judgment sheet-w.p. no. 2874-2009-yousaf ayub khan etc vs ... · date of hearing 29.04.2015 yousaf...
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Judgment Sheet
IINN TTHHEE PPEESSHHAAWWAARR HHIIGGHH CCOOUURRTT,, PPEESSHHAAWWAARR,,
JJUUDDIICCIIAALL DDEEPPAARRTTMMEENNTT..
JUDGMENT
W.P. No. 2874/2009.
Date of hearing 29.04.2015
Yousaf Ayub Khan etc versus Government through Chief
Secretary, Civil Secretariat, Peshawar and others.
Petitioner by Mr. Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, advocate.
Respondents by Mr. Abdul Latif Yousaf Zai, Advocate
General, Syed Muhammad Attique Shah Deputy Attorney
General for Pakistan.
2015
IRSHAD QAISAR J-. Through this single judgment, this
Court shall dispose of W.P. No. 2874/2009, W.P. No.
1296/2012, W.P. No. 1022/2012 and 626/2012 as through
these petitions the petitioners have challenged the vires of
certain paragraphs and schedule of “Shariah Nizam-e-Adl
Regulation, 2009” (NWFP Regulation No. 1 of 2009.
2. The particulars of these writ petitions are as follows;-
i. W.P. No. 2874/2009 titled Yousaf Ayub Khan etc versus Government.
ii. W.P. No. 1296/2012 titled Dr. Adnan Khan versus Government.
iii. W.P. No. 1022-P/2012 titled Hazrat Usman versus Government.
iv. W.P. No. 625-M/2012 titled Fahim Aftab versus Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa etc.
3. W.P. No. 2874/2009 has been filed by Yousaf Ayub
Khan President NWFP Local Councils Association and Zila
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Nazim, Haripur and W.P. No. No. 1022/2012 has been filed
by Hazrat Usman, advocate Mingora Swat, whereby they
are seeking the declaration (with the consequential relief’s)
that paragraph 7, schedule III and other provisions of
“Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 2009” providing for
“Executive Magistrate” including “District Magistrate”
and interalia, entrusting them the judicial functions, are
ultra-vires to Article 2-A, 175(3) and 203 of the Constitution
of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, also seek the
directions to the respondents for immediately taking
necessary steps and measures, as deem fit and
appropriate, to ensure the complete independence of
“Judiciary” from the “Executive”. They have also
challenged paragraph 19(2) of the said Regulation and all
the corresponding laws (Acts, Ordinances, Regulations,
Rules and Notifications), entrusting the Executive officers
with Judicial powers of any nature being contrary to the
Constitution.
4. The petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs;-
“that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to
strike down all the laws (Acts, Ordinances,
the Regulations, Rules and Notifications)
issued there under, entrusting the
Execution officer with Judicial powers of
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any nature not conforming with the
Constitutional provisions, more
particularly Articles 2-A, 175(3) and 203
and the Objective Regulation thereof”.
5. W.P. No. 1296/2012 filed by Doctor Adnan Khan a
citizen, member of the Bar and a former Civil Judge
challenged vires of paragraph 5(e), 7, schedule-III,
Paragraph 19(2) of Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 2009,
with the prayer that on acceptance of this petition the
above provisions of law may be struck down and declared
as nullity in the eyes of law. Similarly all the notifications
issued in the light of above mentioned law for the
appointment of Executive Magistrate and conferment of
powers over them may be set aside
6. W.P. No. 625/2012 filed by Fahim Aftab (party to a
complaint filed under section 133 Cr.P.C) asked for the
following prayer;-
1. “To declare that Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 2009, NWFP Regulation No. 1 of 2009 is discriminatory law and inconsistent with the fundamental rights as envisaged in Chapter-I of Part-II of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973”.
2. To issue direction to the Provincial Government to deploy Police force in the said area of Malakand as the law enforcing agency, conducting investigation in criminal cases according to Cr.P.C 1898”.
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7. The impugned Regulation No. 1 of 2009 sought to
introduce executive magistracy in the Provincially
Administered Tribal Area of NWFP except the tribal areas
adjoining Mansehra District and Former State of Amb and
to entrust it with judicial powers to conduct trials and
impose punishment. Paragraph 2 Clause (b), (c) and (g)
defined Dar-ul-Dar-ul-Qaza, Dar-ul-Qaza and Qazi while
paragraph 5 show types of Courts. Paragraph 6 deals with
the appointment, powers and functions of Qazis while
paragraph 7 create the concept of Executive Magistrate,
and as a consequence vide paragraph 19(2) of the
Regulation, the code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment)
Ordinance 2001 (XXXVII of 2001) applied to the said area
vide Notification No. 1/93-SOS-II (HD)/2001 dated
27.04.2002 was repealed.
8. Since the interpretations of Provincial and Federal
Law and Constitution were involved; therefore, this Court
vide order dated 11.11.2009 issued notice to Attorney
General of Pakistan and Advocate General with the
direction to file parawise comments with the observation;-
“to explain its position with regard to its
Constitutional obligation with regard to the
promulgation of the new laws/enactments
creating parallel forums with powers to
exercise judicial authority and whether it
does not offends against Article 2-A and
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the law laid down in the case of
Government of Sindh versus Sharaf Farid
(PLD 1994 SC 105)”.
9. The respondents No. 1 and 2 submitted their
comments wherein they raised preliminary objection to the
effect that petitioners have no locus standi to file petitions
as they are not aggrieved party within the meaning of
Article 199 (1)(a) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1973. Therefore these petitions are not
maintainable and liable to be dismissed. They have also
given the reason for the promulgation of the Regulation No.
