificate. The Company moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of non-compliance with registration procedure. The Company is of the view that such local or chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of submission of a duly subscribed constitution and by-laws (which was lacking in this case) and due recognition or acknowledgment accorded by the BLR. The BLR and Labor USec held that there was substantial compliance by the mere issuance of the charter certificate. The SC held that the failure of the Secretary of the KILUSAN to certify the required documents UNDER OATH was fatal to the acquisition of legitimate status. Decision of the BLR and USec reversed.

Doctrine: In case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted documents and papers be CERTIFIED UNDER OATH by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by the president is apparent. The submission of the required documents and payment of registration fee becomes the BLR’s basis for approval of the application for registration. Upon this approval, the union acquires legal personality and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to an LLO. The employer naturally

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needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona-fide organization. The inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay the apprehensions of management.

In case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule II, Sec. 3(e), Book V, IRR. Since the “procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions” refers to the certification and attestation requirements in LC 235, par. 2, it follows that the CBL, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter MUST likewise comply with these requirements. There is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because several requirements applicable to independent union registration are no longer required in the case of formation of a local or chapter.

NOTE: This case was decided under the then governing law, Sec. 3, Rule II, Book V, IRR in force before 1997. This was amended by DO No. 9 on 1997 and then by DO No. 40 on 2003.

g. Phoenix Iron and Steel Corp. v. Sec. of Labor (1995) – disputed here is the applicability of Progressive Dev Corp v. Sec. of LaborSummary: The Union filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arb. The Company sought clarification of the legal personality of the Union. The Med-Arb dismissed the petition finding that the Union had not complied with the requisites of the law. The Med-Arb found that no books of account was filed; CBL and list of members were not attested to by the union president; the CBL was not verified under oath. On appeal, the DOLE called for the immediate conduct of the certification election, holding that technicalities should not stand in the way of the election. SC granted the petition of the company and set aside the DOLE’s decision.

Doctrine: The ruling in Progressive applies to the case at bar. A local or chapter becomes an LLO only upon submission of the following to the BLR:(1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the federation or national

union; and(2) CBL, a statement on the set of officers, books of accounts all of which are certified under

oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president

Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does NOT become an LLO.

C. Question of Legitimacy1. Cases:

a. SS Ventures v. SS Ventures, etc. (2008)Summary: SS Ventures Labor Union filed with the DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election. SS Ventures then filed a petition to cancel the union’s certificate of registration invoking the grounds in LC 239(a) on alleged instances of fraud and misrepresentation committed by the Union in securing its registration. The DOLE cancelled the registration of the Union which was reversed by the BLR and this reversal was affirmed by the CA. SC denied the Company’s petition.

Doctrine: While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be cancelled or the union may be decertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the status of an LLO.

Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of any acts enumerated in LC 239(a). To decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the application for registration and the supporting documents.

b. Furusawa v. Sec. of Labor (1997)

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Summary: The Union filed a petition for certification election among the RAFE of the Company. The Company moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the Union was not an LLO. The Company bases its argument on the fact that the Union submitted only a photocopy of its certificate of registration, not the original, as such there is no conclusive proof that the Union has acquired legitimate status. The Med-Arb and the Sec. of Labor held that the copy is sufficient and granted due course to the petition. SC affirmed.

Doctrine: The submission of a Xerox copy of the Union’s certificate of registration to prove its legitimacy is sufficient. A certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a fact-finding and non-adversarial character. It is not covered by the technical rules of evidence. Under LC 221, proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure. The court has already construed LC 221 in favor of allowing the NLRC to decide case on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted without resorting to technical rules of evidence. The technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in the position papers and other documents.

c. San Miguel Corp. v. San Miguel etc. (2007)Summary: Respondent is a registered chapter of PDMP which filed 3 separate petitions for certification election to represent the 3 division of SMC. This was dismissed for fragmenting a single bargaining unit. Petitioner, as the incumbent EBA of SMC, filed with DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent’s registration and its dropping from the rolls of LLOs on the ground, among others, that PDMP is not a LLO but a trade union center (TUC) and cannot create a local or chapter. DOLE-NCR revoked the certification but on the basis of non-compliance with the 20% membership requirement. This was reversed by the BLR and the CA. The petitioner raises the issue of the respondent’s personality as LLO before the SC. SC granted the petition. It held that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter. Thus, respondent must comply with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.

