iii. Jurisdiction over the subject matter – jurisdiction in rem

Applied Food Ingredients Co., Inc. v. CIRG.R. No. 184266November 11, 2013Sereno, CJ.

Doctrine:The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may, at any time, be raised by the parties or considered by the Court motu proprio.

Facts:Petitioner alleged that from September 1998 to December 31, 2000, it paid an aggregate sum of input taxes of P9,528,565.85 for its importation of food ingredients, as reported in its Quarterly Vat Return. These sales were claimed by petitioner to be zero-rated.

Subsequently, these imported food ingredients were exported between the periods of April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000, from which the petitioner was able to generate export sales.

On March 26, 2002 and June 28, 2002, petitioner filed two separate applications for the issuance of tax credit certificates (TCCs) in the amounts of P5,385,208.32 and P4,143,357.53, respectively.

On July 24, 2002, in view of respondent's inaction, petitioner elevated the case before the CTA by way of a Petition for Review.

CTA First Division and CTA En Banc: denied TCC claim on grounds of failure to comply with invoicing requirements.

Issue:WON the CTA has jurisdiction over the TCC claim of AFIC?

Held:No.

Ratio:The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may, at any time, be raised by the parties or considered by the Court motu proprio. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the CTA over petitioner's appeal may still be considered and determined by this Court.

(1) Section 112 (A) provides for a two-year prescriptive period after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, within which a VAT-

registered person whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax.

Petitioner claims that from April 2000 to December 2000 it had zero- rated sales to which it attributed the accumulated input taxes it had incurred from September 1998 to December 2000.

Applying Section 112 (A), petitioner had until 30 June 2002, 30 September 2002 and 31 December 2002 — or the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated sales were made — within which to file its administrative claim for refund. Petitioner sufficiently complied with the two-year prescriptive period when it filed its claim on 26 March 2002 and 28 June 2002 covering its zero-rated sales for the period April to September 2000 and October to December 2000, respectively.

Close of taxable quarter when

zero-rated sale was

made

End of 2-year

prescriptive period to file claim

Actual filing of

administrative claim

April-Septembe

r 2000

30 June 2002

26 March 2002

October-December

2000

31 December

2002

28 June 2002

(2) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application within which to decide on the administrative claim.

In relation thereto, absent any evidence to the contrary and bearing in mind that the burden to prove entitlement to a tax refund is on the taxpayer, it is presumed that in order to discharge its burden, petitioner had attached complete supporting documents necessary to prove its entitlement to a refund in its application filed on 26 March 2002 and 28 June 2002. Therefore, the CIR's 120- day period to decide on petitioner's administrative claim commenced to run on 26 March 2002 and 28 June 2002, respectively.

Counting 120 days from 26 March 2002, the CIR had until 24 July 2002

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within which to decide on the claim of petitioner for an input VAT refund attributable to the its zero-rated sales for the period April to September 2000.

On the other hand, the CIR had until 26 October 2002 within which to decide on petitioner's claim for refund filed on 28 June 2002, or for the period covering October to December 2000.

Records, however, show that the judicial claim of petitioner was filed on 24 July 2002. Petitioner clearly failed to observe the mandatory 120-day waiting period. Consequently, the premature filing of its claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warranted a dismissal, inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.

Actual filing of

administrative claim

120-day period of

CIR to decide

claim ends

Actual ate of filing of

judicial claim

26 March 2002

24 July 2002 24 July

200228 June 2002 26 October

2002

RA 1125, as amended by RA 9282, S7. Jurisdiction. — The CTA shall exercise:

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

(2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial; . . . .

"Inaction by the CIR" in cases involving the refund of creditable input tax, arises only after the lapse of 120 days. Thus, prior thereto and without a decision of the CIR, the CTA, as a court of special jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction to entertain claims for the refund or credit of creditable input tax. "The charter of the CTA also expressly

provides that if the Commissioner fails to decide within "a specific period" required by law, such "inaction shall be deemed a denial" of the application for tax refund or credit. It is the Commissioner's decision, or inaction "deemed a denial," that the taxpayer can take to the CTA for review. Without a decision or an "inaction . . . deemed a denial" of the Commissioner, the CTA has no jurisdiction over a petition for review."

Considering further that the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA is dependent on the 120-day period, both periods are hereby rendered jurisdictional. Failure to observe 120 days prior to the filing of a judicial claim is not a mere non- exhaustion of administrative remedies, but is likewise considered jurisdictional. The period of 120 days is a prerequisite for the commencement of the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA. In both instances, whether the CIR renders a decision (which must be made within 120 days) or there was inaction, the period of 120 days is material.

Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corp. v. CullenG.R. No. 181416November 11, 2013Peralta, J.

Doctrine:It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss.

The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than the title of the complaint.

