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The Unconscious Experiencer:

Bhokttvain thePramtbhedaof the Trika

SomadevaVasudeva

1 Introductory

The exegetes1 of the non-dualist Trika school of aivismhere principally theKashmirian author Abhinavagupta (ca. 9751025 AD) and his immediate2 prede-cessors and followershave extended inherited doctrines to formulate a paradigmof a complex self.3 In some of its manifestations, this self exhibits paradoxicalabilities, such as being simultaneously unconscious yet also an experiencer. Theseunique characteristics are defended with epistemological argument, attacking ri-val schools of Skhyas, Naiyyikas, Mmsakas, and various schools of Bud-dhism, and recent scholarship is demonstrating the extent to which this transformedthe aiva non-dualist doctrinal positions, as substantial material was borrowed andincorporated from other systems.4

Despitemuch recent work, for most readers, the opponents theories concerningthe nature of the selfBuddhists propounding its absence, schools of Skhya, Yo-ga, and Vednta that postulate a self that is primarily a seer(dra), a witness(s-kin), a knower (jt), or a cogniser (upalabdh)are much more well known,

1I would like to thank Kei Kataokaand Christopher Wallisfor corrections to an earlier draft.2These constitute the following disciplic succession: Somnanda (ca. 900950 AD) Ut-

paladeva (ca. 925975 AD) Lakmaagupta (fl. ca. 9501000 AD) Abhinavagupta Ke-marja (ca. 10001050 AD). For this chronology seeSanderson(2007:411ff.).

3Two independent aiva systematisations[1.] the KlcenteredKrama, and [2.] the non-dualistvarapratyabhijinfluenced and informed this exegesis;Sanderson(2007:427434) calls it aKrama-influenced, Pratyabhij-based exegesis of scripture in the Trika. There is also a lesser in-fluence from [3.] the Spanda system and [4.] the dualistaivasiddhnta. Of these Utpaladevasva-

rapratyabhijis frequently cited on matters of epistemology, while the aivasiddhntais adducedrarely without qualification, unlessthe context happens to be a commonplace aiva teaching with lim-ited doctrinal implications. This exegesis presents itself as an exposition of revealed aiva scrip-tures called Tantras that comprise a system called the Mantramrga, or the Path of Mantras. SeeGoodall&Isaacson2011 for an up to date, general survey. The term Mantramrgais becomingthe preferred term for what some secondary literature still refers to as Tantrism.

4See Torella (1994:introduction) for the substantial borrowings of Buddhist doctrine. Consider-ing Somnandashostilityto Bharthariin his ivadibut his disciple Utpaladevas adoption of manyabddvaitapositions in his foundational works of thevarapratyabhijsystem, Torella has sug-gested the possibility that Somnanda was only aware of only the firstKaof BhartharisVkya-

padya, a possibility that is reevaluated inNemec(2011a:5967).


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204 Journal of Indological Studies, Nos.24 & 25 (20122013)

while the aiva voice remains less familiar.5

Before we can understand the Trikas doctrine of a self that can be an un-conscious experiencer, we must unravel the internal dynamics driving this claim.To do this, two central tenets of the Trika system therefore need to be evaluated,with a perspective that seeks to contrast the Trika against the Skhya sourcesfrom which it has inherited the mental triplex of the buddhi, ahakra and ma-nas(and much terminology), and, with a view to differentiate the Trika from its Sai-ddhntika aiva rivals.6 Firstly, the Trikas self is an experiencer(bhokt) of experi-ences or qualia(bhoga)that can be pleasant, painful, and vexing or indifferent (de-

pending on how one interpretsmoha).7 These qualia belong to the self, and not tothe mental mechanism, as would be the case for the Skhya. The Trikas self isalso an agent(kart). This specifically intends to establish that the self must be theconsumer of the fruits of karmic retribution (karmavipka) that it is responsible for.8

Secondly, the Trikas self is also a complex of seven types of perceivers (pram-t)which are located within a series of paths(adhvan), primarily the path of theta-ttvas, or reality levels, and the associated path of the bhuvanas, or the worlds, whichconstitute the primary ontological ranges of medieval aivism. Only one of theseven perceivers can be the locus of self-awareness and identity at any given mo-ment. Which perceiver this is depends on the type of object that is being cog-nised. In an ordinary cognition by the lowest type of perceiver the self is thereby re-fracted into a phenomenological hierarchy that is made up of these seven apper-ceptive grades. The lower three of these perceivers are furthermore distinguished

by the presence or absence of three limitations or defilements(mala): [1.] limi-tation of individuation(avamala), [2.] limitation by karmic retribution(krma-

mala), and [3.] limitation by my (myyamala). In accordance with a redefini-

5For sustained, ongoing work on self as understood in the dualist aiva Siddhnta see Watson(2006, 2013 etc.).

6SeeMatagapramevaraVP 6.4cc5ab for a more general aiva definition of the self: paurtm samuddia ketr ketraja eva ca | arr ceti ruddhtm bhokt ca paribhyate.

7This triad ofsukha, dukhaandmohahas been accepted from the Skhya, where it is under-stood to represent the experiential aspect of the threeguas, see, e.g.,Yuktidpik17c. The transla-tion ofmohais problematic. In Vcaspatis elaboration in theSkhyatattvakaumud(13.2, 1.1728:atra ca sukhadukhamoh paraspara virodhina svnurpi sukhadukhamohtmakny eva ni-mittni kalpayanti | te ca parasparam abhibhvyabhibhvakabhvn nntvam tad yath str r-

payauvanakulalasampann svmina sukhkaroti | tat kasya heto | svmina prati tasy su-kharpasamudbhavt | saiva str sapatnr dukhkaroti | tat kasya heto | t prati tasy dukha-

rpasamudbhavt | eva puruntaram tm avindat saiva mohayati | tat kasya heto | tat prati ta-sy moharpasamudbhavt anay ca striy sarve bhv vykhyt), a beautiful, young and mod-est woman of good family brings pleasure to her husband (sukh-k), pain to her co-wives(dukh-k), and she leaves indifferent, stupefies, frustrates, confounds, vexes or beguiles other men(mo-hayati). The Saiddhntikas are quite aware that this triad derives from the Skhyas, see, e.g., Agho-raiva inMgendravttidpik2.14b: eva tarhi kpil manyante puruo hy akart svabhvanirma-las tasya vivekajnt prva parrtha pravttv asvatantratvt paramakraa praktir eva ma-haddirpea sukhadukhamohtman svakryetmna bhogyatay darayati sa eva sasra ityucyate |.

8In view of the widespread notion of the triple nature ofbhogamentioned above, I have, on thewhole, avoided translating derivatives of the rootbhujwith words related to the English verb enjoy.


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Bhokttvain thePramtbhedaof the Trika (S.D. Vasudeva) 205

tion9 of theMlinvijayottara,10 these are considered to be three forms of founda-

tional ignorance.Kemarja summarizes the non-dualist aiva view of the self as follows:

Svacchandatantroddyota5.88 (Kedp. 76, 1149rv):

tath hy ayam tm [1.] sakocbhsasatattvprammanyatt-3 manehbhilaabdoktenavena malena, [2.] ubhubhavsan-

tman vividhajanmyurbhogadena krmea, [3.] tatprabhavenaca kacukapuryaakasthlabhttmannjtikatrividhadehatadra-

6 yavicitrabhuvanabhoktavyrthasrthaprattibhj mykhyena male-na ca valita | yata sarvasyaiva [1.] sakucito bhivagdimayo[2.] ntarullekhaatkra [3.] kagaurdirpo mukatreda jn-

9 mtydiprattisiddha evyam artha |

2 satattv ]] em.Sanderson, tattv Ked1 7 sakucito ]] Ked, sakuciti+++1 8 mukatreda ]] conj.Isaacson, mutredaKed, muddheda1

To explain, the self is enveloped by [1.] the defilement of individuation,designated here11by the word yearning, which is the erroneous convic-tion that one is incomplete,12 which has as its essence an appearanceof contraction, [2.] by the defilement of karmic retribution, which ismade up of positive and negative latent impressions, and which grantsthe enjoyment of various births and life-spans,13 [3.] and by the defile-ment called My14, deriving from that [impurity of karmic retribu-tion], which occasions the cognition of a plethora of objects to be ex-

perienced in the threefold body with its various genera of embodiment,[the threefold body] which is constituted by [a.] the [five] cuirasses(see page 213), [b.] the ogdoad of the subtle body, and [c.] the body ofthe coarse elements, and in diverse worlds which are the substrates [ofthe body]. For this matter is established by everyones personal expe-rience such as: I who am contracted, subject to yearning and so on,who am overcome with hundreds of internal impressions, who appearto be lean and pale and so on, in such and such a place,15 know this.

9The threemalas were originally imagined to be substantial defilements, seeGoodall(1998),Acharya(forthcoming).

