.jpecial Sub j ects Jepa:rt.ment IJi'.l-t; ... 6' ~.T .E,.:. .cY Ila•'.i-.t.T. Y ..iC ,1.:u ...

F'ort Bennin··, ieo~p:ia

J:JO:ES T tt~ F. '_, 1·'HT i' 1~;i_H. I 'l-..1 ~l .;i.' , PREP J,,, .-, h~ I ·- _,i•!T. :.::,._ ,I~ ,;.U.w Jl ,-\.':' ... LY _E'OR CCJ itiII .:;'J u 'uf~:iT1'~ - ·.:i . ..:1· \. ··V-~?

Ca.pt Victor I • (obertso -, Jr •

.Fto$ter Nft 131

'l' · BL B u . COiil' r;r·~T S

CE . .••• ..•••.•. •.• • •.••. ••• -.. , • • -•••••• ........... ~'·· ..... 2

Jr..:;cl.i.::>..J u." •.••• ~;·• ... . ......... •. '• ..... . . ;,,; ...... . ....... ,. ;,;· ... . ·~ l.ly.

... ~ ............. _ ... _. ·~ e ~ • . ~"'-. I •••••• ~ Ii . . ....... . .. 15 Iu:INJ:i. B •••• ··~· ....... • ....... ...... . l.? bIELJ:(J...,11.11.Pl-.Y •••• . -.. .•••• .. . . . · -· •....• . ! .. . . . ~·- . • I • e e .. • • ••

1

P EFAC.E

-17 .:.entrirnber lr.t5t

The po n of view expr"es '.led in· this pap~r is t ·hat c:'

the :mthor - r(-trt necessarily tha~ of the United States ;,rnw

I r,fantry ..:chool or the United :-Jt.:1te~ Army.

~h-,.4-~~ VICTOR M. lWBER~. Captain., Infantry

• >' ' • ,

L

I I .i.t0DU G11 ION '

.f· .. ,-

The; Infantryman i s the cut~'~h.g e d r;o of t he sword of ,- ; . ,

mili tary1 might. The Iri,f;~n~P':YJnan ''is ~a1 led upon , i!1i·.:'ti!IT/3

of war w~.· th an .a.·.>rm.:<.e. d ~'demy·, to .fig' ht a v·e·r·· y· 'T'i 0r';~ona~~ · ··1ar i.:;--.e'.!•v'c .. " '' ," : • ".: ;t",;)\! ,. ·'·"'' " · ,·;Ji., ~ r· , ...... · . " .... . .. ,.. . . . ..

;mtli thi+.~n.e'(lly~r~ :foot soldier.. He 1:ieets }.pe -¢.ft:~y a t :tt,:~~Y ', 1 · '· , ., ·' /, ~:"'; '" c•> ·'.

clos-~:; r~~.ea: , <;;g:f~f?P. h an d t o J}a;ri,d. _ h i a pp~iliary<~t.;s·~tqn is

tne :;*~t;a:fu,:iae'::?.~~uct'$o:ri of t h e eriemy h;e~J);ppo·s e§ ~ .

To i~~omr·jjsW;~l\,i!p;,,@ls~~On lje

7 i: .~Ui'~~~4, by . all 0 f

the weapp~s ~-~J_ -~-~_eq,~al .:~ni~_~'- Pfe,e,?~cL~P- ~;~ist --~im i n con -r '•! ,.' J(o I . . "

;~:~:: k: t:~::: c•h ::,:;: ~J;::;:~;:~~;:::::: ;:::k ~UP~ . th

':::''::1~=:~l;:::r:;~i~;::~t.:e ~~r~;::t:~ii:k an e~myjfiorce '~~'Y~~n?'.!1'.~:~ in $~tdng p:o.?iti:~n~s ;(,ind suo9o r te'd

by their dwn tanks. IJ:fo,~a.:t'Ji}r. i t i e c ansi~~red-i:·th@}~:Ythe {be:st. -·-·.. ~;- ~1}

bec~µSe · ~:~'.~:::?Ein:=;~;::tt~~:::;::~:~: ::ly be ~¢::m t~i:::dp::.,:::q:;t:§;11:;~ l ook ·~~ •. $~~hip~ ing whi cp :our Inf an try ;, t~:c·ei:'V;.e,S: <}"fi~b. ::.it;;an~s; ~~ .l:!:~f:~na1:¥:ze ~fl,i s

particulkri,; training , :;~hd 't6"~td.et.~~i1l~ ... ~f th1s ~f.;~in~p,g· i s t ;,;_-.'

adequ,.ate · · It is not -,t,be "·'int'.~nt·i·gir ··6r:~_ th:~r :·a.uthc>r to ¢liscu~s ,- , - "' .. ,,_,,~ ' j,(t'.' ,-~-- ·" , T· ·: - -'. - < , .- .·.';' -"

the re],a. i~ve merits ·of S~!lje ~~o~:-:IBr.ar;toh ·o;-: to ~rgue<:if .~~~~ tank ~ is ·;weappn of the pa st or t}1e .. f uture. I t '.3(;$;;, assumed

.. }~ll~.t/ ~~~~, - is ·"·~ integral part of our military machine §i:fr~' ·"' .. > : • J· t ' '

., .. , 3

. •11 ·· . ·; .,, :_ >r;t

as sudh is t0 play • very majo role in any future wqr .

