jen experience and jen philosophy

American Academy of Religion

Jen Experience and Jen PhilosophyAuthor(s): Thaddeus T'ui-chieh HangSource: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Mar., 1974), pp. 53-65Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1461527 .

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Jen Experience and Jen Philosophy THADDEUS T'UI-CHIEH HANG

I. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE MEANING OF THE WORD Jen

N the ancient texts of pre-Confucian China, the word jen appears very in- frequently: in the three hundred verses of the Book of Odes it appears only twice; in the twenty-eight chapters of the Book of Documents it appears

only once; and on the oracle bones it does not appear at all.' However, in the approximately 2500 years since Confucius, this word jen has become a household word in China. One could not do without it in daily life or in discussing morality, and even in cosmology and metaphysics it would be difficult to avoid the concept of jen. The diverse uses of this word suggest, on the one hand, that it has a very popular application and, on the other, that its application involves several dangers. When used in different contexts, the word tends to change in meaning. In modern times this kind of situation is anything but uncommon. For example, everyday words such as "freedom," "peace," "democracy," and "people" have quite different meanings when used by different people. The dis- similarity in meaning of the term "God" in Spinoza and in Thomas Aquinas is significant indeed. Aristotle long ago pointed out the various meanings of the word wcva (to be).2 Although the usage of the word jen is not as complex as that, it still requires analysis.

Without going into the etymology of the word jen, we may observe that its most fundamental meaning is the earliest experience of interpersonal relationship. The jen in the Book of Odes (Cheng, Shu yu-t'ien), "Beautiful and jen," simply has a descriptive quality. Here the jen is possibly a description of a kind of aesthe- tic experience. The jen discussed by Mencius has already been enriched in meaning by focusing on essential human nature: "One who is without natural compas- sion is not a man" (Kung-sun Ch'ou Part I). He further states: "Jen is man" (Chin-hsin Part II). The word jen in The Analects of Confucius, on the other hand, is given a different meaning in the sentences "Restraining oneself and restoring temperance constitutes jen" (Yen Yiian) and "One should take jen as his

1 Ch'ii Wan-li, "Jen-tzu han-yi chih shih te kuan-cha" [An Examination of the History of the Meaning of the Word Jen], K'ung-tzu yen-chiu chi [Collected Studies on Confucius] (Taipei: Chung-hua ts'ung-shu pien-shen-wei-yuan-hui, 1960), pp. 273-85.

*Aristoteles Graece, Ex Recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri, vol. 2 (Berlin: Academia Regia Borussica, 1831), 1103a33-1103b10.

THADDEUS T'UI-CHIEH HANG is Professor of Philosophy at National University of Chengchi, Taipei, Taiwan, and holds the Ph.D. from the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy. He is the author of four books in Chinese and two in German, and he has recently delivered lectures in Fulda, Mainz, and Kbnigstein/Ts.

53



54 THADDEUS T'UI-CHIEH HANG

own task" (T'ai-po). This, then, is not the human nature shared by all men in common; rather, it is a moral level attainable only after an existential choice has been made. (That in the Doctrine of the Mean and in Mencius the meaning of jen is different has already been pointed out by Tuan Yii-ts'ai in his Shuo-wen chieb-tzu chu, chap. 8, Part I.) Finally, jen also has a metaphysical meaning, as found in the phrase "jen and Heaven-Earth are one body" from Ch'eng Hao (Ming-tao 1032-1085). Although the above four usages of the word jen are different, they all denote a common basis in some respects. These four meanings can perhaps constitute a ready-made "system of jen":

1. the earliest experience of jen 2. the theory of human nature as embodied in jen 3. the existential choice of jen 4. the metaphysical meaning of jen

II. THE EARLIEST EXPERIENCE OF Jen AND HUMAN NATURE

Since the word jen began to be used largely at the time of Confucius, the explanation of this word found in Hsii Shen's Shuo-wen chieh-tzu, compiled between the reigns of Emperor An and Emperor Huan of the Eastern Han Dynas- ty (second century A.D.), is not too far removed from its origin, and thus this explanation is reasonably reliable. The explanation of jen found in the Shuo- wen chieh-tzu is as follows: "The word jen (o_) means affection and is composed of the word man ( A.) and the numeral two ( -. )." Tuan Yii-ts'ai com- ments on this text in the following way: ". . . interpersonal relationship ... this

relationship between two persons refers to you and me, a term of endearment. If there is only one person there can be no relationship; if there are two persons, then there can be mutual affection. Therefore this word is composed of man and the numeral two."3 Hsii Shen's and Tuan Yii-ts'ai's explanations are confirmed through the word jen itself. Further, to date no one has voiced opposition to their interpretations. Jen expresses affection between two persons; consequently, these two persons identify each other as "you" and "I." The very theme of Martin Buber's famous book I and