Doctrine: Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon an LO irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the LO, not being an LLO, acquires no rights.

However, a direct challenge to the legitimacy of an LO based on fraud and misrepresentation in securing its certificate of registration is a serious allegation which deserves careful scrutiny. Allegations thereof should be compounded with supporting circumstances and evidence.

d. Phil. Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union (2006)Summary: After the Union’s petition for certification election was denied, the Union president notified their intention to negotiate a CBA for its members. The Hotel advised the Union that since it was not certified by the DOLE it could not be recognized as such. A notice of strike was issued by the Union. After conciliation conferences, it was agreed that a consent election be held. However, the Union suddenly conducted a strike. The Sec. of Labor certified the case to the NLRC. The NLRC found that the strike was illegal and ordered the dismissal of the union officers and members. On appeal to the CA, the CA ordered the reinstatement of the union members for failure to prove their illegal acts. Hence, this appeal by the Hotel. SC agreed that the strike was illegal but remanded the case to the LA in order to determine the respective liabilities of the strikers.

Doctrine: Under LC 255, only the LO designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. The Union is admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees of the Company, hence, it could not demand from the latter the right to bargain collectively on their behalf.

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Not every LLO possesses the rights in LC 242. LC 242(a) must be read in relation to LC 255.

On the contention that the Union was bargaining only for its members, the same would only only “fragment the employees” of petitioner, held that “what [respondent] will be achieving is to divide the employees, more particularly, the rank-and-file employees . . . the other workers who are not members are at a serious disadvantage, because if the same shall be allowed, employees who are non-union members will be economically impaired and will not be able to negotiate their terms and conditions of work, thus defeating the very essence and reason of collective bargaining, which is an effective safeguard against the evil schemes of employers in terms and conditions of work.”

e. San Miguel Corp. v. Mandaue (2005)Summary: The Union filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE-RO attaching the required documents. The Company filed a motion to dismiss on the sole ground that the Union is not listed or included in the roster of LLOs per DOLE Certification. The Union then submitted the documents to BLR arguing that these documents were submitted in compliance with the requirements for the creation of a local/chapter. The DOLE then certified the Union. The Company, in its Comment to the Position Paper, argued that the Union was not an LLO at the TIME of the filing of the petition. The Company cites the cases of Toyota Motors and Progressive Development Corporation-Pizza Hut v. Ledesma wherein the Court ruled that the question of prohibited membership of both supervisory and rank-and-file employees in the same union must be inquired into anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election; and that a union composed of both of these kinds of employees does not possess the requisite personality to file for recognition as a legitimate labor organization. SC does not agree.

Doctrine: It should be noted though that in the more recent case of Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union , the Court, notwithstanding Toyota and Progressive, ruled that after a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack, but questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation

f. Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union – PTGWO (2003) - Reverses Toyota and DunlopSummary: The Union filed its petition for certification election before the Med-Arb. The Company opposed on the main ground that the list of the union members submitted was defective and flawed as it included signatures of supervisors, resigned, terminated, and AWOL employees. The Med-Arb ordered the holding of the certification election and held that the inclusion or exclusion of employees should be held in a pre-election conference. On appeal, the DOLE ordered the removal from the Union’s roster supervisory employees. The CA affirmed the DOLE resolution. SC dismissed the Company’s petition.

Doctrine: In Toyota Motor Phils v. Toyota Motors Phils. Corp. Labor Union , the SC held that an LO composed of both RAFE and SE is no labor organization at all. It cited Dunlop Slazenger Phils. v. Sec. of Labor which held that it becomes necessary anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election to inquire into the composition of any LO whenever the status of the LO is challenged on the basis of LC 245.

Here, the rulings in Toyota and Dunlop are abandoned. The SC held that after a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation. The grounds for cancellation of union registration are provided for in LC 239.