'l'he te:nn lnfa.ntrYman is no t 1 · .• 1ited in c1efinition to the

enlisted soldier in ti e nf·antry , but includct> his of?f:i,.cers.

'rhe ,~era· oresenu trainin,,,. pro~ram as i11cluded it:t ~h~

subject of t i ;nonc 17raph is construed to meav the train­

inf?: prosr ms desi ::ned to tra ~n the basic . I nfant· )' solnier­

fro ti; e of ind cti on throu-=-·h cr;i-'lPletion of he man euver

or est ins; D, "e of unit tro..inin :; . Additionally , · t i s

realized ~lic:3.g each An-:iy area .ro a;rams training for its

organic U.nl.t~ and thi·9'J' i·s: fre<iuently scheduled .bf th~ .. · :i:tjFita]j-· ..

lation commander. This training involves TO:.:: un:±t-s ,wb'ich : , ·,;- ~ .

are not L volved in elementary trainint:;. This i t'.ra~:h:tng :Ls J: ''· ,

,·

ofte

r,\!'hen an alyzing t h e various trainin g •programs. .• ;,

Tne .:.ntroduction of' atomic ·weapons to t h e battlef'i'eld

of the f iture has caused many ct.anges in our milita:ry doc­

tri e and eve_ organization . Its effects cannot :h.e'. over­

ooked and haYe been considered within £h~' s co:p e of thi s

paper .

4

BIBLIOGRAPHY

.1. Anders• J. D. J Lt. Col. 1 - Inf. J inter­viewed at Fort Benning, Ge,orgia t 23 November 1957·

2;. Blakely, H. w., "Mines Might Make the Difference" Combat Forces Journal, 5: 29-31 1 May, 1§55.

3.

4.

Combat B~lftJ;.ins, extract):! liom (Issued~. s. divisions Korea, November, 1952).

Ely, Louie ilt~.l. The Red ArmY Tod.ax (Harrisburg t'a .. : Thi Military Service Publishing Co. , 1953 ) •

·S:·~-'~ Linton, W • M. , Col. , _GS (CE) , 1n~erviewed at Fort 5enning1 Georgia, l6 Noveinber 1957.

6. Panel ,on Mine Warfare (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Report of panel meet.ing in March, 19.52}.

7. TraiD.inf Bulletin Nr. } (Fort Monroe 1 va~t Qt Ice, Chi.? Qf Inay Field Forces, 21 May 195)).

a. Tra1hing Circular Nr. t~ (Department of thj Army: U November s2},

9. Wa:trs·9n, F. M. and Bridges, Bennie R.i ~. OiAre We Fooling?" Infant~Schoo QuarterJ~v . • l-7-22. JU!v r I -- -- --

18

DS 917.l .131 (1952 )dR

UF 553 .S4? dU

I

Ul66 -.Al3(l95)}dR

!

-!

Dn?:"ing World './ar II, on .:m isL n·l n amer.. Luzon , a

battalion jof Infantry wa s preparing for an -attack~ I ,_

very short time before ~he battc1 ion -was to nrake this I

attack ·a ~ank n a 0on leader reported -t<'> t~ e battalion

comman_der j t~at he w1~s attached for the ope~ation. There l

w*-,§ not ~ficient ~irne for an.y lengt.hy; e0ordinatiorr be-

tween the bfttalion -cq~ander and t.he·· tank I?la:~on leader--.

The 1 .was not f-amili-ar wi:t-h tanks to .a~y i· i ·h decrree

and did n t .r know .~rom his o ·m experience c nd trc inint; the I

best meth d i of employment of this attached ... l.qtcon of tanks •.

So_,, wit-h h~ usual question, 11 1bat ca.n: you ·q,o for Mc?", the

tw9 of±;,,i,9 r:~ made ha;Sty pla~s for the, etnp:J;o~~-nt' ·o.f t,he

tank .Plilr~.,.. Of. When 4he · .atta'Ck c0mmenc·ect t ,he t anks were

la~e o~sing the line of d,eparture, the colpnel felt

that wrre

~f<:tl

oh- ~ ! --

sflf to ~et hi

,drawing mo;re fire .than they w,ere deli verin ~ -_>:

he WflS displeased with the perfor mn.nce of the

Qoµsequently, he ordered the platoon leader

and his tanks out of the area immediately

q.ack. ·This Infantry commander elt, as'·' riGJ come

mo~~ wl5).o - oi not understand what armor can '.db, or what i~~.-' re . that his uni.it was better off Without the tanks. l , '

r~·e Jf~tta~im:1 ,cdqunande~ made a ~tatement that

. wi~h >' e~perienc.e ~.a.nd 'a little patience that r;et­-j

w ~t-a11k-ers .and their problems as well as artillery-

--. . . . 'e~r p,-o<"\blem:s i _ncrease the effectiveness of t~e

-;~··-• .,,,.,> ) It is easi'l;y &e.en...-that combined training be-·~.._

1 ..... " .. ~! F .C~· 'U. •1 ,I~JJINu '~ · , 1... , $2nd 1 Ii~l.' D VI ,;.iIUN J •' ll. -" · G ... ' u _; _'_'. CA u1n1 JL

L .. ,AJJL._ U; T ~.rl.3 3 2D c~~fi.BUlli c...J L.I'H::.il :. Ofi'ice of t he Di vision Commander

Fort Brag,, , t. orth l:arol i na

9 August 1958

Dear Rober tson :

I am ,,._ad to have a try at ans\·re ..... ing your G.Uesti ons , altboug t hey ':are· not on.es .9ii' W-liicr: I have s t rong convictions.

