On Keenan's Definition of "Subject Of"Author(s): David E. JohnsonReviewed work(s):Source: Linguistic Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 673-692Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4178012 .Accessed: 30/03/2012 09:42

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Linguistic Inquiry.

http://www.jstor.org

Linguistic Inquiry Volume 8 Number 4 )Fall, 1977) 673-692.

Remarks and Replies

On Keenan's Definition of "Subject Of" David E. Johnson

1. Introductory Remarks'

Keenan (1974; 1976), hereafter K, has attempted to provide a definition of the notion ''subject of" (SUBJ) "which would be universally valid in the sense that it would allow us to identify subjects of arbitrary sentences from arbitrary languages" (1976, 332).2 K claims that his proposal, "while cumbersome, does nonetheless allow us to verify many universal generalizations stated in terms of that notion (SUBJ/DEJ)" (p. 332). In this article, I will examine K's proposal in detail and will argue that it is fundamentally inadequate in a number of crucial respects.

K's definition is of considerable interest for at least the following reasons. First, it has become increasingly apparent in recent years that grammatical relations such as SUBJ play a central role in syntax (cf. Chung (1976); Johnson (1974a,b; to appear); Johnson and Postal (in preparation); Perlmutter and Postal (1974); Postal (1976; 1977)). Hence, any proposed definition of a "major" grammatical relation should be looked at carefully, since its impact on linguistic theory could be quite far reaching. Second, in my estimation, there is sufficient reason for rejecting Chomsky's (1965) categorial definitions of the "basic" grammatical relations (e.g. the definition of SUBJ as the relation [NP, SI, defined as holding between a string A dominated by an NP, NPA, and a string B dominated by an S node, SB, in any phrase structure configuration [SB X NPA

Y], such that NPA is the only NP directly dominated by SB). Moreover, K's proposal aside, there has been, to the best of my knowledge, no other, potentially viable

Copyright (C) 1977 by David E. Johnson lI would like to thank Paul Postal for valuable discussion on this topic in general and on this article in

particular. This article has also benefited substantially from insightful comments on an earlier draft by George Lakoff, Jerry Morgan, Geoff Pullum, and Sue Schmerling, as well as the LI readers, to all of whom I am grateful. Research for this article was supported in part by a Fellowship for Independent Study and Research (#F77-77) from the National Endowment for the Humanities, to whom I am also grateful.

Abbreviations used, but not explained, in the text are: abs = absolutive, cm = case marker, erg ergative, nc = noun class, perf = perfective, prt = particle.

2 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, page references are to Keenan (1976).

674 REMARKS AND REPLIES

proposal for defining any grammatical relation. Third, based on considerations such as the ones above, proponents of relational grammar (RG) posit grammatical relations as primitives (cf. Johnson (1974b; 1977); Johnson and Postal (in preparation); Perlmutter and Postal (1974; 1977)).3 If K's definition were successful, then this basic characteris- tic of RG would be partially undermined. On the other hand, if his definition were to fail, then this would indirectly support the RG view that such relations cannot be satisfactorily reduced to more basic, independently needed constructs.

Before appraising K's definition, I present his expression of his motivation for developing an adequate definition of SUBJ. This statement is, as it turns out, important for a reasonably comprehensive evaluation of his proposal.

(1) Such a definition is needed in universal grammar in order for the many universal generalizations which use this notion to be well defined. For example: 1. Accessibility Hierarchy (Keenan and Comrie, 1972): NPs on the upper end of

the AH, given below, are universally easier to relativize than those on the lower end. Thus some languages (Ls) have relative clause forming strategies which apply only to subjects; other Ls have strategies which apply only to subjects and direct objects, others have ones which apply only to the top three positions on the AH, etc.

Subj > Dir Obj > Ind Obj > Obl > Gen > Obj of Comp 2. Functional Succession Principle (Perlmutter and Postal, 1974): If one NP can be

raised out of another then it assumes the grammatical relation (subject of, direct object of, etc.) previously borne by the other.

3. Advancement Continuity Principle (Johnson, 1974c; Trithart, 1975; Keenan, 1975a): If a L can advance (e.g., via operations like Passive) NPs low on the AH to subject then it can advance all intermediate positions to subject. Thus if a L has a locative voice (e.g., the school was seen Mary at by John) then it necessarily has a direct object (= Passive) voice.

Clearly generalizations like 1-3 determine constraints on the form, and substance, of possible human languages. But to verify them and determine their universality it is necessary to be able to identify subjects, direct objects, etc., in a principled way across Ls. If we use different criteria to identify subjects in different Ls then "subject" is simply not a universal category and apparently universal generaliza- tions stated in terms of that notion are not generalizations at all. In addition, absence of identifying criteria for subjects, etc. makes verification of putative universals like 1-3 difficult. Counterexamples can be rationalized away by merely saying that an offending NP is not "really" a subject, etc. Finally the claim that we have primitive intuitions concerning which NPs are subjects founders, like all arguments from intuition, when the intuitions of different individuals do not agree. (p. 305)

3Circa 1972-1973, a number of independent observations by B. Comrie, E. Keenan, J. Morgan, D. Perlmutter, P. Postal, and J. Ross sparked a renewed awareness in the linguistic community that grammatical relations play a fundamental role in syntax. In 1973, Perlmutter and Postal, in lectures and unpublished work, first proposed and presented arguments that transformational grammar should be replaced by a theory of relational grammar.

REMARKS AND REPLIES

2. Evaluation of Keenan's Method

2.1. The Method

K presents a rather complex procedure for defining SUBJ, which I shall briefly outline.

(2) a. Define the notion "basic sentence (b-sentence)". They are ". . . roughly the ,simplest' sentences syntactically" (p. 309).

b. Establish a universal list of properties that are, in a wide range of languages, associated with NPs of b-sentences that are clearly felt pretheoretically to be SUBJs (called "b-SUBJs"). This list is called the Subjects Properties List (SPL).

c. B-SUBJs of arbitrary L are then defined to be any NPs of b-sentences of L that exhibit a "clear preponderance" of the properties on the universal SPL.

d. Given the determination of b-SUBJ for a particular L, establish a more inclusive list of properties associated with b-SUBJs of L, SPL'. Note that SPL' might very well contain any number of properties idiosyncratic to b-SUBJs in L, e.g. specific case marking or word order properties.

e. SUBJs of nonbasic sentences in L are defined to be "those NPs, if any, which present a clear preponderance of the properties characteristic of b-SUBJ [i.e. properties on the SPL'/DEJ]" (p. 309).

