February 2017

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The start of 2017 saw a number of ongoing issues of political volatility in South Asia, continuing to

illustrate the subcontinent's susceptibility to potential unrest. Pakistan saw large, and in some cases,

violent nationwide protests in January over a number of missing activists, and accusations of

government involvement in their disappearing. Meanwhile, as the Awami League continue to dominate

party politics within Bangladesh, the size of the party has come to accommodate a vast number of

divergent views and ideologies particularly at the local level, increasing the propensity for violence

between local leaders. In India, sensitivities between different regional groups in Tamil Nadu and

Karnataka sparked protests over the legality of two cultural traditions involving bulls, while the

government outlined its plans for bolstered nationwide security ahead of regional state elections. In Sri

Lanka, frictions arose between two major parties over the drafting of the country’s new constitution, an

issue which also has the potential to increase the rift between the government and the Tamil minority,

who have a strong stake in its formation.

In Southeast Asia, both Islamist militancy and the role of Islam in society were key issues over the month

of January. In Indonesia, protests against the hardline Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) gained significant

momentum, with increasing criticism of their particular brand of conservatism’s place in Indonesian

society. The relationship between Malaysia and Myanmar continues to be pushed as the Prime Minister

in Kuala Lumpur focused on the issue of the Rohingya, heightening the risk of stoking tensions between

Muslims and Buddhists with notably emotive and religious rhetoric. Across the Sulu Sea, the Philippines

continued to witness the Islamic State-linked Abu Sayyaf group carrying out kidnap-for-ransom

operations in the southern areas, rendering the sea around Mindanao one of the most dangerous areas

of the world for piracy and maritime armed robberies.

China’s regional political dominance remained a largely defining factor in the foreign policies of many of

the countries in East Asia and some of the domestic policies. In Taiwan, the relationship with China saw

a rocky start to the year, with the latter sailing an aircraft carrier into the Taiwan Strait and the Taipei

military simulating drills of an invasion by China. Vietnam saw large anti-China protests on January 19 in

Hanoi, over the ongoing contentious issue of the South China Sea. Meanwhile, Japan and India both

offered military hardware to the country in an attempt to help the balance in the region. In the same

breath, the China-opposed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system, was risen

to an issue of political contention in South Korea as electoral platforms begin to form policies in the light

of President Park’s impending departure.

Finally, January marked an obstacle filled month for the government of Thailand whose plans for the

coming year were somewhat stalled as their carefully crafted constitution was retracted for royal review,

while reports of institutional corruption threatened to tarnish the junta’s reputation at home and

abroad.

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PAKISTAN............................................................................................................................................................................4

BANGLADESH .....................................................................................................................................................................5

CHINA .................................................................................................................................................................................6

INDIA ...................................................................................................................................................................................7

INDONESIA .........................................................................................................................................................................8

MALAYSIA & MYANMAR ....................................................................................................................................................9

PHILIPPINES .................................................................................................................................................................... 10

SRI LANKA ........................................................................................................................................................................ 11

THAILAND ........................................................................................................................................................................ 12

SOUTH KOREA ................................................................................................................................................................. 13

TAIWAN ............................................................................................................................................................................ 14

VIETNAM .......................................................................................................................................................................... 15

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Despite the lack of clarity surrounding their whereabouts,

the fact that the activists’ near-simultaneous disappearance

sparked widespread protests by civil society underscores

entrenched suspicions among Pakistani society that the

state continues to resort to the use of intimidation tactics

to weed out its vocal critics. Further, the continued

reluctance of returned activists to publically reveal

information regarding their abductors is likely to contribute

to a general sense among Pakistanis that the victims

remain under pressure by the establishment to avoid

communicating with the media. If proved true, the

incidents are indicative of the Pakistani state’s growing

monitoring of dissent through social media,

complementing its known history of censoring traditional

media. Additionally, violent counter-protests led by

rightwing Islamist groups accusing the missing activists of

blasphemy also shed light on a section of Pakistani society,

that view criticism of the state as tantamount to

blasphemy.