Thou4 was precisely that which Tuan

Yii-ts'ai expounded one and a half centuries ago. Looking at this in terms of personality development, our modern day psy-

chologists see, as never before, the importance of the earliest experience of inti- mate relation between mother and infant. This is the earliest social relationship experienced by every person. From this point of view the statement from Mencius, "Jen is man," has already received adequate verification, because man, from the earliest stages of development, feels the need for others- he requires

8Tuan Yii-ts'ai, Tuan-shih Shuo-wen chieh-tzu shu, Ching-yiin-lou edition [An An- notation on the Shuo-wen chieh-tzu by Tuan Yii-ts'ai] (Taipei: Ch'i-ming Bookshop, 1961), chap. 8, Part 1.

'Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Scribner's, 1958).



Jen EXPERIENCE AND Jen PHILOSOPHY 55

"interpersonal relationships" not only for sheer survival, but also for emotional

security.5 He feels the need for companionship with other human beings. Only in this way is intellectual and spiritual development possible. Once the child has grown up, interpersonal relationships become complicated. There are opposing interests and the external influences of the adult world which tend to form the regrettable circumstances referred to in Hobbes' "homo homini lupus" and the "war of every man against every man."6 Nonetheless, if each person scrutin- izes his basic nature, he will realize a very fundamental fact: mutual affection and the communication between minds constitute man's happiness, whereas isolation and misunderstanding are the causes of his misery.

In compliance with the experience shared by all men alike, Mencius is right in using "Jen is man" (or jen is what man is) as his definition for the human being, unlike Aristotle, who defines man as a "rational animal." The meaning of Mencius' statement, however, requires a more thorough explanation. It should not imply that hostility does not exist among men, but rather it means that impulses and behavior contrary to jen will not enable man to fulfill himself and will in fact cause him to drift further and further away from his own nature. Fromm's Man for Himself seems to substantiate Mencius' notion of the goodness of human nature in considering "creative love" to be true self-fulfillment. This kind of love encompasses both love of oneself and love for others.7

We must discuss briefly the question regarding the compatibility of the concepts of human nature and evolution. The concept of evolution which is widely accepted by biologists negates the idea of an unchanging human nature. The present stage in human evolution is the result of past stages and, relying upon the old, it moves toward the future. And, just as Teilhard de Chardin points out, "L'6volution ... est une montee vers la conscience."8 Therefore, the reflexive consciousness actually attained by mankind definitely belongs to the sphere of man; there is no possibility of a sliding back into a lower form. Regardless of how man continues to evolve, it is only through the continued development of consciousness that he can fulfill himself.9 If we define human nature as the whole of all properties which belong definitely to the human being, then we can say that both reflexive consciousness and jen pertain essentially to human nature.

Since the original meaning of the word jen was the affection held between two persons, we consider that Western language terms such as "humanitas," "hu-

" Arthur T. Jersild, Child Psychology, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 47, 59, 173-76.

SThomas Hobbes, "Leviathan" in Edwin A. Burtt, ed., The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill (New York: Modern Library, 1939), p. 162.

" Erich Fromm, Man for Himself (Chinese translation, Taipei: Chih-wen Press, 1970). 'Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Le Phenome'ne Humain (Paris: Seuil, 1955), p. 287. 'Thaddeus T'ui-chieh Hang, "Hsien-tai K'o-hsiieh yii che-hsiieh te jen-hsing-kuan"

[The Concept of Human Nature in Modern Science and Philosophy], T'ien-chu-chiao hsiieh-shu yen-chiu hsiieh-pao [The Catholic Academic Research Report] October 1971, pp. 47-53.




manity," "Menschlichkeit," and "benevolence" all are inadequate to express exactly the meaning of jen. Therefore, I recommend that a combination of two Greek words, "dianthrophy" or "interpersonality," be adopted as a synonym for jen.9a

Someone might object that jen refers not only to the relationship between two persons but also to good will among many people. However, not every kind of "good will" in the world necessarily complies with the conditions of jen as I understand it. In order to have genuine dianthropy, there must be at least an implicit "I-Thou" relationship - otherwise it is nothing but baby-kissing politicking. Implicit "I-Thou" relationship means that although "I" in fact do not have the "I-Thou" relationship with most people, still, upon contact with anyone else, "I" always employ the mental practice of regarding the subject as "Thou" and never simply dismiss him as an insignificant "other" or take myself as the absolute norm. The mental practice of regarding another person as "Thou" is the attitude of jen. Directly opposite to this is the attitude of Ts'ao Ts'ao (deceased 220 A.D.): "Rather than have others wrong me, it is better to wrong others." There is yet another attitude which, on the surface, is different but, in substance, is similar. This attitude is found in one's "doing good," "cultivating virtue," "acquiring merits," "establishing achievement," and "establishing mass support." These actions all involve taking oneself more or less as the center and others as means; though not necessarily bad, these actions are still far from the perfection of the true jen.