10TheMlinvijayottarais the root scripture the Tal seeks to explain.11In the SvaTa, the text being commented on. Cf. SvaTa 3.177a: nimittam abhilkhyam.12Tal9.65a: apramanyat ceyaTalVivad loc:apramanyatavamalalaka.13Or: various births, life-spans and experiences.14The Trikas exegetes also commonly use the PK 3.2.5ab definition ofmyyamala: bhinnave-

dyaprathtraiva mykhya.15Kedhere readsamutra + ida. Amutranormally contrasts withiha, here, so that the mean-

ing should be over there, or more commonly in the next world, an inappropriate sense for a de-scription of direct personal experience, the core formulation of which is usually: aham ida jn-mi, I know this. This is also implied by the evident correlations of the sequences 13 and ac. My initial emendation to this wasamuko treda, I, who am so and so, here. I have in-


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While the model of the self that emerges is therefore a unique one, we can also

see that the categories being scrutinized appear to correspond to those of the S-khya (see table 1 for a comparison, though the aivas would contest this equiva-lence, of course). This does not mean that we must assume a direct borrowing ofthese categories from contemporaneous Skhya works. In particular, the idea thatthe self is an actual experiencer(bhokt), is also prominent in what remainsof the P-upata Atimrga precursor to the aiva Mantramrga. For example, the expres-sioncetanatvd bhokttvt tanmayatvcis repeated five times in Kauinyas Pa-crthabhya 5.39 to qualify thepurua. This Pupata conception of experiencer-hood was not limited to the enjoyment of karmic retribution, however, since in com-menting on 5.3 Kauinya cites a verse providingnirvacana-etymologies definingthetm,16 whereatti viayn, it consumes the objects of experience, seems in-tended as a paraphrase ofbhokttva. As for the idea that the self is an agent, Kau-inya does not use the term kartin his commentary to 5.3. But he does cite averse giving a string of specific agentive-suffix nouns with designate agents of spe-cific cognitive actions attributed to the self:17 It is the listener, the toucher, seer,taster, smeller, thinker, speaker, knower etc.. In this list the speaker could per-haps also be taken as a non-cognitive agent. But since all of the others seem in-tended as subvarieties of witnessing (skitva), we should presumably rather in-terpretvaktas some form of a cognising verbaliser agent. In a summary verseKauinya then cites a number of synonyms for the self, none of which howeverconveys a primary meaning of agency: purua cetano bhokt ketraja pudgalo

jana | aur vedo mta sk jvtm paribh para ||. Only later, at 5.35, in anargument concerning the apportioning of karmic retribution, does Kauinya imply

that the self is an agent.18

2 The Direct, Agentive Experiencer

Despite such an obvious inflow of Skhya ideas and material, the early Mantra-mrga was at odds with the Skhya long before the non-dualist aivas of the Tri-ka school entered their most intense (and perhaps also most agressive) hermeneutic

phase. One of the most significant departures from the Skhya is the idea thatan experiencer must also be an agent. In the post scriptural period this was alreadydefended by Sadyojyotis (ca. 65075019), the earliest known commentator of thedualist aivasiddhnta, who is also roughly a contemporary of the author of the

Yuktidpik (ca. 680720), the most important commentary to the Skhyakri-

stead adopted a reading suggestedby H. Isaacson (personal communication):amukatra, which elim-inates the unncessary repetition of I, who am so and so.

16Pacrthabhya 5.3:yad pnoti yad datte yacctti viayn puna | yaccsya satatabhvatasmd tmeti sajita ||(Cf.alsoLigapura1.70.96)

17Ibid., sa ca rot spra dra rasayit ghrt mant vakt boddh ityevamdi18Pacrthabhya5.35:tac ca dukha nnyo nubhavati kartaivnubhavati,And that suffer-

ing is experienced by [its] agent alone, not by another.19For this date seeSanderson(2006).


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TRIKA SKHYAKRIK

i) conscious(cetana) conscious(cetana)

ii) consumer/experiencer(bhokt) experiencer([mahaddi]bhokt)

iii) agent(kart) = non-agent(akart)

iv) [seven perceivers(pramt)] [witness]

1. sakala dra

2. pralaykala (+praktilayaPY)

3. vijnkala (+videhaPY)

4. mantra, 5. -a, 6. -mahea [kevala purua]

7. iva

Table 1: The Trikasauand the Skhyapurua

k.20 Sadyojyotis argues that experience is a kind of action, which implies that theexperiencer must be a kind of agent.21 This he uses to support the inherited aivascriptural doctrine of the selfs agency(karttva), and he attacks the Skhya ideathat experience is not direct, but that: Experience is the reflection of the self inthe experienced, like [the reflection] of the moon in water.22 Despite this, it is alsoevident that the doctrine he defends, at least as far as the three internal organs

[1.] the mind ormanas, the [2.] intellect orbuddhi and [3.] personalization oraha-kraare concerned, is in many respects derivative. He defines experience asfollows:

In brief, the intellect, that has assumed the form of the object of cogni-tion such as happiness etc.,23 is the object of experience(bhogya). Ex-

perience(bhoga)is a manifestation of the experiencers awarenesstinged by the object of experiencein the object of experience (i.e.the

20See e.g. Bhogakrik99cd: akarttvbhyupagame bhoktabdo nirarthaka, If it is acceptedthat the self is not an agent then the word consumer is meaningless. Aghoraiva comments:bhoga-

sypi kriytvd bhokttvenaiva pusa karttva siddhyati, Because consumingtoo is an action, theselfs status as an agent is established just through its being a consumer. The idea was so importantthat Sadyojyotis repeats it with different wording at Tattvasagraha16: vyartha bhoktrabhidh-na vyartha ca tata pradhnacarita va | nari karttvavihne na ca bhoga ihprayojake d-

a ||21We are fortunateto have SadyojyotisBhogakrik, where he discusses the relationship between

the categories of thebhokt, bhogaand thebhogyain depth. See especiallyBoccio(2002).22Refutation of the Skhya view ofbhogainBhogakrik(75cd):bhogye bhoga prabho ch-

y yath candramaso jale.23Sukha, happiness is a standard example for an internal object of cognition, while nla, a blue

thing, is a standard example of an external object of cognition.


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buddhi).24

Aghoraiva expands this to mean that the experiencer(bhokt)here intends theself functioning as a synthesizer (anusadht)of cognitive events. It manifestsan awareness that is tinged by the intellect that has itself ascertained the object ofcognition as pleasurable etc. This awareness takes the form: I am experiencing

pleasure etc.25 Such composite experiences are qualia(bhoga)for the Saiddhnti-kas.26

Themanasorcittahas a dual role, because it functions as the instigator(prav-ttikraka)or controller(adhiht)of the external senses27 and simultaneously isalso responsible for the internal function of attention(sakalpa).28 Since, for theSaiddhntikas, attention is both an action and a cognition that is ever-present in theself,29 it must be different from the products of the intellect and the personalization,

because these, being merely forms of grasping, namely of the grasped(grhya)inthe case of the intellect, and of the grasper(grhaka)in the case of personalizationrespectively, are both purely cognitive(pratyaya).30

The functioning of personalization results in effort(sarambha), the intellectachieves determination (adhyavasya)of a cognised object, and experiencerhoodis the defilement of individuation(avamala), which takes the form of mistakenly

believing non-self to be self.31 As is evident, much of this has direct antecedentsin the Skhya system, Sadyojyotis major departure (besides minor ones, such ascounting the threeguas astattvas) comes with the incorporation of the aiva fivecuirasses(kacuka)as enablers of the selfs cognition.

TheYuktidpik, to the contrary, suggests that the self must be a non-agent be-

cause it lacks the property of being productive (aprasavadharmitvt),32 which, con-24Tattvasagraha of Sadyojyotis 15: buddhir viaykr sukhdirp samsato bhogyam | bho-

gye bhogo bhoktu cidvyaktir bhogyanirbhs ||25Aghoraivaad loc: tata ca bhoktur anusandhtu puruasya, bhogye buddhykhye sukhdya-

dhyavasyarpe, sukhy aha dukhy aham iti bhogyanirbhs bhogyoparakt cidvyakti savidu-dbhava sa bhogo mantavya.

26SeeBoccio1415 for a discussion ofBhogakrik64cd65ab where Sadyojotis distinguishestwo types ofbhogya.

27MgendratantraVP 12.9.28Cf. MatagapramevaraVP 13.812.29For theaivasiddhnta caitanyais considered to comprise both action and cognition. See M-

gendratantraVP 2.5ab: caitanya dkkriyrpa tad asty tmani sarvad |, similarlyBhogakri-kof Sadyojyotis 130cd: dkkriye sarvaviaye sarvagatvd aor mate ||.

30Laghukto the Tattvasagrahaof Sadyojyotis 8bcd: tatrecchabdena sakalpkhyam (My,sakalpkhyam avadhnaPedFilliozat) ekgratparaparyyam ucyate | tac ca dkkriytmaka-tvd buddhyahakrakryd grhyagrahakaparmarstmano bhinna, tayo pratyayarpatvd |ato yasyaitat krya tan mana iti manasiddhi.