1 . I don 't .feel that the Army is g oing far enough i!! i~a tactical doctrine; , nor .:.n its orn,'ln > atio. , in fac_ing up ·.to the effectsv_ of' the at omic weapon . I believ e a small sel ect, .. mobile and elus ive group , d t h co1nmunicatians per-

i tting it t o caD. I'or --f ire supro!'t, will in- an ato qic oa.ttle- ·--­field be mi litarily stronger t han a more ponder ous force . Cn the other hand, I don 't \.:now t.r.rhy the use of a.to . i cs wi l l have much bear:tng on ~he i ntegr at i on of armor into t he infan-try defensive ;iosition. I Iean t owards the idea of an :.rm com:!)OS{?d of air cavalry ~ artiller y and ar.;;mred units , the l atte r rnost emphat i cally t o i n clude a n or infa t r y . -Y philosophy on.~ t his :'matter :may' be _ arnered by readin.g the i n closure.

'-· .... ·

~ -~. I -C.an '.t answer this very well. ~fl. this di vision we~'i'd'o t ~ have suf:f'icient traini n g with the t~nk battalion on this ost , but on the oth~~ hand that training is not so ef?pentir fYO, an .airbo. r n a ~.J.. : VisiOz+ ~"il( l;6 a l eg J;iifantry ·\l.<i vis.ion.

J . I should say l't _he airborne, as opposed to regular infantrj , i s .. ,ore qualified ;to do practically any battle task by raascm ·of t he fact that ·oµr, soldier is by arid large a heartier s oul and in better physical c ondition: I will say that any infantry suddenly called upon to fight in clos e coordinat i on wit h armor will suffer seriously for lack ;of'. previous trai n ing - and . 13~: will the tanks . · ·

I I Best personal \dshes,

ls/Hamilton ta:. Howz e /t/HA!•HLTOK jH_. HQi, ZE

.fajor Gen.e r al , USA Commanding

( A~tho:r 1 b 11ote: Extract s of t hi s lette r niay not be 'm~d~· - ··­without t~e exprecsed aporoval of the author o~ this monp­graph) .

J.7

. ,.~'lildrf.~v-e :, ~fi;mip.~ted ·po>'S~i~ly .all of the> .iro _

lem~ It.. wbuld

. '.'l .a...f'e ,$:1-~*.·;,"the batt.q),,~on,',,~omman<}.er sorlle ide· -q:r ~- 'I':<-;' :,_,.'" -- ('~,

1 · fY. -c~1 e ~m.ot' to v~l\iab].:y -assi ·1 ·him. in ucco!'.1 -

.... .tJf,~~ ... '.}frl:*-$s;l~~,,;tli:,'~·--a~~~'·Cl. • ·~·· ~writ.tien by ~his co·n-·6 - .. ·--~,

:~:~~~;~:~~ ::::::Eb~ :~u:::~:eG~~-o::~ : .1 cf: "t

:Wf!~l\ r"t··~!l I'.9:.1;'a.nt;r;,rman · 1 th! era o.f Pl: ..,l -L ut 1>on 1.:~rf ~re , 'f±na' i:n.l~~i.r in !). 1.ot._.pl"t ' 13 u··u l J 'l'.t; ·,rJ '[;;f':ti9pr re . .,rt·,

tp me -4a~ring; t ~~ir, . m .i e}.lt.enant ..... ni th ot' the· 999th

Guide~·~~ssi~es: Battali on-. Here i s _rour "utoma ic s~rnc .1~0 ..... ·~ . l ~-;..,- ••. :. ' . - .• "~- ,,,

ri*zeci ~.~c.t~~'¥~c- ~:G':t!·i.vaf;o·r;. Wb.at P,:o you '·''a t .• 1 e ~;o r o 1 ·it li

it~ ': - II wo~~ ~ifse to be sure ~h-at l,; r.·rc.s trained before-;,:''£, ~·

hand: nqt t o '~~al?: - #,jle wi<-bng but:;t;Qn,~ ~i.'(.9": 9 ) I . ;;:~ ,,,. ..

Cqlon el ;<Sw:l.ft;" strozj.gly fe , t.'tla·t. ~he.:r·~ 1:.r s n 1irB ! •',f_· . ;

need rdr mori :and ~nore braining mtb <'!'"1t'.ll:' in Q der to learn I . . . . . - " useful !Bmployment. '" 8:S,l~ it l~ l,~, at t e tj;1:n,~ he TJTote ld s

' ~~i~Y- . : ;;t~,_'.. . ;!_': -~' ,,-,

arti'cl ~ f or the !n~ant;3L-J'o~.nil, 1vo:cnel .swift co.n-clucietl '

tha _. t e " organization of .;~~;e . p~w Ini'antrJ" di vis'ion wi.th. , <, i~' ;1,

;'. '

tank c mpani es in t h e r egi ment , :::in c t~~ b.at_tali·9ns . int.e-

ing t 'l1 ·· opnort uni ty for t his t r aining . n ( 9 : 9 ) Ro;rever., :f:.§il.'

day th~ ~:mly tanks fo und i_~ t he n ew r egfo:ent, t'~~ Infaxitry 1 I

battle' I group, are the on~-s in the lleconnaissan c e Platoon l

and as la:p i nterim we ap on in tl~e Assault Gun Plat oon•:~ lf;l,l~ I

missi o4 ~f this little s e !?Jil ent of a rmored mi ~11t is entirel y

differ, nt from that ;,q~.:. norma.1 armor and t he Inf antrym<1n of

~.he bat't~e group is usually denied t·h. e. _ omiortu,·ity · .. ··.t.<J tratn

·~th t ese particular t A.n k s unless, p~t course> he J,'.Si a

"'!lemberl ojf these platoons.