Facts:MPMCC (Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corp.) demanded from respondent Robert Cullen, a condominium unit owner in MPMC, payment of alleged unpaid association dues and assessments. Respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the 2002 election of petitioner's Board of Directors.

Cullen then demanded from petitioner an explanation why he was considered a delinquent payer despite the settlement of the obligation. Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Hence, the Complaint for Damages

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filed by respondent against petitioner and MLHI.

MPMCC: MTD for lack of jurisdiction as case involves an intra-corporate dispute.

RTC: intra-corporate dispute. Dismissed.

CA: reversed. Ordinary civil action.

Issue:WON the case involves an intra-corporate dispute within the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts (SCCs).

Held:Yes, intra-corporate dispute. Case before RTC Br. 58, not an SCC, ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Remanded for re-raffling.

Ratio:It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.

In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy, the Court uses two tests, namely, the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.

An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. Thus, under the relationship test, the existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations makes the case intra-corporate.

Under the nature of the controversy test, "the controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code

and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation." In other words, jurisdiction should be determined by considering both the relationship of the parties as well as the nature of the question involved.

Applying the two tests, we find and so hold that the case involves intra-corporate controversy. It obviously arose from the intra-corporate relations between the parties, and the questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the corporation.

The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than the title of the complaint. Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of the allegations made by respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner against respondent as w ell as the validity of petitioner's act in preventing respondent from participating in the election of the corporation's Board of Directors. Respondent contested the alleged unpaid dues and assessments demanded by petitioner.

RTC designated as SCC has jurisdiction over the case as per SRC S5.2.

Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development Corp.G.R. No. 197592 and 202623November 27, 2013Villarama, J.

Doctrine:The court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.

A court’s orders implementing its judgment rendered without jurisdiction

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must be set aside because a void judgment can never be validly executed.

Facts:The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. In the course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional works. The scope of work under these change orders were agreed upon by petitioner and respondent.

Respondent made a demand for the items which petitioner allegedly failed to settle.

Respondent sued petitioner in RTC Marikina City to collect the aforesaid amounts. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment.

The trial court issued a writ of execution ordering the sheriff to demand from petitioner the immediate payment and tender the same to the respondent.

Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution.

CA: petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COA's primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.

Issue:WON the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to this case.

Held:Yes.

Ratio:Petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction

Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTC's jurisdiction over the matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. To this, we need only state that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as

the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties.

There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the present case.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.

The RTC's orders implementing its judgment rendered without jurisdiction must be set aside because a void judgment can never be validly executed.

Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. CAG.R. No. 173946June 19, 2013Perez, J.

Doctrine:(1) The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.

(2) Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party

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to a case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense.

Facts:Petitioner Boston Equity Resources, Inc. (BERI) filed a complaint for sum of money against respondents Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Lolita filed an Answer and later an Amended Answer stating that her husband and co-defendant Manuel is already dead. Pretrial and trial followed.

In the period given to Lolita to file a demurrer to evidence, she filed an MTD for, inter alia, the Manila RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel.

RTC: denied MTD.

CA: granted certiorari by Lolita. Issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal. For raising the issue in her MTD, Lolita not barred by laches to question jurisdiction of RTC.

BERI: Lolita MTD filed more than 6 years after her amended answer was filed. As per Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in the proceedings conducted by the RTC.

Issue:WON Lolita is barred from raising issue of jurisdiction (over the person of the deceased Manuel).

Held:Yes. CA decision reversed and set aside. RTC to proceed with trial of case against Lolita Toledo.

Ratio:The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, in Tijam, the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of the then Court of First Instance to hear a case for the collection of a sum of money in the amount of P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal courts.

In subsequent cases citing the ruling of the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at issue was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter of the case.

In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.

What respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court's jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.

Rule 9, S1, and Rule 15, S8

Objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . . Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be waived . . . subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches.

Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be

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asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.

Tijam v. SibonghanoyG.R. No. L-21450April 15, 1968Dizon, J.

Doctrine:A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question by estoppel by laches.

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

Facts:Spouses Tijam filed a collection case for P1,908.00 against spouses Sibonghanoy before the CFI of Cebu. They also prayed for a writ of attachment but the same was dissolved upon filing of a counter-bond by defendants and Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.

CFI Cebu rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Said judgment became final and executory. The writ of execution issued against the defendants was returned unsatisfied, prompting plaintiffs to move for the issuance of another writ now directed to the Surety.

The writ against the Surety was finally issued.

Surety: motion to quash writ of execution. Summary hearing required by rules not conducted. CFI denied MTQ.

CA: affirmed RTC ruling. Later granted MOTEX filed by Surety.

Surety: instead filed MTD on ground of lack of jurisdiction of RTC. MTC has jurisdiction for recovery of sum of money the subject matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00 (as per Judiciary Act of 1948). CA certified the case to the SC.