III. THE CHOICE OF Jen AND EXISTENTIAL ACTUALIZATION

Even though the facts brought to light through our consideration of child psychology seem to be consistent with Mencius' theory that human nature is good, still we cannot ignore the factuality of evil. World history is riddled with the scars of evil. Of course, a thorough understanding of the source of evil seems to be beyond the grasp of man. The Bible uses symbolism to point out that wickedness originally arose out of an injury sustained by human nature- that of original sin. The meaning of this "original sin" has at least one aspect which is similar to Hsiin-tzu's theory that human nature is evil. Whether we like it or not, the fact that human nature contains some element which would lead man to perpetuate evil is neither easy to deny nor easy to ignore.

Plato considered evil to be ignorance. A person will not do something which he clearly understands to be evil.1' Consequently, evil is not voluntary; rather, it is the result of an ill disposition of the body and education. Those who per-

9" Only before the proofreading of this article did I see the very informative article of Prof. Wing-tsit Chan, "The Development of the Concept of Jen and its Interpretations in Europe and America" (Hong Kong: Ch'en Yung-chieh che-hsiieh lun-wen-chi, 1968), pp. 3-19. Prof. Chan points out that Mr. Peter Boodberg had suggested, on similar grounds as mine, that jen should be translated as "co-humanity."

10 Plato, "Meno" in Edith Hamilton, ed., The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Bollingen series 71, 1961, 77e.




petuate evil are pitiable.", This theory, which Plato accepted from Socrates, seems to deny man's ability to choose freely between good or evil actions.

Although the theories of the goodness or evil of human nature propounded by Mencius and Hsiin-tzu respectively do not wholly deny, as does Plato's, the possibility of the voluntary perpetration of evil, still they do not expound a clear account of the responsibility which man should acknowledge with respect to good and evil action. As an outgrowth of this, Tung Chung-shu (ca. 179-104 B.c.) advocated that man's nature is good but his emotions are evil. Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.-18 A.D.) considered that human nature is a mixture of good and evil. Wang Ch'ung (27-100?) divided human nature into three classes: superior, mediocre, and inferior. He considered that the goodness of human nature as propounded by Mencius refers to the superior class, the notion that human nature is a mixture of good and evil as propounded by Yang Hsiung refers to the mediocre class, and the opinion that human nature is evil as propounded by Hsiin-tzu refers to the inferior class. The neo-Confucian Chu Hsi (1130-1200), in accordance with his theory of the ii and ch'i dualism, considered ii to be wholly good and thought ch'i to be composed of the "clear" and "turbulent." Of course evil conduct arises from the "turbulent" ch'i.12 All of the above theories regarding an explanation of good and evil seem to overlook the fact that man has the ability to choose freely. According to their theories, it would appear that man's goodness or evil is determined by his fate. Those persons who belong to the "inferior class" or who possess "turbulent ch'i" are only able to do evil, while those who belong to the "superior class" or who possess "clear ch'i" are predestined to be good. The theories that nature is good and emotions are evil and that nature is a mixture of good and evil are also within the scope of determinism. Since everything is determined by Heaven, there is nothing which man can do himself. Some people (those of superior nature) cannot help but do good, while others (those of inferior nature) cannot help but do evil, just as sure as air rises and water runs downward. Good and evil are just like the laws of nature - no one is able to accept the responsibility for his own conduct.

The trend in modern psychology is also inclined toward determinism, especial- ly in the United States. As Gordon W. Allport remarks in American psychology textbooks, it seems that the words "will" and "freedom" have been banished.13 B. F. Skinner is a typical representative of the deterministic trend. Since, according to him, man is wholly determined by heredity and environment, of course he is not responsible for his conduct. "Free will" is simply a delusion.14

Modern existential philosophy, however, agrees on the point that the dis- tinguishing characteristic of human existence lies in the "making project" of

'Ibid., Timaeus 86e; Laws 5, 731c, d. " Lo Kuang, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh ta-kang [An Outline of Chinese Philosophy], vol. 1

(Hong Kong: Catholic Truth Society, 1952), pp. 60-68. ' Gordon W. Allport, Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 83. " B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Knopf, 1971).




one's own future and in freely realizing oneself. Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, and Marcell are unanimous on this point.'5 They certainly do not disregard the limitations imposed by heredity and environment, yet they are intensely aware of man's ability to freely choose his own course of conduct. Their conviction is confirmed by every man's experience.

