JOURNAL OF ANIMAL WELFARE LAWNovember 2005 www.alaw.org.uk

Association of Lawyers for Animal Welfare

ALAW

Registered Office: Springfield, Rookery Hill, Ashtead Park, Ashtead, Surrey KT21 1HY. A company limited by guarantee (No 5307802 – England).

Address: PO Box 67, Ellesmere, Shropshire SY12 9WZTelephone: 01691 622444

Website: www.alaw.org.uk

David Thomas

CONTENTS

Co-ordinator: Anne Wignall

Directors: Alan Bates, Jeremy Chipperfield, Simon Cox, Andrew Lutley, Paula Sparks,

Email: info@alaw.org.uk

Editor: Christine Orr

The Association of Lawyers for Animal Welfare (ALAW) would like tothank Compassion in World Farming Trust for its generous support ofthis Journal.

The views expressed in this Journal are those of the authors and do notnecessarily represent those of ALAW.

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What we need is clarity: pet fairs and the Pet Animals Act 1951

The Hunting Act: human rights and EC law challenges

UK case law

Culling of non-native species

Import of dog and cat fur to the EU

The Animal Welfare Bill

Media Watch

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The Animal Welfare Bill

Sasha ForemanSolicitor

The Animal Welfare Bill was introduced inthe House of Commons on 13 October.Since July 2004 when a draft Bill waspublished, it has undergone publicconsultation, pre-legislative scrutiny (by theEnvironment, Food and Rural AffairsCommittee) and significant re-drafting.Shifts in Government policy during thisperiod have affected its content. Althoughmuch in the Bill is a welcome improvementon the present situation, it is in somerespects more conservative and preservingof the status quo than had been hoped.

This article analyses some of the principalprovisions of the Bill and the areas intendedto be dealt with in secondary legislation.

Welfare offence1

The “welfare offence” is pivotal tobringing animal welfare law in line withprevailing ethical views on animals. Therationale underlying this offence is toenable action to be taken to prevent ananimal from suffering to the degreerequired to act under the cruelty offence,by requiring a person responsible for ananimal to take reasonable steps to ensurethat its needs are met to the extentrequired by good practice. The needs of ananimal will encompass its environment,diet, ability to exhibit normal behaviour,need to be housed with or apart from otheranimals, protection from pain, injury anddisease and other factors. This offenceshould enable many animals to be helpedin future.

However, although the duty is alreadyqualified by the requirement to take only“such steps as are reasonable in all thecircumstances”, new wording since thedraft Bill makes it relevant for a court to

1 Clause 8.

have regard to “any lawful purpose forwhich the animal is kept and any lawfulactivity undertaken in relation to theanimal”. This has the unfortunate potentialto create inconsistent protection for animalsdepending on the purpose for which theyare used. Rather than the offence leading tothe disappearance of activities involvinganimals where it is extremely difficult orimpossible to ensure their welfare (forexample the use of elephants in circuses),this proviso seems to give such activitiesspecial latitude.

Cruelty offence2

The new offence of causing or permittingunnecessary suffering updates its somewhatarchaic equivalent in the Protection ofAnimals Act 1911. Although the Bill doesnot expressly refer to mental suffering asthe 1911 Act does, the explanatory notes tothe legislation expressly include it.

Recordings of cruelty

The draft Bill created an offence of making,possessing, distributing or publishingrecordings of an animal fight. This has beenremoved. It has been suggested that animalwelfare legislation is not the appropriateplace to deal with recordings of animalfights, cruelty and bestiality as these are amatter of moral outrage not welfare. Notonly does this seem extraordinary given thatsuch material must feed the taste forviolence towards animals and the demandfor fights and cruelty to take place, but thereis no indication that the problem will bedealt with elsewhere, for example inpossible new laws on possessing andaccessing extreme internet pornography.The existing law on obscenity and use ofanimals in films applies inadequately tothese problems.

2 Clause 4.

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The definition of “animal”3

The protection given by the new legislationwill be restricted to vertebrate animals unlessregulations are adopted to extend thedefinition of “animal”. This limitation isostensibly on the basis that only animals forwhich there is sufficient scientific evidence oftheir capability to experience pain or sufferingshould be included. There is, however,increasing scientific consensus that certaininvertebrates have this capacity, in particularcephalopods and decapod crustaceans(octopus, squids and cuttlefish, crabs, lobstersand crayfish). These creatures are protected bywelfare legislation in other countries, such asNew Zealand, and the abovementionedCommittee supported their inclusion in thenew legislation. However, the Governmentproposes merely to “continue to review” thisarea, possibly because of the implications anextension of the definition of “animal” wouldhave for the legislation governing animalsused for experimental and scientific purposes.

The application of the Bill is further limitedto, broadly, domesticated and kept animals.Wild animals living in the wild are notprotected unless and until taken undercontrol by a person.

Tail docking4

The Bill contains a ban on mutilations,including tail docking of dogs for cosmeticreasons, following the definition of a RoyalCollege of Veterinary Surgeons workinggroup. There is, however, a power to makeexemptions in regulations that the Governmenthas stated will, unless Parliament decidesotherwise, permit docking.

Regulations5

Regulations may be made under the Bill forthe purpose of promoting the welfare of

3 Clause 1.4 Clause 5.5 Clause 10.

animals for which a person is responsible,avoiding the need to use primary legislationto update welfare standards applying to non-farmed animals, a factor partly responsiblefor the slow manner in which this area oflaw has been updated. (There already existpowers to adopt regulations relating tofarmed animal welfare.)

The Department for the Environment, Foodand Rural Affairs published its regulatoryimpact assessment coincident with the Bill.The specific activities involving animals tobe regulated are:

pet shops (including internet selling),pet fairs,animal sanctuaries and rehabilitationcenters,livery yards,tethering of equines,riding establishments,animal boarding,dog breeding,greyhound racing,performing animal trainers and suppliers,rearing of game birds for sport shooting.

These areas will be variously subject tolicensing, requirements to register with thelocal authority or compliance with codes ofpractice. The proposals lack real detail atthis stage but appear to be influenced by anew Government policy on “betterregulation” and what industry is preparedto bear. Areas of concern include theincrease in the maximum period forlicensing and inspection of establishmentssuch as pet shops and riding schools fromone year to three years, over-reliance oncertain industries where serious welfareproblems are known to regulate themselves,and the legalisation of pet fairs underlicence. The moves to license livery yardsand to start to regulate animal sanctuariesare, however, positive.

