july 2016 · back to table of contents max security solutions ltd. office: +44 20 3540 0434 the...

July 2016

Back to Table of Contents

MAX Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com

Throughout the month of June, amidst the holy month of Ramadan, militancy continued to pose a threat in several

countries in South Asia. In Bangladesh, numerous militant attacks were recorded despite a week-long anti-militancy drive.

Nonetheless, the low-level, operational sophistication of militant groups in the country remains largely unchanged.

Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the fatal attack on the famed Sufi singer highlights the Taliban’s enduring perception of moderate

Sufism as un-Islamic. The recurrent instances of gun-related violence also shed light on the lack of adequate restrictions

regarding the possession of firearms in Pakistan, leading us to assess that Sectarian elements may conduct additional

targeted attacks against minorities; particularly in Karachi. Furthermore, Reports on June 4 indicated that fighters from

the Maldives in Syria allegedly release video threatening domestic politicians. While the capability of such militants to

return and conduct attacks in Maldives remains unclear at the time of writing, the government is likely to take the threat

video seriously, given that it remains the first notable threat to Maldivian politicians emanating from the militant group.

Political developments were also a dominant feature in Asia. Perhaps most notable in this field was in Malaysia, with the

consolidated win in semi-urban regions of Selangor, Perak for BN, thus strengthening Pm Najib’s support base. In India,

the series of protest and counter protests between the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), currently in government in Delhi, and the

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the ruling party at the Center, were indicative of the high tensions between the two political

parties. The upcoming month of July will also be politically signifacnt in Japan as Prime Minister Abe’s popularity is in

question over the Upper House elections on July 10. While these elections cannot directly affect Prime Minister Abe’s

position, the outcome of the polls has largely been seen as a test of the premier’s current popularity among the Japanese

electorate.

China continued to display a hard power projection, as it persisted building in disputed islets. These infrastructural

projects by Beijing come just a few days or weeks before an international tribunal is expected to side with the Philippines

and reject China’s claim to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. They are meant to serve as “facts on the

ground,” which will enable China to mitigate the ramifications of the arbitration via hard power projection. Additionally,

Beijing cut off communication with Taiwan due the refusal of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing Wen to endorse the idea of a

single Chinese nation, a concept known as the 1992 Consensus that concludes Taiwan and the mainland to be part of one

China. Further steps by China are liable to be implemented in the coming weeks should President Tsai continue to be

reluctant to disavow calls for Taiwanese independence.

Lastly, sectarian tensions remain high in Myanmar, as attacks against Muslim minority communities were recorded,

representing one of the most significant hindrances in the country’s reform process. In Australia, significant anti-Islamic

feeling was prevalent among so called nationalist or patriot groups, which has become increasingly visible in light of the

growing threat from the militant group the Islamic State (IS) threat, as well as the issue of refugees from the Middle East,

some of whom have attempted to come to the country.



PAKISTAN ..............................................................................................................................................................................3

BANGLADESH ........................................................................................................................................................................4

CHINA .....................................................................................................................................................................................5

INDIA ......................................................................................................................................................................................6

INDONESIA ............................................................................................................................................................................7

MALAYSIA ..............................................................................................................................................................................8

MYANMAR .............................................................................................................................................................................9

PHILIPPINES ........................................................................................................................................................................ 10

SRI LANKA ........................................................................................................................................................................... 11

AUSTRALIA .......................................................................................................................................................................... 12

HONG KONG ...................................................................................................................................................................... 13

JAPAN .................................................................................................................................................................................. 14

MALDIVES ........................................................................................................................................................................... 15

SOUTH KOREA .................................................................................................................................................................... 16

TAIWAN ............................................................................................................................................................................... 17

Notable Dates for JULY 2016 ............................................................................................................................................ 18



The clashes suggest heightened cross-border tensions over

the issue of fencing the busiest official border crossing

between the two countries that has seemingly persisted

despite Pakistan’s handover of the Angoor Adda border

crossing to Afghanistan in mid-May. While Islamabad

restarted construction work on the fence in an attempt to

hamper cross-border movement of militants, Kabul remains

steadfast in its opposition to such unilateral moves, refusing

to accept the internationally-recognized Durand Line as the

legitimate border delineation. Given the high casualty count

from the clashes as well as mutual security and economic

interests in preserving stability along the border, both sides

would be keen to avoid a similar escalation, despite

threatening statements by Zakhilwal. That said, Kabul and

Islamabad are unlikely to budge their respective positions in

the near term, and further attempts by Islamabad to erect

barriers along Torkham will likely be seen by Kabul as an

attempt to legitimize the disputed Durand Line border.