Despite an initial claim by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s

(TTP) Fazlullah group, widely regarded as one of the

strongest militant groups in Pakistan, it appears more likely

that the January 21 attack was orchestrated by the Lashkar-

e-Jhangvi al-Alami (LeJ-A) in close collaboration with the

splinter Mehsud splinter group of TTP. This assessment is

rendered credible given the January 17 killing of the LeJ

chief Asif Chotu, which may have led to the Parachinar

blast as a retaliatory strike. Moreover, the attack is further

indicative of attempts by the LeJ-A to gradually coalesce the

most potent splinter factions of the TTP, particularly those

led by fighters belonging to the Mehsud tribe that are

discontent with Fazlullah’s leadership of the TTP, into one

cohesive unit. While the success of such a strategy remains

ambiguous at present, these groups may still be willing to

offer limited cooperation to each other in an attempt to

minimize the prominence of core TTP elements such as the

Fazlullah group, particularly in their strongholds in

northwestern tribal areas of Pakistan.

At least five missing

Pakistani civil society

activists trigger protests

nationwide

LeJ-A, TTP Mehsud

group claim

responsibility for

market attack in

Parachinar, Khyber

Agency

At least three activists

reportedly ‘recovered’

safely by family

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The implication of two local leaders from the ruling Awami

League (AL) in the attacks on Hindus, which was originally

linked to the hardline Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) group, is

particularly notable, as it is in contradiction with the party’s

ostensibly anti-extremist, secular platform. This

development appears to illustrate the divergent range of

views and ideologies within the ruling party, particularly at

the local level. However, there is also the distinct possibility

that the attacks were not motivated by inter-religious

hostilities, but over land disputes.

Regardless, the decentralized power hierarchy within the

AL additionally contributes to the challenges the party faces

to rein in local leaders. In part, the propensity for violence

that local leaders have shown can be linked to the

Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), AL’s youth wing, which

often forms the recruitment ground for the party’s junior

leadership. The BCL’s high levels of factionalism, evident in

the regular violent clashes on university campuses, appears

to have found increasing representation within the party.

Additionally, the youth wing’s known links to criminal gangs

further exacerbate the scale of violence during local

skirmishes by rival factions.

While the government has publicly acknowledged this

issue, their crackdown primarily on the youth wings of their

political rivals, such as the JeI-linked Islami Chhatra Shibir,

has likely served to further embolden the BCL and local

leaders.

It appears that the

protests against

the establishment

of a proposed coal

plant in Rampal

over environmental

concerns are

increasingly

gaining

international

traction. This was

evident after the

issue was raised at

the World Economic Forum when Prime Minister Sheikh

Hasina defended the project. Meanwhile, the increased

violence and alleged police excesses being reported at anti-

Rampal protests are liable to draw increased international

attention over the issue in the coming months.

The presence of violence can be attributed, in part, to the

fact that a large section of the protesters is comprised of

student groups, whose demonstrations in Dhaka have

typically carried a higher risk of violent clashes with police.

Meanwhile, it remainד unlikely that the AL government will

concede to the protest lobby’s demands to suspend the

project, given that India remains a major investor in the

project. This is particularly unlikely, in light of New Delhi’s

recently proposed expansion of energy ties with Dhaka.

Two AL leaders held for

attacks on Hindus in

Brahmanbaria District

32 arrested in clashes

between rival BCL

factions in Dhaka

Protesters, police clash

at anti-Rampal protests

in Dhaka

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The smog, and resulting lack of visibility, imperiled air and

land travel to such a severe extent that on January 3, the

government released its first-ever red alert for fog over

Beijing. Much of the spate of pollution is seasonal: northern

China primarily uses coal to power heating systems in the

winter. In Beijing, this reality is compounded by the city’s

geography, which has both mountains that trap particulate

matter and relative isolation from seaborne winds. Beyond

this, the persistence of air pollution in the region is due to

the importance of polluting sectors, including cement, coal,

and steel, to the industry in northern China, and specifically

in Hebei. Even with dictates from the central government,

local officials in these regions are unlikely to shutter these

industries and imperil employment rates. However, without

significant reductions in smog, protests over environmental

degradation in the region may proliferate over the coming

weeks.

Unrest escalated in Xinjiang in January, with security

officials killing three alleged militants following a deadly

attack in December 2016 on a Communist Party office.

Tensions in Xinjiang over the past year have seen upwards

of 1,000 incidents of local unrest, and the deployment of

over 30,000 government personnel to secure the province.

Beijing is particularly concerned with the increasing

sophistication of attacks within Xinjiang, as well as growing

reports of Uyghur separatists collaborating with

transnational militants over methods and organization. In

light of these intersecting trends, Beijing has moved to

strengthen the province’s long borders with Central and

South Asia, specifically China’s ostensible ally, Pakistan.

