justin, gale_identification and definition in the lysis_agph, 87, 1_2005!75!104

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ZUR DISKUSSION

Identification and Definition in the Lysis

by Gale Justin (Sacramento)

Abstract: In this paper, I make a case for interpreting the Lysis as a dialogue of defi-

nition, designed to answer the question of “What is a friend?” The main innovation

of my interpretation is the contention – and this is argued for in the paper – that So-

crates hints towards a definition of being a friend that applies equally to mutual

friendship and one-way attraction – the two kinds of friend relation very clearly iden-

tified by Socrates in the dialogue. The key to understanding how the two different

kinds of friendship can have a common definition is to appreciate that the property

of being a friend has a relational character.

What is the main question asked by Socrates in the Lysis? Some scholars have urged

that what Socrates means to ask is what feature intrinsic to persons who desire and

what features possessed by the objects of their desire explain the attraction between

the entities. Other scholars say that the question under consideration is, “What is

friendship?” – understood only as a reciprocal relationship between human beings.

Still others suggest that Socrates is primarily interested in the question of “What is a

friend?” – both in the case in which friendship is construed as a necessarily mutual re-

lationship and in the case in which it is not.1 I subscribe to the third view, but I part

company with its proponents on a central point. They believe that Socrates does not

offer any explanation of what is common to the two relations that he speaks of as

friends; whereas, I believe that he alludes in the Lysis to a single account of being a

friend that applies equally to mutual friendship and to the one-way attraction rela-

tion.2 It is, therefore, my concern to argue that (1) the question Socrates raises is the

1

The attraction theory is defended by Glidden 1981, 46; Mackenzie 1988, 26; Ir-win 1995, 54f.; Reshotko 1997, 4; Versenyi 1975, 187. The friendship view ismaintained by Annas 1977, 532; Adams 1992, 4; Bolotin 1979, 66; Gonzalez1995, 69f.; Guthrie 1977, 144f.; Pangle 2001, 305; Roth 1995, 2f.; Tessitore 1990,117; Vlastos 1969, 6 f. The question of “What is a friend?” is taken to be the mainquestion by Levin 1972, 239f.; Robinson 1986, 65f.; Santas 1977, 81f.

2 Consider Robinson 1986, 79: “Plato has not, in his [favorite] suggestion that τγαν ‘the good’ is φλον ‘friend’ to the intermediate made any provision whichwould allow this one-way attraction to become an element in a mutual friend-

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76 Zur Diskussion

definitional question of what is a friend; (2) he identifies, in the course of pursuing an

answer to that question, two kinds of friend relation; and (3) he provides the basis for

a definition which can explain both kinds of relation.3

1. Main Question of the Lysis

I begin with remarks on how the dramatic dimension of the dialogue lays the ground-

work for raising the definitional question. The general context is Socrates’ display

undertaken to advise the love-struck Hippothales on how a lover ought to go aboutendearing himself to his beloved. Socrates starts off his interrogation of Hippothales

by asking the youth to describe his tactics of amorous pursuit. After hearing that

Hippothales composes encomiums in honor of Lysis, Socrates points out that the be-

stowal of praise is likely to make the favorite harder to catch. Hippothales concedes

this and asks Socrates to advise him on what sort of seduction strategy he should use

to win Lysis’ affection. Hence, the entire subsequent discussion is oriented towards

answering the question that Hippothales’ request for assistance brings into the dia-

logue, namely, “How does a person become friendly to, προσφιλ«, (206c2) another

person?”

This exact question emerges explicitly when Socrates begins his first exchange with

Menexenus. Socrates asks Menexenus, who is already Lysis’ friend, how a person be-

comes the friend of another (212a6–8). Moreover, it is evident from the text at

216c1–217a2 where Socrates uses interchangeably the phrases “to become a friend”,

γγνεσαι φλον, and “to be a friend”, εναι φλον, that the lead question, “How doesone become a friend?” is a variant of the definitional question, “What is a friend?”

Socrates switches from one formulation to the other because both can be answered in

terms of exactly the same condition: whatever accounts for what it is to be a friend

also settles how one becomes a friend.4 Thus, the dramatic and the philosophic di-

mensions of the dialogue make reasonably clear that the main question of the dialo-

gue is (some version of) the definitional question, “What is a friend?”

My understanding of the main question may be contrasted with the approach ac-

cording to which the question under investigation is, “What is friendship?” The term

“friendship”, φιλα, appears only ten times in the dialogue; and, it never occurs in the

context of a question. Moreover, on the friendship approach Socrates’ examples of

one-sided attraction are hard to accommodate, since friendship is normally under-

stood to involve mutuality. But the examples of one-sided attraction qualify as friend

relations on the hypothesis (the neither good nor bad is friend to the good) that is So-

ship”. Robinson reaffirms this view in his overall interpretation of the Lysis forProject Archelogos: http://www.archelogos.phil.ed.ac.uk.

3 Nothing that I say hinges on a judgment about either for whom the Socrates-cha-racter speaks or what place the Lysis occupies in the chronological order of Pla-to’s dialogues.

4 Santas 1979, 155, notes the close connection between these questions.


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crates’ first candidate definition of the relation to be defined. So the specification of

that relation should not be an obstacle to including one-sided attraction within its

scope.5 These considerations count against taking the question, “What is friend-

ship?” to be at the heart of the Lysis.

The converse interpretative procedure which weights the examples of one-sided at-

traction more heavily than those of mutual friendship recommends treating the Lysis

as developing a theory of desire, pursuit, or ultimate value. There is, I think, one ma-

jor drawback to this procedure. Socrates typically seeks to clarify a value concept

with interlocutors who might be thought to know or have beliefs about the concept in

question. For example, he discusses courage with the distinguished general Laches,

piety with Euthyphro who is about to charge his own father with impiety, and the fine

with the considerably accomplished Hippias. But nothing about Lysis or Menexenus

uniquely qualifies them to discuss desire, pursuit, or ultimate value. So if the topic of

central concern in the Lysis is to have special relevance to the traits (especially the be-

liefs) of the interlocutors, as it typically does, it is not likely to be the nature of desire,

pursuit, or ultimate value. The drawbacks to the just now mentioned interpretative

procedures give us, therefore, good reason to try for an interpretation of the Lysis in

terms of the question, “What is a friend?”

2. Identification of Two Kinds of Friends

As the opening step of such an interpretation, I want to consider how Socrates’ ap-

proach to the poets’ views on friends reveals that the friend relation has two sub-kinds. Having suitably chastened Lysis and Menexenus, Socrates turns their atten-

tion to traditional poetic teachings on the subject of friends (214a3–4).6 He takes up

Homer’s view that god draws like to like and Hesiod’s contrary opinion that most op-

posite things are friends.

In following out the implications of Homer’s verse, Socrates claims to find in it the

“hidden meaning” that the good are friends. He then exclaims: “We are now able to say

who are friends.”7 The fact that Socrates “discovers” in Homer’s teaching (214d5–6)

5 Roth 1995, 11f., dismisses Socrates’ examples of an attraction of a person to hisopposite precisely because the relation cannot, he says, be mutual. But this is aproblem only if we assume at the outset, as Roth does, that the relation to be de-fined is reciprocal friendship.

6

I discuss below the interrogations of Lysis and Menexenus.7 Lysis, 214e1. I use throughout (sometimes slightly modified) the translation of W. R. M. Lamb, Plato (Cambridge, Mass. 1925), vol. 3, 7f. Sedley 1989 proposesthat Socrates’ exclamation contains the main question of the dialogue. It is, hesays, the identification question of who or what is a friend to whom or what? So-crates’ exclamation may, however, contain the particular question as to whoexemplifies the friend relation rather than the general question concerning thenature of the relation itself. To support his view of the exclamation as containingthe general, i.e., the main question of the dialogue, Sedley argues that the identi-


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the case of friendship between good people, when this certainly is not explicitly there,

suggests that he himself believes it to be, in a qualified form at least, a genuine example

of the relation to be defined. Furthermore, it is made plain that this kind of friendship

is a mutual relation, for the consideration that counts against it is the fact that the

friends who are similar (or self-sufficient) cannot benefit each other. Setting aside the

fact that this friendship cannot supply a definition of being a friend, I would point out

that Socrates needs at the beginning some agreed-on examples of the relation which the

interlocutors are attempting to define.8 I submit that the case of friendship between

good people serves this purpose. In a qualified form, it is a bona fide example of one

kind of friend relation. I discuss below additional evidence that Socrates accepts as one

kind of friend relation the mutual friendship of people who possess good qualities, af-

ter I consider an example of a second kind of friend relation that Socrates accepts. This

is an example that Socrates extracts from Hesiod’s teaching.