The fatal attack on the famed Sufi singer highlights the Taliban’s

enduring perception of moderate Sufism as un-Islamic. The

recurrent instances of gun-related violence also shed light on

the lack of adequate restrictions regarding the possession of

firearms in Pakistan, resulting in their easy availability, further

lowering the threshold of targeted attacks. The high-profile

killings also serve to spread a sense of insecurity among

individuals of minority faiths as well as prominent critics of the

TTP in Pakistan who will increasingly be perceived as potential

targets. As the latest attack follows the TTP Mehsud faction’s

claimed killing of prominent Shiite activist Khurram Zaki in

Karachi on May 7, the militant group’s continued successes in

carrying out targeted killings as opposed to mass-casualty

attacks in the city remains noteworthy. While this may indicate

a notable deterioration of militant capabilities, several factions

of the TTP continue to remain operationally active in Karachi,

and they are liable to exploit the relatively weak security

situation in the city to launch additional targeted attacks.

Afghan-Pakistan border

skirmishes over

Torkham fence kills

four, injures 40 others

Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan

Omar Zakhilwal warned Islamabad

of dire consequences if iwork on

Torkham gate was not halted

Prominent Sufi singer killed in

attack by Hakimullah Mehsud

faction of Tehreek-e-Taliban

Pakistan



The holy month of Ramadan witnessed a spike in militant activity including the June 5, June 7 and June 10 attacks claimed

by the Islamic State (IS) and the June 15 attack on a Hindu professor committed by Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), a different

transnational Islamist group. Given that HuT has not directly been involved in militant violence in the past, the possibility

of more Islamist groups conducting targeted attacks in an effort to garner publicity remains high. Additionally, as evident

in the consistent low grade militant violence witnessed in both the most recent incidents as well as most attacks over the

past months, the operational sophistication of militant groups in the country remains largely unchanged. Attacks

targeting religious minorities, including Shiites in the vicinity of places of worship, with an aim of highlighting the

operational capacity of militants and to discredit the ruling government, is likely to occur in the run up to Eid-Ul-Fitar. In

response to the ongoing attacks, the June 10 counter-military operation was likely an attempt by the government to

project stability and an ability to effectively curb militancy. That said, the vast majority of arrests were considered criminal

rather than militant and attacks have continued unabated following the drive. In this light, security measures including

the deployment of additional foot patrols and checkpoints at entrances and exits of major urban centers ahead of Eid

remain likely, particularly in Dhaka and Chittagong. Additionally, with the police being continually deployed as part of a

heightened alert status, the probability of counter-militancy authorities being stretched too thin may result in decreased

counter-militant efficiency. Separately, with more than 2,000 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) activists reportedly being

arrested during the crackdown, the ruling Awami League is likely to continue blaming its political opposition for the

killings, in an attempt to discredit its opposition and further strengthen its hold on the political landscape in Bangladesh.

Hindu killed in Bonpara

in Natore district.

Five-day nationwide

anti-militancy drive

commences, resulting

in the arrest of 11,000.

Hindu professor hacked

and injured in

Madaripur in central

Bangladesh.

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The recent protests in Gansu and Guangdong Provinces

highlight the growing trend of “mass incidents” in China as

the country’s economic growth rate has slowed. They point

to the ongoing challenges Beijing faces in promoting state-

led development while also maintaining the country’s

security situation. Of the two incidents, the Wukan protests

in particular are problematic, given the village’s infamous

demonstrations in 2011 against the government. During

those protests, despite intense government pressure, the

villagers were able to successfully demand the institution of

a democratically elected village chief. As such, Wukan is a

symbol of effective community organizing in China, and

incidents there could have outsized symbolic significance.

Given a lack of compromise between the government and

villagers, as well as China’s weakening financial situation,

similar incidents to these two will likely multiply in the days

and weeks to come.

These infrastructural projects by Beijing come just a few days

or weeks before an international tribunal is expected to side

with the Philippines and reject China’s claim to sovereignty

over most of the South China Sea. They are meant to serve as

“facts on the ground,” which will enable China to mitigate the

ramifications of the arbitration via hard power projection.

Indeed, these buildings are just the latest in a spate of Chinese

construction in disputed islets, and will be joined by a Chinese

hospital set to open on Fiery Cross Reef in late June. China has

also made use of its bilateral relationships to shore up

support and minimize dissension to its sovereignty claims;

State Councilor Yang Jiechi undertook a lobbying trip to

Vietnam on June 27. Following the release of the arbitration,

China’s rhetoric and actions will likely intensify, and could

ignite reactive military build-ups, especially by Vietnam,

Indonesia, and the Philippines.