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Conclusion

Although this article focuses largely onwhere the Bill could have gone further, thereis also much to welcome. It is hoped thatsome of its deficiencies can be remedied inParliament. The new law is expected to enterinto force in 2006. Further work will then berequired over at least the next five years toput in place effective secondary legislationto further protect animals.

What we need is clarity: pet fairsand the Pet Animals Act 1951

Alan BatesBarrister, Monckton Chambers

It was concerns about the depressingconditions in which pet animals were beingsold at certain London markets that ledParliament to enact the Pet Animals(Amendment) Act 1983. That Act amendedthe Pet Animals Act 1951 so that itprovided, in Section 2, that “[i]f any personcarries on a business of selling animals aspets in any part of a street or public place, orat a stall or barrow in a market, he shall beguilty of an offence.” The 1983 amendmenteventually led to the complete eradication ofpet-selling stalls at regular markets.

Since the exotic pets craze of the early1990s, however, a new form of market-typeselling of pet animals has emerged whichperhaps presents even greater animalwelfare negatives than the market stallswhich used to so sadden the compassionatemarket-goer. In many towns and citiesacross the UK, in community halls, leisurecentres and schools, exotic animal fairs aretaking place, often calling themselves“reptile exhibitions”, at which animals aresold as pets directly to the public. Thetypical event consists of a number ofdifferent trestle-table stalls from which tens,hundreds, or even thousands, of reptiles andother exotic animals are displayed andoffered for immediate sale by differentindependent breeders and dealers. In many

ways the format is that of a jumble sale,albeit that the “goods” sold are sentientcreatures rather than unwanted bric-a-brac.The animals have often been transported formany hours in the backs of hot cars andvans, before being displayed in unsuitablecages stacked one atop another. Manyvisitors to these “exhibitions” will makeimpulse purchases of exotic animals thathave highly specialised care requirements,and will do so without the benefit ofappropriate care advice from the sellers.

Pet birds are also being sold at suchoccasional events. Indeed, bird fairs tend totake place on a much larger scale than theirreptilian counterparts. The National Cageand Aviary Bird Exhibition, organised byIPC Media (the publishers of Cage andAviary Birds magazine), is the highlight ofthe bird dealers’ calendar. The 2003 event,which took place in early December of thatyear at the National Exhibition Centre nearBirmingham, was granted a pet shop licenceby Solihull Metropolitan Borough Councilfor the selling of up to 100,000 birds.Undercover investigators from Animal Aidvisited the event and documented a numberof apparent breaches of the conditionsattached to that licence, as well as of theWildlife and Countryside Act 1981.6 Themultiple independent traders offering birdsfor sale at that event were drawn from acrossthe UK, with at least one coming fromanother EU Member State. Plainly,therefore, the sellers were not mere small-time hobbyists, but were serious commercialoperators. Many thousands of birds arebelieved to have changed hands in thecourse of that event.

Quite apart from the obvious welfareconcerns that are posed by such events,campaigners against them also point to thepotential risks to public health. Whateverclaims may be made by the sellers of birds

6 “From Jungle to Jumble – National Cage andAviary Birds Exhibition 2003: Evidence,findings and recommendations”, a report byAnimal Aid, March 2004.

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and reptiles at such fairs, it is improbable todeny that at least some of the animals beingoffered for sale will have been caught in thewild or will at least have recently mixed withwild-caught animals. Indeed, such eventswould appear to be an ideal outlet for thedisposal of animals by black market dealersor persons involved in various forms ofwildlife crime. The Animal Aid report7recorded that, of a sample of five birds whichwere purchased at the event and tested forChlamydia psitacci (psittacosis), one (aSenegal parrot) had the infection, which canbe transmitted to humans. The avian fluoutbreak in Asia, and the continuing spreadof the virus around the world, would appearto highlight the dangers inherent in bird-human interaction in large-scale market-typesituations.8 Reptile fairs also presentsignificant public health risks, particularly inview of the absence of quarantinerequirements for imported cold-bloodedanimals and the documented cases of fatalinfection of humans with salmonella throughcontact with pet reptiles. Indeed, theoccurrence of two infant deaths in the UKwithin six months as a result of salmonellainfections from reptiles prompted theDepartment of Health to re-issue a warning in2000 that children under five years of age,pregnant women, the elderly, and theimmuno-compromised should all avoidcontact with reptiles.

What, then, is the legal position with regard tothese events? Do they fall within theprohibition, in Section 2 of the 1951 Act, ofselling animals from market stalls and inpublic places? And if they do not, then do theyrequire a “pet shop licence” from the localauthority in order to avoid the commission ofcriminal offences contrary to Section 1 of thatAct, which prohibits the keeping of a pet shop

7 Ibid.8 The death of an imported parrot in an Essexquarantine facility from the H5N1 strain of avianflu (the lethal strain which can be passed on tohumans) in October 2005 led to a temporary EUban on the selling of birds at pet fairs. The ban isdue to expire on 31 December 2005.

except under the authority of such a licence?Campaigners against such events have facedconsiderable frustration at the variety of viewsof the law adopted by different localauthorities, who bear the responsibility forgranting licences and prosecuting offencesunder the 1951 Act. While most localauthorities have accepted the campaigners’arguments that these events fall within theSection 2 prohibition, some have licensedthem under Section 1, while yet another groupof local authorities regard these events asoutside the scope of the 1951 Act altogether sothey are left unregulated.

The Section 2 prohibition on selling animals inpublic places and from market stalls

What exactly is a “public place” for thepurposes of the 1951 Act? The phrase is notdefined in the Act itself, but has generallybeen defined in other regulatory legislation as“[a]ny place to which the public have accesswhether on payment or otherwise”.9 Such adefinition would appear to be capable ofembracing leisure centres, racecourses, schoolplaying fields, agricultural showgrounds andother places where pet fairs typically takeplace. The difficulty with giving such a broadscope to the phrase, however, is the need toexclude conventional pet shops, which itplainly cannot have been the intention of thelegislature to prohibit.

Further confusion has been caused by theorganisers of pet fairs who have sought toportray their events as being open to“members only”, essentially as a device tocircumvent rulings by some local authoritiesthat pet fairs that are open to the public,whether on payment of an admission fee orotherwise, are properly regarded as beingheld in public places and thus as fallingwithin the Section 2 prohibition. Often the“memberships” sold are a thinly disguised

9 Licensing Act 1902. Other examples of the useof the same or a similar definition are: IndecentDisplays (Control) Act 1981; EnvironmentalProtection Act 1990, Part VIII, Section 149(11);Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, Section 10(2).