Issue:WON the collection suit should be dismissed for CFI’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Held:No.

Ratio:The Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

Although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses, the Surety became a quasi-party therein when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin. Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with Sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court

Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.

At the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter- bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

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The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

From the time the Surety became a quasi-party, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

Padlan v. Spouses DinglasanG.R. No. 180321March 20, 2013Peralta, J.

Doctrine:Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.

Facts:Respondent Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a lot of the Limay Cadastre covered by a TCT. Her mother had a conversation with one Maura Passio regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, her mother borrowed the owner's copy of the TCT from her and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots from Lot No. 625-A to Lot

No. 625-O, under the name of Elenita and her husband.

Maura was able to sell through falsified deeds lots to different buyers. One such buyer was Lorna Ong, who later caused the issuance of TCT in her name. A few months later, Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00

After acquiring knowledge of the sale, the Dinglasans demanded Padlan to surrender possession of the lot but the latter refused. Respondents then filed before the RTC Balanga, Bataan an action to cancel the title held by petitioner.

RTC: Padlan buyer in good faith. Complaint dismissed.

CA: reversed RTC decision.

Padlan: MR, RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

Issue:WON the RTC acquired subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Held:No. Civil case dismissed without prejudice.

Ratio:Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time BP 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by RA No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129. RA 7691, S1, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions:

Sec. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty

7

Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; . . .

RA 7691, S3 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of first level courts:

Sec. 33.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx(3)Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.

An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself." "Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued

by the government through the Register of Deeds. While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.

A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In one of the hearings, respondents' counsel informed the court that they will present the tax declaration of the property in the next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor's Office. However, they did not present such copy.

Since the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

People v. EstrebellaG.R. No. 71464August 4, 1988Paras, J.

Doctrine:Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is and may be conferred only by law, and that jurisdiction over a given crime not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereon by the parties involved in the offense. RPC Art. 344 does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It could not effect said jurisdiction, because the same with respect to the instant crime is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code.

[Note: Rape is now a crime against persons. Who may now initiate an action for rape?]

Facts:

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Accused Romeo Estrebella was charged with the crime of rape of Joy Alcala, a mental retardate, aged 13 but with mental age of only 6 or 7. The Complaint against Estrebella was signed by Alcala herself. He was found guilty as charged.

Estrebella: trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to try the case because the complaint was filed by a minor and mental retardate complainant, contrary to R110 (1985), S4 and 5:

The offended party, even she were a minor, has the right to institute the prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority.

and RPC Art. 344:

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party of her parents, grandparents or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be . . .

Issue:WON the trial court lacks jurisdiction to try Estrebella’s case.

Held:No. Court has jurisdiction. Judgment of conviction affirmed.

Ratio:Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is and may be conferred only by law, and that jurisdiction over a given crime not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereon by the parties involved in the offense. The aforementioned provision of Art. 344 does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It could not effect said jurisdiction, because the same with respect to the instant crime is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the RPC, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Art. 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of

the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial.

While the complaint may have been technically defective in the sense that complainant was incompetent, this defect has been cured when complainant's brother Fernando Alcala took the witness stand for the prosecution.

Lloraña v. LeonidasG.R. No. L-39810March 28, 1988Melencio-Herrera, J.

Doctrine:To determine whether or not the principle of res judicata applies, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment;

(2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

(3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and

(4) there is, between the first and the second action identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.

Facts:Spouses Lloraña filed a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the order of CFI Capiz dismissing the case for enforcement of warranty against eviction filed by them against respondents Geners on the ground of res judicata.

First case: Recovery of possession filed by Precila Gener against other Geners and Spouses Lloraña to recover 2ha Riceland in Tapaz, Capiz. Precila alleges that the property was adjudicated to her in the extrajudicial settlement executed by her, her mother, and sisters.

Lloraña spouses filed answer with cross-claims against the Geners, alleging the they purchased the lot in a pacto de retro. The cross-defendants did not repurchase the lot in the stipulated period and that said cross-defendants had a warranty against eviction in favor of cross-claimants.

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Defendants Geners and Lloraña spouses failed to appear at pre-trial and trial. CFI decided in favor of plaintiff.

Fourth case: Lloraña spouses v. Geners for enforcement warranty against eviction. Case dismissed by CFI for bar by prior judgment.

Issue:WON latter case barred by res judicata.

Held:Yes.

Ratio:To determine whether or not the principle of res judicata applies, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment;

There is a final former judgment which is in Civil Case No. M-87. The defendants and cross-claimants, none other than the Lloraña Spouses themselves, who are the petitioners herein, filed in said case a Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial, which was, however, denied. They did not appeal the Decision, hence, it acquired finality.

