issues in christian–muslim relations: a malaysian christian perspective*

This article was downloaded by: [Eastern Michigan University]On: 10 October 2014, At: 08:29Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Islam and Christian–Muslim RelationsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cicm20

Issues in Christian–Muslim Relations: AMalaysian Christian PerspectiveAlbert Sundararaj Walters aa Diocese of West Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, MalaysiaPublished online: 02 Jul 2007.

To cite this article: Albert Sundararaj Walters (2007) Issues in Christian–Muslim Relations: AMalaysian Christian Perspective , Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 18:1, 67-83

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410601071139

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cicm20

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410601071139

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Issues in Christian–Muslim Relations:A Malaysian Christian Perspective�

ALBERT SUNDARARAJ WALTERS

Diocese of West Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

ABSTRACT Malaysia is a democratic secular federation with Islam as its official religion. Over thelast few decades, this unique model of tolerance and accommodation has been undergoingastounding developments politically, socially and economically. Intense intra-Muslim strugglescoupled with increased state-mobilized Islamizing efforts have produced disturbing knock-oneffects on non-Muslim minorities. Religion is so profoundly interwoven with race, ethnicity,politics and economics that it is impossible to speak of one without touching upon the others.This article aims to elucidate key practical issues affecting Christians living in a majority Islamiccontext. It further proposes significant policy options for managing Muslim–Christian relationsin twenty-first-century Malaysia. Education is crucial for promoting interreligious harmony,religious freedom, and respect for people of different traditions. More collaborative endeavoursthrough interfaith dialogue should help Malaysians transcend cultural, racial, linguistic andreligious barriers. Both Christian and Muslim faith communities need to learn more about andfrom each other and to move forward towards nation-building and a common destiny.

Introduction

Christian–Muslim relations has been an issue since the historical rise of Islam more than

fourteen centuries ago. From the beginning, there have been two dimensions to the

question. The first is related to the practical living together of individuals and communities

of the two faiths, and the second to theological challenges. These include questions of

Christian self-identity and self-expression in relation to Islam as well as issues regarding

the understanding of its significance. These matters have engaged Christians through the

centuries. This article intends to identify and discuss some of the major practical issues

affecting Christian–Muslim relations in Malaysia in the recent past, and not the

theological dimension.

This will not be a polemical presentation. Nor will it suggest that one faith is better than

the other. Its hypothesis is that if these practical matters are not dealt with in an amicable

manner, we could in fact be heading towards a crisis between Muslims and non-Muslims.

The main purpose of this article is therefore to underline the importance for people in both

Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations,

Vol. 18, No. 1, 67–83, January 2007

Correspondence Address: Albert Sundararaj Walters, c/o Diocese of West Malaysia, Diocesan Office, 16, Jalan

Pudu Lama, 50200 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Email: [email protected]

0959-6410 Print=1469-9311 Online=07=010067–17 # 2007 CSIC and CMCUDOI: 10.1080=09596410601071139

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

faith communities of learning more about and from each other and moving forward

towards nation-building and a common destiny.

The Malaysian Context

Malaysia is a democratic secular federation. Article 3 of the Federal Constitution expressly

declares that, while Islam is the official religion, other religions may be practised in peace

and harmony in any part of the country. On religious freedom, Article 11 spells out the

right of every person to profess and practise his/her religion. Although the moderate

Islamic majority exercises power, including power over non-Muslim minorities, Malaysia

is often acknowledged as a unique model of tolerance and accommodation (see Riddell,

2004).1 This is especially significant at the start of the twenty-first century when Malaysian

society is undergoing phenomenal political, social and economic changes.

Demographic Changes

Religion is closely correlated with ethnicity and almost all of the major religions of the

world have substantial representation in Malaysia. The census taken in 2000, when the

total population was 23.27 million,2 showed that demographic changes had taken place

in Malaysia. These changes are verifiable over the last few decades and are significant

to the Islamization process from the perspective of religious minorities. The national

census in 2000 showed that the Muslim proportion of Malaysia’s population had increased

from 58.6% to 60.4% over a ten-year period.3 Muslims accounted for 53% in the 1980

census (quoted in Ng Kiok Nam, 1992, p. 97), so there had been a rise of 7% in 20

years (Riddell, 2005, p. 163).

In the 2000 census, Christians made up 9.1% of the population; Hindus 6.3%; Buddhists

19.2%; and Confucianists/Taoists/other traditional Chinese religionists 2.6%; in the 1991

census, the figures were 8.0%, 6.4%, 18.4% and 5.3%, respectively. Figures for 1991 put

folk/tribal animistic religionists at 1.2% and others at 2.1% (Department of Statistics,

1991). The 9.1% Christian population is diverse in terms of history, ethnicity and

denomination.

Above all other factors, it is race that shapes and informs political and religious men-

tality and governmentality4 in Malaysia. And so the context provides a crucial laboratory

to test whether Islam empowered can reflect the democratic, pluralist values espoused by

much of the world in the twenty-first century.

Bumiputra Policy

With increased emphasis on Malay ethnicity, the bumiputras (lit. ‘sons of the soil’), that is,

Malays and the indigenous peoples of West Malaysia and the states of Sabah and Sarawak,

became the subjects of specific policies. The bumiputras were granted special privileges in

various fields. Islamization, under the influence of federal government policies, has

manifested itself in a variety of ways.

Education has always been a sensitive issue in Malaysia and one that has raised many

eyebrows in the past, since it cuts to the heart of both religious and racial issues. Until

68 A. S. Walters

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

2003, the quota system based on the 1971 New Economic Policy (NEP) gave bumiputra

applicants special entry privileges into public universities.

In the economic sector, government-owned companies with a bumiputra profile were

set up, as well as banks granting favourable loans to bumiputras.

The indigenous (bumiputra)/non-indigenous (non-bumiputra) dichotomy is, to all

intents and purposes, a major consideration in the public life of the nation, and affects

the economy, politics, culture, education and almost every other realm of activity. It per-

vades the entire social fabric. It is, in a sense, the de facto culture. The government has

often argued that this dichotomization is necessary to enable it to improve the economic

position of the bumiputras (Razak, 1969).