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sham, with “membership cards” beingprovided on payment of what is in truth nomore than a nominal admission fee payableat the door.

Whether or not a pet fair is held in a publicplace, however, it will still fall within theSection 2 prohibition if it involves theselling of animals as pets from market stalls.The usual common law definition of a“market” is “a concourse of buyers andsellers”. It seems likely that the selling ofanimals from a stall at an event whichconsisted of a number of differentindependently-run stalls gathered together inan open-plan setting would come within thatdefinition, whether the event was heldindoors or outdoors, and whether it tookplace regularly or occasionally.

Until this issue is resolved by the highercourts, however, confusion will continue toreign as to whether or not pet fairs doinvolve the commission of criminal offencescontrary to Section 2.10

Assuming the events do not involveviolations of Section 2, is a pet shop licencerequired under Section 1?

Section 1 of the 1951 Act makes it anoffence to “keep a pet shop except under theauthority of a licence granted in accordancewith the provisions of [the] Act”. Thedefinition of a “pet shop” is provided inSection 7(1):“References in this Act to the keeping of apet shop shall, subject to the followingprovisions … be construed as references tothe carrying on at premises of any nature

10 Section 2 has been the subject of a number ofdecisions in the magistrates’ courts (see, e.g.,Rogers v Teignbridge District Council (TorbayMagistrates’ Court, 7 November 2000); RapaLimited v Trafford Borough Council (TraffordMetropolitan Magistrates’ Court, 18 June 2002);also the Scottish case White v Kilmarnock andLouden District Council 1991 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 69).However, Section 2 has not yet been the subjectof a decision by the High Court or the Court ofAppeal, and thus no binding authority exists.

(including a private dwelling) of a businessof selling animals as pets, and as includingreferences to the keeping of animals in anysuch premises as aforesaid with a view totheir being sold in the course of such abusiness, whether by the keeper thereof orby any other person.” (emphasis added)

Thus, it is not only conventional “highstreet” pet shops that are required to belicensed.11 Accordingly, it would seem that,even if pet fairs do not involve thecommission of criminal offences underSection 2, such offences would neverthelessbe committed under Section 1 by any person“carrying on … a business of selling animalsas pets” who was not doing so under theauthority of a valid licence.

A question therefore arises as to the partywho must apply for, and be issued with, avalid licence in order to “keep a pet shop” atthe event (i.e. carry on a business of sellinganimals as pets). Section 1(2) of the 1951Act appears to provide a simple answer:

11 In Chalmers v Diwell (1975) 74 LGR 173, itwas held that a premises where birds were heldprior to export to overseas purchasers required apet shop licence. The premises were effectivelyno more than a holding center: birds usuallystayed on the premises for less than 48 hours,though they had occasionally remained on thepremises for up to 12 days. Nevertheless, thedefendant was held to have been keeping a petshop. Giving judgment for the Court, Lawton J.attached no weight to the fact that purchasers didnot visit the defendant’s premises. It wassufficient that the defendant was: “in factcarrying on a business of selling animals [as]pets. He [was] in fact keeping those pets on thepremises for the purposes of his business, eventhough it [was] for a limited time.” Thedefendant appears to have supplied the birdsdirectly to the final purchaser (i.e. the party whowould keep the bird as a pet). It thereforeremains unclear whether all premises that holdanimals that are in the pet trade supply chainrequire a licence, or whether the requirementonly applies to premises from which a businessis carried on of supplying animals as pets to thefinal consumer (i.e. the pet owner).

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“Every local authority may, on applicationbeing made to them for that purpose by aperson who is not for the time beingdisqualified from keeping a pet shop, and onpayment of such fee . . . as may bedetermined by the local authority, grant alicence to that person to keep a pet shop atsuch premises in their area as may bespecified in the application and subject tocompliance with such conditions as may bespecified in the licence.” (emphasis added)

Thus, the legislation appears to envisagepet shop licence applications being madeonly by the intending keepers of pet shops,i.e. the legal or natural persons intending tocarry on a business of selling animals aspets (but not by persons employed withinsomeone else’s pet selling business). If thatis correct, then it would appear to followthat every trader intending to sell animalsas pets at a pet fair must apply for, andobtain, a valid licence from the localauthority. It would not be open to localauthorities to grant (as a small numberhave) an “umbrella” pet shop licence to theorganiser of a pet fair under which allpersons selling animals as pets at that eventcould shelter. The organiser of a pet fair isnot, after all, the keeper of a pet shop at allsince it is not the organiser who is carryingon a business of selling animals as pets.Rather, the organiser is carrying on abusiness of “renting out” stalls from whichother parties (the independent traders) carryon their quite independent businesses ofselling animals as pets.

Once again, however, we cannot be sure thatthis analysis represents the law until the pointhas been decided by a court of precedent.

Clarifying the law: the Animal Welfare Bill

The draft Animal Welfare Bill which waspublished by the Department for theEnvironment, Food and Rural Affairs(DEFRA) in July 2004 included powers forthe Secretary of State to repeal the 1951 Actin its entirety and put in its place delegatedlegislation regulating the selling of pet

animals. It was made clear at the time byDEFRA that they were minded to resolve theconfusion over the legality of pet fairs bymaking express provision for such fairs to belicensed and repealing Section 2 of the 1951Act – a change which would have been likelyto lead to an increase in the number of suchfairs, which would then have beenunarguably legal. DEFRA sought to portraythe proposed change as a pro-animal welfaremove bringing pet fairs within the licensingcontrol of local authorities for the first time.Accordingly, the question posed by DEFRAin its consultation documents was whetherpet fairs should be regulated, and not, as anti-pet fair campaigners would have preferred,whether pet fairs should be legalised.

The draft Bill was considered by theCommons Environment, Food and RuralAffairs Committee in the 2004-5Parliamentary session.12 The Committeecriticised DEFRA’s consultation exercise inrelation to the regulation/legalisation of petfairs, recommending that DEFRA consultagain, this time asking interested partieswhether the confusion over the law shouldbe resolved by expressly legalising pet fairsor banning them altogether.

