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David Jakobsen, Rhetorical web-analysis of KurzweilAI.net.

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David Jakobsen7. Sem. Cand. it. I multimedier: IKT og livssyn.Vejleder: Peter hrstrmCensor: Henrik Schrfe

Rhetorical web-analysis of Kurzweilai.net


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Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................31.1 A Nexus of Ideas............................................................................................4

2.0 Problem....................................................................................................................63.0 Theory......................................................................................................................63.1 Classical Rhetoric........................................................................................... 73.1.1 The quaestio cluster .................................................................................. 73.2 Metaphysics and Quaestio.............................................................................. 84.0 Ray Kurzweil and the strong AI controversy ........................................................ 104.1 The Chinese Room Argument......................................................................124.1.1 The deeper issues ....................................................................................134.2 Kurzweils Chinese Room Argument .......................................................... 134.2.1 If the brain can, then a computer can...................................................... 164.3 Objective vs. Subjective...............................................................................17

4.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 185.0 The Rhetoric of KurzweilAI.net............................................................................ 185.1 Ramona ........................................................................................................ 195.1.1 Ramona as exordium............................................................................... 205.1.2 Ramona as narratio.................................................................................. 205.1.3 Chat with Ramona...................................................................................215.2 The Brain ...............................................................................................................225.3 The Rhetorical function of the brain ............................................................ 235.3.1 Top level ................................................................................................. 245.3.2 Middle level ............................................................................................ 255.4 Bottom level .......................................................................................................... 255.4.1 Ramona ........................................................................................................ 265.4.2 The brain ...................................................................................................... 276.0 Conclusion.............................................................................................................28i Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 31ii Figures .................................................................................................................32


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Rhetorical web-analysis of Kurzweilai.net

"Do you know why the Yankees always win?""Because they've got Mantle?"

"No. It's because the other team's too busy staring at the pin stripes."1

1.0 Introduction

KurzweilAI.net is a large site, whose primary function is to be home of the great thinkers, centred

on the area of strong Artificial Intelligence (strong AI). Ray Kurzweil has become known as the

man whose predictions have been remarkably precise, which says quite a lot when compared toembarrassing remarks and predictions people, who ought to have known better, have made when it

comes to computers. In 1990 Kurzweil predicted that a computer would beat the world champion in

chess around 1998, and as a consequence people would not appreciate chess as much as they did

before.2 The then reigning chess champion Garry Kasparov denied in 1990 that such a thing could

happen, but it did, and it was noticed around the world.

Known for his predictions about computers, and as a technician who has made technology to help

blind people, he had quite a bit of credit when he in his book The Age of the Spiritual Machines(1999) made new predictions, this time though, on a much larger scale.

If Ray Kurzweils predictions turn out to be as precise as before, then we will experience an

advancement within computational power that in the next 100 years will facilitate a development

equivalent to the last 20000 years development. According to Kurzweil we find ourselves in the

midst of an exponential growth, just at the point where the exponential factor is about to kick in and

make the difference between what looks like a linear growth, till what looks like an explosion. This

analysis is made on an application and further development of Moores Law3. Kurzweil believes that

the physical limit of growth will be reached in 20194, but that this will only be the limit of the type

of growth that Moores law predicts, a shift in paradigm will allow an exponential growth to

continue and on the basis of this Kurzweil predicts that:

1Catch Me If You Can (2002), Steven Spielberg.2The Age of Spiritual Machines. (1999) Ray Kurzweil. pp. 2133 Moores Law, by Gordon Moore, who in the 1960Th predicted that the size of transistors would be reduced by halfevery 24Th month.4

The Law of Accelerating Returns (2001) Ray Kurzweil http://www.kurzweilai.net/articles/art0134.html?printable=1


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Sometime early in the next century, the intelligence of machines will exceed that of humans. Within

several decades, machines will exhibit the full range of human intellect, emotions and skills, ranging

from musical and other creative aptitudes to physical movement. They will claim to have feelings and,

unlike today's virtual personalities, will be very convincing when they tell us so. By 2019 a $1,000

computer will at least match the processing power of the human brain. By 2029 the software for

intelligence will have been largely mastered, and the average personal computer will be equivalent to

1,000 brains.5

Eventually we will become totally integrated with the machines we have made. The exponential

growth will turn into a singularity, where it no longer makes sense to measure the growth, and then

we will live forever and that no later than in 100 years.

1.1 A Nexus of IdeasKurzweil is convincing and will not go around unheard. Where he comes minds are changed and

the seas of lifes biggest questions are stirred and aroused. Bill Joy is one of those whose life took a

turn after a late night discussion with Kurzweil in a bar. In the book Are we spiritual machines

(2002) George Gilder and Jay Richards recount the story of the unsettling of Joy.

Bill Joy, co-founder of Sun Microsystems, happened to sit with Kurzweil after the closing session, and

Kurzweil briefed him on his vision for the future. Joy was deeply affected, because he knew that

Kurzweil was one of the great intellects of the industry, a pioneer of computer voice recognition and

vision. Coming from Kurzweil, what had previously seemed like science fiction now appeared to Joy as

a near-time possibility.6

Bill Joy started his own crusade against what he sees as a dangerous future. Kurzweil and Bill Joy

shares the same convictions around the idea of where we are heading, when it comes to the

numbers. But they sharply disagree on the vision of what the future has in store for us. These are

not the only prophets though of a brand new future; another futurist is Ian Pearson from Britain.

Listening to his views on AI, as it will unfold within the next 200 years shows how the idea of

strong AI has turned out to be a clash of worldviews.It is certain that there will be strong reaction to this tinkering with the human species. Not everyone

will welcome it, either for religious or ethical reasons, or simple preference. Many people will

dissociate themselves from genetic manipulation or cybernetic technology. These people will remain as

conventional Homo Sapiens (we will rename them Homo ludditus for obvious reasons). They would at

best have to co-exist with these other human offshoots, who would dwarf them mentally and physically.

5The Coming Merging of Mind and Machine (1991) Ray Kurzweil -http://www.kurzweilai.net/articles/art0063.html?printable=16

Introduction: Are we Spiritual Machines? (2002) George Gilder, Jay W. Richards -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0501.html


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They would not be able to compete, and they may have the same relationship to the human variants as

pets do today. Knowing that they too could at any time accept the new technology and move onto the

higher planes of existence would probably rapidly diminish the numbers of Homo ludditus. The race

might just fizzle out due to lack of interest after a couple of centuries of stubborn resistance, say by

2200. Homo Sapiens would be the first species on Earth to have become voluntarily extinct.7

Words like these bring back the words of another futurist, one who spoke of a superman, a being

that would appear as triumphant by setting faithfulness to God aside, for allegiance to the earth.

Ich lehre euch den bermenschen. Der Mensch ist Etwas, das berwunden werden soll. Was habt ihr

gethan, ihn zu berwinden? Was ist der Affe fr den Menschen? Ein Gelchter oder eine schmerzliche

Scham. Und ebendas soll der Mensch fr den bermenschen sein: ein Gelchter oder eine schmerzliche

Scham.8

Perhaps this is the era of a new man, as Ian Pearson and Ray Kurzweil predicts. Perhaps the whole

concept is misconstrued from the very outset. Perhaps Bill Joy has it right, and we are about to look

a dire and gruesome new future in the eyes unless we try to force a control upon the technological

development. But it seems clear that a whole bunch of worldviews clashes on this issue, and one

cannot give a simple answer, without profound metaphysical consequences, to the challenge these

people have put in front of us.These are some of my motives for turning my focus on the website KurzweilAI.net. Here Kurzweil

has made a Home of the great thinkers. A name he mentions on the site:

KurzweilAI.net features the big thoughts of today's big thinkers examining the confluence of

accelerating revolutions that are shaping our future world, and the inside story on new technological

and social realities from the pioneers actively working in these arenas.9

And on a video about the homepage10, where it says:

Ramona hosts KurzweilAI.net, the home of the big thinkers. Have a question of technology and how

its likely to evolve, just ask Ramona.It seems to me though, through the reading of Kurzweil and the response that he gets from the

critics, that he gains a lot from drawing top notch philosophers and scientists into this home,

perhaps even more than his own argumentation should earn. What he gains is rhetorical of nature.