In the course of investigating Hesiod’s proposal that a person is attracted to his/her

opposite, Socrates mentions the attraction of an uninstructed person to a person

with a special expertise (215d7–8). He shows approval of this particular association

when he maintains that only a person who recognizes his own ignorance can love

knowledge (218a7–b3). The knowledge he has in mind is clearly not limited to the

knowledge that is attainable by individual inquiry, but encompasses knowledge that

can be acquired by associating with an expert. This supposition is supported by the

prominent use Socrates makes of the example of the sick person who is friendly to the

doctor. The sick person is attracted to medical knowledge in the doctor. 9

Furthermore, it is important to note that two moves by logic choppers (216a9)

pave the way for Socrates’ dismissal of the relationship of attraction between oppo-sites. The logic choppers (a) treat the relation as if it were necessarily reciprocal, and

fication question also occurs at 218b7–8. But taking 218b7–8 to contain the iden-tification question requires an emendation in that line of text. 218b7–8 should be,Sedley says, emended from στι τ φλον κα οϊ to στι τ φλον κα ο . This isbecause he translates 218b7–8 as “what the friendly and the unfriendly are”, and,as he points out, µ not οϊ would be the proper negation for the substantive “thefriendly”, τ φλον. So Sedley emends the omicron-upsilon from a negation to arelative pronoun. As I understand the disputed line of text, the expression beingnegated is not the substantive “the friendly”, τ φλον, but the verb of the indirectquestion “what is a friend?”, στι τ φλον. Thus, I think the line reads: “what isa friend and what is not [a friend]”. This is a suitable translation in the context;and, it is acceptable Greek, since οϊ is the proper negation for most finite verbs

(Smyth 1920, 601 and 604f.). Yet without his (elegant) emendation, there is noclear-cut occurrence of the identification question as the main question of thedialogue. I am grateful to Ruby Blundell for discussing with me the grammaticalpoints of Sedley’s proposal.

8 I am indebted on this point to Burnyeat 1977.9 Roth 1995, 11, thinks that Socrates’ use of the patient-doctor relation is insincere,

for there is, Roth maintains, no way in which the doctor can be construed as op-posite to the sick. But the doctor has health in the sense of having medical skill.In this sense, what the doctor has is the opposite of the sick.


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(b) substitute moral terms for non-moral terms. They can, thereby, offer as an in-

stance of the relation the case of a good person who is attracted to a bad person. But

this association violates the interlocutors’ agreement that a bad person cannot be a

friend (214c8–d4). So Socrates concludes that mutual attraction of opposites cannot

provide an adequate analysis of being a friend. Nothing that the logic choppers have

said, however, impugns as an example of being a friend the one-way attraction of an

uninstructed person to an expert. And the fact that Socrates builds a substantial

amount of theory on the patient to doctor relation is a good reason to bel ieve that he

accepts one-way attraction to an expert as a genuine example of the relation under

discussion (218e3–220b5).

3. In Support of Two Sub-Kinds

I want now to offer additional considerations in support of my contention that So-

crates accepts that being a friend has two sub-kinds, each of which has one of the afo-

rementioned examples as a particular instance. The first consideration is linguistic.

There is in Socrates’ discussion of the poets’ verses a division of labor imposed on

two Greek constructions. Socrates uses “to be friends”, εναι φλοι, and its variants to

designate the mutual relationship between good persons. For example, on the basis

of the alike proposal, he claims: “We now can tel l who are friends. For the argument

discloses that they are the good”, 5Εξοµεν ρα δη τνε« εσν ο φλοι γρ λγο«

µν σηµανει τι ο ν σιν γατο (214e1–2). By contrast, he uses “is friendly to/

friend of”, στι φλο« τ/το, to designate the attraction relation between a personand his/her opposite. For example, he says: “The sick person is the friend of the doc-

tor”, κµνν […] το ατρο φλο« (218e3–4). It could be mere coincidence that So-

crates regularly employs the εναι φλοι construction to refer to the mutual relation-

ship between good people and to the mutual friendship of Lysis and Menexenus

(207c7); whereas, he uses φλο« with dative or genitive for designating one-way attrac-

tion to an expert. But the fact that these phrases serve consistently to denote instan-

ces of two distinct kinds of relationship strongly suggests that Socrates intends to

mark off by their means two varieties of the friend relation: a mutual friendship be-

tween people who are good in some sense, and a one-way attraction relation between

a person who lacks some good and a person who possesses that good.

A second consideration supporting the same idea is based on features displayed by

the initial cross-examinations of Lysis and Menexenus. Each exchange gives promi-

nence to a different one of these two varieties of the friend relation. Consider first So-

crates’ examination of Lysis. The episode portrays Socrates engaged in behaviorwhich can achieve, according to the earlier agreement with Hippothales, a return of

affection. Since Socrates actually does get from Lysis an affectionate response

(211a3–5), the exchange is likely to provide some insight into the nature of a mutual

friendship.

To begin, Socrates asks Lysis whether he believes that his parents want him to be

happy. When Lysis answers that he does, Socrates inquires whether Lysis believes a

person is happy if he is a slave and does nothing that he wants. Lysis says, “No”. At


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this point, Socrates ventures the conclusion that Lysis’ parents do not restrict him

from doing what he wants. But Lysis affirms that they restrict him a great deal. Now

Socrates probes Lysis on his attitude towards the restrictions in order to determine

whether it is incompatible with his combined beliefs that freedom is necessary for

happiness, and that his parents want his happiness. Socrates pursues the topic of in-

compatibility by introducing examples of things that Lysis wants, but is not allowed,

to do. In this way, Socrates hopes (a) to present the restrictions in unfavorable terms,

and (b) to lay the groundwork for the judgment that Lysis’ parents do not desire his

happiness. From the negatively colored examples, Socrates infers the conclusion that

Lysis seems to achieve no benefit from his considerable assets (208e8–209a1). And if

we assume the additional premiss that happiness requires the beneficial use of what-

ever assets one happens to have, then he insinuates the judgment that Lysis’ parents

prevent Lysis from being happy.

Lysis does not, however, concede Socrates’ claim that he gets no benefit from his

possessions. This suggests that he does not have a wholly negative view of the con-

straints. He tells Socrates that they are in place because he is not yet of age (209a5–6).

His response connects the restrictions to the goal of insuring his future happiness.

This is how Lysis’ parents would explain the constraints. And given Lysis’ untrou-

bled attitude towards the restrictions, he apparently shares his parents’ point of view.

Thus, his reply makes clear that the freedom he requires for happiness is compatible

with the imposition of some reasonable constraints.10

In the next phase of the cross-examination, Socrates leads Lysis to the realization

that the restrictions are not due to his age, but to his level of skill. Socrates does this

by pointing out that his parents entrust to him things that he knows how to use. For itis these things that he will use well. So Lysis now explains the difference between the

assets that he can control and those that he cannot in terms of his having and his not

having knowledge. Thus, Lysis becomes at least dimly aware that the restrictions cor-

respond to limits he himself would impose if he had knowledge. In this way, the free-

dom that Lysis associates with happiness is nearly identified by him with self-rule.

With this much accomplished, Socrates goes on to insure that Lysis will give

knowledge pride of place among his values. To this end, he employs a story about the

King of Persia. The Great King, says Socrates, would allow Lysis to season soup with

fistfuls of salt or use ashes to medicate the royal heir’s eyes if he considered Lysis to

be skilled at cookery or medicine. Since these imagined measures go well beyond

standard cooking and medical procedures, and since it is unlikely that the Persian

King makes competency the sole determining factor in his choices, Socrates’ claims

10 Bolotin 1979, 86, thinks that throughout the exchange Lysis understands free-dom to be doing whatever one wants. So, according to Bolotin, Socrates uses theexamples of parental restrictions to “challenge Lysis’ contentment with his pa-rents” (88). Gonzalez 1995, 73, also thinks that Socrates intends the examples tomake Lysis feel that his parents hinder his freedom. As I understand the negativelight in which Socrates casts the restriction, it is not intended to drive a wedgebetween Lysis and his parents but is a ploy used by Socrates for the purpose of as-certaining Lysis’ candid opinion of the restrictions.