The Animal Welfare Bill which is nowmaking its way through Parliament doesnot provide a power for the Secretary ofState to repeal Section 2 of the 1951 Act,since only Section 1(1) of that Act can berepealed in consequence of the making ofdelegated legislation. It is unclear whetherthat change was the result of a happydrafting error or a genuine change of heartby DEFRA. Curiously, the RegulatoryImpact Assessment accompanying the Billcontinues to state that pet fairs will beregulated (rather than prohibited).DEFRA’s present position on the pet fairsissue is therefore unclear, and the Bill (ascurrently drafted) will do nothingwhatsoever to resolve the confusion overthe legality of pet fairs (which was, afterall, DEFRA’s original justification for its

12 HC 52-1, December 2004.

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intention to introduce regulation of suchevents). It thus seems that the legality ofpet fairs will ultimately be decided by thecourts, rather than the legislators we electto make policy choices on the nation’sbehalf. What is needed is for the Bill to beamended to, in turn, amend Section 2 ofthe 1951 Act to make it clear that allcommercial selling of animals as pets bymore than one independent trader at atemporary event falls squarely within theSection 2 prohibition.

The Hunting Act: human rights andEC law challenges

David ThomasSolicitor

Introduction

On 29 July, the Divisional Court gave itsjudgment in the latest challenge to thevalidity of the Hunting Act 2004 (the“Act”).13 There were two main challenges,the first, led by the Countryside Alliancewith a number of individual claimants,based on human rights arguments, and thesecond on European Community (EC) law.The Government was the defendant in eachcase.14 The RSPCA was given permission tointervene to oppose the challenges.

The Act prohibits the hunting, or assistingthe hunting of, wild mammals with dogs,unless one of the many exemptions inSchedule 1 applies. The exemptions relate toparticular activities (such as stalking a wildmammal, or flushing it out of cover, incertain circumstances) or to species (rabbitsand rats are not protected). Hare coursing is

13 The Countryside Alliance and others; Derwinand others; Friend and Thomas v HM Attorney-General and the Secretary of State for theEnvironment, Food and Rural Affairs, RSPCAintervening [2005] EWHC 1677.14 In the form of the Attorney-General and theSecretary of State for Food, the Environment andRural Affairs.

also banned. In this article, “hunting” refersto hunting with dogs.The human rights arguments: engagementof, and interference with, articles of theEuropean Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

There were ten individual claimants,including a huntsman with stag hounds, aprofessional terrierman, the owner of alivery yard business, a farrier, hare coursinggreyhound trainers, a landowner whoallowed hunting over his land, the master ofa beagle pack and a person who claimed hissocial and family life revolved aroundhunting. They argued that the Act breachedtheir rights under one or more of the articlesof the European Convention for theProtection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”),including in particular Article 8 (right torespect for private life and the home),Article 11 (freedom of assembly andassociation), Article 1 of the First Protocol(“1P1”) (right to possessions) and Article 14(prohibition on discrimination).

In each case, the Court had first to decidewhether the Article could in principle applyto the subject matter of the Act. If so, thequestion was whether there was a primafacie breach and, if so, whether theGovernment could nevertheless justify it.Since the justification arguments appliedequally to the EC claim, the Court dealt withthem together (see below).

Article 8 ECHR: engagement andinterference

The Court said that, at best, the right torespect for private life could only beengaged for those for whom hunting wascentral to their lives. Two claimants whocame reasonably close on the facts were thelivery yard owner and the terrierman.However, the Court decided against eventhese claimants. The nature of the “intrusioninto personal integrity and inter-personaldevelopment” caused by the hunting banwas qualitatively different from that

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involved in most of the relevant cases of theEuropean Court of Human Rights and theintensity was less. In addition, much of theintrusion here was economic and thereforemore appropriate for consideration underArticle 1P1.

As far as the respect for home limb ofArticle 8 was concerned, the Court agreedwith the Inner House of the Court ofSession in Adams v Scottish Ministers15

(a challenge to the equivalent legislation inScotland) that land over which huntingtakes place cannot be a person’s “home”(which only extends to their dwelling houseand immediate surroundings). It also held,applying the House of Lords’ decision inHarrow LBC v Qazi,16 that there was norelevant interference where someone losttheir home because it was tied to theiremployment or business which was itselfaffected by the Act.

Article 11 ECHR: engagement

The Court agreed with Adams that Article11 was not engaged. Although hunts couldno longer gather for the purpose of huntingwith dogs, they could meet for otherpurposes such as drag-hunting.

Article 1P1 ECHR: engagement andinterference

Article 1P1 prohibits governments fromdepriving people of their “possessions” orcontrolling their use, unless this is in thepublic interest. The claimants argued thattheir land, animals and inanimate objects andlivelihood all constituted “possessions” andthat there had been deprivation or control.

It was common ground that there wasinterference with some claimants’ physicalor real estate possessions, such that theGovernment had to provide justification.The Court thought that the interferenceconstituted mainly if not entirely control

15 [2004] SC CS 127.16 [2004] 1 AC 983.

rather than deprivation, which meant thatthere was unlikely to be a right tocompensation (there is none under the Act).It also held that loss of the opportunity toearn income (as opposed to the goodwill of abusiness) was not a “possession”.

Article 14 ECHR: engagement

The prohibition on discrimination in Article14 only applies if and to the extent that oneof the other articles is engaged. There is alist of prohibited types of discrimination,with a catchall “other status”. The Courtsaid that for the latter to apply a claimanthad to establish a relevant personalcharacteristic; there was none in the presentcircumstances. As was pointed out inAdams, any discrimination arising out of ahunting ban was “not between persons butbetween activities”.

EC claimants: engagement of articles of theTreaty establishing the European Community

The argument was that various articles inthe Treaty concerned with cross-bordereconomic activities were breached. Thesewere principally Articles 28 (free movementof goods) and 49 (services).

The EC claimants included Irish dealersselling horses and coursing greyhounds tothe UK, a person providing huntingholidays in the UK to EC visitors, aPortuguese national who has visited the UKfor hunting holidays and the owners of ahorse livery and hireling businesses withEC clientele.

Article 28: engagement

Article 28 prohibits “quantitative restrictionson imports and all measures havingequivalent effect … between MemberStates”. The Court said that there was nodispute that horses and greyhounds are“goods” within the Article.

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Applying the European Court of Justicedecision in Keck,17 the Court held that Article28 was not engaged, even though there was asufficient factual link between hunting and theexport of horses and greyhounds from Irelandto the UK. This was because the Act had nogreater impact on the cross-border trade thanon trade in the animals within the UK.