The argumentation is the same, but it is done in a new setting. Where he in his own writing admits

7http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.pearson/web/future/evolution.rtf- His Conclusion.8Also sprach Zarathustra. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche - http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/philosophie/texte/nietzsch/also.htm9

http://www.kurzweilai.net/about/frame.html10www.kurzweiltech.com/aboutray.html (klik p linket: .. A brief video profile of Ray Kurzweil.)


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the shortcomings of his own views on what is considered central issues like consciousness 11, he

has the possibility of controlling the argumentation in a more subtle way by launching them into the

web of a current philosophical discussion on this issue, thereby including himself among those who

have an opinion on an issue, where agreement is scarce and dispute is common.

2.0 Problem

The question I have then in turning my attention to this site is rhetorical of nature. Ray Kurzweil

defends through his authorship of several books his view on AI, understood in the strongest sense,

as the theory that algorithms are what make up human intelligence. A part of that work is also done

through the site KurzweilAI.net, and thus I would like to know:

What role does the functions and design of the site play concerning the central views on AI? What

consequences have these had on the making of the site?

Through a presentation of the different positions on AI, that are discussed by Kurzweil and his

critics, I would like to focus on some of the central problems in the debate on strong AI, as they are

found on the kurzweilAI.net. These will serve as a pivotal point a rhetorical analyzes of the sites

design and functionality, in order to see what consequences these have had in the making of the site.

3.0 TheoryMy approach to an analysis of KurzweilAI.net will be the classical terms used in rhetoric as well as

a critical analysis of the ideas of Ray Kurzweil as he presents them in his writing, both in book form

and on KurzweilAI.net. The Chinese Room is a central argument in the controversy concerning

strong AI and Ray Kurzweil has also had to deal with it. This has been done in the book Are we

Spiritual Machines (2002). Since this book is available on KurzweilAI.net and an integrated part of

the site, this argumentation will be a part of the analysis. It will be through this analysis that the

central problems in the debate on strong AI will be found, which then in turn can be used as pivotal

points in the rhetorical analysis.

In my approach to the classical terms of rhetoric I will use the adaptation for analyzing websites

that Per Hasle has outlined in his article Brug af retorik i analyse, design og konstruktion af IKT

(specielt websites) (2003) (hereafter: bIKT) and in the article: Telling Truth or Time, Cicero, St.

11The Age of Spiritual Machines (1999) Ray Kurzweil. pp 77.


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Paul and St. Jerome: An Essay in the Relation between a Rhetorical and an Early Christian

Conception of Truth and Communication. 12(1999) (Hereafter TTT)

3.1 Classical Rhetoric

In bIKT Per Hasle discusses some of the issues and problems you run into when trying to use these

terms, which typically have been used to construct speeches, to an analysis of a website. But while

you can run into some problems when you take concepts and terms that has grown out of a classical

situation as natural part of a speech, and adapts them to a website today, Per Hasle also notices that

the surprising thing is how these classical terms easily can be adapted to other communication

forms than the speech.13 I will here define some of the terms and concepts I will use from classical

rhetoric in analyzing KurzweilAI.net, and tell how I plan to use these.

3.1.1 The Quaestio Cluster

The first thing to be aware of is the different clusters within the rhetorical parts of a speech. The

concepts that I here find most interesting are the ones belonging to the Quaestio cluster. Quaestio

deals with the construction of a narrative (mythos), which is one among many within a domain.

Domain should be understood as the area circumscribing a case, or an issue. This mythos is

constructed by selecting and connecting the different facts (endoxa) within this domain. The domain

should therefore not be seen as a static, but rather a dynamic area, depending upon the way a

mythos is constructed. This is seen in a figure Per Hasle uses to illustrate quaestio:14 (Figure 1). A

mythos is constructed by connecting different endoxa, of which some of them could be drawn in

from outside the domain.

This concept is especially valuable in dealing with a highly controversial topic. A quaestio by its

very nature deals with some controversial issue, i.e. some case on which there is no universal

agreement beforehand.(Hasle 1999)15

This is the main reason why I have chosen this cluster of terms from classical rhetoric. Strong AI is

a controversial topic and in such a case it is prudent to postpone ones truth commitments until all

the different stones has been turned. A careful analysis of what it is that convinces in such an

12Telling Truth or Time, Cicero, St. Paul and St. Jerome: An Essay in the Relation between a Rhetorical and an EarlyChristian Conception of Truth and Communication (1999) Per Hasle.www.hum.au.dk/ckulturf/pages/publications/ph/truth.htm - all references are to this articles.13Brug af retorik i analysen design og konstruktion af IKT. (specielt websites) (2003) Per Hasle. pp. 2.14

From a power point presentation used in Per Hasles teaching.15http://www.hum.au.dk/ckulturf/pages/publications/ph/truth.htm [9]


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argumentation is important. The second reason why I find the quaestio cluster interesting is that it

focuses not only on the traditional ethos, logos and pathos, but on how these are used on a deeper

level where the orators intentions can be traced through his intentions in selecting the different

endoxa. Hasle says a couple of things that points in these directions. First of all truth is not the aim,

but a tentatively and plausible narration.

So far it should be clear that in investigating a certain case with a certain purpose, one is not simply

finding the truth. Indeed, one is not even in principle trying to find the truth. Rather, one is constructing

a narration - in Greek, a Mythos - which is only one among many possible ones. And even on its own

terms - that is, when that narration has been chosen and hence is tentatively regarded as the most

plausible one at hand - the narration is not a picturing of incontrovertible facts, but a rendering of

established documentation.16

And secondly the deeper structure of site concerns the selections that are made prior to the

argumentation, selections that are framing the questions has to be approached.

Inventio + dispositio: logos becomes a question about selection, even framing of the case; a choice

between a number of stories a mythos.".17

While Per Hasle sees the quaestio cluster fit to find traces of a sites quaestio, he has a word of

warning though, when one intends to use the quaestio cluster in an analysis:

It has to be said though, that the possibility of tracing the quaestio, has significant limitations, and that

it will only be interesting for certain purposes.18

Since he doesnt specify what some of these purposes and limitations could be, I find it relevant to

spend some time here arguing why I chose this concept and how I intend to use it. When this word

of warning has been said though, it also has to be said that Per Hasle sees this approach as initially

possible, and an area that ought to could be focused on, in a longer disputation.19

My intention here would fall very short of being a disputation, but nonetheless I hope they could

contribute to point to a possible use of this concept when analysing a website that seeks to promote

and communicate a specific idea with great metaphysical consequences.