The first Western philosopher to take free choice as a condition for ethical conduct was probably Aristotle. He rejected Plato's notion that good conduct is voluntary and evil conduct is involuntary. He repeatedly affirmed that evil conduct is also voluntary and that men should assume full responsibility.

Now, what is the standard for choice? Aristotle considered that happiness is the supreme goal sought by man and that in itself it is not a subject of delibera- tion. We deliberate only about the means of attaining this goal. Aristotle also maintained that only the choice of goodness and virtue will enable us to attain

happiness."1 Although the ancient philosophers of China did not discuss free choice in the

same manner as Aristotle, still they took it as the basis of moral life. When Confucius states "Restraining oneself and restoring temperance constitutes jen" (Analects, Yen Yiian), he is obviously referring to an abandonment of selfishness and a choice of tempered conduct. Confucius' reference to existential choice in the following passage is particularly apparent: "The man of ideals and the man of jen will not seek life if it means doing injury to jen, and would be willing to die if it means fulfilling his jen" (Analects, Wei Ling-kung). Tseng Tzu's statement, "One should take jen as his own task" (Analects, T'ai-po), also dem- onstrates an attitude of one who has made a firm decision. "One should take jen as his own task" means also a rejection of any attitude which does not correspond to the requirements of jen. The following passage from Mencius is very similar: "I have a passion for fish and I have a passion for bear's paw. If I cannot have them both, I would choose to reject the fish and take the bear's paw. I also have a passion for life and a passion for righteousness. If I cannot have them both, I would choose to reject life and take righteousness" (Kao-tzu Part I).

The meaning of jen as contained in the above quotations ("Restraining oneself and restoring temperance constitutes jen" and "The man of ideals and the man of jen will not seek life if it means doing injury to jen") is not the same as the meaning of jen as manifested in man's earliest experience and as embodied in human nature. When a person first experiences jen, he is still not in posses- sion of complete consciousness. As he gradually matures, he starts to become aware of the undianthropic experiences of jealousy, selfishness, and aggressive- ness. These all appear before he has attained a clear, reflexive consciousness. Up to this stage, this person is without the ability to make a free choice and, as a consequence, is also without moral conduct in its proper sense. Finally there

"'Thaddeus T'ui-chieh Hang, "Hsien-tai ts'un-tsai ssu-hsiang yen-chiu" [A Study of Modern Existential Thought], Universitas Monthly Review, January 1970, pp. 11-20.

16Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics" in R. McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941).




comes a day when he attains a level of clear self-consciousness and is able to make a free choice regarding his own conduct. Only at this point can he be considered a moral subject. When he makes a choice between dianthropy and undianthropy, however insignificant the matter may be, he has already perpe- trated either a moral or an immoral act. For example, when there is the possibility of either abusing his younger brother or not doing so, and a child chooses the former course of action, he commits an immoral act. This is because he is clearly conscious of the fact that he is acting wantonly and deriving pleasure at his younger brother's expense. This choice causes his self to be blocked off and not open towards his younger brother. If a person cultivates the habit of undianthropy over an extended period of time, he will begin to lose his original dianthropy and will eventually be "alienated" from his authentic nature.

Using the above method to explain the beginnings and development of moral conduct seems to be nearer to reality than, for instance, the Kantian theory. From the Christian point of view, the dianthropic nature can be considered as being endowed by God. Long before the full development of consciousness, a child experiences unconsciously his dianthropic nature in feeling the necessity of becoming closer to other persons. On attaining his self-consciousness he becomes gradually conscious of the fact that this is the course of self-fulfillment. Still he cannot avoid the interference of the opposing forces which would have him follow an undianthropic course of action. His choice can possibly lead him to the fulfillment of his dianthropic nature, or it can possibly lead him to abandon his own nature and take the path of undianthropy and alienation. Since the cumulative force of undianthropy in this world is very powerful, sufficient to influence most men (there are those who consider this force to be "original sin"), every person must constantly decide between dianthropy and undianthropy, either fulfilling his own nature or failing to do so. The choice of dianthropy causes one to be open to "thou" and to be able to communicate with "thou." His self daily expands with love, just as Mencius states that "Those who are dianthropic love others" (Li-lou Part II) and "Those who are dianthropic, going from that which they love, reach that which they do not" (Chin-hsin Part II). On the other hand, the choice of undianthropy causes a person to be isolated and to look upon another as a remote "him" or even as "it," losing the "I-Thou" communication and becoming alienated from his authentic human nature.

