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7 AD-R123 388 RELTIELY RECURSIVE RTIONAL CHOICE(U) STNFORD UNIV
L/1F CA INST FOR MATHEMATICAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNCLASSIFE A A LEWIS NOV 81 TR-357 NGM84-79-C-86S5 FC5iUNLSIjmhhhhm h5/Alm~hhhhhE~l m
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHARTt4AfION0kL BUREAU OF STANDARDS- 1963-A
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RELATIVELY RECURSIVE RATIOIIAL CHOICE
by
Alain A. Lewis
NIS ,TIDC TAR
JWllatficatio
Distribution/Availability Codes
Technical Report No.357 Avail and/
November 1981 Dist special
Prepared Under
Contract ONR-NO00Ih-79-C-0685, United States Office of Naval ResearchCenter for Research on Organizational Efficiency
Stanford University
INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES .
Fourth Floor, Encina HallStanford UniversityStanford, California E TI
94 305 DIJA5LECT e
JAN4
d&uWWbmM is s35lo"-*
ABSTRACT
We have demonstrated previously (Lewis [1981]) that within the
framework of recursive functions, a distinction must be made between
representations of the paradigm of consumer choice, and realizations
of a given representation. The present paper extends our previous
framework to show, in brief fashion, that the concept of a recursive
rational choice function defined as an effectively computable represent-
ation of Richter's [1971] concept of rational choice, attains by means
of an application of Church's Thesis to the degrees of unsolvability
associated with a classification of types of subsets of the natural
numbers, a minimal bound in a measure of computational complexity
entailed by its realization in an effectively computable manner.I
4\
, • ' : I :ii I ! Ha "a
RELATIVELY RECURSIVE RATIONAL CHOICE*
by
Alain A. Lewis**
I. Introduction
The purpose of the introduction is to acquaint the reader with
the key concepts and terminology employed in the derivation of the
principal result of our previous paper, to which the present work is to
be considered as a sequel. The reader is encouraged to refer to the
earlier paper (Lewis [1981]) for a more extensive exposition of the items
that are summarized in the following discussion. The idea that is basic
to the construction and definitions is that recursive structures of number
theoretic character, by means of what is known as Church's Thesis ,
represent a very general class of effectively computable procedures, that
in another sense, typify ideal devices of artificial intelligence.
By a recursive space of alternatives is meant a pair <R(X) ,FR >
nwhere R(X) is the image of a subset, XC ]R+, that is compact and
n
convex, in a recursive metric space, M(On), which is in turn comprised
of n-tuples of R-indices of recursive real numbers; and where IF is theR
class of all recursive subsets of R(x). A recursive choice on <R(X),IF >
is a set valued function defined on the class IFR , C FR+ P(R(x)),
*This work was sponsored by Office of Naval Research Contract ONR-NO00 1 4-79-C-0685 at the Center for Research on Organizational Efficiency atStanford University.
**Department of Mathematics, College of Science, National University of
Singapore, Kent Ridge, Singapore, 0911.
tThe discussion of Church's Thesis in Chapter 1 of Rogers [1967] isan excellent introduction to this concept.
9!
such that for any AS FR , C(A) C A. We call the choice on <R(X),JFR>
RR
a recursive rational choice if (1) there exists a binary relation
>:R(x) x R(x) {1,0) termed the preference ordering; (2) there exists
a function f : R(X) - IN such that if it should be true of C 9
8E R(X) that a5 8 then f(a) > f(8); and (3) for any AE FR
C(A) = {a E A : VB E A f(a) > f() . A recursive rational choice on
<R(x),IFR> is thus rational in the sense of Richter [1971] and is
representable also in Richter's sense. The graph of a choice on <R(X),F >
is an enumerated collection of pairs of sets <F , C(JFR )> indexed
by J E IN whose domain* is {)FR , and whose co-domain is
{C(F ) } The elements of the domain of graph (C) are members ofj JIN
the class IFR , and it can be demonstrated" that if the choice on
<R(X),FR > is recursive rational, then the elements of the codomain
Sc(FR ) are also members of the class F.. A further result is that
a recursive rational choice on <R(x),FR > is also recursively representable
in the sense that the components of graph (C) are all effectively computable
by machine devices, in which case graph (C) C F R x FR. A recursive
rational choice on <R(x),FR is said to be recursively realizable, for
suitable choice of domain, if and only if graph (C) is recursively solvable
or equivalently if graph (C) is a recursive subset of IFRx FR. The
*The domain is full if 3K ED Vi J K F A FiR FR
%Cf. Lewis, [19811, Proposition V.2.