The series of protest and counter protests between the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), currently in government in Delhi, and

the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the ruling party at the Center, is indicative of the high tensions between the two

political parties. While exchanges between the parties have largely taken place within the purview of the legislative

assembly, the spike in protests and counter protests between its rank-and-file members signal a spillover of tensions

into the streets. It appears that the BJP views AAP’s growing political ambitions, evidenced by Kejriwal’s intentions to

replicate AAP’s success in Delhi, Punjab and Goa state elections in 2017, as a legitimate national-level threat. The BJP’s

protests are likely seek to undermine AAP’s image as an anti-corruption outfit, by implying the party’s involvement in

the Delhi Jal Board corruption scandal. Meanwhile, AAP’s counter-allegations and protests highlight the party’s attempt

to consolidate itself as a mainstream political force in Delhi which could replace the Indian National Congress as the

BJP’s primary national rival before the next general election in 2019. There is a latent threat of violence as a result of

clashes between party workers, as evidenced by the alleged assault of an AAP Dalit councilor by BJP members on June

9. Given that the DJB corruption scandal is currently under investigation, additional street protests in response to

developments in the case are anticipated, especially in the vicinity of prominent locations in the center of Delhi such as

the BJP’s headquarters on Ashoka Road, Kejriwal’s residence on Flagstaff Road or Jantar Mantar and will likely cause

disruptions to travel in the capital in the short to near term.

AAP activists protest

the alleged assault of a

Dalit councilor by BJP

councilors in Delhi

BJP party activists

demonstrate against

AAP’s alleged

involvement in DJB

corruption scandal

BJP MP Maheish Girri

protests outside AAP

Delhi chief minister

Arvind Kejriwal’s house

against AAP allegations

linking him in the MCD

murder case

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The attendance of over 10,000 supporters from the FPI, as

well as additional hardline groups, indicates the continued

sensitive and polarizing perceptions of communism within

Indonesia. The large-scale attendance was catalyzed by a

government plan to investigate the 1965 anti-communist

mass killings. Many religious and conservative groups have

expressed fears that any investigation into the killings may

revive communist sentiments in the Muslim nation. Given

the prevalence of Islam, and growing popularity of ultra-

conservative and radical ideologies, it is likely that any

perceived attempts to displace Islam or placate seemingly

un-Islamic ideologies will be met with strong protest. This

trend has been notable across Indonesia, with anti-

communist protests also taking place in Medan on May 18.

The June 8-9 arrests, coupled with the recovery of

ammunition, demonstrates the continued threat of

militancy emanating from IS-linked or affiliated individuals

within Indonesia. Given Surabaya’s significance as the

country’s second largest urban center, we assess that

militant elements may seek to conduct attacks in order to

undermine the Indonesian security apparatus’ ongoing

anti-militancy efforts. This assessment is further bolstered

by suspected plans to target security infrastructure in

Surabaya, as previously witnessed during the January 14

Jakarta attacks by local IS-affiliated militants. While the risk

of militant threat in Indonesia remains elevated, other

major cities in Southeast Asia, such as Kuala Lumpur and

Singapore, remain more attractive targets.

Islamist pressure group,

Islamic Defender’s Front

(FPI), conducts large-

scale protest against

the alleged rise of

communism, in Central

Jakarta

Three Islamic State (IS)

linked militants arrested

on suspicions of

plotting attacks in

Surabaya; homemade

explosives, firearms

recovered

Fourth suspect

arrested; Surabaya

residents asked to

remain vigilant for

remainder of holy

month of Ramadan,

cooperate with security

personnel

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The NSC Act allows for the establishment of a National

Security Council headed by the PM, also entrusting the

council with overarching powers. This act has been criticized

by both opposition parties and human rights groups for the

council’s absolute powers, which would allow for any region

to be declared a security area if deemed a risk as also

empowering security forces to enter, search premises and

arrest suspects in the area. While the act is likely to be

perceived as an attempt by PM Najib to secure absolute

powers, thus possibly undermining the established

democratic values, the government is liable to present the

new Act as a necessary law to mitigate security threats in the

country. However, indiscriminate arrests under the NSC act

in the coming months may possibly lead to anti-government

protests by opposition parties and civil rights groups.