The undianthropy mentioned above is the consequence of free choice. There are, however, some who suffer from physiological or psychological disorders and cannot develop normally. Also, there are persons who develop to a certain stage and then stagnate or regress, suffering from neuroses or psychoses. Abnormal development and neuroses or psychoses can also cause people to be emotionally numb or, in other words, to be "pu-jen" or "undianthropic." Of course these latter cases are involuntary and thus do not fall within the scope of our discussion.

At this point I would like to mention the opposition of Lao-tzu and Chuang- tzu to dianthropy. Lao-tzu states: "Heaven and Earth are not dianthropic; they consider the myriad things to be straw dogs" (chap. 5); "The great Tao must be




in a state of neglect before there can be jen and righteousness" (chap. 18); and "Therefore, when we neglect the Tao, then te arises; when we neglect te, then jen arises; when we neglect jen, then righteousness arises; when we neglect righteousness, then ceremonies and rites arise" (chap. 38). Chuang-tzu is at times very similar to Lao-tzu: "Therefore, those of antiquity who had a clear understanding of the great Tao were first enlightened toward Heaven, and then proceeded to the Tao and te. Having a clear understanding of Tao and te they then proceeded to jen and righteousness. Having a clear understanding of jen and righteousness, they then proceeded to the standard of conduct. Having a clear understanding of the standard of conduct, they then proceeded to shapes and names . . ." (T'ien-tao). Chuang-tzu, in another passage, seems deliberately to ridicule the Confucians, looking on jen as worthless: "Tigers and wolves are dianthropic .... Since the sire and cubs are affectionate toward each other, how can this be other than dianthropic?" (T'ien-yiin).

In the final analysis, what Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu leveled their criticism at were those incomplete and deficient areas in which the practice of dianthropy by the Confucians fell short. Lao-tzu's demands were as follows: "The highest goodness is like water; for water benefits the myriad things without contending with them" (chap. 8); "The more he does for others, the more he gains for himself; the more he bestows on others, the more he has himself" (chap. 81); "The Tao of Heaven benefits without injuring; the Tao of the sage does so without contending" (chap 81); "The sage places himself last and yet is made first.... Is this not because he is without consideration for himself? Because of this he is able to fulfill his own self" (chap. 7). What Lao-tzu means by these expressions ("The highest goodness is like water," "without consideration for himself," and "benefiting without injuring") is essentially the same as the jen of Confucius and Mencius, but his ideal is even higher than theirs. In Chuang- tzu's statement, "Its benefits and bounty may be dispensed to ten thousand ages, and yet no one in the world is aware of it" (T'ien-yiin), his central thought is the same in most respects as that of Lao-tzu.

Mo-tzu's criticism of the Confucians is even less concerned with dianthropy itself. He was dissatisfied with the Confucian "behaviour towards kindred on a graduated scale, respect toward superior men according to grade" (Fei-ju Part II). He considered that the Confucians were nothing but men of biases - that is to say, they were discriminatory in their love. Mo-tzu then advocated a kind of ungraduated love toward all people, an undifferentiated, "universal love" (Chien- ai Part II). The "superior goodness" advocated by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu in "... and water benefits the myriad things without contending with them" and "its benefits and bounty may be dispensed to ten thousand ages" and the "universal love" advocated by Mo-tzu are both extensions of love. There is no essential difference between these and the dianthropy of Confucius and Mencius. As has been pointed out above, the dianthropy mentioned by Confucius is not endowed by nature. It must pass through a process of free choice before it can be realized, and thus it is "existential realization." Mo-tzu's universal love is




not different in this respect. Lao-tzu's "superior goodness" is certainly not endowed by nature, but rather it must be actualized through free choice. In fact, those who would attain the level of "non-contention," whose "benefit and bounty are dispensed to a thousand ages" and who want to "engender but not appropriate, act but not rely upon," "understand their masculinity while preserving their

femininity," and all must pass through a process of free choice. This lies in choosing a position between contending and not contending, between appropriating and not appropriating, between relying upon and not relying upon, between masculinity and femininity. Lao-tzu's "superior goodness" and Mo-tzu's "universal love" all belong to the choice and the existential realization of dianthropy. Only their ideal and method of realization differ from that of the Confucians.

