kim, kihyeon - internalism and externalism in epistemology

8/11/2019 KIM, Kihyeon - Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology

1/15

North American Philosophical Publications

Internalism and Externalism in EpistemologyAuthor(s): Kihyeon KimSource: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp. 303-316Published by: University of Illinois Presson behalf of the North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014469.

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2/15

American Philosophical

Quarterly

Volume

30,

Number

4,

October

1993

INTERNALISM

AND EXTERNALISM

IN

EPISTEMOLOGY

Kihyeon

Kim

A

HE

distinction

between

internalism

and

externalism

has

been

one

of the

most

widely

used

distinctions

in

current

epistemology,

one that has been applied both to accounts

of

epistemic

justification

and

to accounts

of

knowledge.

Unfortunately,

there

are

some

confusions

over

which

theories

are

internal?

ist

and which

theories

are

externalist.

The

main

goal

of

this

paper

is

to

show

that

there

are

three

components

of

epistemic

jus?

tification and

that the

internalism/external

ism

distinction

can

be

made

on

three

corresponding

dimensions. Once

the

three

di?

mensions

are

acknowledged,

we

will

be able

to

see

that

most

confusions

over

internalism

and externalism arise

from

conflating

the three

dimensions. I shall

begin

my

discussion

by

con?

sidering

some

examples

of the

confusions.

I. SOME EXAMPLES

OF THE

CONFUSION

The distinction between

internalism and

externalism

usually

goes

hand in hand with

a

contrast

between

traditional

epistemology

and

a

new

trend

in

epistemology.

Roderick

Chisholm

says

that the

usual

approach

to

the traditional

questions

of

theory

of

knowl?

edge

is

properly

called

internal or

inter

nalistic. 1

Laurence Bonjour

echoes this

claim

when he

says:

When

viewed

from the

general

standpoint

of the

western

epistemo

logical

tradition,

externalism

represents

a

very

radical

departure. 2

Epistemologists

usually

agree

to

regard

D. M.

Armstrong,

Alvin

Goldman,

Fred

Dretske,

and

Robert

Nozick

as

the

leading

externalist

radicals.3

According

to

the

simplest

definition of

ex?

ternalism,

as

offered

by

Armstrong4

and

Bon

Jour5, externalism is the view that what

makes

a

true

belief

knowledge

is

some

rela

tion

(e.g.,

causal

relation,

nomological

rela?

tion,

or

counterfactual

relation)

that

holds

between

the belief

state

and

the

situation

which makes the belief true.6

As

we

shall

see,

this criterion classifies

most

of the above

mentioned

accounts

as

ex?

ternalist.7

However,

according

to

it,

Gold?

man's

process

reliabilism

would

not

be

an

externalist

account.

Process

reliabilism

as?

serts

that

a

person,

S,

is

justified

in

believing

that

p

only

if S's

believing

that

p

is

produced

by

a

reliable

cognitive

process.8

Goldman

re?

stricts

the

extent

of

belief-forming

processes

to

cognitive

events,

i.e.,

events

within

the

or?

ganisms'

nervous

system. Thus, epistemic jus?

tification of

a

belief is defined

by

him

without

reference

to

the fact

that makes

the belief

true.

The

Armstrong-BonJour

definition,

therefore,

classifies

process

reliabilism

as an

internalist

analysis

of

epistemic

justification.9

Many

epistemologists

would be

unhappy

about

this

consequence.10

This

unhappiness

seems

to stem

from

one

strong

intuition

about externalism.

The

intuition is

that,

if

the

epistemic

justification

of

a

belief

is

analyzed

in

a

way

that entails

a

high objective

prob?

ability

of the beliefs

being

true,

then the

analysis

is

externalist.

From

the

internalist's

perspective,

a

belief's

epistemic

justification

is

a

purely

internal

matter

in that

it is

to

be

described

without

reference

to

any

connec?

tion

with

the outside

world.

This is

clearly

ex?

pressed

in

Chisholm's

view of internalism:

According

to

this

traditional

conception

of

'internal'

epistemic justification,

there

is

no

logical

connection

between

epistemic

justifi?

cation

and

the

truth. 11

In

process

reliabilism,

a justified belief is a belief produced by a re?

liable

cognitive

process,

where

the

reliability

303

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3/15

304

/AMERICAN

PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

of

a

cognitive

process

is

a

propensity

of

pro?

ducing

more

true

beliefs

than false beliefs.

Therefore,

in

this

account,

a

connection with

the external world in terms of truth

(or

like?

lihood

of

being

true)

plays

a

crucial

role

in

the

analysis

of

epistemic justification.

For

this

reason,

many

epistemologists

think

that

proc?

ess

reliabilism

is

an

externalist

account

of


Unfortunately,

defining

externalism in

terms

of

the truth

connection

causes

a

prob?

lem

elsewhere. Keith

Lehrer

and

Laurence

BonJour both view the

truth

connection

of

beliefs

as

being

necessary

for

epistemic justi?

fication. According to Lehrer,

If S knows

that

p,

then S

is

completely

justified

in

accepting

that

p

in

some

way

that

is

not

defeated

by

any

false

statement...Undefeated

justification provides

a

truth

connection

be?

tween

the

mind

and the

world,

between

accep?

tance and

reality.

BonJour

says:

And,

if

our

standards

of

epistemic

justifica?

tion

are

appropriately

chosen,

bringing

it

about that

our

beliefs

are

epistemically justi?

fied will also tend to

bring

it

about,

in the

per?

haps

even

longer

run

and

with

the usual

slippage

and

uncertainty

which

our

finitude

mandates,

that

they

are

true. If

epistemic justi?

fication

were

not

conducive

to

truth

in

this

way,

if

finding

epistemically justified

beliefs

did

not

substantially

increase

the

likelihood

of

finding

true

ones,

then

epistemic

justification

would

be

irrelevant

to

our

main

cognitive

goal

and

of dubious worth.

The

truth-connection criterion

of the

exter?

nal

world, therefore, classify

the

accounts

by

Lehrer and

BonJour

as

externalist.

However,

they

are

two

of the

severest

critics

of

exter?

nalism.

Naturally,

their

own

accounts

of

epistemic

justification

often

count

as

models

of

internalism.

This is another confusion.

II. THE

INTERNAL

AND THE

EXTERNAL

What

should

we

conclude

from

the discus?

sion

so

far?

Should

we

conclude that inter?

nalism and externalism

are so

ambiguous

that it is hopeless to classify diverse episte

mological

accounts

in

terms

of

them?