Islamic Politics

An Islamic resurgence has been taking place in Malaysia since the 1970s. This worldwide

phenomenon has had its own peculiar impact on domestic affairs. One important contribu-

tory factor has been a sense of insecurity on the part of the Malay majority in the face of a

substantial non-Malay minority. This has led to an increased ethnic awareness and asser-

tiveness among Malay Muslims.

Over the last three decades there have been significant efforts at restructuring that have

changed the direction of Islamic politics in Malaysia. This period has been dominated by a

revival of orthodox Islam throughout society. To this end, the federal government has

mobilized the organs of the state towards conscious and concerted programmes of

Islamic revivalism. The call for a holistic Islamic ethos has been further spearheaded by

the dakwah movement.

Furthermore, the trend over the past few years has been worrying. The dominant Malay

party in the government coalition, UMNO (United Malay National Organization), has

tried to be more Islamic than the opposition Islamic party, PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia

or Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party). This intra-Muslim struggle involving one-upmanship and

concerted efforts at ‘Islamizing’ Malaysia has been a grave concern for many Malaysians.

This contest has intensified lately and the ripples have affected religious minority commu-

nities in the country. Non-Muslims conclude that the federal government emphasis on the

inculcation of Islamic values and the PAS state government’s insistence on the implemen-

tation of Islamic law (Sharica) are two sides of the same coin.

Statements on the Islamic State

Malaysia’s establishment as a secular state is the essence of a social contract that was

crystallized in the Federal Constitution. The secular nature of the constitution cannot be

changed by a mere ministerial statement. And so the announcement on 29 September

2001 by the then Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, that Malaysia was already an

Islamic state created a wave of concern among both Muslims and non-Muslims.5 In a

further development, Mahathir announced in June 2002 that Malaysia was ‘an Islamic fun-

damentalist state’ because the government adhered to the fundamental teachings of Islam.6

Although some Malaysians have downplayed these statements as plain rhetoric made for

political expediency, they have had a ripple effect on Malaysian society.

The social contract was reached after much consultation and debate involving all the

racial and religious components at the time of independence in 1957. That agreement

Issues in Christian–Muslim Relations in Malaysia 69

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

was affirmed by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the father of the nation and first prime minister of

Malaya (1957–1963) and of Malaysia (1963–1970). He made the following statement in

Parliament in May 1958 while rejecting a statement by Dato’ Haji Yahya bin Haji Wan

Mohamed: ‘I would like to make it clear that this country is not an Islamic State as it is

generally understood; we merely provide that Islam shall be the official religion of the

State’ (Kamali, 2000, p. 30).

The Tunku asserted his disapproval of the concept of an Islamic state in similar terms at

another time in these words: ‘There is no way we should have an Islamic State here . . . we

cannot force the non-Malays and non-Muslims to follow our way of life. Our slogan “live

and let live” must be maintained because it is the only practical solution in a multi-racial

society like ours’ (cited in Foong, 2001, p. 3).

This sentiment was well reflected in the general climate existing at the time of indepen-

dence and also throughout the 1960s and is appropriately encapsulated in the words of

Muhammad Suffian Hashim, the first Malay chief justice. He expressed the contemporary

inclinations of the pioneer leaders of this young nation as follows: ‘Politics and religion

cannot be combined together, and the implementation of Islamic law in criminal and

civil affairs (not including personal law) to all people in the country is not suitable

because Malaysia is a multi-racial state’ (Kamali, 2000, p. 32).

Since independence in 1957, Islam has been the official religion of the Federation of

Malaya. This does not in any way suggest that Malaysia is an Islamic state. The position

of Islam as the official religion is essentially a recognition of its prominent status in the

evolution of the Malaysian polity. While the Malaysian Constitution recognizes the gov-

ernment’s obligation towards Islam, it also pledges to uphold freedom of worship and to

allow non-Muslims to practise their own religions (see Hashim, 1976, pp. 218–219). ‘In

Malaysia, religion is so intricately intertwined with race, politics and economics that it is

impossible to speak of one without touching upon the other’ (Malaysian Consultative

Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism [MCCBCHS], 1989, p. 4).

The issue of religious freedom vis a vis the position of Islam in Malaysia provides for a

most pertinent and interesting illustration of the interaction between religion, politics

and socio-economic factors in the modern world.

On the other hand, although the government administration has held radical Islam at bay

without alienating the Muslim majority in order to build a prosperous, multi-ethnic nation,

there is a threat of regional militancy bent on establishing a pan-Islamic state across South-

east Asia, as well as a growing domestic Islamic opposition party, PAS. PAS wants an

Islamic state in Malaysia with strict laws to punish criminals with public whippings and

amputation. Its popularity among ethnic Malay Muslims has put the ruling UMNO on

the defensive.

Islam Hadhari

Meanwhile, the present prime minister of Malaysia, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, is trying to

shift the focus of the Islamic state debate. He is promoting an alternative vision of Islam,

which he calls ‘Islam Hadhari’, or ‘civilizational Islam’, as a model for development in

Malaysia. It stresses the moral value of education, economic development, and protection

of minorities, as a counterweight to PAS’s narrow emphasis on dogma. It is also aimed at

Muslims who stray from the faith and need to be brought into line by persuasion, rather

than coercion.

70 A. S. Walters

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Islam Hadhari emphasizes the importance of progress—with an Islamic perspective—in

the economic, social and political fields. It stresses the need for balanced development,

including both physical and spiritual development. Hence, Badawi proposes a holistic

development approach for Malaysia. This means a shift in the approach to development

from a ‘secular paradigm’ to a ‘tawheed paradigm’, which emphasizes developing a think-

ing society, social harmony and economic progress.

Key Issues Affecting Muslim–Christian Relations

With the state moving into the realm of societal values and ‘Islamizing’ institutions, a

number of pertinent questions disturb the minds of the religious minorities. How will

this affect daily life, economics, education, the legal system, the rule of law, dress, diet,

etc.? What would be the implications of such a process in a multi-ethnic and multi-

religious society? The common feeling among Christians is that greater restrictions will

be imposed upon the practice of their religion because of the government’s deep commit-

ment to Islam and the prevailing Islamic atmosphere.