2.2. Keenan's Notion of "Basic Sentence"

It is important to notice that "b-sentence" is used in (2) in two very distinct ways: (a) as a one-time-only step in establishing the SPL component of the definition, (2b), and (b) as an actual component of the definition, used in each application, in conjunction with the SPL, to determine b-SUBJs in particular Ls and, hence, used indirectly in generating the "beefed-up", language particular SPL', (2c). In the first role, the construct plays no part in the actual statement of the definition and is, therefore, basically immune to criticism. This is so since nothing crucial rests on the method K chose to set up the SPL initially. One is only concerned with the resultant formal statement, that is, whether it is consistent, explicit, well-defined, empirically adequate, etc. In the second role, however, "b-sentence" is part of the generative mechanism that specifies b-SUBJs and SPL's in particular Ls. As such, if it is determined to be unacceptable, then the entire enterprise must be judged unsatisfactory. K's definition of "b-sentence" is as follows (p. 307):

(3) For any L, a. a syntactic structure x is semantically more basic than a syntactic structure y if, and

only if, the meaning of y depends on that of x. That is, to understand the meaning of y it is necessary to understand the meaning of x.

b. a sentence in L is a basic sentence (in L) if, and only if, no (other) complete sentence in L is more basic than it.

Now, from the viewpoint of "b-sentence" as a formal component of the actual definition, it is unacceptable. The main problem is that it relies on such notoriously vague and intuition-bound notions as "understand" and "the meaning of y depends on

676 REMARKS AND REPLIES

that of x". It is crucial here to note that the auxiliary concept of "clear cases" is of no avail. This concept is only appropriate to the notion "b-sentence" in the first role discussed above. As part of a generative mechanism embedded in universal grammar, this definition must meet the quite reasonable standard of being explicit, i.e. intuition free. Acceptance of (3) would be every bit as objectionable as allowing grammatical rules to be imprecise; that is, as objectionable as, for example, permitting the conditions of application and the structural change of a given rule to vary according to particular intuitions of individuals.

Besides the objection of vagueness, (3) presents other problems. For example, as far as I can tell, (3) has the unfortunate consequence that any paraphrase of a given sentence S is more basic than S. Suppose that sentence S, has meaning M1 and paraphrase S2, which also has meaning M1. Then, to understand the meaning of S, it is necessary to understand the meaning of S2 (and vice versa). As a result, e.g., John caused Max to become not alive (S2) is more basic than John killed Max (S,). But this seems to fail to provide K with his intended result, namely, the specification of the "simplest sentences syntactically". Or consider the following "chain" of progressively more basic sentences: John killed Max - Max died - Max came to be not alive - Max was an animate object - Max was an object - Max occupied a portion of the physical universe at a particular stretch of time - . . . As the above sentences illustrate, it seems that K's concept of "sentence basicness" does not correlate in any straightfor- ward way with "syntactic simplicity". Finally, it should be stressed that the notion "syntactic simplicity" is itself not well-defined.

It would be a simple matter to dispense with the notion of b-sentence as an aid in setting up the SPL. But it is not a simple matter to remove it from the actual definition of SUBJ itself. Thus, it can be concluded that (3) alone provides sufficient reason for rejecting K's definition of SUBJ.

2.3. Lack of Necessary and Sufficient Criteria

K observes (p. 312):

Furthermore, we have not been able to isolate any combination of the b-subject properties which is both necessary and sufficient for an NP in any sentence in any L to be the subject of that sentence. Certainly no one of the properties is both necessary and sufficient . . . Consequently, we must have recourse to a somewhat weaker notion of definition. We shall say that an NP in a b-sentence (in any L) is a subject of that sentence to the extent that it has the properties in the properties list below. If one NP in the sentence has a clear preponderance of the subject properties then it will be called the subject of the sentence. On this type of definition then subjects of some b-sentences can be more subject-like than the subjects of others in the sense that they present a fuller complement of the subject properties.

Failing to find necessary and sufficient defining criteria does not lead K to conclude that the SPL fails as the foundation of an acceptable definition. Rather he goes on to

REMARKS AND REPLIES

claim, implicitly, that although there is no specific set of necessary and sufficient defining criteria, there does exist a higher level, general criterion of "clear preponder- ance" (CP), which, given an arbitrary clause in an arbitrary language, will pick out a necessary and sufficient set of properties for that clause and language. But what reason is there to believe that this approach will work? It would be one thing if no one property were necessary and no one property sufficient as long as one could argue that, in some specifiable combination, these properties provide necessary and sufficient criteria. But the compounding of inadequate (contingent) criteria by some vague formula does not guarantee a valid result.

Clearly the success or failure of such a definition rests largely on the adequacy of the notion CP. Hence, CP must be independently well supported for the definition to have a chance of being acceptable. The most direct way to provide support for the notion CP would be to illustrate in detail how it picks out the desired NP in a large variety of cases. If its utility could be demonstrated, then one might be inclined to feel that the notion has some initial plausibility. Unfortunately, K does not provide the all- important, empirical basis needed to support the final statement of his definition.

Problems with the notion CP do not end with the mere omission of supporting examples. Upon inspection, it is not clear exactly what this construct refers to. I can think of at least two interpretations, which are subject to different problems. On the "'absolute" reading, this phrase would mean that for an NP to be a b-SUBJ it must have at least a majority of the properties on the SPL, i.e. at least 16 properties. On the "relative" reading, the phrase would mean that for an NP to be a SUBJ it must have more of the SUBJ properties than any other NP in its clause. (There are, of course, other possibilities. For example, one could require that an NP have a minimum number of properties, say 9, and be in the majority relative to other NPs.) K (1974, 4) was more explicit in this regard. To quote: "An NP is subject of a b-sentence to the extent that it possesses the subject properties on the SPL. The subject of a sentence will be that NP which possesses a solid preponderance of the subject properties relative to other NP in the sentence" (final emphasis added/DEJ).