These actions could see projects in the countries’ cross-

border China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) scaled

back or reshaped in order to increase their security. Yet

there is only so much Beijing can control; the bus

explosions in Guangdong show the preponderance of soft

targets available beyond the heavily-secured borders of

Xinjiang. Although it remains unclear whether those

attacks were carried out by Uyghurs or related actors at

present time, their implementation reinforces past

precedent in suggesting the threat domestic militancy

poses to wider Chinese state security.

China issues red alert

for smog across

northern regions of

country, including

Beijing

Chinese security forces

kill three alleged

militants in Xinjiang

Six injured in twin bus

explosions in Foshan,

Guangdong Province

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The mass mobilizations in favor of the traditional bull-taming sport,

Jallikattu, were notable for their length, largely peaceful nature, and

appear to have set a precedent for agitations demanding “preserving

culture”, as evidenced by renewed protests to resume a similar buffalo

racing sport in neighboring Karnataka. The fact that general citizens

mobilized largely via social media for over six days at Marina Beach is a

testament to the cultural significance that Jallikattu holds, particularly

amongst younger Tamilians. Notably, political participation was at a

minimum, with some opposition leaders even prevented from joining

protests at Marina. Nevertheless, unanimous political support played a

factor in passing the ordinance. As things currently stand, the Supreme

Court reserves the right to rule against the state’s ordinance. Further,

given that the sport bears significance during the annual Pongal harvest

festival, latent tensions have the potential to re-emerge, due to the lack

of a sustained resolution.

In addition to the aforementioned UK Foreign

& Commonwealth Office (FCO) and intelligence

alerts, security agencies also reportedly

released a warning days before India’s 68th

Republic Day, citing increased potential for

militant attacks. Although the days prior to

and shortly after the public holiday have

passed without incident, such warnings are

intermittently released prior to major public

holidays, as well as during the winter tourist

season, as previously assessed. Having said

that, the enhanced security measures are

liable to continue through February, as the

country is preparing for state elections in five

states, namely Manipur, Punjab, Uttar

Pradesh, and Uttarakhand in northern India

and Goa in the south. Given the regional,

cultural and religious dynamics at play during

election season in India, general tensions

remain heightened, increasing the risk of inter

and intra-party violence within each state. In

terms of external security threats, Punjab

State’s position along the Indo-Pakistan border

increases it’s susceptibility to cross-border

infiltrations and consequent militant attacks,

as witnessed at Pathankhot airbase in January

2016.

FCO issues warning of

potential militant

attacks ahead of

February Punjab State

elections

Security bolstered in

New Delhi, elsewhere

over intelligence alert

on potential militant

infiltrations

Tamil Nadu legislature

passes ordinance

allowing Jallikattu sport,

following localized

clashes, protests in

Chennai, elsewhere

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There appears to have been a notable level of pushback

against the FPI in the past month. On January 30, West Java

Police named prominent leader Rizieq Shibab as a suspect

for alleged defamation of Indonesia’s national Pancasila

ideology and first President Sukarno. Public discontent

appears tangible when large scale mobilizations calling for

the group’s disbandment were held in Bandung, Bali, and

Surabaya on January 19, 22 and 26 respectively. These

developments follow concerns over the group’s apparent

gains in legitimizing itself amongst mainstream Indonesian

discourse through mass protests in late 2016. The pending

charges have potential to rally mass opposition,

considering Pancasila’s nationalistic overtones and

Sukarno’s party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of

Struggle (PDIP) is incumbent. Further complicating matters

is Rizieq’s accusations against former President and

Sukarno’s daughter Megawati Soekarno for alleged

blasphemy against Islam. This too may face significant

pushback from PDIP loyalists, considering Soekarno’s

revered position amongst Indonesia’s political elite. As

such, these actions are likely to further polarize opinion

about the hardliners, while interrogations of Rizieq remain

potential focal points for protests and localized unrest. In

light of the FPI’s long-known willingness to utilize violent

acts as a means of retaliation or general aggression,

tensions over ongoing legal challenges may even manifest

into arson attacks; as most recently witnessed on January

13.