1 of 2009. In Para No. 8 of the comments it is contended
that this arrangement in no way offend the separation
of judiciary from executive as it was done in 1996
under the separation of Executive from Judiciary
through an Ordinance & Magistracy functioned
unobjected till 2001, when the posts of Deputy
Commissioner/ Assistant Commissioner/ Extra
Assistant Commissioner were abolished. As far the
issue of amendments in Criminal Procedure Code is
concerned prior to the passage of 18th amendment the
same was on the concurrent list as per Article 70(4)
read with Fourth schedule of the Constitution. And the
Federal and Provincial Governments both were
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empowered to make amendments in the criminal
procedure code. After the passage of 18th amendment
the Concurrent List has been done away, however,
under amended Article 142(b), still the Parliament and
the Provincial Assembly have powers to make laws
with respect to Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure and
Evidence.
10. At the very out set of the arguments Mr. Abdul Latif
Yousafzai, learned Advocate General and Syed Atique
Shah, learned Additional Attorney General raised objection
to the maintainability of the petitions on the grounds that
the petitioners do not come with in the definition of
aggrieved person under Article 199 of the Constitution of
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. It is contended that
petitioners had not personally suffered as a consequences
of the impugned law nor any case of the petitioners are
pending as a consequence whereof they will be personally
affected by its determination by Executive Magistrates
instead of Judicial Magistrates. These objections were
negated by learned counsel for the petitioners and
contended that through these petitions the impugned laws
have been assailed in the public interest. That one of the
petitioner Fahim Aftab is a party in criminal complaint while
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the three petitioners are advocates and the guardian of the
Constitutional rights of the public. Now the question is that
whether a person who is not personally aggrieved can
assail a law enacted in contravention of fundamental
rights?
11. In Pakistan we have written Constitution and it is
incumbent on every one to comply there with. Article 8 of
the Constitution stipulates that;-
1. “any law in so far as it is inconsistent
with the rights conferred by this
chapter (chapter-I Fundamental
Rights), shall, to the extent of such
inconsistency be void”
2. “The State shall not make any law
which takes away or abridges the
rights so conferred and any law made
in contravention of this clause shall, to
the extent of such contravention, be
void”.
5. Sub Article 5 of Article 8 further lays down;-
“The right conferred by this Chapter
shall not be suspended except as
expressly provided by the
Constitution”.
12. Article 199 (2) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic
of Pakistan, 1973 also removes the barrier or obstruction
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that may be placed in the way of a person approaching the
High Court for enforcement of fundamental rights as the
said provision stipulates that;-
“Subject to the Constitution, the right to
move a High Court for enforcement of any
of the Fundamental rights conferred by
chapter I of the Part II shall not be
abridged”.
In this respect guidance is sought from case
Ardeshir Cowasjee versus Karachi Building Control
Authority 1999 SCMR 2883. The relevant paragraph 23 of
the said judgment is reproduced.
“We may also refer to the following
judgments of this Court in which the
concept of locus standi has been
dilated upon in relation to a
Constitution petition and, interalia, it
has been held that for maintaining a
proceeding in writ jurisdiction, it is
not necessary that a writ petitioner
should have a right in the strict
juristic sense, but it is enough if he
discloses that he had a personal
interest in the performance of the
legal duty, which if not performed or
performed in a manner not permitted
by law, would result in the loss of
some personal benefit or advantage
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or curtailment of a privilege in
liberty or franchise.”
Reference may also be made to Balochistan Bar
Association versus Government of Balochistan PLD 1991
Quetta 7 wherein it is held that “the High Court is
empowered to examine the vires of civil/criminal law
on the touch stone of Constitution”. Reference may be
made to a case Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
versus Government of Pakistan, PLD 2009 SC 507
wherein it is held;
“It needs to be kept in view that apart from
the jurisdiction vested in High Court by
virtue of clauses (a) and (b) of Article 199
of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1973 a special jurisdiction is
conferred by clause (c) which a High Court
shares with the original jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 184(3)”, “The power to
enforce fundamental rights has been
conferred upon the superior Courts
through Articles 199(1)(c) and 183(3); it
may be seen that under Article 4 every
body has to be treated in accordance with
the law and under Article 8, a law
inconsistent with fundamental rights is to
be treated as void”.
13. Neither the learned Advocate General nor Additional
Attorney General has attributed any ulterior motive to the
petitioners. From the careful perusal of the contents of
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petitions it reveals that they have knocked the door of
Constitutional Court to assist their fellow citizens in leading
their lives in the glow of Constitution and to enjoy the rights
provided therein. It is settled law that if a person, who has
no personal interest and in the larger interest comes
forward and question such lacunas the doors of the Court
should not be shut for him, but rather kept open for him.
Thus the objection taken to the maintainability of the
petitions on the ground that they are not aggrieved person
and therefore cannot approached this Court under Article
199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
1973, are not tenable for the reasons stated above and
thus rejected. Moreover three petitioners are advocates
and one is effectee and they have the right to challenge the
vires of law as the custodian of law as well as the effectee.
14. Through the present petitions the petitioners have
challenged the Constitutional Validity of Paragraph 5(e), 7,
19(2) and Schedule 3 of Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation,
2009, Repeal of Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment
Ordinance 2001, Notifications relating to establishment of
Court of Executive Magistrate in PATA on the grounds that
these are against the spirit of Provision of Article 2-A,
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175(3) and 203 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan 1973.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that
Executive Magistrates including District Magistrates and
inter-alia entrusting them the judicial and trial function are
ultra vires to Article-2-A, 175(3) and 203 of the Constitution
and are totally against the independence of judiciary from
the executive. That entrusting the Executive Officers with
the judicial powers of any nature is being contrary to the
Constitution. That through the cover of paragraph 7 of the
Regulation, the institution of Executive Magistrate with
judicial powers have been illegally revived inspite of the
fact that the institution of Executive Magistrate has already
been abolished through Code of Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Ordinance 2001. That the revival of this
Executive Magistrate system is without lawful authority.