In response to the prevailing situation, Christians and other religious minorities have

acted, especially over that last three decades, to map out strategies in order to feel

secure in working together on issues of common interest. Mohamad Abu Bakar captures

this when he says,

One aspect of this Islamisation drive, which was to have a significant impact on race

relations, was the central and state governments’ attempts to bring their adminis-

trations in line with religious requirements . . . [Non-Muslims] entered the fray by

activating their own organizations, mobilizing their members, or forming their

own societies in order to champion the cause of their co-religionists in the face of

the Islamists’ challenge. (Abu Bakar, 2001, pp. 69–70)

This was done in order to monitor enactments and policies that affect the religious life of

minority religious groups in the country. The non-Muslim communities resolved to

strengthen their status by becoming creative challenges in society, involved in the main-

stream task of nation-building. For instance, the Christian Federation of Malaysia (CFM)

was founded in 1986 as the government-driven Islamization programme built up steam.

This broad-based alliance, representing around 5,000 member churches,7 includes

almost all Christian denominations and speaks for about 90% of the Christian population

of Malaysia. The CFM acts on behalf of the Christian community in relations with the

government and other religious communities.

The CFM is also a member of the Malaysian Consultative Council for Buddhism,

Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism. This Council, founded in 1983, serves as a forum

for resolving sensitive issues regarding religion and related matters for the four non-

Muslim religions. Its official website clarifies what prompted this effort:

In August [1981], statements were made by the governing authorities and others

regarding Malaysia’s ultimate status as an Islamic State. These statements gave rise

for concern to the leaders of the non-Muslim religions and they saw that as a positive

opportunity to come together to promote matters of mutual interests [and] defend

against common threats, to build a nation where religious and racial harmony reigns.8


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Let us now consider some of the main issues that affect Christian–Muslim relations in

Malaysia and Christian responses to them.

Marginalization and Discrimination under Islamization

The government generally respects non-Muslims’ right of worship. But Malaysian

Christians have regularly expressed concerns about the marginalization of non-Muslim

communities as a result of Islamization. State governments carefully control the distri-

bution of land, building of non-Muslim places of worship and the allocation of land for

non-Muslim cemeteries. One glaring example of the reluctance of the authorities to grant

land or construction permits to non-Muslims is provided by the story of the proposal to

build a Catholic church in Shah Alam in the state of Selangor (Chew, 2000, pp. 272–274).

By the early 1990s, it had become quite obvious that discrimination existed in the dis-

tribution of land for places of worship in town-planning. In comparison with Muslims,

insufficient places of worship were allocated to non-Muslims. In the state of Johor, for

instance, it was recommended that a non-Muslim place of worship would be allotted

for every 4,000 worshippers with the spatial requirement to be set according to ‘suitable

standards’. In comparison, one mosque would be allotted for every 800 worshippers with a

spatial requirement of 0.4 hectare. Similar examples are found in plans for other towns.9

After non-Muslim protests, the vague ‘suitable standards’ were specified as 0.2 hectare,

half the space allocated for a mosque (Chew, 2000, p. 271). In September 1998, the

Federal Ministry of Housing and Local Government published a document entitled

Guidelines for Planning Places of Worship for Non-Muslims. This controversial circular

raised eyebrows among the religious minorities.10 A leading Christian publication

reflected non-Muslim displeasure, saying,‘The Guidelines are oppressive, unfair, unjust

and unconstitutional.’11

Islamic Values Programme

Fears among religious minorities have been made more credible by the Islamic values

programme. The government has made concerted efforts to introduce an Islamic code

of conduct as a check on the negative secularist tendencies thought to be associated

with Western societies. Since these values are propagated as being universal, non-

Muslims have often asked why they should be called ‘Islamic values’. This creates

further alienation between Muslims and others in a society where ethnic polarization is

already quite serious.

The lack of interaction and racial integration among schoolchildren and young people is

a worrying trend in Malaysia. A backbench member of Parliament cited a survey carried

out by Universiti Malaya which showed that 98% of Malay students did not mix with

non-Malays. Similarly, the study revealed that 99% of Chinese students and 97% of

Indian students did not mingle with others.12

Education Structure

Christians have also expressed fears that the structure of education is being changed to

conform with Islamization. One example is the introduction of Islamic history and civili-

zation courses as compulsory components of university programmes. This move has found

little support among non-Muslims. Paul Tan (now Bishop), former director of the Catholic

Research Centre, takes particular issue with this action by government:

72 A. S. Walters

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

If the intention of introducing the subject of Islamic Civilisation was that the

non-Muslims would come to understand Muslims better through it, then for the

same noble reason the Government should introduce a subject of other major religious

civilisations so as to help the Muslims understand the non-Muslims. (Basri, 1992, p. 32)

National unity and development through the education system are enshrined in the

National Philosophy of Education. This stresses the holistic development of the individual

based on the tenets of the Rukunegara—a set of principles proclaimed on Independence

Day, 31 August 1970, which serves as a guide to national unity, and peaceful, harmonious

living in Malaysia.

The five principles are:

1. Belief in God.

2. Loyalty to king and country.

3. Upholding the Constitution.

4. Rule of law.

5. Good behaviour and morality.

Educational programmes and activities should be designed and geared towards the achieve-

ment of national integration and unity among the various religions and races. But there is

growing concern about whether this ultimate aim of the education system is being met.

Islamic State and Islam Hadhari

In Malaysia, where Muslims constitute the majority, there are political movements and

religious leaders and intellectuals who call for the application of the Sharica, seen as a cri-

terion of government legitimacy. This meets with opposition from some Christians and

Muslims who, as citizens, object to a rigid political model that they believe would

hinder civil rights and hinder society from coping with modem challenges.

This call for implementation of the Sharica, and PAS’s public declaration of its intention

to set up an Islamic state should it come to power, have sent jitters through the non-Muslim

community.13 They cannot accept being put in the position of aliens or second-class

citizens in their own country. Christians often complain that the Sharica, even should it

protect the freedom of Christian worship and practice and guarantee their right to have

their own personal law, would lead inevitably to their marginalization.