I

be?

lieve

that

this

is

a

hasty

conclusion.

I will

show

that

there is

a

clear

concept

of the in?

ternal

in

the

relevant

epistemological

sense.

Being

internal

and

being

external

are

relative

concepts.

For

example,

the earth is

external

to

Venus,

but it is

internal

to

the

so?

lar

system.

This

suggests

that

any

classifica?

tion

of the

internal

and

the

external

must

define

a

unit

antecedently,

relative

to

which

the classification would

be made.

The

question

is,

then,

what is

an

epistemo?

logical

unit that should

dictate the

definition

of

the

internal

and the

external

in

an

epistemologi

cally

relevant

sense.

We

can

approach

an

answer

to

this

question

by considering

a

motivation

behind traditional epistemology.

Epistemology

is

interested in

distinguish?

ing,

in

a

principled

manner,

justified

beliefs

from

unjustified

beliefs,

and

instances

of

knowledge

from

instances

of

non-knowledge.

In

specifying

the

conditions of

epistemic jus?

tification

and

knowledge,

the

goal

of

maxi?

mizing

truth

while

minimizing

falsehood

plays

a

predominant

role. A

very

rough

guideline

for the

analysis

of

epistemic justifi?

cation

and

knowledge

is

that

a

belief

is

justi?

fied for

a

person

if

and

only

if her belief is

desirable

from the

viewpoint

of

seeking

the

above

goal.14

That

is,

epistemic

evaluation

governing

the

analyses

of

justified

belief

and

knowledge

is

guided

by

the

goal

of maximiz?

ing

truth and

minimizing

falsehood.

Setting

up

the

goal

of

epistemological

evaluation this

way

reveals

the

underlying

di?

chotomy

not

only

of

traditional

epistemology,

but

also of traditional

philosophy

in

general,

namely,

the world outside

a

cognitive

agent

versus

a

human mind that

strives

to

acquire

a correct picture of it. Given this standard

metaphysical

realist

assumption,

the

way

the

world is

and

the

way

the world is believed

to

be

by

a

cognitive

agent

can

diverge.

Once

our

fallibility

is

recognized,

a

truth-seeker

has

to

determine

which of her

beliefs

are

acceptable

from

the

truth-seeking

point

of view.

That

is

how

epistemology,

seen as

an

analysis

of

epistemic justification

and

knowledge,

gets

started.

As

Quine

says,

Doubt has

oft

been said

to

be

the mother of

philosophy. This has a true ring for those of us

who look

upon

philosophy

primarily

as

the

theory

of

knowledge.

For the

theory

of

knowl



4/15

INTERNALISM

AND EXTERNALISM

IN

EPISTEMOLOGY

/

305

edge

has

its

origin

in

doubt,

in

scepticism.

Doubt

is

what

prompts

us

to

try

to

develop

a

theory

of

knowledge.

The above sketchy outline of the general

framework

of traditional

epistemology

sug?

gests

that the

human

cognitive

system

rather

than the external

world,

which

is its

target,

is

the

entity

relative

to

which the

internal has

to

be

defined

in

epistemology.

This

suggests

the

following

definition:

X is internal

to

a

cognitive

agent

S

from

an

epistemic

point

of

view

if and

only

if

x

is

something

that

hap?

pens

within the

cognitive

system

of

S.

Unfortunately,

this

definition

is both

too

vague and too broad. It is hard to determine

what

exactly

is within

a

cognitive

system.

Does this include

only

those

happenings

within

the

brain,

or

does

it

also

include

the

proximal

stimuli such

as

retinal stimulation

and

tactile stimulation?

More

importantly,

the

above

definition

is

too

broad

because

not

all

the

things

that

happen

in

one's

cognitive

system

provide

clues for the

way

the world

is.

Notice,

for

example,

that

neuro-physiological

processes

involved in

cognition

are

clearly

within

the

cognitive system. However, they

are

not

internal

to

S

from

an

epistemic point

of view.

As

we

have

seen,

epistemology

en?

dorses the

dichotomy

between the

way

the

world is

and

the

way

the world

is

perceived,

believed,

or

thought

to

be. The

properties

pertaining

to

the

neuro-physiological

aspect

of

cognition

may

be

an

ontological

or

causal

foundation for the

existence of

states

like be?

liefs,

but in themselves

they

are

not

a

part

of

the

epistemic perspective

of

a

cognitive

agent

on

the world.

Neurological properties

cannot

be

grasped

by

S's

reflection,

and

therefore

they

cannot

provide

any

internal

clues

for

a

cognitive subject

about

the

way

the

world

is.

It

emerges

from the above

discussion

that

not

everything

that

happens

within the

cog?

nitive

system

of

a

cognitive

agent

should

count

as

internal

to

her from

an

epistemic

point

of

view.

Among

the

happenings

within

her

cognitive

system,

only

those

that

are

graspable

by

her

introspection

should

count

as

internal. The

following

definition

matches

the idea

of

the

internal

in

traditional

epistemology:

(I)

X is

internal

to

a

cognitive

agent

from

an

epistemic

point

of

view if

and

only

if X

is

introspectible by

her.

The categories of the internal and the exter?

nal

are

intended

to

be

mutually

exclusive

and

jointly

exhaustive.

Thus,

we can

derive

the

definition

of

the external

very

easily

from

(I):

(E)

X

is external

to

a

cognitive

agent

from

an

epistemic point

of view if and

only

if

X

is

not

internal

to

her.

Many

epistemologists

embrace

(I).

Here

are

some

examples:

Internalism

is

the view that the

justification

making properties of any justified belief must

be

(epistemically)

internal

to

the

mind

of the

subject

who

holds that

belief,

that he could

always

know such

properties

of his

belief

by

reflection',

that

is,

through

mere

introspection,

memory,

and

reason

(intuitive

and

deductive).

The internalist

assumes

that,

merely

by

reflect?

ing

upon

his

own

conscious

state,

he

can

for?

mulate

a

set

of

epistemic

principles

that

will

enable

him

to

find

out,

with

respect

to

any

possible

belief

he

has,

whether he

is

justified

in

having

that

belief.

The

internal,

in

the relevant

sense,

is

that

to

which

one

has

introspective,

thus

internal,

ac?

cess;

it includes

beliefs,

visual and

other

sen

18

sory

impressions,

and

thoughts.

What confers

justification

must

be internal

to

the

subject

in

that

she

has

a

specially

direct

cognitive

access

to

it.