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regarding Lysis’ prospects are surely exaggerated. Nevertheless, Socrates seems to be

willing to embellish a hypothetical case as a means of enticing Lysis to pursue

knowledge. Thus, generalizing from the fanciful examples, Socrates concludes:

With regard to matters in which we become intelligent, every one will entrust us

with them […] and in such matters we shall do as we wish […]. Nay, not only shall

we ourselves be free and rule over others in these things, but these things will be

ours. For we shall derive benefit from them. (210a9–b7)

Socrates is telling Lysis what it means for a person to acquire expertise in something.

A person who acquires expertise in a thing (eyes, mules, government) can extract be-

nefit or advantage from the thing. Since he would be able to make possessions useful,

other people entrust to him their possessions; and, he would, in turn, be free to do

with the things entrusted to him whatever he wants (cf. 208a2–b1). The legal owner

of the thing would be “ruled by” the expert’s opinion. It is, however, the legal owner

who receives the benefit that the expert produces by his skilled use of the things en-

trusted to him.11

Lysis may not grasp this last feature of the expert, which is to produce benefit for

others. But clearly the prospect of being in a leadership position, especially in the po-

litical realm, may have sufficient appeal to motivate Lysis to put knowledge at the

head of his list of values. In any event, Socrates has surely enhanced Lysis’ desire for

knowledge; and, he has simultaneously educated him on the essential ingredient of a

happy life (assuming that freedom in the sense of rational rule is necessary for hap-

piness, as Lysis is likely to assume).

It now needs to be recalled that this exchange was intended to show Hippothaleshow to win the return of affection from a beloved. Lysis does, as I mentioned, re-

spond to Socrates’ educative talk with affection and admiration. So it is fair to say

that were Hippothales capable of emulating Socrates’ philosophic discourse with Ly-

sis, Lysis would be disposed to feel affection towards him. Moreover, Lysis is clearly

intellectually curious and reasonably self-restrained. Since these qualities in Lysis are

apparently attractive to Hippothales, a friendship formed between them would be

based on the good qualities that each of them has.

What scholars may find troublesome in this view of Hippothales as attracted to

Lysis in virtue of Lysis’ good qualities is Ctesippus’ complaint that Hippothales’ po-

ems and love songs dwell on Lysis’ noble birth and his family’s wealth.12 But Socrates

ignores Ctesippus’ complaint about the compositions when he chastises Hippotha-

les. He says that the greater the praise that Hippothales lavishes on Lysis, the greater

will be the blessings that he will seem to have lost, if he fails to win the youth’s affec-

tion (205e5–8). Socrates’ reproach implies that Hippothales is attracted to Lysis’many good qualities, not the least of which is his bodily beauty. So there is reason to

11 In this paragraph I am indebted to remarks made in conversation with RoslynWeiss.

12 See, for example, Glidden 1981, 49, Tessitore 1990, 116, and Gonzalez 1995, 85.Contrast Bolotin 1979, 78: “Hippothales’ most pressing wish is to capture forhimself the ‘beautiful and good’ Lysis”.


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think that were Hippothales able to engage in co-inquiry, he and Lysis could form a

mutual friendship based on the good qualities of body and soul that are possessed by

each of the youths. The Lysis exchange, then, gives us a glimpse of what a mutual

friendship between Hippothales and Lysis might be like.13

I turn next to Socrates’ more adversarial approach to Menexenus. Dramatic details

of the exchange suggest that Socrates is operating in this elenchus as an expert friend.

The cross-examination is carried on in the presence of Ctesippus in his role of Men-

exenus’ teacher, not cousin (211c3–d1). And Socrates’ line of questioning is reminis-

cent of Euthydemus’ clever talk to Cleinias (Eud. 275d3–277b1). Thus, Socrates,

functioning as instructor of moral inquiry, mimics the rhetorical style of sophistic

educators. Attention to Socrates’ instruction shows, however, (1) that Menexenus,

not Socrates, confounds two kinds of friends,14 and (2) that Socrates works hard to

highlight, not obscure, the difference between one-sided attraction and mutual

friendship. In order to obtain confirmation of these two claims, it is necessary to con-

sider how Socrates commences the cross-examination. He does so by offering Men-

exenus three options for identifying who becomes friend to whom, if one person likes

another. These options are (a) the person who likes, (b) the person who is liked, and

(c) “There is no difference”, (212a9–b2). Option (c) can be taken in more than one

way. One way is to interpret (c) as follows: (c’) The person who likes and the person

who is liked in return do not differ in respect of being a friend. This way of complet-

ing (c) admits the possibility that the person who likes is not a friend of the same kind

as the person who is liked. It is (c’) along with the possibility of friends of different

kinds that seems to be, as we shall see, the option that Socrates would choose.

Option (c) is actually chosen by Menexenus. Menexenus seems to understand (c)however, as an elliptical way of asserting something of this sort: (c’’): “It makes no

difference, if one says ‘A is a friend of B’ or ‘B is a friend of A’, each is a friend pe-

riod.” As Menexenus sees it, friend A and friend B are “on a par”, since he seems not

to realize that liking and being liked are different conditions. Menexenus subscribes

to this unsophisticated view of a friend probably because he has acquired the affec-

tion of his friend Lysis by doing no more than liking Lysis (212a1–5).15

13 The Lysis elenchus can also be seen as simulating the type of exchange engaged inby a philosophic lover and his beloved, each of whom possess an affinity of cha-racter but play asymmetric roles in the relationship. See Phaedrus 253a1–6 and253c2–6.

14 Annas 1977, 532f., Levin 1972, 242f., Robinson 1986, 65f., and Santas 1977, 83,contend that Socrates equivocates in this exchange on “friend”, φλο«. Glidden

1980, 276f., argues against this contention.15 Glidden 1980, 282, suggests that syntactic considerations underlie Menexenus’choice of (c). “As a student of Greek language, Menexenus might well assumethat the use of that verb [“to like” / “to be liked,” φιλεν / φιλεσαι] explains theuse of the corresponding adjective”. But the Menexenus elenchus – unlike Socra-tes’ argument using “because” in the Euthyphro (9d2–11a8) to which Gliddencompares the elenchus – makes no mention of grammatical orderings. So theredoes not seem to be a textual basis for ascribing to Menexenus such an educatedchoice.


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In an effort to clarify what Menexenus is thinking when he selects option (c), So-

crates inquires:

What are you saying? Do both become friends to each other (λλλν φλοι

γγνονται), if only one likes the other? (212b3–5)

The most natural way of reading Socrates’ second question is to take him as asking

whether two people become mutual friends, if only one likes the other. This reading

of the question is in harmony with Socrates’ use of the phrase “to be friends”, εναι

φλοι, to denote mutual friends, given that he has a tendency in this dialogue, as we

have seen, to switch back and forth between “to be” and “to become” (213c6–10,

216c1–217a2). If this is a correct construal of Socrates’ second question, then it is fair

to say that Socrates would not answer that question in the affirmative. Socrates’ open-

ing question, “What are you saying?” shows, I think, that he is surprised by the view

that he conjectures is implicit in Menexenus’ commitment to (3), namely, the view

that a person becomes a mutual friend by doing nothing more than liking another

person. The surprised reaction shows that Socrates does not think one-way attrac-

tion and mutual friendship are indistinguishable relationships. And although he does

not here call “friend” either party to the one-way attraction relation, he later uses a

friend expression to characterize both parties to the relation (212d5–213a6). Presum-

ably, then, it is option (c), understood in terms of (c’) with the possibility of sub-

kinds of friends, that Socrates would choose.

Menexenus readily assents, however, to Socrates’ second question because he has

not given much thought to what is involved in being a friend. It is not until Socrates

goes on to point out (and Menexenus agrees) that a person who likes may not be likedin return that Menexenus realizes that liking and being liked are different conditions.