D sp:j.te the knowledge we gai ned from World War :ti, :t\'1e ! ........ .

ertt·~~e ·· ti.ntcr·t·fl:e .... KOJ:e~n War in relatively t he s~e ·Er£,ate of ,._ .. ..... ;~~t~~~-;·4

6 > · ' •, ".._.,-,

With": t.he general c.0~"1tents of the '"lreser.t nil"in; "r "·-rn ...

under wlli:oh oi;u• Infuntt'Y uni:~;S' train torluy . Tell "u , 1.t;;t

do you think qf r,J ose 'I'O~r:uns i wof ar as ,;.1-e ti .. e llotted

to tank .'.tnd :fn,;f.'a.n,try tr'aining as · co .. bincd t.eam is concerned.

Ans ~ I j;)::rir.ik there Is a def·· ni te lac}: o1' in·~crE::st anc1

cffo:·i; put iritQ ·tank-irtfa;itry trair.ing t·xlay . 1 s l recall ,

·~ ne"Ver did train with -::n: ar nor at night no with t.he·ii in

r ,do!rf,t believe t:'.'!at the trai Lr p!'Of.~I'aJ~S ~· ,_,. '·~'

provid~ or reqtli'rEi enough ;pM-e for nft'mtr, ·'en to 1 ork ·.-r:'.. th

tari"ks and earn t ,o u t. e t ii cm .

I beL.eve th t tan :ers vo1 ld like -r.o • •orl •:.ri t

us bec a1 . se they ·now tr;:it thev n8f'ci us f'or their cJ ose o-

tection .

I pe.rson~f];_:v !J~~·:r· that ::1orc train.:..n : ~ho:.ild be

conducted With tankS. ' t.:b, 'etlable i.,hc ::cc ' " .nc ~ e · r officers . -- '),~,,.,,~~ -· z

to knov~ h01;· to operat_e vn.:t.?,.tar.ks in COT.bat . .u ):t no;..r, I

don't believe the_y, do ..

Another type of <t,rai.ning i.rith the t.::in!rn r: ·ch

ib~ necl '!;Ct.ed i 5 he ro e of Infantry with t Tn : s e ·- lo-:red i L

riot COl!'ltroh, ''ny unit may be ·-C·¢11ed, on, .-,to. hai.dl.~; !'.'. riot

at -~?-IlY ime ~ and

ready .•

I have examined the,_~~b.oie 'interv;i .~w - _a.na,'' :t:~nd it -vo be

an ace it'ate -ae,cotirit,:· of fo'~ :5ii·t~·r;iew q~;naucied ;'·bn 6 ...ieptcmber ' · · · ~tc- .. ; - ~- ''

,, \ ua -~~f~~ , . . ._,s~iNt~Y'r.t= ~ 'it~s·;r .- >, .

· _c:~ptar,lh ,. :r~f 9ll.ttiy' -;~··,

1958 .

(Author .:>. :!ote: Ca"itain Jtarley ;!: . Ad.a.""!ls' is \~i. hoLd~r O.·~]th; Congression;:il ltedal of Eonor >•rhi.ch he wor in Korea while a

ember of the l9t :'1 Infantry , 24th 1·1i vision . ) ·· ·

r ~- ---·· -

16

1 1: &'> ; ~ofar as ~.he Inf ant "'}'lnan s _ ro ·l ed ·u .f he

1cnt o_· a.t· w~- · d a b i l i t y to use i t \fll.3 con c e r ne . •

a cent i1 tery· ~w with , apt.::i1 .::J t r le~: T ,. .'.dam"' , 1.old _ -

ci' the " Medal .of Honor ·1:K a vet - r £:n o:f . · ld

.., !:e lJre. n . r ,. Captain . d-9.~ - made ~t qt i "".e c l8 r

t t :.o i { 1·ot, fe 1 t .:i.t we ucr e any better !_:.i:re a r ed to

u ... c i. "!l : . ~ i n ..._ ,, . 0 1 EJc : . 1 t an We\ ' . .rere ini t · all in . orl

It i: s l:i s exp e r· e 1ce that t.l e s .:al l i.i t

r:c..:m~ nder., i .nQt. 1·no'· eno n tr c cont): ol · .1. employ..:

tJnt o f t lml'- s to. be ab:. e \;O effic · ... ntly 1 t.i.. l .::. ze .. hem in

cor:bat . It i ~ his oplnion. t. .at tod.ay C,.pJlltnanders ·a,~>@ rio .....

i .t.ere~ted, :i,n ,;oi g out of their way to train their un.: ts

to become iProficient in .he u.tili~ation o.f armor ~ .:n ·nter-1

estinc; not~ is that Captain Adams m.enti-0ned the tank-infantTy

trainii . . = fpr riot control~ He .feels tb9"t any unit mriy t e

Called Up0r 1

tO quell a riot ;'ajl.0 that it SbQUld Certainly be

ready. He ; feel s that t. e train inf'. pro ·:rams neglect ti.i s

particular; phase P_so . Captain Adams indicated that h~ I .-

does not. b~lieve the. our current training r r o6r a ns are

geared ~o ~eveloping the necessary proficiency of" the tank­

infantry tt~· Gertain y a s wars prog;ress and our '1\<;ti· coi)C;

tinue t ·.q o!}erate with tanks they learn '~.o obtain the '1os t . I .