The continued efforts of radicalized individuals to travel to

the Islamic State’s Middle Eastern “caliphate” is evidenced

in the 22 Indonesians deported from Turkey on suspicions

of the same in the last two weeks of January. The

developments factor into the estimated 700 or more

Indonesians currently believed to have traveled to IS-

controlled territory in Iraq and Syria. While the mere act of

travel does not pose a security threat, the risk arises in the

event that individuals move back to Indonesia, after

potentially receiving training and expertise. At this point, it

remains unlikely that high-profile Syria residents like

Bahrun Naim, alleged mastermind of the January 14, 2016

Jakarta attacks, may return to Indonesia, particularly

considering the January 10 US State Department

designation of Naim and associated Jemaah Ansharut

Daulah (JAD) as a “specially designated terrorist” individual

and group respectively. Having said that, undocumented

militants may seek to return under the radar via land or

sea borders, if not via air. Concerns over such threats have

been publically expressed by the top brass of Indonesia’s

security apparatus; however, significant challenges appear

pertinent in terms of securing Indonesia’s vast shoreline,

measuring more than 54,000 km. Increased border security

is a likely approach to stymie such a threat, while

immediate efforts are also liable to focus on preventing

radicalization of at-risk individuals, while monitoring

movements of suspects with the assistance of allies.

US State Department

lists Jemaah Ansharut

Daulah (JAD) as

“terrorist group”

Islamic Defenders Front

(FPI) members allegedly

set fire to GMBI office in

Bandung

At least 17 individuals

deported from Turkey

on suspicions of

traveling to IS territory

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The plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar’s restive Rakhine State has become a highly emotive issue in Malaysia over the

past months, due in no small part to Malaysian Prime Minister (PM) Najib Razak’s continued focus on the issue,

frequently commenting on what he perceives as an “ethnic cleansing” of the impoverished people, during large-scale

rallies and official press statements. While this could be interpreted as a populist tactic meant to shift focus from

internal domestic issues, the effect will likely increase the threat of attacks against the estimated 150,000 Myanmar

migrant workers in the country. As the issue continues to become increasingly politicized in Malaysia, and Naypyidaw

continues, as frequently indicated, to remain on its current policy course in Rakhine State, police officials in Malaysia

may project a reluctance to protect the Myanmar nationals or investigate future attacks, further entrenching their lack

of safety and tacitly encouraging such violence.

While responsive violence has thus far been minimal, in light of heightened anti-Malaysia sentiment among Myanmar’s

hardline Buddhist population, evident in a series of protests that took place at the Embassy in Yangon, the threat

remains latent and highly possible. Naypyidaw’s decision to halt the flow of migrant workers to Malaysia in December

2016 is only likely to further entrench such positions at home and any additional attacks against workers still in the

country will serve to heighten such a potential.

Beyond isolated, emotive attacks against nationals, the threat of more organized Islamist militancy over the issue is also

likely to be increasingly witnessed over the coming months, highlighted by Malaysia’s top counter-terrorism official on

January 5, when he stated that Myanmar faces a growing danger of attacks by foreign Islamic State supporters fighting

for Rohingyas. Such attacks are likely to take place in major urban centers throughout the country and even in central

areas of Yangon, as proven during a spate of bombings targeting the financial capital in November 2016, including one

at an immigration office in the central affluent business district of Kyauktada.

Recognizing the sharp deterioration in relations between the two nations and the severe potential for radicalization

over the issue, both Naypyidaw and Kuala Lumpur have come to several compromises over the issue, most notably the

January 20 agreement to terms of an aid flotilla organized by the Malaysian Consultative Council of Islamic

Organizations. However, these piecemeal efforts are unlikely to sway public opinion in either country and as long as PM

Razak continues to make the issue a major focus of his regional policy, radicalization is likely to far outpace the

potential for détente.

Malaysian authorities claim

arrest of Indonesian national

alleged to be planning

militant attacks in Myanmar

Myanmar warns its migrant workers in

Malaysia of heightened threat after

Myanmar nationals hacked to death

near Kuala Lumpur

Malaysian PM Najib

Razak demands

Myanmar army stop

killing Rohingya

Myanmar,

Malaysia agree to

terms of

Rohingya aid

flotilla

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Despite growing international concern, including the

International Chamber of Commerce declaring that the

Sulu Sea was one of the only areas of the world that did

not see a significant decrease in piracy in 2016, hijacking

operations continued into January 2017. While Abu Sayyaf,

the major regional hostage-taking group, has traditionally

been known to attack smaller vessels, the latter part of

2016 and early 2017 saw them look towards larger targets.

