studies in christian muslim relations christians why this muslim violence volume 3

Christians: Why ThisMuslim Violence?

VOLUME 3

STUDIES IN CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM RELATIONS

SOME OTHER BOOKS WRITTEN OR EDITED BY

DR. JAN H. BOER

The Prophet Moses for Today

Abraham Kuyper: You Can Do Greater Things than Christ(trans / ed.)

Science Without Faith Is Dead (Under same cover with above)

Wholistic Health Care (Co-editor: Dr. Dennis Ityavyar)

Vol. 1: Medical and Religious Dimensions

Vol. 2: Social and Political Dimensions

Wholistic Health Care Of, For and By the People

Caught in the Middle: Christians in Transnational Corporations

The Church and the External Debt (edited)

Missions: Heralds of Capitalism or Christ?

Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a Colonial Context

For more details, see his Web site:

www.SocialTheology.com

Belleville, Ontario, Canada

Christians: Why This Muslim Violence?Copyright © 2004, Jan H. Boer

This book is my contribution to the healing of Nigeria’s religious relationships. Iam sharing with you the thoughts of Christians on these relationships. Anyone

who has similar goals may freely use any of this material, provided credit isgiven to both the original author and myself, and provided the quotation is

accurate. For anyone with other goals, no part of this book may be reproduced inany shape or form without written permission from the author, the usual excep-

tion being brief quotes for review purposes.

National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Boer, Jan HarmChristians: Why this Muslim violence? / Jan H. Boer.

(Studies in Christian-Muslim relations ; v. 3)Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 1-55306-727-4.--ISBN 1-55306-729-0 (LSI ed.)

1. Nigeria--Religion--20th century. 2. Religion and politics--Nigeria--History--20th century. 3. Riots--Nigeria--History--20th century. 4. Islam--Relations--Christianity. 5. Christianity and other religions--Islam. I. Title. II. Series: Boer, Jan Harm. Studies in Christian-Muslimrelations ; v. 3.

BL2470.N5B62 2004 261.2'7'09669 C2004-901676-8

For more information, please contact the author at:

E-mail: [email protected] site: www.SocialTheology.com

Nigerian edition 2004 by: Stream Christian Publishers6 Noad Ave. (behind Central Bank), P.O. Box 13377Jos, Plateau State • E-mail: [email protected]: 73-458541 • Mobile: 803-7181354

Essence Publishing is a Christian Book Publisher dedicated to furtheringthe work of Christ through the written word. For more information, con-tact: 20 Hanna Court, Belleville, Ontario, Canada K8P 5J2

Phone: 1-800-238-6376 • Fax: (613) 962-3055 E-mail: [email protected] • Internet: www.essencegroup.com

Some years ago I published The Prophet Moses for Today:366 Social Biblical Meditations. Many of these meditations con-tained stories from Nigerian life gleaned from Nigerian newspa-pers. Frequently Nigerian readers would ask me, “How did youget such deep and accurate understanding of our culture?”

The public is generally cynical about the truthfulness of themedia, including the press. However, my readers’ common reac-tion told me that, in the long run, Nigerian newspapers do givean accurate reflection of the nation’s culture. This series ofStudies in Christian–Muslim Relations is based to a high degreeon these same newspapers and magazines.

This noble breed of harassed Nigerian journalists performtheir tasks under the most trying circumstances with poorequipment, dangerous means of travel and grossly inadequatecompensation.

THEREFORE

I dedicate this volume to and salute

All Nigerian reporters, journalists, as well as the publishers of news magazines and newspapers

Especially

Obed B. Minchakpu

and

Today’s Challenge

Under great stress they have courageously covered some of the ugliest chapters of Nigeria’s recent history. The pages

of these studies are a testimony to their tenacity.

List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

2. Christian Self-Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

3. The Perceived Muslim Spirit of Domination . . . . . . . . .29

4. A Menu of Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

5. The Perceived Role of Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85

6. Explanations for Specific Riots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167

Appendices

1. Islam in Africa Conference: Communiqué (Chapter 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .232

2. J. Mambula: Promoting Religious Peace (Chapter 4) . . .238

3. TEKAN: Recent Happenings and Events in the Country (Chapter 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245

4. ABU Lecturers: The Violent Politics of Religion(Chapter 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253

5A. International Commission of Christians, Jews andMonotheists (Chapter 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .258

TABLE OF CONTENTS

5B. Arab African International Bank (Chapter 5) . . . . . . . .260

6. The Christian and the OIC (Chapter 5) . . . . . . . . . . .262

7A. Letter from CAN to Governor Isa Mohammed, 18 Oct/88 (Chapter 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .266

7B. Letter from CAN to Governor Isa Mohammed, 9 Feb/89 (Chapter 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .269

8. J. Obemeata: Appeal to Colonel Nwosu (Chapter 5) . . .271

9. A Release from the ABU Christian Community (Chapter 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .275

10. Y. Turaki: My Personal Recommedations to the Tribunal(Chapter 6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .285

11. Anonymous: Resolving the Religious Tension (Chapters 4 and 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .288

12. O. Minchakpu: Christian Retaliation Increasing (Chapter 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .293

13. G. Ehusani: Fanatics, Bandits and the Failure of the State. (Chapter 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .296

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .303Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .319

ABU Ahmadu Bello UniversityACF Arewa Consultative ForumASUU Academic Staff Union of UniversitiesBUK Bayero University of KanoCAN Christian Association of Nigeria (Christian

umbrella organization)CCN Christian Council of NigeriaCOCIN Church of Christ in Nigeria (denomination)CRK Christian Religious KnowledgeECWA Evangelical Churches of West Africa

(denomination)EEC European Economic CommunityFMG Federal Military GovernmentIHT International Herald TribuneILM Islamic Liberation MovementIRK Islamic Religious KnowledgeJETS Jos ECWA Theological SeminaryJNI Jama’atul Nasril Islam (Muslim umbrella

organization)LCCN Lutheran Church of Christ in NigeriaLGA Local Government Area

ABBREVIATIONS

LGC Local Government CouncilMSS Muslim Student SocietyNACOMYO National Council of Muslim Youth OrganisationsNANS National Association of Nigerian StudentsNC National Concord (newspaper)NCD Nigerian Christian DigestNIPSS National Institute for Policy and Strategic StudiesNIREC Nigeria Inter-Religious CouncilNN New Nigerian (newspaper)NSO National Security OrganisationNT Nigerian Tribune (newspaper)NTA Nigerian Television AuthorityNYSC National Youth Service CorpsOIC Organisation of Islamic ConferenceRCM Roman Catholic MissionREC Reformed Ecumenical CouncilRK Religious KnowledgeTC Today’s Challenge (ECWA magazine)TCNN Theological College of Northern Nigeria

(Bukuru, Plateau State)TD ThisDay (newspaper)TEKAN Tarayyar Ekklesiyoyin Kristi a Nijeriya

(Fellowship of the Churches of Christ in Nigeria)TSM The Sunday MagazineUNIJOS University of JosUPCF Uniformed People’s Christian Fellowship

10 Studies in Christian–Muslim Relations

The first three volumes of these Studies in Christian–MuslimRelations deal with the bloody series of religious riots that havemarked recent Nigerian history. While Volume 2 deals withMuslim interpretations of these riots, the volume you now have inhand presents Christian interpretations of the same riots.

As you heard Muslims speak freely in that earlier volumethrough numerous quotations, so will Christians be given theirchance in this one. As I requested Christians to listen to or readMuslim opinions carefully, so I now make the same request toMuslims. For once, listen to the other party. For a few briefmoments, put aside your hatred and anger and practise a bit ofempathy. Step out of your argumentative mode and try to feelalong. When I made the same request of Christians in Volume 2, Iknow you strongly supported my request. “Yes, Christians,” youthought, “give us your ears just for once.” Well, I now ask the samefrom you. Is it too much to ask? And be sure not to react to thisvolume without first reading the earlier volumes.

Since it is Christian opinion that informs this volume, Islamwill not come off very positively—as Christianity did not exactly

INTRODUCTION

� O N E

shine in volume two. I want it well understood that this volumedoes not constitute a study of Islam. It covers only Christian opin-ions about Islam and that in a confrontational situation. Naturally,Islam is going to look rather negative in this context, but the samewas true of Christianity in Volume 2. I want it understood that thisnegative picture is not the only way in which Islam can be por-trayed. Unfortunately, that positive side is not reflected in the expe-riences and opinions of their Christian compatriots.

It will be found that Christians present several explanationswhich run parallel to those of Muslims as described in Volume 2.Both are frustrated. Both allege oppression by the other. Bothaccuse the government of supporting the other. Both demonise theother. In the past I have been tempted to dismiss both sides asimmature, irresponsible and unreasonable. And perhaps that is notan altogether unfair assessment. When an individual or a group isconsumed by anger, hatred and mistrust, more positive traits likematurity, responsibility and rationality are sometimes relegated tothe backseat.

Of course, such situations are not unique to Nigeria or even toChristian–Muslim situations in general. I presently live in Canada,but have also spent thirteen years in the United States. ManyChristians in both countries feel they are heavily under siege by asecular establishment. However, secularists similarly argue thatthey are under siege by Christians and that they suffer severe dis-advantages for their faith,1 though they do not normally think oftheirs as a faith perspective. These two faiths often demonise eachother in these countries as well. The secularist often fails to under-stand the motivation of the Christian and wonders why the latteris so unreasonable—just as Nigerian Muslims and Christians feeltowards each other. So, there are some parallels. A major differenceis that not much blood is shed in this battle. The battle is foughtwith other kinds of weapons—but it is a struggle, a serious one.


� Major Actors _______________________________

Before moving on to the main topic, I will introduce some ofthe Christians who have played prominent roles in this ongoingdrama. I begin with a number of highly-placed and respectedChristians who grew up in Muslim surroundings. These men havebeen achievers all their lives, but they all live(d) in humble circum-stances, far below the level Nigerian culture would lead us to expectfrom them. In the Nigerian culture of flamboyance, such lifestylesspeak volumes of the integrity of these men and mark them asunusual. I would like to accord these honourables the status of“Christian fathers,” and in these studies will refer to them as such.No one can claim these “fathers” do not understand the Muslimcommunity, as they have been brought up in Hausa-Fulani culture.These men also have wide government experience, so that no onecan pull the wool over their eyes at that front either. ReverendProfessor Dr. Ishaya Audu, especially, has been at the highest fed-eral cabinet level. Two of them share the dubious honour of havingbeen political prisoners. These are true insiders.

Professor Ishaya Audu, a medical doctor as well as a clergyman,is a former Vice Chancellor of Ahmadu Bello University (ABU),the only Christian to have held that position in this Muslimstronghold. He was toppled in the Gowon coup but later rose tobecome Minister of External Affairs. In addition to these high posi-tions, he has also experienced the worst as a political prisoner. Heis soft-spoken and highly revered by Christians. Since his return toprivate life, he is frequently called upon to assume leadershipresponsibilities. I personally served under him in his capacity asChairman of the Christian Health Association. In the Nigeriancontext of “strong-man culture” and given the prestigious positionshe has held, the simplicity of the health clinic he runs in a poor sec-tion of Samaru, near Zaria, is nothing short of amazing. A majorconcern of his is the freedom and welfare of Hausa, Fulani and

Introduction 13

Kanuri Christians. His gentle manner of speech sometimes hidesthe force of what he is really saying so that one has at times to readbetween the lines.

Like Ishaya Audu, Dr. Christopher Abashiya is a Christian with aMuslim-Fulani background and with government and civil serviceexperience as well as a high reputation. His government positionshave included university administration, Kaduna State commissioner,and that state’s Chairman of Health Management Board, while healso served as special advisor to Governor Lar of Plateau State.2

At one time he presented himself as a presidential aspirant, notso much because he actually aspired to that position but because,as he explained to me, he wanted to experience the inside of poli-tics at that level. He found it sadly wanting and discovered he hadno taste for it. In addition he has held various prestigious positionsin his church, ECWA. In contrast to Ishaya Audu, he is blunt anddirect in his utterances. He openly declares what can only be readbetween Audu’s lines. In this respect he is more like Jolly TankoYusuf, whom we will meet in the next paragraph. Abashiya was amember of the Kaduna state government committee investigatingthe Kaduna 1987 fracas as a representative of Christian interests.Apart from their modes of expression, Audu and Abashiya soundlike identical twins. Their background being what it is, a student ofthe situation cannot afford to ignore their views.

Jolly Tanko Yusuf, the third personality, was brought up in agrassroots Muslim family in Takum, Taraba State, where his fatherwas among the leading Muslims. Attendance at a school operatedby the Sudan United Mission led to his conversion to Christ. Indue time he began working with Christian Reformed missionaryRay Browneye, who, when Yusuf showed political interests,encouraged him to follow his inclinations and serve the Lord inthat sphere. Yusuf did well there.

As the years went by, he held various prominent positions.During colonial days, he was member of the Northern House of


Assembly and became a Deputy Minister. After independence, hewas given various international ambassadorial assignments thattook him, among others, to Germany, China, North Vietnam,Korea and Sierra Leone, a career that earned him his life-long titleof “Ambassador.” Yusuf ’s autobiography, as well as the stories hetold me personally, clearly show how he had frequent dealings withSir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna or Sultan of Sokoto, the leader of theNorth. He knew the Sardauna well and was thus in touch with theMuslim nerve centre.

Later in life, upon his return from foreign assignments, Yusufbecame prominent in the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN).During this period he had frequent access to the Head of State towhom he would interpret the Christian stand on current affairs. Asa CAN leader, he also endured the indignity of imprisonment sub-sequent to a failed coup in which he was accused of having a hand.He succumbed to cancer in the year 2000.

The Honourable Haruna Dandaura comes out of theHausa–Muslim culture of Kano city. There he rose to become theChief of Sabon Gari, the large non-native section of Kano City thatis full of Christians, southerners and their churches, schools, hos-pitals, shops—in short, of cosmopolitan Nigerian culture. Hejoined the police, reached the rank of Inspector and ended upteaching legal subjects in police colleges. He later was appointedjudge in various courts around the North. He was the first judge inall of Nigeria in the Customary Court of Appeal system.Subsequent to his first retirement the federal governmentappointed him Chief Commissioner of the Federal PublicComplaints Commission, an indication of his high reputation. Stilllater, in spite of his age, he moved on to become Chairman of theCode of Conduct Bureau. In terms of our topic, Dandaura waspreoccupied with peace between the two religions and, thoughoften rebuffed by leaders of both, struggled heroically for dialogue.Indeed, he is an apostle for peace even today at his advanced age.