BN’s win in the by-elections has effectively solidified the BN’s

hold over the country’s contemporary politics. Furthermore,

the win in semi-urban regions of Malaysia, followed by a

victory in the mostly rural state of Sarawak in May is liable

to be projected as the BN’s reach within every section of the

Malaysian society. With Prime Minister Najib Razak

consolidating his leadership following the victory, the results

can be further perceived as the inability of the opposition

coalition of Pakatan Harapan as well as ousted UMNO

leader and former PM Mahathir Mohamad to inspire

confidence among the public for an alternative government.

Thus, while the opposition parties may seek to organize

coalition protests in the coming weeks in a bid to project a

united stance, PM Najib may attempt to further strengthen

his position by cracking down on expressed dissent, as has

been evidenced in the past.

National Security

Council (NSC) Bill

adopted as law, without

royal consent to bill

Barisan Nasional (BN)

coalition secures victory

in twin by-elections in

Sungai Besar and Kuala

Kangsar



While Myanmar has undergone significant reforms following October 2015 elections, the treatment of ethnic Rohingya

represents one of the most significant hindrances in the country’s reform process and the repeal of most remaining

sanctions being levelled against the state. The seeming further entrenchment of longstanding anti-Rohingya policies by

the newly elected Aung San suu Kyi-government is likely to lead to increased international pressure, particularly by the

United States, given Sectary of State John Kerry’s visit to the country in late-March and the recent renewal of the bulk of

remaining US sanctions against the state on May 13, over the issue. While Suu Kyi announced in late-May her intention

to lead a new effort to bring peace and development to Rakhine State, where the majority of Rohyinga Muslim live, the

statement offered no details on how issues would be addressed. She also asked for “enough space” to deal with the

Rohingya issue and cautioned against the use of “emotive terms”, presumably implying the use of the word Rohyinga.

In this context, the statement was more likely an attempt to assuage international concerns and maintain the status

quo, rather than develop any sort of significant policy change. Increased pressure is likely to further exasperate the

frequency of violent incidents targeting the minority community, similar to the June 25 attack, as Buddhist national

groups have consistently expressed outrage over external, international pressure. While limited, in the long-term

perceptions of America’s meddling in internal affairs is likely to lead to increased anti-US and anti-Western sentiment,

which could manifest itself in increased demonstrations at relevant Western embassies and interests and may even

take the form of targeted attacks against Western foreign national operating in the country in the long-term.

Tibetan spiritual leader

Dalai Lama Urges Suu

Kyi to Address

Buddhist-Muslim

Tensions on June 14

Information Ministry

bans officials from

using the term

"Rohingya" to describe

Muslim minority in the

country on June 21.

Buddhist nationalists in

Bago destroy mosque

and house belonging to

Muslim on June 25



Duterte’s public address on June 4 in Davao City urging the

public to take up arms against criminals, with the proposal

for bounties for police officials involved in the killings of

drug offenders might be related to the spike in police

operations, extrajudicial killings targeting alleged drug

dealers and criminals. Keeping in mind that the President-

elect won a landslide victory in the May 9 general elections

on the basis of his anti-crime agenda promising stringent

measures against criminals, the anti-crime drive is likely to

aggravate following the inauguration of Duterte on June 30.

As the new government takes office and the anti-crime plan

is launched officially, the step might face opposition in the

Philippine Senate and Congress. However, the political

maneuvering conducted by Duterte’s party, garnering

support for his agenda and his mass appeal are likely to

limit any opposition to his perceivably radical plans.

The beheading on June 13 coupled with the execution of

another Canadian hostage on April 25, when a similar

deadline lapsed, signifies the desperation of Abu Sayyaf

with regards to receiving financial dividends for their

hostages. However, the release of a Filipina hostage from

the group of individuals abducted in September 2015,

might have resulted out of negotiations initiated by

President-elect Duterte, perceived to have several

connections with local Muslim Moro rebel leaders in

Mindanao. Private negotiations supposedly launched for

securing the release of the Norwegian national and other

hostages might be fruitful, with the assistance of the newly

elected government under Duterte in the near term.

Operations by the Philippine military are liable to continue

in the provinces of Sulu and Basilan, known strongholds of

Abu Sayyaf with the motive of eradicating the group.

Anti-crime drive follows

Duterte’s address

urging public to take up

arms against criminals,

drug dealers

Abu Sayyaf beheads

Canadian national on

June 13 after ransom

deadline lapses

Reported Islamic State

video urges Southeast

Asian Muslims to travel

to Philippines to fight

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The two separate incidents of student protests, and the

resulting clashes with security forces, underscore the latent

volatility prevalent when public demonstrations are held in

Colombo. The protest on June 15 was a result of a

longstanding issue in Kelaniya University, with teachers

temporarily boycotting classes on March 18. As a result,

tensions remain on campus, after the arrests of students

accused of hazing. Additionally, these protests indicate the

strong politicization of student groups on campuses.