One characteristic which the Confucian and Taoist philosophies share in common is that they are grounded in man's realization of his own existence. They do not emphasize the external, restrictive "regulations," "edicts," and "laws" to the extent that Jewish people and Westerners do. It is only the Mohists who pay relatively more attention to the "intent of Heaven" and the "will of Heaven." They state very clearly that the source of dianthropy and righteousness is a "noble and knowing" Heaven, and that to "go contrary to the will of Heaven" is to "receive the punishment of Heaven" (T'ien-chih Part II, no. 27). In fact, the Confucians also advocate that "The endowment of Heaven is called nature, fulfillment according to nature is called the Tao, and the nurturing of the Tao is called education" (Chung-yung chap. 1). According to the research of T'ang Chiin-yi, the "Heavenly mandate" contained in the Book of Odes and Book of Documents originally referred to "that which Heaven decrees, or the commands of God." Thus it is religious in nature.17 A Heaven or God which issues decrees refers to a personal God, which is again the Heaven of Mo-tzu. Their difference seems to lie in the fact that the Mohists deduce dianthropy and righteousness from "the intent of Heaven" and the "will of Heaven," while the Confucians take the personal experience of dianthropy as their starting point and only reach the "mandate of Heaven" in the end. Ontologically, the Confucians also recognize the anterior position of the "mandate of Heaven," but in terms of cognitive sequence the "mandate of Heaven" would be placed at the very end. I feel that this attitude of the Confucians is very reasonable indeed. Lao-tzu and Chuang- tzu do not disagree with the Confucians on this point. Because of the influence of the Judaic and the Greco-Roman cultures, do Christians overemphasize external "restrictions" and "laws"? Are the concepts that "self-fulfillment is dianthropy" or "sincerity is self-fulfillment" more congruent with the true meaning of Christian revelation? These are both questions worth asking. Touching on this point, I would like to mention the famous moral theologian Bernhard Hiiring, who raised similar questions in a study week (1956) held in Wiirzburg.s8 I

1 T'ang Chiin-yi, "Hsien-Ch'in ssu-hsiang chung chih t'ien-ming kuan" [The Concept of Heaven's Mandate in Pre-Ch'in Thought], New Asia Report, Series 2, Edition 2 (Hong Kong, 1967).

SBernhard Hiring, "Die Neuheit des Sittlichen Lebens" in Die Neuheit des Lebens




think that the idea of a "Heavenly Mandate" is necessary in order to establish the obligatory character of moral order. The merit of the Confucians seems to be precisely in their insistence that this obligatory moral order is rather implanted in human nature and that the true development of human nature and the "Heav- enly Mandate" occur hand in hand.

The ethics founded in existential actualization come relatively close to the self-actualization which means a complete and harmonious development of personality in modern psychology. This idea was first propounded by the Swiss psychoanalyst C. G. Jung; at present this movement is being led by A. H. Mas- low.19 The position held in the book by Erich Fromm, Man for Himself, mentioned above is also similar in most respects. The existential actualization of

dianthropy also comes close to the "creative altruism" discussed by the sociologist Sorokin.20 Konrad Lorenz, who made a rich contribution to the field of animal

psychology, said about aggression that it is an "essential part of the life-preserving organization of instincts," "... by accident it may function in the wrong way and cause destruction," and that the only way for humanity in the future is universal love and friendship.21 Bertrand Russell, on the point of death, advocated that one must not restrict himself to a small sphere, but rather must expand himself (Ausweitung des Ichs), causing the emotions to follow the intellect in its growth.22 Both Sorokin and Russell considered that dianthropy and love are

necessary conditions for the continued existence of our world. Apart from these, there are no other forces which can put an end to man's suicidal wars and revolu- tions in our atomic age. From this we get a glimpse of what a philosophy of jen could mean to the present and future world.

IV. THE COSMIC AND METAPHYSICAL MEANING OF Jen

The notions of the earliest experience of dianthropy, of dianthropic nature, and of existential choice all lie within the sphere of man. In the ancient philosophies of China, however, dianthropy was not restricted to the sphere of man.

als Ziel und Frucht der Weltmission (Miinster, Westf.: Missionstudienwoche, 1956), S. 124-33, 128-29.

1 Jolan Jacobi, Die Psychologie von C. G. Jung (Ziirich: Rascher, 1949); see also A. H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Rein-

hold, 1968). In this connection I find the qualification of Aristotelian self-realization as "ethical egoism" inappropriate. (See Kai Nielsen, "Alienation and Self-Realization," Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 48 (January 1973): 21-33; Richard Kraut, "Egoism, Love and Political Office in Plato," The Philosophical Review 82 (July 1973): 330-44.) Being a biological scientist, Aristotle considers self-realization to be a quasi-biological concept: the human being, growing biologically and spiritually, realizes or actualizes itself. A human being is no more egoistic than a tree is egoistic by growing properly. The Confucian concept of self-actualization is still further from egoism, because it essentially implies dianthropy and altruism.