Article 49: engagement

Article 49 says in essence that a national of aMember State must be allowed to provideservices in other Member States. The Courtsaid that the provision of livery and hirelingservices, and offers of participation by hunts,fell within the Article (although it was unclearwhether recipients of cross-border servicescould also rely on it).

Justification and proportionality (ECHR andTreaty)

To the extent that Articles 8, 11, 1P1 and 14are engaged and there is prima facieinterference with the rights in question, thereis an escape clause for Contracting Partieson various specified grounds. Even wherethose grounds apply, the interference mustbe no greater than is necessary (theproportionality test). There are similar get-outs under the Treaty. For example, Article30 allows restrictions on imports and exportson the grounds (inter alia) of “publicmorality” and the “protection of the life andhealth of ... animals".

The claimants’ essential argument was thatthe Government could not justify a huntingban because there was insufficient scientificevidence, in relation to the various quarryspecies, that the use of dogs caused moresuffering than other methods of thepopulation control which was said to benecessary. They made much of the fact thatthe Government’s preferred solution hadbeen to register hunts if they could meet the

17 Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Criminalproceedings against Bernard Keck and DanielMithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097.

twin tests of utility (population control) andleast suffering, not the outright ban (subjectto exemptions) which Parliament enacted.They also argued that the exemptions regimecreated unjustifiable anomalies.

After considering some of the voluminousevidence, and in particular the report of theBurns Inquiry (which concluded thathunting with dogs “seriously compromisedthe welfare” of each quarry species), theCourt held that the Act had a legitimate aim,namely “preventing or reducing unnecessarysuffering to wild mammals, overlaid by amoral viewpoint that causing suffering toanimals for sport is unethical and should, sofar as is practical and proportionate, bestopped”. There was sufficient materialavailable to the House of Commons for it toconclude that hunting is cruel, and morecruel than alternative methods of populationcontrol. The fact that the scientific evidencewas not conclusive did not matter. A banwas a proportionate response to theperceived mischief; and the allegedanomalies could be explained.

The Court concluded that whether to banhunting was “intrinsically a political judgmentand a matter of domestic social policy,incapable of measurement in any scientificallycalibrated scale, upon which the domesticlegislature had a wide margin of discretion”.The House of Commons had been entitled toreject the registration option.

Conclusion

Each of the claims was therefore dismissed in itsentirety. However, because of the importance ofthe issues raised, the Court granted permission toappeal on certain grounds.

Of course, should the House of Lordsdecide in the hunters’ favour in the othermain challenge to the Act – relating to theuse of the Parliament Act – human rightsand EC law arguments become irrelevant.The appeal in that case was heard in July.

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MEDIA WATCH

“When free trade trumps animalprotection” – to be published in the NewLaw Journal.David Thomas argues that animal protectionmust be given much greater importance ininternational trade law.

UK CASE LAW

Covance Laboratories Limited and CovanceLaboratories Incorporated v PETA EuropeLimited and others18

On 16 June 2005 an important judgment washanded down by Judge Peter Langan in theHigh Court of Justice (Leeds District Registry).

The background to the case is that in 2004 amember of PETA USA obtainedemployment with Covance Laboratories Ltd(“CL USA”) in its Primate ToxicologyDepartment. She filmed the treatment ofmonkeys, including monkeys being hit,choked, taunted and terrified (apparentlydeliberately) by employees. She made herfilm into a video, and also made detailedwritten records of the systems andprocedures used by CL USA. Her materialwas analyzed by lawyers and vets withinPETA USA, who concluded that CL USAwas committing serious breaches of federaland state legislation. On 17 May 2005PETA USA submitted complaints againstCL USA to various US bodies, and held apress conference to publicize these matters.Later the same day PETA Europe publicizedthem in Europe.

The following day, Judge Langan heard anapplication by the holding company of CLUSA for an injunction to prevent publicationof the video, which he granted. On 27 Mayand 10 June 2005 he heard submissions forthe continuation of the injunction until trial.It was asserted that PETA Europe receivedfilm material “knowing that it was secret,

18 Not yet published.

confidential and private to” CL USA, andthat PETA Europe knew that the materialwas taken and compiled in breach of theinvestigator’s obligations as an employee.The injunction was discharged, on thefollowing grounds.

The judge noted that an injunction whichwould prevent further publication wouldinterfere with the right to freedom ofexpression, a right guaranteed by Article 10of the European Convention for theProtection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms. Section 12 of theHuman Rights Act 1998 provides:

“(1) This section applies if a court isconsidering whether to grant any reliefwhich, if granted, might affect the exerciseof the Convention right to freedom ofexpression…

(3) No such relief is to be granted so as torestrain publication before trial unless thecourt is satisfied that the applicant is likelyto establish that publication should not beallowed…”

In addition, under Section 12(4), where theproceedings relate, inter alia, to journalisticmaterial (as in this case), the Act specifiesthat the court must also have regard to theextent to which it would be in the publicinterest for the material to be published.

Regarding the effect of Section 12(3), JudgeLangan applied the House of Lords decisionin Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee:19 “thegeneral approach should be that courts willbe exceedingly slow to make interimrestraint orders where the applicant has notsatisfied the court he will probably (‘morelikely than not’) succeed at the trial”. Healso applied the Court of Appeal’s judgmentin A v B plc,20 in which Woolf CJ stated:“the existence of a public interest inpublication strengthens the case for notgranting an injunction … the fact that the

19 [2005] 1 AC 253, 22.20 [2003] QB 195, 11.

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information is obtained as a result ofunlawful activities does not mean that itspublication should necessarily be restrainedby injunction on the grounds of breach ofconfidence…”

Concerning the merits of the case, the judgestated that the question of whether there wasan interest capable of being the subject of aclaim for confidentiality should not beallowed to be the subject of detailedargument at the interlocutory stage. Whetheror not the information in the video was of itsnature confidential could not be determinedwithout a debate on the authorities i.e., justsuch detailed argument. He stated that it wasimpossible to say that the issue was one inwhich CL USA was likely to succeed attrial. Nevertheless, assuming for thepurposes of the judgment that CL USAwould establish confidentiality, he statedthat even if that assumption was made “theeffect of doing so is far outweighed bymatters on which it is possible…to reachdefinite conclusions. I refer to the [defence]of public interest…” The existence of thisdefence made it highly unlikely that CLUSA would succeed at trial. Therefore, inaccordance with the abovementioned case-law, the injunction was discharged.