They were led by the Inter-University Students Union,

which is affiliated to the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi

Peramuna (JVP) Party. Both protests indicate the latent

propensity for escalation in student protests and potential

disruptions to travel, as central areas such as Galle Road

and the Presidential Secretariat were blocked as a result of

the clashes between security forces and students.

The calls for the disqualification of Central Bank Governor

Arjuna Mahendran on corruption allegations throughout

the month of June culminated in street protests in

Colombo on the 23, which were peaceful in nature.

However, the incident served to highlight the widespread

support for the protest both from activists of the Anti-

Corruption Front (ACF) as well as other political outfits such

as the Wamay Peramun, and the Joint Opposition. In the

aftermath of the protests, it is unlikely that the issue will

continue to stir tensions, given that Sri Lankan Prime

Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has agreed not to re-

appoint Mahendran, owing to the controversy surrounding

his tenure as the central bank governor. That said, the

issue remains under investigation by a parliamentary

committee, and based on its developments, anti-corruption

activists may likely resume demonstrations in Colombo.

Police used teargas,

water cannons to

disperse student union

protest in Colombo

Water cannon, tear gas

reported on medical

student protest in

Colombo

Demonstrations in Fort,

Colombo for the

removal of central bank

governor on corruption

allegations

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Anti-Muslim sentiment has increased throughout the

country in recent year in light of an uptick in attacks by

radicalized youths. As immigrants from predominantly

Muslim countries continue to enter the country, anti-

immigration and anti-Muslim movements are liable to gain

traction in certain sectors of Australian society. As such,

further demonstrations in protest of the immigration of

individuals of Muslim heritage will likely occur in the

coming weeks and months. With that said, given the history

of activists from Australia’s far-left confronting those from

the far-right, the aforementioned protests are liable to be

met by far-left activists and devolve into unrest.

The June 28 firebombing, along with the June 26 protests,

underscore the significant anti-Islamic feeling prevalent

among so called nationalist or patriot groups in Australia,

which has become increasingly visible in light of the growing

threat from the militant group the Islamic State (IS) threat, as

well as the issue of refugees from the Middle East, some of

whom have attempted to come to the country. With this in

mind, friction within Australian society in regards to its Muslim

community is likely to continue in the short term with

immigration and security to play a significant role in the

upcoming general elections on July 2.

Far-Right, Far-left protesters clash during

demonstration against Muslim Refugees

in Melbourne

Car firebombed outside Perth

mosque during evening hours

in suspected hate crime



The June 8 protest is significant because it reveals how

ubiquitous the divide between segments of the Hong Kong

population and Mainland China have become. Although the

international cosmetics company alleged it canceled the

concert by a prominent pro-democracy singer due to

security considerations, pro-democracy activists claim it

was an act of "self-censorship" following pressure from

Beijing and Mainland Chinese consumers. In the short-

term, more isolated protests, and possible boycotts,

against the company in Hong Kong are possible. In the

long-term, this incident illustrates and reinforces the

increasing impact that political tensions in Hong Kong can

have on the business continuity of international, private

brands in the semi-autonomous city-state.

The allegations by the Hong Kong bookseller have fanned

perpetual political tensions between rival pro-democracy

and pro-Beijing camps in the semi-autonomous city. In

addition to the march on June 18, there was a smaller pro-

Beijing counter-protest on June 19. On June 24, police

arrested popular pan-democratic legislator Leung Kwok-

hung, allegedly for receiving illegal donations. This rising

crescendo of instability comes ahead of legislative elections

on September 4. Given the long-running animosity

between the two sides, and the beginning of the campaign

cycle, similar actions are likely to metastasize in the weeks

and months to come. Additionally, there are signs that the

gaps between the two sides are growing, especially with

regard to the “one country, two systems” paradigm, which

could make future compromise more unlikely.