The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is NOT among the grounds for cancellation, UNLESS such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of LC 239.

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D. Rights of LLOs1. LC 242 – Rights of Legitimate Labor Organizations

a. An LLO shall have the right:(1) To act as representative of its members for purposes of collective bargaining (2) To be certified as exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate CBU for

purposes of collective bargaining (3) To be furnished by the employer:

(a) Upon written request:(i) Annual audited financial statements(ii) Including the balance sheet (iii) And profit and loss statements

(b) WHEN?(i) Within 30 calendar days from date of receipt of request, after union has

been duly recognized by employer or certified as SEBR of employees in the CBU

(ii) Or within 60 calendar days before expiration of the existing CBA, or (iii) During CB negotiations

(4) To own property(a) Real or personal (b) For the use and benefit of the LO and its members

(5) To sue and be sued in its registered name; and (6) To undertake all other activities designed to benefit the organization and its members

(a) Including cooperative, housing welfare, and other projects not contrary to law

b. Notwithstanding any provision of a general or special law to the contrary, the income and properties of LLOs shall be free from taxes, duties, and other assessments(1) Including grants, endowments, gifts, donations, and contributions they may receive from

fraternal and similar organizations, local or foreign (2) Which are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY, and EXCLUSIVELY used for their lawful purposes (3) Exemptions may be withdrawn only by a special law expressly repealing this provision

NOTES:- Not every LLO possesses the rights mentioned in LC 242:

Right to represent employees in collective bargaining is true only for the union of the majority members of the CBU; this does not attach to a minority union even if it is an LLO

Right to be certified as EBR is true only for the union that won in the certification election or consent election; losing union has no representational status although it is an LLO

2. LC 242-A – Reportorial Requirements – a. The following are documents required to be submitted to the BLR by the LLO:

(1) Its CBL, or amendments thereto(a) The minutes of ratification,(b) List of members who took part in the ratification of the CBL (c) Within 30 days from adoption or ratification of the CBL or amendments thereto

(2) Its list of officers(a) Minutes of the election of officers(b) List of voters within 30 days from election

(3) Its annual financial report (a) Within 30 days after the close of every fiscal year

(4) List of members at least once a year or whenever required by the BLR

b. Failure to comply with the above requirements:(1) Shall NOT be a ground for cancellation of union registration(2) But SHALL subject the erring officers or members to:

(a) Suspension, (b) Expulsion from membership

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(c) Or any appropriate penalty 3. Cases:

a. Acedera v. International Container Services, Inc. (2003)Summary: Following a retrenchment program, the Union filed a notice of strike which included as cause of action: (1) the retrenchment of employees, and (2) the erroneous use of divisor in the computation of wages by the company. Petitioners herein are the dismissed employees in the retrenchment program. They filed a Complaint-in-Intervention. The LA ordered the proper divisor and the payment of differentials but dismissed the intervention. NLRC dismissed the decision of the LA but affirmed the denial of the intervention. The CA likewise ruled in same manner. SC held that intervention was not proper as the interests of petitioner are properly represented by the union.

Doctrine: A labor union is one such part authorized to represent its members under LC 242(a) which provides that a union may act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This authority includes the power to represent its members for the purpose of enforcing CBA.

While a party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to intervene in a case, ordinarily, a person whose interests are already represented will not be permitted to do the same except when there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative will not act in good faith for the protection of all interests represented by him

To reiterate, for a member of a class to be permitted to intervene in a representative action, fraud or collusion or lack of good faith on the part of the representative must be proven. It must be based on facts borne on record. Mere assertions, as what petitioners-appellants proffer, do not suffice.

b. Phil. Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union (2006)Summary: After the Union’s petition for certification election was denied, the Union president notified their intention to negotiate a CBA for its members. The Hotel advised the Union that since it was not certified by the DOLE it could not be recognized as such. A notice of strike was issued by the Union. After conciliation conferences, it was agreed that a consent election be held. However, the Union suddenly conducted a strike. The Sec. of Labor certified the case to the NLRC. The NLRC found that the strike was illegal and ordered the dismissal of the union officers and members. On appeal to the CA, the CA ordered the reinstatement of the union members for failure to prove their illegal acts. Hence, this appeal by the Hotel. SC agreed that the strike was illegal but remanded the case to the LA in order to determine the respective liabilities of the strikers.