As Prime Minister Badawi has stressed repeatedly, ‘Islam Hadhari’ is shorthand for an

Islamic state that is peaceful, moderate and just, and embraces all races and creeds. Islam

Hadhari principles are not ‘new’ but an extension of existing Islamic principles. They are

also in line with policies of the previous Mahathir administration.

Some Malaysians think that Islam Hadhari is neither a political nor a religious

philosophy but UMNO’s political agenda. It serves to tell Malaysians that UMNO

Islam is more responsive to the modern world than PAS’s. Some Christians have also

expressed concern that, of the ten principles, only one refers to the protection of the

rights of minority groups. They have also questioned whether the ‘justice’ preached in

Islam Hadhari would be applied to all religions.

The opposition party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), has responded by saying the

‘929 Declaration’14 that Malaysia is an Islamic state is a total repudiation of the 48-year-old


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

social contract of the major communities. This social contract, established in the 1957

Merdeka Constitution, 1963 Malaysia Agreement and 1970 Rukunegara, states that

Malaysia is a democratic, secular and multi-religious nation with Islam as the official

religion, but not an Islamic State.15

Non-Muslims on the whole perceive Islam Hadhari as supplementing and complement-

ing the Mahathir administration’s Islamizing policies over the last two decades or so. To

add fuel to fire, the call of Badruddin Amiruldin (Member of Parliament for Jerai) in

Parliament for Malaysians who do not want to live in an Islamic state to leave the

country went uncensored.16

There are today in Malaysia people of the Muslim faith who hold an ‘extreme exclusi-

vism’ position—a rejectionist view that eliminating the ‘other’ will eliminate the problem.

They reiterate that the so-called immigrant population of Indians and Chinese must get out

if they find Malaysia too Islamic. However, if Islam Hadhari is to be implemented in

accordance with its own principles, it should encourage an open and tolerant culture

that promotes interreligious dialogue and understanding.

Anti-Christian Statements and Actions

Besides marginalization and discrimination under Islamization, Christians in Malaysia are

perturbed by specific statements and actions that seem to undermine their position within

the country.

Bible banned

In 1981, a federal level statute was introduced banning the possession and circulation of

the Indonesian-language Bible, Alkitab. The Alkitab was restricted under the Internal

Security Act (ISA) because it was deemed to be prejudicial to national interests and the

security of the country. As a result of representations made by the Council of Churches

of Malaysia (CCM) in early 1982, the ban was amended to allow Christians to have

copies for their personal and liturgical use, but no one else was allowed to possess it.

The restriction placed on the use of the Malay Bible was accompanied by other legal

restrictions. One of the most contentious pieces of legislation was the banning in 1991

of the use in any non-Islamic literature of four terms regarded as Islamic: Allah,

Kaabah, Baitullah and Solat (Walters, 2002, p. 77).17 This move was particularly signifi-

cant for Christians, since the term Allah had been in regular use to refer to God in Christian

worship and liturgy. The implementation of this law impacts directly upon the issue of

importation of religious literature.18

Furthermore, in April 2003 the Home Ministry banned 35 books, including the Bup

Kudus, the Bible in the Iban language.19 The Bup Kudus has been widely used by

Iban-speaking Christians since it was first published in 1988. About three weeks later,

upon the intervention of the then acting Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, the

ban was lifted. The main bone of contention, according to the Department of Islamic

Development of Malaysia (JAKIM), which led to the banning was that it contained the

phrase Allah Tala. This phrase is derived from the Arabic Allah tacala meaning ‘Almighty

God’ in Islamic usage.20

In contrast to restrictions on the production and distribution of Christian literature,

Muslim literature of an orthodox kind enjoys freedom from official interference. This

includes writings of a type that cause consternation in Christian circles. As Robert Hunt

74 A. S. Walters

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

observes, ‘Anti-Christian polemical works are commonly found in Muslim bookstores and

anti-Christian comment is allowed in the context of larger presentations of Muslim

theological concerns’ (Hunt, 1997, p. 217).

National Christian leaders also registered their dismay and concern at statements made

by Mohd. Nazri Abdul Aziz, a Cabinet minister in Parliament in April 2005. He spoke of

not allowing the free use of the translated versions of the Bible in Bahasa Malaysia and

Bahasa Indonesia.21 The CFM then appealed to the Prime Minister and to the Cabinet

to calm the anxieties of Christians in the nation, by correcting the views expressed by

the honourable minister. All Malaysians are fluent in Bahasa Malaysia. Being the

medium of instruction in schools and the lingua franca of the nation, it has become the

common language of all Malaysians regardless of race or religion. So the right of non-

Muslims to use the Malay Bible should not become an issue.

Aggression against churches

High-handed activities against the Christian community have gone further than official

authoritative restrictions. The torching of church buildings in a number of states in

Peninsular Malaysia in July and October 2001 was a clear indication of deteriorating com-

munity relations in the country. This destructive action left five churches severely

damaged or ruined.

In 2005, local authorities in the state of Johor demolished a church belonging to the

indigenous Orang Asli tribal people following a dispute over the ownership of the land

on which the church was built (Beard, 2005). Though these incidents may have been

caused by some disgruntled anti-government extremist groups or overzealous bureaucrats,

they raise major concerns in the Christian community regarding progress towards harmo-

nious interreligious relations.

Abuse of Christian symbols

Great concern was also expressed by the Christian community regarding the use of

Christian symbols to campaign in a local by-election in Pendang and Anak Bukit

(Kedah State) in 2002. In response, the CCM issued a press statement condemning

misuse of religious images:

To depict the Prime Minister as ‘paderi besar gereja’ [church high priest or bishop]

is not only distasteful but also hurtful to Christians, as it not only shows insensitive-

ness on the part of those who have resorted to such election tactics, but also politi-

cizes religious differences.22

In a multi-religious society, people should learn not to be frivolous with the symbols and

religious practices of each other’s religion.