3.2 Metaphysics and Quaestio

In his book Metaphysics (2002) Peter Van Inwagen introduces metaphysics as a place without

information, a place without given facts. Not that they arent around to ultimately be found, but

16http://www.hum.au.dk/ckulturf/pages/publications/ph/truth.htm Pp. [10]17 Teaching material (autumn 2005) Hasle uses in his teaching on using the classical rhetorical terms for analysingwebsites. Quaestio - the problem-oriented process of investigating and understanding. (Translation is my own.)18Brug af retorik i analysen design og konstruktion af IKT.(Specielt websites)(2003) Per Hasle. pp. 7. (Translation is

my own)19 Ibid. Pp. 7. The word he uses is the Danish word: afhandling. (Translation is my own)


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because we humans simply seem to be very bad at doing this stuff. Other beings might exist who

are better at metaphysics, and they would perhaps wonder why we cant solve these metaphysical

problems that have plagued philosophers since the early days. According to Inwagen this is a

particular problem for metaphysics:

In the end we must confess that we have no idea why there is no established body of metaphysical

results. It cannot be denied that this is a fact however, and the beginning student of metaphysics should

keep this fact and its implications in mind. One of its implications is that neither the author of this book

nor your instructor is in a position in relation to you that is like the position of the author of your text

in geology or tax law or music theory. All these people will be the masters of a certain body of

knowledge, and, on many matters, if you disagree with them you will simply be wrong. In metaphysics

however, you are perfectly free to disagree with anything the acknowledged experts say-other than their

assertions about what philosophers have said in the past or are saying at present.20

He goes on to give a very enlightening example of how this could apply to the metaphysical

problem of the existence of an immortal soul, and shows how a philosopher could go about

disputing claims made, or make claims of the metaphysical kind, but never reaching an epistemic

situation where his answers would be information. Facts of the kind you find in textbooks. So in

metaphysics one finds oneself hard pressed to ever reach a point where you can say this is the truth

on this matter, and we can henceforth regard every objection as nonsense. This is exactly the

situation Hasle seems to say that we ultimately finds ourselves in anda fact that the classical

rhetoric reveals to us:

Together with the notions of Quaestio, Mythos and Speech as a unity of speaker, audience and theme,

this makes up a certain idea of 'comprehension'. For not only the making of a speech, but also the

process of investigation and the process of comprehending the speech by and large follow the same

principles: all of them are selective, constructive, and involve rationality, emotionality and ethics. 21

And continues to say:

The bottom-line in our context is this: comprehension is not the uncovering, or the grasping of some

absolute truth. (Not even in the more cautious sense of fallibilism, where truth is assumed to exist, but

where some uncertainty must always be allowed for due to human fallibility.)22

When comprehension on a controversial question has taken place, then according to Hasle, one will

not necessarily have grasped the truth, but one will find oneself persuaded by the aptness, one could

say, of a mythos in rendering the established documentation.

20Metaphysics (2002), Peter Van Inwagen. pp. 12.21

Ibid Pp. [14]22 Ibid Pp. [15]


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The quaestio idea from classical rhetoric, as Hasle sees it, therefore seems to have the following in

common with Metaphysics, which I find useful for this particular analysis: Minimally it doesnt

focus on communicating a fact, or simply passing on information, but instead on seeing the greater

picture. Ultimately or taken radically they differ on whether that is everything to be said - but

minimally a rhetorical analysis can tell us how persuasion takes place, by deconstructing the

website on the different levels in a search for traces of a quaestio.

4.0 Ray Kurzweil and the strong AI controversy

Ray Kurzweil has with his claims about AI taken side with what has become known as strong

Artificial Intelligence a description which has been coined by one of its critics John Searle

(1980).23 Minimally strong AI entails the view that computers, given the right program, can literally

be said to understand and have cognitive states. 24 By making a distinction between different kinds

of artificial intelligence, he distinguishes out for critique the view that the appropriately

programmed computer literally has cognitive states. 25

The view of Ray Kurzweil is not so explicitly stated, and sometimes he can say things that make it

sound like we never will know whether a computer is conscious, even though it runs the appropriate

algorithm, and it performs actions that would imply consciousness. If this is true, then according to

a standard definition of strong AI, consciousness cannot be a mental capacity, since there then isnt

anything more to consciousness than an appropriate algorithm.26 When this is said though, then it is

obvious from statements such as the following, that he belongs in the strong AI camp:

Once a computer achieves a level of intelligence comparable to human intelligence, it will necessarily

soar past it. A key advantage of nonbiological intelligence is that machines can easily share their

knowledge. If I learn French, or read War and Peace, I cant readily download that learning to you. You

have to acquire that scholarship the same painstaking way that I did. My knowledge, embedded in a

vast pattern of neurotransmitter concentrations and interneuronal connections, cannot be quickly

accessed or transmitted. But we wont leave out quick downloading ports in our nonbiological

23Minds, Brains and Programs. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 3, (1980) John Searle.24http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html. In The Emperors New Mind, Roger Penrosedescribes strong AI like this: According to strong AI, not only would the devices just referred to indeed be intelligentand have minds, etc., but mental qualities of a sort can be attributed to the logical functioning of any computationaldevice, even the very simplest mechanical ones, such as a thermostat. (Roger Penrose, The Emperors New Mind. Pp.21.)There seems to be a minor difference between these two definitions, a difference of little importance though, for thisanalysis.25

Ibid.26 Are we spiritual machines. pp. 145


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equivalents of human neuron clusters. When one computer learns a skill or gains an insight, it can

immediately share that wisdom with billions of other machines.27

He clearly subscribes such mental abilities to computers as: having intelligence, being able to share

their knowledge, learning skills and gaining insights. These are notions that are sometimes just away of talking about computers, but which Ray Kurzweil must be taking literally, if he is to claim

anything at all. He must therefore be taken literally when he talks about computers reading and

understanding, and not just as using a figure of speech:

Computers will be able to read on their own, understanding and modelling what they have read, by the

second decade of the twenty-first century. We can then have our computers read all of the worlds

literature books, magazines, scientific journals, and other available material. Ultimately the machines

will gather knowledge on their own by venturing into the physical world, drawing from the full

spectrum of media and information services, and sharing knowledge with each other...28

These ideas only make sense if Kurzweil somehow confirms some version of strong AI, since all

these notions are mental in nature something that humans do, but which defenders of strong AI

claim are going on inside the computer, and since everything that goes on in a computer is an

algorithm, Kurzweil falls in line with Penrose description of strong AI. Penrose describes very

clearly the connection between the notion of an algorithm, and the specific mental abilities:

Thus according to strong AI, the difference between the essential functioning of a human brain

(including all its conscious manifestations) and that of a thermostat lies only in this much greater

complication (or perhaps higher-order structure or self-referential properties, or some other

attribute that one might assign to an algorithm) in the case of a brain. Most importantly, all mental

qualities thinking, feeling, intelligence, understanding, consciousness are to be regarded, according

to this view merely as aspects of this complicated functioning; that is to say, they are features merely of

the algorithm being carried out by the brain.29

While it is evident that Ray Kurzweil belongs in the strong AI camp, from sayings like the ones just

mentioned, it is also a problem that he doesnt state his claims in a more straightforward manner.

When he therefore charges authors like William Dembski and especially John Searle for

misrepresenting him30, he must shoulder a part of the blame himself.

27The Evolution of Mind in the Twenty First Century. (2002) Ray Kurzweil -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0500.html28 Ibid.29Emperors new mind. (1989) Roger Penrose, pp. 22.30

.. That having been said, I will say that the misquotations from Dembski are not nearly on the massive scale ofSearle. (http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0493.html)


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4.1 The Chinese Room argument

John Searle also clearly sees Kurzweils claims as falling in the category of strong AI, because in

analyzing Kurzweils view on intelligence, he sees that it is merely the carrying out of an algorithm:

Why does increase in computing power automatically generate increased intelligence? Because

intelligence according to Kurzweil, is a matter of getting the right formulas in the right combination and

then applying them over and over, in his sense recursively, until the problem is solved.31

Therefore John Searle finds it fit to apply the Chinese Room Argument to the view of Ray

Kurzweil. Since Kurzweil has the credentials of being the one who predicted the downfall of the

world champion in chess to a computer John Searle gives a version of the Chinese Room

Argument applied to deep blue. He thinks it is a major conceptual mistake to think that what went

on in deep blue was the same as what went on in Kasparov what really happened inside deep bluecan be compared to what in the Chinese Room Argument happens to John Searle as he frantically

runs around shifting symbols according to some rules.