The reason for the growing numbers of kidnap-for-

ransom and piracy operations in the region is likely

twofold. First, as the military campaign against Islamist

groups in Sulu gained traction under President Rodrigo

Duterte, the group’s need for money and leverage

increased, necessitating such actions. Second, as groups

such as Abu Sayyaf saw continuing success in receiving

ransom payments, underscored by the release on January

14, the incentive for carrying out more kidnappings, and

targeting larger vessels increased. It remains unknown

exactly who has been paying the ransoms in many cases,

with reports of both foreign governments and individuals

transferring funds, as well as suggestions of Philippine

government involvement. Reports of the latter’s

involvement are supported by the role that the Moro

National Liberation Front (MNLF), a government-aligned

militant group in the Mindanao region, has played in

facilitating many of the hostage releases.

Following the clashes between New People’s Army (NPA)

militants and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in

North Cotabato, there was increasing talk of the possible

collapse of the negotiations between the communist groups

(of which the NPA is a member) and Manila. However, despite

occurring three days after the first meetings in Rome began,

on January 19, the clashes are unlikely to completely halt the

talks, while they do significantly strain relations.

It is possible that the attacks were either carried out in an

attempt to gain a stronger foothold in the upcoming round

negotiations coming in late February or that they indicate a

lack of full control of on ground forces by the groups’

commanders in the

negotiations. In that

regard, the

possibility of

increased attacks

throughout February

increases, with

assaults on both

military and civilian

installations

remaining probable.

Eight fishermen

reportedly killed in

hijacking attempt near

Zamboanga City

Abu Sayyaf release

Korean, Filipino

hostages, after

receiving 500,000 USD

Eight soldiers, one

militant die in clashes

between NPA, military

in North Cotabato

ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed

Robbery against Ships - 2016 Annual Report

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It appears that increasing friction between the United

National Party (UNP) and the United People’s Freedom

Alliance (UPFA) during the ongoing drafting of the

constitution has considerably weakened the National

Government of Unity. The primary source of contention

appears to be the proposed shift in the country’s mode of

government, from presidential to parliamentary systems.

Consequently, supporters of UPFA, led by President

Maithripala Sirisena, will increasingly push for executive

powers to remain with the president, while the UPFA, led

by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, will seek a change

in the status quo.

Meanwhile, further political instability appears imminent,

should the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) withdraw its

support for the constitutional process. Given that President

Sirisena has categorically denied the likelihood of regional

federalism, a key demand of the TNA, civil unrest among

the northern Tamil districts may ensue. Meanwhile, the

Joint Opposition (JO) is liable to take advantage of the

currently frayed political relationships to renew calls for

former President Mahila Rajapaksa’s return to political

office as a uniting force. In this context, the likelihood of

popular demonstrations and inter-party clashes remains

high in the coming months in Colombo and northern Sri

Lanka.

While intermittent protests by the Inter-University Student

Federation against privatized education are not

uncommon,

tensions

appear

particularly

heightened at

the present

time due to the

arrest of four

Buddhist

monks at the

demonstration.

Similarly, the

unrelated but

comparable

protests by

disabled army veterans over contempt charges against a

different group of monks who supported their cause are

indicative of the heightened sensitivities surrounding

criminal action of Buddhist religious figures. Based on the

arrests, similar future student and veteran demonstrations

may draw support from religious hardline groups such as

the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Should this occur, the scale of

participation in future rallies will significantly expand, as

will the scope for civil unrest, based on the BBS’s past

precedent of violent protest.

TNA threatens to quit

constitution process

over federalism

Tear gas used during

student protest in

Colombo over arrest of

monks

Disabled veterans

demonstrate over

charges against monks

in Colombo

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Thailand’s military government, headed by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha and the National Council for Peace and

Order (NCPO), saw a number of obstacles in January of 2017. This likely played a part in the decision to postpone the

elections, which could cause future problems during the run-up to a potential democratic transition. Elections were

initially announced to take place in 2017 following the passing of a new constitution, which vastly increased the

legislative power of the military junta. However, very quickly into the new year, the government announced that

elections would have to be postponed to give the government time to pass more laws through which to govern the

elections. In the aftermath of this announcement, it was revealed that the new constitution, which was passed through

a referendum in August 2016, had been retracted for review by the newly crowned King Vajiralongkorn to deal with a

number of clauses which reportedly diminished his powers. Particularly, the palace requested amendments to a rule

which requires the monarch to nominate a regent when he leaves the country. It further requested revision of an

article which makes the constitutional court the final arbiter at times of political crisis, a role traditionally taken on by

the crown, as well as an article requiring royal proclamations to be countersigned by a minister. Such clauses were

likely put in place in an attempt to check the power of the monarch, given his reported relationship with the powerful,

populist Shinawatra family, who stand at the center of much of the country’s 15-year political crisis. While the NCPO is

likely to abide by the King’s requests in an attempt to avoid the perception of any ideological rifts between the two most

powerful branches of government, it remains possible that the role of the monarch may act as a growing point of

contention for the military junta, who remain suspicious of the new King’s intentions.