The relative interpretation runs into the following serious problem. If an NP merely needs more properties than any other NP in its clause to be, e.g., a b-SUBJ, then the definition would allow the case in which SUBJs in a language J are defined by a subset S of the SPL and SUBJs of some distinct language M are defined by another subset T of the SPL, where S and T are disjoint. That is, totally different criteria could be used in the definition of SUBJ in J and M, ignoring the trivial and irrelevant fact that all the properties share the distinction of occurring on the same "'universal" list. The reason that this could happen is that, since none of the properties is necessary, S might contain, for example, properties 1-15 and T properties 16-30. Within J an NP that had 13 properties from S, while its competitors had only 2 or 3, would still be ""the SUBJ". A similar situation could hold in M with subset T. But one of K's main assumptions is that "if we use different criteria to identify subjects in different Ls then 'subject' is

678 REMARKS AND REPLIES

simply not a universal category and apparently universal generalizations stated in terms of that notion are not generalizations at all" (p. 305). Thus, the relative interpretation is, apparently, inconsistent with K's assumption concerning the need to use the same defining criteria in every language and, presumably, is not the proper interpretation of CP as used in the revised (1976) version.4'5

An examination of the absolute interpretation also leads to serious problems. If a given NP must have a majority of the SUBJ properties to be, e.g., a b-SUBJ, then, in this case, it is true that there would be at least one property shared by any pair of b- SUBJs. Thus, one might claim that under this interpretation the same criteria are used. However, this would be a very weak and peculiar use of the phrase, since there would be no guarantee that any set of three or more SUBJs would share a unique property. This all leads back, of course, to the fundamental weakness that there is no group of properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for an NP to be a SUBJ. That is, there are no universally valid defining criteria on the SPL.

Besides the objection to the equivocation on the phrase "same criteria", there is the further criticism that the absolute requirement is simply too strong, that is, it would wrongly fail to recognize a number of NPs as SUBJs. Thus, for example, K accepts "weather sentences" such as It is raining as basic, but it appears that it in such expressions would not be picked out as SUBJ. This follows since it does not, apparently, have a majority of the SUBJ properties. As far as I can determine, it in such sentences would have at most four of the properties listed in K (1976): 3.4.4 (deletion across coordinate conjunctions); 3.12 (leftmost in sentence); 3.16 (undergoes raising); D (immediately dominated by S node). In general, it would appear that idiom chunk, dummy, and sentential SUBJs go unrecognized when the absolute requirement is applied. Specific examples in which it is not clear that the absolute requirement would succeed include There is a chicken in your suitcase, Who was worshipped by the Mayans for 350 years?, The cat has her tongue, No one is loved by her, and That the world is oblate proves that Columbus was right. Summing up, it appears that the two most natural interpretations of CP lead to unsatisfactory results. The crucial role that CP plays in the statement of the definition and the seriousness of its attendant problems would alone, I think, force one to reject K's proposal.

Let us step back from the foregoing problems and consider some other aspects of the definition. K essentially assumes that there are two lists: (A) a universals list (UL), partially represented in (1), on which there are universals that refer to SUBJ, among other grammatical relations, and (B) the SPL, on which there appear various pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic properties to be used in defining SUBJ1 within universal grammar. The lists suffer from the problem that they are to a large extent arbitrary.

4 Mutatis mutandis, this argument carries over to different sentences in a single language. 5 One might reply that the "same criteria" is the notion of CP. But this reduces the notion of "same

criteria" to vacuity. To see this, consider two disjoint sets of properties, P, and P2, characterizing two classes of objects, say, unicorns and bananas. Construct a third list that is the union of P1 and P2. Then the CP formula would evidently pick out bananas and unicorns as a "natural class".

REMARKS AND REPLIES

Elements on the SPL could just as well occur on the UL and vice versa. For example, the SPL contains the following property: "The NPs which control verb agreement, if any, include b-subjects" (p. 316). One could argue that this generalization should appear on the UL ("verbs agree with SUBJs if they agree at all"). In fact, this would be a theorem, given a generalized Continuity Principle that covers verb agreement and the Perlmutter-Postal principle that only terms can trigger verb agreement.6 These univer- sals could be indirectly justified by showing that SUBJs, defined independently of verb agreement, conform to the theorem. Or, arguing the other way, the Keenan-Comrie generalization concerning which NPs are universally easier to relativize, (1.1), could appear on the SPL rather than on the UL, etc. In fact the following property is listed on the SPL: "NPs which can be relativized, questioned, and cleft include b-subjects" (p. 320). But this makes the definition circular: the relativization universal appeals to SUBJ, which in turn is defined in part by an appeal to the universal concerning relativization-thus assuming what is to be justified. Many of the other syntactic criteria are also very suspect in this regard; for example, "subjects are the most natural targets of 'advancement' transformations. E.g., Passive in English advances direct object to subject" (p. 319); "NPs which can be coreferentially deleted in sentence complements when coreferential with matrix NPs always include subjects" (p. 316).

The major point here is that, in order to avoid circularity, a number of syntactic properties (and, perhaps, certain semantic and pragmatic ones as well) would have to be taken off the SPL. The exact number would depend on various assumptions as to what properties make crucial use of grammatical relations. Because it is not clear, especially independently of a particular theory of grammar, exactly which syntactic properties must or should be dropped from the list, it is impossible to judge the impact of this revision precisely. However, in the most extreme case, there would be virtually no significant syntactic properties left on the SPL, and SUBJ would be defined essentially in terms of semantic and pragmatic criteria. This, however, would fail, as reflection on the properties of dummies and idiom chunks quickly reveals. For example, in It seems to be raining in Poughkeepsie, it should be picked out as SUBJ of seems, yet it appears to have no relevant semantic or pragmatic properties, let alone a CP of them. Moreover, in most current theories with intermediate grammatical stages, there would be, in general, no semantic or pragmatic properties associated with intermediate stage NPs. Thus, intermediate stages would not, given the above revision, have SUBJs. Since there is good evidence for intermediate stages, it appears that a

6 In Johnson (1977), I attempted to generalize the Advancement Continuity Principle (cf. (1.1)) to cover all rules that refer to grammatical relations. The facts are somewhat complicated since, inter alia, various rules can have "upper bounds"; for example, Tough Movement applies to non-SUBJs but not to SUBJs. If we oversimplify matters by ignoring such rules, then a generalized Continuity Principle, what I have called the Continuous Segment Principle, can be roughly stated as follows: For any grammatical process P (of type T), if P can apply to some term B on the relational hierarchy (SUBJ < direct object < indirect object < oblique object) in a language, then P can apply to A on the relational hierarchy, provided A < B. Given the Continuous Segment Principle and the Perlmutter-Postal Verb Agreement Law (only terms can trigger verbal agreement), it follows immediately that if any NP can trigger agreement in some language, then SUBJs can.

680 REMARKS AND REPLIES

predominantly nonsyntactic approach would fail to define SUBJ in a significant class of cases. In my view, this is a disastrous consequence.