Doctrine: Under LC 255, only the LO designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. The Union is admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees of the Company, hence, it could not demand from the latter the right to bargain collectively on their behalf.

Not every LLO possesses the rights in LC 242. LC 242(a) must be read in relation to LC 255.

On the contention that the Union was bargaining only for its members, the same would only only “fragment the employees” of petitioner, held that “what [respondent] will be achieving is to divide the employees, more particularly, the rank-and-file employees . . . the other workers who are not members are at a serious disadvantage, because if the same shall be allowed, employees who are non-union members will be economically impaired and will not be able to negotiate their terms and conditions of work, thus defeating the very essence and reason of collective bargaining, which is an effective safeguard against the evil schemes of employers in terms and conditions of work.”

c. Cornista v. NLRC (2006)

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Summary: The Phil Veterans Bank underwent liquidation as ordered by the Monetary Board. All the employees were terminated. RA 7169 was passed by Congress reopening the bank. The Rehabilitation Committee started screening processes for hiring new employees with hiring preferences given to veterans and their dependents. The Union filed a ULP case against the Committee arguing that RA 7169 nullified the liquidator’s termination of employees. The LA dismissed the case for lack of merit. This was reversed by the NLRC which directed the immediate reinstatement of all Union members. Pending cases before the SC, the Bank and the Union entered into a compromise agreement. CA reversed the NLRC ruling. The SC upheld the SC. The forcible closure of the Bank by operation of law permanently severed the employment relationship. The members of the union are bound by the compromise agreement.

Doctrine: A labor union’s function is to represent its members. It can file an action or enter into compromise agreements on behalf of its members. Here, majority of the Bank’s employees authorized the Union to enter into a compromise agreement with the Bank on their behalves. Union members were bound by the resulting compromise agreement when they affixed their signatures thereon, thereby giving their individual assent thereto, and when they accepted the benefits due them under that agreement. As it is, the Compromise Agreement in question detailed the amounts to be received by each employee. Petitioners and other employees of the Bank knew exactly what they were ratifying when they affixed their signatures in the said compromise agreement. Further, respondent Union is a closed shop union. For this reason, it was the only one with legal authority to negotiate, transact, and enter into any agreement with the Bank. The Compromise Agreement was ratified by 282 Union members representing a majority of its entire 529 membership. The ratification of the Compromise Agreement by the majority of the Union members necessarily binds the minority.

d. San Miguel Corp. v. San Miguel, etc. (2007)Summary: Respondent is a registered chapter of PDMP which filed 3 separate petitions for certification election to represent the 3 division of SMC. This was dismissed for fragmenting a single bargaining unit. Petitioner, as the incumbent EBA of SMC, filed with DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent’s registration and its dropping from the rolls of LLOs on the ground, among others, that PDMP is not a LLO but a trade union center (TUC) and cannot create a local or chapter. DOLE-NCR revoked the certification but on the basis of non-compliance with the 20% membership requirement. This was reversed by the BLR and the CA. The petitioner raises the issue of the respondent’s personality as LLO before the SC. SC granted the petition. It held that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter. Thus, respondent must comply with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.

Doctrine: The acquisition of rights by any union or LO, particularly the right to file a petition for certification election depends on whether or not the LO has attained the status of an LLO. LLOs have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.

e. Republic v. Kawashima, etc. (2008)Summary: The Union filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE-RO. This was opposed by the Company in a MTD alleging that the Union did not acquire any legal personality because of its mixed-membership of RAFE and SE. The Med-Arb dismissed the petition because of the mixed membership. DOLE reversed and ordered the conduct of certification election. However, the CA reversed the DOLE and held that because of the mixed-membership, it cannot qualify as an LLO. SC granted the petition of the Union. The governing law is RA 6715 and IRR. DOLE decision reinstated.