Introduction 15

He loves to write on Christian–Muslim issues, but has difficultyfinancing the publication of his writings—a telling commentary onhis unusual integrity as a public servant.3

Then there is the Reverend Wilson Sabiya from the LutheranChurch of Christ in Nigeria with its headquarters in Numan. In dis-tinction from the “fathers,” he was neither brought up in a Muslimenvironment, nor did he serve in government, except indirectly as auniversity lecturer. He confined himself largely to church positionsboth denominational and ecumenical, especially in TarayyarEkklisiyoyin Kristi a Nijeriya (TEKAN). He was also a leading figurein CAN and did much to arouse the Christian community withrespect to the Muslim challenges that arose from the originalConstituent Assembly in the 1970s. He provided aggressive leader-ship for Christians in Gongola/Adamawa State.4

Being a decade younger than the fathers and not having servedin government, Sabiya is in a class by himself. It is unfortunatethat, due to ill health, this hero of faith has had to withdraw frompublic life.

Along with Wilson, we honour A. W. Machunga and the lateJabanni Mambula, both former general secretaries of TEKAN, andthe other leaders of TEKAN who were/are the administrators andleaders of the various TEKAN denominations. All of these havestood firm at the frontiers.

The above seven warriors are by no means the only ones ofinterest to us. There is also an interesting “gang” of three youngermen, all, like Abashiya, from Southern Zaria. There is Dr YusufuTuraki, former general secretary of Evangelical Churches of WestAfrica (ECWA), a one-time member of the CAN nationalExecutive Committee, holder of a doctorate in social ethics fromthe University of Boston. There is a fellow ECWA member,Yohanna Madaki, former military governor of Gongola State whodared take on the Muslim establishment personified by the Emir ofMubi. This challenge led to his early retirement. He now runs a law


practice in Kaduna and represents the legal interests of various vic-tims of alleged Muslim oppression, including the Sayawa Christiancommunity. Then we have the indefatigable Father Dr. MatthewHassan Kukah, the famous writer and acknowledged defender ofthe Christian viewpoint, especially, though not exclusively, that ofthe Roman Catholic hierarchy. All of these gentlemen, with theexception of Machunga, will crop up during the course of thismonograph. Their influence goes far beyond the writings that areadduced in these pages; they are active participants behind thescenes in ways only their own people will fully appreciate.

Of course, there are many more heroes who have resistedMuslim aggression. There is a host of CAN personalities at everylevel from local to national chairman. We will meet them through-out these volumes. Some of them have worked hard as leaders,while others are members “on the ground.” A prime example of thefirst is Victor Musa, an ECWA warrior—former general secretaryof ECWA, pastor of the main ECWA church in Kano and activemember of CAN at every level. During his Kano days, he was oneof the two Christians who were appointed to the state’s commissionto report on the 1982 riot and produced the minority Christianreport. Unfortunately, we will not meet him much in these pagesfor the simple reason that he has not published much and, for someunexplainable reason, is not quoted much, either.

One voice that is conspicuous by its silence is that of the formerHead of State Yakubu Gowon from Wusasa, son of an Anglicanevangelist. While his brother Daniel, a village chief, features in thesepages and even rates an appendix, the name of this retired generaland head of state hardly appears except in the negative in connec-tion with the confiscation of Christian institutions by his adminis-tration.5 He is also said to be the one to have taken Nigeria into theOrganisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) as observer.6

Some are calling into question his puzzling chairmanship ofthe Northern Elders’ Forum, a largely Muslim body that some

Introduction 17

regard as representing feudal Northern Muslim interests. Though Ihave met this man and appreciate his gentle ambience and humil-ity, what he says or does behind the scenes is not accessible to me.Thus, he hardly features in these pages—a strange silence for themost prominent Christian son of the northern soil, if not soul.7

� Format Details ______________________________

As to the characteristics and aims of both this series and thisparticular volume, I encourage you strongly to read theIntroduction to the entire series in Volume 1 as well as its shorterequivalent in Volume 2. This volume stands in the tradition estab-lished there and assumes you have read its predecessors.

I do want to repeat a promise I made of a Companion CD vol-ume.8 In addition to these monographs, that companion volumewill include hard-to-locate materials such as Nigerian Muslimpoetry and communiqués from both sides. Some of these arealready published but difficult to get your hands on. Others will beunpublished documents such as conference papers, reports, mem-oranda, declarations and letters from both Christian and Muslimsources, mostly in English, but some in the Hausa language. As Iget hold of other interesting materials on Islam and Muslims, thesewill be added as well. This CD should greatly enhance the researchvalue of this entire project and perhaps raise it to the level of areader in Christian–Muslim relations.

As in the previous monograph, I again remind you that, whileEnglish is Nigeria’s official language, some of the quotations arefrom people for whom English is their third language. I will takethe liberty to smoothe out the roughest spots to protect the repu-tation the authors enjoy with readers who have never been chal-lenged to write in a language other than their own. Unusual assome of the English may be, these quotations come from a peopleamong whom even so-called “illiterates” often know half a dozen


languages and who readily switch between them throughout theday. That is an accomplishment of which few native English speak-ers can boast.

My method of documentation is slightly unusual. While mostreferences in the text will have their endnotes, often they will be veryminimal, since complete information can always be found in the bib-liography. In some cases there is no need for an endnote at all, since,again, you can find the relevant information in the bibliography.

There are some organizational tensions I have not been able tosolve to my own satisfaction. You will notice that I discuss someissues under headings of personal names and sometimes the sameissues re-appear under topical headings. This tension results frommy desire to acquaint you with both personalities and issues, butI have not found a way of joining these two in a fully satisfactorylogical arrangement.

In addition, Christian writings, like those of their Muslimcounterparts, often are not carefully organised so that they freelymix topics and pile up accusations and problems without end orlogical arrangement. Emotion often replaces logic, at least, Westernlogic. As a result, it sometimes becomes almost impossible to sys-tematically use quotes from them, according to the specific topic athand, without chopping them up into bits and pieces that then losesome of their coherence. Here we have yet another reason that thesame issues sometimes appear under different headings. One canargue that these organizational problems reflect the organizationalproblems of Nigeria itself. Messiness begets messiness. The purposeof most of this series is not first of all to argue so much as toacquaint you with the issues at hand. If I accomplish this, I will besatisfied, even if the logic of the arrangement leaves something tobe desired.

Welcome to the near-chaos that is Nigeria.

Introduction 19

� Notes _________________________________________

1 Monsma & Soper. See especially the chapter by the self-consciouslysecular liberal Rogers M. Smith.

2 Tsado, TC, 5/87, p. 5. 3 M. Gaiya, throughout. 4 He started in Gongola State. States were reorganised and renamed,

with Sabiya ending up in the new Adamawa State. 5 For example, T. Yusuf in Grissen, p. 83. 6 Ado-Kurawa, 2000, p. 197. 7 These comments do not call into doubt Gowon’s Christian dedica-

tion. Statements and actions attributed to him in the media about theneed for Nigeria to pray ( Y. Gowon) and to “embrace Christ” (C. Oditta,TD, 13 Aug/2003) are indicative of his devotion. However, he does seemto channel this devotion into a different direction from that of his co-reli-gionists. For one thing, it has not prevented him from cooperation withthe northern establishment, as this volume will show.

8 For availability of the CD contact author at [email protected] orat www.SocialTheology.com.

20 Notes for pp. 12–18

Though this volume is mostly a Christian critique of Muslimsin the Nigerian setting, it should be understood that Christians donot blame only Muslims for their problems any more thanMuslims blame only Christians. Both groups recognise that theythemselves have contributed to the problems. This brief chapterprovides a taste of what Christians say about themselves.

To start off with, Engineer Salifu, long-time general secretaryof CAN in what used to be the ten northern states, put it verystrongly. “Frankly,” he stated,

I put the blame of the ills of the country squarely onChristians! Because we have not been the light and salt of theworld as we ought. The challenge before us as Christians is justone—to live righteously. Do what is right wherever you are.By the time you find even half the Christians in a state orestablishment doing what is right, they will change that place.Unfortunately most Christians prefer to follow the stream.Personally I don’t blame the Muslims or those who do notbelieve. I blame Christians who are not ready to stick to what

CHRISTIAN

SELF-CRITIQUE

� T w o

is right. You see, immediately some of them see money—fin-ish. They just go ahead and do what they want. So let us dowhat is right even if it means suffering for it. Refuse to be pro-moted. Refuse to take that job. The Christian girl shouldrefuse to give her body just to get that job or promotion. By thetime you have people doing this, the society will change. Thisis the challenge for Christians.1

The northern zone of CAN, in its booklet Leadership inNigeria, claims that Nigeria is “more than 60% Christians.” It asks,“How is it that their presence has not been felt in the affairs of lead-ership in this country? What is it that makes them compromise somuch?” The author wonders why Christians who participate in thehighest levels of government “remain cowardly silent” as the coun-try is smuggled into the Muslim camp.2

In the same publication another writer asks, “Where have theChristians been all this time?’’ The answer is:

They have been involved but have hidden their lights underthe bushel. The average Muslim, when he gets to a high posi-tion becomes more religious—for the Christian the reverse isthe case. He becomes less godly. He sees his brothers and sistersas fanatics! He becomes too busy to go to church…—once ortwice a year is enough for him. He is ashamed to be seen inhis office with a Bible.

The writer mocks his wayward fellow Christians much as doMuslim critics mock their compromisers.

He prefers to chairman many social occasions and functions.He speaks more English than the Englanders themselves.When therefore Christians pray for Christians to be in posi-tions of authority, they should pray for those who will remem-ber their creator….3

These sentiments are widespread amongst Christians.


CAN accused the Christian community of radical failure. TheChristian is to be the Lord’s “ambassador” on earth and a light andsalt to a dark and sour world. Unfortunately, “Christians as a com-munity in Nigeria have failed in their ambassadorial responsibili-ties.” Indeed,

Politics may be a dirty game—but who will make it clean? IfChristians distance themselves from politics that lead to lead-ership, then demons will have a field day as has been the casewith Nigeria up till today. If demons govern and rule us andburn our churches and marginalise us and treat us like secondclass citizens in our country of posting, then why should theChristian community complain? The price honest people payfor keeping silent and not getting involved is to be ruled bydishonest men.

For those who wonder how such a situation of non-involve-ment in politics could have arisen, CAN points to the missionaries“who planted our feet on solid ground,” but who

did not impart to us the technique of governance. For anyoneto be interested in the governance of a country was “blasphe-mous.” A Christian should not be interested in politics, we aretold. We are often reminded that politics is a dirty game andtrue Christians should distance themselves from it. Our“light” should be hidden “under” the “bushel” we…have beenreminded from pulpit to pulpit… The righteous cannot ruleif he is taught not to be interested in governance.4

CAN not only criticises Christians; Christians also criticise it.At a launching ceremony in Jos, the former PermanentRepresentative of Nigeria to the United Nations, the now lateMajor General Joel Garba, a Christian, called on CAN leadershipto “reflect on the teachings of Jesus Christ, rather than pursuingselfish interests.” CAN, Garba charged, “has abandoned the king-

Christian Self-Critique 23

dom of God for narrow-minded gains on earth.” CAN should“prove that political objectives have not overtaken their vision andthe teachings of Christianity.” The chairman of the occasion, SilasJanfa, holder of various high civil service positions, chimed in bystressing that “CAN needed serious surgical operation in order toachieve the objectives for which it was founded… it needs to abideby the teaching of Jesus Christ.”5

Amunkitou Dolom is one of the “small people” whom I intro-duce occasionally. I have no idea as to his/her identity but assume heis a man. He writes that “it is obvious that all peaceful methods byCAN to make the government see reason have been exhausted to noavail.” The government continues to fan religious upheavals. Thevarious reports published by CAN and others on the many upheavals“leave no room for doubt as to which party exhibited intolerance andaggressiveness, and is thus in the wrong.” Governments drag theirfeet over the recommendations submitted by commissions.“Everyone knows which religious sect enjoys governments’ covert,and even overt, support.” CAN knows “that it is the desire to con-trol the nation’s economic and political power…that drives the richand hypocritical Muslims to be ready tools in the hands of a socialclass who unfortunately characterise our government.”

In this context Dolom asked,

Why is CAN, through Today’s Challenge, its majormouthpiece, wasting its time explaining over and overagain, persuading, begging, crying and shouting over theobvious, knowing that the Federal Might is deliberatelykeeping mute? CAN should have known long before now,that it is nonsense to flog a dead horse. They should lookelsewhere for deliverance.

CAN has been turning the other cheek for over a decade. “Howmany cheeks has CAN? Perhaps CAN has 70 times 70 cheeks, butdeath toll, destruction of property, maimed Christians…have risen


to well over the 70 times 70 illusory goal, which is 4900.” CANshould simply “return fire for fire. They need not be discreet aboutit.” Dolom socks it squarely to us:

It is sheer cowardice for CAN to fill the pages of dailies andelectronic media calling on the government to punish theirfoe. It is absurd, too, for CAN to bother us with claims of gov-ernments’ partiality. If CAN is such a weakling that it cannothelp its members in defending their faith, then it is too bad,because the government has overtly said “No!” to CAN’s callsfor redress. If CAN can’t fight, I would advise that it lie downand die without further noisy disturbances of the society. Noheavens will forgive you for inaction…. Rhetorics have neversaved in the past, do not save now nor will save later.6

You can hardly bite harder.Dakum Shown was a member of the Church of Christ in

Nigeria (COCIN), a major church in Plateau State, and Speaker ofthe Plateau House of Assembly during the civilian regime ofGovernor Solomon Lar. He chided his church and its members forfailing to play their proper political role. They have divided realityinto religious and political sectors in such a way as to abandon theirresponsibility in society. He warned that “on the last day God willask His followers”:

Where were you when the nation’s treasury was looted? Whenthose who looted the public treasuries came to church and evenmade donations? When you refused to vote for the upright can-didates, were you not allowing the wrong people to get intogovernment to manipulate and destroy the rapid growth of thechurch? When decrees and edicts prevent God’s faithful servantsfrom spreading His Ministry, where were you? When justice,truth and fair play were murdered and God’s innocent chil-dren made to suffer, where were you?