It must

consist of

some?

thing

like

a

belief

or

an

experience,

something

that the

subject

can

typically

spot

just

by

turn?

ing

her attention

to

the

matter.

So

far

we

have

seen

that

the

definition

of

the

internal in

an

epistemologically

relevant

sense can

be

given quite clearly

in

terms

of

introspectibility,

and

that

this

definition

is

supported

by

the

fact

that

many

epistemolo?

gists

accept

this

definition.

Let

us

now

ask

what

sorts of

things

would be internal

and

what

sorts

of

things

would

be external

ac?

cording

to

(I).

The

classification

I

will

propose

in

the rest

of

this

section

is

by

no

means

conclusive.

A

conclusive

classification would

require

philo?

sophical

and

psychological

research

on

the

capacity

of human

introspection

and

on

the



5/15

306

/

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

nature

of the

things

to

be

classified.

Obvi?

ously,

this

goes

beyond

the

scope

of

this

pa?

per.

But

this

inconclusiveness

of

the

classification will not affect the main point of

this

essay.

Let

us

consider

why.

The

next

section

will

argue

that

an

episte?

mological theory

consists

of three

different

ingredients,

each of which

resides

on a

differ?

ent

dimension.

Depending

on

the

introspec

tibility

of the three

ingredients,

the

theory

can

be classified

either

as

internalist

or as ex?

ternalist

on

three different dimensions.

The

main

thesis of this

essay

is

that,

even

if

epistemologists

agree

on

what

is

internal and

what

is

external,

a

confusion

over

the

use

of

internalism

and externalism will

con?

tinue

to

arise when

they

conflate

the

three

dimensions

on

which the

internalism/exter

nalism

distinction

can

be made.

Moreover,

most

confusions

with

regard

to

the

use

of

in?

ternalism and externalism

are

due

to

the

conflation

of

one or more

of these dimen?

sions,

rather

than the lack of

a

proper

under?

standing

of

what

is

introspectible

and what

not.

This

is

why

the inconclusiveness

of

my

classification

of the internal

things

and the

external

things

will not affect the central the?

sis

of

this

paper.

Let

us now

turn

to

the clas?

sification of

the

internal.

Many

of

our

cognitive

states

such

as

beliefs

and

thoughts,

conative

states

such

as

inten?

tions

and

desires,

and

sensory

states

such

as

visual

impressions

and

auditory impressions

are

prototypical

examples

of what is internal

to

a

cognitive subject.

Some

of these

psycho?

logical

states

may

be hard

to

detect

by

intro?

spection.

Some

may

be

even

impossible

to

detect by introspection. This is

an

empirical

question

that

remains

to

be

answered,

but

whatever

the

answer

to

it

turns

out to

be,

psy?

chological

states

that

can

be detected

by

in?

trospection

are

internal

to

a

cognitive

agent.

For

simplicity,

I will

talk

as

though

all

psycho?

logical

states

are

introspectible,

and

are

therefore

internal

to

a

cognitive

agent.20

In

contrast,

proximal

stimuli

of

a

cognitive

system

such

as

retinal

stimulations

do

not

seem

to

be

introspectible,

and

are

therefore

external

to

a

cognitive

subject.

Facts of the

world

are

also external

to

her

because

they

in

themselves

are

not

introspectible

by

her

even

though

they

might

be

observable.

Truth

is also

external

to

her.

A belief

has

a

propo

sitional

content.

According

to

well-known

ac?

counts of truth, the truth-value of the content

of

a

given

belief

depends

either

on

its

corre?

spondence

with the

fact

or on

its

coherence

relation

with the

contents

of other

beliefs.

Either

way,

the

truth

of

a

belief

goes

beyond

the

introspection

of

a

cognitive

subject.21

It

is

controversial

whether causal

relations

among

psychological

states

can

be

in?

trospected.

The view

that for

external

events

causal

relations

are

not

observable is

com?

mon

in

the Humean

tradition.

However,

many philosophers dispute

this.22

Moreover,

even

if causal

relations

among

external

events

are

not

observable,

it

may

be that

causal

relations

among

internal

psychological

states

can

still be

detected

by

inner

observa?

tion,

that

is,

by

introspection.

The

non-ob

servability^of

causal

relations

among

external

events

may

be due

to

some

feature of their

being

external. For

these

reasons,

it

is

danger?

ous

to

make

a

sweeping

claim that

all

causal

relations

among

psychological

states

are

not

introspectible.

However,

again

to

have

a con?

crete

example

for later

discussion,

I will talk

as

if

all causal relations

are

not

introspectible.

The

rationale

for

doing

so

is

that those who

argue

for

the

observability

or

introspectibil

ity

of

causal relations

appeal

to

very

rare

in?

stances

of causal

relations.

This

suggests

that

most,

if

not

all,

causal relation

may

be

not

observable

or

introspectible.

How about

cognitive

processes?

They

are

the

most

recalcitrant

cases

for the

classifica?

tion.

Suppose

that

a

reasoning

process

is

de?

fined as a sequence of belief states with

introspectible

psychological

properties.

Thus,

on

this

view,

reasoning

processes

are

in?

trospectible,

and

therefore

internal

to

a

cog?

nitive

subject.

However,

vision,

which

is

a

robust

example

of

a

cognitive

process,

seems

to

include retinal

stimulation

as

one

compo?

nent.

Thus,

it

includes

a

part

that

is

not

in?

trospectible

and

which

is,

therefore,

external

to

a

cognitive

subject.

Moreover,

it

is

unclear

that

a

cognitive

process

can

be

defined

with?

out

reference

to

the

causal

relations

among

its

component

psychological

states. For these

reasons,

it

is

hard

to

say

whether

a

given

psy



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INTERNALISM

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307

chological

process

is internal

or

external.

It

is

even

harder

to

argue

for the

introspectibility

of

psychological

processes

in

general.

So,

I

shall

suspend any definite judgment

on

the

introspectibility

of

psychological

processes

and,

therefore,

on

whether

psychological

processes

of

a

cognitive

subject

are

internal

to

her.

Here

again,

I will talk

as

though

psy?

chological

processes

of

a

cognitive

subject

are

internal

to

her. The

rationale

for

doing

so

is that

most

her

psychological

states

are

in?

ternal

to

her

and,

therefore,

her

psychological

processes

that

are

sequences

of her

psycho?

logical

states

are

mostly

introspectible

by

S.

III. THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE

INTERNALISM/ EXTERNALISM

DISTINCTION

So

far,

I

have

been

talking

about

theories

of

epistemic

justification

and theories

of

knowledge

indiscriminately.

In

this

section,

I

will

talk

just

about theories

of

epistemic

jus?

tification. This does

not

mean

that

what

I

am

going

to

say

from

now

on

applies

only

to

theories

of


The frame?

work

I

will

develop

in

this

section

is

general

enough to apply to theories of knowledge as

well.23

A

simple

intuition

about

epistemic

justifi?

cation

is

that

a

person,

S,

is

justified

in

believ?

ing

that

p

only

if S's

belief

that

p

is based

on

adequate

grounds.

This

suggests

that

a

theory

of


has to

explain

what

it is for

a

belief

to

be based

on

adequate

grounds.

The

expression being

based

on

adequate

grounds

makes

reference

to

three

different

epistemic

concepts:

ground,

ade?

quacy,

and

being

based

on.

Therefore,

a

the?

ory

of


that tries to

analyze

being

based

on

adequate

grounds

must

include three

different

parts

that

an?

swer

the

following questions:

(1)

What

sort

of

things

in

general

can

be

grounds

for the

justification

of

beliefs

(e.g.,

external

facts,

non-doxastic

psychological

states,

doxastic

psychological

states,

psycho?

logical

processes)?

(2)

What

is

the

criterion

(or criteria)

of

ade?

quacy

that

a

ground

(grounds)

has

(have)

to

satisfy

in

order

to

yield

justification

for

a

particular

belief?

(3)

What is the

proper

basing

relation

that

must

hold

between

the

belief

in

question

and its

adequate

grounds?

A theory of epistemic justification can give

either

an

internalist

or

an

externalist

answer

to

each

of the

three

questions.

Moreover,

an

answer

to

one

question

is

independent

of

its

answers

to

other

questions.

This

suggests

that

the

internalism/externalism

distinction

with

regard

to

a

theory

of

epistemic

justification

can

be made

on

three different dimensions.

Let

us

consider

these three

dimensions

in

turn:

First Dimension: The Ground

of

Epistemic Justification

Theories of

epistemic

justification

differ

on

what

sorts

of

things

can

be

grounds

for the

justification

of

beliefs.

One famous

contro?

versy

focuses

on

whether

only

beliefs

can

be

grounds

for the

justification

of

beliefs,

or

whether non-doxastic

psychological

states,

e.g.,

experience variously

characterized

as sense

data,

the

given,

etc.,

can

be

grounds

as

well.

This

dispute

arises

because

some

epistemolo

gists

claim that

something

can

justify

a

belief

only

if it has a

propositional

content. Accord?

ing

to

their

view,

since

the

experience

itself

does

not

have such

a

propositional

content,

only

a

belief

about

the

experience,

not

the

experience

itself,

can

be

grounds

for

justifica?

tion of

experiential

beliefs.24

This

controversy

is

a

domestic

dispute

within the

family

of views that

identify

justi?

fying grounds

as

psychological

states,

doxas?

tic

or

non-doxastic.

They

all

assume

that

the

evidential

relation between

justifying

psy?

chological states at ground level and the be?

lief in

question

is crucial for the

epistemic

justification

of the

belief. This evidential relation

is

always

assumed

to

be

some

type

of

content

relation. Let

us

call

any

doctrine

that

incorpo?

rates

this basic

assumption

evidentialism.

This

contrasts

with the

view

of other

epistemologists

who

argue

that

what

is

cru?

cial for

epistemic

justification

of

a

belief

is

not

its evidential

relation

to

its

grounds,

but

how the belief is

produced

(i.e.,

which

cogni?

tive

process

is

responsible

for

the

production

of the

belief).

According

to

process

reliabi?

lism,

the

psychological

processes

of

a

cogni



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tive

agent,

as

opposed

to

her

psychological

states,

are

the

source

of

epistemic justifica?

tion.25

Therefore,

on

this

account,

the

sorts

of

things

that can be

grounds

for

justification

are

cognitive

processes.26

Let

us

call the

doc?

trine that

a

cognitive

process?the

one

that

is

responsible

for the

production

of

a

belief?

determines

the

justification

of

the belief

processism.21

The views

I

have considered

so

far

con?

cerning

the

nature

of

grounds

of

epistemic

justification

differ in their

details,

but

they

agree

that the

ground

of

epistemic

justifica?

tion is

something

internal. As

we

have

seen

in section 2, doxastic psychological states,

non-doxastic

psychological

states,

and

cogni?

tive

processes may

all

count

as

being

internal

according

to the

introspectibility

criterion.

For

these

theories,

the sorts of

things

that

are

grounds

for

justification

are

internal,

and

so

we

may

call them

ground

internalism.

Ground internalism

covers a

wide

range

of

theories of


that

some

epistemologists

regard

as

externalist theo?

ries.28

There

are

two

things

to

notice before

we

consider

some

examples

of

ground

exter?

nalism.

First,

ground

externalism does

not

claim

that

only

the

external

can

be

grounds

of

justification

of beliefs.

It

grants

that

grounds

for

inferential

beliefs,

i.e.,

beliefs

jus?

tified

by

other

beliefs,

can

be

something

in?

ternal

(grounding beliefs).

However,

ground

externalism is

distinguished

from

ground

in?

ternalism in that it allows

that,

for

some

be?

liefs,

their

justifying

grounds

can

be

something

external such

as an

external

fact.

Second,

most

ground

externalists

seem

to

be

interested not in

analyzing epistemic justifi?

cation,

but

only

in

describing

the

conditions

under

which

a

true

belief

qualifies

as

knowl?

edge.

They

include D. M.

Armstrong,

the

early

Goldman of A Causal

Theory

of

Knowing,

Nozick,

Dretske

and Peter

Unger.

According

to

Armstrong,

S's belief that

p

is

knowledge only

if

there is

some

specifica?

tion of S such

that,

if

any

person

is

so

speci?

fied and he further

believes

that

p,

then

p

is

the

case.

What is

crucial for

knowledge

in this

account is that the belief is related, in terms

of

a

nomological

relation,

to

the fact that

makes the

belief

true.29,30

The

nomological

relation

in

Armstrong's

account

is

replaced

by

a

causal

relation

in

Goldman's

account

and

by

a

counterfactual relation in

Nozick's31

and Dretske's32 accounts.