Doctrine: If there is one constant precept in our labor laws, it is that only an LLO may exercise the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate CBU for purposes of collective bargaining. What has varied over the years has been the

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degree of enforcement of this precept, as reflected in the shifting scope of administrative and judicial scrutiny of the composition of an LO before it is allowed to exercise the right of representation.

Under RA 6715, the prohibition against the questioned mingling in one LO was reinstated. However, the law was silent on the exact effect of the violation on the legitimacy of the LO. Following DO No. 9, the Court in Tagaytay Highlands reversed the ruling in Toyota and Dunlop.

While there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and RAFE in one LO, the LC does not provide for the effects thereof. After an LO has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of an LLO. Any mingling between the SE and RAFE in its membership CANNOT affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration UNLESS such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud under LC 239.

NOTE: This case was decided before RA 9481. Under RA 9481:(1) LC 245 is amended, a new LC 245-A is created (2) Under LC 238-A, a pending petition for cancellation of registration will NOT hinder an

LLO from initiating a certification election(3) Under LC 258-A, employers have no personality to interfere with or thwart a petition for

cancellation election filed by an LLO.

NOTE: Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof

E. Effect of Non-Registration1. Protection Technology v. Sec. of Labor (2000)

Summary: The Union filed a petition for direct certification or for certification election with the DOLE. This was opposed by the Company on the ground that the Union was NOT an LLO for its failure to submit its books of account. The Med-Arb dismissed the petition. This was reversed by the DOLE and the Sec. of Labor ordered the holding of certification election. The principal issue here is whether books of account form part of the mandatory documentation requirements for registration of a newly organized union affiliated with a federation, or a local/chapter of such, as an LLO. SC held that the case of Progressive was clear. Non-submission of books of account certified by and attested to by the appropriate officer is a ground which the employer can invoke legitimately to oppose a petition for certification election filed by the local/chapter concerned.

Doctrine: It appears from the records that a certification election was held despite the TRO issued by the SC. Since it was conducted in the presence of DOLE representatives, the SC will not nullify it BUT the Union must comply with all requirements for registration,

The Union must comply with all the requirements of registration as an LLO before it may enjoy the fruits of its certification election victory and before it may exercise the rights of an LLO. Registration is a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by an LO and the exercise of the rights and privileges granted by law to LLOs.

2. Subuanon Rural Bank, Inc. v. Laguesma (2000)

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Summary: The Union filed a petition for certification of the supervisory employees of the Bank. The Med-Arb granted due course to the petition. This was opposed by the Company on the ground that: (1) the employees sought to be represented were actually managerials; and (2) the representative of the union also represents RAFE which violates the rule on separation of unions. The Company’s motion was denied by the Med-Arb and the DOLE. Hence, this petition. SC held that the employees were neither managers nor confidential employees. It also held that the holding of the certification election was proper.

Doctrine: One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization. Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification election if the management appeals on the issue of the validity of the union's registration.

F. Action or Denial of Application and Remedy 1. LC 235 - Action on Application

a. BLR shall act on all applications for registration within 30 days from filing b. All requisite documents and parents:

(1) Shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may be AND

(2) Attested to by its president

NOTES:- Documents required to accompany an application for union registration must be true and correct - LC 239 lists the grounds for cancellation of union registration

Misrepresentation, false statements, or fraud, are grounds for cancellation or denial of registration

2. LC 236 - Denial of Registration; Appeala. The decision of the Labor Relations Division in the RO denying registration may be appealed

by the applicant union:(1) To the BLR(2) Within 10 days from receipt of notice thereof

NOTES: - Because an independent union or local chapter operates at the enterprise level:

It applies for registration at the DOLE RO where the union principally operates If its application is denied by the RD, the denial may be appealed to the BLR Dir.

If still denied, the denial is appealable directly to the CA

- Because a national union or federation operates in more than one region: It applies for registration DIRECTLY with the BLR which is a national office

Although the application is received by the DOLE RO If BLR denies the application, denial is appealable to DOLE Sec.