An identity crisis

A recent issue may be termed an ‘identity crisis’. As an upgrading exercise, all Malaysians

were advised to change their old identity cards to the electronic chip-based MyKad by the

end of 2005. However, there have been a number of complaints by some non-Malays/non-

Muslims that the National Registration Department (NRD) has incorrectly recorded their


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

religion in the database. Some who are Christians were listed as Buddhists or Sikhs, while

others who are non-Muslims were listed as Muslims.

On the surface, this seems to be a trivial matter, but the minority Christian community

has plenty of reasons to be concerned. This possible misrepresentation of the size of the

Christian population could have serious implications and repercussions. Firstly, it could

affect the political power of the group. Secondly, it may also be linked to town planning

and approval by local authorities for churches to be built in housing estates.

Conversion and apostasy

The question of religious conversion and apostasy is often a very controversial issue in

many parts of the world. It is even more contentious in Malaysia, where religion,

culture and ethnicity are intricately interwoven with each other. Although Article 11 of

the Federal Constitution guarantees freedom of religion for all citizens, in reality non-

Muslims enjoy what could be described as ‘conditional’ or ‘restricted’ freedom.

In 1987, one of the incidents that greatly impacted the Malaysian church was Operasi

Lalang when 106 persons were detained under the ISA allegedly for subversion, violence

and threat to national security. Among those arrested for propagating Christianity to Malay

Muslims was Jamaluddin bin Othman (also known as Yeshua Jamaluddin), a convert to

Christianity. His right to convert away from Islam was upheld in a landmark decision

by the High Court of Malaysia on 6 October 1988. The Federal Court further ruled that

Jamaluddin was free to follow his conscience and practise his newfound religion.23

However, other cases have been far more complicated and perplexing. In the remark-

able dispute concerning Nor Aishah binte Bokhari, this young Malay woman, according

to an affidavit she filed at the High Court, left Islam in October 1997. She converted to

the Christian faith with the intention of marrying Joseph Arnold Lee, a Catholic of

Chinese–Indian parentage. This news outraged Muslims, who held demonstrations in

several mosques. Some Muslim groups, however, called for changes in the law that

would prevent the repetition of cases like Nor Aishah’s. Harakah, a paper published by

PAS, even called for apostates to be arrested under the ISA, which permits detention

without trial (Jayasankaran, 1998).

Another outstanding case related to the issue of apostasy is that of Lina Joy, who had

changed her name from Azlina Jailani. Lina Joy, a Muslim who converted to Christianity

in 1998, was granted leave on 13 April 2006 to appeal to the Federal Court over the

National Registration Department’s refusal to delete her status as a Muslim from her iden-

tity card (Wong, 2006). In 2005 her application to the Court of Appeal was rejected on the

grounds that her statutory declaration was insufficient for the NRD to remove the word

‘Islam’ from her identity card. The reason was that renunciation of Islam is a matter of

Islamic law and requires the determination of some Islamic religious authority. Can the

NRD require people who wish to delete the word ‘Islam’ from their identity card first

to produce a Sharica Court document certifying they have renounced the religion? The

MCCBCHS objected, saying that

it is of the view that a person’s religion cannot be determined by religious law or

bodies other than the person himself/herself. To state otherwise would undermine

the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion under Article 11 (1) of our

Constitution and Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.24

76 A. S. Walters

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

In December 2005, one high-profile case regarding conversion was that of M. Moorthy @

Mohammad Abdullah, a mountaineer who had climbed Everest in 1997. His widow,

S. Kaliammal, tried unsuccessfully after her husband’s death to contest his conversion

to Islam and lay claim to his body. She argued that her husband was a practising

Hindu, and said that while he was alive he did not inform her of his conversion to

Islam. Kaliammal had no right to be heard in the Sharica Court. Her appeal to the High

Court to hand over Moorthy’s body to her was rejected. The High Court ruled that it

had no jurisdiction to review a Sharica Court decision that Moorthy had converted to

Islam. He was finally buried according to Muslim rites (Singh & Yatim, 2005). The

fact that the widow had no legal remedy is very alarming. The High Court decision,

however, is not likely to end the wider debate raised by this case, on the rights of non-

Muslims in such circumstances. The issue also raised the question of whether Malaysia

has parallel legal systems with no final arbiter.

Generally speaking, many religious organizations welcomed the Prime Minister’s

assurance that matters related to religious conversion would be spelt out clearly to

avoid confusion and dissatisfaction.25 But non-Muslims, who fear that Sharica is becoming

the supreme law of the land, want more than soothing words in their anxiety that the

common law and civil justice system is under threat.

In the light of the Moorthy case, the MCCBCHS urged the government to amend Article

121 (1A) of the Constitution, which states that all matters pertaining to Islam should be

handled by the Sharica Court.26 The CCM General Secretary, Dr Herman Shastri, said

serious consideration should be given to the said Article, whose present interpretation

blurred the lines of jurisdiction between the civil and Sharica courts. Shastri said,

Civil courts should be seen to protect and uphold justice of citizens with regard to

fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. In no way should a

judge abdicate responsibility in hearing the case of one who seeks to exercise the

right to be heard in court.27

The failure of S. Kaliammal in her efforts to seek relief in the High Court and recover the

body of her husband for burial, and her being told there was no provision for mounting a

legal challenge to decisions made by the Sharica Court, proves that Dr Mahathir Mohamad

was right about Malaysia being an Islamic state. After all, in an Islamic state, Islamic law

is above the constitution.

These cases regarding conversion and apostasy beg the question, especially for minority

religious communities, of whether the way of life guaranteed under the Constitution is still

available to them. And, if not, to what extent has that way of life been displaced by the

clamour that Malaysia is now an Islamic state?

The cases mentioned above highlight a constitutional crisis. The Sharica Court and

Sharica law have been elevated to a status that was never intended by the framers of the

Malaysian Constitution. What Malaysians have witnessed recently is the self-emascula-

tion of the civil court judges in giving sway to the Sharica Court and Sharica law.