Furthermore, K is apparently assuming as well understood and in little need of clarification a number of linguistic concepts that many linguists feel are extremely ill understood and in great need of explication and/or justification. Examples include: reflexivization, semantic roles or cases (agent, patient, etc.), presupposition, quantifi- cation and scope, metaphor, idiom, and topic. It is quite generally assumed that it is a major responsibility of linguistic theory to provide a precise, empirically adequate formulation of these concepts. Such notions are not the type of thing that should be built into a definition, since a definition is only as clear as the basic concepts that enter into its description. In contrast to this state of affairs, consider the Chomskyan definition of SUBJ. It makes use of several primitive notions such as "dominates", NP, S, etc., which can, at least within the theory of transformational grammar, be considered relatively well understood and, therefore, proper input to a definition.7

The fact that no combination of properties has been found to provide necessary and sufficient defining criteria for subjecthood is, I believe, a very significant finding in itself. Given the broad scope of K's energetic study, this failure, it seems to me, firmly supports the RG view that grammatical relations are not to be defined in terms of more basic notions, but rather are themselves appropriately considered to be primitive constructs. 89

2.4. The Promotion-to-Subject Hierarchy

K's conception of SUBJ leads him to set up the following Promotion-to-Subject Hierarchy (PSH):

(4) Coding Properties (position, case, agreement) > Behavior and Control Proper-

7I would like to stress the point that although Chomsky's definition is, a priori, perfectly reasonable (that is, it is neither circular nor equivocal, and makes use of relatively well understood notions), it is, in my opinion, still inadequate for empirical reasons (cf. Johnson (1974b), Keenan (1974; 1976)).

8 It is my feeling that even if there appeared to be a certain amount of evidence that the SPL and the CP formula worked in a variety of cases, the whole idea would still be extremely implausible. K's definition is meant to be part of universal grammar, i.e. part of the nonaccidental, general features of language, which, in some sense, do not have to be learned by children acquiring language. Since the definition is stated in terms of the SPL, it follows that each child must be either innately endowed with a representation of the SPL or with some procedure that generates the SPL, so that he can identify SUBJs, etc. But when we look at the properties on the SPL, many of them seem unlikely candidates for such a role. For example, it seems unlikely to me that such things as metaphor, idiom, and presupposition are understood by children antecedent to, and are used to construct the derivative notion of, SUBJ. Surely the burden of proof falls to the proponent of such an idea. And acceptable support would have to include more than the mere presentation of a variety of specific cases that work.

9 Dyirbal, a strongly ergative Australian language, appears to thwart K's definition. To the extent that it can be determined, his definition selects absolutive, and not ergative, NPs as SUBJ, in spite of the fact that ergative NPs correspond to (transitive) SUBJs in English, while absolutive NPs correspond to both English intransitive SUBJs and to direct objects. Johnson (to appear) presents a number of arguments that Dyirbal ergative NPs are in actuality (transitive) SUBJs (cf. Postal (1977)). If this conclusion is valid, then K's definition would be falsified independently of the considerations discussed in the text.

REMARKS AND REPLIES

ties (deletion, movement, etc.) > Semantic Properties (agency, selectional restrictions, etc.)

The PSH is interpreted as follows: "if an NP in a derived sentence is assigned any of the three categories as subject properties then it is assigned all the higher categories. And within the category of coding properties, if an NP acquires the verb agreement characteristics of subjects then it must also acquire the case marking and position; and if it acquires the case marking then it must also acquire the position" (p. 324). Here I would like to object to the use of phrases such as "pass on" that occur in statements such as (i) "some properties of subjects are harder to pass on to underlying non- subjects than are others" (p. 323) and (ii) "if the subject properties can be ordered in terms of how hard they are to pass on to other NPs then we would have another universal generalization" (p. 323) (emphasis added/DEJ). The undesirable characteris- tic of such terminology, if taken literally, is perhaps most clear in the case of Semantic Properties. K states that "We know of no clear cases in which derived subjects become e.g., agents" (p. 324) (emphasis added/DEJ). It appears that K is suggesting that Semantic Properties can, at least in principle, be quite literally passed on or transferred from one NP to another in the course of a derivation; thus, for example, NPs might go in and out of agenthood. It might be thought that K is simply implying that some transformational rules (or their analogues) can apply before semantic rules assign a semantic representation. That is, "transformationally" derived structures provide input to the semantic component, as is the case with the trace proposal. But if this is all that K intends, then putting Semantic Properties on the PSH and stating that they are "the hardest to acquire" merely serves to obscure real issues.

Unfortunately, the notion of "passing on subject properties" is apparently to be taken quite literally. K states (p. 324):

If certain transformations were actually defined as subject creating ones (e.g., Perlmutter and Postal, 1974 would define Passive as an operation which converts an object to a subject) then each such transformation could simply be marked according to how far down the ordering of subject properties [on the PSH/DEJ] it can extend in assigning subject properties to other NP. So some operations would be more subjectivizing than others.

Overlooking the confusion engendered by the vague notion that semantic properties can be transferred from one NP to another, it is still the case that K never states how such a grammatical rule could be characterized nor what kind of grammatical theory could make use of such rules. Various questions arise: which of the nonnecessary and nonsufficient properties does a rule like Passive transfer? Is there a core of properties that are transferred in all cases in a given language? Is there a core that is transferred in all languages that have the rule? Does its application depend on the number of subject properties already possessed by the direct object(s) in the relevant clause? Since the properties to be transferred are contingent, it could well be the case, apparently, that Passive in two languages could assign entirely different SUBJ "traits". What K would

682 REMARKS AND REPLIES

have to provide to make this idea workable would be some sort of universal "passive function" that picks out the right type and number of properties to be transferred in every possible case, always resulting, of course, in a situation in which the former direct object acquires enough properties to make it the most subject-like. Note also that, for example, one of the SUBJ properties is that of being a good target for advancement, yet in general derived SUBJs cannot be ousted by advancement rules such as Passive (a subcase of the Perlmutter-Postal Advancee Tenure Law). Hence, this property must be excluded from those that can be acquired via passivization.

There is no reason to believe that such a universal "passive function" can be formulated. Yet without specifying in a general way which properties are passed on in which cases, the so-called Passive operation is a nonrule; that is, the only thing that would be holding the various subcases together would be the labels "Passive" and "SPL". Glancing at other rules, how would, e.g., Subject-to-Object Raising be stated: NP of highest SUBJ rating becomes NP of less than highest (second highest?) SUBJ rating of the immediately superordinate clause? How might so-called Dative Movement (advancement of indirect object to direct object) fit into a theory making use of such rules? Certainly, it is incumbent upon anyone advocating such a radical change in linguistic theory to answer a fair number of such questions, that is, to specify the new grammatical theory in enough detail to make it testable.