Then appealable to the CA

3. Cases:a. San Miguel Corp. v. San Miguel, etc. (2005)

Summary: Respondent is a registered chapter of PDMP which filed 3 separate petitions for certification election to represent the 3 division of SMC. This was dismissed for fragmenting a single bargaining unit. Petitioner, as the incumbent EBA of SMC, filed with DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent’s registration and its dropping from the rolls of LLOs on the ground, among others, that PDMP is not a LLO but a trade union center (TUC) and cannot create a local or chapter. DOLE-NCR revoked the certification but on the basis of non-compliance with the 20% membership requirement. This was reversed by the BLR and

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the CA. The petitioner raises the issue of the respondent’s personality as LLO before the SC. SC granted the petition. It held that PDMP cannot directly create a local or chapter. Thus, respondent must comply with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.

Doctrine: As to petitioner's claims that respondent obtained its Certificate of Registration through fraud and misrepresentation, this Court finds that the imputations are not impressed with merit. In the instant case, proof to declare that respondent committed fraud and misrepresentation remains wanting. Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights.

However, that a direct challenge to the legitimacy of a labor organization based on fraud and misrepresentation in securing its certificate of registration is a serious allegation which deserves careful scrutiny. Allegations thereof should be compounded with supporting circumstances and evidence. The records of the case are devoid of such evidence. Furthermore, SC is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, such as the BLR, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality.

b. Umali v. Lovina (1950)Summary: The Independent Employees Union (IEU) filed an application for union registration with the Sec. of Labor. The Sec replied by saying that it cannot register it as of yet because its registration would be contrary to his policy of allowing only one union in one company. However, the Sec assured that if the earlier union should fail to hold an election, he would register the IEU. But despite the failure of the first election to elect their new officers, the Sec still refused to register IEU. Thus, IEU filed mandamus. SC granted mandamus.

Doctrine: There being no lawful reason for the respondent to refuse the registration of the application for the petitioner's union and permission to operate as a legitimate labor organization; it being the duty of the respondent to register the application and issue the permit upon payment of the required fee, as provided for in section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 213, the investigation to be conducted by him, as required by law, having been conducted and completed, as may be inferred from his official statements in connection therewith, the conclusion in connection therewith, the conclusion is inescapable that he has neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins him to perform as a duty resulting from his office, and that such neglect unlawfully excludes the petitioner's union from the use and enjoyment of a right to which it is entitled.

c. Vassar Industries Employees Union v. Estrella (1978)Summary: Upon the expiry of the existing CBA between ALU and the Company, 111 out of 150 employees disaffiliated from ALU and established VIEU. They then filed their application for registration upon compliance with all requirements. Pending their registration, the Union then filed a petition for certification as bargaining agent of the RAFE of the Company. The Med-Arb denied the petition on the ground that the union was not duly registered with the DOLE. It then appears that the BLR denied their application on the ground that there is a registered collective bargaining agent in the company. Hence, the Union filed this certiorari case before the SC. SC ordered the registration of the Union, there being no legal obstacle to such step and duty.

Doctrine: The prayer in the petition is limited to ordering the BLR to give due course to the application for registration. As this is a certiorari proceeding, equitable in character, the SC is empowered to grant the relief adequate and suitable under the circumstances so that justice in all its fullness could be achieved, As long as an applicant union complies with all of the legal requirements for registration, it becomes the BLR’s ministerial duty to so register the union.

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NOTE: Philippine Labor Alliance Council v. BLR – Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, a certification election is the most expeditious way of determining which LO is to be the exclusive bargaining representative.

d. Progressive Development Corp. v. Laguesma (1997)Summary: The Union filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE. The company opposed in an MTD alleging fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in the Unions registration. It then initiated a case for the cancellation of the Union’s registration. The Med-Arb, however, granted the petition and ordered the conduct of the certification election. This was affirmed on appeal by the DOLE USec. Thus, the Company filed certiorari. The SC framed the issue in this wise: Whether or not, after the necessary papers and documents have been filed by the LO, recognition by the BLR merely becomes a ministerial function. SC said NO. The basis of the Company’s opposition was LC 239(a) and (c). These constitute a grave challenge to the right of the Union to ask for certification election. The Med-Arb should have looked into the merits of the opposition.