Additionally, the announcement of the corruption watchdog’s lower ranking of Thailand in 2016, while not a major

factor in local politics, was widely seen in the country as a blow to the junta’s image as an enforcer of political order and

anti-corruption against the Shinawatra-led red shirt movement. Although the government remains robust at the time of

writing, their popularity and ability to govern without democratic oversight are based on their continuing position as a

stabilizing force within Thailand, against the chaos of the 2014 crisis. Indeed, the junta’s abilities to maintain a strong

and united ruling body, as well as to purge the country of corrupt and controversial elements, were deemed an

essential part of what necessitated the initial coup. If they are thought to be weakening or fragmenting, they may

attract growing opposition from the general populace and royal family, increasing calls to push forward elections. In

that regard, the announcement of a fresh anti-corruption scheme by the NCPO remains likely in the coming months, as

it continues with plans to hold democratic elections and ensure a stable transfer of power.

Military government

announces

postponement of

elections until 2018

Prime Minister states

government revising

constitution upon royal

request

Watchdog report claims

corruption perceptions

have worsened in 2016

under military regime

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As President Park Geun-hye defends herself in the ongoing impeachment trial, the South Korean political discourse has

already moved towards who her eventual replacement would be in the likely scenario that she is removed. One of the

most hot-button issues in the election appears to be the deployment of the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area

Defense (THAAD) system, a US built anti-ballistic missile system designed to shoot down short, medium, and

intermediate range ballistic missiles. With new threats from Pyongyang and analysts predicting imminent tests of new

missile technology, the South Korean defense establishment appears adamant on installing the THAAD batteries,

despite waning voter support. Beijing is especially vociferous against the American-made missile system and has made

numerous public threats about economic penalization if the THAAD program goes through. Due to pressure from

China, combined with the efforts of pacifist and environmentalist civil society groups, recent polls suggest that as much

as 51% of the population is

currently against deployment.

This near half-half division

amongst the general population

runs directly down party lines with

candidates expected to run in the

wake of a successful impeachment. Those running for the ruling conservative Saenuri party appear to be mostly unified

in their support of the system, whereas candidates within the two largest more liberal opposition parties, the

Democratic party, and People’s party, have voiced objection. Meanwhile, former UN General Secretary, and potential

conservative candidate, Ban Ki-moon has moved back and forth on the issue but appears to have settled on a pro-

THAAD stance. This fluid support has also been witnessed by the current government, headed by interim president and

current Prime Minister Hwang Ko-Ahn. Whereas the Ministry of Defense signaled on January 15 that the THAAD

deployment may be delayed because of issues with budgeting and land allocation, Hwang came in front of the press a

week later to state the exact opposite; that THAAD’s deployment needs to be “swift”. This type of unclear message from

the ruling administration underscores the deep political divisions and general confusion over when, and even if, the

THAAD system will ever fully come into force. With elections on the horizon, some voters may be swayed towards a

certain party based on their beliefs over the issue, threatening to politicize what was previously considered a military

issue. In this context, as support for THAAD becomes party-centric and conflates into what is likely to become a

contentious election period, pro and anti-THAAD demonstrations are liable to be witnessed in the coming months.

Reports surface on

behind-closed-doors

Chinese threats over

THAAD system

Defense Minister

indicates possible delay

in THAAD deployment

Prime Minister vows

“swift” deployment of

THAAD system

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Although Sino-Taiwanese hostilities have risen since the

ascent of Taiwan’s Beijing-skeptic President Tsai Ing-wen,

statements by US President Donald Trump over the “One-

China

Policy”

have

further

raised

tempers.

January’s

military

incidents

suggest

that the

status quo

that has

held cross-

strait

relations

in check

since the

Third

Taiwan Strait Crisis is beginning to fracture under

aggression on all sides. Whether the sides avoid

confrontation will depend on pursuing direct

communication and formulating clear policy expectations,

requirements that are likely to be unfulfilled over the

coming months.