Since he now also realizes that friendship for him involves two–way liking, Menexe-

nus concludes that neither is a friend, if only one person likes the other (212c8–d1).

He thereby contradicts his assent to the second question posed earlier by Socrates.

Socrates next takes up separately the parties to the one way attraction relation. But

the interlocutors agree that neither party individually can become a friend, since one

party may hate the other; and, hatred makes enemies, not friends, of people. The

cross-examination concludes once Menexenus openly admits that he is at a loss to say

who becomes a friend to whom, if only one person likes the other. The negative out-

come of the elenchus is, then, traceable not only to Menexenus’ reasonable belief that

a person cannot be a friend to an enemy, but also to his inability to conceive of the

one-way attraction relation. When faced with the possibility that the friendly person

might not be liked in return, he surrenders his belief that the two are friends because

it does not occur to him that a person whose affection is not returned is a differentkind of friend.

It seems clear, however, that Socrates wants to highlight, not unacceptably oblite-

rate, the distinction between one-sided attraction and mutual friendship. For he

keeps consistently to the case of one-sided attraction; and, he shows that there is a

basis for distinguishing it from mutual friendship, namely, the fact that one-sided lik-

ing can arise in contexts that preclude its being characterized as reciprocated affec-

tion. Thus, Socrates does not, as a sophist might do, move on a purely verbal basis


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from consideration of a pair of persons who reciprocate affection to consideration of

a pair of persons, only one of whom likes. Rather, he works to reveal exactly what it is

about one-sided attraction that makes it a distinct kind of friend relation. The Men-

exenus exchange emphasizes, then, the one-sided attraction relation; whereas, the Ly-

sis exchange reveals some salient features of a mutual friendship. The fact that the

two exchanges give prominence to a different kind of friend relation is further evi-

dence for my claim that Socrates accepts that the friend relation has two sub-kinds.

One final consideration in support of this contention is the fact that Lysis is de-

picted as being capable of having relations of both kinds. He and Menexenus claim to

be mutual friends (207c7–8). He is also the object of Hippothales’ one-way attrac-

tion. And Socrates intimates that Lysis could be involved in a one-way attraction

relation with his fellow Athenians. Socrates’ remarks to Lysis concerning managing

the Athenians’ affairs suggest that Lysis could acquire an administrative expertise in

virtue of which his fellow Athenians would be friendly to him (209c5–d4). Further-

more, there is no indication that Lysis would be attracted in turn to something in

those whom his expertise serves. Thus, even if Socrates thinks it only a possibility

that Lysis’ fellow Athenians could be friendly to an administrative skill in Lysis, the

mere mention of it shows that Socrates regards the one-way attraction relation as

being a bona fide kind of friend relation.16

The details in this section strongly suggest that Socrates accepts mutual friendship

and one-way attraction as genuine sub-kinds of the friend relation. Socrates’ termi-

nology, the philosophic content of the exchanges, and significant features of the dra-

matic framework make reasonably clear that he divides friend relations into these

two kinds. I now want to show that Socrates hints towards a definition of being afriend that can explain both of the sub-kinds.

16 On the basis of Socrates’ subsequent positing of desire as a cause of being afriend, Gonzalez 1995, 78 n. 21 and 83 n. 30, maintains that only a good lackedby human beings can be the good in virtue of which people are friends. If Gon-zalez is correct, then Socrates could not hold that a person is a party to a friendrelation in virtue of possessing administrative expertise. But Gonzalez’s require-ment that all parties to a friend relation lack the good in virtue of which they arefriends results from his assumption that “friend” applies to entities one at a time.As a consequence of this assumption, he thinks “friend” shifts its meaning from“what is possessed” – the meaning he attributes to it in the first exchange withLysis – to “lacking what belongs” the meaning he thinks it takes on once Socrates

identifies desire of good with the motivating cause of being a friend (82f.). Thefact is, however, that being a friend is a relational property. A person is a friend toor of someone. Therefore, attribution of the property involves more than one per-son. I explain how this works on Socrates’ view in section 9. My point here is thatSocrates can without any shift in meaning maintain that the friend relation ob-tains between a person who possesses a good and a person who lacks/desires thatgood, since the property of being a friend applies to someone in relation to some-one else. So Lysis can be a party to a friendly relation in virtue of having an ex-pertise that his fellow-citizens lack.


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4. Socrates’ Analysis of Being a Friend

A number of commentators see 216c1–222d9 as offering Socrates’ own view of what

it is to be a friend.17 And most commentators would agree, I think, that Socrates’ ex-

position divides, roughly, into four stages. Stage I (216c1–218c3) introduces Socrates’

“favored” hypothesis that the neither good nor bad is friend to the good because of

the presence of bad. Stage II (218c4–220b5) makes plain that the first friend of the

neither good nor bad is some good.18 Stage III (220b6–222b3) removes “presence of

bad” and posits “desire of the akin” as what in our psychic make-up motivates us to

acquire friends. And Stage IV (222b4–222d9) takes up the question of whether theakin relation could be the basis for the friend relation. I agree with this collective

view of Socrates’ overall strategy. My question is whether Socrates works his way

through these various stages to an account of being a friend that can simultaneously

17 Versenyi 1975, 188f., Glidden 1981, 50f., Mackenzie 1988, 27f., Santas 1977,81f., Gonzalez 1995, 78f., and Kahn 1996, 285f. For a different view see Vlastos1969, 6f., Annas 1977, 537f., and Roth 1995, 1f.

18 Bolotin 1979, 169, Mackenzie 1988, 29f., Santas 1977, 86, Gonzalez 1995, 83 n.30, Kahn 1996, 285 f. Glidden’s view is different. He takes Socrates’ concern to bewhy does an individual (Hippothales, Menexenus) love or become a friend tosomeone in particular (Glidden 1981, 50). Thus, he construes the first friend,πρτον φλον, not as a kind of entity, but as a functional (formal) principle. It

exemplifies, he thinks, whatever it is that “is served by the agent’s loving what hedoes” (56). Glidden is, I think, mistaken in his belief that Socrates wants to ex-plain why particular individuals become friends and, as a consequence, value thethings they do. Glidden draws one line of support for this interpretation fromreading Socrates’ question “How does one become a friend?” as requesting anaccount of “how it is that Lysis and Menexenus became friends” (50). But Socra-tes’ question does not ask for a biographical account of the role that friends playin a person’s life. It is, as I have argued, a variant of the definitional question;and, it asks for the explanatory factors of being a friend.Furthermore, Glidden contends that Socrates’ investigation focuses on uncon-scious motivational factors that result from an agent’s condition (48f.). To sup-port this view, Glidden discusses the fanciful examples that Socrates uses to en-courage Lysis to become wise. Glidden points out that these examples provide awholly unrealistic picture of conscious motivation (48). So Socrates, Gliddenconcludes, cannot be striving to explain conscious motivations and attitudes.

Rather, he wants to find “psychological elements in the personality which mightremain unknown to the agent himself” that explain the “function love playsin our lives” (49 and 56). Glidden is, I think, misled by his belief that Socratesis always intending to convey a truth, even when what he says is patently false, if taken literary. The unrealistic character of Socrates’ examples relative to thechoices that people actually make seems wholly explicable in terms of Socrates’aim of converting a thirteen-year-old to intellectual pursuits. In my view, then,the conversation with Lysis is intended, not to reveal unconscious affective atti-tudes, but to encourage Lysis to form new ones.


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explain mutual friendship and one-way attraction. I hope to show that the answer to

this question is yes.

To better understand the drawback of attributing to Socrates an analysis of being a

friend that cannot account for both kinds of relation consider a version of this view.

Gonzalez says that Socrates’ “results can be summarized as follows: we who are nei-

ther bad nor good desire that ultimately loved good of which we are in want”19. If the

elements that explain the friend relation are, as Gonzalez proposes, a neither good

nor bad subject who desires an abstract good and the abstract good that is desired,

then there can be no uniform account of reciprocal and non-reciprocal relations be-

tween friends. For the primary analysis is in terms of a subject and an abstract object.