4:
I-
-3-
ment of the main theorem of Lewis ([1981] Theorem IV4) which places
a distinction between the notion of recursive representability and
recursive realizability.
Theorem 1.1: Allow <R(x), FR> to be a recursive space of
." alternatives derived from the recursive metric space of F , M(Fn),
for R(X) the recursive representation of a compact, convex subset
of IRn . Let C : F * - F be the nontrivial recursive rational+ R R
choice on <R(x), FR> and select from the class of sequences
(FR ) IN, element [F I C FR that comprises a full domain for
graph (C) C F x F . Then, per fixed selection of { IR R R~
graph (C) is recursively unsolvable and therefore is not recursively
realizable.
The method of proof of the above theorem employs the fact that
the restriction of graph (C) to its codomain was unsolvable by showing
that any predicate that was adequate for describing the codomain
belonged to a specific place in the Kleene-Mostowski Hierarchy that
4 classifies subsets of the natural numbers by the complexity of their
descriptions*. We presently exploit this feature of the proof to obtain
a lower bound on the degree of difficulty of computing the graph of
4 a recursive rational choice function by identifying the complexity of
descriptive predicates in the hierarchy with a measure of computational
!4 *A brief discussion of the Kleene-Mostowski Hierarchy is given in
Appendix I of Lewis [1981]. A fuller discussion is in Rogers 119673
Ch.l4, pp.301-334.
4
difficulty. The assertion of Church's Thesis which equates those
functions that are effectively computable by ideal computing devices
then becomes relative to the descriptive complexity of the predicates
that are used to describe the function. Functions that are effectively
computable in this sense of complexity are termed the relatively
recursive functions.
II. Relatively Recursive Rational Choice
The concept of relative recursiveness originates with the work
of the logician, Emil Post , and is concerned with the reduction of a
decision procedure for a given set of natural numbers, A, to that of
another set of natural numbers, B. Intuitively speaking, a set A of
natural numbers is reducible to a set B of natural numbers, if for a
total predicate T : IN - {1, 0), if the restriction to B, 'IBF can be
recursively realized, i.e., there exists a recursive 9 IN * such
that
f(n) = 1 when TIB (n) is true
O(n) = 0 when TIB (n) is false.
Then there exists a recursive realization for the restriction of T to
A, TVAl i.e., a recursive r(o) :i + iN ch that
*Cf. Lewii [1981], Ch.II, and Rogers [1967] p.130.
f'Degrees of Recursive Unsolvability", (Preliminary Report),4 Abstract Bulletin of A.M.S.. Vol.54. [1948], DD. 641-642.
-5-
{ r(f)(n)= 1 when TIA is true
r(=)(n) 0 when is false
Alternatively, the set A is said to be recursive relative to B, or
recursive in B.
In a subsequent article, Jointly authored with Kleene [i], Post
develops more fully the concept of relative recursiveness in terms of
degrees of unsolvability, which in turn is based on relations of
reducibility between decision procedures for subsets of the natural
numbers. The subject of degrees of unsolvability has been developed
into an extremely sophisticated branch of mathematical logic following
the article by Post and Kleene. To attempt a discussion of the substance
of the theory of degrees of unsolvability would exceed the bounds of
the present paper, and we will confine ourselves to using only those
items that bear on the relative recursiveness of rational choice,**
referring the interested reader to more comprehensive works.