31Laghukto Tattvasagraha12ab: bhokttvena pustvamalenntmdv tmbhimnar-pea

32The compound prasavadharmin, a karmadhraya with the suffix -in, is here aiaprayogausage in place of the expectedbahuvrhi prasavadharman. Bhattacharya(1993:205, and fn. 15)has shown that already Vcaspatisaw fit to explain this apparent solecism by arguing that the suffix ismeant to convey constant production(nityayogam), a meaning which could not be derived from the


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versely, is the hallmark of matter.33 The property of being productive intends for

the Skhya specifically motility and transformation, both of which cannot be de-tected in the self.34 Agency lies not with the self but with the evolutes of pri-mal matter. varaka does, however, admit that his non-agent self is an experi-encer, orbhokt, when he advances the existence of experiencerhood as a proof forthe existence of a self. Since both manifest(vyakta)and unmanifest matter(avya-kta) are insentient it is impossible that they could experience each other. There-fore, once we have identified matter as a thing to be experienced, we can estab-lish that a correlated sentient experiencer of it must also exist, and this can only

be the conscious self.35 Evidently, the Skhya conception of experiencerhooddiffers considerably from that of the aivas.

The non-dualist aivas manipulate these categories into a quite different set ofassumptions. Kemarja explains that experiencerhood arises from the defilementof individuation, which is regularly interpreted as that form of ignorance that leadsto the mistaken belief that one is incomplete(apramanyat),36 as follows:

Svacchandatantroddyota ad4.127cd (1fol. 83v): arrea yat kta

arrair yad arjita kicit tatraiva y viayatvensakti kicin mesyd ity abhivagas tad etan malakryam apramanyattmaka-vamalotthpita bhokttvam |

The state of being an experiencer(bhokttva) is a product of defilement(mala), that is to say, it arises from the limitation of individuation(a-vamala), which has as its nature the belief that one is incomplete

a limited attachment to whatever is produced by ones body, or to what-ever is accumulated by ones body, as objects of enjoymentthat takesthe form of the hankering: May I have a little bit!

bahuvrhicompound alone. TheYuktidpik(p. 180) is content to simply explains it as a possessive:prasavrtho dharma, prasavadharma so systi (cf. P. 4.3.120) iti prasavadharm.

33Yuktidpik p. 180: akartbhvo prasavadharmitvt |34Yuktidpik p. 180: ka punar asau prasavrtho dharma ity ucyate | praspandanaparimau |

nikriyatvd akarteti yvat tad idam aprasavadharmitvd akarteti |35Yuktidpik: puruo sti bhoktbhvt||17c|| iha sukhadukhamohtmakatvd acetana vya-

ktam avyakta ca | tasmd asya parasparea bhogo nopapadyate ity avaya bhoktr bhavitavyam| yo sau bhokt sa purua |. The Mharavttiadds an example invoking the consumption of foodas a parallel. iha madhurmlatiktalavaakaukay a ras | etai abh rasair yukta bhoja-

na dv bhokt sdhyate | asti bhokt yasyeda bhojanam | evam ida vyaktvyakta dv s-dhaymo 'sty asau paramtm puruo yasyeda bhoktur vyaktvyakta bhogyam iti | There are,in this world, six flavours: sweet, sour, bitter, salty, pungent, and astringent. When one sees food

prepared with these flavours, the existence of a consumer can be established. In the same way, whenwe see manifest and unmanifest matter we can establish that there exists a self, the Purua, for whom,as an experiencer, this manifest and unmanifest matter is the thing to be experienced. The sameexample is also given in GauapdasBhya.

36Non-dualist commentators use a standardised set of expansions for the three defilements (see e.g.NeTUdd 16.56): [1.] ava = apramanyat,erroneous belief that one is incomplete, [2.]krma= ubhubhdisaskra, positive and negative karmic latencies, [3.]myya = bhinnavedyaprath,manifestation of differentiated objects of cognition.


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As such, it is not an ultimately existing reality, but an entity that is synthesized

in Bhairavaor non-dual consciousness, an event that incidentally is not consid-ered in any way to impair or alter the fact that he remains the totality. 37

This agentive experiencer then enjoys or suffers experience (bhoga), that is, thefruits of karmic retribution (vipka). Karma, for Abhinavagupta, depends on anagent because it is an action. It can be considered a product of the aforementioneddefilement only metaphorically:

Tal 9.98cd100ab (K1 fol.65v, K2 fol.367

v368r, B1 fol.237v, K4

fol. 98rv):3 ki ca karmpi na mald yata karma kriytmakam ||

kriy ca karttrpt svtantryn na punar malt |

y tv asya karmaa citraphaladatvena karmat ||6 prasiddh s na sakoca vintmani mala ca sa |

5 karmat ]] KedK1K2B1, karmatK4

Moreover, karma itself does not evolve from defilement, because karmais essentially action, and action arises from autonomy that consistsof agency, but not defilement [which is neither an agent nor indepen-dent].38 Karmas [essential] nature of being activity, which is gener-ally acknowledged to be the production of differentiated effects,39 isnot possible in the self without contraction, and that [contraction] is

defilement([ava]mala).

This introduces the important concept of contraction(sakoca),40 which char-acterizes the relationship between the supreme self, Bhairava, and the limited self.41

The limited self is a contraction of the plenary powers of Bhairava.42

37Mlinvijayavrttika1.745cd46ab:abhinno bhagavn ea bhairavo bhogyabhokttm || tma-ny evnusandhya sarvad pravigraha,This undivided Lord Bhairava, cognitively synthesizingin himself thestateof being an experiencer of objects of experience, is always endowed with a plenary

body.38Jayarathaad loc: mald ity akartttmaksvtantryarpd ity artha.39Takingcitraphaladatvenaas a predicative instrumental rather than as a causal instrumental.40varapratyabhijvimarin3.2.5:tatra svarpasya nimlana sakoca, There contraction

is a veiling of the own-form.41Tantrlokaviveka 1.5 : bhedapradhna tattadanantbhsasabhinna sakucittmarpa

naratvam, Individuality, which is determined by differentiation, which is interpenetrated with in-finite appearances, and is a contraction of the self

42Tantrloka 13.213: ajnarpat pusi bodha sakocite hdi | sakoce vinivtte tu svasva-bhva prakate || When the heart is contracted, the souls knowledge is ignorance, but whencontraction ceases, its own nature shines forth. Jayaratha ad loc: iha hdi srabhte vimartma-ni rpe sakocite gubhvam pdite ya pusi parimittmany aprkhytirpo bodha saiv-

jnarpat tena sahaikatvam ity artha. For Abhinavaguptas views on these kinds of erroneouscognitions seeNemec2011b: 250ff.


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Because the contraction of Bhairava into the limited self is brought about by the

defilement of individuation(avamala), Abhinavagupta admits that, defilement,as an enabling factor, might, in a transferred or figurative sense (upacra)be saidto cause karma.

ava

Bhairava au bhokt

krma

sakoca

bhoga

Figure 1: Contraction and themalas

The contracted agentive experiencer imagines that karmic fruition, either posi-tive, negative, or delusional, is experience, and thereby he exists in various formssuch as gods, or humans etc.

Tal 9.100cd101ab (K1fol. 65v, K2fol. 367

v368r, B1fol.237v, K4

fol. 98v) withavataraik: tena sakoca vinsya na tattatphalad-3 ne smarthya | sakocaeva malaity asyatatkraatvam upacarita,

sakucito hi bhokt ubhubhdytmaka bhinna sat phalam t-mani bhogyatvenbhimanute yena devamanuydivicitrarpataysy-

6 vasthnam |vicitra hi phala bhinna bhogyatvenbhimanyate ||bhoktary tmani teneya bhedarp vyavasthiti |

2 vinsya na ]] KedK4, vinnsyaB1 2 tattat ]] KedK4, tatB1 3 eva ]] Ked,eva ca K4 3 ity asya ]] Ked, iti yasyaB1, iti asyaK4 4 sat phalam ]] KedK4,

saphalamB1 6 syvasthnam ]] Ked, vasthna tad ha B1K4

Therefore, without contraction [of the self], it (karma) has no capac-ity to produce differentiated effects. Defilement is none other than con-traction, therefore its causality towards it (karma) is [intended] in afigurative sense, for the contracted experiencer(bhokt)misconstrues

(abhi-man)the fruitiongiven as differentiated, and as good and badetc., to be an experience in himself, whereby he exists in variousforms such as gods, humans etc. For the diverse fruit, differentiated,is misconstrued to be what is experienceable (bhogyatvena) in the expe-riencer who is [misconstrued to be] the self. From this derives this dif-ferentiated existence.