Protesters target

international cosmetics

brand due to alleged

“self-censorship”

A Hong Kong bookseller

missing in China since

October 2015 claims

Beijing “abducted” him

Thousands of pro-

democracy legislators,

activists march on the

city’s China Liason

Office



While the July 10 upper house elections cannot directly affect Prime Minister Abe’s position, the outcome of the polls has largely been seen as a test of the premier’s current popularity among the Japanese electorate. Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) swept the 2012 elections which brought him to power in a wave of popularity and remained strong throughout the 2014 snap elections, however Japan’s political and economic circumstances in the interim have left many questions about the Prime Minister's waning support. Unease of the LDP’s potential success has also been heightened by the Democratic Party of Japan, which held power from 2009 to 2012, merging with the Japan Innovation Party, and agreeing to cooperate with the Japan Communist party. A move likely driven by a will to take as many seats from the LDP as possible in the Upper House. Abe’s popularity has further taken a hit following a number of controversial reforms with regards to Japan’s constitution, in which he attempted to remilitarize the traditionally pacifist country, as well as his much debated economic policy known as Abenomics. Moreover, strains have arisen from the US military base scandals in Okinawa following reports of a local being killed by a drunk driver from the base, and another being raped. Meanwhile, Abe has seen controversy within his own party after a high-profile governor of Tokyo, and LDP political ally, was forced to resign over his misuse of taxpayers’ money. With that in mind, this election is likely to be seen as a milestone for Abe, defining the future of his premiership and how the LDP will approach the upcoming 2018 general elections.

22

Amendment to the

Public offices election

act lowers of voting age

from 20 to 18

Campaigning for Upper

House elections began

as 121 seats are

contested

Japanese communist

party chief quits calling

SDF funding a budget

to kill people



While the capability of such militants to return and conduct attacks in Maldives remains unclear at the time of writing,

the government is likely to take the threat video seriously, given that it remains the first notable threat to Maldivian

politicians emanating from the militant group. The incident is likely to further vindicate the opposition’s repeated claims

regarding the growing trend of Islamist radicalism in Maldives, and the government’s alleged incapacity to adequately

monitor the large number of Maldivians departing the country to fight for militant groups like the al-Nusra Front in

Syria. The operation of radical Islamists gangs like the Kuda Henveiru and Buru within the capital city of Male, as well as

the sizeable number of local sympathizers for militant groups like the Islamic State (IS) in the Maldives, as evidenced by

the 2014 pro-IS rally in Male calling for the implementation of sharia law in Maldives, presents a significant challenge

for the government. Opposition activists are likely to attribute the allegedly high numbers of radicalized Maldivians as a

byproduct of decades of political instability under the authoritarian rule of former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom,

the half-brother of current president Abdullah Yameen. Additionally, given Maldives’ close proximity to a major sea lane

of communication (SLOC) along the Arabian Sea, the alleged high per capita rate of radicalization in the Maldives is

likely to attract concern from neighboring littoral states.

Reports on June 4

indicate that Maldivian

fighters in Syria

allegedly release video

threatening domestic

politicians on May 3

On June 12, a local

source indicated that

three Maldivians had

joined an extremist

group in Syria

Reports on June 17

indicated that the

Maldivian government

unveiled a ‘zero

tolerance’ counter-

terrorism policy



The recent threats by IS against US installations in South

Korea indicate an attempt by the transnational militant

group to attempt to illustrate its global reach, while

remaining committed to threatening the US and its military

as an apparent form of protest to American intervention in

the Middle East. The choice to threaten South Korea

remains curious given the lack of local Muslim population

and public support for IS, along with Seoul’s well-seasoned

security establishment which would leave US targets in

South Korea to be particularly difficult for IS to successfully

attack. This is especially true considering the large number

of US bases currently operational in Europe, where IS

already has operational capabilities. Nonetheless, the

threat in South Korea remains latent, as with the rest of the

world, as IS are likely attempting to project global

aspirations regardless of their militant capacity.

Following North Korea’s two missile tests on June 22 the

UN security council announced plans to meet and discuss

the issue, which is has become standard a protocol.

However, it is unlikely that any action other than further

sanctions will be considered given the implicit risks of a

military campaign. While the missile tests do seem to

indicate Pyongyang’s continuing commitment to missile

development, the policy is likely more one of defense, than

aggression. In that regard, the North Korean elite is likely

attempting to mitigate any possible joint attempts to

topple the regime by proliferating its missile technology as

a deterrent. On a geopolitical level this policy will likely

further alienate China, Pyongyang’s traditional regional ally,

who are becoming increasingly impatient with North

Korea’s militarization given its potential to destabilize the

region, and thus jeopardize China’s financial development

and regional economic hegemony.

National Intelligence Service (NIS)

announce that Islamic State threaten

attacks against US military

installations in South Korea

Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn

announces increased security

measures following IS threat

Pyongyang carries out two

consecutive missile tests, Seoul

holds national security meeting



Taiwan experienced a significant uptick in civil

disobedience during the month of June as thousands of

activists took to the street to demonstrate against a variety

of subjects throughout the month. The increase in

demonstrations and high participant turnout is notable as

the vast majority of the rallies were in protest against

government actions. These demonstrations are a turbulent

start for the new government after the elections in January.