Doctrine: A more than cursory reading of LC 234 clearly indicates that the requirements embodied therein are intended as preventive measures against the commission of fraud. After a labor organization has filed the necessary papers and documents for registration, it becomes mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to check if the requirements under LC 234 have been sedulously complied with. If its application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the application and the supporting documents, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of recognition has been issued, the propriety of the labor organization's registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with LC 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for certification election.

Furthermore, LC 235 itself grants the Bureau of Labor Relations a period of thirty (30) days within which to review all applications for registration. The thirty-day period ensures that any action taken by the Bureau of Labor Relations is made in consonance with the mandate of the Labor Code, which, it bears emphasis, specifically requires that the basis for the issuance of a certificate of registration should be compliance with the requirements for recognition under LC 234.

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CANCELLATION OF UNION CERTIFICATE REGISTRATION

I. ProvisionsA. LC 238 – Cancellation of Registration; Appeal

1. The certificate of registration of any LLO, whether national or local, may be cancelleda. BY the BLR b. After due hearing c. Only on the grounds specified in LC 239

B. LC 238-A – Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of Registration 1. A petition for cancellation of union registration shall:

a. NOT suspend the proceedings on certification electionb. NOT prevent the filing of a petition for certification election

2. In case of cancellation:a. Nothing herein shall restrict the right of the union to seek just and equitable remedies in the

appropriate courts

C. LC 239 – Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration 1. The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration

a. Misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with:(1) The adoption or ratification of the CBL or amendments thereto (2) Minutes of ratification, and (3) List of members who took part in the ratification

b. Misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud, in connection with:(1) The election of officers,(2) Minutes of the election of officers, and (3) List of voters

c. Voluntary dissolution of members

NOTES:- Cancellation of registration means that the union is no longer an LLO

Its juridical personality as well as its statutory rights and privileges are suspended But cancellation does not invalidate an otherwise valid CBA which the union has entered into

before the cancellation of its certificate - NOTE that having an illegal strike is not a reason to cancel a union’s registration - Who may seek cancellation; where:

Any party-in-interest may commence a petition for cancellation of registration EXCEPT in actions involving violations of Art. 249 (ULP of LOs) which can be commenced

only by the members 30% of the members should support the action against the union, although any member/s

specially concerned may also report any violation by the union or a union officer

II. Cases:A. Mariwasa v. Sec. of Labor (2009)

Summary: Mariwasa Siam Ceramics Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration against the Union for alleged violation of LC 234 for not complying with the 20% requirement due to the disaffiliation of 102 members who executed affidavits recanting their union membership. The Company also alleged massive fraud on the part of the Union in violation of LC 239. DOLE –RD granted the petition and cancelled the Union’s certification. This was reversed by the BLR on appeal which was affirmed by the CA. SC dismissed the Company’s petition. It held that the affidavits were standardized and pro forma and thus no probative value. It also held that the Union’s failure to be mathematically precise with its membership is of no moment because it met the 20% requirement. The SC also held

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that the bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would not provide a valid reason to cancel respondent’s certificate of registration.

Doctrine: Even assuming the veracity of the affidavits of recantation, the legitimacy of respondent as a labor organization must be affirmed. While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the union’s application for registration, the affiants were members of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a labor union. LC 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the application for union registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence.

For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto; the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.

B. Sta. Lucia East v. Secretary of Labor (2009)Summary: Following the denial of the Med-Arb of a previous petition for certification due to the inappropriateness of the bargaining unit, the CLUP-SLECC re-registered to cover only RAFE on SLECC as SLECCWA and filed a petition for certification. This was opposed by the Company in an MTD on the ground that it voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as the EBA. Ultimately, a CBA was entered into between the Company and SMSLEC. The Med-Arb dismissed SLECCWA’s petition on the ground of contract bar rule. Labor Sec. and CA reversed and held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA could not bar SLECCWA’s petition. SC found no error and held that the voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was valid.

Doctrine: The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of LC 239. Thus, the CLUP-SLECC having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration.

NOTE: The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in UNORGANIZED establishments.

NOTE: In petitions for certification election, the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arb’s decision. The exception to this rule is when the employer is requested to bargain collectively.

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labor 2 jogger

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