Here is what happened inside Deep Blue. The computer has a bunch of meaningless symbols that the

programmers use to represent the positions of the pieces on the board. It has a bunch of equally

meaningless symbols that the programmers use to represent options for possible moves. The computer

does not know that the symbols represent chess pieces and chess moves, because it does not know

anything. As far as the computer is concerned, the symbols could be used to represent baseball plays or

dance steps or numbers or nothing at all.32

There is absolutely no understanding going in inside the computer as it processes the symbols, and

even these are not meaningful to the computer, they are meaningful to us, who designed the

computer. One could perhaps think that the computers understand the binary numbers 1 and 0, but

even these are, according to Searle, meaningless symbols to the computer:

The symbols in the computer mean nothing at all to the computer. They mean something to us because

we have built and programmed the computer so that it can manipulate symbols in a way that is

meaningful to us. In this case we are using the computer symbols to represent chess positions and chess

moves.33

The Chinese room argument is essential for understanding the controversy of strong AI. It seems

like John Searle has pinpointed the intuition that divides the two sides. There have been many

critical responses to his argument, more than I could deal with here, but I find myself much in

31I Married a Computer. (2002) John Searle -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0499.html32

Ibid.33 Ibid.


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agreement with Roger Penrose assessment of The Chinese Room argument. After having viewed

what he considers to be the strongest objections he concludes:

I think that Searles argument has a considerable force to it, even if it not altogether conclusive. It is

rather convincing in demonstrating that algorithms with the kind of complication that Schankscomputer program possesses cannot have any genuine understanding whatsoever of the task that they

perform; also, it suggests (but no more) that no algorithm, no matter how complicated, can ever, of

itself alone, embody genuine understanding in contradistinction to the claims of strong AI.34

There are two issues though that I find interesting and important for an analysis KurzweilAI.net.

The first on is just to point out that through this argument one is launched into deeper metaphysical

controversies. The second is that one of Kurzweils objections to the argument seems to point out

some of the major problems with John Searles own view of mental states.

4.1.1 The Deeper issues

The crucial point whether there is any understanding, is tackled differently by the opponents of

the argument, and the deeper underlying philosophical issues are about syntax and semantics,

intentionality and the classical mind-body problem. Here I find the discussion around intentionality

to be crucial to the issue of Artificial Intelligence, and the mind body problem. If chance would

permit I would like to investigate that later on. The classical mind-body problem with the classical

two camps of dualism and monism is brought into the light through the response Ray Kurzweil

gives to the Chinese Room.

4.2 Kurzweils Chinese Room argument

The discussion that unfolds between Ray Kurzweil and John Searle is interesting since they both

agree to a materialistic view on man, but both shun away from an eliminative reductionism. Ray

Kurzweil, has quite a few objections to the Chinese room, I have for this analysis chosen to focus

on just one of his counterargument against the Chinese room. In this argument he seeks to show,

that ones basic intuition regarding meaning and understanding doesnt change if you exchange the

computational terms in the Chinese room, with neurobiological talk. Since John Searle also believes

that man is a physical machine, Kurzweil thinks that the Chinese Room argument also strikes down

on Searles biological naturalism:

34Emperors new mind. (1989) Roger Penrose, pp. 26.


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Searle acknowledges that biological neurons are machines, so if we simply substitute the phrase human brain for

computer and neurotransmitter concentrations and related mechanisms for formal symbols, we get:

The human brain succeeds by manipulating [neurotransmitter concentrations and related

mechanisms]. The [neurotransmitters concentrations and related mechanisms] themselves are quite

meaningless: they have only the meaning we have attached to them. The [human brain] knows nothing

of this, it just shuffles the [neurotransmitters concentrations and related mechanisms].35

So Kurzweil claim is that if this exchange of the terms involved is a valid one, then even the human

brain doesnt have understanding. But is this argument persuasive? I dont think so. It seems that

Kurzweil argument goes something like this:

(1) If the Chinese room argument is successful then no machine could ever exemplify or cause

meaning

(2) The brain is a machine and it does exemplify or cause meaning

(3) Therefore it is not the case that no machine could ever exemplify or cause meaning

(4) Through modus tollens it therefore follows that The Chinese argument is not successful.

Since Searle affirms that somehow the brain causes consciousness, and for the sake of discussion

everything ells necessary like intentionality, whether it is derived or intrinsic, he must thereforeaffirm (2) and (3) so if he doesnt accept (4) then his business must be with (1).

But why should he affirm that? I dont see any reason that he must necessarily do that. He could

argue that all the Chinese room shows is that a purely computational process could never produce

intelligence and understanding, or even better he could say that while it is the case that not all

machines, like a computational one, could exemplify meaning, then a specific one could do it and

this is the case with the brain. He could thus succeed in denying (1) by refuting the strong modal

claim it seems to imply. The question then arises whether such a modal claim is necessary, orwhether Kurzweil even uses such on. But he must do either that or claim that some essential kind of

similarity exist between the brain and an algorithm, such that if one denies the capability of having

mental states of the first, then one also must deny it of the second. And perhaps that is what he

intends with the argument. But what should that essential similarity be? No suggestion seems to

present itself, such that it could not even be logically possible that it is the specific biological nature

of the brain that causes understanding. If Kurzweil cannot show such an essential similarity then his

35

Locked in His Chinese Room. (2002) Ray Kurzweil -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0495.html


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counterargument doesnt succeed. It is logically possible for Searle to postulate meaning as

something the brain causes in a way that a computer made of silicon could not do it.

While this is logically possible, it certainly also seems ad hoc to do so. And this is a fact that I think

Kurzweils counterargument succeeds in showing.

Other philosophers pointed out; that the Chinese Room argument and Searles argument that The

brain causes mind, displays a biological chauvinism.

Responders to Searle have argued that he displays substance chauvinism, in holding that brains

understand but systems made of silicon with comparable information processing capabilities cannot,

even in principle.36

The argument would then be that when John Seale postulates non-reducible mental states to the

brain, but denies them of silicon then he does so ad hoc. And this points to a problem that other

philosophers have criticized John Searle for.

The Danish philosopher Sren Hartnow Klausen says:

Searle kan ikke bde mene at bevidsthed er et virkeligt, irreduktibelt fnomen og samtidig erklre det

for en trivialitet uden metafysiske konsekvenser.37 (Searle cannot both think that consciousness is a

real, irreducible phenomenon, while at the same time declaring it a triviality without metaphysical

consequences.) (My own translation)

The theistic philosopher J.P. Moreland says:

Despite the frequent assertions by a number of philosophers that Searle is a property dualist, he denies

the charge and seems puzzled by it. However, in my view, Searle is indeed a property dualist and an

epiphenomenalist one at that, though he also denies the latter charge as well In light of Searles

descriptions of the mental and physical, it is obvious why most philosophers charge him with property

dualism and the burden of proof is on him to show why he is not.38

Searle doesnt want to join the camp of the dualists. According to J.P. Moreland, Searle has two

reasons for not being a dualist. Firstly if one wants to be that, one must accept the entire Cartesian

metaphysics, and secondly he says that dualists accept a false dichotomistic vocabulary in which

something is either physical or mental but cannot be both.

39

Moreland rejects both of Searlesclaims about dualism and says:

Moreover, Searles own view has a dichotomistic vocabulary in which he distinguishes normal

physical (e.g., neurophysiological) properties from emergent biological physical (i.e., mental)

properties. So he has simply replaced one dualism with another.40

36 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/37Metafysik. (1997) Sren Hartnow Klausen. pp. 80-81.38Searles biological naturalism and the argument from consciousness. (1998) J.P. Moreland. pp. 164.39

Ibid. 164.40 Ibid. Pp. 165.