That introduction of Executive Magistrate contravenes
Article 175 (3) of the Constitution, which provide
that,”Judiciary shall be separate progressively from the
executive within 14 years from the commencement day,”
i.e. from August 14, 1973, which period of 14 years came
to an end on 18.08.1987 and the impugned law is in
Contravention of Article 175(3) of the Constitution of
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Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. That Constitution
envisages independent of “Judiciary” and any forum
created with an “Executive” as adjudicator of civil/criminal
or fiscal cases/issues is clearly in conflict with the
Provisions of Articles 4, 8, 9, 25 and 175 thereof. That
Article 25 of the Constitution envisages equality before law,
including process of law, hence subjecting the citizen to
two set of judicial system is but discriminatory, as well.
That the Constitution is based on the principle of trichotomy
of powers, in which “Executive”, “Legislative” “Judiciary”
have their own functions independent from each other.
That the function of the Executive Officers as Judges
cannot reflect fairness and impartiality. That non fixation of
the tenure of such Executive Officers also undermines their
independence and fairness. It is further contended that by
way of ordinary legislation, the powers and jurisdiction of
the Constitutional Courts cannot be restricted, as has been
done through this Regulation. Hence same is also violative
of Provisions of Articles 203 of the Constitution. That
provisions of the Regulation have been enforced within the
ambit of Article 247 of the Constitution. But the very
commendable act of enforcing the “Shariah Laws” has
been done in an unlawful manner as para No. 7 of the
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Regulation is inconsistent with the Constitution. No legal
requirement has been imbedded in the Regulation as to the
qualification/knowledge of Executive Magistrate with
reference to Shariah laws. That para 7(3) is in conflict with
the Provisions of Article 228 of the Constitution. That vide
para No.19 (2) of the Regulation, by way of mere repealing
Ordinance No. XXXVII of 2001, the provisions relating to
powers and procedure to be followed by the Executive
Magistrate have not been revived, by virtue of Section 6-A
and 7 of the General Clauses Act 1897 (X of 1897). That
para No.7 is also void in view of Article 143 of the
Constitution, dealing with the inconsistency between
Federal and Provincial law. That the exercise of powers by
Government under Articles 247(3) of the Constitution is
void. That Malakand Levies registered the cases under
section 154 Cr.P.C, carry out investigation and after
completion of investigation submit challan under section
173 Cr.P.C. They are untrained and are not authorized by
Provincial Government to conduct investigation and submit
challan. That illiterate and untrained persons supervise
investigation while under Cr.P.C only Police is authorized
to conduct investigation in criminal cases. This practice of
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investigation is contrary to the basic principle of equal
treatment and due process of law.
16. These arguments were rebutted by Advocate
General and Additional Attorney General and stated that
Executive Magistrate has been revived in PATA through
promulgation of Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 2009, in
accordance to the provision of Article 247 of the
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. That
before the 18th Amendment the criminal law was on the
Concurrent Legislative List of the Fourth Schedule of the
Constitution and the Provincial Government was also
empowered to do legislation on it and even now Provincial
Government is still empowered to legislate on the subject
under amended Article 142(b) of the Constitution. It is
further contended that Executive Magistrate was revived to
save the writ of the State in the area.
17. Under the Constitution the fundamental rights are
entrenched for every citizen and they are guaranteed
against the excesses of all branches of Government
including the legislature, be it the Federal Government or
the Provincial Government. Now it is to be seen whether
the impugned paragraphs of Regulation No. 1 are in
violation of the Constitution and they should be struck of
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from the Regulation which is meant for the establishment of
Nizam-e-Sharia in the area? The Constitution provides for
independence of judiciary and its separation from
Executive as specifically mentioned in Article 175(3), within
fourteen years, from the commencement day (President’s
Order No. XIV of 1985), but even then it was not done
after the lapse of 14 years. Thus the citizen were
compelled to knock the doors of Superior Courts for the
independence of judiciary from executive. The superior
judiciary after a long historical contemplation and endows
discussed the principle of separation of executive from the
judiciary, fundamental rights on the subject of trial, Article
2-A, 142, 143, 175, 202 and 203 and other questions and
issues raised in those petitions are similar to the present
petitions.
18. For the proper appreciation of the background of
independence/separation of judiciary reference may be
made to Hamood-ur-Rehman’s report in connection with
the Law Reforms Commission 1967-70. In Sharaf Faridi’s
case known as “Judicial Case” Hon’ble Judge of Sindh
High Court Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian discussed this report in
detail. It would be useful to get the guidance from the
strenuous efforts made by Superior Courts as many of the
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questions raised herein have already been determined and
settled in case of Sharaf Faridi versus Federation of
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, PLD 1989 Karachi 404
matter of separation of the Judiciary from the Executive
and the subject of independence of the judiciary were
dilated upon. Wherein it is held;-
“It contemplated trichotomy of powers
between the three organs of the State,
namely the Legislature, the Executive and
the Judiciary. Each organ of the State was
to function/operate within the bounds
specified in the Constitution. The judiciary
was assigned very important role to play,
mainly to act as the watch dog and to
ensure that none of the organ of the
Government functionaries acts in violation
of any of the provisions of Constitution or
any other law . . . . . the supervision and
control over the subordinate judiciary
vested in High Court under Article 203 of
the Constitution keeping in view Article
175, is exclusive in nature, comprehensive
in extent and effective in operation. It
comprehends the administrative power as
to the working of the subordinate Courts
and disciplinary jurisdiction over the
subordinate Judicial Officers. In this view
of the matter, any provision in an Act or
any Rule or a Notification empowering any
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executive functionary to have
administrative supervision and control
over the subordinate judiciary will be
violative of Article 203 of Constitution,
besides, it will militate against the concept
of separation and independence of
judiciary as envisaged by Article 175 of the
Constitution and the Objective
Regulation”.