2.5. Two Additional Problems

2.5.1. K's formulation of his definition refers to the notion "the SUBJ of a sentence". But it is generally conceded that the relevant grammatical construct is "SUBJ of a clause at grammatical stage S". In fact, K implicitly admits this is the relevant notion by his reference to "underlying non-subjects" and "derived subjects". However, it is not even clear that K's definition could be made compatible with the conception of SUBJ as relative to particular grammatical stages. Suppose, for example, that "the SUBJ of a sentence" is reinterpreted as "the SUBJ of abstract clause structure C at stage S". Then, a previously unmentioned problem would become more acute, namely, the one involving the notion of "weighting" the SUBJ properties. For instance, is there any justification for taking semantics into consideration when determining SUBJ at superficial stages? To illustrate, in any case where an NP is a surface SUBJ and also an agent, that NP would quite plausibly be also analyzed as an initial SUBJ. Since not all surface SUBJs are agents, one could reasonably claim, as I would, that it is only with respect to the initial grammatical stage that agenthood is relevant for the determination of subjecthood. The fact that some surface SUBJs are agents would, under this view, be a fortuitous consequence of the fact that such surface SUBJs are also initial SUBJs. Conversely, in English, the property of verb agreement would seem to be totally irrelevant for the determination of initial SUBJs. It seems to me that K's approach confounds a number of aspects of clause structure that are clearly distinguished in the commonly accepted "stage approach" to grammatical analysis.

REMARKS AND REPLIES

2.5.2. Finally, it should be stressed that K's definition is transderivational. A deleterious consequence of this is that rules that "create and destroy" SUBJs would also be transderivational. The problem is that to determine that one NP has more SUBJ properties than another NP, one must know the syntactic behavior of the NPs in question, e.g., whether they can control reflexivization, deletion, etc. But the relevant behavior might well not be manifested in the particular clause that is, say, under "scrutiny" for the application of some rule. That is, it would appear that "potential behavior" or behavior in related sentences would determine whether some NP is SUBJ. Likewise, a "SUBJ-creating" rule like Passive would apparently assign trans- derivational properties. That is, Passive would assign properties that might not manifest themselves in the sentence in question. Such considerations make it all the more difficult to imagine a grammatical theory that could make use of K's conception of SUBJ.

3. A Look at the Motivation and Justification

Returning now to K's motivation for constructing a definition of SUBJ, presented in (1), it seems to me that he has greatly overstated his case. Even without independent definitions of grammatical relations such as SUBJ, generalizations making reference to them do not thereby become vacuous, i.e. incapable of falsification. If the overall theory is well constructed, i.e. tightly constrained, then the demands of consistency alone should suffice to avoid empirical vacuity. For instance, if a given NP in a language L is identified by a set of principles as SUBJ, then that NP should, all other things being equal, obey all the other principles that apply to SUBJ. If it does not, then the theory as presently formulated is falsified and some change must be made. If it turns out that many ad hoc changes are required to account for a significant set of facts, then the theory becomes less explanatory and, hence, of less interest and, perhaps, is to be rejected altogether. But as long as the system of principles collectively makes testable predictions, it is perfectly respectable to have uninterpreted primitive terms occurring in the principles themselves. Although it would be of considerable interest if a valid definition of the "basic" grammatical relations could be given, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure that a theory built on these relations will be falsifiable.

As K points out, his definition of SUBJ leads quite naturally to the conclusion that SUBJ is not an all-or-nothing notion. Roughly, the more SUBJ properties an NP possesses, the more "subject-like" it will be. This "multifactor" concept of subject- hood, if justified, would have important consequences, since such a view is inconsist- ent with both RG and transformational grammar (in the former, SUBJ is an all-or- nothing primitive term; in the latter, it is an all-or-nothing defined term). Unequivocal, empirical support for degrees of subjecthood would support K's multifactor concep- tion. In support of his view, K presents a number of cases in which putative SUBJ NPs act differently with respect to a number of SUBJ criteria. For example, in some

684 REMARKS AND REPLIES

languages, initial SUBJs, but not derived ones, trigger verb agreement (e.g. Achenese; see Lawler (1977)) or undergo raising (e.g. Jacaltec; see Craig (1975)). While it is true that such situations would be expected within a theory adopting a multifactor definition of SUBJ, the evidence is not very persuasive. As far as I can tell, the data cited can all be accounted for within any theory that has, for example, grammatical stages and "absolute" grammatical relations, and allows reference to conjunctions of conditions (e.g. the set of all Xs such that X is an NP and X is indefinite; that is, indefinite NPs). The evidence really only shows that languages subclassify grammatical relations along a variety of dimensions, for example, definite/indefinite, transitive/intransitive, initial/ derived, etc. Such subsetting conditions do not indicate that grammatical relations are a mere cluster of more primitive properties.

The following examples should help to clarify the general situation. Lawler (1977) gives the following example of verb agreement in Achenese where initial, but not ''cyclic", SUBJs trigger agreement.

(5) Achenese a. gopnyan ka gi-com lon

she perf she-kiss me 'She (already) kissed me.'

b. lon ka gi-com le-gopnyan I perf she-kiss by-her 'I've (already) been kissed by her.'

Another language that has (in certain cases) initial SUBJ agreement is Palauan.10 The following examples are from Josephs (1975).

(6) Palauan a. A ku-suub e ak mo pass a test

prt I-study prt I will pass prt test 'If I study, then I will pass the test.'

b. A lo-suub e ng mo pass a test prt he-study prt he will pass prt test 'If he studies, then he will pass the test.'

c. A babier a ku-luches er ngii prt letter prt I-write prep it 'The letter is being written by me.'

d. Ngak a lu-leker-ngak a Toki I prt he-awakened-me prt Toki 'I was awakened by Toki.'

10 Passive in Palauan is quite regularly, under certain circumstances, a copying rule. Evidence that the constructions in (6c), (6d), and (6e) are indeed passives comes from (i) the word order and (ii) the fact that, as in other Malayo-Polynesian languages, only SUBJs can relativize and the putative derived SUBJ, but not the putative ex-SUBJ, in (6c), (6d), and (6e) can undergo relativization.

REMARKS AND REPLIES

e. A ngalek a k-silebek-ii prt child prt I-kicked-him 'The child was kicked by me.'

Facts such as these do serve to falsify one part of the 1974 Perlmutter-Postal Verb Agreement Law: only terms in cycle-final structure can trigger verbal agreement. Consequently, this statement has to be dropped from the general theory. The foregoing discussion provides a clear illustration of how a linguistic theory making use of uninterpreted primitives in its axioms, in this case the grammatical relation SUBJ, can be falsified. While these facts are of considerable interest, they do not pose any problems in principle. All that they show is that in some languages the verb agreement trigger is the initial, rather than the "cyclic", SUBJ. Since grammatical stages are independently motivated, there is no reason to adopt, nor any advantage in adopting, the view that derived SUBJs in such cases are only SUBJs to a certain degree.