This very specific aiva understanding of the term bhoktasadirectagentiveex-periencer, that is to say, as an actual and immediate experiencer of karmic retribu-


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tion, must therefore be distinguished from that of other schools of thought. This be-

comes evident if we contrast it with the more familiar notion that the self might bean experiencer only indirectly, apparently, or metaphorically. Several varieties ofthis view are expressed in the surviving works of the Skhya system and in pre-sentations and refutations by opponents. In the most common version of this doc-trine, the Skhya is at pains to deny that the selfs status of being an experi-encer implies that the purua has undergone a transformation. Instead, it con-sists merely of the kind of experience one has when witnessing a reflection aris-ing in a mirror(pratibimbodaya). This theory has been discussed in most detail inAsano(1991).43

Even though the aiva Mantramrga44 has a long and complex history of assim-ilating, adapting and criticising the tenets of the Skhya, the details of which re-main to be uncovered,45 we should not, in the present case, assume a direct influ-ence from the Skhya without further evidence. This is because, as we have seen,bhokttva is a topic already in the Pupata Atimrga precursor to the Mantram-rga, and from the Pacrthabhyaof Kauiya we can trace it back even fur-ther into thevetvataraand theKahaUpaniads etc.46 The idea that the indi-vidual is an experiencer or enjoyer thus predates the Mantramrga by a consider-able amount of time. The triad of the experiencer-experience-experienced(bhoktbhoga-bhogya), too, that is common in the Mantramrga, occurs already in theV-kyapadyaof the grammarian-philosopher Bharthari, another work that was influ-ential in the formative period of non-dualist aiva doctrine. Since, however, itis there found in the opening section, where Bharthari is comparing his concep-tion of Brahman with the ultimate stages of other schools of thought without ex-

plicitly identifying them, it is not certain whether he is here alluding to theai-tantraof Vragaa (ca. 300),47 or perhaps even to the Pupatas, or some othergroup.48 It is therefore possible that some Skhya-like ideas are derived from

43See alsoSaito(2011),Qvarnstrm(2012).44See most recentlyWatson,Goodall&Sarma(2013).45One of the most interesting ideas so far is that ofTorella (1999), who proposes that we should

consider two different kinds of Skhya, one of them a *smnyastra. He concludes: One isa relatively coherent complex of doctrines and beliefs which has become, subliminally as it were,an integral part of Indian tradition, impelled by its intrinsic power and prestige deriving above allfrom its being the first bold and consistent systemization of the scattered patrimony of upaniadicspeculations. The other is the Skhya as adaranatrying to put in order or develop, in some way orother, these doctrines, which are perceived as a timeless legacy even by those that are not their directupholders.

46Cf. Kahopaniad3.4, the parable of the chariot: 4. The senses(indriya), they say, are thehorses; / The objects of sense, what they range over. / The self combined with senses and mind /Wise men call the enjoyer(bhokt). (transl.Hume1921), and especially thevetvataropaniad1.812.

47Note thatMharavttitoSkhyakrik73 states that the stra on which theSkhyakrikof varaka is based, by which it means the aitantra, discussed the categories of the agent, theexperiencer, the experienced, and liberation:kart bhokt bhojya moka ctra cintyate.

48Vkyapadya1.4, ed. and transl. W.Rau (1977), ekasya sarvabjasya yasya ceyam aneka-dh | bhoktbhoktavyarpea bhogarpea ca sthiti ||, [Ohne Anfang und ohne Ende ist das


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other schools of thought that have their own complex history of assimilating S-

khya thought.An immediate question arises. Where is it that this agentive experiencer enjoysor suffers his experiences? To answer this we need to consider the non-dualist ai-vas systematisation of their scripturally inherited range of ontologies.

3 TheTattvakramaas an Artificial Causal Chain

The self proposed by the Trika finds itself located in and against an ontology ofsix paths (aadhvan), only one of which is important for us here: the path ofthe tattvas. The lower reaches of the aiva tattvakrama, or the hierarchy of the

principles or reality levels, appear to be an inheritance from the mature hierarchy of

principles of earlier Skhya thinkers. We thus find the individual soul,purua,thehighest principle of the Skhya, distiguished fromprakti, matter, and the twenty-threetattvas that evolve from it arranged beneath it just as in the Skhya schema.These are the three mental facultiesthe intellect(buddhi), personalization(aha-kra), and reflection (manas)49the five faculties of sense perception (buddhndri-

ya), the five faculties of action(karmendriya), the five sensory media(tanmtra),and the five gross elements(mahbhta). For the non-dualist exegetes of the aiva

Mantramrga, this individual soul (purua), even if isolated from matter orpra-ktithe goal of the Skhya systemis not yet liberated: they do not seek self-realization, but rather god-realization, since only iva exists.

To these twenty-five were superadded the fivekacukas, cuirasses, that inhibit

the individual soul: [1.] limitation by time(kla), [2.] binding fate(niyati), [3.]limited power to act(kal), [4.] limited power of knowledge(vidy),50 [5.] limited

passion (rga). Above them is found primal matter (my). This reality level,together with all of the principles below it, constitute the black(asita), or impure(auddha), universe (adhvan, lit. path). Above this black universe is the white (si-ta), or pure(uddha), universe with fivetattvas:ivatattva, aktitattva, sadivata-ttva, varatattvaanduddhavidytattva, adding up to the commonly encounteredlist of thirty-sixtattvas. But what exactly is atattvafor the thinkers of the Trika?

In hisTantrlokaAbhinavagupta cites a definition from a dualist Saiddhntikawork, theMatagapramevara, with approval.51 According to his interpretation, a

Brahman,] und wessen Dasein als des Einen, das aller Dinge Samen enthlt, hier vielfltig unterder Gestalt von Genieer, zu Genieendem, und unter der Gestalt des Genusses auftritt,. With thenotion of the Bhartharis Brahman as the holder of all seeds (sarvabjasya: comms.aktyupagr-hyasya, bhinnaaktipracitasyacompare the Yogcrabja-theory, where thelayavijnais said to

besarvabjaka, seeKragh(2006:18, 304).49For these translations seeWatson(2006:62).50Sometimes also labelled as auddhavidy, impure knowledge, to distinguish it from the higher

uddhavidy,pure knowledge.51Abhinavagupta hasdecided to endorse theview of theMatagapramevarapresumably not just

because it accorded with his doctrinal agenda, but also because it was influential among his Saiddh-ntika co-religionists. The scriptural layer of the aiva Mantramrga does not present an unanimous


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tattvais that which is recurrent(anugmin)in all of the members of its class.52 A

tattvais therefore comparable to an universal, or a common property (smnya).53

aiva scriptures arrange thesetattvas into hierarchical lists: lowertattvas aresaid to be evolutes of highertattvas. This evolution is explained as causation, therelationship between thetattvas in this hierarchical model is therefore one of causeand effect (kryakraabhva): lowertattvasarecausedbyhighertattvas, resultingin a fixed order of creative progression (si). In view of the complex historyof the rivalling streams of aiva revelation, such a claim to a firmly establishedorder is beset with problems.54 For Abhinavagupta this relationship is first of allaffirmed by the scriptural authority of the Siddhayogevarmata55, the immediate

precursor of theMlinvijayottara, the root scripture hisTantrlokais based on.56

This causation is however merely artificial (kalpita). From a strict savidadva-yanon-dualist point of view, iva is the only existing cause and agent, and Abhina-vagupta therefore distinguishes the causal relationship into two types: an absolutecausal relation(pramrthika)and an artificial one(kalpita, sa).57 Absolute,or non-artificial causation is established by arguing that true agency(karttva)canonly be grounded in autonomy(svtantrya).

Tal 9.8 (B1fol. 224rv. K4exp. 4, 6):

vastuta sarvabhvn kartena para iva |asvatantrasya karttva na hi jtpapadyate ||

In reality, the agent of all phenomena is supreme iva, who is capableof acting(na),58 for agency is completely impossible for someone

viewofwhata tattva is. For theexegetical traditions of theTrika that areof concern here, the situationis clearer: thetattvakramais quite simply one of the six ontological paths.

52Tantrloka 10.2ab (B1fol.268v): em [em. Sanderson; teKedB1] am tattvn

svavargev anugminm |.53For a more detailed discussion of the various definitions of the aiva tattvas seeVasudeva

(2004:189191). This understanding is also found in thevarapratyabhijsystem, e.g.varapra-tyabhijvimarin3.1.2 p. 192: bhinnn vargn vargkaraanimitta yad ekam avibhaktabhti tat tattva, yath girivkapuraprabhtn nadsarasgardn ca pthivrpatvam abr-

patva ceti, That which is the efficient cause for the [conscious subjects] collectivisation of distinctgroups, [that which] appears as one, undivided, that is [defined as]tattva. As for example Earth andWater [respectively in the case] of mountains, trees, cities etc. and rivers, ponds and oceans.

54This relationship is argued for in Tal 9.7ff.(B1fol.223v) Jayaratha introduces the section with

kryakraabhvtm tattvn pravibhgo vaktavya[], The demarcation of thetattvas, whichis based on the relationship of cause and effect, must be stated.