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The ad hoc-ness of Searles own description of mental states is properly what drives Ray Kurzweil

when he says that he finds the Chinese Room Argument hopelessly tautological.41 While not

logically driven to also deny the brain understanding, it seems postulated out of the blue to say that

such entities as understanding and intentionality could be simple and basic in a naturalistic

paradigm. So even though I find the Chinese Room argument successful in refuting the claims of

strong AI, I also find it an argument that shows the weakness of a naturalistic approach to mental

entities. It seems ad hoc to postulate their existence and treating it as a triviality that they should be

physical, when a rival theory exist that has these states as something that fits naturally in. Such a

theory could be a substance theory of a kind, or a theory which admits the metaphysical

consequences the existence of mental entities must have for their worldview. Ray Kurzweil in fact

deals with such a theory on his website, as well in his writings. InAre we spiritual machines?

(2002) and in a Chat; Ray Kurzweil debates William Dembski who takes an Aristotelian approach

to the soul. In these debates Kurzweil seems to use John Searle arguments as a model for how

consciousness can emerge in a computer, just as Searle argues for the brain.

4.2.1 If the brain can a computer can

William Dembski argues that from something material you only get something material. You can

therefore never get any spirituality in a machine, because it takes a soul, which is not a physical

thing. But here Kurzweil is in sharp disagreement with Dembski. He thinks everything can be

accounted for within the limitations of materialism. Kurzweils logic seems to be: If a materialistic

approach to the brain is taken, then strong AI is not impossibility. Since the brain somehow causes

consciousness, and it is strictly physical, a computer is also capable of doing it.

As I pointed out, however, with multiple quotations of John Searle (e.g., human brains cause

consciousness by a series of specific neurobiological processes in the brain), Searle apparently does

believe that the essential philosophical issue of consciousness is determined by what Dembski calls

tender-minded materialism.42

It seems clear from this usage of Searle that Kurzweil tries to slip consciousness in through the door

Searle opens for his own biological naturalism. As I mentioned above I do not think that Searles

41 Are we spiritual machines? Pp. 128.42

Dembskis Outdated Understanding.(2002) Ray Kurzweil. -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0493.html


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response to this tactic is convincing. But if Searles postulation of mental states as a basic part of a

materialistic worldview, is a notion that philosophers like Klausen and Moreland find ad hoc, then

what about Kurzweils own view on mental states like consciousness and the like? He has

something to say about it, and I would like to look into his way of talking about the difference

between the objective and the subjective.

4.3 Objective vs. Subjective.

As a materialist Kurzweil is dedicated to the idea that all the answers to what everything is and

consists of can, in principle, be reduced to either energy or matter. I.e. to something that fall into a

materialistic paradigm.

Dembski is correct that with regard to human performance, indeed with regard to any of our

objectively observed abilities and reactions, it is my view that what Dembski calls the materialist

approach is valid. One might call this capability materialism. Capability materialism is based on the

observation that biological neurons and their interconnections are made up of matter and energy, that

their methods can be described, understood, and modelled with either replicas or functionally

equivalent recreations.43

There is thus nothing in the universe that in principle cannot fall under the category: described,

understood and modelled with either replica of functionally equivalent recreations. But that seems

to stand I opposition to the statements that Kurzweil gives about the privacy of the subjective

experience:

there is no objective (i.e., scientific) method that can definitively measure or determine the subjective

experience (i.e., the consciousness) of another entity.44

For Kurzweil there seems to be a fundamental difference between the objective and the subjective.

The subjective being something that we cannot penetrate with direct objective measurement:

This limitation has to do with the very nature of the concepts objective and subjective.

Fundamentally, we cannot penetrate the subjective experience of another entity with direct objective

measurement.45

To the general materialist this is not a satisfying situation as is seen in a quote from Howard

Robinson:

If science cannot encompass the subjective, then subjectivity becomes a door through which mystical,

irrational and religious notions can enter and reassert themselves against the modern metaphysic of

scientific realism.46

43 Ibid.44 Ibid.45

The Evolution of Mind in the Twenty First Century. (2002) Ray Kurzweil -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0500.html


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A scientific explanation implies giving a set of propositions about some part of the universe, such

that another scientist could investigate the exactly same propositions; it therefore follows that these

propositions must be given in third person, or be reducible to such. It seems then that a materialist

would confirm a proposition like:

(5) Everything in the physical world can, in principle, be encompassed by a scientific description

given in third person.

But this seems to be in opposition with a proposition like:

(6) Fundamentally we cannot penetrate the subjective experience of another entity with direct

objective measurement.

If something is a subjective experience then it must necessarily be someones. And if I confirm (6)

then it follows that for these persons experience (5) cannot be true. There are simply areas that a

third person description cannot describe. (6) Seems to imply that these areas only can be described

in first person. Since Kurzweil confirms (6), it befalls on him to show how he can also remain

within the borders of materialism, which would want to confirm (5).

4.4 Conclusion

I think it is clear from the above argumentation that Kurzweil takes the same route that Searle does,

when he postulates the emergence of consciousness and other mental states. The same critique

Klausen and Moreland gives Searle can be applied to Kurzweils view on mental states. In light of

rival theories that has mental states as natural parts; it seems ad hoc for Ray Kurzweil to postulate

such in a worldview that he also confines to the limitations of materialism.

5.0 The Rhetoric of KurzweilAI.net

From the words of Kurzweil though, it doesnt seem that he takes this philosophical discussion to

be very important, even perhaps as something that he could be wrong about, while still confirming

his views on strong AI. In The Age of Spiritual Machines (1999), he concludes a chapter on the

philosophical discussion about the soul, where he has mentioned theories that are in direct contrast

to each other, with the following remarks, which I find symptomatic of his approach to the

philosophical controversies that his strong AI sparks:

46

Matter and Sense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Howard Robinson: Pp. 2. Quoted from J.P.Moreland and Scott Rae: Body and Soul. pp. 102.


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My own view is that all of these schools are correct when viewed together, but insufficient when

viewed one at a time. That is, the truth lies in a synthesis of these views. This reflects my Unitarian

religious education in which we studied all the worlds religions, considering them many paths to the

truth. Of course, my view may be regarded as the worst one of all. On its face, my view is

contradictory and makes little sense. The other schools at least can claim some level of consistency and

coherence.47

It must be clear from this analysis that we have been tossed into deep philosophical waters, and

have found some of the sine qua none of strong AI. Using the general standard scientific

commitments to materialism and the ad hoc postulation of John Searles biological naturalism Ray

Kurzweil has found a place to stand in these high waters. The ground is definitely not secure, but

seems secure enough for him to keep on waiting for the right amount of technological advancement

to be available. But as the above quotation shows: it is not through this argumentation that Kurzweil

hopes to convince the world about his views. We must therefore turn our attention to the way this is

done on KurzweilAI.net, and in order to do so, I will use the classical terms from rhetoric to

examine the way Ray Kurzweil uses functions and design rhetorically.

5.1 Ramona

The first impression one gets when entering the site, is Ramona in a popup window. Since these can

be quite annoying most browsers these days have a function that disables these. If that is the case,

then one will not meet Ramona immediately.

Otherwise she turns up by herself and you are invited to make a chat with here, see her move and

hear her speak. When she is activated, a thing which implies downloading and installing a special

Flash module, she starts telling you about news.

It is clear from the information available on the site, that she is a central function of the site. She is

introduced as the host of the site on the video available from Ray Kurzweils homepage.48 On the

site she is introduced as a chatterbot (conversational robot) who can have conversations with

visitors, as a the owner of The Brain, the second big function of the site, and finally as a thinker49

Her function I will try to analyse on the three different levels, with regard to the three officia and

finally bring it together in an attempt to find traces of the Quaestio.

47 Age of Spiritual Machines. (1999) Ray Kurzweil. pp. 77.48

www.kurzweiltech.com/aboutray.html (klik p linket: .. A brief video profile of Ray Kurzweil.)49 http://www.kurzweilai.net/about/frame.html


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5.1.1 Ramona as exordium

Even though exordium belongs in the partitiones cluster, it seems obvious to include it here, since

Ramona is the first impression one gets when entering the site. Analytically Hasle points to the

importance of determining whether a site has an exordium, and if then what the site wants with it.50

As exordium Ramona definitely

serves the function of keeping

the viewer on the site. If you

install the special flash player for

viewing and hearing her, she will

make herself known, when the

page is loaded. She moves,

speaks and announces news.