Another example in which the notion of grammatical stage plays a role is in the statement of Imperative Deletion. In English, for instance, the victim of Imperative Deletion must be the "cyclic" SUBJ of the relevant verb:

(7) a. Hit John! b. *John be/is/was/were hit! (no passive equivalent to (7a))

In contrast, Maori allows passivization of imperative clauses and the deletion of "cyclic" non-SUBJ, as these examples from Hale (1968) illustrate:

(8) a. haere ki te toa go to the store 'Go to the store!'

b. hutia te puna hoist-passive the anchor 'Hoist the anchor!'

c. tuaina te raakan raa fell-passive the tree yonder 'Fell that tree!'

This variation across languages can be accounted for by recognizing that it is possible for a language to allow NPs that are initial, but not "cyclic", SUBJs to be victims of Imperative Deletion. This analysis allows one to maintain the theoretically desirable claim that Imperative Deletion universally deletes SUBJs. At the same time, this analysis destroys the motivation for claiming that there is some sort of variation in degree of subjecthood across languages in this area. That is, Imperative Deletion provides no firm basis for claiming that in Maori ex-SUBJs are more subject-like than they are in English.

Or consider the following facts from the ergative language Dyirbal. As pointed out in footnote 9, as far as it can be determined, K's definition picks out absolutive, and

686 REMARKS AND REPLIES

only absolutive, NPs as SUBJ in Dyirbal. Compared to absolutives, ergative NPs have relatively few of the SUBJ properties. In particular, ergative NPs cannot, but absolutive NPs can, undergo Relativization and Coreferential Deletion. One interesting SUBJ property that ergative NPs do possess, however, is the ability to optionally undergo Imperative Deletion, just like absolutives of basically intransitive predicates such as 'sleep', 'go', etc." The following examples cited in Dixon (1972) illustrate this point.

(9) Dyirbal

a. {inda bani

(you) come abs

'Come!'

b. {iinda} bayi yara balga

(you) nc man hit erg

'Hit the man!'

The analysis proposed here and defended in detail in Johnson (to appear) is that ergative NPs in Dyirbal are syntactic SUBJs and that absolutive NPs are members of the disjunctive class of intransitive SUBJs and direct objects (contra K's definition). In the case of imperative clauses, ergative NPs are SUBJs and, hence, their deletion is perfectly regular. The fact that ergative NPs in Dyirbal cannot relativize and undergo coreferential deletion is attributed to a subsetting condition to the effect that ergative SUBJs cannot participate in these grammatical processes. Here, then, is a case where a subsetting condition refers to the notion of transitivity: intransitive (absolutive) SUBJs, but not transitive (ergative) SUBJs, can undergo a variety of rules.

This transitive/intransitive subsetting condition is also quite clearly at work in such languages as Basque, Chuj, Eskimo, K'ekchi, Langgus, Pocomam, Niuean, and Zuni (cf. Johnson (to appear); Postal (1977); Smith-Stark (1976)). For instance, Smith-Stark (1976) argues that ergative NPs in Pocomam undergo Raising and control Reflexiviza-

The term 'ergative" as used here does not refer to morphology. Rather, 'ergative" is synonymous with "transitive SUBJ" and "absolutive" refers to either an intransitive SUBJ or a direct object (cf. Johnson (to appear); Postal (1977)). The reason for this is that, in general, many grammatical processes, e.g. Case Assignment, Verb Agreement, Relativization, and Coreferential Deletion, may be sensitive to the absolutive/ ergative dimension, independently of nominal morphology. The more general notion defined here allows for a unified characterization of various phenomena involving so-called ergativity. For example, in Dyirbal pronouns do not exhibit absolutive/ergative morphology and yet they pattern like ergatively case-marked nonpronominal NPs with respect to nonmorphological processes. Like nonpronominal NPs, transitive SUBJ (ergative) pronouns cannot relativize or undergo coreferential deletion. Therefore, it is desirable to have them belong to the same class, namely, the class of ergative NPs. On this view, sensitivity to the absolutive/ ergative dimension is basically a property of rules. Oversimplifying somewhat, a language may be said to be absolutive/ergative if it has rules that are sensitive to the absolutive/ergative dimension.

REMARKS AND REPLIES

tion. In addition, Pocomam appears to have Passive, in which an ergative NP is "ousted" by an absolutive NP, and ergative morphology only in certain aspects. In short, there is excellent evidence that ergative NPs should be analyzed here as transitive SUBJs. Nevertheless, it appears that ergative NPs in Pocomam cannot delete under coreference (Smith-Stark (1976)) and do not freely relativize (Smith-Stark (personal communication)). Facts like these show that the notion of a subsetting condition involving transitivity is well motivated outside of Dyirbal. That is, this possibility must be provided for in universal grammar. From the standpoint of universal grammar, therefore, appeal to such a condition in the case of Dyirbal is principled. Again, there does not seem to be anything to be gained by appealing to the ill-defined notion of "'degree of subjecthood".

As a final example, consider clausemate Reflexivization. In English, the reflexiv- ized nominal cannot be a surface SUBJ:

(10) a. John hurt himself. b. *Himself was hurt by John. c. *Himself hurt John.

In Cebuano, however, the reflexivized nominal can, optionally, be a surface SUBJ, although it cannot also be an initial SUBJ, as the examples below, cited in Bell (1974), illustrate:

(II) Cebuano a. Nagbantay ako sa akong kaulingen

look after I cm my self 'I look after myself.'

b. Bantayan nako ang akong kaulingon look after-passive me cm my self 'Myself will be looked after by me.'

c. *Nagbantay ang akong kaulingon kanako look after cm my self me 'Myself looked after me.9

According to K's proposal, derived SUBJs of passive clauses in Cebuano would be less subject-like than in English since they can be reflexivized and the ex-SUBJs in Cebuano would be more subject-like than their English counterparts since they can, in these cases, control reflexivization. On the basis of very similar facts, Schachter (1976, 515) has gone so far as to state:

For if the conclusion that I have reached, to the effect that the sentences of Philippine languages do not have subjects, is in fact correct, then obviously it cannot be the case that subject represents a linguistic universal. Rather it represents a common, but non-universal, clustering of properties which need not in principle be assigned to a single constituent type.