Shown called upon COCIN to “chart a new course of action.”She is “to come out in full force to re-educate its followers to theimportance of their civic responsibilities.”7

Tanko Yusuf, one of our “fathers,” demanded that Christians“cleanse” themselves. He was especially emphatic on the need forChristian unity. In fact, it became his “consuming mindset.”Christians need to be united, he argued repeatedly, but that willnot be easy. “Too easily do Christians pursue their own narrowinterests, private or tribal. Too often they put individual or tribalgoals above our communal mission….” He took severalChristians to task for preaching false doctrines “that are theantithesis of the Christian faith.” He faulted Christians for beingblind to “the rottenness in…Nigeria’s social, economic, politicaland spiritual life since our independence.” Christians must takeup the challenge of clean politics and civil service. Unfortunately,leaders fail to challenge their members at this very point. He has,he alleged, heard bishops and pastors preach against politicalinvolvement, because, they said, “politics is sin.” Yusuf countered,“False. False. This critical misunderstanding of politics has kepttoo many Christians from becoming involved. How sad! In sodoing we abandon our fate to unjust, unscrupulous leaders.”Yusuf did not hesitate hanging out Christian dirty laundry.Partially to clear himself, he publicly wrote about corruption inCAN in connection with a government grant for the building ofthe national ecumenical centre.8

Though these sentiments crop up many times more than theabove paragraphs indicate and though they are to be taken seri-ously, they do not represent the dominant tone in relationship toIslam. This in-house critique is not meant for the outside world,least of all for Muslims. It is similar to tribal self-critique that willnot tolerate the same from the outside.

Over against Islam, the late Alex Fom expressed the dominanttone well:


It is true that religion continues to play a destabilising role inthe socio-economic life of Nigeria. But the first question weshould ask is, what religious sect constitutes the destabilisingfactor? At no time do the Christians get up in arms to desta-bilise the politico-economy of the country. At no time do theChristians get up to riot. No. The Maitatsine groups forinstance are Muslim groups. All this burning of churches, whodid them? They are Muslims.

This is the driving sentiment in the Christian community, even inthe minds of Christian self-critics. And that therefore inevitably isthe main tone for the rest of this book.


� Notes _________________________________________

1 J. Tsado, TC, 5/87, pp. 8-9.

2 P. 5.

3 CAN, Leadership…, pp. 36-37.

4 CAN, Leadership, pp. vii-viii. The background to these problems is

explained in some of my other publications. See Boer, 1979, Chapter 10;

1984, Chapter 8; 1989, pp. 10-13.

5 H. Hassan, 9 Feb/94.

6 Dolom, TC, 6/88.

7 It is significant that in the 2003 elections three COCIN members

are running for governor in Plateau State. Politics being what it is in

Nigeria, this presents the denomination with a whole other pastoral chal-

lenge, the opposite from the one under critique in this section.

8 Grissen, pp. 9, 98-100, 107, 113-114.

28 Notes for pp. 22-26

You will notice in this and the succeeding chapters that, as withMuslims in Volume 2, Christian opinion is largely unanimous.There may be some differences in detail, but by and large the pic-ture is that of a single choir with different voices, all contributingto one harmonious whole. Unfortunately, when put next to theMuslim harmony, the two jar so badly that they produce a disas-trous disharmony.

Within the Christian community there is an established cul-ture of Christian political correctness that will not tolerate dishar-mony or serious dissent within the ranks. I submitted an article toa Nigerian Christian theological journal and referred to the opin-ion of Anthony Enahoro, one of the last remaining colonial politi-cians and a Christian. Enahoro is more positive towards the adop-tion of the sharia than is usually the case with Christians. The edi-tors deleted the reference; it could not be tolerated. The rest of thearticle was received by the readers with considerable appreciation,but that one discordant note by a highly respected senior Christianelder was not allowed to stand, even though his opinion hadalready become public knowledge.

THE PERCEIVED MUSLIM

SPIRIT OF DOMINATION

� T h r e e

The Muslim spirit of which this chapter speaks does not refer tothe entire spirit of the Muslim community. The discussion is restrictedto the way Nigerian Christians view that spirit in the context of theirmutual struggle for control and recognition. As mentioned earlier,Muslims were viewed sympathetically in Volume 2 and Christianssomewhat negatively; in this volume the situation is reversed. Thischapter or even entire volume does not accurately represent my per-sonal estimation of the Muslim spirit in Nigeria so much as that ofNigerian Christians. It is this estimation that drives them.

There are five major terms that form the core of that NigerianChristian view. These are: domination, intolerance, violence, sus-picion and anger. These form the Christian bottom line. We haveseen in the second monograph how suspicious Muslims are ofChristian intentions, how oppressed and angry they feel. The sameis no less true for Christians. This bottom line drives much of theiroutbursts and actions. These cries of anger and exasperation areheard time and again from almost every Nigerian Christian whohas ever written on Christian–Muslim relations in Nigeria.

� The Spirit of Domination ___________________

Nigerian Christians are of the opinion that Muslims have anatural instinct for domination. They have a need to dominate.They feel uncomfortable when not dominant.

Tanko Yusuf1 had a sure conviction, born in the fire of experi-ence, that Islam, especially in its fundamentalist expression, seeksto control the entire world, including Nigeria. This is one ofNigeria’s two major struggles; the other is corruption. He did notregard the Muslim push for domination as an aberration in Islam..It is an expression of its deepest nature. In Islam, “religion and gov-ernment are one and the same.”

It is considered legitimate for Muslim political leaders to usestate facilities, institutions, and power to promote Islam. It


seemed natural, then, when Nigerian self-governmentbegan…, to Muslim leaders that they openly use governmentfor both religious and political purposes.2

Yusuf used to hammer away at this theme without let-up.Throughout his political career, he saw himself as a watchdog forChristian interests versus alleged attempts of Islam to take over thecountry, attempts often unconsciously supported by the colonialregime. His public struggle against Muslim domination started theday he challenged the practice of opening the meetings of the colonialNorthern House of Assembly with Muslim prayers. As the Chief ofKagoro tells the story in the introduction to Yusuf ’s autobiography,

The Honourable Mr. Niven was creating the incorrect impres-sion that Islam was the one and only religious faith in thenorthern part of Nigeria. Mallam Yusuf called the Speaker’sattention to the fact that at least two or three religions wererepresented in the session. Would it not be only fair… that atleast two different prayers—Muslim and Christian—beoffered before the sessions began? The British-born Mr. Nivenpolitely conceded.3

Yusuf never tired of his warnings regarding Muslim domina-tion of Nigeria. The country’s “government, armed forces, and itspowerful hard-line fundamentalist Muslim minority want absolutepower only for themselves,” he insisted.4 With great bitterness heasserted that Babangida, a former head of state, “and his corruptcronies believe they must (and are the only ones who can) ruleNigeria. Only the few Fulani and the elite Hausa tribes, they say,have the talent, ability, and leadership qualities to rule Nigeria. It istheir destiny. What arrogance!”5

Yusuf was well aware of the classic Muslim schematic withrespect to the place of non-Muslims. He knew that Muslim tradi-tion allows for only three alternatives, none of which are acceptableto Christians. “Infidels” must be converted, subjugated or elimi-

The Perceived Muslim Spirit of Domination 31

nated. This also underlies Muslim aims for Nigeria.6

It is not only the fundamentalists, extremists or so-called fanaticswho seek to dominate. Even “moderate” Muslims, according to Yusuf,

have pushed Islam as hard as they could…since our indepen-dence. They have maneuvered jurisdiction over religion, edu-cation, economic, and personal lives. They have set up Islamicjudicial institutions and have instituted administrative poli-cies that aimed to implement Sharia throughout the country.7

If we can believe this experienced warrior, it would seem mysuggestion in the previous monographs—that the fundamentalistsin Nigeria may be the dogs of the moderates—is not so far off themark; or are the moderates in the process of “fundamentalizing?”

Another more recent affirmation of this Muslim spirit comesfrom Adewale Thompson, a former chief judge of Ondo State in theWest and the current National Secretary of the Yoruba EldersCouncil. Why can Christians not live at peace in Kano and why areChristians not tolerated in other places in the North? he asked.8

Thompson reached back into colonial history to 1942, whenAwolowo, the leader of the Yoruba nation at the time, asked the emirsin the North to cooperate with the south to gain early independence.The emirs responded that they would not cooperate “unless we[southerners] accepted their religion.” Thompson commented, “Itwas there in black and white. That is the basic factor dividing us.Nobody knows about that unless you research into history and dis-cover it. And so in order to achieve that purpose, they plan to dom-inate, impose their religion on us.” Today, Muslims are “followingit up” in their behaviour.9

In the context of all this anger, suspicion and rancour, it is nowonder Christians take very seriously Muslim declarations of supe-riority and domination. Danjuma Byang considered a thirteen-year-old statement from Ibraheem Sulaiman still valid in 2000. Sulaimandeclared, “Muslims must be masters, not servants” and that the


sharia outlaws “subservience and dependence. It is from this per-spective that Muslims in Nigeria should press for their demands.”10

Of course, we have overheard Muslims in Volume 2 expressthis sentiment so openly that Christians have every reason tobelieve this. In their very presence, R. D. Abubakre, a Muslimsenior lecturer at the University of Ilorin, speaking in a very irenicmood, declared “that the people of God should control the helm ofsecular affairs.”11 He stated this as a matter of fact in the presenceof Christian scholars without embarrassment or any attempt tohide this Muslim instinct for power and control. It is the naturalattitude of Muslims they do not bother to hide; it is their “nativeair.” They display little sensitivity about the offence this attitudecreates in others, let alone the suspicion and hostility. It is a domi-neering attitude expressed everywhere, in Nigeria and abroad. ThePlateau State TV station in Jos, established for the very purpose ofgiving the Christianized Plateau people a voice of their own,quoted a spokesman of the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain assaying, “The nature of Islam is to acquire power.”12

Please allow an author’s aside. No sense of “fairness” and noamount of Western so-called “common” sense seems capable offreeing the Muslim community from this power complex. This isnot because they are devoid of rationality, but because, like every-one else’s, their reason is governed by their heart and by their worldview. The secular, the Christian and the Muslim world views sim-ply don’t mesh and therefore we lack the platform of a commonrationality. It is never a matter of “religion within the bounds ofreason,” as Kant would have it and as secularists prefer it, but,rather, always of “reason within the bounds of religion,” asNicholas Wolterstorff of Yale so aptly put it.13 What seems per-fectly fair, rational and common sense to one community seemsabsurd, irrational, unfair and even oppressive to the other. The ideaof a global “common sense” is a pure myth used to impose Westernsecularism on the world, including Islam.14


� Related Characteristics ___________________

The drive to dominate requires a certain psychological com-plex to support that drive. Nigerian Christians have not had to gofar afield to recognise such a complex in the Muslim community.Intolerance and violence are among the dominant characteristicsChristians pick up on repeatedly. They are difficult to separate, forthe one often calls up the other.

1. INTOLERANCE

Ibrahim Yaro was blunt about these issues. He recalled thatChristianity has had its phase of intolerance and oppression. Apartfrom the crusades, Christianity in the past has persecuted peoplefor preaching heresy. Today, Christians regret such acts and are cre-ating much more room for tolerance and freedom.

On the other hand, today, “Islam is persecuting non-believers,subjugating them, and obliterating their freedom and so is relivingthe stone-age life.” Yaro hardly tired of the theme. “While otherreligions,” he somewhat exaggerated, “are receptive, hospitable andtolerant to ‘infidels,’ Islam is antagonistic, violent and intolerant.”Other religions, he claimed, welcomed Islam. Alas, little did theyknow that they welcomed “unbridled intolerance.” While Muslimstoday are building mosques in the traditional bastion ofChristianity, intolerance in Muslim nations makes even alterationsto church buildings difficult, let alone building new ones.15

In its Kafanchan Release,16 CAN affirmed that all these dis-turbances are the result of Muslim intolerance. This intolerancefirst surfaced publicly in the intra-Muslim skirmishes, but has sincereared its head in the Muslim–Christian disturbances and under-girds them all.

In fact, the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies(NIPSS) report regarded religious intolerance as one of the basicunderpinnings of Nigerian violence. It blames Muslims more than


it does Christians. Intolerance was said to be more in evidenceamong Muslims, with Christians “being more the target than theorigin of intolerance.” Christianity in the south of Nigeria, insistedthe report, “has over the years not been lording it over the otherreligions.” At least until 1986, NIPSS claimed that “Christianshave been at the receiving end of the rising tension” between thetwo. “The Christians have so far peaceably absorbed and toleratedattacks on their freedom of religion.” This was in sharp contrast tothe Muslims in Kano with their organised attack on Christians inconnection with St. George’s Church. The report warned that ten-sions were rapidly moving Nigeria towards “the greatest danger everto the future peace and security of the country. The earlier the gov-ernment defuses this ominous time bomb, the better.”17

2. VIOLENCE

Ever since the 9/11 terror, Muslims love to quote the state-ment, “Islam is the most misunderstood religion in the world.”Nigerian Christians are more in tune with a quotation with whichIbrahim Yaro begins his monograph: “In Nigeria, Islam maintainsthe record of being the most bloody and controversial. This asser-tion may be regarded as a historical legacy rather than an aberra-tion. Right from time immemorial, Islamic activities had beenassociated with violence.”18

“Vindictiveness,” Yaro insisted, “is at the core of the Muslimreligion, and [it has] nothing to restrain or counter the humantemptation to judge and condemn others.” Its “harshness is thedirect result of its uncertainty about salvation and eternity. TheMuslim fear of Allah’s judgement and condemnation turns out-ward into the same kind of action towards others.”19

� Muslim Plans ________________________________

Tanko Yusuf was absolutely convinced that Muslims have con-crete plans to take over Nigeria. He was in the good company of


other leaders. Abashiya, another one of our “fathers,” went evenfurther. Islam, according to him, has become aggressive and would

like to obliterate Christianity from Nigeria. The Kafanchanreligious crisis was a testimony to this fact. Also various meet-ings and write-ups of the Muslims20 have shown that theMuslims, or rather some of the militant ones, are certainly outfor nothing less than the complete obliteration of Christianityin Nigeria. They want to make Nigeria an Islamic republic.21

Yaro was similarly sure of a “secret plan to overrun the entirenation.” A major “source” of his information was a random conver-sation he overheard between three Muslims in a taxi in which manycomponents of such an alleged campaign were listed.22 The credibil-ity of such a random source leaves something to be desired. My pointin drawing attention to Yaro’s version of the allegation is to indicatethe widespread popularity of this suspicion. It is as popular withChristians as is the conviction of Muslims that global Christianity isplotting to destroy Islam, an issue treated in Volume 2.

CAN’s Kafanchan Release23 explained, “Muslim elite, togetherwith the government and emirs, colluded to exterminate Christianityso that the unfinished work can be completed, that is, the declarationof Nigeria as an Islamic nation.” CAN declared the Kafanchanepisode as “the first stage of the process of Islamisation of the nation.24

There is evidence that the next stage would have been the killing ofprominent Christians in the North.” CAN warned that

The continuous condoning of the Muslims’ religious intoler-ance by the government has aided the rapidly growing tensionbetween the Muslims and Christians. As long as the govern-ment is seen to continue to collaborate and aid the Muslimsin their design to intimidate, subjugate and terrorise innocentNigerians into submitting to their political and religiousmanipulation, this will eventually break the country.