Finally, according

to

Unger,

[F]or

any

sentence

value of

p,

a

man

knows

that

p

if

and

only

if

it is

not

an

accident that

the

man

is

right

about its

being

the

case

that

p. 33

He

says

that

in

his

analysis

a

complete

absence of the

accidental

has

to

obtain

in

a

certain relation

concerning

the

man

and

the

fact?4

Here is

a

table that

shows

a

distinction

be?

tween

internalist

theories and

externalist

theories

on

the

ground

dimension:

Internalism

Externalism

Evidentialism

Armstrong,

Dretske,

Processism

Nozick,

Unger,

Goldman in

A

Causal

Theory

of

Knowing

Second Dimension: The

Adequacy

of

Grounds

The

general

information

concerning

the

sorts

of

things

that

can

be

grounds

is

insuffi?

cient

to

determine whether

a

particular

be?

lief is

justified

for

a

believer.

Any

theory

of

epistemic

justification

must

include

not

only

an

account of

the

sorts

of

things

that

can

be

grounds

for

the

justification

of

beliefs,

but

also

an

account

of which

grounds

are

ade?

quate

with

respect

to

the

justification

of

a

particular

belief.

One

question

that arises is

what

a

theory

of

epistemic

justification

takes

as

the

locus of

the

criterion

(criteria)

of

justificatory

ade?

quacy

of

grounds

for

a

particular

belief. The

second

way

of

distinguishing

internalism

from

externalism arises from the different loci

in which the

adequacy

criterion of

a

theory

resides.

First, consider,

for

example,

a

theory

that

claims

that

some

grounds

are

adequate

for

justification of the belief that p because those

grounds

in

fact

make

the belief

that

p

likely

to

be

true.

In

this

theory,

the

adequacy

crite



8/15

INTERNALISMAND

EXTERNALISM

IN

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309

rion is

the

objective

probability

that

the

con?

tent

of

the

belief in

question

is

true

given

the

contents

of

its

grounds.

Even

though

the

proper analysis

of

objective probability

is still

in

dispute,

it is

clear

that

any

adequate

ac?

count

would

treat

it

as

being independent

of

the

perspective

of

a

cognitive

agent.

After

all,

it should

be

objective.

Therefore,

such

a

the?

ory

is

externalist with

regard

to

the

adequacy

criterion.

I

will

call such

a

theory,

which

de?

fines

adequacy

criterion

independently

of the

mental

dimension

of

a

cognitive

agent,

ade?

quacy

externalism.

Next,

consider

a

theory

that

claims

that

some

grounds

are

adequate

with

respect

to

the

justification

of

the

belief

that

p,

because

the believer

thinks

they

make

the

belief

that

p

likely

to

be

true.

In

this

the?

ory

the locus of the

adequacy

criterion is the

thought

of

a

cognitive

agent.

Therefore,

ac?

cording

to

my

criterion of the

internal,

this

theory

is

internal

with

respect

to

the

ade?

quacy

of

grounds

because

thoughts

are

psy?

chological

states

that

are

supposedly

introspectible.

I

will

call this

type

of

theory

adequacy

internalism.

Now let

us see

how

this

distinction

can

be

applied

to

current

theories of epistemic justification.

Goldman's

process

reliabilism

claims

that

a

cognitive

process

is

an

adequate ground

for

the

justification

of the

belief

produced

by

it

only

when

the

process

is

reliable.

So,

accord?

ing

to

process

reliabilism,

the

ground

of

jus?

tification

is

a

cognitive

process

and

the

adequacy

criterion is

the

reliability

of the

process.

The

reliability

of

a

cognitive

process

is

defined in

terms

of its

propensity

of

pro?

ducing

more

true

beliefs than false

ones.

Ob?

viously,

this

propensity

is

not

introspectible

by

a

cognitive

agent.35

Therefore,

Goldman's

process

reliabilism

is

an

adequacy

externalist

theory.36

This

explains

why

many

epistemolo

gists

think

of

process

reliabilism

as

external?

ist. It

also

explains

why

Chisholm associates

externalism with

the

invocation

of truth in

the

analysis

of


and

why

that leads him

to

think

of

process

reli?

abilism

as

being

externalist.37

Lehrer's and BonJour's coherence theories

are

also

adequacy

externalist.

They

assert

that

a

belief

is

justified

for

a

cognitive agent

only

if it is

likely

to

be

true.38

Therefore,

their

theories

are

adequacy

externalist

for the

same reason

that

Goldman's

process

reliabi?

lism

is

an

adequacy

externalist

account.

Fur?

thermore,

according

to

coherentism,

the

criterion

of the

adequacy

of

the

grounds

for

the

justification

of

a

belief

is

the

coherence

relation

between the belief

and the

ground?

ing

beliefs,

which

comprise

all the

rest

of

the

cognitive

agent's

beliefs.

Even

though

the

no?

tion of

a

coherence relation

is

unclear,

it

is

supposed

to

be

a

logical

and

explanatory

re?

lation. If it

is,

the traditional

coherence the?

ory

of

justification

is

an

adequacy

externalist

theory. According

to

BonJour,

one

of

the

most

prominent

coherentists,

the

minimal

condition

for coherence

is

logical

consistency.39

The logical consistency of a set of beliefs is de?

termined

by

whether it is

possible

that

all

the

beliefs

are

true,

regardless

of what

a

cognitive

agent

thinks of the

relations

among

them.

Some

evidentialist

accounts

claim

that

a

piece

of evidence is

adequate

for the

justifi?

cation

of

a

belief

only

if

it

makes the

belief

objectively

probable.

These

accounts

include

the

theories

by

Swain and

Alston.40

On this

view,

grounds

for the

justification

of

a

belief

are

some

other

psychological

states

and these

grounds

are

adequate

for

the

justification

of

the

belief

only

if

they

stand

in

the

objective

probabilifying

relation

to

the belief.

Some

foundationalist

theories

assert

that

some

grounds

are

adequate

for

the

justifica?

tion of the belief

that

p

because,

if

those

grounds

had

not

existed,

then the

belief

that

p

would

not

have been

held.

The

theories

by

Nozick and

Dretske

I

introduced earlier

are

the

examples

of

this

type

of

theories.

These

foundationalist

accounts

are

also

adequacy

externalist

theories. For

the

truth-conducivity

relation expressed by the counterfactual is

defined

independently

of the

introspection

of

a

cognitive

agent

and,

moreover,

is not

in?

trospectible.