Judge Langan considered that concernthat laboratory animals should be treatedwith basic decency was a matter ofinterest to substantial sections of thepublic. In the present case, the holdingcompany of CL USA published an animalwelfare statement on its website that itwould treat animals with “respect” andwould follow “all applicable laws andregulations”. He said that a comparisonof what was said in the statement andwhat may be seen on the video was “acomparison between two differentworlds…If, as seems likely…the group ofwhich CL USA forms part has fostered amisleading impression, PETA Europe isentitled to correct it publicly.”

This ruling is greatly to be welcomed,establishing as it does that the public has a

legitimate interest in being informed aboutanimal abuse in laboratories.

Glyn (t/a Priors Farm Equine VeterinarySurgery) v McGarel-Groves and Others 21

In this case, the defendant (Mrs McGarel-Groves) was the effective claimant byreason of her counterclaim to the actualclaimant’s otherwise undisputed claim forveterinary fees. The claimant (Mr Glyn) andthe second Part 20 defendant (Mr Grandiere)were the effective defendants (bothveterinary surgeons). Mrs McGarel-Grovessought compensation from each of them inconnection with the death from laminitis ofher horse Anna (a dressage competitionhorse), allegedly caused by an overdose ofcortico-steroids.

Mr Glyn was the vet generally responsible forAnna. Mrs McGarel-Groves regarded him asresponsible for Anna’s health and if Anna wasto be seen by another vet, Mrs McGarel-Groves always wanted him to be in attendanceto ensure that Anna came to no harm.

In 2001, Anna’s trainer suggested to MrsMcGarel-Groves that she had an orthopaedicproblem and needed treatment with cortico-steroids. Mrs McGarel-Groves agreed, on thecondition that Mr Glyn would be inattendance to observe and ensure that Annawas treated properly. She was never warnedof the slight risk of laminitis thataccompanied treatment with cortico-steroids.

Mr Glyn did attend Anna’s treatment (by MrGrandiere), and watched as injections werecarried out. However, he stated that he didnot know what drugs were administered, norhow much. He stated that the decision tocarry out the injections “with all the attendantrisk” was a matter for Mr Grandiere giventhat he was the French Dressage TeamVeterinary Surgeon. He claimed that he wasnot present in any sort of supervisory role,and that rather he was present as an observer,and to provide a history.

21 [2005] EWHC 1629 (QB).

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It was held, however, that, having regard to thewording of Mr Glyn’s invoice for the day inquestion, he was much more involved in thedecision-making as to the nature of thetreatment to be given than he claimed.Moreover, it was clear from Mr Glyn’s ownevidence that his duty to observe gave rise to afurther duty to intervene to protect Anna if theproposed or actual treatment was in any wayinappropriate. He rendered himself unable tojudge whether the treatment was inappropriateby failing to ask what drugs were beinginjected or the dosage, and was therefore inbreach of this duty.

Regarding Mr Grandiere, the judge foundthat there was no clinical justification for thetreatment administered, and that he wastherefore negligent. He should also havewarned Mrs McGarel-Groves of the risk thetreatment entailed.

Responsibility for Mrs McGarel-Groves’loss was apportioned between Mr Grandiereand Mr Glyn on an 85:15 basis.

Culling of non-native species

Bridget MartinSenior lecturer in law, University ofLancashire

Alien species, more correctly identified asnon-native species, have been around forcenturies. Indeed, it would not beinaccurate to state that much of ourcommon wildlife falls into this category.Mammals such as rabbits, grey squirrelsand fallow and muntjac deer have all beenintroduced into Great Britain at varioustimes. Currently, for a number of reasons,some non-native species are a major causeof concern.

Non-native species that become invasivewill almost always raise concern as theymay then cause problems which can bevery serious. For example, coypus farmedfor their fur in the last century escaped orwere deliberately released into the wild

where they cause massive damage.Because of this, it was decided that theyshould be totally eradicated, which tooktwo attempts over several years to achieve.A more recent example is that of theAmerican bullfrog, a species imported intoGreat Britain as tadpoles to provide aninteresting addition to garden ponds.Again there were escapes into the wild andfurther importation was banned in 1997.This article will use three case studies toillustrate different problems posed by alienspecies that have become invasive, andhighlight the ethical dilemmas that arisewhen sentient creatures have to becontrolled, in part because of the need tofulfil our legal obligations on biodiversityand conservation.

The first case study will examine the ruddyduck, an alien species that does not causeproblems in Great Britain but presents sucha threat to a critically endangered Spanishspecies that it is planned to eradicate thebirds entirely from this country as well asany that have made their way to Europe.

The ruddy duck

A North-American species, ruddy duckswere originally imported into Great Britainby the Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust, to theircentre at Slimbridge from which, allegedly,three of the ducks escaped to produce, by2000, an estimated 5,000 birds in the wild.There they do no harm as they have foundand filled an ecological niche.

However, most years, a few ruddy ducks flyto Spain where they may come into contactwith the white-headed duck, a criticallyendangered species teetering on the edge ofextinction. Mating may take place,producing hybrids, some of which will befertile because of the close geneticrelationship between the two species.

The United Nations Convention onBiological Diversity22 requires the white-

22 Entered into force on 29 December 1993.

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headed duck to be saved from extinction andthat includes maintaining its genetic purity.Furthermore, the white-headed duck is listedas a “priority species” under the HabitatsDirective,23 that is, a species for theconservation of which the EuropeanCommunity has particular responsibility

To quote the Department for theEnvironment, Food and Rural Affairs(DEFRA): “Without control, ruddy ducksare … expected to colonise continentalEurope and threaten the white-headedduck with extinction, throughhybridisation and competition”.24

Therefore Birdlife International preparedan action plan, in line with the Council ofEurope Convention on the Conservation ofEuropean Wildlife and Natural Habitats25

and endorsed by the EuropeanCommission, which “highlights the needfor control, and ultimately eradication, ofboth wild and captive populations of ruddyducks (particularly the UK sourcepopulation)”.26 The Wildfowl andWetlands Trust and the Royal Society forthe Protection of Birds (RSPB) state thatthe cull must go ahead.27 Other experts,such as Professor Christopher Smart of theCentre of Environmental History at St.Andrews University, argue that there isnothing wrong with hybridisation, hybridsbeing “the raw stuff of evolution”.28