In this judgment the Hon’ble Judges set out the
concept of the trichotomy of powers prevailing in the
Constitution, the special role of judiciary and stressed that
Parliament could not encroach upon the judicial domain. In
the judgment it is further held that;-
“The denial and failure to establish
independent Courts and Tribunals by
separating them from executive, negates
Article 9 of the Constitution of Islamic
Republic of Pakistan 1973. That a
mandatory duty has been cast upon the
executive and legislative to separate the
judiciary from executive but they have
remained completely silent, dormant and
unconcerned. Such omission to exercise
jurisdiction not only violates Article 175
but infringes fundamental rights as well. In
such circumstances necessary orders can
be passed and directions in mandatory
form can be issued to ensure enforcement
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of provisions of the Constitution and to
prevent the breach of fundamental right”.
When against this judgment of Sindh High Court the
Government of Sindh filed an appeal in Supreme Court it
was dismissed vide judgment Government of Sindh
versus Sharaf Faridi PLD 1994 SC 105 and held that
“the independence of judiciary means;-
a. “that every judge is free to decide
matters before him in accordance with
assessment of the facts and his
understanding of law without improper
influence, inducement or pressures, direct
or indirect, from any quarter or for any
reason, and
(b) that the judiciary is independent of the
executive and legislature and has
jurisdiction, directly or by way of review,
over all the issues of a judicial nature”.
19. Agitation against law similar to Regulation No. 1 of
2009 had been continuing since long. These have been
challenged in the Supreme Court from time to time. There
are chain of authorities where the Supreme Court has
assumed jurisdiction of judicial review, which even
otherwise is the final arbiter of dispute in order to maintain
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check and balance. For these reasons, the independence
of the judiciary has been guaranteed and secured.
20. In the case “Dr Mubasher Hussan versus
Federation of Pakistan” (PLD 2012 SC 265) the august
Supreme Court had declared the NRO to be illegal, un-
Constitutional and void ab-initio.
21. In the Al-Jehad Trust case “PLD 1996 SC 324, 429”
although the august Supreme Court stated with reference
to the appointment of Judges of superior judiciary but the
principles applies with equal force to all judicial
appointments including those of in the District Judiciary.
The dictum laid down in Al-Jehad case was soon
reaffirmed by Supreme Court in case of Mehram Ali and
others versus Federation of Pakistan” (PLD 1998 SC
1445-1474) and “Sheikh Liaqat Hussain versus
Federation of Pakistan” (PLD 1999 SC 504, 658). This
dictum has also been reiterated in Sindh High Court Bar
Association versus Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010
SC 879, 1182 Munir Hussain Bhatti versus Federation
of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 407.
In the case of Mehram Ali and other versus
Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1998 SC
1445 the august Supreme Court after considering
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the relevant Constitutional Provisions and
precedents laid down guiding principles, some of
these are as follows;-
i. That Articles 175, 202 and 203 of the Constitution provide a frame work of judiciary i.e. Supreme Court, a High Court for each province and such other Courts as may be established by law.
ii. That the word “such other Courts as may be
established by law” employed in clause (1) of Article 175 of the Constitution are relatable to the subordinate Courts referred to in Article 203 thereof.
iii. That in view of Article 203 of the Constitution
read with Article 175 thereof the supervision and control over the subordinate judiciary vests in High Court, which is the exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation.
iv. Any Court which is not under the
administrative control of High Court and/or the Supreme Court does not fit in within the judicial frame work of the Constitution.
v. That the independent of judiciary is inextricably linked and connected with the process of appointment of Judges and the security of their tenure and other terms and conditions”.
In the case of “Muhammad Irshad versus
Assistant Commissioner Swat and others” (PLD 1990
Peshawar 51), this Court held “Provisions of Regulation
laying down procedure for trial of offences mentioned
there in and remedies provided thereto are violation of
Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1973”. In the case of Government of
Balochistan through Additional Chief Secretary versus
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Aziz Ullah Memon and 16 others (PLD 1993 SC 341) it is
held;-
“Article 25- - - Any law made or action
taken in violation of principles contained
in Article 25 is liable to be struck down
……… “where the statutory functionary
acts malafide or in a partial, unjust,
oppressive or discriminatory manner, his
action can be challenged for violation of
equality clause of the Constitution………
separation of judiciary from executive
being the cornerstone of independence of
judiciary, unless it was independent, the
fundamental right of access of justice
could not be guaranteed”.
22. In case Accountant General Sindh versus Ahmad Ali U.
Qureshi PLD 2009 SC 522 it is held;-
“In broader sense, the concept of
independence of judiciary is not confined
to the extent of disposal of cases by the
Judges and discharging of judicial
functions rather in the extended meaning,
the concept of independence of judiciary
is complete separation from executive
authorities of the State in all the matters
including pay and pension which is an
essential component of independence of
judiciary”.
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23. The above said dictum has also been reiterated in
Sindh High Court Bar association Vs Federal of
Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 879, 1182) and Munir Hussain
Bhatti Vs Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 407). In
the latter case at page 467 the Supreme Court, after
examining the case law, recorded that;-
“It is an undisputed trend of our
Constitutional system that in matter
of appointment, security of tenure
and removal of Judges the
independent of judiciary should
remain fully secured.”
In the above judgment and particularly in Sharaf
Faridi case it is held that;-
“the supervision and control over
the judiciary vested in the High
Court under Article 203 of
Constitution, keeping in view Article
175, is exclusive in nature and any
notification empowering any
executive functionary to have
control over the subordinate
judiciary will be violation of above
Article 203 of the Constitution.