Sour relations between the ruling Democratic Progressive

Party (DPP) and the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) resulted

in arrests after nine KMT activists were arrested on January

18 for storming a government building. The activists’

efforts came amid their ongoing protest over the work of

the DPP-supported Ill-Gotten Party Assets Settlement

Committee (IGPASC), which has frozen millions of dollars of

KMT assets. The DPP instituted the law and subsequent

IGPASC in order to correct alleged historical wrongs,

according to which the KMT unfairly profited from decades

of one-party rule and possession of assets taken from

mainland China and the Japanese occupation of Taiwan.

Although the IGPASC on January 23 released approximately

4.8 million USD in funds to the KMT so that the party could

pay its workers’ salaries, year-end bonuses, and other

benefits, the KMT remains in dire financial straits and is

cutting almost 50 percent of its labor rolls. It claims that

the DPP is instituting a political purge of its primary

opposition opponent, which will leave it unable to fight a

DPP that commands an overwhelming majority in the

Legislative Yuan. It has further vowed to lead a

simultaneous legal struggle and series of demonstrations

to pressure the government. While seemingly desperate,

this movement could link with other labor groups and build

on mounting public disapproval over the DPP’s economic

record.

Military jets scramble

after China sails

Liaoning aircraft carrier

through Taiwan Strait

Taipei conducts drills

simulating Chinese

invasion of central

Taiwan

Opposition KMT

activists detained after

storming government

building in Taipei

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MAX Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com

The month of January 2017 saw a number of developments in Vietnam-China relations and with other regional

neighbors over the South China Seas. The Vietnamese public, at large, is considered nationalistic, so a natural

progression from this would be widespread strong support for clearly defined and defended borders. This desire for

sovereignty has extended to Vietnam’s maritime claims and manifested itself in a large-scale, anti-China protest in

Hanoi on January 19. Interestingly, although the Vietnamese government views Chinese progression with man-made

islands on the Vietnamese-claimed Spratly Islands with strong discomfort, the protests were swiftly and aggressively

dispersed by police. The crackdown was likely due to the fact that despite disharmony at sea, China is still an important

economic partner for Vietnam. Additionally, one-party countries

like Vietnam exercise significant control over political discourse;

even pro-government or nationalist movements are often

perceived as threatening to the central leadership.

In regards to the former, Vietnam has gone out of its way in

January to mend ties with China over the South China Sea,

despite voicing concern over the same issue in December 2016.

Meanwhile, other countries also wary of China’s growing naval

presence in the region have come to Vietnam, offering material

support for developing capabilities to counter Beijing’s

ambitions. The two arguably largest sovereign threats to China’s

hegemony in Asia, India, and Japan, both offered Vietnam new

gear. India’s offer to sell Hanoi the indigenous Akash missile

system, which may not have fully recouped development costs

at home and is already being phased out, may have been an

economic as opposed to fully geopolitical move, but when

combined with Japan’s offer of new patrol boats, it paints a picture of regional superpowers attempting to use

Vietnam’s troubles as a proxy for their own concerns with China. In light of these developments, one can expect to see

more outreach to Vietnam from South China Sea stakeholders in 2017, including China. Additionally, large Vietnamese

cities are likely to be the site for future anti-China protests, whether the government condones them or not, as

competition over territory heats up.

India offers to sell

Akash missile system

Japan offers to sell

patrol boats

Large anti-China

protest broken up in

Hanoi

China-Vietnam joint

statement on SCS

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MAX Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com

SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SATSUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT

Malaysia (Kuala

Lumpur): Thaipusam

Myanmar: Union Day

Bangladesh: Shahid

Dibosh (Mother

Language Day)

China: Spring festivalIndia: Saraswati PujaMalaysia: FederalTerritory DayTaiwan: ChineseNew YearVietnam: TetChina: Spring festival

Sri Lanka: National Day

Sri Lanka: Navam FullMoon Poya Day

India (in Haryana andMaharashtra) &Sri Lanka: MahaShivaratri

Philippines: PeoplePower Holiday (schoolsclosed, govtservices/businessesremain open)

Taiwan: PeaceMemorial Day(nonworking day)

Taiwan: PeaceMemorial Day (actualholiday)

Japan: Foundation Day

Thailand: Makha Bucha

(actual holiday)

Pakistan: KashmirSolidarity Day

Thailand: Makha Bucha

(nonworking day)