It is

not

hard

to

see

that

other

ground

externalist theories such

as

the

ones

by

Armstrong

and

early

Goldman

are

also

ade?

quacy

externalist

theories. In

them,

a

nomologi?

cal

implication

or

a

proper

causal

relation

between

a

belief

and

an

external

fact

are

crite?

ria of

adequacy

and

they

are

not

introspectible.

On

the other

hand,

a

foundationalist

the?

ory

that claims

that

some

grounds

are

ade?

quate

with

respect

to

the

justification

of

the

belief that

p

because

the

believer

thinks

that



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PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

those

grounds

make the belief that

p

likely

to

be

true

would be

an

adequacy

internalist

the?

ory.

For the

criterion

of

adequacy

depends

on

the thought, therefore, on something that is

supposedly

introspectible by

the

believer.

Richard

Foley's theory

is

an

example

of foun?

dationalist

adequacy

internalism.

According

to

him,

S

is

justified

in

believing

that

p

just

in

case

it

is

uncontroversial

to

assume

that

p.

This

requires

S

to

believe that

p

and

re?

quires

him

to

believe

it

with

more

confidence

than he

believes

propositions

that

can

be

used

to

argue

against

it. In

addition,

p

must

be such

that

S,

on

reflection,

would

believe

that in most relevant possible situations in

which

he

believes

p

his

belief would be

true

[my

emphasis].41

Other

examples

of

adequacy

internalist

theories,

that refuse

to

define

the

adequacy

criterion for


in

terms

of truth-connection with the external

world

as

expressed

by

objective probability,

in?

clude the theories

of

Chisholm

and Pollock:

The

internalist

assumes

that,

merely by

reflect?

ing

upon

his

own

conscious

state,

he

can

for?

mulate

a

set

of

epistemic principles

that will

enable him to find out, with respect to any

possible

belief

he

has,

whether he

is

justified

in

having

that

belief.

The

epistemic

principles

that

he

formulates

are

principles

that

one

may

come

upon

and

apply

merely

by

sitting

in one's

armchair,

so

to

speak,

without

calling

for

any

assistance.

In

a

word,

one

needs

only

consider

one's

own

state

of

mind.

...the internalist maintains

that

epistemic

norms

must

be

formulated

in

terms

of

rela?

tions between beliefs

or

between beliefs

and

nondoxastic internal

states

(e.g.,

perceptual

states), and he denies that these norms are

subject

to

evaluations

in

terms

of external

con?

siderations.

The

following

table shows

a

distinction be?

tween

internalist theories

and externalist

theories

on

the

adequacy

dimension:

Internalism Externalism

Adequacy

Chisholm,

Ground

Externalists,

Foley,

Process

Reliabilism,

Pollock

Lehrer,

BonJour,

Swain,

Alston

Third

Dimension:

The

Basing

Relation

A

cognitive agent's

having

adequate

grounds

for the

belief

that

p

is

still

not

suffi?

cient

to

make her

justified

in

believing

that

p.

The

belief

that

p

must

be

properly

based

on

its

adequate grounds.

This

relational

compo?

nent

constitutes the

third factor

of

epistemic

justification.

Since

it

was

pointed

out

by

Roderick

Firth,

most

epistemologists

have

ac?

cepted

it

as

a

necessary

condition

of

epistemic

justification.441

will

discuss

this

factor in

terms

of

an

example

given

by

Pollock:

A

man

might

have

adequate

evidence for

be?

lieving

that his

wife is

unfaithful

to

him,

[but]

he

might

systematically ignore

that

evidence.

However,

when his

mother,

whom he

knows

to

be

totally

unreliable in

such

matters

and

bi?

ased

against

his

wife,

tells

him

that

his wife is

unfaithful

to

him,

he

believes it

on

that basis.

The

belief is

defective,

because it

is

not

properly

based

on

adequate grounds

for

it.

However,

the

husband's

belief could

have

been

epistemically

worse

if

he had

not

had

any

evidence

at

all for

the belief. For

this

rea?

son,

Firth and

Foley

say

that the

belief

of

the

man in the

example

is

oropositionally,

but not

doxastically,

justified.

By

propositional

jus?

tification,

they

mean

the

presence

of

ade?

quate

evidence,

and

by

doxastic

justification,

they

mean

the

presence

of

adequate

evidence

and

a

proper

basing

relation

between

the

be?

lief

in

question

and

the

adequate

evidence.

However,

to

make

such

a

distinction

be?

tween two

different

senses

of

epistemic justi?

fication

is

misleading.

For,

according

to

our

common

intuition

concerning

the

use

of

the

term epistemic justification, it is more

natural

to

say

that the

husband's belief

in

the

example

is

plainly unjustified.

We

have

a

strong

intuition

that,

even

if

he has

adequate

grounds

for

the belief

that

p,

if

he believes that

p

on

some

odd

basis,

then he

is

not

justified

in

believing

that

p.

For

this

reason,

Pollock's

distinction between

justifiable

belief and

jus?

tified

belief

captures

the

intended distinction

more

naturally

than

the

one

between

propo?

sitional

justification

and doxastic

justifica?

tion.

And

a

theory

of


is interested

in

the

analysis

of

justifiedness

of

a

belief

rather

than

in the

analysis

of



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/AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

52

tion

of

beliefs.

For this

reason,

we

cannot

tell

whether BonJour

is also

a

connection

ex?

ternalist

or

not.

Connection externalism includes all the

theories

by

Ground

Externalists

and the

theories

by

Firth,

Goldman,

Feldman and

Conee,

and

Alston.53

In Ground

Externalist

theories,

a

belief

is

connected

to

an

external

fact

in

terms

of

a

nomological

relation,

a

counterfactual

relation,

or a

causal

relation.

These relations

are

not

introspectible

as we

have

seen

already.

Any

processist

account,

including

Gold?

man's

process

reliabilism,

has

a

built-in

exter?

nalist analysis of the basing relation. On that

view,

justified

belief

is

a

belief

that is

pro?

duced

by

an

adequate

cognitive

process

and,

therefore,

the

connection

between

the

belief

and

its

adequate

grounds

is

a

production

re?

lation.

Production

is

a

causal

process.

Hence,

any

processist

account is

a

connection

exter?

nalist

account.

Alston,

and Feldman

and Conee

offer

ex?

amples

of

connection

internalist

accounts

from evidentialism.

According

to

them,

the

required basing relation that

must

hold be?

tween

evidential

psychological

states?

grounds

of

epistemic

justification?and

the

belief

in

question

is

a

causal relation.

Alston

says,

The

ground

of

a

belief

is what

it is

based

on....