from thi.s ~e~ and becqmt) an ef~icient i, ting fore~~ Why I I I

must we wa1t1until we arc engaged il). war witt a r~l ~nemy,

shooting r~a+ bullets , rind sus aini.£ roa casual ies befo e

we suddenl 'Qecome aware th,at i:re have nc i:lected trai r. ir. g ·

conjunctio

I . this particular area?

hJt traini~g does our Infantr. soldier have ~fij i.-rith tanks? The enlisted Infantryrnan is f:i,rst I d tanks under ATP 7-200 , Army Training Progr~n

7

ANNEX. - INTERVIEV ,fITH _;,,-""';.i,,I. ~'R L.c..'i l.' • • dJ: .., , .. Difr. t.: 3, FORT BEN1H,Ntf,, 1 .. ~L·. ,,,J..11 .

Qu.es: Caotni.n Adams;, ho · much sery-!.;:;e h ve you?

Ans~ Jixteen years- total \ i.tb seven as a com'ili ""'ioned

offic~r.-

Ques : Have you 11 Yer co:-- :c n ecl a~ Tnfant.ry ri ~·1e ~i:·n ­

pany, and i.:' "'O Phe:-e ar.d ··rhen?

Ans: Yes ,, I did,. I co:nma ded a co:~-p~my o 1e 3 d

'e-;iment from J ~nua y 1957 thro 1-1:'1 i:J rch 1958 .

Ctues : In your e>rneriences as a rifle co.,. an~· co::mtander

in garri son 'id vou ever tro.in 'tit .. t.::ir k~?

Ans : Only on t,·10 occa.:>ions . Llnce ;-:r-is in a nornal

ycle ATP and he other tti"".e WA-S- in training -or riot ccn­

trcl • 'J.lh·e cycle traininll" WaS directed by regi.nent 'ln<t CG:il­

pany co"1. ..... a~1de.'s ilt' ut.e t.l:ei~~ :9~n· problems . ThG trai:'l.i. ,~; 1,.:as

rather limited .

t ~ 1 ... . -- ~

oc:cas· un ~-~ tol fi ht along w.i:th t"tnks?

On1 y otclce during a wi:thdr.awal and .~e. ':!ere mostl:/

riding them at th~t time . ·-.

Ques: Do you feel that you and your men 1e::-e quali -

fied to fight ui th the!I unon first meeting?

I was famili a r wit~. emplo;•in.:; them due t/o my ,,. •:1,

experience ..-~~th anks in .orld ~rar II . _I have .great ccn-

fidence in them and like to employ them . However, many

comr..a.nders of units oi' rhy reg ·mer:t did not kriow ho·"' to

e'!!ploy the. ar:d to control the ... .

ues : Captain Adams , I believe that }ou-are fmn{ iar

15

. ~t

!

ek bf training by th time e meets th~ tanks and is in

t platoon . ase of' basic unit training . Now 'he is taught

tha rote "Oi' tank~ with infantry; m.11tual su.pp ort with t! c infant :Y-tank tearn; co por-. ~i ... n ~ conunand,, control, and cotn-

~.· .

munica , ion~ of the .in.f.a.ntry;..tank team; methods of at:tac.k, '· ·:•- ""; ~ "•'w .' ......... ...._..,

conduct of the attack , C\nd re.o~ganization Md preparation

"ot' Cotltinuation of the attack; a field exercise· .!.nvoJ vine

~:, rifle platoon operating "4.th a ul.:itoon of -t?Jtks 'tQ l""ing

0'~11~ th~ }?1"inciples of t.he am.411 infarrtry-'tfoUlk team l.n

attackt Communic Ftions et.-raen tal1.k and infantry Qlements

'·dll bf stressed • .ft ( 2: 44,45) i'or th~s traini~ ATP 7- 200

author4zes eigrt hours. ApprQX,imately t hree weeks later

.1hile in the oompany pha~~, the soldier receives six __ ours l .

rore of infantry-tank team, in att~ck. The only ai~ ·8 e.ce

betweet this trai :in ~ ar.:d that -i :ven p~eviously is "that the

exerci:ke i involv~s the ~n-tire company and includes the I

breachtng of an anti-tank minefield. ( 2 : 50) No:t!e that a.11

of the training mentioned here ~is l i .ited to the offense,

a d hough it is dependent upon the individual commander,

it .is ot required that anY tr~ining be co~dU:c.ted at h;ht . I

There s i no requirc ~ent th,.at s:!..1!fulated conditi ons of Bt0 ·.i c

warfar~ ~xist . A~though 'A1'P 7-200 includes the rifle company o:f he

I

airbor*e diiJ.sion, current TOE's exclude al~ tanks from the I

airborfe division . Each Infantry division has one t ank

battalton organic to its organization, and these tanks are

quite tnfrequently furnished to the battle groups for train­

ing with the Infantry. : The airborne division must arrange I I

with at f1rmored unit, if' available , for tanks :~jjp ~~b:~ pro-

vided o the di vision to enable its Infantry ~Q recei::Ve., _

_ <;:OJ:Tlbin d t-ra;i:ning. Obviously in this last sJt_uation tanks

·,·k1ways available since thef ·traini-ng --mis.!=;i.pqs of tt-fe

After conside 'ati on of' -r.he r•esearc r-;:i turi l : s p:::·e -

,., ... e 'l v "1ir ono["r. ">h , and · deli ti n~~ r e'•din · ot

r cvritt ~e ..... i ncd , ..:.t is" t e o in i on o the ' 1:.-~hor ... la

... _ r 'l · en t. r a i r:i i_.,. ~ro .,..am of t he \.Jn i t ed .Jt .tes l\r: ny do es