Graphically she is made very

lifelike. In fact her movement are

made by Ray Kurzweil himself,

and on a video she is introduced

as his alter ego51, a fact that has some implication on a deeper level. There is thus a pathos appeal

to Ramona, on a top level. You are intended to be moved by the appearance of someone who is real.

If one is searching the web for AI, you would properly stick around to find out just how real

Ramona is. Or at least that is likely the intention behind Ramona, and the function she serves on a

top level. A further analysis of her will take us into another term from the partitiones cluster

narration.

5.1.2 Ramona as Narratio

The narratio plays the role of being a resume of the page. It must give the user a sense of what this

is about. It is not to be confused with mythos, which is the whole narration about the domain, and

which we will get to at the bottom level. Hasle stresses the role of a narratio as very important for

quickly giving the user a foretaste.52

50Brug af retorik i analyse, design og konstruktion af IKT (specielt websites)(2003).Per Hasle.) Pp. 5.51

www.kurzweiltech.com/aboutray.html (klik p linket: .. A brief video profile of Ray Kurzweil.)52Brug af retorik i analyse, design og konstruktion af IKT (specielt websites)(2003).Per Hasle. pp. 5.


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And Ramona takes you straight into the realm of strong AI, with pathos, ethos and logos appeals.

The more you get to know the site, the greater a role Ramona seems to play. In the start she was

something you could activate, then you can read an interview with her, and thereafter you are

already making thoughts about strong AI. When you reach the interview you are already getting

into an argumentation for strong AI. You dont get into it through premises clearly stated that are

intended to prove a conclusion. Neither are you introduced to the subject as something we see from

afar. But she is there right in your face. This is clearly a pathos appeal that serves as an exordium

and a narratio. The interview with Ramona is also clearly set up on the site to throw her in our face,

as one who baffles the interviewer, who is struck by how convincingly real she is. The first words

one meets in the interview with Ramona, is an introduction to the interview itself:

Surprise, embarrassment, and misunderstanding are all hallmarks of a real conversation, a journalistnotes after conversing with KurzweilAI.net's chatbot host, Ramona.53

At this point one senses the intentions of the site in a few words. It is trying to convince us, that a

program like Ramona, is not just virtual its reality. And that if it is not convincing at the moment

it will be later.

5.1.3 Chat with Ramona

If you accept the invitation to a chat with Ramona, you can fittingly ask her something about what

she just said, as you entered the site. I asked: Who is Ray Kurzweil? A natural question since she

announced the publishing of his new book, as I entered the site.

Ramona answers the question right away, she moves from side to side, smiles and her lips are aptly

synchronized with her talk, which flows freely:

Raymond has invented many things, like that reading machine for the blind, oh, and me.

53

Immaterial Girl. (2003) Phil Bowermaster -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0617.html


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This answer has a lot of elements which are interesting from a logos, ethos and pathos perspective.

There is a pathos appeal in Ramonas admiration of her inventor. She talks about him in a personal

way he is the inventor of her, as a person. Notice also how it is simply assumed that she is a real

person a me. There is also an ethos appeal in these words. Ray Kurzweil is a benevolent man

concerned with the wellbeing of the handicapped people. But this is not everything. Ramona answer

has put other things in motion. On the main page The Brain has begun moving. A longer and more

enlightening answer is now available, that goes like this:

Ray Kurzweil is a writer, inventor and entrepreneur responsible for such advances in pattern

recognition and artificial intelligence as optical character recognition, automatic or continuous speech

recognition, and digitial synthesizers. He also has sponsored innovative projects in the cyber arts, and in

health and medicine.54

The ethos appeal is great here. Kurzweil is one who believes in a positive future, where the

advancements in technology will be something that benefits humanity, not as Bill Joy whose vision

of the future is rather gloomy.55 And Kurzweil has a past to back up his claims he has used

technology to help people. But Ramonas function taken without her connection to the brain is

clearly the pathos appeal. From the site you can hear her songs, see her music videos and chat with

her.56 The connection between her and The Brain, one is taken into the logos appeal on perhaps the

greatest rhetorical tool on the site. The site informs about the connection between her and The

Brain, but not clearly though, one has to search for the answer. 57

5.2 The Brain

The Brain is central for a rhetorical analysis of the site. Functionally it is a rather intuitive way of

approaching the Site. One can follow thoughts around, read articles and the definitions The Brain

makes of the thoughts you bump into. When one clicks on [The Brain] link in the header menu, the

Brain is started up, with the default word: Artificial Intelligence. If this is the entrance to the page,

then a narratio can be seen in this function as well. It tells us what this Site is about. When you

place the marker over the word in central, what looks like neural connections are highlighted to

other thoughts. On a top level the graphical colour could be called futuristic blue or deep blue,

with some connotations to a certain prediction made about the computer with the same name.

54 http://www.kurzweilai.net/brain/html/kurzweil_entry.html55Why the future doesn't need us. (2000) Bill Joy. http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html56

http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?m=957 http://www.kurzweilai.net/about/frame.html


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This blue colour seems well chosen for the site, and especially for The Brain. But this is properly

not a colour chosen by the designer of the page, since it is the default colour this program comes

with. It is made by a company called The Brain. It seems rather superficial and a bit dishonest when

the program is called Ramonas brain.58 One can download a trial version at www.thebrain.com and

play around with it, organizing thoughts connected to each other either as parent, child or a new

thought. The company describes how the program works in the following way:

BrainEKP integrates information from document repositories, Web sites, databases, and other

applications. BrainEKPs knowledge architecture models the way information is created and accessed,

forming a single knowledge map that reflects the best thinking of your organization.59

Unless one thinks that organizations can be conscious entities capable of having thoughts there is no

reason to think that this is Ramonas brain. But it is also unclear what claims are made and how

these has to be interpreted concerning the reality of Ramona. Since she is promoted as Ray

Kurzweils alter ego, the brain must reflect his thoughts. And not something that Ramona has

mastered.

5.3 The rhetorical function of The Brain

It makes quite a lot of sense to find out what rhetorical function the brain has on a top, middle and

finally on the bottom level.

58 Her "Brain" is a visual map showing how each "thought" (browsable word or phrase) relates to other thoughts on the

site. http://www.kurzweilai.net/about/frame.html59www.thebrain.com no direct link available.


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5.3.1 Top level

At the top level The Brain has a design function. It symbolizes something mechanical wheels that

turns around. Small signs we humans call words, and which Kurzweil claims computers also does,

make up thoughts, related by threads. The blue deep blue colour is futuristic and technologically

cold. I have made these considerations before, so here it will suffice to connect these with a pathos

appeal. It gives the impression of a being a well thought through concept. Its primary function is

mainly on the middle and bottom level.

5.3.2 Middle level

At the middle level we find a good deal of argumentation. Ray Kurzweil has gathered a lot of

articles from a lot of great thinkers about AI.60 The brain permeates the site, which is packed with

scientific and philosophical articles. These articles give an ethos appeal of being competent and

engaging towards opposing views. What is special about these articles is the setting into which they

are placed. They are all subjected to the control of The Brain. If you bump into words that The

Brain recognizes, then they will be marked blue and be interactive. If you choose to click on them,

then you will leave the text you were reading, and be taken to another page. Here The Brain will

start up with this new word in focus. It will give a definition of the word and link to articles where

this word is present to a certain degree. Since I am convinced that this is a deliberate function I

believe The Brain has a huge influence on how these articles will be read.