Concern for and conviction of Muslim plans continue to dom-inate our time period. Even a sober and careful judge as HarunaDandaura hesitantly suggested, in the context of the St. GeorgeChurch debacle in 1982, that there is indeed a conspiracy or planon the part of Muslims to remove and destroy. He wrote,

Those who planned the building of the mosque near thechurch are…to blame. There was a wide expanse of landbetween the compound, Fagge and Sabon Gari and the plan-ners could have shifted the construction of the mosque fartheraway from the church. It would almost appear that the plan-ners had a mind to move the church and mission after theyhad built the mosque. Should we then believe that there wasa deliberate intent to remove us from where we had been forover forty years before the mosque was built?

He ended the paragraph with a gentle but unmistakable threat,“I will, without hesitation, suggest that no heed should be taken toany such suggestion.”25

One prominent southern Christian leader we have not yet met isC. O. Williams, a retired federal civil servant who had a second careerin the ecumenical world of Nigeria as long-time general secretary ofboth the Christian Council of Nigeria (CCN) and CAN. Williamspresented a hard-hitting lecture to a group of German clergy in whichhe dealt with various aspects of Christian–Muslim relations. Herecognised an increase in “fanatical” Muslim “aggressiveness” around1977. He explained this phenomenon with reference to two impor-tant international Muslim conferences, the Conference of WorldIslamic Organisation in Mecca and that of the World of Islam Festivalin London. Both of these conferences decided on plans that consti-tuted an anti-Christian crusade or jihad that was to halt the Christianmarch. In Nigeria, their “grand” opportunity came when the militaryhanded over power to the civilian regime of Shehu Shagari. The newMuslim governors “made no secret of their main goals: the advance-


ment of Islam at all costs and the total extermination ofChristianity…in their respective states.” Williams listed the followingsteps planned for Nigeria:

1. Take-over of Christian schools and hospitals;

2. Substitution of Christians names of Christian schools withMuslim names;

3. Replacement of Bibles in hotels with copies of the Qur’an;

4. Circulation of “false and vicious propaganda” aboutChristians;

5. Ridiculing Christians and making “provocative pronounce-ments” about the Christian faith;

6. Making “unprovoked attacks” on Christians, especially inthe North.

Williams was proud of the response of Christian leaders tosuch attacks. They would appeal to the government “to arrest theugly situation, before it became uncontrollable.” In addition, they“took more positive steps” that “aimed at creating peace, under-standing and harmony between Christians and Muslims.” One ofthese was the establishment of various forums for dialogue, but assoon as the civilian governors took over, these efforts were torpe-doed and the new Muslim initiatives listed above were started. TheMuslims promptly “boycotted the dialogues.” It was from thattime that “fanatical or ‘Fundamentalist’ Muslims became militantand intensified their anti-Christian activities.”

Williams dubbed the decade of 1976–1986 a “remarkable” onefor religious developments. It was “characterised by…blatant andvigorous attempts” by “Muslim fanatics, especially in northernNigeria, to uproot Christianity.” Muslims made it clear in everyway that Nigeria is a Muslim country. The impression was beingcreated that “Christians have no right to be there, or that they are,at best, second-rate citizens.” “Blatant injustice against Christians”


was “given free reins and received the undisguised backing of thePowers-That-Be.” He referred to Kano’s St. George’s Church,where the Kano State Government allegedly backed the attempt todestroy a church that had existed for forty years. When the “fanat-ical Muslims” failed to achieve their aim, they destroyed otherchurches. “Most members” of the inquiry committee belonged to“the very fanatical group which had gone on rampage!” Theaccused were their own judges!

He had little to say about government reaction, but gave aglowing report on Christian reaction. After all “the provocative pro-nouncements and actions of the Muslim fanatics,” Williamsreported proudly,

Christians have one, only one, consistent reaction: namely, pre-sentation of written protests to the Powers-That-Be. Evenwhen it was generally expected that Christians would returnfire for fire, after the ungodly Kaduna State devastation, wesimply drew the attention of the Powers-That-Be to the evilact. We also appealed to all Christians to keep calm and peace-ful and to be full of prayers for Nigeria.

I confess to be somewhat taken aback by this one-sided, if notfalse, picture. Williams’ presentation was published in December1995, some years after Zangon-Kataf. How could he simply ignoreChristian aggressive behaviour during that mayhem, not to speakof the Christian role in some subsequent riots?

Some less prominent figures similarly insist on the existence ofMuslim plans. B.S. Wadumbiya of the College of Education ofHong, Adamawa State, made no bones about it. Behind these riotslies the desire to turn Nigeria into a Muslim country with a theo-cratic government. In order to achieve that, its engineers use everytool at their disposal, including the ignorance and illiteracy of theaverage Northern Muslim, who does not know the meaning ofdemocracy and constitution. They are “deaf and blind” to the


country’s legal system. Religion is used for manipulation to divideand rule all of Nigeria and to control the economy.

A self-designated former Muslim, Emman Usman Shehuinsisted that “it is obvious that there is a determined effort to turnNigeria into an Islamic State.” He pointed to people like El-Zakzaky who “have not hidden this intention.” He also sum-marised the decisions by various international Muslim bodies suchas the World Islamic Organisation, OIC and the Islam in AfricaConference, that “have drawn up resolutions…ensuring thatMuslims subjugate non-Muslims.” He reproduced a twelve-pointprogramme of the Pakistani Islamic Revolution that allegedlyincluded the following:

1. A natural democratic state is radically different from anIslamic state.

2. Non-Muslims cannot be full citizens of an Islamic state.

3. Non-Muslims are to be treated as stateless citizens in anIslamic state.

4. Non-Muslims can only stay in an Islamic state on the basisof an agreement or treaty.

5. Non-Muslims cannot be entrusted with any key position forthe civil or military service.

6. Non-Muslims cannot claim political rights.

7. Non-Muslims must be taxed more heavily than Muslims intrade or commerce.

8. Non-Muslims cannot be elected into legislative assembly.

9. Non-Muslims cannot be members of the cabinet or takeninto the national body where state policy is determined.

10. Non-Muslims must have their separate cultural agency.

11. A Non-Muslim who embraces Islam will have his civil,political and military rights restored.


12. If a Muslim accepts another faith, he is to be punished evento death. This is known as the law of apostasy and is the mainreason why a lot of Muslims are scared of accepting Jesus….

This programme, Shehu asserted, is very much like theCovenant Umar B. Al-Khatab drew up to regulate Christians inSyria some centuries ago. “It is no coincidence,” Shehu suggested,that Usman Dan Fodio is often referred to as Al-Khatab. In addi-tion to these prohibitions, Shehu summarised various concrete1974 decisions taken by the World Islamic Organisation in Mecca.Their upshot is that all Christian activities and organisations inMuslim countries must be suppressed.

Skeptics, a group from which I was slowly and almost unwill-ingly forced by the facts to extricate myself, may reject this notionof a Muslim plan as an invalid and paranoid conspiracy theory.However, in Volume 2 there is reference to it in an importantspeech by the Sardauna in which he unabashedly talked about amaster plan. It was important enough for him to repeat the idealater. It is clearly no mere figment of the imagination fueled bysome fake conspiracy theory dreamed up by fundamentalist anti-Muslim Christians. CAN commented rather proudly that theSardauna’s plan to dip the Qur’an into the ocean has been over-taken by Christians’ planting the Bible firmly in the northerndesert.26 Though this sounds like a Christian victory, that is not theconclusion to which this somewhat cute statement was meant totake us. Muslim oppression of and discrimination againstChristians have not ceased with the planting of the Bible in thedesert but, according to Christians, continue on a daily basis.

Even the NIPSS report referred to global plans drawn up byMuslims: “The Muslim/Christian relations in Nigeria should beseen partly from the worldwide perspective. It is instructive torecall the 1974 resolutions of [the] World Muslim Council…inMecca that year.” The report explained that the “principal aim” of


these resolutions was “to counter the influence of Christianity,” butNigerian Christians tend to think of these resolutions as a plan forworld domination. Perhaps the difference is the same! The resolu-tions include the following steps:

1. the establishment of Muslim centres to resist Christian mis-sionary activities;

2. the establishment of Islamic radio and TV stations;

3. the takeover of secular expressions of Christian activities suchas schools, hospitals;

4. the establishment of intelligence centres to monitor Christianactivities;

5. the banning of Christian literature in Muslim countries;

6. the mobilization of the economic strength of the Muslimworld to deny support to any country where Christian mis-sionary activities are against Islam.27

Conspiracy theories may be politically incorrect in religious studies,but we are not dealing with abstract theories so much as with lifeexperiences, concrete reality and fears which have solid ground. Thereare various foreign documents floating around Nigeria that supportthe idea of the plan. Nigerians sometimes embrace these reports asauthentic, even when there are good reasons to doubt them. It is themain topic of a kind of mysterious book written by Edwin and JodyMitchell,28 supported by many quotations from individuals andNigerian newspapers and magazines. There is an article on the samesubject by Susan Braungart allegedly published in the InternationalHerald Tribune (IHT). Allow me to reproduce the relevant part:

We indicated last Wednesday that President IbrahimBabangida will formally proclaim Nigeria a Federal IslamicSultanate on February 28, 1990. As a result of an exclusiveinterview with Dr. Hamid Al-Gabid, Secretary General of the


OIC in Cairo yesterday, we make the following correction.President Babangida shall proclaim Nigeria a Federal IslamicSultanate on March 28, 1990. Nigeria became a full-fledgedmember of the OIC on…February 14, 1989, and Nigeria alsoautomatically became a signatory to the Arab League Treaty ofJoint Defence and Economic Cooperation, which makes itimperative that Nigeria should be prepared to attack Israelwhenever the OIC and the Arab League want her to do so.

Dr. Al-Gabid also confirmed that with this new develop-ment, the Sultan of Sokoto becomes Nigeria’s undisputedsupreme sovereign as Sultan of Nigeria, all the present groupof traditional rulers shall become relegated and sub-servient tothe Sultan. All forms of worship and religious promotions byChristians, Ahmadiyyas and tribal groups shall be bannedand abolished for good, and Sharia Law shall be imposed onNigeria. The foregoings are in line with conditions laid downby the OIC.

Frankly, this does not seem to be an authentic document. Forone, the English is clearly substandard. Secondly, the predictedevent did not occur, not even twelve years later—not even a singlesign of any attempt to impose the Sultan on the country. Besides,would Babangida, who held on to his power so tenaciously untiloverthrown by a coup, voluntarily step down in favour of theSultan? Thirdly, no OIC official would divulge such a “secret” planahead of time, for that would destroy it before it was evenattempted. Fourthly, the attempt to verify the document’s authen-ticity with IHT has yielded denial from the paper. Another part ofthis article gives some historical information about the Fulani thatis fairly accurate and is probably meant to make the rest of the doc-ument credible, but it will not fly.

However, such documents are considered genuine byChristians. Nigerian Christians distribute them, because they


seem to accurately reflect Muslim ambitions as Christians under-stand them. To me they appear to be attempts to raise religioustensions to prepare the ground for more upheaval, possibly to cre-ate conditions ripe for a coup. I do not deny that Muslims haveplans. I am denying the authenticity of this and some other circu-lated documents.

Probably a more reliable statement is from a Commissioner ofPolice of the defunct Gongola State who is not further identified.He fully agreed with this Christian allegation of a Muslim plan.This official investigated a number of people arrested in connec-tion with religious violence and reported that “these young menbelong to an organization whose objective it is to destroy the secu-lar government and entrench a pro-Iranian Islamic government.According to them, this is a long-term effort which has alreadybeen set in motion. The young men are members of a larger orga-nization existing in all parts of the country.”29

� Muslim Methods _____________________________

According to TankoYusuf, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna, onceboasted that “he would use whatever means necessary to completethe unfinished work of Islamisation started by his great grandfather,Shehu Usman Dan Fodio….” The Sardauna “used his political posi-tion and power to threaten chiefs and traditional rulers; indirectly heforced weak ones to change to Islam; he bent the law to his ownaims; he used district heads and district officers for the same pur-pose.” Yusuf continued, “So brazen was his abuse of office thattoward the end of his life, Bello spent more time and effort“Islamizing” than as premier…. He used government planes, vehiclesand other facilities openly and freely for his religious campaigns.”30

Of course, the opposition between “Islamizing” and functionsof premier is a Christian perspective. Muslims would argue that“Islamizing” is one of the major functions of a Muslim ruler.


Bello’s example became standard for military regimes, one afteranother, using even Christians such as Yakubu Gowon who, in hiscapacity as head of state, took over Christian schools and hospitals.State governments used public funds to establish Muslim schoolsin Christian states. Yusuf, the diplomat, would occasionally burstout in some most undiplomatic language:

Public institutions—the judicial system, newspapers, publishinghouses, and radio and television—were forced to operate in waysthat promoted Islam and discriminated against Christianity.Christians have been denied access to electronic media in…northern states, while Islam monopolises 24 hours for its broad-cast in the same area. Agents of the devil compound the miseryby using the media to heap insults on Christians. Every hour theMuslims broadcast provocative statements about Christianity.31

Yaro’s book is full of such vituperation about how “the mostmisunderstood” and “most bloody” religion tries to implement itsplan in Nigeria.

Though Islam can offer me all necessary material gifts onearth, including employment and promotion, I cannot acceptthese things and agree to close my eyes to those things whichdiminish the dignity of the human person which Islam (or dowe say its adherents?) tend to promote. Violence! Violence!Kill! Kill! Cheat! Deprivation! Social injustice! Monopolizingcommon goods and offices.32

The early history of Islam in Nigeria is replete with stories ofviolence and wars termed, in religious euphemism, “Holy jihad .”The present history of Islam in Nigeria is full of stories of violenceand spilling of blood.