With this in mind, if the government continues to pass

unfavorable legislation, additional large-scale

demonstrations are liable to occur in the coming weeks

and months. This potential for widespread demonstrations

notwithstanding, given the Taiwan’s history of organized,

nonviolent protests, any further demonstrations in the

near future will similarly maintain a relatively low

propensity for violence.

Beijing cut off communication with Taiwan due the refusal of

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing Wen to endorse the idea of a

single Chinese nation, a concept known as the 1992

Consensus that concludes Taiwan and the mainland to be part

of one China. The cessation of communication between the

two nation states was likely implemented in order to put

pressure on the newly elected president to quell calls for

Taiwan’s independence. Further steps by China are liable to be

implemented in the coming weeks should President Tsai

continue to be reluctant to disavow calls for Taiwanese

independence.

Labor groups protest

against reduction of

annual holidays I

Taaipei

Hundreds protest ineligibility for

Taiwanese identification cards

for Chinese Spouses

China cuts off all official

communication with

Taiwan



Asia

Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation

July 3

July 6-8

Laylat al-Qudr which

commemorates the night which the

Prophet Muhammad received first

verse of Koran

Eid al-Fitr, or Hari Raya Aidilfitri,

is the Muslim festival which marks

the end of the holy month of

Ramadan.

While Laylat al-Qudr is celebrated across Asia as a

religious holiday, it is a national holiday in

Bangladesh, India (West Bengal, Delhi,

Maharashtra), Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives,

Pakistan, Phillippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, with

public and private offices likely to be closed before

the wider Eid al-Fitr observations. Those operating

or residing throughout the region on July 3 are

advised to allot for disruptions to business

continuity as a result of the closure of government

offices and private businesses as well as religious

celebrations.

Eid al-Fitr marks the end of Ramadan, the month of

fasting and prayer in the Muslim community.

Muslims typically attend prayers at mosques and

engage in communal meals, while the festival is

observed as a public holiday in a number of

countries. Those operating or residing throughout

the region on July 6 are advised to allot for

disruptions to business continuity as a result of the

closure of government offices and private

businesses.

Bangladesh – Back to portion


July 1 Jumatul Bidah, the last Friday of

Holy Month of Ramadan

Private and public sector closures should be

anticipated on July 1. Heightened vigilance must be

maintained while operating in the vicinity of Shiite

and Christian religious sites, given the latent threat

of militant attacks. Additionally, security is liable to

be bolstered in the vicinity of major religious focal

points.



Hong Kong – Back to portion


July 1 Establishment Day commemorates

the transfer of sovereignty over

Hong Kong from the United

Kingdom to the People’s Republic of

China. It is commonly marked with

large-scale fireworks displays as well

as large, often political, rallies

Allot for possible disruptions to business continuity

as a result of the closure of government offices and

certain private businesses. Also, given the tradition

of holding political marches during the holiday, in

conjunction with the ongoing tensions between pro-

democracy and pro-Beijing activists in Hong Kong,

some rallies could feature scuffles with police and

isolated violence. Security will likely be bolstered as

a result, which could further impact normal travel

patterns throughout Hong Kong.

India – Back to portion


July 7 Maharana Pratap Jayanti is held to

commemorate the birthday of

famed 16th Century Rajasthani

Rajput ruler Maharana Pratap.

Celebrated as a regional public

holiday in Haryana, Himachal

Pradesh, and Rajasthan.

Special commemorative programs and processions

are likely to be witnessed. In addition, banks,

businesses, and educational institutions in the

abovementioned states are likely to be closed for

duration of June 7. We advise to allot for disruptions

to business continuity due to the closures.

July 20

Kabir Jayanti is celebrated as a

regional holiday to commemorate

the birthday of Saint Kabir, a

renowned poet and mystic from the

15th Century in Bihar, Chandigarh,

Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, and

Punjab.

Cultural events may be organized to commemorate

the day, while banks, businesses, and educational

institutes are slated to remain closed in the

abovementioned states on June 20. It is advised to

allot for disruptions to business continuity due to

the same.

Indonesia – Back to portion


July 4-7 Idul Fatri is a prominent national

holiday in Indonesia, which marks

the end of Ramadan and is

celebrated by Indonesian Muslims.