Beside it would militate against the
concept of operation of powers and
independence of judiciary”.
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These pronouncements were unambiguous and
provide the norms to be adhered to in the appointment
process for the district judiciary.
Similar view was taken by Supreme Court in Benazir
Bhutto’s case PLD 1989 SC 416 the SC.
24. The terms “access to justice to all” mentioned in
Article 4 of the Constitution include the doctrine of due
process of law, the tribunal or the Court before which the
rights of parties are adjudicated is so constituted which
gives reasonable assurance of the honesty and impartiality
of its judges that it is a Court of competent jurisdiction.
25. The Universally adopted and recognized basic
principle of the independence of judiciary requires that;-
“The judiciary shall have jurisdiction
over all issues of a judicial nature”
and that “Everyone shall have the
right to be treated by ordinary
Courts or Tribunals using
established legal procedure”.
Condition of service and tenure of Judges were also
recognized to be important.
26. Our Constitution is based on the principle of trichotomy
of powers in which Executive, Legislative and Judiciary
have their own defined functions independent from each
other and the executive cannot be given judicial powers as
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it would encroach upon the defined domain of the judiciary.
The Objective Regulation, which is a substantive part of
Constitution (Article 2-A) provides for the independence of
the judiciary but this provision would be negated and
rendered null and void if a person is tried by an executive
officer over whom the judiciary has no control as envisage
by Article 203 of the Constitution, 1973, i.e. each High
Court shall supervise and control all Courts subordinate to
it. Our Constitutional Courts have consistently held that the
process of appointment to the judiciary must be carefully
scrutinized through the lens of Constitutional principles
such as the principles of separation of powers.
27. The august Supreme Court gave a well defined
meaning and outlined the scope of the separation of
powers and judicial independence as mentioned in our
Constitution. It is in the backdrop of the judicial
pronouncement referred to above, and the interpretation of
the Constitution made therein, that Rules for recruitment of
judicial officers were framed in different provinces and in
our province “the North West Frontier Province Judicial
Service Rules 2001” were promulgated. In Rule 3 of the
above Rules the detail of Constitution of judicial service is
described. Which is comprised of;-
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a. District and Session Judge/Zilla Qazi.
b. Additional District and Sessions Judge/Izafi Zilla Qazi.
c. Senior Civil Judge-cum Magistrate, empowered under section 30 Cr.P.C/Aala Alaqa Qazi;
d. Civil Judge cum Judicial Magistrate/Alaqa Qazi.
Note. The designation of Zilla Qazi, Izafi Zilla Qazi, Aala Alaqa Qazi and Alaqa Qazi wherever used in these Rules, shall be deemed to be relevant only to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of the North West Frontier Province”.
In Rule 4 it is emphasis that the appointment to a
post shall be made by the High Court.
“In Rule 5 method of Recruitment was also given…
Appointment to Service shall be made in the following
manner;-
a. appointment to a post of Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate/Alaqa Qazi shall be made by initial recruitment;
b. appointment to a post of Senior Civil Judge cum Judicial Magistrate empowered under section 30 Cr.P.C/Aala Alaqa Qazi shall be made on seniority cum-fitness basis from amongst the Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate/Alaqa Qazi on the recommendation of Department Promotion Committee.
c. Appointment to a post of Additional District and Sessions Judge/Izafi Zilla Qazi shall be made to the extent of;-
i. Not less than two-third by
promotion, on the
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26
recommendation of Departmental promotion Committee from amongst the holders of the post of Senior Civil Judge-cum-Magistrate, empowered under section 30 Cr.P.C/Aala Alaqa Qazi, and;
ii. Not more than one-third by initial recruitment from amongst the members of the Bar. Public Prosecutors/Government Pleaders and Additional Public Prosecutors/Additional Government Pleaders;
d. appointment to a post of District &
Sessions Judge/Zilla Qazi shall be made by promotion on the recommendation of the Departmental promotion committee, on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness, from amongst the holders of the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge,/Izafi Zilla Qazi;
e. appointment by initial recruitment to a post of Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate/Alaqa Qazi shall be made on recommendations of the commission based on the result of a competitive examination to be conducted by it in the subjects specified in the Appendix to these Rules.
In the impugned Regulation Qazi has been defined
in paragraph 2(1)(g) which is as follows;-
“Qazi means a duly appointed Judicial Officer as
specific and designated in column No. 3 of Schedule II
which consists of;- “Schedule II”.
i. District and Sessions Judge/Zilla Qazi; ii. Additional District & Sessions Judge/Izafi
Zilla Qazi;
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27
iii. Senior Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate under section 30 of Cr.P.C 1898 in Aala Alaqa Qazi;
iv. Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate/Aalqa Qazi.
These are the same Judicial Officers, the detail of
which have been given in Rule 3 of the Judicial Services
Rules 2001. In para No. 5 of the Regulation the detail of
these Court have been given in clause ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ and ‘d’
i.e. Court of Zilla Qazi, Court of Izafi Zilla Qazi, Court of
Aala Alaqa Qazi and Court of Aalqa Qazi.
28. In paragraph 6 under the heading of “Qazis and
their powers and function” certain conditions were
imposed for their appointment. In sub para No.1 of
paragraph 6 it is specifically stated;-
“Any person to be appointed as Ilaqa Qazi
in the said area shall be a person who is
duly appointed Judicial Officer in the
NWFP. Preference shall be given to those
judicial officers who have completed
Shariah course from a recognized
institution”.
29. Beside the above noted Courts of Qazi in column
No. ‘E’ of para No. 5 Court of Executive Magistrate was
also introduced and constituted. In the impugned
paragraph 7 the powers and functions of Executive
Magistrate are given which is reproduced as under;-
(7). Executive Magistrate.