'1 ~t l"'epa"' e I n.fr, it r. ·.n adeq ::.tely Jc · c •o;bin°d er o.-

ti ,. s i ii a,r; or. 'ri.i:c, opin i on i · "~ ed.:.. c ·~ t ed ·.i oa the

f o

l . Tr....,i i.:1 o Infn1:tr. ,,-i_ t h ta.~ ( --. $ 1 st o t; e_.

l1:m.i. ted off ensive ma neuv·e s or e 11~ o:;ment .

2.- t- ou~h it is ch.men e1 t u on t.1e i1 .i Yidunl

co"lm n· er, ~ra nir:!g is mcst -often • i.1n i t,;eu t o liours of day-

light.

3. Infantry uni ts have VPr: lit~le opportuni y

to train \fi h tan~ uni t.s -o-v-er a :prolonged period so n.t

the Infantryman might b-e: mat.le aware of' the problems '"hicl·

confront the a'?'lUored lJ#i't's.. For exantple , proble. s such ., s

1?he log' s-Uical apd maintenance requirements \·thich bu~den

tank uniJt$.

I 4. Tl.e ef:t"ects Pl'l tanks of' ::lto'TliC att e.field

co'hditi ns is n ot presented t o tne Infantryman so t at he

might a the position of tbe Armored unit ~n the

5 . The major cause 0£ the· lack of surficient

training under t e conditions listed above is that current

training progr ams .ao not- ·allot. Infantry units adequatE?

amounts lo~ time ror c6mi>lned training.

14~"

0 t

d r

'lh ~nk s ar uti · zed r e -

e ior.

0 th on ... ·o of t l i.::i r nrent o:~ . · io •

l"' will h b l' re the t . '~ 1 again be employed

airb¢'nl$ division.

dam

1 t. in i.:L ~ i..;ond ict rJ the ir or a battle group

nual ~Ii inin as~ . In re '' o " t"" e!' written 'to io

c 1 'lt.on din eral of t .. C' $.2nd

Airborne •iv·· nion, Gene 41 Howze bad tht: following ~ say:­

"In thia . di vi .. o we d.o not. nave su!i'ieient 'tfraining ·with

the tank at a io on this 1)0,sty blJ.t on ·the other hand -

n t no ~ssential t-o an ·airborne diV'i:sion ~s o

a leg inf ntry iVision . "()) He c ·ntinuod by stating "that

any · y callc upon to f'ight in close coordi­

n ion wit ~r or . .n. l suffer ;S9r1ou'.Sly for l~ck of p1~evious

tr inin~ ~ an so r 11 tbe ,tatika,.u{3) . '

As .as een ·o t ou.t,previously tank-infantry

t a· nin"' und • the elc:ncn, . Army 1'raining Proeram is

to off ei\ s · e employm.en.t. Only when ct>nducting training tests

ed ad't"anccd W'lit training .are Ini'~try units n •

them in .. h defe sc . New battlefield tactical

concepts envision nfantry units in an ev~r-increasing role

of mobile defense . :Jeca se of lethal et1·ects of t he odern

ato.ic wea)ons, u .:.t 11 not b~ able to maintain the

offense at his ovn discretion. Ene ·es may constantly re­

vert from the of£enee o the de£ense and baek a~ain to the

9i'1f_~E$.e in order to gain the :advantage over the enemy .tn

9

of con"t.rol a. d close coordination v.riL spell

succ~sa or .failure of !:iuch an opera ion. Obviously ~ only

by continuous integrate:i ·:tra.!..nln.[! H-111 thi 5 be ac't;ievetl.

If the present tro.in1.ng pro ~:ran p:roµares thB Infa. try·· an . ....._ . . . . - .... - . - '

ad.e£-u,'1tely ~or co ,\bi _ed o era ions · ·ith armor t wl y is it

·, .i.rti;..:i.lly impossi '.:ile. t.o ,.. .i.nd a favcrable indo.r·sement of

t. e traini:ig pro.1;;.·r;;i.m a~ it now s ... a.nds?

- --r-- --· ~- -~ ----- ----.....,....,.... - -- --.~~·--- ... -..,.... . --...

t> 0 Ullit re not coordinated to . utually support one another.

lly wren nn I nf'a . try battle group is p ep rin · f'or i t.s

tl t 1a · ninrr test, a company of tanlrn is provJ.ded from

t he tank oattalio •.. 'rhe t anks are u t ilized durin~ any pre ­

test training or rehea sals conducted. T.m!kB re utiliz.ed

c:uring the concluct of ~~'E( trainin~ test, but after co01r,leti.tip

.they ore 1returned to '1 t;l;ie control of their paren~ orr;ani zntion . , ,,.;

l t wi ll be t a.n::l . ~6nt.~~ ha,i;pl"e the ·t:ep.ks "Ldll a gain he e;-tp o yed.

in rainil\~ -u~ej_1;e~·, ;tf':''t:hen• ±ii an f1 i.rborJ1e di visi on'

'l'hsy are

'.lJlQ~ 8111 lo;Yed in th .¢on.du~h o,t' ,·'~~e a±rbo1'l~ battle grou) I ;· . T:·~f/·.r· -· " .· ' -. ' ,;

annual tra:i,nin ~ :toe~. In·~eply to ·;a .. :l-e-tt·•r 1·rritton to .:ljor

General mnilton R. ':Howse• commanding ~eneral of th_ S2nd

Airborne i v:i.ai,on, Gin.er~:£' Howa·e had ;Cl\~, E-6_~1-o'\4.l)g: o say:.