Gonzalez attempts to extend his proposal as follows:

Socrates and the boys can establish a reciprocal friendship by seeking together

that good that belongs to all of them but of which all are deprived. 20

But this extension introduces an explanation of being mutual friends that differs

from the primary analysis of the friend relation. So Socrates would have to admit,

contrary to the implication of his definitional question, that there is no uniform ac-

count of the property of being a friend. The text gives us, however, no reason to think

that Socrates doubts that being a friend has a common nature. So I want to suggest

that Socrates’ four-stage analysis leads to an account of being a friend according to

which desire for good and a certain particular good possessed by another person are

the explanatory elements in virtue of which the property is applied. I will come back

to the question of how this account can explain both reciprocal and non-reciprocal

friendships after I have discussed the stages of Socrates’ exposition.

5. Stage I

In Stage I, as others have noted, Socrates identifies the good as one component of the

friend relation.21 What has not, perhaps, been noticed is that at this stage of his ana-

lysis, Socrates anticipates his shift in Stage III to desire as the motivating cause of

being a friend and, thereby, lays the groundwork for an analysis of being friend in

terms of desire for good.

Socrates anticipates his shift to desire as the motivating cause of being a friend

when he compares the effects of being bad and having bad present on the relation

between desire for good and being a friend. Since being bad and having bad present

have opposite effects on the joint occurrence of desire for good and being a friend –

having bad present engenders it, being bad precludes it – the comparison implies thatthe connection between desire for good and being a friend is causal. Moreover, the

19 Gonzalez 1995, 82.20 Gonzalez 1995, 86.21 This is noted by Mackenzie 1988, 29, Santas 1977, 84f., Gonzalez 1995, 78, Kahn

1996, 28, and Rowe 2000, 209.


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relative order in which the properties are introduced points to desire for good as the

causal antecedent (motivating cause) of being a friend (217e5–218a2).

Socrates lays the groundwork for analyzing being a friend in terms of desire for

good by emphasizing the link between desire for good and being a friend. For this

emphasis makes most sense if one of these notions can be used to explain the other.

And this can be done because desire for good can account for the aspect of being a

friend that Socrates clearly appreciates, namely, its relational aspect (218d6–7).

In order to strengthen my claim that desire for good can explain the relational

aspect of being a friend, I wish to compare desire for good with the relational inter-

pretation of being hungry. If being hungry is interpreted as yearning for food rather

than as rumbles in the stomach, then being hungry applies to a person in virtue of the

person’s yearning/desire and in relation to the abstract entity food. If we assume,

however, that the person is hungry for the steak on the barbecue, then being hungry

applies to the person in virtue of the person’s yearning/desire and in relation to that

particular instance of food. Analogous points hold for the property of desire for

good. Attribution of the property may be in reference to a relation between the psy-

chological state and an abstract entity or in reference to a relation between the state

and a natural entity, depending on the specification of the object of desire that is

given. The fact that desire for good itself has a relational nature makes it suitable to

explain the relational aspect of being a friend, and in consequence, qualifies it to

serve as one of the explanatory elements of the friend relation. Hence, it is plausible

to regard Socrates’ attention here to desire for good as paving the way for his treat-

ment of it as an explanatory factor of being a friend.22

6. Stage II

Socrates begins by asking:

Whoever is a friend, is he a friend to someone or not?

[…] for the sake of something and because of something? (218d6–10)

The first question gives prominence to the relational nature of being a friend. The

second question pursues investigation of being a friend by asking about the causes of

the relation. Scholars agree that Socrates takes up in this section the question con-

22 Glidden 1980 thinks that Socrates treats being a friend as a non-relational pro-

perty. He contends this approach reflects “Plato’s bizarre theory of relations”(282). In Glidden’s view, then, a person can be a friend without being a friend toor of anyone (287). Mackenzie 1988, 26, also regards being a friend as a non-re-lational property. This prevents her, I think, from seeing that Socrates’ analysismakes genuine progress. For she assumes that being a friend must be explained interms of either the desired element or the desiring element; and, since neither oneby itself can provide an adequate account of the value property, the dialogue endsin an impasse (30f.). In my view, the attribution of being a friend depends on thepresence of both elements.


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cerning the aim of a friend relation, and that he investigates in the next section the to-

pic of motivation.

Socrates’ discussion of the aim of a friend relation is connected to his claim in

Stage I that the good is a component of the friend relation. In both cases, Socrates’

concern is with the range of entities that can be chosen as friends. When Socrates

identifies the good as one component of the relation, he is characterizing the

befriended party in a formal way. Whoever is chosen as a friend, that person is cho-

sen as the source of some good. When Socrates takes up the question of aim, he is

talking about the material side of the same choice, the specific good – for example,

medical knowledge – in virtue of which the possessor of the good is befriended. Mo-

reover, by drawing Menexenus’ attention to the aim of a friend relation, Socrates can

present for Menexenus’ consideration the general idea that some attachments are di-

rected towards procuring and sustaining others. To elucidate this point, Socrates

asks Menexenus whether a person cherishes health, a good (218e6–7), for the sake of

acquiring a further friend. When Menexenus responds affirmatively, Socrates sug-

gests that the series of means-end attachments must eventually reach the first friend,

τ πρτον φλον (219c7–d1). It is, Socrates says, this entity that is the genuine friend,

whereas the friends that are used as means to the association with the first friend are

“friends in name only” (220a6–b3).

Several scholars see in Socrates’ use of the phrase “first friend” an implicit ref-

erence to the ultimate human good. On one version of this sort of interpretation, the

first friend is happiness. According to a second version, it is the Good itself.23 Sup-

port for this general approach may be found in the neuter phrase, “τ πρτον

φλον”, that Socrates uses to designate the terminus of the series of means-end at-tachments. The expression shows that for Socrates an inanimate entity, not a person

as such, is the overall goal of the friendly person’s choice of friends. But a narrow

reading of the neuter phrase is not the only option. The phrase can be understood to

denote a property that is involved in the terminal friendship, not on its own, but in

virtue of its being possessed by the befriended party to the final friendship. Notice

Socrates’ willingness to apply the neuter adjective (or possibly noun) “φλον”,

“friend”, to the feminine “ ’ψγεια”, “health” (219a5–6) and the feminine “ α-

τρικ”, “medicine” (219c1–2). Clearly, the application of the neuter term to entities

whose names belong to the feminine gender is intended to indicate that the entities

are included within the class of friends. But since here the application of “φλον” can

be understood to be in reference to the bodily health and the medical knowledge pos-

sessed respectively by the healthy person and the doctor, it is arguable that the refer-

rent of “τ πρτον φλον” should be understood in a parallel way. On this alterna-

tive, broad reading of “τ πρτον φλον”, the phrase denotes a good possessed bythe befriended party to the terminal friendship.

The broad reading of the phrase coheres well with the general idea that Socrates

wants to promote by bringing in the reference to the first friend. A person does take

23 Proponents of the happiness version of the interpretation include Vlastos 1969,7, Versenyi 1975, 195f., Irwin 1995, 54, and Adams 1992, 276. Kahn 1996, 288,and Bolotin 1979, 206f., endorse the Good itself version.


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an interest in a doctor, for instance, because a doctor possesses a good – medical

knowledge – that is, in normal circumstances, valued by the person merely as a means

to procuring and protecting other, more intimate attachments. So the broad reading

of “first friend” can secure Socrates’ point about the means-end structure of personal

attachments. Furthermore, the broad reading allows for relationships between per-

sons – the agreed upon topic throughout the dialogue – to be genuine friend rela-

tions. For on the broad reading, a person’s attachment to another person is a condi-

tion of his/her acquisition of the first friend. On the narrow reading, by contrast,

personal relationships are demoted to the status of “friends in name only”, since the

person’s ultimate attachment is to the first friend on its own.24 Thus, the broad rea-

ding is, I think, the more plausible reading of “τ πρτον φλον”. It can secure So-

crates’ point about the means-end structure of personal relationships; and, it serves

well the associations that are the central topic of the conversation. On the interpre-

tation that I recommend the first friend is, then, whatever good is involved in the ter-

minal friendship.25 I offer support for the claim that the first friend is a good, not a

specific kind of good, after I ask what entitles Socrates to terminate the progression

and posit a first friend.