Cuti Bersama is a public holiday

introduced by the government to

improve efficiency of public servants

and stimulate tourism during Idul

Fatri.

Given that the joint holiday spans across an entire

working week with the inclusion of Idul Fatri, banks,

government offices, private companies, and

educational institutions are expected to be closed

from July 4-8. In addition, severe traffic congestion

can be expected along major highways and

thoroughfares around major urban centers,

particularly at the beginning and end of the week, as

it is customary for citizens to travel to their

hometown to celebrate Idul Fatri. Hence, it is

advised to allot for disruptions to travel and

business continuity due to the slated holiday.



Japan – Back to portion


July 18

Marine Day, also known as the

Ocean day, is celebrated on the third

Monday of July to honor and express

gratitude for the marine resources

endowed upon the country, as well

as to hail the significance of the

ocean for the island nation.

The day is celebrated as a public holiday nationwide

since 1995, and is marked by local lantern festivals,

fireworks show, fishing competitions among other

celebratory events. Given the prolonged weekend

and the public holiday, business continuity is likely

to be disrupted. Furthermore, tourist sites around

oceans are liable to be crowded, thus causing

bottlenecks in routes leading to them, considering

the possible celebratory events that may be

scheduled for the day.

Malaysia – Back to portion


July 6-7 Hari-Raya Aidilfitri is the end of

the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

Celebrated by Muslims nationwide

marking the day of the culmination

of stringent dawn-to-dusk fasting.

Marked as a day of homecoming among the Malay

Muslim community. Commemorated by prayers

offered at local mosques and celebrated by close

family gatherings. The two-day holiday and the

usual surge of travelers returning to their native

places is liable to cause significant travel disruptions

due to overcrowded roads. Furthermore, security is

liable to be bolstered at scheduled large-scale

gatherings near pivotal religious sites.

Maldives – Back to portion


July 26 Independence Day is celebrated in

commemoration of the end of

British rule over Maldives.

The day is marked with various activities, including

parades by security forces with the most prominent

Independence Day-related event being held at the

Republic Square in the capital city of Male.

Heightened security measures should be

anticipated in the vicinity of celebratory events in

Male given the expected mass participation, which

may result in traffic disruptions.



Myanmar – Back to portion


July 19 Martyrs’ Day is a national holiday

observed on 19 July to

commemorate Gen. Aung San and

seven other leaders of the pre-

independence interim government.

According to custom, high-ranking

government officials pay their

respects at the Martyrs’ Mausoleum

in Yangon on the morning of the

holiday. In addition, Myanmar Waso

Festival or Lenten Season, marking

the beginning of Buddhist Lent, also

falls on July 19 in 2016.

Those operating or residing throughout the country

on July 19 are advised to allot for disruptions to

business continuity, given the likely closure of most

businesses, banks, embassies, and government

offices.

Pakistan – Back to portion


July 5-8 Eid-ul-Fitri is the end of the

Islamic holy month of Ramadan,

commemorated by Muslims

nationwide

Commemorated through prayer services at

mosques. Private sector closures should be

anticipated on July 6, government offices are

liable to remain closed on July 7 and 8, Allot for

travel disruptions while operating in the vicinity

of major religious focal points, given the

likelihood of road closures and an enhanced

security presence.

Singapore


July 1 Armed Forces Day honors the

country’s servicemen and

servicewomen with a military

parade presided over by the

Minister of Defense, as well as

military displays, exhibitions, and

activities.

Given the slated military parade, there is a likelihood

for traffic disruptions in the vicinity of the event.

However, businesses are expected to be open as

usual given that this is not a national holiday, but

only a day to commemorate soldiers.



Sri Lanka – Back to portion


July 19

Esala Full Moon Poya Day national

holiday is a Buddhist religious high

day that commemorates Buddha’s

first sermon, signaling the start of

his teaching, and the annual

monsoon retreat of Sri Lanka’s

Buddhist monks.

Those operating or residing in Sri Lanka on July 19

are advised to allot for disruptions to business

continuity as a result of the closure of government

offices and private businesses.

Thailand


July 18-19 Asahna Bucha Day is the first full

moon of the eighth lunar month,

commemorating the Buddha's first

sermon in the Deer Park in Benares,

India and the founding of Buddhist

monkhood 2,500 years ago.

The day is celebrated as a public holiday and

religious festival. Across the country public and

private offices are likely to be closed, while

worshipers often visit local temples or travel to their

home towns to observe the holiday. Those

operating or residing in Thailand on July 18-19 are

advised to allot for disruptions to business

continuity given the aforementioned public

holidays.

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