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28
1. In each district or protected area, there shall be a District Magistrate, Additional District Magistrate, Sub Divisional Magistrates and other Executive Magistrates as the Government may deem necessary to appoint.
2. The District Magistrate and all other Executive Magistrates shall discharge their functions, responsibilities and exercise their powers according to the established principles of Shariah and other laws for the time being in force in the said area.
3. Keeping peace, maintaining order, enforcing the executive authority of the Government and “Sadd-e-Zara-e-Jinayat” shall be the duty, responsibility and power of the District Magistrate. For this purpose he may take action against an individual under the established principles of Shariah.
4. The cases included in schedule III to this Regulation shall be exclusively triable by Executive Magistrates.
Explanation… The expression “Sadd-e-Zara-e-Jinayat” means and includes all actions and steps taken under the Shariah laws and any other law in force for the time being for the control of crimes.
30. Neither any criteria for the appointment of those
Executive Magistrates nor the terms and conditions of their
service has been described. The impugned Regulation
does not require that the Executive Magistrates have any
legal education and training and instead of their
appointments by High Court as required under Article 203
of Constitution, it empowered the Government to appoint
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
29
them as it may deem necessary and theoretically an
illiterate person could be appointed as an Executive
Magistrate. Even if it be presumed that the Government will
only appoint Government Servants as Executive
Magistrate, they would have no legal training, nor are they
required to acquire any training before being granted
judicial power. While against them the Qazis/Judicial
members are required to acquire a legal decree after
studying law for many years and they are appointed,
provided they pass the prescribed test and interview as
required in Rule 5 of the Judicial Service Rules 2001 and
paragraph 6 of this Regulation 2009. While the Executive
Magistrate envisaged under the impugned Regulation
would be not better then layman. Neither they were made
under the supervision of High court nor were they
appointed by High Court. Rather this prerogative was given
to Government and vide notification No. SO (FATA)/HD/1-
60/NRA-09 dated 02.10.2009 the Additional Chief
Secretary (Home) Government of NWFP, appointed
different government officers as District Magistrates, Sub-
Divisional Magistrates and Executive Magistrates and
entrusted them with the powers of First Class Magistrates.
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
30
31. Article 202 of the Constitution, authorizes High Court
to make “Rules Regulating the practice and procedure
of the Court or any Court subordinate to it”. But the
High Court has no power to make Rules regulating the
practice and procedure of the Executive Magistrates. The
Executive Magistrates who do not have to be law
graduates nor required to possess any legal training can
hardly be expected to decide cases in accordance with
laws. It has rightly being held by the Superior Courts;-
“That they would be nothing but Kangaroo
Courts or Mock Courts in which the
principles of law and justice are
disregarded or perverted”.
32. If one takes a deep scrutiny of the provisions of
impugned law, it will be clear that Government conferred
unrestricted and unfettered power in the executive to
administer criminal justice, when regular Courts, consisting
of Civil Judges/Judicial Magistrates having qualification as
required by the said Regulation and Subordinate Judicial
Service Rules 2001, have been established in the area to
adjudicate civil and criminal disputes. It is complete
negation of the fundamental rights which guarantee equal
protection of law, equality before law and right of access to
justice unhindered and unfettered as provided by the
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
31
Constitution and the injunctions of Islam. From the
cognizance of the schedule offences as provided in
schedule I the Executive Magistrates came into the power.
They are the dominating figure in the extra trial. Since our
Constitution is based on the principle of trichotomy;
therefore, to impose executive Magistrates, without control
of High Court the Government creates discrimination in the
area and negates the very concept of justice and violates
fundamental rights. These impugned paragraphs thus
create a bar against the right of citizen to approach the
established Courts of law and to be governed by the
general criminal law and procedure applicable in the entire
country. In the presence of normal Courts the addition of
Executive Magistrate in the area is not based on any
rational classification or intelligible differentia. Moreover by
these provisions the rights of access to Courts and justice
has been denied, which is by itself an infringement of
fundamental rights which provides that every citizen shall
be entitled to equal protection of law and will not be
deprived of life and liberty save in accordance with law.
The provisions of Articles 4, 8, 9, 10-A and 25 do not
permit the legislature to frame such law which may offend
the fundamental rights. Since the Constitution envisages
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
32
independent judiciary, separated from the executive and in
the present case the Government Officers having no
required knowledge, degree and training have been
appointed by Government, therefore the Executive
Magistrates created under the paragraphs 5(e) and 7 under
the control and superintendence of executive for
adjudication of criminal cases as given in Schedule III of
the Regulation will be in a complete conflict with Articles 4,
8, 9, 10-A, 25, 175 and 203.
33. It is settled that the mandate and commencement of
Article 175 must be obeyed and implemented; any laxity in
this regard will amount to violation of Constitutional
provisions. It is also admitted principle of law that a fair trial
is deemed to be vitiated if judicial functions are given to the
executive and its officer and the independence of the
judiciary cannot be secured if the executive is made a part
of judiciary. In similar nature of case the Balochistan High
Court in case Muhammad Kamran Mullahkhail And Others
Versus Government Of Balochistan through Chief Secretary
And Others (PLD 2012 Balochistan 57) has held;-
“(1) Article 175(3) of the Constitution brought an end to executive magistracy, and to revive or reenact it, as done by the impugned laws, runs contrary to the provisions of Article
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
33
175 of the Constitution;
(2) "Such other Courts as may be established by law" mentioned in clause (1) of Article 175 of the Constitution relate to the subordinate Courts referred to in Article 203 thereof and not `courts' manned by executive magistrates, which are alien to the Constitution;
(3) The Constitution envisages tracheotomy of powers between the three organs of the State, namely, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary and the impugned laws in setting up ‘Courts' of Executive Magistrates encroach upon the judicial domain, which the Constitution does not permit;
(4) The Constitution guarantees an independent judiciary and the Executive Magistrates established under the impugned laws negate the concept of an independent judiciary;
(5) ……………;
(6) …………...;
(7)…………...;
(8) ………...…;
(9) ……………;
(10) ………….;
(11) ……….…;
(12) ……..….;
(13) ………....;
(14) ………....;
(15) The impugned laws are repugnant to the Federal law on the subject therefore the same are void in terms of Article 143 of the Constitution”.