As my informal description of the facts suggests, I believe that such radical

688 REMARKS AND REPLIES

conclusions are unwarranted within any theory that has grammatical stages. The gross difference in behavior between languages such as English, German, and Indonesian, on the one hand, and Cebuano and Tagalog, on the other, in the areas such as those discussed above can be sensibly interpreted as indicating that the relevant principles governing the grammatical processes in question hold at different grammatical stages. One can thus maintain absolute grammatical relations; the claim that grammatical relations such as SUBJ are universally applicable constructs; the revised Perlmutter- Postal Verb Agreement Law (only terms can trigger verbal agreement); and the Perlmutter-Postal Reflexivization Law (only terms can trigger reflexivization), with the understanding that the latter two principles, among others, must be relativized to language-specific grammatical stages.

One thing that K's general discussion highlights is the great importance of stating at what grammatical stage various relations and conditions hold. Thus, within a multistage theory, it makes no sense, strictly speaking, to say (for example) that A is "the SUBJ of clause C". Rather, one must specify that A is "the SUBJ of C at stage S". As the above examples suggest, it now appears quite clear that a number of languages allow NPs that are initial SUBJs but "cyclic" non-SUBJs to control a variety of processes such as Reflexivization, Equi NP Deletion, Verb Agreement, etc. What remains to be determined is the exact type and range of such phenomena, for example, whether there are interactions among them such that if a language triggers a process P with initial triggers then it also triggers process Q with initial triggers, and which combinations of conditions that can be defined in principle within multistage theories actually occur. But the description of such phenomena causes no real problem for multistage linguistic theories. To the contrary, such theories are, in a real sense, made to order for such facts.

4. A Possible Source of Confusion

In this section, I would like to discuss a possible source of confusion regarding the intent of K's proposal.'2 First, I would like to contrast a rather broad and somewhat ill- defined notion of general linguistic theory (LT) with a much narrower notion of what I will call "grammatical theory proper" (GT). GT is roughly that subpart of LT that specifies the essential properties of grammatical structure per se. For example, GT would presumably characterize, inter alia, a class of phonetic features, a class of syntactic categories, various "levels" of linguistic representation, and the notion of a possible grammatical rule. Besides GT, LT would presumably include a system underlying language acquisition and, perhaps, one fundamental to language processing, etc. The language acquisition system might reasonably contain principles that aid a child in determining such things as which phonetic strings are verbs, NPs, etc., and

12 This section has benefited greatly from detailed comments on an earlier version of this article by Jerry Morgan.

REMARKS AND REPLIES

which NPs are surface SUBJs, etc. Quite plausibly, conditions of GT contribute to this enterprise and, in particular, those universals that crucially refer to subjecthood (SUL). So, for instance, assuming the truth of the statement that SUBJs are universally the easiest NPs to relativize, a child might '"hypothesize" that a nonrelativizable NP is not a SUBJ at the relevant level of analysis. Suppose then that there is a set of principles relevant to the determination of subjecthood, SP, which is part of the language acquisition system. SP might be referred to, ill-advisedly I believe, as a "definition" of SUBJ.

There are, of course, other possible "definitions" of SUBJ external to GT, e.g., a discovery procedure used in field work situations for identifying SUBJs in a language- independent manner. The important point to keep in mind is that any set of statements outside of GT, such as SP, has no necessary bearing whatsoever on the status of the term SUBJ within GT. Specifically, SUBJ could be primitive or receive a GT-internal definition quite unrelated to an external "definition" such as SP.13 Furthermore, if SP were to make use of principles from GT, which in turn refer to SUBJ, then SP could not in principle have any bearing on the characterization of SUBJ within GT without creating a vicious circle. On the other hand, if, for example, SP and SUL were disjoint, one could maintain, without inconsistency, that the conceptual content of SUBJ within GT is properly characterized in terms of SP (conceptually moving SP into GT). But one is certainly not forced to any such conclusion. Thus, suppose it were discovered that children observe that eye dilation is perfectly correlated with a linguistically signifilcant class of NPs, called SUBJs. This would not mean that conditions and rules in GT referring to SUBJ should (or could) be reformulated so as to refer to eye dilation (cf. Chomsky (1965, section 4)). In short, various factors can enter into the decision whether a given construct should be taken as primitive or not (cf. Carnap (1953, esp. 312-316)). 14

It appears to me that the construction of K's definition, various statements in the text describing what function the definition is to fulfill, and a number of properties listed on the SPL might suggest that K is presenting a GT-external "definition" of SUBJ. In particular, one might assume that K is presenting a discovery procedure for identifying SUBJs (cf. the statement in (1)). However, certain statements suggest that a GT-internal definition is what K, at least ultimately, has in mind. On this interpretation of his proposal, the construct SUBJ does not exist, even in GT, independently of certain SUBJ properties. That is, an NP is SUBJ solely by virtue of the fact that it is

13 In my opinion, the term "definition" should be specifically reserved for any set of statements that provides necessary and sufficient criteria for the introduction of a term into, and hence its elimination from, a theory.

14 Note also that if, for example, the SP fails to provide a fail-safe procedure for picking out SUBJs, then the identification of which NPs function as SUBJ would be ill-defined. Given this situation, a speaker might make different identifications over time and two speakers of a given language might differ as to specific identifications, leading to language change. However, the construct SUBJ could still remain perfectly well defined and discrete within GT.

690 REMARKS AND REPLIES

associated with a certain cluster of designated properties. In this case, it would be possible to formally eliminate the term SUBJ from LT altogether in favor of reference to the defining criteria; that is, under this view, SUBJ is a notational convenience. Evidence that this is the correct interpretation comes from such statements as the following: (i) "Such a definition is needed in universal grammar" (p. 305) and (ii) "Note further that on this type of definition 'subject' does not represent a single dimension of linguistic reality. It is rather a cluster concept, or as we shall say, a multi- factor concept . . . And being a subject is, we claim, more like being intelligent than, for instance, like being a prime number" (p. 321). The GT-internal interpretation puts K's definition conceptually on a par with Chomsky's configurational approach, in which the construct SUBJ is reduced to the independently needed constructs "node", "dominates", "is labelled", etc., and is formally eliminable in favor of these more basic notions.

Construed as a GT-internal, "constitutive" definition, K's proposal is indeed a radical departure from both the view of transformational grammar and RG. It is as a GT-internal proposal that the definition is a potential threat to RG, since it would contradict the RG assumption that SUBJ is a primitive construct. In the foregoing discussion, I proceeded as if the GT-internal interpretation were the correct one. It should be kept in mind, however, that most of the above criticisms hold under either interpretation.

5. Conclusion

While K has collected and systematized an impressive array of facts and generalizations pertaining to SUBJs in diverse languages, the considerations discussed above indicate that his proposal is fundamentally inadequate as a definition of SUBJ. In fact, I would personally conclude that the best interpretation of K's results is that they provide a reductio ad absurdum argument in favor of the RG view that grammatical relations such as SUBJ be taken as primitive, theoretical terms. As such, they are neither defined in terms of, nor directly connected to, observables or antecedently understood concepts. As uninterpreted, theoretical terms, however, they are indirectly connected to observables and/or antecedently understood concepts via the empirically testable predictions resulting from the statements in which they occur.