(2) the former judgment must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

The Court, which rendered the judgment in Civil Case No. M-87, had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. A civil action for recovery of possession, annulment of partition, accounting and damages was properly within the jurisdiction of the then Court of First Instance of Capiz (Section 2[a], Rule 4, Rules of Court). Jurisdiction over the parties is not disputed.

(3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and

The judgment in Civil Case No. M-87, dated April 25, 1968, is a judgment on the merits, that is, it was rendered after consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties during the trial of the case.

(4) there is, between the first and the second action identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.

The Lloraña Spouses, who are the plaintiffs in the second case, are the same parties who filed a cross-claim against the Geners in the earlier case. The Geners, who are the cross-defendants in earlier case are also the defendants in the latter case. The subject matter in both cases is the sale with pacto de retro allegedly executed by the Geners in favor of the Lloraña Spouses. The cause of action in both cases is also identical, which is the liability of the Geners to the Lloraña Spouses for damages for alleged breach of their warranty, as vendors, against the eviction of the Lloraña spouses, as vendees.

Republic Planters Bank v. MolinaG.R. No. 54287September 28, 1988Gancayco, J.

Doctrine:The order of dismissal in the first case does not have the effect of an adjudication on the merits of the case because the court that rendered the same did not have the requisite jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants therein. This being so, it cannot be the basis of res judicata and it cannot be a bar to a lawful claim.

Facts:First case: Republic Planters Bank (RPB) v private respondents for collection of sum of money based on a PN for P100,000.00.

Case was dismissed by CFI Manila Br. 36 for RPB’s failure to prosecute the case within a reasonable length of time.

Second case: also RPB v private respondent for collection of sum of money based on same PN for P100,000.00.

Private respondents filed MTD on ground of res judicata. CFI Manila Br. 20 dismissed the case with prejudice. That court in prior case did not acquire jurisdiction over person of private respondents of no moment.

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Issue:WON the second case was barred by res judicata.

Held:No.

Ratio:Respondent trial judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when he dismissed the case because he thereby traversed the constitutional precept that "no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law" and that jurisdiction is vitally essential for any order or adjudication to be binding.

The order of dismissal in the first case does not have the effect of an adjudication on the merits of the case because the court that rendered the same did not have the requisite jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants therein. This being so, it cannot be the basis of res judicata and it cannot be a bar to a lawful claim. If at all, such a dismissal may be considered as one without prejudice.

There are no indications that petitioner intentionally failed to prosecute the case. The delay could not be attributed to its fault. Petitioner pursued the case with diligence, but jurisdiction could not be acquired over defendants-private respondents. The sheriff had not yet submitted his return of the alias summons when the action was precipitately dismissed by the trial court.

ALU-TUCP v. BorromeoG.R. No. 75736September 29, 1988Sarmiento, J.

Doctrine:The courts of law have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom. That is basic and elementary. Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the proper labor officials of the Department of Labor.

Facts:Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) filed a notice of strike and complaint for various offenses before the MOLE against respondent Belyca Corp. ranging from ULP to non payment of minimum wages.

Respondent filed an action for injunction with the RTC, alleging that

works prevent the giving of feeds to the hogs and fowls who would die if not attended to (about 7,500 hogs and 8,000 fowls). The RTC issued a TRO commanding striking workers to allow Belyca to feed its hogs and fowls.

Belyca then sought extension of the TRO for 20 days was granted by the RTC.

Issue:WON RTC has jurisdiction over the injunction case.

Held:No. RTC orders declared void.

Ratio:The courts of law have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom. That is basic and elementary. Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the proper labor officials of the Department of Labor, thus:

ART. 217.Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.

(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1.Unfair labor practice cases;

2.Those that workers may le involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

3.All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other bene ts provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits.

4.Cases involving household services; and

5.Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.

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(b)The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

Art. 128. xxx

(b)The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance with the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor regulations officer and raise issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection.

That the case in question involves a labor dispute is patent from the records. In rendering his ruling, the respondent judge himself was aware that the dispute was the result of an impasse between employer and employees, an impasse cognizable alone by the National Labor Relations.

The respondent judge cannot enjoin acts carried out as a consequence of the strike without unavoidably ruling on the legality of the strike itself. To say indeed that the workers had obstructed free passage to the strike-bound firm, is, by necessity, to say that the strike was illegal, notwithstanding the judge's own words of caution.

What is even clearer is the fact that in labor cases, injunction itself stands as an exceptional remedy. It does not lie save in those cases as the Labor Code provides:

ART. 255.Injunction prohibited. — No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code. The fact that the poultry and piggery maintained by the private respondent required close care and attention does not warrant the respondent judge's assumption of jurisdiction. It did not confer on him the competence he did not have. Jurisdiction is vested by law

and not by the demands of emergency.

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