" n this divisia. \·:c do not h ve ~~tii'c-ient t:l-~i.1,11.b:~,'\Tith .c, .

the tank battalio on t.h1$: post , ·l)~t;Tt]Oi, t l e ot,~r ·hitnil thti;t " ~'.:~;' ". ' ' , ·,,:;; . ~'',;~ .· .. '.

t.rainine; is. not "'0 asse u i t:L to n:r'6o;rhie divi.sion:·:n's to

a 1q inf ntry di viSiDri '"( 3) 1-!c ~?i~~~nueti· ~:;~i~ti_~.g "tha:t

s~tlo enly cal.::l.er up~ t'.D ff~1!. tn:·close .. co9rdi.-'f--·:_ __. _-- ,.. .

:naition with r. or Wll:'i $U;!fer $f>rt:QU:.S~'Y ... or la~.lc of pr.e~'9iis train.:.ng ... and so •,rill t e t~~-~ 1(·.i·} ·.!'. ..:. . ·>)F'

As has been poi t e out ~~Vio~~y~ ;~ank~i~:!;'az\t,ry; ;£;/ ,-,- - - );~ ·_~;2;};- --·~ "*t" ·-· -•. ··,,;/·. - . ~-- :,;·- . <.. -~:~' ·'

training under t.he •l&filitary · ~Y ·-:;:atl!1~t, P:r~uanhis l.i)Tti,ted ;_ -. - - -' -- - .,~:·.: -·~~?;' . . - ),~ ,. - '\( , _ _.;( to off e .. si ve emolo)~ ent . ':Only ,.,·hen :0<;1ndu9tmg ,:,;-trai~ing 't/~sts

, >"':' ·,... •

and sus t.a · ned adv..anc~ unit training are ~itfant.ey· urti ts.' apt ; }" :'· . . ~

to utili2ie them in t 1e de!i&nse~ ,, liew ~-~t~efi~~d:~tap~i. ca1:

cone ept s en vis i on Infantry unit.a in. ~ ·~ye);-~in~reasi.:~g ro::i..e ( , ' .·· ... ; • ~>-·:'"! ,, ;

of mobile1 defense • ... .Beca~se :0£'.i:Cethal ettects_. ~i /~he mD.de~ - . -. - . . ''.. t :". ,._ t":. ·:~_, - ., ~~-'-' ,..

atomic weapons, a unit' will not ~be" a~J;~~,·~q .. Jt}<\~t}t~in."t-h.e . ~~;: ··,-- -:;-.·, - ·;,- ./ .;-

pf;f!~~,e; art his o\rm discretion • . ~~.~e,!3: ni~Y., 99n,9·taµt~y ~r~ .~ ~< ¥, ( ,_,,. ·,-;r.._ j• . , - -

vert .from the oi'fen.C\e to t;lle (:l~et1:.$:e-' and '\;;~ck; agai11 ' to the,. . . - - . -- ·-" ~-,;,.,, _.,. . ~

.or~~Si.~; iiI1 order to gain the advanta~e o~~~ - ":tli~ enemy ,_. -,,. >

9 ) {-)

be more occasions when they will be t h an v!hen

they Infantry 11 ds tanks and .t anks n e ed Infantry.

ihen a rifle unit has the .-:i ission of' fl nnk f;Uard1

:-:idv·m ce

gua.rd 1.J r~ar gU:_a;d or 'lt o.Jt c::uard, it recuires a r '1or 6Upnort-. '

m.:u1ks ~re .frequently needed in the attack, the def ens e an d

t h e withdrawal. Eacl1 of those are -. different operation "' d i

requires specific knowledge of that :)articul c:tr t_, e o. cr~ -1

.,i o • I OonduGting these operations with armor should c ..,!Je j

rul e r'3.ther than the exception. I

Fpr the pfl st six years the ut. r h s verved in 'ti,:; ,

combatrready u..11its . ~pproximately v ... •o :"nd one-hR.11' yc"r"'

'1el'e spent as a c r,impany commander of I f·,_nt :.· c1its . u. i g

thi,a t~ltje the a\l.thor h~s ~l"ai.nrui several .groups o.f · ~v~mc . ~ lndi vi· ual Trainee:;;, completed severa;l 1-ost Cycl-e r .'.1 i nin!'"