References

Bell, S. J. (1974) "Some Notes on Cebuano and Relational Grammar," unpublished paper, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Carnap, R. (1953) "The Interpretation of Physics," in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Appleton-Century-Croft, New York.

Chomsky, N. (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Chung, S. (1976) "An Object-Creating Rule in Bahasa Indonesian," Linguistic Inquiry 7, 41-87.

REMARKS AND REPLIES

Craig, C. G. (1975) Jacaltec Syntax: A Study of Complex Sentences, unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Revised version to be published by University of Texas Press.]

Dixon, R. M. W. (1972) The Dyirbal Language of North Queensland, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Hale, K. (1968) Review of P. W. Hohepa, A Profile Generative Grammar of Maori, Journal of the Polynesian Society 77, 83-99.

Johnson, D. E. (1974a) "On the Role of Grammatical Relations in Linguistic Theory," in M. W. Lagaly, R. Fox, and A. Bruck, eds., Papers from the Tenth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 269-283.

Johnson, D. E. (1974b) Toward a Theory of Relationally-based Grammar, unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Johnson, D. E. (1974c) "Prepaper on Relational Constraints on Grammars," unpublished paper, IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York.

Johnson, D. E. (1977) "On Relational Constraints on Grammars," in P. Cole and J. Sadock, eds., Syntax and Semantics 8: Grammatical Relations, Academic Press, New York.

Johnson, D. E. (to appear) "Ergativity in Universal Grammar," in D. M. Perlmutter and P. M. Postal, eds., Studies in Relational Grammar.

Johnson, D. E. and P. M. Postal (in preparation) Arc Pair Grammar. Josephs, L. S. (1975) Palauan Reference Grammar, Pali Language Texts: Micronesia, University

Press of Hawaii, Honolulu. Keenan, E. L. (1974) "A Universal Definition of 'Subject Of'," paper read at the Winter LSA

meeting, New York; mimeographed, UCLA. Keenan, E. L. (1975) "The Logical Diversity of Natural Languages," unpublished paper,

UCLA. Keenan, E. L. (1976) "Towards a Universal Definition of 'Subject'," in C. Li, ed., Syntax and

Semantics: Subject and Topic, Academic Press, New York. Keenan, E. L. and B. Comrie (1972) '"Noun Phrase Accessibility and Universal Grammar,"

unpublished paper, Cambridge University, England. [Revised version appears in Linguis- tic Inquiry 8, 63-99.]

Lawler, J. (1977) "A Agrees with B in Achenese," in P. Cole and J. Sadock, eds., Syntax and Semantics 8: Grammatical Relations, Academic Press, New York.

Perlmutter, D. M. and P. M. Postal (1974) "Lectures on Relational Grammar," presented at the LSA Summer Linguistic Institute, Amherst, Massachusetts.

Perlmutter, D. M. and P. M. Postal (1977) "Toward a Universal Characterization of Passiviza- tion," in Papers from the Third Annual Meeting, Berkeley Linguistic Society, University of Berkeley, California.

Postal, P. M. (1976) "Avoiding Reference to Subject," Linguistic Inquiry 7, 151- 181. Postal, P. M. (1977) "Antipassive in French," in J. Kegl and D. Nash, eds., Papers from the

Seventh Annual Meeting North Eastern Linguistic Society, MIT, Cambridge, Massachu- setts.

Schachter, P. (1976) "The Subject in Philippine Languages: Topic, Actor, Actor-Topic or None of the Above?" in C. Li, ed., Syntax and Semantics: Subject and Topic, Academic Press, New York.

Smith-Stark, T. (1976) "Ergativity, Grammatical Relations, Pocomam, and Cosmic Conscious- ness," unpublished paper, University of Chicago, Illinois.

Trithart, L. (1975) "Relational Grammar and Chicewa Subjectivalization Rules," in R. E.

692 REMARKS AND REPLIES

Grossman, J. L. Sam, and T. Vance, eds., Papers from the Eleventh Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 615-625.

9-2 Mathematical Sciences Department IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center P.O. Box 218 Yorktown Heights, New York 10598

Linguistic Inquiry Volume 8 Number 4 (Fall, 1977) 692-696.

On "Deep and Surface Anaphora"

Edwin S. Williams

0. In "Deep and Surface Anaphora" Hankamer and Sag (H & S) divide anaphoric elements, including ellipses, into two classes, which they claim are distinguished on three dimensions. Deep anaphoric elements cannot contain missing antecedents, in the sense of Grinder and Postal;' their antecedents must be coherent semantic units;2 and they can be pragmatically controlled.3 On the other hand, surface anaphoric elements can contain missing antecedents; their antecedents need not be coherent semantic units; and they must have linguistic, or spoken, antecedents (that is, they cannot be pragmatically controlled). If properties such as these do cluster around two distinct groups of anaphoric elements, then a significant advance in the theory of anaphora is made when this clustering is recognized-each group can be more narrowly character- ized than the amalgam of the two groups could have been.

The position taken here is that the distinction between deep and surface anaphora

1 As an example of the missing antecedent phenomenon, consider the following sentence: (i) John didn't buy a car, so Bill did, and it was green.

The antecedent for it is "contained" in the missing VP. See Grinder and Postal (1971) for further discussion. 2 The following sentence is ambiguous:

(i) John thinks he is taller than he is. It can be given two logical representations:

(ii) The amount x (John thinks he is x tall) is greater than the amtiount x (he is x tall) (iii) John thinks (the amount x (John is x tall) is greater than the amolint x (he is x tall))

(ii) represents the noncontradictory (sensible) reading, and (iii) the contradictory reading. In these two examples, the material corresponding to the matrix VP and the than clause is italicized; in

(ii) this material is not a "coherent semantic unit" because it contains a variable (x) that is not bound within the italicized material. The material italicized in (iii), on the other hand, is a "coherent semantic unit".

3 "Pragmatic control" is used by H & S to refer to cases in which the sense or reference of an anaphoric item is inferred from the context of speech, in the absence of any spoken or "linguistic" antecedent. Thus, if two persons A and B are watching C do something difficult, A can say to B, out of the blue.

(i) I can do that, too.

That has no antecedent in A and B's discourse; that it refers to C's activities must be pragmatically inferred. Not all anaphoric items allow such control. For example, it would be inappropriate for A to say

(ii) I can, too.

in the situation described above, because missing VPs require spoken antecedents.