Dr Shad Saleem Faruqi calls this phenomenon a ‘silent re-writing’ of the Constitution.28

The Prime Minister has made it clear that matters concerning religious conversion need

to be spelt out plainly in the Federal Constitution and other laws to prevent confusion

among Malaysians and has pointedly said that in whatever legal action ‘we initiated,


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

we must also ensure that justice is served to all’, adding that the right of Malaysians to

follow the religion of their choice must be respected (Wong Chun Wai, 2006).

‘Clash of Civilizations’ Malaysian Style

Religion and race are regarded as sensitive subjects in Malaysia. Disquiet among the

minorities started brewing in December after the civil High Court refused to intervene

in the Moorthy case. Matters came to a head on 19 January 2006, when nine non-

Muslim ministers, or almost a third of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s Cabinet,

handed him a memorandum urging him to amend the Constitution to ensure the protection

of minority rights.

The unusually bold move of the Indian, Chinese and other ministers has unsettled

Malay-Muslims and is stoking fears that the deeply divisive situation could boil over

into religious or racial strife. Such a breaking of ranks at the highest level of government

has not happened since the 1969 race riots that established Malay political supremacy as a

given factor in Malaysian politics. That event also acted as a precursor for inter-racial pol-

itical peace and for social and economic development (Kuppusamy, 2006).

Religious issues are ultra-sensitive in multi-racial Malaysia, especially with politicians

ready to exploit religious sentiments. In an interesting response, both UMNO and PAS

politicians condemned the move by the non-Muslim ministers notwithstanding their

political differences. This has created the impression that Islam is under attack from

non-Muslims. The non-Muslims also seem to be united across political boundaries. It is

no longer government versus opposition. It is Muslim versus non-Muslim—a ‘clash of

civilizations’ of sorts—Malaysian style.

The Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, gave assurance that ‘Article 121(1A) of

the Federal Constitution relating to the Sharica Court would not be amended, but other

laws might be changed if they affected the rights of non-Muslims’.29 However, on 21

January 2006 the memorandum to Badawi was withdrawn. The retraction of the document

signed by nine non-Muslim Cabinet ministers calling for a review of laws affecting the

rights of non-Muslims was made during a meeting between Abdullah and five of the sig-

natories (Elias, 2006).

The Revd Wong Kim Kong, Secretary-General of the National Evangelical Christian

Fellowship (NECF), said that while the Prime Minister’s request for the withdrawal of

the memorandum was needed for the sake of religious, national and racial unity, the retrac-

tion should not be construed as ‘giving in to pressure’.30

Quo Vadis—Where Do We Go from Here?

Malaysia is at the cutting edge of thinking on pluralism within a majority Islamic context.

However, the uneven playing field needs to be levelled. The articulation of the Rukune-

gara and Vision 202031 provide key ingredients for the development of a genuinely

‘democratic, liberal and tolerant society’. But this has somehow been undercut by Islami-

zation and fuelled by rivalry between the two main Malay political groups. If the present

Islamization policies are a foretaste of what a comprehensive Islamization and dhimmini-

zation in an orthodox Islamic state would entail, there is ample reason for grave concern

about the prospects for non-Muslims enjoying a free and democratic way of life in

Malaysia.32

78 A. S. Walters

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

Despite the political unease, achieving national unity has been the overriding aim since

Malaysia gained independence in 1957. The greater use of Bahasa Malaysia as the national

language and as a medium of instruction at all levels of education has, to some extent, led

to the development of a Malaysian identity. It has helped to strengthen solidarity among

the various ethnic and religious groups in the country. Moreover, education is the key for

promoting interreligious harmony, religious freedom, and respect for people of different

traditions. Above all, education must be committed to seeking truth, justice, peace and

reconciliation.

With the introduction of Vision 2020, Dr Mahathir also coined the term Bangsa

Malaysia, (‘Malaysian nationality’ or ‘Malaysian race’) with the hope of reconciling

racial differences and transcending the various divisions and particular identities. This

concept is often referred to and much cherished by advocates of increased ethnic and reli-

gious integration, especially in Christian circles. Thus, within the ambit of shaping a

common Malaysian identity and destiny, the Rukunegara and Vision 2020 will occupy

cardinal reference points (Walters, 2002, p. 31). Earnest efforts should therefore be

made to ensure a harmonious religious life and mutual understanding, while at the same

time curbing religious fanaticism and sectarianism.

In the case of the Malaysian experience, national unity and integration in its true sense

need to come from a deep-seated conviction and a readiness to understand and appreciate

other people’s cultural and religious values without injuring one’s own value system.

What is needed is mutual respect for one another’s beliefs and points of view. There

must be frankness, sincerity and above all empathy, to work together to build up each

other’s faith in a multi-religious society. Religious harmony should entail affirmation of

faiths, so that people of various religions live together in peaceful coexistence as one

united people (Basri, 1992, p. 8).

The following are some policy options for managing Muslim–Christian relations and

promoting religious harmony in Malaysia:

. A Religious Harmony Commission should be established with equal representation

from all religions.

. A mechanism should be created within the government administration to check against

misinterpretation of government policies and any implementation that has an extreme

Islamic bias.33

. An Institute for the Study of Race Relations should be set up to carry out research on

inter-ethnic developments and formulate policy proposals to address simmering

tensions in society (cf. Abraham, 2004).34

. Religious leaders should ensure harmony in society by not knowingly and blatantly

sowing seeds of discord but reconsidering their roles and actively promoting tolerance

and understanding among their followers.

. Christian religious and community leaders should increase their participation in the

political process.

. Christians should actively engage and interact with people of other religious traditions

through genuine social concern and community involvement.

. The Christian community should take Muslim–Christian relations seriously, carry out

research into Islamic issues and engage in intellectual discourse with Islamic scholars

and intellectuals.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

. The national education policy (and other related government policies) should be

revised, and strategies should be drawn up to overcome racial polarization among

young people, especially in schools and institutions of higher learning, to bring about

better racial integration.

. A single national education system should be developed, based on merit and not on the

quota system, which makes provision for bumiputras in the allocation of places in

universities and colleges.

. Elements of human rights should be incorporated into the school curriculum and

introduced as a subject at university level (Chok Suat Ling, 2000).