55See Trszk (1999).56Tantrloka9.7 (B1fol.223

v): tatrai (tatrai ]] Ked, tatraiB1) daryate da siddha(siddha ]] Ked, siddh[e]B1)yogvarmate | kryakraabhvo ya ivecchparikalpita ||, In thiscontext is taught the relation of cause and effect, created by ivas volition, of these [tattvas], as it isseen in theSiddhayogevarmata.

57Tantrasra 8.34: tatrai tattvn kryakraabhvo daryate sa ca dvividha: pram-rthika sa ca. TheTantrasrais a concise summary of his longerTantrloka.

58For this sense ofnasee Mlinvijayvrttika1. 173cd174ab: kriyakte sphua sphromytva pratipadyate || mytattvasvarpe hi iventi vakyate. SeeSanderson(1992:300ff.)for a discussion of this term.


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who is not autonomous.

This draws on the grammarian Pinis definition59 of the independent(svata-ntra)factor of action(kraka)as the agent(kart). This autonomy, moreover, is anexclusive property of iva who consists entirely of consciousness. It would be con-tradictory to claim that something could be autonomous and at the same time un-conscious.60 Without agency, Abhinavagupta claims, there can be no causality.61

These claims are defended against a Buddhist causal theory that draws on the Bud-dhist akaranandanasDharmlakra.

Another important claim also derives from the Trikas non-dualism. The au-tonomous agent iva, as the only reality existing at the level of absolute causa-tion, must also himself be the manifestation of the hierarchy oftattvas.

Tantrasra 8.34: tatra pramrthika etvn kryakraabhvo yaduta kartsvabhvasya svatantrasya bhagavataevavidhena ivdidha-rntena vapu svarpabhinnena svarpavirntena ca prathanam |

Among those [two types of causation] the absolute causal relation issuch that it is a manifestation (prathanam)of the autonomous Lord,whose intrinsic nature is agency (karttva), with such a body [in theform of thetattvas] beginning with [the principles of] iva and endingwith Earth, [a body that is] different from his own form, but that restsin his true form.

We may summarize the situation that the ordinary, transmigrating self, alsoknown as thesakala, finds itself in as follows. Believing himself to be an agent,bound by the three defilements (mala)that are forms of foundational ignoranceabout the selfs true status, consuming karmic retribution as an experiencer(bho-kt), the self perceives, as apramt, the twentyfour lower constituents of the hi-erarchical ontology of thetattvas from earth upto primal matter(prakti).62 Thislimited self, orpurua,moreover, is constituted by the twentyfifthtattvawhen itis enveloped and inhibited by the next five tattvas, the cuirasses(kacuka)men-tioned above. The order in which these come into existence is subject to disagree-ment in the revealed Tantras Abhinavagupta and his followers accept as authorita-tive. As a consequence, since Abhinavagupta insists that the divinely revealed scrip-tures must all be literally true, he heuristically gives up on causation as an abso-

lutely stable or invariable phenomenon. The Trika can therefore be said to adhere

59Adhyy1.4.54:svatantra kart.60Tal 9.9, B1335

r, K4exp. 6: svatantrat ca cinmtravapua parameitu | svatantra ca ja-a ceti tad anyonya (anyonya ]] KedK4, anyonya{ca}B1) virudhyate || Jayaratha comments:

svtantrya hi svaprakatvam ucyate jya ca paraprakyatvam ucyate na cnayos tdtmyasasargo v bhaved ity ukta tad anyonya virudhyata iti |

61Tal 9.10cd, B1335r, K4exp. 6: na karttvd te cnyat kraatva hi labhyate ||, Apart

from agency no other kind of causality can be obtained.62SeeVasudeva(2004:192196).


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to a doctrine of indeterminate cause,*aniyatahetuvda. This means that the differ-

ent sequences of evolution can all be equally true. Kemarja justifies this break-down of causality by appealing to the inherent relation of experiencer and experi-enced(bhokt-bhogya)that subsists between the self and the world.63

Svacchandatantroddyota11.63cd64ab kacukapacakavalit pu-mso bhoktro bhogyasmnyarp ca praktir yugapad eva my-ta sambht bhoktbhogyayo parasparpekitvd ato tra kald-n yugapad eva tasmd iti mytattvd udbhava ukta.

Souls enveloped by the pentad of cuirasses become experiencers, and,at the very same moment, primal matter, in the form of a generic thingto be experienced, arises from My, because an experiencer and athing to be experienced mutually presuppose each other. Therefore it

is stated [in this Tantra, that the cuirasses] headed bykalarise simul-taneously from My.

Some selves engage in limited knowing while being tinged by limited desire (ra-jyan vetti), others are tinged by limited desire while they engage in limited know-ing(vidan rajyati), and as a consequence they imagine the hierarchical position ofthese two cuirasses to be different.64

Limited selves can, moreover, perceive each others bodies and intuit, but notperceive, each others sentiency. That is not to say that the limited sakala soulcannot be perceived (as an object). It can, but not by anothersakala. Instead, itcan be perceived by a different kind of perceiver, the pralaykala, who in turn is

perceptible as an object to thevijnkala, and so on to a depth of seven grades.This constitutes the sevenfold apperceptivepramtbhedaphenomenology of theTrika that is present in every simple cognition.

4 The Experiencer as Perceiver

The aiva agentive experiencer is not helplessly stuck in this hierarchicaltattvakra-maby his subjection to karma. He can actively ascend, either by having his past andfuture karmic fruition destroyed by aiva mantras in the ritual of initiation(dk),or by practising the conquest of the reality levels (tattvajaya) to master these tattvas,one by one, employing the techniques of aivaaagayoga.65 Different views on

what this ascent means can be found in the various aiva scriptures. For Abhina-vagupta, following the homologies set out in the vyptisection of theMlinvija-yottaratantra, the relative hierarchical position of the agentive experiencervis--visthe tattvakramais determined by the class of object he can perceive, and, inturn, it determines the type of perceiver he is.

63For this relation see especiallySpandakrik29 with theVivticommentary.64Svacchandatantroddyota11.63cd64ab: ka cid rajyan vetti kacic ca vidan rajyattydi

pus vicitraprattikramnusr kacukakramo nyathnyath ca sambhvyate.65For more detailed account seeVasudeva(2004:145ff.)


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The innovation of a phenomenological perspective reorients the Trikas con-

templative or yogic ascent; the lengthy and time-consuming surmounting of lev-els taught in the dualist aivasiddhnta is rejected as an inferior path. Instead of in-sisting on a gradual ascent along the hierarchy of thetattvas that requires the yo-gin to master each level in turn through introsusception (sampatti)and then tran-scend it with yogic judgment(tarka)the most important ancillary(aga)of aivayoga,theMlinvijayottarateaches an oblique trajectory through a fifteenfold re-fraction of reality by seven levels of hierarchically stacked, subjective perceivers(pramt). The seven progressively less pure types of apperceptive perceivers (sa-ptapramt)are [1.] iva, [2.] mantramahevara,the sovereigns ofmantralords[3.]mantrevara, themantralords, [4.]mantra, [5.]vijnkala, those freed fromlimitation by [remaining only as] consciousness, [6.]pralaykala, those freed fromlimitation by dissolution, [7.] sakala, the limited perceiver.66 Each one of theseforms of witnessing awareness possesses a faculty, aakti, that when active func-tions as the instrument with which the perceiver is capable of perception. Every per-ceiver acts as a transcendental subject of the objectivised level immediately be-low his own. If we add to these fourteen factors (i.e. seven cognisers and seven cog-nitive powers) also the purely objective level at which things can exist in their own-form (svarpa), we arrive at fifteen refractions (pacadaabheda) thatarepresentinevery ordinary cognition. In Abhinavaguptas non-dualism of consciousness the in-ert own form must also be a form of consciousness. It differs from thesakalaex-

periencers because they possess a much greater degree of self-awareness, some-thing lacking at the level of the quasi-inert own-form, but even this most extrin-sic object must be minimally self-aware.67

If a sakalamanages, through yogic or gnostic efforts, to apperceive the selfwhich is perceiving an external thing, he thereby ascends to become the next typeof perceiver, thepralaykala. If such a perceiver is in turn made into an object ofapperception, then the next level of being a vijnkalais attained. This processcontinues, in a reductive series, to the extent of seven apperceivers. At each stagethere is only ever one triad of perceiver, perception, and perceived, since the lower

perceivers are folded into the own-form, becoming in turn the next thing perceived.The energies of these seven perceivers are explained as a gradual diminishing

and eventual falling away of the limited power of action (kal)and the limitedpower of knowing([auddha]vidy), which are two of the cuirasses(kacuka)thathinder the soul, and their gradual replacement withuddhavidy, pure knowledge.68