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
34
34. Keeping in view the above discussion and the ratio
of the cited judgments, we are inclined to hold that under
Article 203 of the Constitution supervision and control over
the subordinate judiciary vest in the High Court and any
Court created under any law which is not subject to the
judicial supervision of High Court would be violative of the
Article ibid.
35. In such view of the matter we have no hesitation to
say that the provisions of the Regulation empowering the
Executive Magistrates to exercise judicial functions are
contrary to the provision of the Constitution and also in
negation of the judgment of the superior Courts referred to
above. The Government has no authority whatsoever, to
appoint Government Officers to perform the judicial
function.
36. The next question which needs consideration is the vires
of paragraph 19(2) of the Regulation vide which the Criminal
Procedure Code (Amendment) Ordinance 2001 (XXXVII of
2001), applied to PATA vide Home and Tribal Affairs
Department’s Notification No. 1/93-SOS-II(HD)/2001 dated
27.04.2002 was repealed. Now it is to be seen whether the
Governor was competent to repeal the Ordinance No. XXXVII
of 2001 (Federal Law) and to legislate in respect of criminal
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
35
law and criminal procedure through the impugned provision
of the Regulation where the same has already been legislated
by the Parliament and whether it is not against the
provisions of Article 143 of the Constitution?
37. The impugned paragraph 19(2) sought to revive the
relevant sections of Cr.P.C in respect of which the
Federation had already legislated and interalia undo the
changes made to the code of criminal procedure through
(Amendment) Ordinance XXXVII of 2001 which came in to
force on 14.08.2001, removed the Executive Magistrates
from the code. Before discussing the legal impact and
validity of these amendments we deem it appropriate to
reproduce the relevant sections of law before and after
Amendments vide Ordinance No. XXXVII of 2001 which
are as under;-
After amendment section 4 “ma” was inserted.
“Magistrate” means Judicial Magistrate and
includes a Special Magistrate appointed under
section 12 and 14.
Sub section (2) of section 6 before
amendment. There shall be the following classes of
Magistrates, namely;-
(i) Judicial Magistrates.
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36
a. Magistrates of the first class. b. Magistrates of the second class. c. Magistrates of the third class. d. Special Judicial Magistrates.
(ii) Executive Magistrates.
a. District Magistrates. b. Additional District Magistrates. c. Sub-Divisional Magistrates. d. Special Executive Magistrate. e. Magistrates of the First Class. f. Magistrates of the Second Class. g. Magistrates of the Third Class.
Sub section 2(6) after amendments.
There shall be following classes of Magistrate.
a. Magistrates of First Class. b. Magistrates of second class and c. Magistrates of the third class.
Section 8(2) has been omitted. Section 10, 11
and 13 in respect of appointment of District
Magistrate, Executive Magistrate, and their powers
by Provincial Government have also been omitted.
Sub section 2, 3 and 4 of section 14 were
omitted and in sub section I the word Executive
Magistrate was also omitted.
38. Apart from above amendment, in the whole Cr.P.C
wherever the word Executive and District Magistrate
appeared these were amended and their powers were
given either to Judicial Magistrate or Sessions Judge. In
the Amended Ordinance XXXVII 2001 directions were
issued to the Provincial Government to exercise their
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
37
powers in respect of grant and withdrawal of powers of
Magistrate etc with the recommendation of the High Court.
39. Vide impugned paragraph the Federal statute has
been repealed without observing the relevant provision of
law and Constitution and sought to specifically undo the
changes made to the Code by the Federation which was in
complete contravention of Article 143 of the Constitution.
The said Article is reproduced as under;-
143. Inconsistency between Federal and
Provincial Laws. - - - If any provision of an
Act of a Provincial Assembly is repugnant
to any provision of an Act of [[Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament)] which [[Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament) is competent to enact,
or to any provision of any existing law with
respect to any of the matters enumerated
in the Concurrent Legislative List, then the
Act of [[Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)],
whether passed before or after the Act of
the Provincial Assembly, or, as the case
may be, the existing law, shall prevail and
the Act of the Provincial Assembly shall,
to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
In Wattan Party versus Federation of Pakistan
PLD 2008 SC 697, the Supreme Court held that the Court
can exercise its powers under Article 8 to strike down a
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
38
Provincial Law, if it offends a Federal Law as stipulated in
Article 143. The relevant para is reproduced as under;-
"Article 8 of the Constitution grants the
power of judicial review of legislation
according to which this Court is
empowered to declare a law void if it is
inconsistent with or in derogation to
the fundamental rights. However, at the
same time this Court is empowered to
declare any legislation contrary to the
provisions of Constitution under some
of the identical provisions of the
Constitution as under Article 143 of the
Constitution on having noticed
inconsistencies between the Federal
and Provincial laws the Court is
empowered to declare that which out
of the two laws is in accordance with
the Constitution. Besides it is an
accepted principle of the Constitutional
jurisprudence that a Constitution being
a basic document is always treated to
be higher than other statutes and
whenever a document in the shape of
law given by the Parliament or other
competent authority is in conflict with
the Constitution or is inconsistent then
to that extent the same is liable to be
declared un-Constitutional. This is not
for the first time that a law like
Ordinance, 2000 has come for
examination before the Court as in the
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
39
past a number of laws were examined
and when found against the
Constitution the same were declared
void and of no legal effect. Reference
may be made to the case of Syed Zafar
Ali Shah v. Gen. Pervez Musharaf Chief
Executive of Pakistan (PLD 2000 SC
869) wherein it was held that judicial
power means that the superior courts
can strike down a law on the
touchstone of the Constitution. The
nature of judicial power and its relation
to jurisdiction are all allied concepts
and the same cannot be taken away. It
is inherent in the nature of judicial
power that the Constitution is regarded
as a supreme law and any law contrary
to it or its provisions is to be struck
down by the Court, as the duty and the
function of the Court is to enforce the
Constitution."