Having described the parameters, Yaro proceeded to summarisethe killing and destruction of the various riots described in Volume1 as expressive of the nature of Islam. Nigeria is only a current exam-


ple of what happened in Egypt during its Islamisation process.Quoting from Ishak Ibrahim’s well-known book on Egypt, BlackGod and Holy War, he warned that Egypt illustrates how Islam caninvade, permeate, and subvert a nation and culture. Although Islamultimately became the majority religion in Egypt, this national con-version was not accomplished without much bloodshed and destruc-tion. Through manipulation, blackmail and outright obliteration ofresistance, Islam became the religion of the majority in Egypt.33

While Muslims in Western countries are building theirmosques and enjoying their freedom, it is quite the opposite inMuslim countries, where Christians can neither build nor altertheir buildings without permission from the highest authority inthe land. Islam is intolerant of others and is constantly encourag-ing jihad against Christians. Gaddafi of Libya has allegedly saidthat “infidels” in the Middle East “should accept Islam, leave thecountry, or be eliminated.”34

Referring to various developments in Nigeria, Yaro bitterlycomplained:

Years ago, it was Moslem assault on Christian lives. Monthsago, it was Islamic destruction of Christian churches. Weeksago, it was Islamic seizure of Christian schools like Queen ofApostle’s College, Kaduna, which they renamed QueenAmina. Days ago, it was Islamic attempts to sell our jointly-owned nation to the aggressive Arab world. Today, it is testi-monies of Islamic this, Islamic that, positical35 jihad, eco-nomic jihad, religious jihad, job-employing jihad, scholarshipjihad. Islam, Islam, Islam!36

Yaro could go on and on. Muslims employ a variety of “means andagents” to intimidate us. “They victimise us, they crucify us.” Andthen, using the same agents, “they appeal to us to be calm, peace-ful and law-abiding.” Should we “continue to be calm in the faceof all these gross abuses and man’s inhumanity to man?”37


If this allegation about Nigerian Muslim intention of wipingout Christianity still seems contrived and unbelievable, then per-haps the testimony of a former self-professed Muslim terrorist whoactively participated in such a campaign will add some weight to it.We have already met Alhaji Aliyu Ibn Mamman Dan Bauchi inVolume 1, where I reported on his vicious attacks on Christians.Subsequently he converted to Christ and revealed the secrets of hisMuslim mission of terrorism under the alleged sponsorship ofJama’atul Nasril Islam (JNI). He claimed to have been appointed byJNI as co-ordinator of a programme “to eliminate Christianity.”38 Itwas under that umbrella that he claims to have engaged in the cam-paign of violence and confusion described in Volume 1.

He told how, under the auspices of JNI, he organised a studentriot at ABU in 1978. Both students and the people of Samaru wereinstigated to shout Muslim slogans. The ultimate aim of the exer-cise was to restore the leadership of Islam and to “eliminateChristianity.” All the chiefs in the area were informed of theseplans. The campaign was to start at ABU, extend to all of KadunaState, spread into Plateau State and from there fan out into the restof the country. The riot started but was quickly nipped in the budby mobile police. Yes, sometimes the police could act decisively.Eleven people died in the incident, all of them Muslims.39 ThisMuslim attack on Christians failed.

Dan Bauchi is not the only Paul-type figure in Nigeria. OneAbdullahi Jibril was another former Muslim persecutor ofChristians. Prior to his conversion to Christ, he described himselfas “a great Muslim fundamentalist, waging war against Christiansand Christianity.” He led a group of fifteen who would go aboutdisrupting church crusades in Kano. Though a fundamentalist, onewould expect him to eschew occultism, but he “acquired voodoopowers from witch doctors” which, he said, “assisted him greatly inhis persecution of Christians and protected him physically duringattacks.” On December 14, 1996, his group went to break up a


crusade in Koki, Kano State, but suddenly his occult powers lefthim helpless. To make the story short, this humbling experience ledhim to Christ—and now he became the victim of Muslim perse-cution. His family rejected him and forced him to leave his home.He has been wandering around trying to escape persecution whilepreaching Christ. “Many Muslims have threatened to deal withme. Some have said they will kill me,” he reported.40

These confessions from former Muslims do much to corrobo-rate the frequent accusation by Christians that Muslims, or, at least,certain major groups within Islam, are out to destroy Christianityand that the religious riots have religious-political goals. It appearsthat such an interpretation is not as far-fetched as some think andcannot be shrugged off as merely false alarm. As far as Christiansare concerned, there is too much evidence to deny that terrorismwas definitely part of an approved Muslim campaign.

Another source of violence was the world of students and theirpowerful organ, the Muslim Students Society (MSS). The NIPSSreport presented a long list of examples of their intolerance andready violence. Students “have often been encouraged to revoltagainst what are regarded as unIslamic traditions.” In some institu-tions they refuse to recite the National Pledge but prefer to shout“Allahu Akbar.” In a Potiskum school, girls demanded “a separatedrinking water source, claiming that non-Muslim students haddefiled their praying ground with fæces when, in fact (as investiga-tion later revealed), it was they who did so in an attempt to dis-credit the non-Muslim students.” The MSS leader responsible forthis action was suspended by the school but soon re-instated upon“intercession by the emir.” Muslim female students “demanded tobe excused from wearing the school uniform which was consideredunIslamic” and from “physical education which they claimedunIslamically exposed their bodies.” MSS members forced a groupof Bendel State students to shut down a cultural show because itinterfered with a Muslim meeting nearby. Muslim students partic-


ipated in a rampage at ABU, destroying properties and burning theNigerian flag. Similarly, the “MSS were prominent” in the Kanodisturbances of 1982 which led to the destruction of churches. Thereport concluded that “the MSS has become a group whose activi-ties must be closely watched for the sake of the peace and securityof Nigeria’s multi-religious society.”41

Others have also observed that violence by Muslim students,with or without MSS, has indeed been widespread. James Okoromatells the story of Muslim students disrupting a national conventionof the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) at BayeroUniversity, Kano, in 1993, in the wake of the Zangon-Kataf riots.Tension was high in the country because of the death sentencesimposed on Major General Zamani Lekwot and seven others.Okoroma claims that more than half a million Christians haddemonstrated in Kaduna demanding the release of these men. It hadbecome so tense that even prominent Muslims, including SultanDasuki and some emirs, were appealing to the president for pardon“in the interest of peace and continued existence of the country.” Intheir view, the matter “had shifted from a criminal offence to a reli-gious rift between Christians and Muslims, which, if not properlyhandled, could shake the foundations of the country.” NANS, forreasons of its own, had joined the bandwagon of those who were call-ing for pardon. An unidentified group of Muslim students, describedas “fundamentalist,” jumped to the conclusion that NANS was thussupportive of CAN. The attackers explained that they took offencebecause NANS had been converted “into an arm of CAN.” Theleader of the pack shouted, “You are infidels. We must kill you. Youare against Islam. Allahu Akbar.” They were armed with guns, bows,arrows, daggers, charms and other dangerous weapons. They shotand wounded many conferees, though none were killed.42

Any time Muslims feel that their plan is threatened byChristian developments, Christians claim that Muslims will tor-pedo, undercut, boycott, derail or do whatever it takes to stop


those developments. The TEKAN Action Committee recognisedat least two such incidents. In a nation-wide local governmentelection, Christians received about seventy percent of the votes.The plan had been for each local government chairman to repre-sent his people at the Constituent Assembly, where the constitu-tion would be reviewed. Since Christians were in the majority,“the powers that be were made to change the idea and to appointor nominate others in a bid to neutralise the Christian majorityand to ensure Muslim domination and perpetual rule as presi-dents.” However, even under the new plan, Christians still formedthe majority in the Assembly. The Committee warned not torejoice too quickly, for some of those were not “committedChristians.” They “could easily be persuaded by the mundane andmaterial benefits” the Muslims would dangle before them. Prayeris needed to strengthen Christian members so as not to yield toany diabolical plan of the opponents. That plan included the useof money, girls “and other bad ways to divert the attention of someof the Christian brethren.”

During a recent National Conference of Nigerian Women, anuproar developed when Muslim women realised that a Christianwoman was going to win the election. They promptly torpedoed theevent so that no election was held. In another development, Muslimswere accused of “emasculating” the Christian vote by buying off theirregistration cards so as to prevent them from voting altogether.43

The Christian conviction of a Muslim strategy to undo themwill not die. An editorial in The Comet warned the nation about ameeting of fifteen Northern Muslim governors, where the Governorof Zamfara of sharia fame allegedly made a pronouncement aboutsuch a plan. “He rose up, stoutly…pontificating that the plan tospread Islam to cover the four corners of Nigeria is a fait accompli,”an accomplished fact, with the establishment of the sharia.44 Thesecond issue in this article was that these governors together con-tributed a huge sum of public money to a Muslim cause.


C. O. Williams, national general secretary of CAN at the time,was very upset by the danger this presented. He circulated copiesof this editorial to all Christian members on the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) along with a warning:

As the contents of the publication are very grave and capableof engendering highly inflammable consequences, a copy ishereto attached for your very careful study—earnestly hopingthat the fully-charged issue will be frankly discussed at thenext meeting of NIREC and that the Council will take appro-priate and realistic decision on it.45

Many documents, purported to be Muslim in origin, are cir-culating among Christians, which Christians take as proof(s) of aMuslim plan to subjugate Nigeria. These are among the documentsthat Christian leaders whisper about when they vaguely point outto the skeptic that they have the documents to prove that Muslimsdo indeed have detailed schemes to take over the country. One thatlooks more genuine than most is a communiqué allegedly pub-lished by the Islam in Africa Conference (IAC) held in Abuja at theend of November, 1989. It constitutes Appendix 1. TheConference pledged to take a number of threatening measures ofalarming proportions against Christians. Please read the documentbefore proceeding to the next paragraph.

In order to achieve its aims, a steering committee had beenestablished which included Nigeria. Among its tasks in Nigeria wasthe conversion of the then National Republic Convention, a formerpolitical party, into the National Islamic Party of Nigeria. That wasthe only party to produce “leading government functionaries.” Thepermanent headquarters was to be located in Abuja. The conferenceratified the admission of Nigeria into the OIC and “thanked thegovernment and people of Nigeria for having generously donatedUS$21 billion to the Islamic Development Fund of the OIC.” Thecommuniqué closed with the request to the government of Nigeria


“to implement all policies and programmes of the OIC to show thewhole world that Nigeria is truly an Islamic nation.” The end of thedocument features the seal of both the Islamic Council in Londonand of the President of Nigeria. Everything is hanging out. Literallynothing is left to the Christian imagination. This one feels, looksand sounds authentic, very authentic.46

I had long been wondering how this document fell intoChristian hands and assumed that it had been purposefully leaked tocreate disturbance in the country. Edwin and Jody Mitchell’s booksolved the mystery.47 It may well have been leaked for that very pur-pose. An anonymous party who identified himself as “YourConcerned Christian Brethren, Nigeria” sent the document to theMitchells. The sender described the document as “nothing more buttotal declaration of war by the devil and his religion with an attemptto win God’s Nigeria into his devilish enclave of a darkened nation”and expressed the desire that it be forwarded to President Bush Sr.What with the seals of the Nigerian President and of the IslamicCouncil affixed, the Michells regarded it as a “top secret governmentdocument from Nigeria.” To their credit, they did weigh the authen-ticity of the document and ended up accepting it as legitimate—asdid I. They also made numerous copies that were then sent toNigeria. Subsequent letters from Nigeria tell of the thousands ofcopies its Nigerian recipients made and distributed on their own sothat the Christian community was blanketed with it. The documentcaused surprise, dismay and more than a few gallons of tears.48

There is a variety of documents of different degrees of trust-worthiness. Attached to a photocopied circular from the tabloid,Christian Victory are two alleged Muslim documents. By circulatingsuch documents, regardless of their authenticity, Christians haveappropriated them as their own understanding of Muslim inten-tions and, as such, they have a place in this volume. One of thesedocuments is said to be a statement of the Izala Action Group’s“Major Plan.” Because of its brevity, I reproduce it here in full.


IZALA ACTION GROUP—MAJOR PLAN

Muslims should be calm and prepared. They should strive toequal themselves in the forces through the help of other high rank-ing Muslims, which will enable them to make war by all means andIslamise Nigeria. At any time, assistance will come from Arab andMuslim countries to do away with Kaferis, that is, Christians.

• Top religious (Christian) leaders must be the first targets.

• No Muslim daughters must marry a Kaferi (Christian), butMuslims should use their wealth to draw Kaferi daughters tothemselves and Islamise them.

• No Kaferi should ever be allowed to rule this country again norhold any important position.

• Kaduna State Commissioner of Police gave out Police forms on24th April to assist Muslims to be greater in Police Force.

• Izalatu seat of plan is at Katsina. Previous secret efforts to procureweapons by Arabs for Muslims was leaked by Old-man Kaferi.

The document is undated. The names of four very prominentMuslims are typed at the bottom: Abubukar Gumi, Major GeneralYar Adua Musa, A.A. Chanchangi, a prominent businessman andIshaku Rabiu. The poor English of the document makes its authen-ticity highly unlikely, since Yar Adua Musa would hardly allow hisname to be associated with this level of English. However, the pointis that Christians readily believe that this is indeed a Muslim plan,for they have seen evidences of most of these activities. I myself amno longer in a position to deny such Muslim plans, whether or notthe document itself is authentic.

� International Scope of the Jihad _________

Tanko Yusuf frequently faulted the West for failing to take theadvance of Islam seriously. It seemed to be blind. “Sometimes,” he


confessed, “I tremble when I ponder the complacency of theworld’s Christians [read: “Western Christians”] regarding our com-mon adversary.” Islam is involved in a perpetual jihad, the Muslimterm for “crusade.” That jihad governs all aspects of culture forthem. Even its international trade with the West is a part of thatjihad, though the West sees it as purely economic.

It may be well for Western readers to hear Yusuf ’s warningabout Muslim global ambitions, especially since 9/11. Nigeria isonly one of their mission “fields.” Their aim is to conquer the heartof the entire world. He told of a Muslim scholar who predicted that“soon every third person in the world would be Muslim.”

Western nations do not seem to notice that Islam is steadilyadvancing in their countries. Yes, multi-million mosques arepopping up here and there. No, this does not disturb the westernworld. Usually living among multi-ethnic populations with free-dom of religion makes for a permissive attitude towards Islam.

“The lull of complacency makes a fertile soil for subtle jihad .” Andthey are using every means at their disposal—“political power, mil-itary strength, oil and petro-dollars, vehicles, national aircraft andmore….” “To understand the OIC, one must understand theimpact of petro-dollars on the world economy.” Islam is slowlygaining control over the Western economic destiny.

Look around you! Besides mosques, Islamic centers are spring-ing up everywhere in the western world. Travelers can seeIslamic shopping centers in Central London, on Regent Street,Knightsbridge, and in other parts of Europe as well as in theUnited States.

Yusuf was annoyed with Western blindness to the Muslim threat.

Is the world aware of Islam’s global growth? Its global ambi-tions? Islam is no longer confined to the eastern hemisphere


where capitalists can safely ignore it. All of western society isfaced with the challenge of Islam. It is now on their doorsteps.Islam’s objective, of course, is to bring the world under theumbrella of Islamic control.