What relation do these types of perceiverhood bear to the selfs enjoyerhood?To explain this, aiva exegetes base themselves on the scriptural teaching that

the selfs experience(bhoga)is a type of knowing,69 an idea that is not in origin

66Mlinvijayottara1.14c17b.67Tal 10.9cd12ab.68Tal 4.34cd (omitted B1fol. 84

v,om.B2fol. 37v):sattarka uddhavidyaiva s cecch parame-

itu,Correct judgement(sattarka)is pure knowledge, and that is the volitional power of God.69Paukarapramevara JP 4.132c:yato jntmako bhogo; Svyambhuvastrasagraha 1.12:

bhogo sya vedan pusa sukhadukhdilaka | t samarthitacaitanya pumn abhyeti karma-


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218

JournalofIndologicalStudies,N

os.24

&

25

(20122013)

perceiver instrument of perception defilement experiencer experienc

(pramt) (pramtakti) (mala) (bhokttva)

1. Sakala vidy(limited knowing) ava, krma, vipkabhokt vivid, stabl

[:earthprakti] kal(limited power of action) myya &viayabhokt & continuo

2. Pralaykala vidyandkalindistinct ava, krma bhogayogyat not vivid, u

[:mytattva] & discontin

3. Vijnkala vidyandkalfading ava bhogayogyat totally inse

[:mahmytattva]

4. Mantra uddhavidyemergent, (/adhikra) sphuabheda, discontinua

[:uddhavidytattva] Vidyandkallatent prarhabheda of separatio

5. Mantrea uddhavidyemerged, latency (/adhikra) sphuabheda, discontinua

[:varatattva] ofvidyandkallatent aprarhabheda of separatio

6. Mantramahea uddhavidyemerged, latency (/adhikra) asphuabheda, discontinua

[:sadivatattva] ofvidyandkalabsent aprarhabheda of separatio

7. iva icchakti, volitional power universal identical

[:ivatattva] vivabhokt with iva

Table 2: Thepramtbheda


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exclusive to aivism.70 Already the earliest dualist aivas must therefore defend

the claim that the status of being an experiencer(bhokttva)is essentially the sameas the status of being a knower(jttva).71 It follows that all of the types of per-ceivers, merely by virtue of their being knowers, can also be accepted as experi-encers. This raises two questions. Firstly, what is the nature of the experiencethat the various perceivers are subject to? Secondly, the pralaykalas and thevi-

jnkalas are by definition unaware of external objects. How can they be admit-ted as experiencers, since they do not even seem to be proper perceivers in the first

place?

Thesakalaperceiver, bound by all three defilements, can unquestioningly beaccepted as a consumer of karmic retribution. For non-dualist Trika theorists hisbhokttvacan be considered real to the extent that the individual, limited self(au)is itself real. The reality of the individual self is merely a contraction of the singular,universal self that is Bhairava. This universal self is therefore the only absolutelyreal experiencer of the hierarchy of the reality levels that constitute the universeas the bhogyawhich is itself an embodiment of Bhairava.72 Bhairava, however,evidently cannot be the experiencer of the three defilements(mala), since these arenottattvas but merely forms of ignorance specific to the limited self. Thesakala

perceiversbhokttvais dependent on the fuctioning of the defilement of karma(krmamala), he can rise to the status of being a perceiver beyond the level ofthepralaykalaonly once he has been freed from it. To guarantee that ordinaryaiva initiates, who practise neither yoga nor gnosis, will be liberated after death,this karmic defilement needs to be destroyed. In the ritual of aiva initiation arelinquishing of the state of being abhoktin all future births and on all levels of

the universe is therefore effected by an intervention called the disjunction (vile-a).73

ta ||70The Yogastra3.35 teaches similarly that bhogais the non-discernment ofsattvaandpurua.71See also, e.g.,Narevaraparkprakaof Rmakaha 5:bhokttva hi jttvam ucyate tad

eva ca pramrthikam tmano rpa72Svacchandatantroddyota 4.96ab (Notehere the intertextuality withivopdhyyas commentary

to theVijnabhairava56): eva caikaiko pi pramt bhvo v vastuta aadhvasphrarpap-rameaaktimaydihntaparmarasrhatvirntisatattva parabhairavarpa eva,In this way,each and every perceiver or thing is in reality only supreme Bhairava, whose nature is repose in I-ness which is the essence of the parmaraof the syllabary beginning with a and ending with ha

which itself is constituted by the power of the supreme Lord who has extended himself into the six[ontological] paths. Here the expressiondihnta (a+di+ha+anta), lit. the phonemes from a toha, is here a variation ondiknta,the phonemes from a to ka, and designates mtk,cf.Svacchandatantroddyota1.31cd: mtk pan ajt (em. ajnPed) vivamtara sa-rvamantratantrajananm dikntm iti.Onmtkas the unkown mother see Vasudeva (2004:llii). See alsoParamrthasra5: tatrntar vivam ida vicitratanukaraabhuvanasantnam | bho-kt ca tatra deh iva eva ghtapaubhva ||

73For a concise account see NeTaUdd 4.5cd6ab, see especially:sampteu bhogeu bhokttv-bhvarpa vilekhya saskra ktv. See alsoSiddhntasrapaddhati(ed. Sanderson)A fol. 23r225v3, B fol. 31v3--34v2:bhogbhve mypd bahirnikramaarpa vilea sa-bhvya


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Since iva, as the highest experiencer, lacks the defilement that renders the

individual subject to karmic retribution, we cannot consider him to be an enjoyerof thiskind. Nevertheless, he is accorded the attribute bhoktboth in early scripturalsources, e.g. in theSvyambhuvastrasagraha,74 and in early exegesis, e.g. in theivastra,75 or in theSpandakrik.76 The Saiddhntika author Aghoraiva, whencommenting on such a scriptural passage, avoids potential doctrinal incoherence

by glossing bhoktas a synonym for protector(rakaka)in these contexts. Thisinterpretation is based on one of the two possible meanings of the rootbhujgivenatDhtupha7.17: bhuja planbhyavahrayo.77 Elsewhere he cites thePar-khyatantra which states that ivas enjoyerhood is merely a figurative usage.78 The

Parkhyatantra, however, does not belong to the earliest phase of the aivasiddh-nta, and earlier commentators of this tradition do not recourse to this justification.

Non-dualist authors, on the other hand, are not compelled to adopt this strat-egy. In their metaphysics, the whole of existence can be explained as the bodily self-experience of iva who is simultaneously both the embodied universe and also itsexperiencer. In the Svacchandatantraas interpreted by Kemarja, for example,ivas bipolar manifestation is inscribed iconographically in a visualisation of Um-

pati who represents both the universe as the object of enjoyment, and who is si-multaneously also the enjoyer of the universe. The left half of his body is the en-

joyed (forvmaalso means agreeable, Kemarja: aeabhogyopabhogtmata-y vmam ardham) and the right side of his body is the enjoyer.79

In this way both the lowestsakalaperceiver and the highest iva perceiver canboth be considered experiencers, albeit of different kinds. But what about the otherperceivers, most of which also exist beyond the defilement ofkrmamalabut lack

the universality of iva?Since, as we have seen, the aivas claim that experiencers are knowers, it is

74Svyambhuvastrasagraha18.38:ivo dt ivo bhokt iva sarvam ida jagat | ivo yajatisarvatra ya iva so 'ham eva tu ||

75ivastra1.11: tritayabhokt vrea.76E.g.Spandakrik29:tena abdrthacintsu na svasth na y iva | bhoktaiva bhogyabhve-

na sad sarvatra sasthita || Vivti: svasth nsti y ivamay na bhavati, tata ca bhoktaiva va-ro bhogyabhvena itavyavasturpatay sad sarvatra sasthita.

77Mgendrapaddhatikof Aghoraiva IFP transcript no. T 1021 p. 145:ivo bhoktaiva sarverakaka | bhokteti bhuji plana eva vartate.

78Parkhyatantra2.99ab:adhikr sa bhog ca lay syd upacrata. See e.g. Aghoraiva adRa-tnatrayapark30: tasya cdhikrdayo vasth aupacrik ity uktamadhikr sa bhog ca la-

y syd upacrataiti |79

Svacchandatantroddyota10.1009ab (be237v, 1309

r): tasya ca bhagavato vivabhoktu2 bhogasthna samasta vai tatrastha vmabhgata | vmabhgatovma dehrdham

ritya tatraiva sthitasamasta bhogasthnam aeabhogyopabhogtmatay vmam ar-4 dham, dakia tu bhoktrpam evrdham | eva ca bhoktbhogtmakavivaarro ya bha-

gavn ata eva sahasrabhucaradirpa ||

2 samasta ]] Ked, samaste be1 2 vma ]] Ked1, vma be 4 bhoktrpam ]] Kedbe,bhoktrpm1 4 evrdham ]] conj., evaKed, evrthambe1 4 bhogtmaka ]] Ked1,bhogtmabe


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evident that the higher perceivers must also enjoy some kind of experience. Abhi-

navagupta therefore discusses its nature several times. In the context of elaboratingthe phases of lucidity, he proposes that the hierarchical position of the perceivers islinked to the clarity and vividness of their experience:

When, for an [ordinarysakala] experiencer [1.] the form is vivid, sta-ble and continuous, that is the waking state, for that same experiencer[2.] its opposite is dreaming, which is the experience of the pralay-kala, [3.] total unawareness is deep sleep, which is the experienceof the vijnkala, [4.] the process of ceasing to differentiate [one-self] from the object of experience, which is the fourth state, is theexpe-rience of themantraetc., [5.] the experience of things as non-differentfrom iva is the state beyond the fourth, which is all-transcending.80

To the three perceivers in the white universe Abhinavagupta assigns the kind ofexperience one has in the fourth state of lucidity (turya). More specifically, for theTrika, these three levels of experiencerhood involve a balancing and gradual equa-tion of subjectivity and objectivity, which when completed results in the attain-ment of the highest level of theivapramt(seeVasudeva2011:294297).