40. Since this Regulation was promulgated in 2009;
therefore, there is no need to discuss the Constitution 18th
Amendment Act which came into force on 19.04.2010
which has also amended Article 142 and 143 and thereby
omitted Concurrent Legislative List but has retain the
matter in respect of criminal law, criminal procedure and
evidence in Article 142(b) empowering both Parliament and
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
40
Provincial assembly to legislate on these subject but the
clog of Article 143 is still there.
41. Since Constitution is not merely an imprisonment of
the past but is also alive to the unfolding of future,
Constitution is the supreme law of all the laws; therefore,
care should have been taken not to transgress the limits
prescribed by the Constitution. But in the present case by
adding paragraph 19(2) in the Regulation the provisions of
Article 143 of the Constitution have been violated as it was
in complete contravention of this Article.
42. It is also important to add that though the Regulation
has been promulgated by Governor under Article 247 of
the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, but
the definition of state as given in Article 7 of the
Constitution is fairly wide and encompasses all authorities
which performs Executive and Legislative functions in any
part of the country. The President and Governor while
exercising their powers under Article 247 of the
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973;
therefore, cannot be excluded from the definition of “State”
as far as the tribal areas are concerned. In this respect
reference is made to PLD 1995 SC 281 in the case of
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
41
“Government of NWFP versus Muhammad Irshad”
wherein it is held;-
“Extraordinary Power, that has been
vested in the President and the Governor
has to be exercised in a manner that would
facilitate the introduction of representative
administration in tribal area and thus bring
that at par with the other parts of Pakistan.
Any legislative and administrative
measures which obstruct or delay such
ultimate goal is beyond the boundary of
power vested in the President and the
Governor. When the President or the
Governor makes a law for the Tribal Areas
which is different from that prevailing in
the rest of the country it must be
accompanied by good reasons- - -
Omission in this regard would lay the
President and the Governor open to
charge of arbitrariness and on that
account compromise the validity of their
action whether it is in the legislative field
or it relates to a purely administrative act”.
43. In the sacred Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Shariah, implemented
through “The Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009”, the
Executive Magistracy has been wrapped, which is the
memorial of the era of colonialism. It is not understood that
even after 68 years of independence a few people still
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
42
desire and even try to clamp the people into shackles of
slavery. Constitution of our country is a collective public
desire which declares independence of Judiciary and its
separation from Executives. But there are few people who
for their motives, and whims seek illegal and
unconstitutional power to revive the Executive Magistracy,
which is one of the remnants of colonial era.
44. In view of what has been stated above it is difficult to
regard the impugned provisions in question as measures
conducive to the peace and good governance of the area
as the Courts of Judicial Magistrates are working there and
the ordinary judicial system, which is in force in the other
parts of Pakistan are working properly. But with out any
apparent justification they have introduced a setup which is
repealed and which is condemned by the residents of the
area. They can therefore hardly be regarded as legitimate
exercise of the extraordinary power which the President
and Governor are enforcing in reference to the area under
Article 247 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, 1973. Therefore, we have no hesitation to say
that by creating the posts of Executive Magistrates efforts
have been made to bring back the Constitutionally and
Judicially withdrawn and condemned Executive Magistracy
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
43
and there by to defeat the Constitutional mandate and
dictum of the Superior Courts.
45. In these circumstances and for above stated
reasons, this and the connected petitions are disposed of
in following terms;-
a. Paragraph 5(e), 7, 19(2) Schedule III and
other relevant paras in respect of
function of Executive Magistrate of
Shariah Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009,
(NWFP Regulation No. 01 of 2009),
Notification No. SO(FATA)/HD/1-
60/NAR/09 dated 02.10.2009 and other
Notifications entrusting the Executive
Officers with Judicial powers of any
nature are hereby struck down being
ultra vires of the Constitution as
violates the requirement of
Constitution and relevant trite law.
b. That any Rule, Notification and any
order issued, declaring or appointing
any person as Executive Magistrate
and authorizing such persons of
exercising powers to conduct trials and
any other powers pursuant to invalid
law as mentioned in Para (a) above, are
also declared as void and of no legal
effect.
c. However, the conviction made and
proceeding conducted by the Executive
Ă.ß.ĂWĂŇ
44
Magistrate, in pursuance of the above
law are hereby saved and protected
under the doctrine of past and closed
transactions.
d. Consequently all pending proceedings
before the aforementioned invalidated
Executive Magistrates, appointed
pursuant to the aforementioned
invalidated Law, to be transferred to
the concerned Judicial Magistrates
(Ilaqa Qazis) or to the Sessions Judges
(Zilla Qazis) of the concerned District,
who after receiving such cases shall
proceed therewith in accordance with
Law.
e. The respondents are directed to take
appropriate measures to bring the
Regulation in conformity with the
Constitution and dictas of the Superior
Courts within a period not exceeding
six months. Any step to be taken,
which relates to the conferment of
judicial powers, in the area shall be
made in consultation with the High
Court.
J U D G E.
J U D G E.
ANNOUNCED. 29.04.2015