One of the aims mentioned in the ten-point strategy under the Ninth Malaysia Plan is

‘building a nation that is stable, united, peaceful and prosperous’.35 One way to achieve

this aim is to make more concerted efforts in interfaith dialogue. This will help Malaysians

transcend cultural, racial, linguistic and religious barriers. Through encounters and

interactions and by harnessing the country’s rich cultural and religious heritage creatively,

people could shape a new Malaysian identity.

As for the Protestant Council of Churches of Malaysia, its commitment to dialogue with

other faiths is expressed on its website in the following terms: ‘Being a Christian

community in a multi-religious Malaysia demands that the churches keep all channels

of communication open and through dialogue with the government and others, to

resolve issues and build religious harmony.’36

The problem of the complex relations between religion (din), the world (dunya) and the

state (dawla) calls for greater dialogue, especially among Christians and Muslims living

together in the same society. One of the main objectives of dialogue should be the

common search for a viable model of society and cooperation in building a truly human

community that in law and practice guarantees equality for all, safeguards religious

liberties and respects differences and particularities.

Conclusion

It is rather unfortunate that aggressive Islamization and polarized politics have led to the

sidelining of the reality of multi-religious Malaysia. Despite constitutional assurance of

religious freedom, there are still biased groups and individuals attempting aggressively

to assert their religious beliefs and impose restrictions on the religious freedom of

others. Government leaders have not been able to offer sufficient guarantees that Malaysia

will not degenerate into something of an Islamic model, such as PAS is promoting.

In such a socio-political and religious climate, interfaith dialogue should be a practical

means for the different faith communities in the country to move from a position of

‘indifferent tolerance’ to one where we can reach a common and open understanding of

one another. This would lead, further, to deeper self-understanding. If Malaysia is to

live up to its claim to being a model of democratic, pluralist Islam, these tensions and

issues will need to be addressed and resolved.

There is an urgent need to ensure that the principles of the Rukunegara and the social

contract on which Malaysia was formed are not suborned and abused. All Malaysians must

be free to profess and practise their religions so long as this does not intrude into the rights

and freedoms of others.

80 A. S. Walters

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

The destinies of Muslims and Christians in Malaysia are interlinked, and there is a long

journey ahead. There is an African saying: ‘If you want to walk fast, walk alone. But if you

want to go far, walk together with others.’ The hope is that the infusion in society of wide-

ranging faith values, including Islamic and Christian perspectives, will go a long way

towards the development of a common vision and a shared future.

Notes

� This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian–

Muslim Relations, University of Birmingham, on 14 February 2006.

1. I am indebted to this and Professor Riddell’s other article (Riddell, 2005) for much of the information

used in the pages that follow.

2. Statistics based on Department of Statistics, 2001.

3. The Malaysia census shows minorities dwindling. Straits Times Interactive, 8 November 2001, ,http://

straitstimes.asiaone.com/. (accessed 12 November 2001).

4. ‘Governmentality’ is a concept developed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in the 1980s.

‘Governmentality’ refers to a historically specific economy of power. It refers to societies where

power is de-centered and its members play an active role in their own self-governance. Because of its

active role, individuals need to be regulated from ‘inside’.

5. Following the declaration, a booklet Malaysia adalah Sebuah Negara Islam (Malaysia Is an Islamic

State/Nation) was published by the Ministry of Information explaining why Malaysia is already an

Islamic nation.

6. Mahathir, ‘Malaysia is “fundamentalist state”’, CNN.com, 18 June 2002.

7. ‘Arson attacks on churches: CFM urges restraint’, Berita NECF, January/February 2002, p. 11.

8. ‘Introduction to MCCBCHS’, ,http://www.mybuddhist.com/public_html/Chi/FourReligion/Four

Religion_C-10%20Introduction.htm. (accessed 21 August 2006).

9. Cited in MCCBCHS rejects guidelines, CANews, August, 1999, pp. 4–5.

10. Documents relating to the debate surrounding this issue are available on the MCCBCHS website

,http://www.pahlawan.com.my/harmoni/. Cf. ‘Why guidelines will destroy harmony’ and

‘MCCBCHS’ alternative guidelines’, Harmoni, December 1999. However, at a meeting between

MCCBCHS and the Minister of Housing and Local Government on 15 February 2000, the Minister

said that this document was never approved by his ministry. Cf. Harmoni 2(2), 2000, p. 6.

11. ‘Let’s dialogue’, Catholic Asian News, September 1999, p. 1.

12. The Star, 14 November 2000. Parliament of Malaysia, Hansard, 13 November 2000, p. 53, ,http://

www.parlimen.gov.my/hindex/pdf/DR-13-11-2000.pdf..

13. ‘Rising religious activism: ready to respond’, Berita NECF, September/October 2001, p. 1.

14. The declaration by the then Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, when addressing the Gerakan National

Delegates Conference on 29 September 2001, that Malaysia was an Islamic state.

15. Speech by Lim Kit Siang, DAP National Chairman, at a meeting of Selangor DAP on 5 October 2003,

,http://www.limkitsiang.com/archive/2003/oct03/lks2671.htm..

16. Malaysiakini.com (accessed 15 July 2005).

17. Allah is Arabic for ‘God’; the Kaabah (Arabic kacba) is a building located inside the mosque known as

Masjid al-Haram in Mecca; Baitullah is from the Arabic bayt allah, ‘House of God’, and Solat, from the

Arabic s˙alat, is commonly used to refer to the five daily prayers in Islam

18. New Christian Herald, 15 March 1997. For example, in early 1997 some 230 Christian books imported

into Malaysia from Singapore and Indonesia were confiscated by the Johor State government authorities,

under the law prohibiting the use of the above words in non-Muslim literature.

19. ‘Home Ministry bans 35 books’, New Straits Times, 9 April 2003, p. 6.

20. ‘Bup Kudus’ ban lifted, says Abdullah’, New Straits Times, 26 April 2003, p. 2.