Irwin contends that a commitment to a psychological thesis about human motiva-

tion lies behind Socrates’ insistence that there is a first friend. According to Irwin,

“Socrates does not say it would be foolish to pursue one thing for the sake of another

without limit; he implies (in ‘we must refuse’) that it is impossible.”26 Irwin’s inter-

pretation is difficult for two reasons. First, it is implausible to suppose that it is on

the basis of a motivational theory implied by Socrates’ remark “we must refuse”,

νγκη πειπεν (219c7), that Menexenus endorses Socrates’ supposition of a firstfriend. In the earlier exchanges, Socrates uses common sense views, not philosophical

doctrines, to gain the boys’ acquiescence in his proofs and disproofs. So Irwin’s in-

terpretation either leaves obscure on what grounds Socrates gains the concession

24 Kahn 1996, 290, indirectly defends the thesis that the first friend is the Good it-self by maintaining that the reciprocity of friendship ceases to be a central topicof the discussion towards the end of the dialogue. Socrates’ last words (223b3–9)suggest, however, that the topic of mutual friendship is central from the begin-ning of the discussion to its end. Scholars who affirm the thesis that the firstfriend is happiness, the ultimate goal of any rational action, cannot accommo-date Socrates’ requirement that a friend benefit whoever has one (207c9,222b10–c1). For it is difficult to understand how a goal, insofar as it is a goal and

only a goal, can be a thing that benefits a person. So proponents of the happinessas a goal approach must either ignore the benefit requirement or insist that So-crates does not seriously endorse it.

25 More exactly, the first friend is a good that is possessed by the befriended party tothe terminal friendship. Since the more exact characterization will receive addi-tional textual support in section 7 (see n. 34), it is enough for now to limit myself to the more neutral claim that the first friend is “involved” in the terminal rela-tionship.

26 Irwin 1995, 54.


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from Menexenus, or it proposes grounds that are not in the least like those Socrates

has used to achieve earlier agreements.

Second, Socrates gives the reader no hint when he claims at 219c7–8 “we must re-

fuse and arrive at some beginning” that our psychological make-up explains our re-

sistance. The fact that the series of means-end attachments has an end could be ex-

plained along psychological lines; but nothing else that Socrates says here supports

Irwin’s psychological explanation. So I would like to propose an interpretation that

fits better, I think, with the text than Irwin’s interpretation does.

On the interpretation that I favor, Socrates and Menexenus have different reasons

for supposing that the series must end at a first friend. Menexenus endorses the idea

of a first friend because his friendship with Lysis supports it. He believes that he is

Lysis’ first friend (206d5–6). Socrates himself concludes that there is a first friend

only after he gives the father-son and coinage examples (219d5–220a6). Both of these

examples are intended to show that people give priority to one among the various

goods that they include in their lives. Having given these two examples, Socrates

claims that the very same principle embodied in the examples governs the case of

friends (220a6–7). Just as people give priority to one among the various goods that

they include in their lives, so too people regard one friendship among the associa-

tions that they have as being more important than any of the others. If this is correct,

then Socrates’ “we must refuse” is a matter of hypothetical necessity. When Socrates

initially raises the question of whether the series of attachments must terminate in the

acquisition of a final friend, he assumes that there must be a first friend, if the case of

being friends is like other cases of valuing. His question to the boys takes into ac-

count by anticipation the fact that they will agree that the case of being friends re-sembles cases of ordinary valuing. Thus, from Socrates’ perspective Menexenus’ con-

cession jumps the gun. For Menexenus affirms a proposition whose truth is for

Socrates conditional upon the truth of the soon to be established proposition that re-

lations between friends resemble cases of ordinary valuing.

I now turn to the dispute regarding the nature of the first friend. In connection

with this controversy, I shall address the two following questions. (1) Does Socrates

think that he has successfully argued for a unique first friend? And, if not, (2) what

view of the first friend can be ascribed to Socrates? I shall simply state and, then,

briefly defend my answers to these questions. I do not think that Socrates believes

himself to have proven that there is only one first friend.27 As I understand Socrates’

analogical argument, he cites two relevantly different cases as examples of people

who prioritize their values. Whereas it is natural to read Socrates’ father-son case as

an example of a person for whom one good in his life occupies a unique position

(219d6–7), the coinage example cannot plausibly be read in this way. People’s eco-nomic priorities vary depending upon their financial circumstances. Furthermore,

Socrates seems to appreciate the difference between the two cases when he amplifies

the phrase, used in stating the coinage case, “what is valued above everything else”,

27 Versenyi 1975, 192f., Mackenzie 1988, 34f., and Irwin 1995, 54, maintain thatSocrates’ series of attachments allows for multiple final friends relative to the dif-ferent ways people prioritize their values. Glidden 1981, 56 n. 145, disagrees.


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good things in general rather than a certain kind of good. For it is clear that Socrates

hypothesizes the absence of bad things in general (220c3–6). And there is no reason

to suppose that the hypothetical situation would have an effect on only one kind of

good thing. Hence, Socrates is here talking about any kind of good thing. Further-

more, this bit of text and the discussion of the first friend connect in the following

ways. First, the stretch of text allows us to add to (2a) and (2b) Menexenus’ affirma-

tion (2c) that good things are not intrinsically useful (220d7–8). With the addition of

(2c), (2) becomes a more plausible candidate for the use-value of the first friend, since

all the other obvious alternatives have now been ruled out. Second, our text provides

a clue to the meaning of (2). For interpreting (2) in light of this stretch of text allows

us to read (2) as asserting the Hippias Minor point that good things/first friends are

useful for doing bad deeds/are for the sake of an enemy. This is a sensible claim. It

also upholds the dist inction that Socrates draws between “for the sake of ”, νεκα, and

“because of ”, δια (218d8–9).28 Third, our text’s introductory question about the use-

value of the good in the absence of the bad can now be seen to have its final answer in

the last step of the argument concerning the difference between subordinate and first

friends. The last step maintains that the absence of bad things/enemies leaves us with

no friends presumably because there would be no use for friends under the imagined

circumstances. The implication of the last step for good things is that they would be

useless, if bad things did not exist.

Thus, we can make sense of (2), find further support for (2), and answer the question

about the use-value of the good in the absence of bad, if we read our stretch of text as

carrying on in the language of good things the larger discussion concerning the first

friend. But this reading presupposes that Socrates equates good things and firstfriends and, thereby, acknowledges a possible plurality of first friends. This characte-

rization of the discussion also raises the question of what Socrates gains by switching

terminology. The first shift at 220c1 enables Socrates to return to the remedial view of

the good and, thereby, to temporarily settle the question of whether the good has, in

28 Shorey 1930, 380f., maintains that “for the sake of” replaces the more appro-priate “because of” to emphasize the difference between subordinate and termi-nal friends. If Shorey is correct, then it is hard to see how (2) can provide a reasonfor (1), the claim that subordinate and terminal friends are opposite. Yet (2) is a“because”, γρ, clause, so it ought to give a reason for (1). Bolotin 1979, 174f.,suggests that “for the sake of an enemy” identifies a person’s defective self as theultimate aim of her friendships. But a person’s defective self is, on Bolotin’s view,what motivates a person to acquire the first friend. Thus, there is, on Bolotin’s

view, no real distinction between the “because” factor and the “for the sake of”factor, despite the fact that Socrates distinguishes them (218d8–9). Mackenzie1988, 30, claims that the terminology “for the sake of the bad” is intended “to explain the nature (ο?τ πωφψκε, 220d5) of the final good” (emphasis in original).But her support for this construal of the phrase is misleading to the extent thatshe quotes only the portion of the line which fits her overall view of the dialogueas dealing with the metaphysical question of what explains intrinsic value. Theremaining bit – 220d7–8 – tends rather to suggest that Socrates is concerned withthe plain-man’s question of what makes the good useful to us.


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addition to its instrumental value, an intrinsic value. Because Menexenus well under-

stands the instrumental value of the good he is inclined to agree, without thorough dis-

cussion of intrinsic value, that instrumental value is the only use-value of the good.

Thus, bringing back the familiar medical metaphor for the purpose of setting aside for

now the option of intrinsic value necessitates a shift to the language of the good. The

second shift at 220d9 signals Socrates’ return to the topic of friends. If this is correct,

then Socrates’ attention to the means-end structure of our engagement in friendships

has enabled him to identify one explanatory component of the friend relation. This

component is whatever good is involved in the relation that terminates a complete se-

ries of attachments. The discussion of first friend closes, however, without providing a

satisfactory account of the use-value of this friend. Socrates implies a plausible use-

value for the first friend when he identifies what is, I think, the second explanatory

component of the relation. He takes up the latter task in Stage III, to which I now turn.