Yusuf was not deterred by the restraints of political correctness.I have recognised, way before the fall of the Berlin Wall, that Islamis/was a threat to both the West and Christianity as great, if notgreater, than was Communism. Political correctness and fear of beinglumped together with Christian fundamentalists and right-wingerskept me from open espousal of that view. Yusuf had no such hangup.He chastised the West for failing to recognise this fact and thus con-centrating exclusively on the Communist threat. He was greatly sur-prised at Western support of “the Islamic world and the Afghanrebels on the grounds of chasing Communists out of Afghanistan.”Communism can change, as events have already shown, but Islamcannot, for it is based on a supposedly eternal blueprint.49

Islam has its OIC, while the West has its European EconomicCommunity (EEC), but, warned Yusuf, there is an important dif-ference. The EEC only has economic aims. “It is not a religious…weapon to convert people to Christianity or to subjugate or elimi-nate those who do not accept that faith.” “Wake up, westernworld!” cried Yusuf.50 While the ambassador was deeply aware ofthe global aims of Islam, where he was ahead of most Christians,one may legitimately question the depth of his understanding ofEEC in terms of its world view and aims. His preoccupation withMuslim challenges may have blinded him to the reality of the“other side.” Demonization of the one led to uncritical “sanctifica-tion” of the other.

� Closing Comments __________________________

There you have the common feeling of Christians for Muslimsin Nigeria, including the feelings of former Muslims who have been


there. Suspicion, strong sense of threats and oppression, trusting noone, aware of clever deceit and cunning, full of malice, exploitingthe common people, not a trace of mutual kindness or cooperation.Whatever self-image Muslims have created for themselves,Christians recognise none of it. Muslims would do themselves ahuge favour by asking whether they are merely fooling themselves.

If you have read Volume 2 of this series, you may rememberthat Muslims regard themselves equally oppressed by Christians. Inthat volume, Muslims are the victims and Christians the perpetra-tors. That is to say, the Christian self-image of an oppressed peopledoes not come through to Muslims, either. Muslims do not recog-nise anything of it. To them, Christians are the oppressors. So,Christians would also do well to take a thorough look at their self-image and ask themselves the same questions.

This chapter presents the basic Muslim spirit as NigerianChristians see it. This perspective, together with its Muslim paral-lel as outlined in Volume 2, constitutes the general climate withinwhich the sparks find a congenial soil to explode. This is theChristian explanation for the background to the riots.


� Notes _________________________________________

1 For Tanko’s identification see Chapter Two. 2 Grissen, p. 73.3 Grissen, p. xi.4 Grissen, pp. xvi, 1-5.5 Grissen, pp. 6, 78.6 Grissen, p. 74.7 Grissen, p. 75.8 Is the problem only in the North? There are enough stories about

the South in these chapters to think otherwise. Only recently a friend ofmine from the Middle Belt who lives in a western state expressed surpriseat what he referred to as a high degree of “Muslim fanaticism” in the West.

9 Olujimi, 20 July/2002. 10 D. Byang, 2000, p. 9. Sulaiman materials taken from Inquiry, No.

1/87, p. 32. 11 R. D. Abubakre, p. 56.12 Plateau TV news broadcast on 17 Jan/92. 13 I let this statement stand even in the face of dangerous terms one

should use very sparingly: “never” and “always.” 14 The issues of this paragraph are among David Naugle’s major

points. I regard secularism as one of the unpaid bills of the church, calledup to correct some devastating Christian distortions, especially Christianintolerance. Its effects are by no means all negative. Human rights areinherent in the Christian world view, but it took secularism, itselfunthinkable apart from Christianity, to develop them. It also took secu-larism to derail them by separating them from its correlates of responsi-bility and realism. The issues of this paragraph are among David Naugle’smajor points.

15 Yaro, pp. 25, 10, 11.16 CAN Release, 1987. 17 NIPSS, pp. 14-15, 30, 31, 33. Again, keep in mind the time

frame—the eighties. Much water went over the dam since then.

Notes for pp. 30–35 57

18 I. Yaro, p. vi. Times International, 19 Mar/84. 19 I.Yaro, pp. 26-27. 20 Christians often make such allegations, but seldom back them up

with specifics like names and other details. Christians should realise thatfrequent undocumented allegations of this type weaken their credibilitywith potential friends and supporters outside the country.

21 J. Tsado, TC, 5/87, p. 7.22 I. Yaro, pp. 17, 38-42. 23 CAN Release, 1987. 24 Though CAN’s point is clear, the logic is somewhat muddled. It is

difficult to understand how this riot can be both in “the first stage” as wellas in a later stage of the Islamisation process.

25 Dandaura, 3 Dec/82, p. 7. 26 CAN, Leadership, p. 7. 27 NIPSS, p. 30. The same Muslim programme was also published

by Christian Victory, a magazine based in Denver, USA. Undated photo-copies of the latter were distributed throughout Nigeria, attached to someother Muslim documents referred to below.

28 Apart from its entry in the Bibliography, for further informationabout this book, see endnotes 46 and 47 of this chapter, along with theassociated text materials, pp. 32-33.

29 TEKAN Study Group, 1987.30 Grissen, pp. 79-80. It is likely that critics will regard Yusuf ’s

emphasis on the Muslim jihad distorted because of his hostility. However,his assertions are fully supported in Paden’s sympathetic work on theSardauna, especially in Chapters 9 and 16. Remember that Yusuf ’s opin-ions are based on personal and repeated observations and experiences thatspan many years.

31 Grissen, pp. 82-84. This subject will be explored in detail inChapter Five.

32 Yaro’s description is similar to that of Dan Bauchi, a former Muslimpersecutor of Christians. He writes, “We have seen how Islam is full ofdeceit, vile for vile, killings, argument and shame…” (Dan Bauchi, p. 54).

33 I. Yaro, pp. 4-8.

58 Notes for pp. 35–46

34 I. Yaro, pp. 8-11. 35 A case of imaginative English in the making, probably referring to

positions. 36 I. Yaro, p. 12. 37 I. Yaro, p. 33. 38 Dan Bauchi, p. 49. I must admit that some of his allegations and

claims become somewhat bizarre. I would not have referred to him ifCAN had not published his story.

39 CAN, Leadership, pp. 49-50.40 MM, Jan/99, p. 30. 41 NIPSS, p. 29. 42 Okoroma. 43 TEKAN Action Committee, 17 Aug/88. 44 The Comet, 23 July/2001. 45 C. O. Williams, letter dated 31 July/2001. 46 Various Christian documents contain summaries of similar deci-

sions on the part of international Muslim organisations. One is found inThe Sharia, CAN’s National Youth Wing, 1987, pp. 23-24. The list ofdecisions is then followed by a list of steps Muslims have already taken inNigeria. Pp. 24-25. For a Christian discussion of an Africa-wideIslamisation programme, see the article by Arye Oded.

47 I hesitate to give much credence to the Mitchell book, because itssectarian view of the Roman Catholic Church would seem to place theauthors beyond the pale of Nigerian Christianity. However, in addition tothis book, Josiah Publishing also profits from the cooperation of ananonymous Nigerian writer who uses the pseudonym of “J. O.” “J. O.” isby now a respected Christian leader in Nigeria whose opinion counts. Hehas published his own book through Josiah Publishing, The HiddenMassacres of Nigeria. In addition, he apparently provides both theMitchells and the British-based Barnabas Fund with reports of events inNigeria. You will meet “J. O.” again in these pages. His cooperation withthe Mitchells does increase their credibility with me. It appears that hetakes a pragmatic approach of using their services while ignoring their sec-tarianism. Furthermore, the book received much praise as an eye-opener

Notes for pp. 46–52 59

from many Nigerian and other African Christians, including pastors.Unfortunately, for security reasons, their names are not revealed, a prac-tice that is understandable, but which does reduce its standing as a reli-able source.

48 Mitchell, pp. 1-22. I restrict my use of this book also because it isnot a Nigerian publication. However, it goes into great detail on Muslimplans to eradicate Christianity and expresses itself much more drasticallythan do most Nigerian writings on the same subject. I do use its quota-tions from Nigerian sources.

49 Grissen, pp. 3, viii-ix. 50 Grissen, pp. 2-4. There are two Muslim centres within one mile of

the residence in Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA, where I wrote these linesoriginally, a city with a conservative reputation second to none.

60 Notes for p. 52–55

This chapter presents a list of factors that irritate Christiansabout Muslims. That list is a very long one. So, I have to be selec-tive. Since quite a number of irritants also involve discussionsabout government, I reserve those to whom that applies for thenext chapter. One of these, a major irritant indeed, is that of pub-lic religious utterances.

As I have indicated elsewhere in this series, Nigerians writingon these subjects have a strong tendency to pile issues and com-plaints on top of each other without careful logical arrangement. Iascribe that tendency not to lack of logic so much as to the strongemotions that these issues evoke. This is useful for getting the gen-eral picture, even if it makes systematic analysis sometimes diffi-cult. While the succeeding sections of this chapter describe theissues under various headings, this opening section presents anexample of a general picture in which everything is piled on top ofeach other.

A MENU

OF EXPLANATIONS

� F o u r

� TEKAN’s General Picture ___________________

My example consists of a TEKAN document submitted to thegovernment panel looking into Kafanchan riot series.1 The sub-mission suggested that the government tacitly supported theseriots by “deliberate non-intervention” and delaying tactics. Itrejected the MSS allegation that the immediate cause was the quo-tation from the Qur’an by Abubukar Bako in his sermon to thestudents at Kafanchan. It pointed out that it is common practicefor both Christians and Muslims to quote from each other’sbooks. No one has exclusive ownership of these books; they are forall people. Furthermore, TEKAN denied that Bako disparagedIslam or its prophet.2 It is misleading to claim that the Kafanchanriot caused the other riots in the state and thus to blame preacherBako for the entire sequence.

The submission furthermore claimed that students at higherinstitutions were being manipulated by some powerful groups todo their dirty work of violence against society. Though the state-ment did not outrightly say it, between the lines we read the chargethat the manipulators used the Kafanchan riot to evoke the others.The government encouraged the continuation of violence by notpunishing its perpetrators. The latter thus felt they had a licence tocommit violence against Christians without any risks to them-selves. In this way, the government and its agencies have becomeaccomplices in these crimes against Christians. In addition, dis-criminatory government appointments and promotions encour-aged the impression that Nigeria belongs to Muslims and thus pro-vided “a psychological booster for crimes against Christians.”Christians have become persona non grata, unwanted aliens in theirown country. And while TEKAN agreed with President Babangidathat the Kaduna 1987 rampage was an attempted coup, a politicalact, “it is nevertheless based on religion.” This allegation is basedon the existence of a national organization that was supposedly outto destroy the secular government and install a “pro-Iranian Islamic


government.” That organization was using young people tothreaten the security of the country. Unfortunately, the organiza-tion was not further identified.

TEKAN adds the ominous warning that Christians pray “thatthe day will never come when our turning the other cheek reachesseventy times seven.” If the government ever allows the provoca-tion to reach that number, “she will have only herself to blame.”This document covers almost all the Christian bases and is a mustread. It is included as Appendix 2. That is the general emotionalclimate of accusations without end….

� Religion ______________________________________

Various themes wind their way through these volumes. Oneis the traditional blindness of secularism to religion in general,along with a degree of hostility to Christianity in particular.Secularist scholars tend to pull up their noses at the notion thatpolitics and economics might be affected by religion. They pre-fer to put it the other way around. In this “light,” one can expectthat argumentation about these riots being largely religious innature will not receive much support. Even Nigerian Christianwriters, educated in a secular spirit often coloured heavily byMarxist theory, will frequently downplay the religious factor inthis sordid history. Though I do not accept such a tendency, I doreadily admit that the religious factor is usually intertwined withother issues. Of course, the same holds true for political and eco-nomic factors.

In Nigeria especially, the religious aspect is never far below thesurface. Paul Ndukwe, a Nigerian living in British Columbia,explained to his Canadian hosts, “One cannot talk about the polit-ical situation in Nigeria without relating it to religion. Every polit-ical programme or event always has a religious overtone. Passion forreligion also affects the economic climate of Nigeria.”3

A Menu of Explanations 63

This situation is due primarily to the nature of religion itself asfoundational to life, as I have argued in Volume 1. It is also due totwo other factors, namely, the open religiosity of Nigerians and thenature of Islam with its (correct) insistence that all of life is reli-gious. All of this clashes with the secular definition of religion.

Major factors in the Bauchi riots are Muslim nervousness atthe increasing strength of Christians and the sale of pork to aMuslim. If the latter is not easily recognised as a religious issue, thatis only because of the narrowness of the secular definition of reli-gion. Because of the dangerous implications of the religious expla-nation, there is a strong political hesitancy to identify the riots asreligious. Violence by a group of Muslims, “allegedly affiliated withthe Taliban movement in Afghanistan,” against eight communitiesin the northern state of Yobe led to an unknown number ofChristians killed in January 2004. Fati Fagbemi, a policespokesman “declined to discuss the number of Christians killed.‘This is a serious, sensitive, and dangerous issue,’” he said. “Wecannot discuss this in the media. Religion is a volatile issue thatcalls for caution. Please do not report the religious angle of it.”4

Could it not be more dangerous in the long run to sweep it underthe carpet and thus allow the situation to deteriorate even further,instead of facing it head on?

James O’Connell, an acute student of Nigerian religiousaffairs, observed that one of the problems in the study of religionand politics in Nigeria is precisely that, in this country, “it is oftendifficult to distinguish religion from ethnicity as a political factor.”5

Difficult, granted; indistinguishable or impossible, certainly not.Be sure to pay close attention to the NIPSS report’s contributionto this part of the discussion as reported a few pages later.

In the Christian literature under survey in this volume, religionis often castigated as a major culprit. The Muslim religion, ofcourse! Since it is usually associated with religious manipulation, Ireserve most of the discussion on this issue for the heading


“Manipulation.” However, there are some issues that need treat-ment under the current heading.

The first is a memo by the now late Jabanni Mambula, for-mer general secretary of TEKAN. The document as a whole isincluded in this book as Appendix 3. There is need “to call aspade, a spade,” a comment he repeats in the conclusion to itsHausa version, “Ranar wanka ba’a boya cibi.” This is his signalthat we should not expect political correctness. He rejects thepolitical explanation and insists that the motivation for the riots“is purely religious.” “Fanatical Muslims wanted to eliminate themore tolerant Muslims or Christians in order to achieve the totalIslamisation of Nigeria.”

