kcl mun study guide - nuclear weapons in north korea (07/02/2012)

KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012

UN Security Council: Nuclear Weapons in North Korea


UN Security Council: “Nuclear Weapons in North-Korea”

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Table of Contents Topic introduction ................................................................................................ 2

Brief country history .............................................................................................. 3

Weapons of Mass Destruction ................................................................................... 5

Current situation .................................................................................................. 7

Further reading .................................................................................................... 8



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Topic introduction In October of 2006, the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea joined the ranks of the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, China, Israel, India and Pakistan when it successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. It is an anomaly on the list – in a group comprised mostly of the world’s wealthiest and most influential states, the DPRK stands out as the only member to have recently suffered from a nationwide famine, the only member to separate its economy totally from the rest of the world, and the only member to shroud all government action in total secrecy. However, with another round of weapons testing in 2009, no seeming interest in dismantling its nuclear program, a very effective counterintelligence program, and infamously unpredictable foreign policy, it is not a country to be ignored. Though its ascent to prominence may have been bizarre and the nature of its power unprecedented, North Korea now represents a legitimate and alarming threat to peace. Most attempts to reconcile the situation diplomatically have faltered, but that does not mean that all hope is lost. The DPRK is currently engaged in a period of transition – ruler Kim Jong Il being gone, his son Kim Jong Un is trying to consolidate his inherited power into effective control over the state apparatus, and with the upcoming centenary of the birth of the country’s first President, Kim Il Sung, Pyongyang has pledged to place reinvigorated focus on economic development. These shifts could represent only nominal gestures, but could also be genuine opportunities to use international diplomatic leverage to reverse the state’s nuclear ambitions, and perhaps even bring it into the international fold. The obligation is on you as delegates to take full advantage of the present situation.



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Brief country history The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was born of several decades of abused, vague and frequently redefined sovereignty. After spending centuries operating as a united and independent Kingdom, Korea fell under Japanese occupation in 1905, when it was used for strategic positioning in the Russo-Japanese war. Five years after that, Japan strengthened its hold and formally annexed the entire peninsula, an era that ended with Japan’s defeat at the end of World War II.

Following the end of the war, the allied powers split Korea into North and South, with the USSR placing a communist regime in charge of all territories north of the 38th parallel, and the United States handling the South. This was in line with the plans that the powers had made two years previous, when they released the Cairo Declaration, pledging independence “in due course.” Neither occupying power permitted full independence for a time, with the Soviet Union allowing only communist rule, and the United States asserting the certitude of military government. Eventually, in 1948, the South and the North issued their own constitutions and proclaimed themselves the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), respectively. In the meantime, various attempts at unification of the two Koreas flailed and floundered.

The situation was further complemented by the international significance of the divide – the United States still had considerable military presence in the south, and the Soviet Union refused to accept the legitimacy of the ROK, declaring the North to be the only valid government on the peninsula. However, the balance of power shifted between 1948 and 1950, with America withdrawing troops from the ROK while the Soviet Union provided heavy assistance for the People’s Army of the DPRK.

The result was that when the north declared war, it relished in a series of decisive victories, and took Seoul quickly, decimating much of the ROK’s army. Tables turned with the entrance of the United States, and again with that of China. Eventually millions of foreign troops had become embroiled in the war, and the brief conflict proved very costly. A ceasefire was negotiated in 1951, with an armistice following two years later. This solidified the segregation of Korea into two states, and marks the start of the present era of Korean sovereignty.

Kim Il Sung, who had been placed in power several years earlier, continued to preside as the ruler of the DPRK. The 1950s and 60s witnessed the cultivation of North Korea’s policies of extreme isolationism, as Kim scaled back his allegiances to Beijing and Moscow, and directed his government’s attention inwards. What followed were a series of major economic failures and an ambitious prioritization of the development of heavy industry and other military technologies at great cost to quality of living. Population skyrocketed, increasing threefold between 1953 and 1993, which compounded resource scarcity in leading to



4 major food shortages. Political oppression abounded, and borders were closed for all intensive purposes.

At the same time, changes in the international political landscape necessitated that the DPRK ease some policies. Where it had once been able to depend solely on the USSR and the PRC, the downfall of the former and the advent of diplomatic relations between the latter and the ROK weakened Kim’s ability to hold out on some fronts. Most notably, North Korea had to accept its southern neighbor’s right to join the United Nations. This spurred a kick-start in diplomatic ties that reversed as soon as Seoul received word of Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Towards the end of his rein, Kim Il Sung groomed Son Jong Il to inherit his near-total control of the government. When Sung died in 1994, Jong Il assumed power and has remained in office until his death of illness in December 2011. He has presided over a country plagued by many serious issues and has adhered to most of the doctrines set in place by his father. In addition to the nuclear dilemma detailed below, Kim’s Korea has also come under heavy international criticism for human rights abuses, and has suffered from chronic and widespread malnutrition and a very low standard of living.



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Weapons of Mass Destruction In the aftermath of the Korean War, serious security concerns began to take hold of then-leader Kim Il Sung, and at this time he kicked off the country’s first serious nuclear ambitions. Having learned than Gen. Douglas MacArthur had considered a nuclear attack on against his country, and perturbed by the strengthening American presence in the region as well as the thawing relations between neighbors Japan and the Republic of Korea, Kim concluded that his country needed a nuclear deterrent.