'P. Sorokin, The Ways and Power of Love (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967). "1Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (London: Methuen, 1970), pp. 39, 258. * Bertrand Russell, "Unsere Zukunft und die wissenschaftliche Zivilisation," Univer-

sitas Monthly Review, November 1969, pp. 1129-34.




They take the moral life of man as their starting point and then expand the course of their thought to Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things. Mencius says, "Those who actualize their hearts understand their nature; those who understand their nature understand Heaven" (Chin hsin Part I). What does he mean by "actualize their hearts"? In Kao-tzu Part I, Mencius states:

All men have a sense of commiseration, all men have a sense of shame; all men have a sense of respect; all men have a sense of right and wrong. A mind with a sense of commiseration is dianthropic. A mind with a sense of shame is righteous. A mind with a sense of respect is temperate. A mind with a sense of right and wrong is wise.

Again, in the same chapter, he states: "Dianthropy is the sentiment of man. Righteousness is the path of man." From this we can see that although Mencius considers that dianthropy, righteousness, temperance, and wisdom all belong to the heart of man, dianthropy occupies a special position. Thus he states concisely that dianthropy is what man is. The meaning of "actualize their hearts," "understanding one's nature," and "understanding Heaven" is that one must actualize dianthropy existentially before he can have personal experience of his own dianthropic nature and, at the same time, personal experience of Heaven. It is not difficult to understand Mencius' statement that the existential actualization of dianthropy causes man to have personal experience of human nature, since Mencius insisted that human nature is good. But after experiencing human nature, how does this enable one to experience Heaven?

To understand this point, we must look for the answer in the Book of Changes. The Hsi-tz'u Part II has the following statement: "The great te (i.e., virtue) of Heaven and Earth is called life." It is commonly held by scholars that the Hsi-tz'u was written before the Han Dynasty, i.e., before 200 B.C. Tung Chung-shu goes one step further and says:

The most beautiful dianthropy lies in Heaven. Its dianthropy manifests itself in Heaven's sheltering and cultivating the myriad things, not only engendering them, but also nurturing them and bringing them to completion. . . . If we examine the will of Heaven, we can see that it is inexhaustible dianthropy. Man receives his task from Heaven, and by emulating the dianthropy of Heaven he becomes dianthropic (Ch'iin-ch'iu fan-lu, Want-tao-t'ung).

The phrase "The great te (i.e., virtue) of Heaven and Earth is called life" in Hsi-tz'u Part II can be explained by the Explanation of the Hexagrams (Shuo- kua) and Introduction to the Hexagrams (Hsii-kua). In the Explanation of the Hexagrams it is stated that "Ch'ien (the first of the hexagrams) is Heaven, and thus is designated as the father; k'un (the second of the hexagrams) is Earth, and thus is designated as the mother." At the beginning of the Introduction to the Hexagrams it is stated that "There is Heaven and Earth, and only then there are myriad things." It continues: "There is Heaven and Earth, and only then there are myriad things; there are myriad things and only then there is male and female.... " Since the Book of Changes designates Heaven as "father" and




Earth as "mother," it extends the dianthropic character to Heaven and Earth. Since our parents who endowed us with life are dianthropic, then a Heaven which bestows life on the myriad things and mankind alike has an even greater virtue of dianthropy. This seems to be the profound meaning of the Book of Changes: "The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is called life." If this explanation is accurate, then Tung Chung-shu does nothing more than write a commentary on the above passage from the Hsi-tz'u. Since Heaven and Earth manifest the benevolence of engendering and nurturing the myriad things, they are the embodi- ment of "inexhaustible dianthropy."