And

presumably

these

are

rela?

tions

of

causal

dependence 54

[my

emphasis].

Feldman's and Conee's

view,

interpreted

in

the

way

relevant

to

our

current

discussion,

is

that

S is

justified

in

believing

that

p

only

if

the

adequate

evidence

is

S's basis

for believ?

ing

that

p

in

the

sense

that S

uses

the

evi?

dence

to

form

the

belief

that

p.55

However,

when

an

evidentialist

account

is

a

connection-externalist

account,

it

can

also

count

as

a

processist

account.

According

to

an

evidentialist

account

that

is connection

externalist,

a

belief

is

justified

just

in

case

the

belief

is

caused

by

adequate

evidence

for the

belief.

Being

caused

by

adequate

evidence

is

equivalent

to

being

produced

(or

sus?

tained)

by

a

cognitive

process

that

takes

the

adequate

evidence

as

an

input.

This is

why

evidentialist

accounts

that

are

connection-ex?

ternalist

are

processists

as

well.

One

important

lesson

we can

learn

from

the

above

discussion is that

evidentialism

and

processism

are

not

mutually

exclusive. An

ac?

count that is evidentialist in its analysis of

grounds

of

epistemic

justification

can

be?

come

processist,

when it

adopts

an

externalist

analysis

of

the

basing

relation.

Summarizing

my

discussion

of

the internal

ism/externalism distinction

on

the

connec?

tion

dimension,

all the Ground Externalist

theories

are

connection

externalist and

all

the

processist

account

are

connection

exter?

nalist

as

well.

Evidentialist

accounts

can

be

either connection

internalist

or

externalist.

However,

when

they

become

connection

ex?

ternalist,

they

can

also

count

as

processist.

The

following

table shows the distinction be?

tween

connection internalist theories

and

connection externalist

theories

across

all

three dimensions

of

the


distinction:

Internalism Externalism

Ground

Adequacy

Evidentialism,

Processism,

including

all

AI theories

and

all

CI

theories

Chisholm,

Foley,

Pollock

Armstrong,

Dretske,

Nozick,

Unger

Goldman

in

A

Causal

Theory

of

Knowing

All GE

theories,

Process

Reliabilism,

Lehrer,

BonJour,

Swain,

Alston

Connection

Evidentialism

Proper

(Foley, Lehrer,

BonJour)

All GE

theories,

Processism

proper,

Evidentialist

Processism

(Alston,

Swain,

Feldman

and

Conee)

This table

suggests

that

the

classification

of

internalism

and

externalism

can

be

a

matter

of

degree.

If

a

theory

is

externalist

across

all

three

dimensions,

it

is the

most

externalist.

A

theory

that

is externalist

on

two

dimensions

will

be

more

externalist

than

the

one

that is

externalist

only

on

one

dimension.

According

to



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INTERNALISM

AND

EXTERNALISM

IN

EPISTEMOLOGY

/

313

this

criterion,

theories

by

Armstrong,

Dret

ske, Nozick,

and Goldman

are

the

most

ex?

ternalist theories.

This

explains

why

their

theories are usually regarded as paradigms of

externalist theories. Goldman's

process

reli?

abilism

is

externalist

to

a

high

degree

because

it

is externalist

on

two

dimensions.

On the other

hand,

Foley's

theory

is

on

the

other

extreme.

His

theory

is internalist

throughout

all

three dimensions.

This

out?

come

seems

to

go very

well

with

Foley's

own

claim that

his

theory

is

purely

subjective

in

the

sense

that

everything

about

epistemic

justification

is determined

by

what

is

given

to

the

perspective

of

a

cognitive agent.56

Lehrer's and

BonJour's

theories

are

less

in?

ternalist than

Foley's,

but

they

are

highly

in?

ternalist because

they

are

internalist

on

two

dimensions.

One

advantage

of

understanding

the three

dimensions

of

the


distinction

as

expressed

in the above table is

to

help

clarify

some

confusions

that have

af?

flicted

current

epistemology.

Let

us

go

back

to

the

examples

of the definitions of internal?

ism

and

externalism

which

we

considered

at

the

beginning

of this

paper.

We have seen

that

Armstrong

and BonJour defined

exter?

nalism

as

the

view

that

analyzes

the condi?

tions

of

knowledge

or


in

terms

of

a

relation between

a

belief

state

and the

fact that

makes

the belief

true.

This

definition seemed

to

have

a

problem

because

process

reliabilism,

which

many

epistemolo

gists

think of

as an

externalist

theory,

turns out

to

be

internalist

according

to

this definition.

Now

we can see

that

the above

problem

is

only apparent. It stems from the conflation of

two

dimensions

of

epistemic

justification,

namely

the

ground

dimension and

the

ade?

quacy

dimension.

Armstrong

and

BonJour

provide

a

definition

of

externalism

that fo?

cuses

on

whether

a

relation

to

an

external

fact

plays

a

crucial

role in

a

theory's

analy?

sis of

knowledge

or

epistemic

justification.

With

the

same

focus,

Goldman

himself

was

inclined

to

see

his

process

reliabilism

as

in?

ternalist.57

On

the other

hand,

those who

are

unhappy

about

classifying

process

reliabilism

as

internalist

focus

on

the

adequacy

dimen?

sion.

Seen

from that

dimension,

epistemic

theories that invoke a truth-connection as a

necessary

condition for

epistemic justifica?

tion

or

knowledge

are

externalist. This makes

process

reliabilism externalist. Chisholm's

definition

of

externalism

in

terms

of

truth

con?

nection

is

a

clear

example

of this

attitude.58

An

analogous

dilemma arises

when the

adequacy

dimension

is

conflated

with

the

di?

mension

of

basing

relation.

If the truth

con?

nection,

which

is the

outcome

of

applying

the

introspectibility

to

the

adequacy

dimension,

is taken

as

the universal

criterion

of

external?

ism,

Lehrer's and

BonJour's

theories

of


are

classified

as

exter?

nalist.

However,

their

theories

are

usually

mentioned

as

typical examples

of internalism

in

current

epistemology.

Here

again,

the

di?

lemma

is

merely

apparent.

One

of

the

most

controversial issues in

current

epistemology

is whether

a

recognition

of

the

support

rela?

tion

between

a

belief

and

its

adequate

grounds

is

necessary

for

the

justification

of

the

belief.

This

issue is

often

addressed

as

the

debate between internalism and externalism.

Clearly,

this

distinction

concerns

the

connec?

tion factor of

epistemic

justification.