A possible means of interpreting the assertion of Theorem I.1
is, that when recursively represented on subsets of the natural numbers,
a non-trivial rational choice function does not contain enough mathemat-
ical information in its graph to render the recursive solvability of
its graph. This is not to say that there may be in fact other subsets
of the natural numbers that do in fact contain enough mathematical
*The discussion in Rogers [19671, Ch.IX, pp.127-134 .
tCf. Ch. 13 of Rogers [19671.
**Gerald E. Sacks, Degrees of Unsolvability, Annals of Mathematics
No. 55, Princeton University Press, [1955], and Joseph R. Shoenfield [19711.
-6-
information. We are then led to the natural inquiry of just how much
mathematical information is required to recursively solve the graph
of a recursive rational choice function. What we wish to show in the
discussion that will follow is that by way of the notion of relative
recursiveness, it is possible to characterize which subsets of the
natural numbers contain enough information for the decision procedure
of recursively representable rational choice. Alternatively phrased,
we wish to inquire into its degrees of unsolvability.
We may first make the observation that there are three classic
notions of reducibility of decision procedures for subsets of the
natural numbers:
Definition I: A set A is generally recursive reducible to a
set B if A is recursive in B.
Definition II: A set A is Turing reducible to a set B if
there exists a Turing machine that reduces the decision procedure for
A to that of B. The reduction is performed by means of an oracle
that provides requisite information about the set B in the computation
of the set A as is required.t
Definition III: A set A is canonically reducible to a set
B if both A in IN-A are B-canonical sets in the sense of Post".
*This is due to Kleene, "Recursive Predicates and Quantifiers,"
Transactions A.M.S., Vol.53, [1945J, pp.41--73.
tCf. Rogers (1967], p.129.
**Post, [19.4.
. , . . .. .. . .r -S . . . . . . -- " : - : . . . . . .. ..
-7-
It is another significant feature of recursive function theory
that the above three notions of reducility of decision procedures are
all equivalent (cf. Post and Kleene [19541, p.379) and hence, no generality
is lost in considering sets of natural numbers that are relatively
recursive versus sets of natural numbers that are Turing reducible in
discussing results on degrees of unsolvability.
Let us next denote the fact that a set A is recursive in a set
B by the relation A < B . Then it can be shown* that for sets of-R
natural numbers the following items are true:
(i) VA[A < A]
(ii) VAVBVC[A < RB .A. B < C) => A < C1-A R -R
If we mean by A RB that both A < RB and B < BA, from items
(i) and (ii) we see that = is an equivalence relation among sets of
natural numbers fram which the following definition can be obtained.
Definition IV: The degree of unsolvability, with respect to
< R, of a set A is defined to be:
[A] ={BC N: A RB) dgA
In terms of the definition, the following facts concerning
degrees of unsolvability can be derived.
*Cf. Rogers [19671 p.78 or Schoenfield [1971] p.44 .
-8-
Proposition II.1 Allow A and B to be sets of natural
numbers. Then
(i) A R B <=> dgA = dgB
(ii) If a < b means that for some A and B a =dgA and
b=dgB, then dgA < dgB <=> A < B and dgA< dgB <=>-R
(A < RB -A. B RA)
We may view the concept of degrees of unsolvability in terms
of a sort of relativized Church's Thesis, in that if A < B maintains-R
then we should think of A as at least as easy to, or alternatively not
more difficult to compute by effective means as B is to compute by
effective means. From this, A = B would mean that A and B are
equally as difficult or equally as easy to compute by effective means.
It can also be observed that the relation < on the equivalence classes
under =R partially orders the set of degrees, an,! thus if the degree
of a set is a measure of the difficulty involved in effectively computing
that set, then the higher the degree under the order < , the more
difficulty involved in effective computation.
If it should happen that set A is recursive, i.e., E -7,0 0
then under the relation of relative recursiveness, for any set B, it
happens to be true that A < RB , and thus that dgA < dgB for any dgB.
*The W-w classification is the first classification in the Arithmetic
Hierarchy. Cf. Lewis [1981] Appendix I or Rogers [19671 Ch.14.