The cull is going ahead. DEFRA hasissued licences “to kill, or take ruddyducks ... including the taking ordestruction of their eggs”.29 The licenceshave been granted because of the need to

23 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992on the conservation of natural habitats and ofwild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7.24 “Review of non-native species policy”, reportof a DEFRA Working Group, 2003, p. 76.25 Entered into force on 1 June 1982.26 See footnote 24.27 Marren, P., “A question of breeding”, DailyTelegraph, 22 March 2003.28 Ibid.29 Under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981,Article 16, licence number WLF100106.

conserve flora and fauna.30 Authorisedpersons can carry out the killing whichmust be done quickly and humanely anddetailed records must be submitted toDEFRA so that essential details of theoperation are collated and on record.31

Is this a rather extreme solution to aproblem that could arguably be solved inless destructive ways? The birds aredifficult targets, hard to kill, and thekilling can cause much disturbance whichis something that can in itself be illegal incertain circumstances.32

The second case study poses an entirelydifferent set of problems. In this instance,the alien species is the hedgehog.

The hedgehogs in the Outer Hebrides

It is a matter of record that between 1974and 1975 seven hedgehogs33 wereintroduced onto the Uist Islands in the OuterHebrides to catch slugs. However, thehedgehogs also ate the eggs of waders andother ground-nesting birds, some rare andendangered, found in internationallyimportant breeding colonies on the islands.Under normal circumstances this wouldprobably not have mattered, however on theUist Islands hedgehogs are an alien speciesand, because there are no natural predatorsthere, there has in effect been a hedgehogpopulation explosion.

Because of the important implications forbiodiversity, the Uist Wader Project wascreated and, after at least a year ofnegotiations, in 2001 it was agreed byScottish National Heritage, the RSPB and

30 The purpose for which the licence is granted.31 Under the terms and conditions of the licence.32 See, for example, Council Directive79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservationof wild birds, OJ L 103, 25.4.1979, p. 1, Article4(4).33See footnote 24, p. 59. Seven hedgehogs wererecorded but there could have been other,unrecorded, introductions.

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the Scottish Executive that the hedgehogsshould be totally eradicated from theislands.34 Since then, an intractable disputehas arisen about how this should beachieved. The members of the Uist WaderProject have spent some three years trying todevise solutions other than culling theanimals and have not come up with ananswer, save that relocation is not an option.On the other side, various hedgehogsgroups, The Peoples’ Trust for EndangeredSpecies and the European HedgehogResearch Group are firmly convinced thatrelocation is the correct answer.

The cull began in spring 2002, on NorthUist where the hedgehogs were killed bylethal injection after they had been locatedusing a spot lamp. No licence wasnecessary to authorise the killing becausehedgehogs are not included in Schedule 5(“rare animals”) of the Wildlife andCountryside Act 1981 and are thereforenot protected. By 2005, there wereapparently so few animals left that thetactics had to be changed and it has nowbeen decided that there will be an autumncull in addition to the spring cull and thatit will be carried out under the provisionsof the Protection of Wild Mammals(Scotland) Act 2002 which entails flushingout the hedgehogs with dogs then shootingthem.35 Although the end result is thesame, this method of killing is even lessacceptable than lethal injections. Indeed,Scottish National Heritage did havediscussions with the Scottish Executive tosee whether there was a possiblealternative to shooting, without success.

The final case study provides aninteresting comparison with both theothers. The American mink is a savagepredator that causes problems on bothmainland Britain and some Scottishislands, the Hebrides in particular.

34 Information given to the author by ScottishNational Heritage.35 Section 2(1).

The American mink

Like the coypus, the American mink wasimported into this country to be farmed forits fur and, again, some of the animalsescaped or were deliberately released. Inthe wild they flourished and haveestablished a feral population throughoutmost of Great Britain. They are verysuccessful hunters, killing birds and smallanimals, in particular the water vole.

The Convention on Biological Diversityrequires the water vole to be protected andthe Government’s Biodiversity ActionPlan for Water Vole “encourages humanecontrol of mink where they pose athreat”.36 Water vole numbers havedeclined dramatically in recent years andthey have become so endangered that thereare now a number of breeding andreintroduction programmes in place. If,however, vole numbers are to recover,they will need some protection from, interalia, American mink.

At present, Government policy aims for localsuppression rather than complete eradicationand it is for landowners and occupiers todecide whether or not they want to take actionagainst mink on their land. Where thishappens, the animals are live-trapped andhumanely destroyed by lethal injection.37

However, there is also the Hebridean MinkProject,38 a pilot project the idea behind whichis that, eventually, there will be totaleradication of the animals on the Hebrides asthey are home to such important breedingcolonies of birds. Again, the culling method islive-trapping and lethal injection.39

Interestingly, the legislation banning huntingwith dogs does make provision for mink stillto be hunted, flushed out by dogs then shot.40

36 Briefing paper given to the author by DEFRA.37 Ibid.38 Information given to the author by ScottishNational Heritage.39 Ibid.40 See, for example, Protection of WildMammals (Scotland) Act 2002, Section 2(3).

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In recent years, mink numbers have begunto decline in some areas and researchsuggests that in part this is due to anincreasing population of otters, twocommentators stating: “otters havepermanently suppressed mink populationgrowth”.41 This is indeed a welcomefinding because there is little or no needfor human intervention where a nativespecies holds an alien population in check.

Conclusion

It will now be obvious that, in somesituations, the presence of alien speciescan give rise to acute ethical dilemmas. Inthe examples given the alien species wereintroduced by human beings. In each case,they are a threat to biodiversity.

There are circumstances where arguablyculling is a necessary evil both to complywith the law and with the need to retainbiodiversity. However, where the target ofthe cull is a sentient creature, surelyculling should be used as the last resort,and alternative solutions sought. Indeed,sometimes it is hard to accept that all otherpossibilities have been thoroughlyexplored and rejected. For example, whilefew would consider relocating mink, itdoes seem unfortunate that there is somuch dissension about relocatinghedgehogs, whose numbers are decliningon the mainland,42 where other species arebeing re-introduced. In this area there areno easy answers.

41 Bonesi, L. and MacDonald, D., “Otters versusmink”, Mammals UK, winter 2005, p.7.42 A survey being conducted by the MammalsTrust UK and Royal Holloway, University ofLondon, which is now in its fifth year, indicatesthat regionally, hedgehog numbers are falling,although the survey needs to run for about tenyears to properly establish long-term trends. Anearlier study carried out in 1991 when comparedwith a similar study carried out in 2001 showeddeclines of up to 50% in some areas.