This was, of course, one line of reasoning, but the ancient philosophers of China seem to have paid little attention to it. Rather, they manifest a strong emphasis on the personal experience of dianthropy. Mencius had profound personal experience of interpersonal dianthropy and of the original dianthropic nature of man. Consequently, from the fact that "Heaven and Earth demonstrate the virtue of cherishing life," he infers the dianthropy of Heaven and Earth. As a result he states that "Heaven gives birthto the people" (Kao-tzu Part I). Al- though in Mencius' three steps ("actualizing one's heart," "understanding one's nature," and "understanding Heaven") he does not directly mention the dianthropy of Heaven and Earth, the neo-Confucians of the Sung Dynasty extended the jen concept to Heaven and Earth. Indeed we have such propositions of Ch'eng Hao (Ming-tao) as "Dianthropy is oneness with Heaven and Earth" (Erh-Ch'eng i-shu Book II) and "Those who are dianthropic regard Heaven, Earth and the myriad things as one." Hence, Confucian thought acknowledges that the human heart has a relationship with Heaven and Earth. The thought of Chu Hsi can be taken as representative: "Now, Heaven, Earth and the myriad things are fundamentally one entity with me. If my heart is upright, then the heart of Heaven and Earth will also be upright" (Chu-tzu chi-chu, Chung-yung ching-i chang-chii).23 Mencius was seemingly of a similar opinion: "Where the chiin-tzu ("gentleman") passes he transforms, where he remains, he spiritual- izes. In all respects he flows together with Heaven and Earth" (Chin-hsin Part I). From the notion that "dianthropy is one thing with myriad things," we can see that dianthropy is not understood only as human nature and the ultimate goal of morality and of self-fulfillment, but is further, in the minds of the Con- fucians, the quintessence and metaphysical principle of all things in the universe. Taking the personal jen experience as their starting point, the Sung philosophers somewhat unexpectedly attained an ill-embracing "Pandianthropism." In fact they interpreted jen as an all-pervading cosmic life.

Earlier we mentioned that the "Mandate of Heaven" found in the Book of Odes and Book of Documents originally referred to the commands of a personal God. The concepts of "Heaven" and "Heaven and Earth" propounded by the neo-Confucians of the Sung and Ming Dynasties contain a very strong tinge of pantheism. However, from the passage "The great virtue of Heaven and Earth is

"Chu Hsi, ed., Chin-ssu-lu (Taipei: World Press, 1962), p. 12; see also Lo Kuang, Chung-kuo che-hsiieh ta-kang [An Outline of Chinese Philosophy], vol. 1, p. 134.




called life" in the Book of Changes, and from the reasoning of Tung Chung-shu towards dianthropy, we must consider that a personal God goes much further than a universal entity in satisfying the dianthropic needs of man. Man possesses self-consciousness and at the same time requires spiritual communication with others. Thus, two men who are both self-conscious and have the need for spiritual communication with others can establish a dianthropic "I"-"you" relationship. Is man really able to have spiritual communication with the universe (the Great Nature) and establish a jen relationship with it? This possibility cannot be negated a priori. The key point lies in whether or not the "Great Nature" possesses a high level of consciousness which can establish the "I" and "Thou" relationship. In fact, although we sometimes feel our oneness with the universe, in the final analysis we still cannot look upon the entire universe as the true "Thou," and we cannot establish spiritual communication with it. Although the universe is certainly able to arouse my spiritual emotions, I have yet to see the universe become aroused in its spiritual impulses. The so-called "cosmic oneness" dianthropy and the experience expressed by the words "in all respects he flows together with Heaven and Earth" are, in the end, emotional states and do not necessarily represent objective reality. If, transcending the universe, there exists a God as Person, He can then establish an interpersonal relationship of "I" and "Thou" with human beings. The "inexhaustible dianthropy" of Tung Chung-shu is indeed better applicable to a personal God. Martin Buber rightly considers that a person can only fulfill "I" through "Thou." The true life lies in the encounter of "Thou" and "I." Our instinctive needs with regard to "the inborn Thou" can only be satisfied by means of the "Infinite Thou."24 The instinctive needs of "'Thou" spoken of by Martin Buber are simply the jen nature. Man in one respect has a dianthropic nature, so he is unable not to aspire toward "Thou." However, the "Thou" in human relations may also be the symbol and the ladder to the "Eternal Thou." The relationship of "Thou" and "I" among men relies upon the "Eternal, Infinite Thou" for its consolidation and fulfillment. This "Infinite Thou" is what Teilhard de Chardin calls the "Omega" of the universe's evolution. The union of man with this "Omega" culminates in what Teilhard de Chardin calls "supreme conscience" and "hyperpersonalization," which not only does not cause a "dissolution of the self," but on the contrary enables it to expand and fulfill itself and to make its exigency to a "life without limit" really count.25

In fact the ancient philosophers of China did not concern themselves with penetrating through to the "Eternal Thou" from the Book of Changes and the reasoning of Tung Chung-shu. Of course, from the idea of the dianthropic need of man as a starting point, we cannot prove that this boundless need can be satisfied. Nonetheless, as the dianthropy is raised to a cosmic principle, we do not see any reason why a personal God should not be taken as the pole of dianthropic relation (the human being constitutes the other pole). This seems to me to be a much more logical and human solution than the dominant pantheism.

' Martin Buber, I and Thou, pp. 28, 80. ' Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Le Phnoomane Humain, pp. 289-93, 337.