7. Stage III

In Stage III Socrates investigates the “because of” (motivating) factor. There is little

doubt that Socrates identifies desire as the motivating factor (221d3–4). 29 What is

less clear is why Socrates next proceeds to argue that any attitude that involves desire

for/pull towards an entity is by its very nature “of the akin”, το οκεοψ (221e4).

Most scholars suppose that Socrates is primarily interested in establishing something

new about the entity that a person desires. But taking this perspective on the role

played by the akin in Socrates’ analysis compels commentators either to put aside en-tirely the earlier specification of the good as one component of the friend relation or

to show that “the akin” designates the good. Mackenzie thinks that the akin sup-

plants the good as a specification of that on the basis of which a person is befriended.

But why should we interpret one stage in the development of Socrates’ hypothesis so

as to assume that he drops a key conclusion that he reaches in a previous stage? Gon-

zalez maintains that “akin” and “good” are interchangeable designations of the be-

friended entity. But there are, as he realizes, occurrences of “akin” for which “good”

cannot be substituted. For example, “akin” has to have a sense other than “good”

when it denotes the property in virtue of which the interlocutors are, on Gonzalez’s

view, friends because the interlocutors are not fully good. Gonzalez gives it the sense

of “lacking what belongs”. But were “akin” in the sense of “lacking what belongs” to

denote the property in virtue of which the interlocutors are friends, then they would

be friends in virtue of a similarity. And, as Gonzalez recognizes, Socrates maintains

that being akin can explain being a friend only if being akin is not applied in refer-ence to the relation of similarity (222b5–10).30

29 Bolotin 1979, 182f., Glidden 1981, 54, Mackenzie 1988, 30, Santas 1977, 84f.,Gonzalez 1995, 81, Kahn 1996, 289, and Rowe 2000, 209, agree.

30 Mackenzie 1988, 29f., treats akin as supplanting good. Gonzalez 1995, 86f., ap-pears to give “akin” a secondary sense that would imply that the akin are similar.


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Upon completion of the akin argument, Socrates returns to the topic of being a

friend. He says:

(1) It has been shown to be necessary for us to befriend the akin by nature […].

(2) Then the true lover, and not the feigning one, προσποιτ8, must be befriended

by the favorite. (222a6–b1)

(1) is partly a consequence of the akin argument for the case of friends. From the fact

that all desires are of the akin, that is all desires are directed towards complementary

properties possessed by other entities (221d8–e2), and given that the friendly attitude

is a kind of desire (221d3–5), a person naturally befriends/desires someone who pos-

sesses a property that is akin to/complements her make-up in some respect. Further,

(1) represents the akin relation as obtaining between the friendly pair rather than as

holding between a desire and the desired object. So (1) departs in a relevant respect

from Socrates’ initial characterization of the components of the akin relation. But it

is also clear from what I will call the responsibility assigning passage (221e8–222a5)

that it is because the attracted person desires something possessed by the attractive

person that the pair themselves are akin. So Socrates is willing to attribute the akin

relation both to the friends and to features of the friends that explain the standing of

the friends in the akin relation. And, as we shall see, Socrates allows one other cha-

racterization of the parties to the akin relation.

Two additional points are worth noting about (1) in light of the responsibility as-

signing passage. First, the causal structure of the friend relation is now clear. Desire

is the motivating cause, since it pulls one party towards a property possessed by the

other member of the pair. And the property possessed by the other party is the aim of the relation in the sense that it is what the attracted person lacks and, therefore, seeks

to acquire.34 Finally, (1) contains the qualifier “by nature” added to the expression

not for the presence, or threatened presence of evils” (172 f.). Socrates simply dis-agrees. He apparently thinks that the well-functioning human body can experi-ence motivating impulses for food and drink in the absence of anything negativeor bad (217a2–5). Hence, some of a person’s “lacks” are neutral in the sense thatthey are part of the structure of a normal member of the species. This point bearson the alleged selfishness of Socrates’ conception of the friend relation. If lacksare not confined to defects, then their elimination need not consist simply inbringing a person back to normal. A lack may motivate a person to extend therange of his capabilities by pursuing, for instance, a relationship with some-one who arouses his concern. For an interesting discussion of this possibility see

Pangle 2001, 315f.34 We have here, as promised, additional support for the point that the ult imate aimof the series of means-end attachments is a good possessed by the befriendedparty to the terminal friendship. For the responsibility assigning passage indica-tes that a property possessed by the befriended person serves as the aim of thefriendship of the akin. If, as I go on to argue, the property is in the case of theakin by nature a genuine good, then a friendship of the akin by nature could ter-minate a series of means-end attachments, since it has the appropriate metaphy-sical structure to be the final friendship. Its defining purpose is a genuine good.


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“akin”. By adding the qualifier, Socrates may want to indicate that desire of the akin

by nature is desire of a good that is akin to a person’s nature. I return to this point

after I address (2).

(2) states that the attractive party cannot help but reciprocate the affectionate at-

titude of the genuine lover/friend. It is, I think, significant that Socrates uses the ex-

pression “genuine”, γνσιο« (222a8–9) – a word etymologically related to “family,

descendent”, γωνο« – to refer to the lover who inspires the return of affection. The ex-

pression implies that there is in the lover something that complements the beloved’s

nature and, thereby, inevitably leads to the beloved’s affectionate response. That So-

crates characterizes the lover in such a way as to account for the return of affection

suggests that the akin relation is not symmetrical.35 Were standing in the akin rela-

tionship sufficient for mutual affection, Socrates could have expressed (2) in such a

way as to imply that it is the akin nature of the pair that insures the mutuality. Since

he chooses instead to further specify the nature of the lover, it would seem that more

than being akin is required for mutual affection. Consideration of one-way attrac-

tion provides additional evidence for this claim. The parties to the one-way attrac-

tion relation could not be akin, if it were part of the essential nature of the akin re-

lation that its members reciprocate affection. Yet one-way attraction is grounded on

desire; and, desire is of the akin. So one way attraction has to be a kind of akin rela-

tion. Moreover, even if we suppose that the akin by nature relation differs from the

plain akin relation, we cannot look to the qualified relation to provide an example of

a symmetrical relation. For the responsibility assigning passage specifies desire and

the object desired as wholly explanatory of that relation. It is difficult to maintain

that mutual affection is an effect of that explanatory structure. Hence, it is safer, Ithink, to conclude that the reciprocity expressed in (2) derives from the genuine na-

ture of the lover. His nature guarantees a return of affection from the beloved. If this

is correct, then (2) reports not one but two instances of the akin relation.

I now return to the point mentioned in the discussion of (1), namely, the fact that

the qualification added to “akin” provides some grounds for supposing that desire of

the akin by nature is fundamentally desire for a genuine good. What I wish to suggest

is that desire of the akin has sub-kinds. Hence, to say that a person desires the akin is

to identify the general character of the desire, not necessarily its specific kind. A spe-

cific kind of desire of the akin is, I suggest, introduced by means of the qualifier “by

nature”. And that specific kind of desire of the akin is desire for good. The main ad-

vantage of this proposal is that it allows us to read the four stages of Socrates’ inves-

tigation as promoting a single conception of being a friend as opposed to setting

forth a series of unrelated and deficient conceptions of the relational property. Here

are some of the ways the proposal contributes to a unified reading of these stages.First, construing desire of the akin by nature as desire for a good akin to the desirer

would fit with the implication in Stage I that desire for good is a cause of being a

friend (217e5–218a1). As I mentioned, Socrates’ focus on how the presence of bad af-

35 Bolotin 1979, 186, claims that “one cannot be akin to another without the otherbeing akin to oneself”.


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fects desire for good would make most sense, if desire for good were the relational

property upon which being a friend depended. Consequently, if we understand desire

of the akin by nature as desire for good, then the motivating factor hinted at earlier is

affirmed in different phraseology in the responsibility assigning passage that belongs

to the Stage III discussion of the akin conception. Second, on the supposition that

Socrates equates desire of the akin by nature with desire for good there is an obvious

connection between Stage II and Stage III of the investigation. For Stage II intro-

duces genuine goods as the aim of the friend relation. If my proposal is adopted, then

Stage III introduces a motivating cause of the friend relation, namely, desire of the

akin by nature, that can be interpreted in such a way that it is the correlate of the aim

of the relation. Third, the proposal allows us to resolve an apparent incompatibility

between the unrefuted option, option (a), offered in Stage IV and Socrates’ claim in

Stage III that people can desire neutral things (221b5–7). Option (a) emerges in Stage

IV’s examination of the hypothesis that the akin relation explains the friend relation.