The special problem posed by thepralaykala and the vijnkalaperceivers istreated separately. As we have seen, in neither of these two phases of perceiverhoodis the self capable of directly cognising objects in the universe. Thepralaykalaisstill bound bykrmamalaand therefore potentially abhoktof a kind comparableto the sakalasoul, but vijnkalaperceivers, on the other hand, should not be

agentive experiencers of this kind, since for them this defilement is lacking. 81 Tosolve this problem, both of these higher perceivers are, as a pair, accorded a specialdeferred status of agentive experiencers. Abhinavagupta raises this problem in thecontext of a defense of the idea that the status of being a cognisable object (vedyat,lit. to-be-known-ness) is a property of objects (bhvadharma):

Tantrloka[viveka]10.132cd133ab (B1fol. 276r, K8exp. 54):

2 nanv asti vedyat bhvadharma ki tu laykalau ||

manvte neha vai kicit tadapek tv asau katham |

4 pralaykalavijnkalau hi prasuptabhujaganyasamdhisthayogi-pryatvn na kicij jnta iti tayor vedittvam eva nstty carya ta-

6 dapekpi kathakra vedyat bhvadharma syt.

4 bhujaga ]] KedK8, bhujaB1 5 tayor]] Ked, om.B1K8 6 apekpi ]] B1K8,apekaypiKed

80Tantrasra 9.51: ki ca yasya yad yad rpa sphua sthiram anubandhi taj jgrat, tasyai-va tadviparyaya svapna ya laykalasya bhoga, sarvvedana suupta yo vijnkalasya bho-ga, bhogybhinnkaraa turya mantrdn, sa bhoga bhvn ivbhedas turytta sa-rvttam.

81SeeMlinvijayottara1.22cd24ab.


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Let us admit [then] that to-be-known-ness is a property of objects.

But thepralaykala and the vijnkala perceive nothing in the uni-verse, how could it (to-be known-ness) be dependent on their per-

ceiverhood?82 Thepralaykalasandthe vijnkalasaremoreorlesslike yogins in a void-trance, they are like sleeping serpents. Becauseof this they do not know anything, and as a consequence these two can-not possess perceiverhood. Therefore it is strange, that a to-be-known-ness(vedyat), depending on their perceiverhood(tadapek), some-how should be a property of objects?

He responds by claiming that their experience is constituted by theirbhogayo-gyat, or competence for experience. Yogyatliterally designates a sort of suitabil-ity, congruity or propriety, and various translations are current for different con-texts.83 I have translated it here in a more narrow stric sense as competence be-cause Abhinavagupta interprets it here as a not yet activated, latent capacity, thatis, as a synonym ofakti.84

The idea ofbhokttvaas bhogayogyatis not unique to the Trika. Goodall(1998:262263) has shown that the dualist Saiddhntika author Rmakaha dis-cusses two types ofbhokttva: [1.] a specific form that is the state of having ataste only for enjoyment (bhogaikarasikatva)that derives from passion(rgaormoha), and [2.] a generic type that is a fitness for experience (bhogayogyatva)that occurs in thepralaykala.85

Abhinavaguptas understanding ofyogyatcan be seen already in theVkyapa-dya. For Bharthariyogyat, restricted by actual utterance (abhidh = viniyoga),86

is the relation between word and meaning.87 Ogawa(1997) has demonstrated82Jayaratha:tadtayor vedittvam.83See, for example,Renou(1944:66): application virtuelle, conditions propres une applica-

tion ;Rau1977: Angepasstheit;Oberhammer1991: Eignung, etc.84Foryogyatas aktisee Ogawa(1997). See alsoTillemans (1997:164): Perhaps certain

Mmsaka currents of the time had themselves made a rapprochement betweenaktiandyogyat.85Cf. Kiraatantra3.2ab: bhokttva nma yat proktam andi malakraam| Vtti: yad etad

bhokttvam asmbhi prgukta tad andi | yato malakraam ukta tato malasynditvt tad apyandi | etad ukta bhavatianyad evsmn mohajanitd bhokttvd bhogayogyatvalakaam etadbhokttvam | pralaykale vidyate na tu vijnakevale karmbhvt | tasya karmavanmalo pi k-raa pariatamalasya pralaykalasypi paramevarnugrhyatvn na tat sambhavati yata |(cf.Goodall & co. (2008:372)). See also Nryaakaha commenting onMgendratantra 8.88: yogyatbhogayogyat tuvayakldideaklavayovasthdyupalakitam arhatvam.

86Cf. Vkyapadya2.405, Ogawa (1997:508) translates as follows:kriyvyaveta sabandho d-a karaakarmao | abhidhniyamas tasmd abhidhnbhidheyayo ||,The relation between in-strument(karaa) and object (karman) is observed to obtain through action. Therefore [the re-lation between] abhidhna (i.e., abda) and abhidheya (i.e., artha) is restricted through [the ac-tion of]abhidh.Rau: Man sieht, dass das Verbum mitten in der Verbindung von Werkzeug undObjekt steht. Das Aussprechen ist daher die genauere Bestimmung von Wort und Bedeutung.

87Vkyapadya3.3.29: indriym svaviayev andir yogyat yath | andir arthaih sabdnmsambandho yogyat tath || Rau: Wie die Sinnesorgane eine anfangslose Angepasstheit an ihre [je-weiligen] Sinnesobjekte besitzen, so ist die anfangslose Verbindung der Wrter mit [ihren] Bedeutun-gen eine Angepasstheit.


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that Bhartharis conception ofyogyat was originally formed in the context of

thekraka theory. A word (abhidhna = instrument relative to abhidh) and itsmeaning (abhidheya= object relative toabhidh) are related to each other by theaction ofabhidh(Vkyapadya2.405). Since Bharthari takes word and meaningas instrument and object, he also presupposes the participation of an agent, an abhi-dht. This role is fulfilled, asOgawa(1997:507) notes, by the verb, since a verbis treated as the agent(kart). The speaker, on the other hand, is responsible for theactivating utterance that orients a word towards a particular meaning, an activitydesignated by terms such aspraidhiandviniyogaand explained aspravakara-a, ukti, abhisadhna.

Abhinavagupta similarly considers thepralaykalaand thevijnkalato pos-sess an intrinsic relation with the object of cognition through yogyat: the ob-

jects are suited to a future cognition by the awakenedpralaykalaor vijnka-laexperiencer. What is lacking in the present moment is a cognitive activation

by the agent (kartviniyoga), that is, the experiencer is not currentlybecause ofa trance-like cognititive dormancydirecting or applying his cognitive faculty to-wards the object, and therefore no cognition is taking place. But just as thegrammar-ians admit that something might function as a cause based on mere potentiality(yo-

gyamtrat),88 so also Abhinavagupta accepts a potentiality forbhoga, actualisedonly in the future, as a sufficient reason to categorise the pralaykalaand thevi-

jnkalaperceivers as experiencers. For thepralaykalaand thevijnkala, ob-jective reality will, at the moment of their awakening, attain the status of being ac-tually cognisable (prakarea vedyat ysyati), whereas currently, in their stu-

por, it possesses this status merely by fitness (yogyatmtrea vedyat ysya-

ti).89Abhinavaguptas claim is motivated only in part by his need to establish cogni-

tive closure by exhausting the function of each type of perceiver in the Trikas pra-mtbheda, for it also follows from the Trikas savidadvayaview that even ap-

parently insentient things are really conscious. There is therefore no reason todeny that even these two beings possess at least nominally a certain kind of know-ing and experiencing. Abhinavagupta attributes to them a deferred condition ofknowing and agentive experience, a condition that, although it is oriented to a fu-ture event, can affect their status in the present. Allpralaykalas and thevijn-kalas will at some point invariably be awakened by iva from the stupor that iso-lates them, they are classified as bhotsyamna-, to be awakened.90 They will

then be assigned roles as either limited sakala souls or as mantras, mantreva-ras or mantramahevaras.91 This is, incidentally, their only chance for libera-tion, for in their isolation they are stuck, and are unable to either ascend or de-scend on their own. Let us consider as a final passage Abhinavaguptas argu-

88SeeOgawa(1997:505).89Tantrlokaviveka 10.140cd145ab: etasya laykalder etad bhvajta svabodhvasare pra-

karea na tv idnm iva yogyatmtrea vedyat ysyati90Tal 10.133cd134.91Tal 10.135ab.


