kirill levchenko, alex c. snoeren, damon mccoy luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf ·...

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Tracking Ransomware End-to-end Danny Y. Huang Maxwell Matthaios Aliapoulios, Vector Guo Li Luca Invernizzi, Elie Bursztein, Kylie McRoberts, Jonathan Levin Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy

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Page 1: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Tracking Ransomware End-to-endDanny Y. Huang

Maxwell Matthaios Aliapoulios, Vector Guo LiLuca Invernizzi, Elie Bursztein, Kylie McRoberts, Jonathan LevinKirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy

Page 2: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Ransomware causes financial damages

Page 3: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Ransomware causes financial damages

Page 4: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Ransomware causes financial damages

Page 5: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Ransomware causes financial damages

How much ransomware revenue?

How to shut down ransomware?

Page 6: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Spam, compromised websites, etc

Page 7: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Page 8: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

All your files are encrypted!

Send 0.5 bitcoins to the following address.

175mBiaNSSHAhoCbpv25y1rJYK4A7d7d1b

Page 9: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

All your files are encrypted!

Send 0.5 bitcoins to the following address.

175mBiaNSSHAhoCbpv25y1rJYK4A7d7d1bCerber: median ~$1,000

Locky: median ~$1,800

Page 10: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

All your files are encrypted!

Send 0.5 bitcoins to the following address.

175mBiaNSSHAhoCbpv25y1rJYK4A7d7d1b

unique ransom wallet address

Page 11: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Victim’s money

Page 12: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Exchange

Victim’s bitcoins

Victim’s money

Page 13: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Exchange

Victim’s bitcoins

Ransom wallet address

Ransomware’s bitcoins

Victim’s money

Page 14: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Exchange

Victim’s bitcoins

Ransom wallet address

Ransomware’s bitcoins

Victim’s money

Page 15: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Exchange

Victim’s bitcoins

Ransom wallet address

Ransomware’s bitcoins

Victim’s money

Exchange

Ransomware’s money

Page 16: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Research questions

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- $16 million over two years, 20k unique payments

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% of revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% of affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Page 17: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Research questions

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- $16 million over two years, 20k unique payments

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% of revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% of affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Page 18: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% of revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% of affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Page 19: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% of affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Page 20: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Page 21: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

1

Page 22: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

1

2

Page 23: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

1 Blockchain Analysis

Page 24: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Page 25: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Page 26: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Page 27: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Page 28: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Page 29: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

known victim

0.5

Page 30: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

known victim

0.5

Page 31: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

known victim

0.5

Page 32: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

known victim

0.5

Page 33: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

known victim

0.5

1.0

1.3

Page 34: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

known victim

0.5

1.0

1.3

potential victim

Page 35: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

artificial “victim”

Page 36: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

artificial “victim”

0.001

Page 37: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

artificial “victim”

0.001

Page 38: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

artificial “victim”

0.001

1.0

1.3

potential victim

Page 39: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Total ransom received

USDper

month

Page 40: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Total ransom received$7.7m$1.8m

$69k$6.6m$100k

USDper

month

Page 41: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Fraction of revenue sent to exchanges

Potential liquidation at exchanges

$2.6 m

$24 k

Page 42: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

2 Reverse Engineering Cerber’s C&C

Page 43: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Cerber’s outbound UDP traffic

Infected host

IP: x.y.z.1

IP: x.y.z.2

IP: x.y.z.3

IP: x.y.z.254

Page 44: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Cerber’s outbound UDP traffic

Infected host

IP: x.y.z.1

IP: x.y.z.2

IP: x.y.z.3

IP: x.y.z.254me

two-week data

victim IPvictim ID

affiliate ID...

Page 45: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Number of infected IP addr per affiliate

Affiliate ID

Page 46: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

3% of affiliates caused 50% of infected IPs

Affiliate ID

Page 47: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

3 Summary

Page 48: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Summary

Tracked ransom payments for 10 ransomware families using co-spending wallet addr

Reverse engineered C&C protocol for Cerber ransomware

Key Methods

Page 49: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Summary

Tracked ransom payments for 10 ransomware families using co-spending wallet addr

Reverse engineered C&C protocol for Cerber ransomware

Key Methods

Page 50: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Summary

Tracked ransom payments for 10 ransomware families using co-spending wallet addr

Reverse engineered C&C protocol for Cerber ransomware

Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two years

Possible chokepoints: exchanges and affiliates

Key Methods Key Results

Page 51: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Summary

Tracked ransom payments for 10 ransomware families using co-spending wallet addr

Reverse engineered C&C protocol for Cerber ransomware

Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two years

Possible chokepoints: exchanges and affiliates

Key Methods Key Results

Danny Y. Huang — Postdoc at Princeton — http://hdanny.org

Page 52: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

4 Appendix

Page 53: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Ransom payments over time

Number of payments per day

Median ransom amount per day

(USD)

Page 54: Kirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy Luca ...yuxingh/static/oakland-18-slides.pdf · protocol for Cerber ransomware Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two

Potentially missing Locky’s ransom payments

Google resultsbinaries found

bitcoin payment