Option (a) asserts that the good is the akin for everyone (222c4–5). Consequently, if

option (a) were selected to elucidate the akin relation that underlies the friend rela-

tion, the good would be one component of the friend relation and desire for good

would be the other component. For the explanatorily more fundamental characteri-

zation of the akin relation is in terms of desire and the object desired (221e4–5). And

on option (a), the akin/the object of desire is the good. Selecting (a) would mean,

however, that only good things are desired. And, as I said, this conflicts with Socra-

tes’ Stage III claim that there can be neutral desires.

It is worth considering whether option (a) can be made consistent with the broader

view of desire because (a) carries over into Stage IV what seems to be the prime can-didates for explaining the friend relation: desire for good and the good desired. Thus,

if the option can be made consistent with the Stage III claim, then its unrefuted sta-

tus enhances the thesis that the four stages of Socrates’ investigation are promoting

essentially the same conception of being a friend. Option (a) can be made consistent

with the broader view of desire, if “akin” in option (a) has the sense “akin by nature”.

The option would, then, express the point that the good is the akin for everyone

whose desire of the akin is of the specific kind, desire of the akin by nature. This con-

strual of (a) would render it consistent with the claim at 221b5–7, since (a) would be

asserting that goods are desired by everyone without implying that they are the only

objects of desire because desire directed towards good things is only one of the sub-

kinds of desire of the akin. So the proposal that desire of the akin has sub-kinds, one

of which is desire of the akin by nature directed towards good things, allows us to in-

terpret the unrefuted option of Stage IV in such a way that it does not conflict with

the broader view of desire taken by Socrates in Stage III. The proposal, thereby, freesus to retain desire for good and the good desired as the prime candidates for what ex-

plains the friend relation because these are the explanatory components of the rela-

tion presented by the unrefuted option in Stage IV. There are, then, several ways in

which the proposal that desire of the akin has sub-kinds enables us to give a unified

reading of the stages of Socrates’ investigation, and thereby, reinforces the view that

Socrates develops in these stages a single conception of being a friend. These consi-

derations are not entirely decisive but they make it reasonable to claim that desire for


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98 Zur Diskussion

good – introduced under a different name in the responsibility assigning passage – is

the second explanatory component of the friend relation. I now turn to Stage IV

where Socrates has the resources to argue that people who desire good are friends

only to the good. Thus, Stage IV can be read as promoting the explanatory compo-

nents of the friend relation already introduced in the earlier stages of the investiga-

tion, namely, desire for good and the good desired.

8. Stage IV

Socrates begins Stage IV by insisting that a successful account of the friend relation

can be given only if it is possible to distinguish the akin from the similar (222b4–10).

The salient difference is this. The akin relation holds in consequence of the fact that

one person lacks and, therefore, desires a property possessed by the other party to

the relation. The similarity relation obtains between entities in virtue of what each

entity has on its own. Thus, were the akin relation conflated with the similarity rela-

tion, it would be difficult to explain the attraction to the friend and also difficult to

meet the requirement that a friend benefit whoever has one.

The aporetic conclusion of the Lysis is partly due, I think, to the fact that boys

equate the akin relation with the similarity relation. This mistake is revealed to the

reader when Socrates begins the Stage IV argument. He does so by posing a di-

lemma. He asks whether (a) good is the akin for everyone or (b) it is the case that bad

people are akin to bad, good people are akin to good, and neither good nor bad

people akin to neither good nor bad (222c4–8). The boys affirm (b). But this optionequates the akin relation with the similarity relation, since the pairs on this option

exemplify the akin relation presumably because the paired entities belong to the same

ontological kind. So the basis of the akin relation on this option is a similarity be-

tween the akin entities. Even when Socrates points out that (b), in conjuntion with

the hypothesis that the akin is friend to the akin, implies that bad people can be

friends, a proposition that was rejected earlier, the boys bypass (a) and endorse in-

stead a more restricted version of (b). But their second choice – good is akin to good –

leads to a problem already mentioned by Socrates, namely, that the good are self-suf-

ficient and, therefore, seem to have no need or desire for friends (215a7–b2). Unsur-

prisingly, then, Socrates evinces puzzlement over the closing conclusion that the

good are friends to the good only. We thought, µεα (222d8), he says, that we had

excluded this hypothesis. The fact that Socrates hedges when he casts suspicion on

this conclusion suggests that the conclusion might be satisfactory were there a diffe-

rent line of argument from which it could be drawn. 36 To argue satisfactorily for the

36 Further support for my suggestion that Socrates here invites presumably the rea-der to find some solution to the final aporia is given at 222e1–4 where Socratescalls for a re-examination of the entire discussion. Socrates’ request would makemost sense, if he thought that a review of the arguments would reveal that some-thing went wrong, thus making possible a way out of the impasse. See also the


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closing conclusion requires, I think, that we preserve the distinction between the akin

and the similar. This means that the akin relation is fundamentally a relation between

a desire and the entity that is desired. Socrates’ formulation of options (a) and (b) in-

dicate, however, that he introduces, as I said he would, a third characterization of the

relata of the akin relation. For the options represent the relation as obtaining bet-

ween a person and an entity. Consequently, if we wish to incorporate into the refor-

mulation of the closing argument one of the aforementioned options, we need to

adopt the third characterization of the relation. But we are justified in slightly modi-

fying the characterization in order to accommodate the explanatorily more funda-

mental characterization of the relation as obtaining between a desire and an object of

desire. Hence, we ought to represent the relation as follows:

P1 People who desire the akin are akin to the akin object(s) of desire.

Furthermore, preserving the distinction between the akin and the similar means that

the elements that comprise the akin relation can belong to different ontological

kinds. This consideration would, in light of the earlier stages of the investigation,

counsel adopting option (a) as a premiss in the argument.

P2 The good is the akin object of desire for everyone.

To P1 and P2 we should add the hypothesis under examination:

P3 The akin is friend to the akin.

Given these premisses, we can infer:

P4 People who desire the akin are friends to the akin object(s) of desire. (P1, P3)

and,

P5 People who desire the good are friends to the good. (P2, P4)

Concern about P5 as involving a substitution in an intentional context should be al-

layed by the observation that the argument proceeds from an outsider’s point of view.

So “the akin” occurs purely referentially in P4 rather than within the attudinist’s on-

tology and is, therefore, subject to substitutivity of identify.37 Now on the basis of So-

crates’ conjecture at 222d5–6, namely, “if we say that the good and the akin are the

same”, we can add:

P6 The good and people who desire the akin are qualitatively the same.

“so far,” οϊπ, at 223b7. Thus, three of Socrates’ comments suggest that furtherreflection on all of the earlier exchanges can produce a positive result. Yet in asense the dialogue does end inconclusively. Although Socrates seems to be com-mitted to the view that philosophic activity, health, and different kinds of knowledge are genuine goods, he does not make clear what else constitutes a ge-nuine good in a friend. In this sense, then, the Lysis is aporetic like the otherelenctic dialogues.

37 For a defense of the substitution see Bonomi 1995, 164f., and Quine 1995, 356f.


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and infer:

P7 The good and people who desire the good are qualitatively the same. (P2, P6)

The next move is perhaps the most contentious.38

P9 The good are people who desire the good. (P7)

We can now infer the conclusion:

C10 The good is friend only to the good.39 (P5, P9)

The conclusion of this argument evades the difficulty encountered by the conclusion

of the closing argument. For “good person” is construed here as “person who desires

the good”, i.e., good things. Thus, a good person would likely care for and want

friends who possess goods that complement the good person’s desire for good. This

fact is also relevant to answering the question of what makes the good in

justin, gale_identification and definition in the lysis_agph, 87, 1_2005!75!104

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