He turned first to ideological allies Russia and China, but neither power saw the situation with the same urgency as Kim. As the politics of paranoia descended on Pyongyang and the era of isolationism began, the DPRK accelerated efforts to develop their own nuclear technology. However, it took several decades to actualize these ambitions – decades riddled with diplomatic failures on behalf of the rest of the world to prevent such an outcome.

After testing missile delivery systems that could conceivably be used to deliver nuclear payloads throughout the 1990s and 2000s, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, quickly proclaiming itself a nuclear power. Following a flurry of diplomatic fervor, heightened sanctions and near-universal condemnation, Pyongyang’s nuclear fever lulled for a few years before having a resurgence in April of 2009, when scientists detonated a second, more powerful device. This met with more condemnations and sanctions that seem to have had no visible effect. Reactors in the DPRK remain operational, and Robert Gates recently warned that the country might be only a few years away from compacting their weaponry such that it could be used to strike the United States.

However, as schizophrenic as North Korean foreign policy can be, these events did not come out of nowhere. For quite some time, North Korea’s nuclear plans were among the worst kept secrets in international politics. As early as the 1980s, American satellites observed the construction of reactors, and by the 1990s the CIA hypothesized that the DPRK might already have a warhead or two at their disposal. While the exact locations and status of specific reactors was often kept secret, Pyongyang has on many occasions stated its interests in establishing itself as a superpower with the capabilities of nuclear warfare, and their weapon tests have been quite public. The ease with which news of their nuclear progress has been disseminated has triggered widespread speculation that Kim wants to use their potential arsenal to command the attention of the rest of world and as a bar- gaining chip in negotiations with other states, notably America. It is worth noting that since the fall of the Soviet Union, the DPRK has attempted, with varying subtlety, to cultivate a relationship with the US, but that these efforts have been largely rebuffed. Policy in Washington D.C. towards Pyongyang has vacillated considerably between administrations, but could never be described as friendly. The most notable progress occurred in 1994 when the Clinton administration brokered a pact to halt the development of nuclear technology, but this was voided less than a decade later under President Bush.



6 Most if not all UN efforts to mitigate the situation have gone unheeded, or worse, provoked Pyongyang to cause more public mayhem. Six-party talks (featuring the PRC, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the US) have arguably proved the most fruitful, though almost all diplomacy has met with tepid responses at best.



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Current situation Seen in context, the DPRK’s nuclear scare is just another facet of its eccentric international personality and series of national insecurities. A nuclear stockpile represents an eccentricity that poses considerably more threat to the rest of the world than Pyongyang’s other garish or clandestine decisions, and as such it must be dealt with seriously and delicately. However, it is still important to take into account the singular character and narrative of the DPRK when discussing potential solutions to the nuclear dilemma. North Korea has shown itself to be a highly unusual state with highly unusual interests and motives. As such, it should not come as a surprise that the usual responses of sanctions and condemnations have failed to elicit the desired results.

Attempts to reason with Pyongyang diplomatically, by the UN and other actors, have been almost as inconsistent as Pyongyang’s own behavior, and have in retrospect often been fundamentally misguided. What a sound policy will entail is up to you as delegates to determine, but the past two decades have provided a plethora of examples of what not to do.

Thus, we encourage you to be creative. For a number of reasons, we may be looking over the precipice at a new era in North Korean history, which merits a new type of solution. In this session, the UNSC has been entrusted with the responsibility of addressing what could be the greatest threat to world peace since the Cold War, and your decisions could pave the path of integration to the global community, spurn another twenty years of deadlock, or provoke nearly unprecedented international calamity.



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Further reading North Korea’s Nuclear Program. The New York Times. 25 July 2011. <http:// topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/ nuclear_program/index.html>

Nuclear Weapons Program. FAS. 16 November 2006. <http://www.fas.org/ nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html>

Q&A: North Korea Nuclear Talks. BBC World News. 20 December 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699>

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program. CRS Report for Congress. 25 Octo- ber 2006. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/74904.pdf>

North Korea. CIA World Factbook. 16 August 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>

South Korea. CIA World Factbook. 16 August 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>

North Korea. Encyclopedia Brittanica. <http://www.britannica.com/EB- checked/topic/322222/North-Korea>

Korea. Encyclopedia Brittanica. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/693609/Korea>

North Korea Missile Tests Defy UN. BBC World News. 4 July 2009. <http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8134115.stm>

North Korea: Return of the Nukes. RT. 26 April 2009. <http://rt.com/usa/news/north-korea-return-of-the-nukes>

N. Korea Says it Has Restarted Nuclear Facilities. Fox News. 25 April 2009. <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,517875,00.html>

N. Korea Conducts Powerful Nuclear Test, Reportedly Fires Short-Range Missiles. Fox News. 25 May 2009. http://www.foxnews.com/sto-

ry/0,2933,521617,00.html

kcl mun study guide - nuclear weapons in north korea (07/02/2012)

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