21. Parliament of Malaysia, Hansard, 12 April 2005, pp. 67–68, ,http://www.parlimen.gov.my/hindex/pdf/DR-12042005.pdf..

22. CCM Newslink, July 2002, p. 2.

23. For a detailed discussion of Jamaluddin’s case see Malayan Law Journal, 1, 1989, p. 418. See also

Breiner, 1991, p. 270.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

24. ‘MCCBCHS expresses regret at Court of Appeal decision’, MCCBCHS press statement, 30 September

2005. Article cited in Berita CCM, October–December 2005, p. 13.

25. ‘Groups laud Pak Lah’s stand on conversion’, Star Online, ,http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?

file¼/2006/1/12/nation/13087505&sec¼nation> (accessed 12 January 2006).

26. ‘Inter-faith group: amend Constitution’, New Straits Times, 29 December 2005.

27. ‘Groups laud Pak Lah’s stand on conversion’, Star Online, ,http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?

file¼/2006/1/12/nation/13087505&sec¼nation> (accessed 12 January 2006).

28. ‘Upholding our secular constitution’, Sun2Surf, ,http://www.sun2surf.com/article.cfm?id¼12597.

(accessed 14 January 2006).

29. ‘PM’s views on hot issues’, The Star, 21 January 2006, ,http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file¼/

2006/1/21/nation/13172929&sec¼nation..

30. Dompok surprised by reaction over memo, The Star, 22 January 2006, ,http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file¼/2006/1/22/nation/13185393&sec¼nation..

31. The year 1990 marked the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the formulation of Vision 2020.

Based on the principles of Rukunegara, the Vision 2020 target is for Malaysia to reach the status of a

fully industrialized and developed country by the year 2020.

32. ‘Christian Federation of Malaysia’s (CFM) stand and proposal’, Catholic Asian News, March 2002,

pp. 14–15.

33. Ibid.

34. This is a revised version of Abraham, 1997.

35. ‘Simplify court procedures, update laws’, New Straits Times, 22 July 2005.

36. , http://www.ccmalaysia.org/netscape/events/past1.htm..

References

ABRAHAM, C. (1997) Divide and Rule: The Roots of Race Relations in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Insan).

ABRAHAM, C. (2004) The Naked Social Order: The Roots of Racial Polarisation in Malaysia (Subang Jaya,

Malaysia: Pelanduk).

ABU BAKAR, M. (2001) Islam, civil society, and ethnic relations in Malaysia, in: N. MITSUO, S. SIDDIQUE & O. F.

BAJUNID (Eds) Islam and Civil Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies),

pp. 57–75.

BASRI, G. (1992) Christian Mission and Islamic Da’wah in Malaysia, 2nd edn (Kuala Lumpur: Nurin Enterprise).

BEARD, B. (2005) Government demolishes tribal church in Malaysia, CWM News, 22 December, ,http://

www.cwmission.org/news/view_news.cfm?FeatureID¼2715..

BREINER, B. (1991) ‘Christians and Muslims in search of common ground in Malaysia’: a response, Islam and

Christian–Muslim Relations, 2(2), pp. 269–274.

CHEW, M. K.C. (2000) The Journey of the Catholic Church in Malaysia, 1511–1996 (Kuala Lumpur: Catholic

Research Centre).

CHOK SUAT LING (2000) Teaching human rights in schools, New Straits Times, 16 May.

DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS (1991) Population and Housing Census of Malaysia 1991 (Kuala Lumpur).

DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS (2001) Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics Report: Popu-

lation and Housing Census 2000 (Putrajaya), ,http: //www.statistics.gov.my/English/PageDemo.htm..

ELIAS, S. (2006) PM: The matter is now closed, The Star, 22 January, ,http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file¼/2006/1/22/nation/13185123&sec¼nation..

FOONG, L. S. (2001) What makes an Islamic state, Berita NECF, November/December, p. 3.

HASHIM, T. M. S. BIN (1976) An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Government

Press).

HUNT, R. (1997) Christian theological reflection and education in the Muslim societies of Malaysia and Indone-

sia, Studies in World Christianity, 3(2), pp. 202–225.

JAYASANKARAN, S. (1998) Forbidden love: Cross-cultural romance sparks Muslim anger, Far Eastern Economic

Review Online, 5 February, ,http://www.feer.com/articles/archive/1998/9802_05/P021.html..

KAMALI, M. H. (2000) Islamic Law in Malaysia. Issues and Developments (Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah).

KUPPUSAMY, B. (2006) Malaysia: race, religion cleave cabinet and country. Inter Press Service News Agency, 21

January, ,http://domino.ips.org/ips/eng.NSF/..

MCCBCHS (1989) Why MCCBCHS Rejects the Application of Syariah on Non-Muslims (Kuala Lumpur).

82 A. S. Walters

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014

NG KIOK NAM (1992) Islam in Malaysia, in: J. P. RAJASHEKAR & H. S. WILSON (Eds) Islam in Asia: Perspectives

for Christian–Muslim Encounter (Geneva: Lutheran World Federation), pp. 97–104.

RAZAK, T. A. (1969) Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (Kuala Lumpur: Government Information Department).

RIDDELL, P. G. (2004) Malaysian Christians and Islamisation, in: A. O’MAHONY & M. KIRWAN (Eds) World

Christianity: Politics, Theology, Dialogues (London: Melisende), pp. 226–256.

RIDDELL, P. G. (2005) Islamization, civil society, and religious minorities in Malaysia, in: K. S. NATHAN & M. H.

KAMALI (Eds) Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the Twenty-First

Century (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 160–190.

SINGH, D. & YATIM, A. H. (2005) Moorthy buried as a Muslim, New Straits Times, 29 December.

WALTERS, A. S. (2002) We Believe in One God? Reflections on the Trinity in the Malaysian Context (Delhi:

ISPCK).

WONG, R. (2006) Case on religious identity in MyKad goes to Federal Court, The Star, 14 April, ,http://thestar.

com.my/news/story.asp?file¼/2006/4/14/courts/13957440&sec¼courts..

WONG CHUN WAI (2006) View delicate topics from all perspectives, Star Online, 15 January, ,http://thestar.

com.my/news/story.asp?file¼/2006/1/15/focus/13111032&sec¼focus..


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Eas

tern

Mic

higa

n U

nive

rsity

] at

08:

30 1

0 O

ctob

er 2

014