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ment that intends to make this plausible by introducing a parallel scenario that is ex-

perientially verifiable:

Tantrloka10.140cd145ab (B1fol.277r, K4fol. 11

rv exp. 92, 93):ata prabhotsyamnatve ynayor bodhayogyat || 140

3 tadbald vedyatyogyabhvenaivtra vedyat |tath hi ghanidre pi priye nakitgatm || 141m drakyatti ngeu sveu mty abhisrik |

6 eva ivo pi manute etasyaitatpravedyatm || 142ysyatti sjmti tadn yogyataiva s |vedyat tasya bhvasya bhoktt tvat ca s || 143

9 laykalasya citro hi bhoga kena vikalpyate |

yath yath hi savitti sa hi bhoga sphuo sphua || 144smtiyogyo py anyath v bhogyabhva na tjjhati |

Therefore, because their status is one of beings to be awakened [fromtheir trance in the future], these two possess a competence for knowing.In their case, the status of being a cognisable object is [admitted as a

property of objects as] a result of a fitness for the status of being acognisable object based on that [competence for knowing].92 To givean example: A woman who is keeping a rendez-vous with her lover,even though her lover is [still] fast asleep, can barely contain herself[thinking]: He will see me who has arrived unexpectedly! In the

same way, iva also thinks: This will be known by him, thereforeI create [it].93 At that moment,94 the status of being cognisable issimply fitness,95 and the experiencerhood of the object is of the samekind,96 for who can fathom the strange experience of thepralaykalaand the vijnkala? To whatever extent there is awareness, to thatextent there is experience, [whether it be] vivid, not vivid, suitable formemory, or otherwise, but [irrespective of these attributes] it does losenot its status of being the thing-to-be-experienced.97

92Jayaratha ad loc: ata samanantaroktn nyyd anayo pralaykalavijnkalayo prabho-tsyamnatveprabubhutsuday, samanantarameva vedittvasyvayam abhivyakter, y bodhe yo-

gyat ptratva tadapekay ca yogyatrpataiva vedyatpi dhardau sambhavatti ko nmtra vi-ghaanvaka ||.

93Jayarathaad loc: etasya laykalder etad bhvajta svabodhvasare prakarea na tv id-nm iva yogyatmtrea vedyat ysyatty ato hetor grhyagrahakarpatay parasparnurpa

yugalam ida nirmiomty eva bhagav chivo pi parmatti |94In the state of being a Pralaykala or Vijnkala, Jayarathaad loc: tadn pralaykaldyava-

sthy.95Jayarathaad loc: yogyatayaiva vedyat bhvadharma ity artha |96I.e. a mere fitness, or competence. Jayaratha ad loc: tvatti sukhadukhdyanubhavarpapra-

rohvasthvilakaayogyatmtrarpaivety artha |97Jayarathaad loc: citro htydi | bhogo hi deaklvasthsvlakaydivaicitryea nnvidho

bhokt vyavatihate yath sphua eva sukhadukhdyanubhavo bhoga iti na niyantum ucitam


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In this way, the actual experience of thepralaykalaand thevijnkalaper-

ceivers is removed from their current state of being by two degrees. Firstly, theyare experiencers only in the remote sense that they possess fitness for experience.But secondly, this fitness is itself contingent on their eventual awakening. In theircurrent trance state, however, they only posses a fitness to be awakened. There-fore their fitness to experience depends on their fitness to be awakened. Abhi-navagupta does admit that he considers the experience of the two higher experi-encers counter-intuitive or strange(citra). Jayaratha even calls the claim that ex-

periencerhood could depend on a future contact with experience unprecedented.98

Surely we do not commonly call a child an old man simply because at some futuretime he will be old?99

Abhinavagupta therefore extends the scope of his simile to demonstrate thatordinary language usage does endorse the varieties of experience he has posited.

Tantrloka10.145cd147ab (B1fol.277r, K4fol. 11

rv exp. 92, 93 ):ghanidrvimho pi kntligitavigraha ||

3 bhoktaiva bhayate so pi manute bhoktt pur |utprekmtrahno pi k cit kulavadh pura ||

sambhokyam dvaiva rabhasd yti samadam |6 tm eva dv ca tad samnayabhg api

anyas tath na savitte kam atropalabhmahe |

3 bhoktt ]] KedK4, bhokttB1

Someone who is unconscious in deep sleep, his body embraced byhis beloved, is still called an enjoyer(bhokt), and he himself [whenawakened] considers it a past enjoyerhood.100 Even someone lack-ing bare imagination (or expectation),101 just at the sight of an ele-

asphue pi tathbhvt | eva bhvitym asphuatare pi yogyatmtrea bhaved eva bhogavyava-hras tattadbhoktraucityena tath tath bhogopapatte ||

98Jayaratha ad loc: nanu kim idam aprva paribhyate bhvibhogasambandhanibandhan bho-ktteti |

99Jayarathaad loc: na hi bhvansthavirabhvena blo pi sthavira ity anupacarita yujyatevaktum iti.

100Jayarathaad loc: na kevala mhadaym eva yogyatmtrea bhoktbhogyat (bhokt-

bhogyat ]] B1K4 ac, bhoktbhogyabhvo KedK4pc) bhaved yvad amhadaym apty (ap-ty ]] KedK4pc, ity B1K4ac) ha, The relation of enjoyer-enjoyed can arise through mere fit-ness not just in an unconscious state, but even in a conscious state. Therefore he says

101Gnolicomments that the expressionutprekmtrahno piappears to be the opposite of whatis expected here. Gnoli(1992:258) fn. 5: Invece di-hno pici si aspetta, nel primo pda, unaqualche parola dal significato esattamente contrario: e cos traduco.Thereforehe translates: Taluno,giovandosi della suafantasiae nulla di pi, al solo vedereuna bella donna pensa al suo futuro possessoe diventa d'un subito ebbro di gioia. We could produce this sense by emending to something likeutprekmtradhr apiorutprekmtraniho pi. However, all the MSS available to me transmitthe cpd. unanimously, and it is also possible to interpret the verses api adversatively: If even suchan unimaginative man feels passion, how much more so would an imaginative man (or a vijn-


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gant woman who is about to be loved102before him, becomes intensely

aroused.

103

Another man, even though he might be of similar disposi-tion, seeing the same woman at the same time, [does] not [react] likethat. O consciousness! Whom shall we blame for this?

Vk/Pk M By B Vy V Bhy Bh

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

T-0

T+n

T-n

Figure 2:Bhokttvaand the Isolated Perceivers

On the basis of this distinction ofbhogainto the two modes of actualised (pra-

karea, prarohea)and potential (yogyamtrea), it is permissible for the non-dualist aivas to consider even these two laykalaperceivers as agentive experi-encers through their deferred status of enjoyerhood. The process described by Ab-hinavagupta is given schematically in figure 2.104

TheMlinvijayottara, the scripture expounded in theTantrloka, is innocentof nearly all of the elaborate ratiocination Abhinavagupta imposes on its much sim-

pler presentation of the doctrine of the pramtbheda. But against the histori-cal background depicted, it would not have been possible for him to simply ad-

kala) do so. This verse is meant to explain metaphorically how the vijnkalas, who abide in bareconsciousness (Tal 9.92ab: vijnakeval prokta uddhacinmtrasasthita), can be experiencers,while the previous verse described thepralaykalas, who exist in a kind of stupor.

102The future middle participle here expresses immediate futurity.103utpreketi kulavadhviaya (kulavadhviaya ]] KedK4, kulavadh+++ viayaB1) sa-

kalpa (sakalpa ]] KedB1, sakalpa K4) | sambhokyamm ity adavat kariyamasa-mbhogm ity artha | ata eva rabhasdavalokanasamanantaram evvegavatbhilea (evvega-vatbhilea ]] KedK4pc, evvegatbhileaB1K4ac) labdhalbha ivasamadasambhogasa-mucitm nandamayatm iyd yensya bhoktbhvo bhavet ||

104Vk/Pkis the Vijnkala or Pralaykala. Mstands for the Mantra-, Mantrevara and Mantrama-hevara perceivers. Byisbodhayogyat, fitness to be awakened. Bisbodha, the awakened state. Vyisvedyatyogyatthe fitness for possessing objects to be known, andVisvedyat, the possession ofobjects to be known. Bhyisbhogayogyat, the fitness for experience and Bhisbhoga, experience.T-0is the moment of awakening, where all of the shifts in status occur.


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