The Logos function is a bit downplayed, or at least there is not so much instruction being made. The

instruction takes place in articles, but these are from various authors of different convictions on

strong AI, and the main rhetorical function is therefore not so much that of instructing, as much as

that of laying down a structure on how the mythos has to be constructed. Because of this I think that

it is on the bottom level that The Brain proves enormously valuable for this Site. On the middle

level there is the role though of giving an ethos appeal. Kurzweil must meet the demands of being

benevolent, showing tolerance and fairness. Since quite a few of these articles are sceptical of the

claims of strong AI, Kurzweil by taking these thoughts into his site must also make these authors

feel at home there. I wonder to what degree they tolerate this control by Kurzweil. One of these

places where this control is seen is in giving definitions of the thoughts being discussed. This can

60

At the page: http://www.kurzweilai.net/bios/frame.html one can find a list of all the material and contributing authorsthat appears on www.kurzweilai.net. Several full length books are available on the site.


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certainly alter a lot in a metaphysical debate. If you for instance click on the thought: Algorithm,

you get the following description:

A sequence of rules and instructions that describes a procedure to solve a problem. A computer

program expresses one or more algorithms in a manner understandable by a computer.

If you compare that description with one from Wikipedia, then you get another answer:

In mathematics and computer science an algorithm (the word is derived from the name of the Persian

mathematician Al-Khwarizmi) is a finite set of well-defined instructions for accomplishing some task

which, given an initial state, will terminate in a corresponding recognizable end-state (contrast with

heuristic).61

The difference being that The Brains definition assumes that an algorithm is something that is

understandable by a computer. This is excatly the point that strong AI has to prove, and a point

which is highly controversial. If this argumentation is already done in the definitions then it comes

dangerously close to begging the question. The debate is thus loaded in a way that turns out to the

favour of Ray Kurzweils view.62 This is to my opinion a shortcoming with consequences for the

ethos appeal. Ray Kurzweil calls the site:Home of the great thinker but I wonder how much they

would feel at home in his definitions.

5.4 The Bottom level

Theanalysis of The Brains function for the sites middle level points forward to a more basic andprofound function The Brain has regarding the construction of a mythos. When constructing a

mythos there will be a selection of the data that one finds relevant, and that will be done to a degree

where one can talk about setting the frames for the narrative. Of the classical rhetorics five parts of

a speech, I have touched on two in this project: exordium and narratio. By viewing Ramona as both

an exordium and a narratio I believe one sees how Kurzweil uses this function not only on a toplevel, as a graphical function and on the middle level as an ethos and pathos appeal, but also as a

vital part at the bottom level. Here I believe she is used as an example of the technological progress

towards creating artefacts of strong AI. She is a part of the mythos that Kurzweil constructs around

the domain of AI. Before focussing on how The Brain is used on the bottom level I find it important

61 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithms62 It is in this connection funny that Ray Kurzweil accuses John Searles Chinese Room argument for being deeplytautological. And even though I have always found Searles logic in his celebrated Chinese Room Argument to be

hopelessly tautological, even I had expected him to articulate an elevating treatise on the paradoxes of consciousness.(Kap 6, Are we spiritual machines) Pp. 128.


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to briefly touch on how Ramona is used at the bottom level as part of the Mythos that Kurzweil

constructs.

5.4.1 Ramona

When Kurzweil talks about AI products achieving consciousness, he typically starts by giving

examples. His book The Age of Spiritual Machines (1999) is full of pictures, anecdotes and small

fictive conversations that present the strong AI argument with alternative means. The rhetorical

power is therefore different from the one an analytical philosopher would have by dissecting his

argument into clear premises, careful distinctions and precisely defined terms. In chapter 8 he

proceeds by giving a bunch of examples of how computers are gaining on us on areas that we

typically reserve for human capabilities. He gives examples of how computers can jam with us;

create music, literature, poetry and works of art. To all of these examples some version of the

Chinese Room argument would apply. As I have shown above, that argument doesnt convince

Kurzweil, but his own counterarguments are only successful to a degree were he can postulate that

the problems concerning strong AI are not more problematic than the ones naturalistic philosophers

have concerning meaning, understanding, consciousness and intentionality. But another rhetorical

option remains open, one he seems to follow to convince by giving examples. Ramona is such an

example. There are no arguments given for the truth-value of the claims that are implied by the way

KurzweilAI.net talk about Ramona. As Kurzweils alter ego, she is someone he also is:

It is the first time that someone has given a singing

performance in front of a live audience while being

transformed into someone else. It is also the first

time that a dancer has danced in a live performance

while being transformed into someone else.63

(Kurzweil is the one transformed into someoneelse.)

When I transform myself into Ramona, I do feel

empowered to express myself as a new personality. I

feel that I am doing more than just playing a role, I

63

Ramona: Questions and Answers. (2001) Ray Kurzweil -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0146.html


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am expressing my female alter ego, and I do find it liberating. I had a vision of who she was, and what

she looked like, and with the help of dozens of brilliant people, I feel she expresses my original

conception.64

Hey! It's me, Ramona, Raymond Kurzweil's virtual alter ego. I'm cuter than he is, I'm smarter, I write

and perform my own music, and I'm as real as you! (Well, almost, I can't get speeding tickets and I

don't pay taxes.) I thought you'd like to hear more about life, so check out my story!65

By using the ambiguity between Ramona being his alter ego, and a virtual reality person, he can get

away with saying things about her that otherwise would seem nearly outrageous or at least highly

controversial. At the bottom level then Ramona is one of the endoxa that make up the whole

narrative of strong AI, mainly as a postulated virtual real person.

5.4.2 The Brain

Concerning the Sites narratio The Brain has a crucial role. It is used, at a fundamental level, to

select how conversation and debate around AI is to proceed. Asking the right question and

controlling the definition of the concepts is an essential part in the metaphysical question of mind

and matter. If one is reading the debate between William Dembski and Ray Kurzweil on

KurzweilAI.net, then one would see Dembski working on definitions on the concepts: machine andspiritual, in order to criticise Kurzweils view.

To see what modifying machine with the adjective spiritual entails, let us start by examining what

we mean by a machine. Normally by a machine we mean an integrated system of parts that function

together to accomplish some purpose.66

Since Dembski is about to give an argument against Kurzweils view on machines as capable of

being spiritual, he sees some problems in such a definition, and makes it more precise.

To avoid the troubled waters of teleology, let us bracket the question of purpose. In that case we can

define a machine as any integrated system of parts whose motions and modifications entirelycharacterize the system.67

In these two quotes the word machine has been highlighted by The Brain 3 times. So if one was

tempted to click on the word, one would be taken away from the article to The Brain which would

give this definition:

64 Ibid.65Ramonas Story. (2001) Ray Kurzweil - http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0093.html66Kurzweils Impoverished Spirituality. (2002) William A. Dembski -

http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0497.html67 Ibid.


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A device which performs a task and is operated mechanically, electrically, or electronically. In

computer terminology, "machine" usually refers to the computer itself.68

One sees that the troubled waters of teleology have not been avoided in this definition. A task is

being performed by a device. And this could have been a computer itself that performed it. So amachine is a computer that can perform a task. It can play chess, speech Chinese etc. I believe this

is one of the ways Ray Kurzweil maintains a control over the Site. By controlling the definitions

and by pointing to articles whenever one is in the hand of The Brain. So by clicking on

consciousness one would get a loose definition, and then links to articles on the question. Here you

would find two articles by John Searle, two by David Chalmers, a live moderated chat, some other

critics and a single article by Ray Kurzweil himself. This gives credit to the title of the site: Home

of the great thinkers. But they are in Kurzweils home. And one of the controls that Kurzweilmaintains here is the right to define concepts, and link articles together that he finds interesting, so

therefore one can question to what extend this is a home of other great thinkers than Ray

Kurzweil.