-. p -
-9-
Therefore, there is a smallest degree denoted as 0, and 0 is the degree
of every recursive set A, i.e., every E -7 set. On the other hand,0 0
if for some set A, it were true that dgA = 0, then the set is recursive,
i.e., E 0-w . The latter assertion follows from the fact that for any
recursive set B, A < RB Therefore we have the following
Proposition 11.2 A set of natural numbers A, is E7r 0
if, and only if dgA = 0
From the proposition, and the relationship it provides between
a recursive set of natural numbers and its degree of unsolvability we
are led, by way of the structure of the partial order on the set of
degrees, to certain deeper qualities of the Arithmetic Hierarchy by
associating degrees of unsolvability with levels and compartments in
the hierarchy of sets of natural numbers.
Let us now remark that Theorem 1.1 can be given an interpretation
at this point in terms of the theory of degrees that we have just
developed. The gist of what Theorem I.1 says is that if we view a non-
trivial recursive rational choice function as a correspondence between
classes of recursive sets the graph of the correspondence cannot be
recursive. By means of Theorem 4 Sec.5 p.24 of Sc) enfield [1971], if
G is the graph of a relation r, then dgG = dgr, and thus a further
interpretation of Theorem 1.1 is that, in viewing C as a correspondence,
since graph (C) is not recursive and the degree of a recursive set is 0,
dgC * 0 by way of Proposition 11.2 . In terms of a relativized Church's
Thesis, if we sa. that dgC * 0 then we merely say that the level of
. . . .. .- -- - - - - -
S.| . S I 5 I 'S l * , lI S * _ . . . .
-10-
difficulty incurred in an effectively computable realization of C is
not as easy as that of the recursive sets. It is desirable however, to
say more than this, to which purpose we now turn to the main result.
III. The Minimal Degree of Recursive Rational Choice
The purpose of this section is to provide a statement on the
lower bound of the degree of unsolvability of recursive rational choice
by means of associating degrees with the classification of sets provided
by the Arithmetic Hierarchy. Observe first, that an alternative means
of defining the components of the Arithmetic Hierarchy to that of using
Kleene strings*, as was done in Lewis [1981], can be obtained by
defining the En and Tn sets inductively as follows:
(i) The S-n sets are the recursive sets.0 0
(ii) A set is E if it can be defined as:
x EA <=> 3yk(,y) E B]
for B, a Tr set.
n
(iii) A set is nn+l
X EA <=> Vy[(x,y) E ]
for B, a E set.n
*A Kleene string is a quantified expression in the first order predicatecalculus of a recursive predicate on IN.
-11-
From this defining framework it is possible to prove the following
propositions by means of induction on the arity of the set*, and give
trules for when sets are E or w.n n
Proposition III.1: If A is Z (r) and B is defined byn n
X E B <> T(X) E A where T is a recursive function, then B is E n(wn).
Proposition 111.2: If A is E or Yt for some m < n,m- m
then A is E and wt.n - n
Proposition 111.3: If A is n(wn), then 11-A is n(E n).
Proposition III..: If A and B are En(w), then A U B
and ArlB are E (w).n n
The first three propositions are in fact properties of the Arithmetic
Hierarchy, and the last says that per fixed arity, the E and it setsn n
are closed under set operations. These properties are in turn useful in
enabling one to evaluate the degrees of the E and wn sets.n n
Lemma 111.5: A set of natural numbers A is E if andn+l
only if for some set B, A < ReB** and B is w n-- n
*The arity of a E or 7r set is n.n n
The proofs are found in Schoenfield [19711 pp.31-32.
**The relation A < ReB reads A is recursively enumerable in B and
weakens A < B . Cf. Schoenfield (1971] p.24.R
-12-
Proof: By definition, A < ReB is true when X E A <=> y[(X,y)] E B].