1,· 'th

to r

'including maneuvers, .<ind. has parti cipat ed in numerous I

exercises. Duri. :! .all of- tljis time, rai r" r · conducted

was don_ onl¥" a .few ":. .L lo,::<' . n :s were

·..ri th \1 h i. ch <.:o train, g enerally allowed

with the Infantry unit on ' a :t.ew hours . ~ach ti.ne

were employe_q there e"'e - a.1_.7 errors mag.e, but t. e

schedules did not ~er:iit enou r l t~me to repeat th w

or roblem and -, '."rofit by the i nitial r<Jistakes.

a platoon or even a section of ·tanks a t t ached

¢ompany for one of its . ~nny Training 'l'ests . :"et

battalion test was taken, a platoon of tanks \·m s

fo.c qne ,,irr rnore of the three mandatory nha ses: the

def en e ~ night withdrawa l and the daylight attack . ':f'li. re .... o­

spect it sec'1s 1.ncredible that more trainin,r:; with armor was

not ctnducted.

ol repeat this theme again, both tanks and Infantry

must n~erstand_ e~.l'~h o-c;.her ' s capabili ti.es and limitations

i£ th~1 are to be ab e to conduct a combined operation.

~ l 12

omplo inr, th

article ti .1 rl , Tl e Ev1 n tr" : , ·o ·cd 'l' .. · c'", •1

me'nted tl:).~t 0 ' 'f, I ny : e !'S i

ann-ored n c.: •• "' r c~ r nd , · :- -. ~ tlo to ule 01t

lu-eely "

!iYllal!li c J .i

f dcfens n~ ~ ~j rft , er tl n

p r;

Cl

c well-suited ~

i ·. t c the ·

flu.in and where

tpe- ri.;1- ., ' t ·ot:al annihilat.io11 .

rcQ c.Jl'i c i ve to describe ar.m.ored forces •. ::.; cinJ_ r 0 ' '..,

t e!' .o d~fin~ t: 1 a.; bi .~ . ' ( 5: 31 i

i:xperience' r m iorld ,'~ I

n ed 'o:i.· r.(') " n~. ~1·t tra ni·1

• c . '() C" ~ ,.<.; :·"""'"" i f •

s :

c ·--,

n t, 1 . e u ... t _eave beh~nd .. . r "'l ·:.... _. • ::it ·c ..

WOa!lOTIS that ·re 0 ten use in s·up!)ort . , I iG diffic\.1.l '- to

e'1.p y annor during darkness and z:'equires considerable

t::-a 1 .inr by both t e Infantry and t..he ar ... r personnel. I

A 01 \· J tb other ty e co~ bn mission.~h the, Infantrynian

cot:.ld icarn to tt-..c c •. d.th tank~ .at ·night ., As Ca1)tain

RO"b~rt "" · S .. ith urotc > 't .e attacking fore~ to fl1~i. t:l·.1. h"

Momentum .zai . cd i 1 da:rlii:ht oper:a.tioris" may C<J - tinuc the

attack at ni 3ht .( e : 66) Captain _Smith continued by wri t· ng

that th.is 1 cont .:.nued manc:uver pre~.rents the enemy fro 1 :re-

org;a .iz' e; 011 newly occupied ~fen.~i\re positions during

the I night , wh · l e ma nt airting the at t- ac ~er s advahtage of

_o

t

the ittitiative , 11 ( :66)

''The so of tanks ' ·th -11f nt~ .r _ ·i".!.,.

ui.: er· o it~· ove h· .n[u:u6J

t l · t t:;i .i.s he be sed t n · ht t.o · ~.:.zc

c i '! l"l uir ...'.

c 1

l

b-r ' ...

onc _;:J rr 1 otir letst. t :J w1rs clc on ,trate: t' 1t t is s rot

t . tlontinent:al .r Cot: end · n i' l ,.

di c..,e .. l · t nl · ibat ur-1.Lts c n •ct t _ ._ ...;t t " t:·-

thr ee percat of all tncticnl t L ·.t ,]_tho T,

3~0

used f or tro..:.nir~ ~ the old ln..:'v..rtr:,r re .i.rne1 t o co'"1b· t

-ne.s.s r equired o . l~· oit"h-;;.. .o ·rs of t· _ <- il f 1 r:· l · ·ht

tr~i i 11 f. 'l.t lat.oon and co1 :1.: ny 1 ,, 1 .

u li~hc b~ De ·rt: cnt of tl.e

.. Art.ny J " ornlined errs Un'tJs ln ... t '"'lie .. ·4·f re 11 ( 10) 1l1!i$

.ci-r-cu.l.9,r · .Showe a def in· te .ee fi.~r i .;;..:n 1. · in lirJ-.:. of

atomi·c bat t l ef' eld c nd ·t i n, • ..f er r eudi s publi

<fation i t bee· mes .1p:i;3.!' ·~nt h'-t h'3 •n jority of our p csent

A;i'P ' s: are 1 ·1c:~ · n .- in ti · "' _i l d . uf ccu se , m n~· o:: -Le

ATP ts whi ch v:crc t csi .-;ned f°or uni s r · !d ::::ed unce ·

tria gular co1 cept have 110-:.. ye'C been re .rr.:.. ttcn +-- , ,. , h ' . pentO'mJ.·c .. 'Yorn:cmizc.tions . -:. crh~ ps 1 e n

:Ln ;-'thls :area' of considorc.c .. ion '.·ril be ,;i 1 e: • . ~ ~ f· r~ · ·

1;hi,.s is a ccompli she d , :the ,,'"P , s as v:rri tten n .C:

are t he res ent guides :.,t; o training vri t hln the ttct.ive arri/.

Al'e there many occ · s· ens · n com at i.·il.en t<.n k s ;,;r l b

e:nplaye~ wit h I nfantry ? h e ans •..,rer to th.:.s is qui t 9 o v · ou:;-; .

11