6.0 Conclusion

The problem I have been working with concerning the analysis of KurzweilAI.net was:

What role does the functions and design of the site play concerning the central viewson AI? What consequences have these had on the making of the site?

After a critical analysis of the way Kurzweil argues for strong AI, it seems obvious that the domain

around strong AI is a highly controversial one. Controversial in a way that gives room for claims of

the sort that Ray Kurzweil makes, because even though there are arguments like the Chinese Room

which seems conclusive against strong AI, the prior commitment of philosophers like John Searle to

a materialistic view on the nature of man and a non-reducible approach to consciousness opens a

door for strong AI. I believe it is against this backdrop that the rhetoric of KurzweilAI.net has to beseen.

I believe the rhetorical analysis have shown that a Ray Kurzweils strong AI position communicated

from the top structure of the site, to the deeper levels, from the graphical aspects to the framing of

how the user will meet the thoughts of the great thinkers on the site. Some general tendencies

pointing in that direction, seems to emerge; tendencies which other philosophers have pointed to in

the literature on mind and matter. The ambiguity in the language that Kurzweil uses makes it very

68 No direct reference can be given.


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difficult to evaluate his claims, but it seems obvious that he simply decides to talk about Ramona

and other AI products as being conscious and real, and she certainly serves as a pathos appeal to

that conclusion, a fact that Kurzweil isnt slow to remark that others have noticed. The logic seems

to be: if it convincingly appears conscious - then it is!

Ray Kurzweil constructs a mythos about spiritual machines. The quaestio, or the domain must be

consciousness a necessary property of spirituality, and machines, a necessary property of a

computer. The different endoxa are predictions about the future and examples of strong AI products

like Ramona. Both of these succumbs to the Chinese Room Argument though, which therefore

seems to point out what a necessary condition of a mental property is a necessary condition that

none of Ray Kurzweils examples of artificial intelligence succeeds in exemplifying, no matter

how fast they are running or how well reversed engineered they are. An algorithm cannot make

up for intelligence. Ray Kurzweils strongest argument though, is to point out the arbitrariness

present in the distinctions of John Searle between silicon and biology. Thus the question is thrown

back into another domain the old mind/matter debate. A debate where the physicalist has the

upper hand these days and views like the one of William Dembski can be defeated by calling it old

fashioned,69as is seen in the response of Daniel Dennett to what he calls old fashioned dualism:

It continues to amaze me how attractive this position still is to many people. I would have thought a

historical perspective alone would make this view seem ludicrous: over the centuries, every other

phenomenon of initially "supernatural" mysteriousness has succumbed to an uncontroversial

explanation within the commodious folds of physical science.70

While Ramona does quite a good work at a top level, she doesnt have the same rhetorical power as

the function of The Brain has. As the analysis of The Brain showed Kurzweil maintains a control

over terms and definitions that are crucial, and even though his definitions arent very different

from a the one you typically would find in a lexicon, they sometimes have quite a big importance as

shown in the example with William Dembski. It is also through The Brain that Kurzweil set up the

frames for the discussion between these great thinkers. This framing leads the user towards the

same conclusion as seen in the discussion between John Searle and Ray Kurzweil. The

philosophical controversies slip into the background, or drown in the sea of multiple controversial

viewpoints.

69 Ray Kurzweils answer to William Dembskis critique has the title: Dembskis Outdated Understanding. And heends his remarks with saying: Finally, if Dembskis intelligence-enhancing extra-material stuff really exists, then Idlike to know where I can get some. His respons looks very similar to Daniel Dennetts: 70

Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds. (1997) Daniel Dennett -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0474.html


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This analysis of KurzweilAI.net touches on a problem regarding mind and matter, which the

philosopher J.B. Stump has made in a review of Flanagans book: The Problem of the Soul: Two

visions of the Mind and How to Reconcile Them, J.B. Stump tells about a strategy that Flanagan

develops with the purpose of changing the popular image of the mind as something that cant be

physical.

Flanagans concern is to replace the picture of humans given by the perennial philosophy what he

calls themanifest image (the concomitants of which are immaterial minds, free will, and immortality)

with one that is consistent with the scientific image. But because the manifest image is so engrained

into our thought patterns, this is no easy task. He identifies three approaches that can be used in trying

to change the manifest image of an age:

1) You may say, You are a fool to believe , well have to straighten you out. 2) You may say, is

not true, but is and is close enough to that youll eventually get used to it. Trust me, everythingwill be alright. 3) You speak of meaning , while I speak of meaning hoping that my way of

speaking will eventually win the day in this play of language games, so that you, or your descendents,

will eventually come to mean when you or they say .71

This strategy simply admits to the fact that the general person do not buy into the scientific way

of looking at the soul. But instead of seeing this as a problem for the scientific view, it sees it as

something that must be solved rhetorically or linguistically. Ray Kurzweil seems to use the same

strategy all over his site. The ambiguity in the way he talks about a function like Ramona or other

computer programs like Deep Blue seems to imply that they must be conscious entities with the

capability of having mental states like understanding and intentionality. So even though the logic

doesnt ad up, as seen in his discussion on the Chinese Room, he can use some of the loopholes that

other philosophers like John Searle have made, to creep in and claim the same for computers as

Searle does for another physical thing to be a conscious entity. While this perhaps isnt

convincing at the moment, it is true as Ray Kurzweil says it will be convincing when they tell us

in the near future that they are. So perhaps this language strategy will turn out to give futurists like

Ray Kurzweil and others the upper hand, not today perhaps but maybe tomorrow. Perhaps we will

end up speaking about calculators and computers as conscious entities and mean what we say. This

will raise problems of another kind - ethical problems that Ray Kurzweil also addresses on

www.kurzweilAI.net, but which I havent found room for here.

71Christians and the Philosophy of Mind: A Review Essay on the Problem of the Soul. (2005). J.B. Stump. pp. 590.


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Bibliography

Books used in this project.

Raymond Kurzweil

The Age of Spiritual Machines (1999); Phoenix.Are We Spiritual Machines? Ray Kurzweil vs. The Critics of Strong AI.(2002); Edited by Jay W.Richards. Discovery Institute Press.

J.P. Moreland and Scott RaeBody and Soul (2002); Intervarsity Press.

Peter Van Inwagen.Metaphysics (2002); Westveiw

Roger Penrose(1989)preface from (1999); Oxford university press.Emperors New Mind.

Sren Harnow KlausenMetafysik (1997); Gyldendal.

Articles

Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds. (1997) Daniel Dennetthttp://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0474.html

Christians and the Philosophy of Mind: A Review Essay on the Problem of the Soul. (2005). J.B. Stump. pp.590. In Philosophia Christi. Vol 5.2.

Ramonas Story. (2001) Ray Kurzweil -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0093.html

KurzweilsImpoverished Spirituality. (2002) William A. Dembski -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0497.html

Ramona: Questions and Answers. (2001) Ray Kurzweilhttp://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0146.html

Brug af retorik i analyse, design og konstruktion af IKT (specielt websites)(2003).Per Hasle. pp. 5.

Telling Truth or Time, Cicero, St. Paul and St. Jerome: An Essay in the Relation between aRhetorical and an Early Christian Conception of Truth and Communication (1999) Per Hasle.www.hum.au.dk/ckulturf/pages/publications/ph/truth.htm

Immaterial Girl. (2003) Phil Bowermaster -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0617.html

Matter and Sense (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Howard Robinson: Pp. 2. Quoted fromJ.P. Moreland and Scott Rae: Body and Soul. (see book section for further details)

The Evolution of Mind in the Twenty First Century. (2002) Ray Kurzweil -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0500.html

Dembskis Outdated Understanding.(2002) Ray Kurzweil. -http://www.kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0493.html

Minds, Brains and Programs. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 3, (1980) John Searle.


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FiguresFigure 1

Figure 2

jakobsen d; rhetorical web-analysis of kurzweilai.net paper 2006

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