If A is E then by (ii) of the inductive definitions, A - ReB
n+l R
for Bir.pnConversely, suppose that A < B, and B is w and suppose
Re n
I indexes A in B, then X E A <[> XC E <=>B.A. X E Ta ,
where T yields elements in accordance with I with an oracle forI
B , and a is a finite sequence of elements in B. One can visualize
BTI as a Turing machine that lists the elements of A using information
about the set B. To see that A is En+l, it will suffice to show thata a
a C B and X E TI are En+ I . By way of Proposition III.4, X C TI
has a recursively enumerable graph and thus is EI. By Proposition 111.2
it is therefore Z n+. We observe next that a C B <=> Vn < ln(a)*
[Va(n) = TB(n)] where V and TB are the definig predicates of
a and B respectively. Since a is finite, by Proposition 111.4, it
will do to show that X = T B(n) is E n+I. However, the following
expression verifies this by way of Proposition III.4 directly:
x = B(n) <=> [(TB (n) = A. n EB).V. B(n) = 0A. n E B)] Q.E.D.
4 The next definition, when applied to the set of degrees, will
provide us with the means to make an assertion about the relative
* difficult in effectively computing recursive rational choice.
*1n(a) is the length of a
*
4 4
-13-
Definition V: For a set of natural numbers A , define the jump
or completion of A as:
A' = { O A(x)= I = X X E TAx X
A Awhere TA is the domain of A, for 0 a defining partial predicate
x X X*
for the set A with Gdel index X
The completion of a set A always has the property that A' < A,-Re
and that A < A' Furthermore, if A < B then A' < B'. From this-R R -R
latter fact when we consider the completion of the elements of the set
of degrees, starting with the minimal degree 0 , we can form an ascending
chain: 0 < R0 ' Of' < ' 0''O< R''' s''' < R0 '''"'' R0 1
This is significant in the light of the next lemma.
nLemma III.6: Let A be a E or a w set. Then dgA < 0,n n-
for 0n the nth completion of the recursive degree 0.
Proof: By induction, if we consider n = 0, if A is E - 0o
the result is trivial as dgA = 0 necessarily. Assume then that the
Lemma is true for wn sets, then from taking Lemma 111.5 forward, andn
by the properties of the completion operator if A were E n+l~ and B""
were rn A < B implies that dgA < dgB < On. The case for E setsn - - - n
can be obtained from Proposition 111.3 by means of the same argument. Q.E.D.
* Cf. Rogers [1967], p.132, p.135, and p.255.
tCf. Rogers op cit Theorem 1(a), p.255.
-14-
Definition VI: A set is said to be a complete Z set (or completen
wn set) if A is E (or wn), and if B is an arbitrary E set
(or w set) B < RAn -
We now demonstrate the main result of the present paper.
Theorem III.T : Allow C : F Fi to be a nontrivial recursive
rational choice on a recursive space of alternatives <R(x), :F >
R
derived from the recursive metric space of R n, M(IRn) for R(X), the
recursive representation of a compact, convex subset of Rn. Then for
any fixed choice from (F) of full domain, the degree of unsolvability
of graph (C) and therefore that of C , viewed as a correspondence on
02* sequences in (F) cannot be less than 0
Proof We begin with the observation that the following
concept of strong reducibility implies general recursive reducibility
of Df. I.
Definition VII: Allow l and 0 to be elements of U P(INJ)*j12
such that *i is n-aky, and 2 is m-dky. Then i is strongly
reducible to 9 written 9 << 9 if there are partial recursive2 1 2
n-4Ay functions fl...' fm for which 0 C Xt(X...,X) (f
*** fm(X 1""'Xn)
We next observe that the following concept of strictness implies
completeness as described in Df. VI.
I|
-15-
Definition VIII: An element of U p(jJ) , is said to be
strictly 7K (or EK) if 0 is VK (or EK), and if any other
A E U P(IN J ) is such that A << .