The Kaduna State branch of CAN held a press conference inthe wake of the Zangon-Kataf riots in which it insisted on the reli-gious nature of this and other riots, but religion yoked with ethnic-ity, the religion being Islam and the ethnic group the Hausa-Fulani.CAN took its gloves off and forsook all political correctness. Theissue is not a local one. “The conflict is not only with the minorityHausa-Fulani settlers in Zango but with the entire members of thatcommunity spread across the country. They look beyond Zangon-Kataf and see every Christian as a target.” The same was true for theKafanchan, Tafawa Balewa and Jalingo riots. Invariably it was theHausa-Fulani Muslims who attacked Christians. “We view all Hausa-Fulani, no matter their state of origin, as coming from one ethniccommunity who share a common challenge in this ethnic-religiousconflict. Naturally, they are all expected to lean up against theKataf.”6 CAN maintained this stance in opposition to the Muslimgovernor, the media and the security agencies who all insisted thatit was “mainly communal and not religious.” It was, CAN charged,both “religious and premeditated.”

Another relevant document here is the NIPSS report. Duringthe half decade preceding the report, religious tension in the coun-try increased in “scale and intensity.” “It would be idealistic,” the


report declared, “to assume that there is no religious problem inNigeria and that conflicts along religious lines are only the result ofthe ‘manipulation’ of religion by vested interests amongstthe…elite.” The report acknowledged the presence of manipula-tion, but it also insisted that “there have been real problems withinthe religions” themselves, such as issues of faith, doctrine, aboutmode of worship and secularism. “It will not do any good to pre-tend that the religious problem does not exist…and it will amountto both intellectual dishonesty and political irresponsibility not toconfront the problem frankly and realistically.”7

At the very time I was writing the above paragraphs, May 2,2002, another riot was raging in Jos with an unofficially esti-mated death toll ranging from twenty to fifty. Consistent withtraditional policy, “police were quick to play down any religiousor ethnic links this time, apparently for fear of reprisal attacks.We are treating it for now as a political issue, because so far wehaving nothing to prove that it was ethnic or religious,” accord-ing to Haruna John, the Christian Deputy Police Commissionerof Jos.8 I include the incident only to show how necessary theauthorities find it to deny the involvement of religion immedi-ately to pre-empt religious reprisals.

Another relevant commentator here is the now late Bola Ige. Herelativised the Christian–Muslim situation by denying that most par-ticipants in the struggle were even genuine Christians or Muslims.The motivation for their struggle does not come from either of thesereligions but from their predecessor, African Traditional Religion(ATR), with its underlying world view. In spite of the large numberof Christians and Muslims, “there are only very few committedChristians and very few committed Moslems. If you scratch the sur-face, underneath you find either paganism or nothing.”9

James O’Connell, whose Nigerian base of operation, like Ige,was Ibadan, recognised that ATR had gone underground as far as itsstructures were concerned, but that it continued to play an impor-


tant role in Nigerian affairs. It “had little hope of formal survival,”he confirmed. “Yet,” he insisted, “the age-old attitudes engenderedin Nigerian peoples by traditional religion…endure in good mea-sure within Muslim and Christian structures and observances.”10

Similarly, C. O. Williams of both CAN and CCN affirmed thatboth Christians and Muslims “still hold tight to some form ofpaganism—just in case the Christian…or the Muslim God provesunreliable and disappointing at critical moments.”11

In other contexts, I have resorted to a similar explanation ofcertain African phenomena12 but, until now, it never occurred tome to apply it to the Christian–Muslim conflict. As sensitive anidea as this may be, it does receive support from some of my YorubaChristian friends who, in private conversations, without beingcoached towards this view and without being aware of Ige’s expla-nation, fully concur with it. However, I have not heard them applythe thought to the current conflict. Ige himself, to the best of myknowledge, did not go beyond simply positing this view to actuallyexploring its relevance to the current context.

That there should be an underlay of an African Traditionalworld view in all of this should surprise us no more than that,according to reputable philosophers, there is an underlay of Greekpagan philosophy mixed in with Western thought, both Christianand secular.13 World views are tenacious and take centuries todevelop—or to be fully overcome by more recent rivals. One usu-ally ends up with a unique mixture of old and new that constitutesa new world view, likely plagued by internal tensions and inconsis-tencies, a feature known as “syncretism.”

Ige’s observation provides some potentially useful buildingblocks for a complete explanation of the mayhem. When bothChristian and Muslim leaders suggest that those who cause theconflict are not faithful adherents of either religion, are they notimplying that the perpetrators may not have been (fully) convertedfrom their former religion? The hearts of the unfaithful are not vac-


uums. In many cases, I would argue, there are more than a fewtraces of African Traditional values at work here.

One feature of African Tradition is a tendency to externalisecauses and to blame other agents for personal shortcomings. It doesnot encourage the development of an awareness of responsibilityand guilt, as indicated in the pages referred to in the last footnote.This feature could be the reason that neither Christians norMuslims easily accept their responsibility and guilt for riots.Christianity especially emphasises human sinfulness and the needto seek forgiveness. Could it be that in some cases this recognitionis resisted due to a combination of human nature and residualAfrican Tradition in the souls of some? Such resistance could be aserious obstacle to a solution.

Another feature of African Tradition is that the spirits areexpected to support the adherents’ prosperity, not vice versa. Thespirits serve us; we do not serve the spirits. We may manipulatethem with sacrifices to do our bidding. When Christians orMuslims feel they are not achieving their worldly ambitions, thesyncretistic ones among them easily resort to elements of the oldthat are more compatible with their ambitions.

And that, frankly, spells manipulation. Manipulation is part ofthe core of Traditional Religion. In other words, the unique mate-rialistic perspective of ATR, in which the spiritual is not denied butsubservient to material well being, easily leads to materialisticambitions in a syncretistic elite.14 Thus it can be argued thatmanipulation itself, arising from residual ATR values and worldview, is also encouraged by the underlay of a third religion.

� Manipulation ________________________________

In the above section I suggested a spiritual explanation formanipulation. In this section we will learn how Christians resort tothe manipulation theory to at least partially explain the conflicts.


Apart from its spiritual background, what happens when peoplemanipulate? What do manipulators do?

For the benefit of readers who have not read Volume 2, I repro-duce the definition of manipulation as given by the NigerianMuslim-Marxist historian, Yusufu Bala Usman. Manipulation, hewrote, means “controlling the action of a person or group withoutthat person or group knowing the goals, purpose and method of thatcontrol and without even being aware that a form of control is beingexercised on them at all.”15 That is the notion of manipulation Iwould prefer to stay close to in this section. However, the writersconsulted on the subject often have a less defined concept of it.

We have already seen that manipulation is a popular explana-tion for the riots amongst Muslims. We will now see its popularityamong Christians as well, especially among journalists and aca-demics. It is here particularly that it becomes difficult to ferret outChristian from secular and Marxist voices, for many Christianshave adopted secular and Marxist perspectives. As said before, I willsimply do my best in identifying Christians amongst them andapologise for any mistake ahead of time.

Though the term “manipulation” may not always be used, theconcept crops up constantly. The TEKAN Study Group in its 1987submission stated that it was “becoming more and more obvious thatstudents are being used by certain groups of powerful individuals forpersonal ends.”16 Alexander Fom was of the view that the violence isusually not caused by religion so much as “some groups of people” forwhom there is “no path of sanity except the jihad.” Tunji Braithwaite,a Lagos-based Christian socialist politician, feels that the problem isnot Islam but, rather, certain Northern fundamentalist and extremistMuslims “who are using religion for very diabolical purposes. Theyuse religion to gain political ascendancy and even steal money andperpetrate the worst imaginable atrocities. They even kill!”17

Wadumbiya, a lecturer in Christian Religious Studies at theCollege of Education, Hong, referred to Northern “crooks” who


engage “in the dirty and sordid politics of divide and rule” and whowere more active at the time of his writing than ever before. “Theyhave used tribalism and failed; they used regionalism and it blewup in their face. Now they have come to religion.” They shouldrealise that if they cause a religious war, its “shape would automat-ically change” from religion to an ethnic battle between “Northernethnic groups verses the Hausa-Fulani. The tension between thegroups in the North is not religious but… political. Religion isonly used to divide and conquer or rule and to manipulate theeconomy of this country.”

Wadumbiya asserted that “most of the religious problems”Nigeria has experienced “are out of place, because they do not belongto religion but to two major issues, politics and ethnic differences.”Most of the “religious uprisings,” he explained, took place where the“Fulani or Hausa people are many.” However,

where the ethnic minorities are more, though most of themmight be Muslims, you hardly find any religious problemerupting among them. And this shows that the main causes forthe riots is not religion but politics, ethnicity, vandalisticnature and desire to loot. The tools used are the poor illiterateswho have nothing to live for. They are the ones who can eas-ily be instigated to violent action, since they would lose noth-ing, but release their tensions of misfortune conditions.18

Though I will not dispute Wadumbiya’s assertions about thereality of the manipulation factor, some of the riots took placewhere Christians and Traditionalists formed the majority, as inZangon-Kataf and Tafawa Balewa. Furthermore, I have earlierasserted that religious manipulation in Nigeria is often reli-giously motivated.

An “interfaith dialogue” conference in Jos issued a commu-niqué in which Christian and Muslim leaders joined to condemnthe manipulation of “religion for selfish and political motives.” The


destruction and killings, it was agreed, “could not have been car-ried out by true, informed and sincere adherents of the two reli-gions.” They called on their adherents “not to allow themselves tobe manipulated by unpatriotic politicians.” They asserted that“conflicts that are usually labelled as religious crises, have political,ethnic and other non-religious motives.” The organiser of the con-ference, David Belin, explained that “some unpatriotic elements areusing religion as a front to diabolically ferment civil disturbance.”19

Obed B. Minchakpu presented a paper at the above conferencein which he spoke about the “forces behind the manipulation ofreligion in Nigeria and its subsequent use as a potent weapon ofintimidation, harassment and political machinations,” which canbe understood only by “examining the respective views ofChristians and Muslims on the relationship between the state andreligion.” Only via such an examination will it be possible tounmask “the satanic forces behind the manipulation of religion”that have led to such conflicts. Minchakpu provided some illustra-tions of how this manipulation was the cause of some of the riots.The Zangon-Kataf debacle of 1992 was caused, he asserted, purelyby ethnic matters. However, “because of selfishness, Muslimsmanipulated it and gave it religious colouration. As a result, peoplewho were hundreds of kilometres from the scene of the crisis wereaffected. This was not because they belong to any of the ethnicgroups in the case, but simply because they were Christians.”

The Kano riot of 1991 about Bonnke was also the result ofmanipulation on the part of Muslims, but the explanation is notvery clear. A clearer example is the 1994 riots in Potiskum whichwere said to be the result of political shifts which threatened theBolewa people. They then aligned themselves with the local Hausa-Fulani Muslims “to whip up religious sentiments.” “And withoutshame, they are attempting to cover up such satanic acts with aframe up story of an alleged conversion of a Christian girl as thecause of the crisis. This is a shame and a disgrace!”20


Minchakpu feels that manipulation is a “sad aspect of[Nigeria’s] national life” which “has brought untold hardship” tomany people. The government that is supposed to defend andimplement the constitution without favouring one religion aboveanother, “has got itself neck-deep into this manipulation of reli-gion. All because of the selfishness of some political desperadoeswho are desperately looking for ways to sustain their politicalstrongholds and power bases.”

Governments at both federal and state levels have all failed tolive up to the constitution when it comes to religion. They havefavoured Islam time and again while suppressing Christianity.21

Binta Faruk Jalingo lived much of her life in Nigeria’s overlap-ping cultures of Islam and the military. Her father and five broth-ers served in the military. She was the wife of a Northern Muslimarmy officer who divorced her because she became Christian. Inthe midst of such an environment, she experienced and overhearda lot of behind-the-scenes things which made her an authority onMuslim behaviour and ambition. She wrote a book that camestraight from her experience of many years in Muslim strongholds.She wrote with a heart full of compassion for the wretched com-mon people who have been betrayed by their leaders.

She begins her discussion with the statement that “reli-gion…has become the backbone of political intrigues in northernNigeria.” People, she affirms, “are…going to the extreme to achievetheir greedy ambitions, even in the name of religion.”

I want the common man to know that their leaders want to usethem for their selfish interests in the cover of religion. A lot ofthese leaders are only using religion to make money and toenrich themselves. Most of these leaders are power drunk whowill always like to see the common man come to beg from them.

Northern Muslim leaders, she alleges,


have blinded the eyes of the common man that they know notthat they are lost. They have passed the road to their father’shouse unknown, yet they want to go home. Their leaders carenot about what happens to them, for they have been aban-doned to the middle of the road without a compass.

Muslims claim their religion to be one of peace, “yet they arebent on killing in the name of religion. Is that what we call peace?”They “are killing in the name of religion. Their hearts are hard-ened, that is why ungodly things are being committed in theNorth, such things like murder, intimidation, ritual killings, slav-ery and so on. Are all these things of peace? The Northern leadersshould stop fooling themselves in the cover of religion.”22

Jalingo reserves strong feelings against the Arewa23

Consultative Forum (ACF), especially regarding the way they luredthe Christian Yakubu Gowon into their scheming. She announces,

I want to bring to the notice of the Christians…that the…ACFis another way of fooling the innocent and the common man ofthe North…. Don’t allow yourself to be cheated. Moslems arecunning people. They know what they are doing as they gave thechairmanship of the ACF to a Christian. Is that not a way toblindfold the Christians and get them hooked-up?

…Moslems are anti-Christians who do not wantChristians to rule. Those Christians supporting the…ACFshould know that they are the Judas that betrayed theChristians. Let them know that the…politicians and leadersof the North are only using them to get what they want.

She warns against having anything to do with people such as thoseof the ACF. “There is an adage that says, ‘when eating with thedevil, use a long spoon,’ but I am telling you that if you are notcareful, he will draw the spoon and get to you. So, don’t even eatwith him. For darkness and light cannot be together.”


How can it be that Gowon has been appointed chairman ofACF, when Muslims have all along been rejecting the notion of aChristian head of state and many were unhappy with Gowon inthat position precisely because he was a Christian? ACF exists “forselfish interests and for destabilizing the North. Don’t get fooled,for all that glitters is not gold.”24 Jalingo has overheard it all andknows how manipulation works first hand. Jalingo was probablynot far off the mark on the Gowon issue. Years earlier, Minchakpuclaimed that “Muslim bureaucrats succeeded in manipulating [his]administration into taking over all Christian mission schools.”25

Many journalists in Nigeria’s so-called secular media prefermanipulation as the main explanation of the violence. The editorof NS, writing about the 1994 Jos riot, rejected the religious inter-pretation in favour of manipulation.26 The argument had it thatsince many families in Jos are comprised of both Christians andMuslims, religion could not possibly be the cause, a logical jump Icannot follow. Manipulation was the only explanation that madesense—at least as long as you don’t define it too closely or identifyits perpetrators.