Import of dog and cat fur to the EU

Christine OrrSolicitor

Millions of dogs and cats are killed eachyear for their fur in Asia, principally inChina. A 1998 investigation by theHumane Society of the United States(HSUS) and investigative journalistManfred Karreman revealed the inhumanityof the living conditions of these animalsand the methods of slaughter. In China,large numbers of dogs, including puppiesunder six months old, were kept in dark,windowless and bitterly cold sheds, chainedby thin metal wires. Methods of slaughterincluded tying dogs tightly around the neckand then stabbing them, after which theywere skinned, often while still alive. Catswere hung from wires while water waspoured down their throats through a hoseuntil they drowned. A subsequentinvestigation by Care for the WildInternational, again in China, revealedworkers in fur farms attempting to stunanimals by repeatedly slamming themagainst the ground then beating their headswith clubs, after which they were skinned,again often still alive.43

The HSUS investigation led to a ban on theimport and export of dog and cat fur in theUS. After further investigations revealeddog and cat fur on sale in several EUcountries, five of these countries (Belgium(temporary ban), Denmark, Italy, Franceand Greece) also introduced various bans.Despite these bans, the EU has become themajor market for dog and cat fur since theUS ban. Traders in China have stated thatdog and cat fur is produced for the West.

The import of dog and cat fur is legal in theUK. Trade statistics separately identifyimports of fur from 12 named animal species.However, 66 tonnes of “other fur” (thecategory into which dog and cat fur falls)

43 For further information on the trade, seewww.voice4dogs.org.

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is also imported into the UK each year. Asthe 12 named species cover almost everyanimal used to make fur products, it seemsvery likely that the majority of “other fur”comes from dogs and cats. As few peoplewould be willing to buy items made fromdog and cat fur, it is generally not labeled assuch. Instead it is labeled as “fake fur”, witha made-up name such as “Gaewolf”, or notlabeled at all. A Newsnight investigationrevealed a member of the British Fur TradeAssociation who said he would be willing toimport this fur and label it misleadingly.

The Department of Trade and Industry statedin July 2003 that it would be willing to ban theimport of this fur if it obtained “hardevidence” that it was on the sale in the UK,which had not so far been produced. It gave asthe reason for its inability to otherwise supporta ban that “the Government’s better regulationagenda requires practical and proportionateevidence-based action”. In January 2005 itupdated Parliament on this issue and statedthat as there was still no evidence of domesticdog and cat fur on sale in the UK theGovernment’s position remained the same.44 45

It may be argued, however, that a ban shouldbe enacted as a preventative measure, andbecause a moral position should be taken. TheUK government should also put pressure onthe EU to adopt a ban, especially as it hasargued that action would be more effective iftaken at EU level.46

In December 1993 MEP Struan Stevensontabled a European Parliament WrittenDeclaration which called on the EuropeanCommission to “draft a regulation … to banthe import, export, sale and production of catand dog fur”,47 which was signed by 346

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45 It also stated in 2005 that mass spectrometrywas now able to identify domestic dog and catfur, although a question mark remained overchemically-treated fur. This makes theimposition of a ban practicable.46 See footnote 44.47 Written declaration 17/2003. Concurrently, amajority of the Council of Agriculture Ministersalso called for a ban.

MEPs. This should have compelled theCommission to act, but it claimed to lack thelegal power and that this was a matter whichshould be handled by national governments.However, a legal opinion produced last yearby UK barristers Philippe Sands QC and KateCook,48 both experts in European law,challenges this view.

In summary, the opinion provides:

There is a good argument thatArticle 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No1774/200249 already provides abasis for the EU to adopt rules toregulate the import and export ofdog and cat fur.The EU has competence underArticle 95 of the Treaty establishingthe European Community to adopt aban on the production and salewithin the EU of dog and cat fur onthe basis that such a measure isnecessary to remove an obstacle tothe functioning of the internalmarket. A measure adopted underArticle 95 must, under the Protocolon protection and welfare of animalsannexed to the Treaty, take accountof animal welfare.The EU also has competence to banthe import and export of fur underArticle 133 of the Treaty, and (on apreliminary view) such a ban wouldbe compliant with World TradeOrganisation rules.

In view of the above, there is arguably noreason for the Commission to postpone anylonger the adoption of a proposal for a ban.Indeed, it should act urgently given the horrificnature of the trade and the expressed view ofthe Parliament.

48 For HSUS and Respect for Animals, April2004.49 Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 of theEuropean Parliament and of the council of 3October 2002 laying down health rulesconcerning animal by-products not intended forhuman consumption, OJ L 273, 10.10.2002, p. 1.

•

•

•

See www.dti.gov.uk/ewt/catdogfur.htm.

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What is ALAW?

ALAW is an organisation of lawyers interested in animal protection law. We see our role aspioneering a better legal framework for animals and ensuring that the existing law is appliedproperly.

We believe that lawyers should, as well as interpreting laws, ask questions about the philosophyunderlying them: they have always had a central role in law reform. There is also a real need toeducate professionals and public alike about the law.

Animal cruelty, of course, does not recognize national boundaries and we are building up anetwork of lawyers who are interested in animal protection in many different countries.

What ALAW will do

ALAW will:• take part in consultations and monitor developments in Parliament and in European and

other relevant international institutions,• highlight areas of animal welfare law in need of reform,• disseminate information about animal welfare law, including through articles, conferences,

training and encouraging the establishment of tertiary courses,• through its members provide advice to NGOs and take appropriate test cases,• provide mutual support and information exchange for lawyers engaged in animal protection

law.

Who can be a member?

Solicitors, trainee solicitors, legal executives, barristers, pupil barristers, judges and legalacademics are eligible to join and will receive regular issues of the Journal of AnimalWelfare Law. Other interested parties can become subscribers to the Journal and receiveinformation about conferences and training courses. Membership fees: UK and EU –

How can you help?

Apart from animal protection law itself, expertise in many other areas is important – for example,public law, civil liberties, environmental health, planning law, freedom of information, civillitigation, media law, company law, charity law and many others.

In addition, lawyers have well-developed general skills such as advocacy and drafting which will beuseful in myriad ways. Help with articles and training will also be welcome.

How to contact us

Visit us at www.alaw.org.uk, email info@alaw.org.uk or write to PO Box 67, Ellesmere,Shropshire SY12 9WZ

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