jEIN
Then, from the fact that strong reducility implies general recursivereducibility if a relation is strictly fK (or K ), then its graph,
in accordance with Df. VI is a complete wK (or E K) set. We have
shown in Lewis [1981], Theorem IV.4, however, that the non-recursiveness
of the graph of a recursive rational choice function per fixed choice of
full domain, occurs in fact because its codomain is strictly E2' and thus
in light of the above equivalence, the codomain of graph (C) is a restriction
of graph (C), i.e. codomain graph (C) C graph (C) in the sense of Df.X
of Lewis [19811, it follows that the degree of unsolvability for graph (c)
cannot be less than the degree of unsolvability of the codoamin. For,
allow graph (r) to be the codomain of graph (C). Then from Theorem 4
of section 5, p.24 of Schoenfield [1971], dg(r) - dg(graph (r)) and
2since dg(graph (F)) = 0 by Lemma 111.6 if graph (r) is a complete 22
set, then, from the fact that r C C, graph (C) = graph (r) U graph (C - F)
and by Proposition 111.2 and Proposition 111.4 applied in successsion,
* U P(N ) is the class of all relation on IN.jem,
tThis is Church's A-notation, and AXO(x) is read "the partialfunction <X,y> that gives y as a value when X takes an integervalue.
=~
L,"
-16-
dg(graph (C)) > 02. The assertion for C viewed as a correspondence
from F R to F follows from another application of Theorem 4 ofR R
Schoenfield, by which dg(graph (C)) = dgC and thus dgC _ 02. Q.E.D.
We have not, as of yet, verified a somewhat natural conjecture
that the degree of unsolvability of a recursive representation for
2rational choice can be no more than 0 If true, by precisely bounding
the degree of recursive rational choice in this fashion, further connections
would be possible within the realm of contemporary theoretical computer
2science, as 0 happens to be the degree of unsolvability of the inherent
ambiguity problem of computer science, and also coincides with the
decision degree of finite classes*.
*Cf. A. Ready and W. Savitch, "The Turing Degree of the Inherent
Ambiguity Problem for Context-Free Languages", Theoretical ComputerScience, Vol.1, L19761, pp.77-91, and Rogers [1967], pp.264-265.
CI
-17-
References
Kleene, Stephen Cole, and Enil L. Post [19541, "The Upper Semi-Latticeof Degrees of Recursive Unsolvability", Annals of Mathematics,Vol. 59, pp.379-402.
Lewis, Alain A., June [19811, "Recursive Rational Choice," Institute for
Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences Technical Report No. 355,Stanford University.
Post, Eil L. [19441, "Recursively Enumerable Sets of Positive Integers
and Their Decision Problems", Bulletin A.M.S., Vol.50, pp.28 4-316 .
Richter, Marcel K. [1971], "Rational Choice", in Preferences, Utility
and Demand, edited by John Chipman, et al., Harcourt Brace,New York, pp.29-58.
Rogers, Hartley Jr. [19671, The Theory of Recursive Functions andEffective Computability, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Schoenfield, Joseph R. [1971], Degrees of Unsolvability, North Holland
Mathematics Studies, No.2, American Elseviar, New York.
I.
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343. "Ex-Post Optimality as a Dynamically Consistent Objective forCollective Choice Under Uncertainty," by Peter Hammond.
344. "Three Lectures In Monetary Theory," by Frank H. Hahn.
345. "Socially Optimal Investment Rules in the Presence of IncompleteMarkets and Other Second Best Distortions," by Frank Milne andDavid A. Starrett.
346. "Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies," by Robert Aumann,Yitzhak Katznelson, Roy Radner, Robert W. Rosenthal, and BenjaminWeiss.
347. "Conditions for Transitivity of Majority Rule with AlgorithmicInterpretations," by Herve Raynaud.
348. "How Restrictive Actually are the Value Restriction Conditions,"by Herve Raynaud.
349. "Cournot Duopoly in the Style of Fulfilled Expectations Equilibrium,"by William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein.
350. "Law of Large Numbers for Random Sets and Allocation Processes,"
by Zvi Artstein and Sergiu Hart.
351. "Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics," by Kenneth J. Arrow.
352. "Shrunken Predictors for Autoregressive Models," by Taku Yamamoto
353. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," by Paul Milgrom and
John Roberts.
354. "Social and Private Production Objectives in the Sequence Economy"by David Starrett
355. "Recursive Rational Choice" by Alain Lewis
356. "Least Absolute Deviations Estimation for Censored and TruncatedRegression Models" by James Powell
357. "Relatively Recursive Rational Choice" by Alain Lewis
I.