Seen

from this

perspective,

Lehrer's and BonJour's

theories

are

internalist. Whether

they

are

in?

ternalist

or

externalist

on

the

adequacy

di?

mension is another

question.

IV.

SUMMARY

I

argued

that

introspectibility

is the

proper

epistemological

criterion

of

the

internal.

I

also argued that theories of epistemic justifi?

cation

or

knowledge

can

diverge

on

three dif?

ferent dimensions.

This

depends

on

how

one

analyzes

the

three

different

components

of


or

knowledge,

namely,

the

grounds

for

a

belief,

the

adequacy

of

the

grounds

for

the

belief,

and

the

basing

relation

between

the belief and

its

grounds.

I

argued,

on

this

basis,

that

internalism and

externalism

can

be

distinguished

in

accordance with

each

component

on

three

different

dimensions.59

University of

Oklahoma

Received

February

4,1993



13/15

314

/

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL

QUARTERLY

NOTES

1.

Roderick

Chisholm,

The

Indispensability

of

Internal

Justification,

Synthese,

vol. 64

(1988),

pp.

285-96

(see

p.

285).

2. Laurence

BonJour,

The Internalist

Conception

of

Epistemic

Justification,

in Peter A. French et al.

eds.,

Midwest Studies

in

Philosophy

vol.

5: Studies in

Epistemology

(Minneapolis: University

of

Minne?

sota

Press,

1980),

p.

56.

3.

D. M.

Armstrong,

Belief,

Truth,

and

Knowledge (Cambridge:

Cambridge University

Press,

1973);

Alvin

Goldman,

A

Causal

Theory

of

Knowing,

The Journal

of Philosophy,

vol.

64

(1967),

pp.

355-72;

Fred

Dretske,

Conclusive

Reasons,

Australasian Journal

of Philosophy,

vol.49

(1971),

pp.

1-22,

reprinted

in

Marshall Swain

and

George

Pappas

eds.,

Essays

on

Knowledge

and

Justification

(Ithaca,

NJ: Cornell

University

Press,

1978)

and

Knowledge

and the Flow

of Information

(Cambridge:

MIT

Press,

1981);

Robert

Nozick,

Philosophical

Explanations

(Cambridge,

MA: Harvard

University

Press,

1981),

chapter

3.

4.

D. M.

Armstrong,

op.

cit.,

p.

157.

5.

L.

BonJour,op.

cit.,

p.

55.

6. The well-known minimal condition for

knowledge

is that a

person,

S,

knows that

p

only

ifS believes that

p

and

it is

true that

p.

Given

this,

modern

epistemology

has

focused

on

other

conditions that

must

be

satisfied

for

a

true

belief

to

qualify

as

an

instance

of

knowledge. Epistemic justification

has been

the

most

popular

candidate

for

this

third condition

of

knowledge,

but

a

number

of

epistemologists

have

attempted

to

analyze knowledge

without

invoking epistemic

justification.

In

this

paper,

I

will

discuss diverse

episte?

mological

theories without

worrying

very

much about

whether

or

not

they

are

theories

of

epistemic

justification.

7.

See section

3.

8.

Alvin

Goldman,

What

is

Justified

Belief?,

in

Justification

and

Knowledge,

ed.

George

Pappas

(Dordrecht:

Reidel,

1979).

9.

Actually,

this

iswhat Goldman

wants.

See,

ibid.,

p.

182.

10. See, for example, L. BonJour, op. cit., p. 57, especially fn. 7.

U.R.Chisholm,op.

cit.,p.286.

12. Keith

Lehrer,

Theory of

Knowledge (Boulder:

Westview

Press,

1990),

pp.

138-43.

13.

L.

BonJour,

op.

cit.,

p.

8.

14. I

am

not

making

the controversial claim that

a

belief

is

justified

only

if

it

has

an

objectively high

probability

of

being

true.

(See

Stewart

cohen,

Justification

and

Truth,

Philosophical

Studies,

vol.

46

(1984),

pp.

279-96

and John

Pollock,

Reliability

and Justified

Belief,

Canadian

Journal

of Philosophy,

vol.

14

(1984),

pp.

103-14).

What

I

say

is

compatible

with

the

subjectivist

claim

that

S is

justified

in

the belief

that

p

if and

only

if S

does her best

in

seeking

truth

with

respect

to

believing

that

p,

regardless

of

the

actual

probability

of

p's

being

true.

15.

W.

V.

O.

Quine,

The Nature

of

Natural

Knowledge,

in

Mind and

Language

ed.,

Samuel

Guttenplan

(Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

1975), p.

67.

16.

Ernest

Sosa,

The

Coherence

of

Virtue

and

the

Virtue

of

Coherence,

Synthese,

vol.

64

(1985),

pp.

3-28,

reprinted

in

Knowledge

in

Perspective (Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

Press,

1991),

p.

193.

17.

R.

Chisholm,

op.

cit.,

p.

285.

18. Robert

Audi,

Causalist

Internalism,

American

Philosophical

Quarterly,\o\.26 (1989),pp.309-20,p.

309.

19.

William

Alston,

Epistemic

Justification

(Ithaca:

Cornell

University

Press,

1989),

pp.

4-5.

20. For

an

example

of

a

view

that takes

psychological

states

as

internal,

see

the

quotations

from

Audi

and

Alston

on

p.

9

of

this

essay.

21.

For

the claim

that

detecting

coherence

among

beliefs

goes

beyond

human

cognitive capacity,

see

Hilary

Kornblith,

The

Unattainability

of

Internalist

Coherentism,

in John

Bender

ed.,

The Current

State

of

the

Coherence

Theory:

Critical

Essays

on

the

Epistemic

Theories

of

Keith

Lehrer and Laurence

BonJour,

with

Replies

(Dordrecht:

Kluwer

Academic

Publishers,

1989),

p.

209 and

Christopher

Cherniak,

Minimal

Rationality (Cambridge:

MIT

Press,

1986),

chapter

3.



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INTERNALISM

AND

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/

315

22. See

D.

M.

Armstrong,^

Materialist

Theory of

theMind

(London:

Routledge

and

Kegan

Paul,

1968),

pp.

97-99.

See also Evan

Fales,

Causation

and

Universals

(London:

Routledge,

1990),

pp.

42-46.

23.

When

necessary,

I

will

point

out

some

features that

pertain uniquely

to

current

theories

of

knowledge.

24. See, Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, reprinted in his Science, Perc

kim, kihyeon - internalism and externalism in epistemology

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