The above argument is not surprising, since NS is a govern-ment-owned medium and Nigerian governments prefer this expla-nation, again especially if the manipulators are not too clearly iden-tified. Clear identification might demand concrete governmentaction against the perpetrators, something these governments havelong hesitated doing.

Dele Omotunde, an editor with TELL magazine,27 after listingmost of Nigeria’s riots since 1980, referred to them as a “viciouscycle of madness and stupidity” and concluded that the “commondenominator is intolerance, which, in turn, breeds violence.” Hecalled the perpetrators “sharpshooters of religious fanaticism.”Religion is like an H-bomb. “All it requires is a demented brain onthe pulpit or mat to detonate it and unleash terror... through dia-bolical manipulation of an unwary congregation.”28 Here you have


many of the ingredients that have been leading Nigeria to destruc-tion: madness and stupidity, intolerance leading to violence, fanati-cism and manipulation.

Among academics, religious manipulation for non-religious pur-poses as the main cause for these riots is a popular theme. The pressstatement of an ABU inter-religious group is a good example and Ihave therefore included it as Appendix 4. It points out how variousNigerian foreign affairs that have religious aspects associated withthem, such as the country’s relationships to OIC, Israel and theVatican, “were being used by sinister and reactionary forces to under-mine the unity of our people and the sovereignty... of our Nation.” Itidentified a “campaign of systematic manipulation of religious senti-ments” meant to divert attention away from the task of nation build-ing. The idea is to “entrench religious conflicts in all facets of ournational life,” in order to retain the status quo of harsh conditions.

Turning to the Kafanchan debacle, the statement declares,

Our experience of the current events and all evidence avail-able to us,29 have convinced us that the violence of the lastseven days was not the brain work of hooligans. It is believedto be the latest stage of a campaign which started about tenyears ago, in the so-called ‘Shari’a Debate,’ in 1976 to ‘77.30

There are “some organisations and individuals” that “witharrogance and impunity, incite and threaten people of other reli-gious beliefs.” Behind this campaign hides a “tiny oligarchy deter-mined to maintain its power, wealth and privileges at all costs....”By that “tiny oligarchy,” though not explicitly identified, I under-stand these lecturers to be referring to a small, very powerful andrich inner clique of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani establishment.

Thus we have Christians in this volume and Muslims inVolume 2 agreeing with each other about the prevalence of manip-ulation as a major cause of the riots. Of course, the identity of themanipulators is another matter! It is no surprise, therefore, that the


government’s Political Bureau reported that “religious conflictshave occurred as a result of manipulation of religion for politicalreasons: ‘organised religions tend to go into alliance with politicalpower structures in society. They sometimes also go into alliancewith, and are used by, the moneyed classes for their own ends.’”31

Federal politicians also place blame on manipulative politi-cians. Senate President Chuba Okadigbo made some revealingstatements about the forces behind the Kaduna 2000 conflagra-tion. There were “a few political up-starts posing as governors” that“have tried to create confusion…by creating openings through eth-nic cleavages and religious bigotry.” He added that “religion couldbe abused if allowed to go wild.” He also promised that measureswould soon be taken “against agents provocateurs who carry armsunder their gowns.” “They have to be identified and brought topublic view in terms of the dangers they pose to the republic andthe people based on their sentiments.”32

President Obasanjo was equally aware of such motivationbehind Kaduna 2000. Through his representative, he explainedthat the mayhem “was politically motivated to bring down the pre-sent administration.”33

The report of NIPSS, another government agency, presents a dif-ferent angle. It admits that manipulation of religion “to serve partisanand electoral interests” does indeed take place. However, it rejects thepopular notion that religious violence is “only the result of… manip-ulation… by vested interests amongst the ruling class and the elite.”Earlier in this chapter we read how the report insists on the effect of“real problems within the religious sphere” that cannot be ignored.34

In other words, NIPSS is rejecting the popular escapist attitudethat is so prevalent in government quarters and amongst Muslimleaders who want to avoid accusing one or both religions. Blamingthe violence exclusively on manipulation by vested interests or,another related excuse, on hoodlums and foreigners, leaves the reli-gions themselves and their leaders too easily off the hook.


� Structural Factors _________________________

According to the NIPSS report, Islam in Nigeria has a strongerdisposition to violence and intolerance than do Christians. Thereason is a sociological one, namely, the fact that in the traditionalMuslim parts of the North, religion and social structures are sointertwined that a change in one is bound to bring about changein the other. In the North, the social structures are shaped by reli-gion more than in other parts of the country. “Social roles, moresand values at home and in public affairs are based on the religion”as well as the religion’s original culture, namely that of Arabs.35

In such a context, a challenge to the religion is simultaneouslya challenge to the social structures. Such challenges are usuallyaccompanied with a lot of upheaval, not infrequently includingirrational behaviour inspired by fear and anger. This gives contentto the oft-repeated slogan that “Islam is a way of life.” A challengeto Islam in northern Nigeria is simultaneously an attack on exist-ing socio-economic relationships and structures. No wonder theissues are as fused as they are and difficult to isolate. The very pres-ence of countless southern Christians in the northern cities consti-tutes a challenge to traditional Northern Muslim ways. The devel-opment of a strong Christian community out of the bosom ofMiddle Belt Traditional Religions has indeed led to radical struc-tural challenges. Vested interests do have reasons to resist change,while Christians, especially in the Middle Belt, have reasons todemand change. This mix of demand and resistance has con-tributed greatly to the general volatility in that area.

� The Gumi Factor _____________________________

We have met Sheik Abubukar Gumi in various places already,including a special section devoted to him in the second mono-graph of this series. Christians have frequently singled him out asan especially powerful factor in the Muslim–Christian mix. Tanko


Yusuf and Gumi both spent their final years in Kaduna. I have theimpression that, in spite of their stark opposition to each other’sgoals, they had a certain respect for each other. That should notsurprise anyone who surveys their common personality traits suchas directness, bluntness, honesty, interest in root causes and in apositive role of religion in society. Yusuf paid a condolence visitupon Gumi’s death. Still, ultimately they regarded each other asfoes representing opposite interests. Gumi, Yusuf realised, stood forthe subjugation, if not destruction, of Nigerian Christianity. Below,I summarise the short chapter in Yusuf ’s autobiography that isdevoted to Gumi and features a picture of Yusuf and Gumi stand-ing next to each other.

According to Yusuf, as leader of the Izala group, Gumi hasinfluenced Muslim youth more than almost anyone. The aim ofthe Izala was to destroy two concepts that were the most preciousto Yusuf, namely, Nigeria’s secular status and her “western andChristian values”—really two sides of the single Nigerian Christiancoin—in order to replace them with Islam. Gumi worked hard toestablish a political system based on Islam. To achieve this hefought to control federal radio and television in Kaduna, channelshe used aggressively to advance his gospel, and “continuallypreached the gospel of violence.” In his sermons, this “self-styledayatollah” advised Muslims to join the armed forces “not particu-larly to serve the nation but to learn war tactics” in order to “takeover the country.” He openly sought to incite the people againstthe government and secularists [read: Christians]. Gumi also fol-lowed the Christian example by establishing a kind of Muslim RedCross in the country and began plans for separate Muslim hospi-tals and schools.

Though many Muslim scholars objected to his interpretationof the Qur’an, many elite “lay” members of the Muslim commu-nity sought guidance from Gumi. His organization caused muchdisturbance, has been involved in various riots and is responsible


for the loss of many lives and properties. The authorities, accord-ing to Yusuf, “have the full facts concerning Izala’s criminal activi-ties,” but have remained silent and taken no action against them ortheir leader. He was one of the “sacred cows” we heard about ear-lier that the government feared to touch. The violence whichattended his return from Saudi Arabia after receiving the KingFaisal Laureate award, confirmed Christians in their fears thatMuslim countries, “especially the OIC and their Nigerian collabo-rators,” wanted to Islamise Nigeria at all cost. The silence of thegovernment did not help alleviate this fear. Yusuf ’s judgement wasthat “the flagrant abuse of power by Gumi …does not permit neu-trality in government.”36

Ibrahim Yaro reproduced extracts from an article in the magazineThis Week entitled “The Upsurge of Islamic Fundamentalism.”37 Thearticle placed Gumi in the context of a Muslim resurgence inNigeria under the influence of Ayatollah Khomeini, whose cas-settes blared throughout northern city streets. This led to mount-ing tension that was allegedly further encouraged by Gumi. Hepreached militancy and did not accept “a religion that says: ‘Turnthe other cheek.’ His doctrine is an eye for an eye.” He used threeavenues to preach this doctrine: the Kaduna Central Mosque, hisfour-hectare residential compound and Radio Kaduna. The articlefurther stated that Gumi was leader of the “Izala sect, which has arigid and uncompromising attitude to the interpretation of theQur’an. The Izalas are said to draw inspiration from dying for thecause of Islam.” They have contempt for Muslims belonging toother sects, while they “abhor Christians.”

Gumi’s attitude to Christianity was not entirely flattering. Hedid not think that “it is a religion worth anything.” Drawing uponanother magazine, Yaro alleged that Gumi and other Muslim lead-ers “have made it very clear that they do not accept the rest of us.We do not belong.” Asked whether Muslims could be under apolitical party with Christian leadership, “Gumi, a


typical…Muslim, answered, ‘I don’t think we can accept aChristian to be our leader unless we are forced.’ ‘What if Christiansdo not accept Muslims as their leader?’ He replied, ‘Then we haveto divide the country.’”

Yaro commented,

This frontline Muslim gentleman has unequivocally pointedout that the mission of Islam in Nigeria and the world at largeis not to bring peace and promote social justice, ashe…thoughtfully said that, “The two-party system of govern-ment will not be south against north but Islam againstChristianity. Once you are a Muslim, you cannot accept anon-Muslim to be your leader.”

“Note,” suggested Yaro, “Gumi had rightly pointed out that it isalways ‘Islam against Christianity.’”38

Gumi dashed any hopes of a unified pluralistic Nigeria. Yaroasked what plan Islam had “for the progress and unity of thehuman race” and concluded that Islam “has nothing to offer” inthis area. When Gumi was asked what Islam could contribute toNigerian unity, he answered that it would require the conversion ofall to Islam. “Muslims could continue to suppress other religionsuntil they become [a] minority. It will be only then that Nigeriacan talk about unity and progress.”39

Yaro saw Gumi as “an outstanding enemy of Nigeria as anation. He has made many treasonable and insinuating statementscapable of plunging the entire nation into a blood war.” Yet, Gumi“is left to move and enjoy much more freedom than thoseNigerians who need freedom most—and that while the govern-ment insists that there are no sacred cows!” On the outside backcover of his monograph, Yaro features a number of Muslim quota-tions, one of them is attributed to Gumi and reads “Progress andunity of the human race means converting Christians and non-Muslims to Mohammedanism.”


It was not only Gumi’s statements that increased the tensionsbut his actions as well. He was among the foremost lobbyists tohave Nigeria join the OIC, an issue that has caused great unrestamong Christians. He is also credited with promoting militancyamong Muslim youths. The last two actions “contributed tounprecedented harvests of religious riots” in Kaduna (Kafanchanand Zangon-Kataf ) and in Bauchi. Christians are convinced thatGumi was out to turn Nigeria into a Muslim country “by all pos-sible means.” Large sections of the Muslim community saw him asthe fire that relit “the torch of Islam which has flickered under...colonialism, westernization and secularism.”40

Readers of Volume 2 in this series may recall that Gumi had ahand in marrying the daughter of Christopher Abashiya, one of our“fathers,” to a Muslim. This was not the only time he was involvedin such arrangements. Jabani Mambula, the late former general sec-retary of TEKAN, sent a Hausa-language circular to all TEKANmembers in which he informed them that the National ExecutiveCommittee of CAN had investigated how Gumi was collectingChristian girls under eighteen to marry them off to Muslims. “AllChristians of Kaduna”41 had staged a protest at the premises of theCommissioner of Police,42 but no explanation was provided them.

Indeed, Gumi was a powerful player, one who provokedChristians more than any other Muslim individual, except, perhaps,President Babangida. Even the leaders of the Islamic Movement didnot arouse their ire and concern as much as did Gumi.

� Closing Remarks ____________________________

As closure to this chapter, I include an anonymous articlefrom TC as Appendix 10. It reflects the tone of this chapter sowell. This appendix is appropriate also as a closing document forthis entire volume.43


� Notes _________________________________________

1 Towards the Right Path, pp. 57ff. 2 Of course, arguing the superiority of Christ over Muhammad,

though not provocative to Christians, would be very provocative to a hot-tempered group of young MSS students.

3 Ndukwe, Feb/2003. 4 O. Minchakpu, 19 Jan/2004. For additional information about this

“Taliban” development, see also REC News Exchange, Jan/2004; BBC, 5Jan/2004; N. Musa, Guardian, 6 Jan/2004, 7 Jan/2004; BBC, 7Jan/2004; Vanguard, 7 Jan/2004, 9 Jan/2004; A. Bego, Daily Trust, 13Jan/2004; A. Borzello, BBC, 14 Jan/2004; J. Lohor, TD, 15 Jan/2004; S.Awofadeji, TD, 20 Jan/2004; Onuorah, Guardian, 29 Jan/2004.

5 J. O’Connell, p. 196. 6 CAN, Kaduna Branch, 17 June/92. 7 NIPSS, p. 6. 8 Unidentified news report from London forwarded by a friend, 3

May/2002. Also L. Achi. 9 P. Clarke, p. 175. 10 J. O’Connell, p. 200, endnote 1. 11 C. O. Williams, p. 6. 12 It is generally agreed by many philosophers, especially those of the

Kuyperian stripe, that Western Christianity has absorbed elements of thePagan Greek world view. Western missionaries have inherited that char-acteristic and exported it as part of their gospel. A basic element of thestruggle between Christians and Muslims is precisely that mixed syn-cretism that keeps bedeviling the entire scenario. J. Boer, 1979, pp. 449-456; 1984, pp.132-137.

13 In the appropriate volume, I will, in fact, argue that a basic prob-lem in our conflict is precisely the element of pagan Greek world viewmixed in with the missionary presentation of Christianity in Nigeria thatis one of the factors bedeviling the entire scenario.

14 J. Boer. CC, 5 June/98. See Appendix 3 of forthcoming Volume 5for full text.


15 Y. B. Usman, 1987, pp. 11-12. 16 TEKAN Study Group, 1987. 17 J. Tsado, TC, 5/87, p. 9. 18 Wadumbiya, 1991.19 O. Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, p. 31. 20 O. Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, pp. 7-8. 21 O. Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, p. 9. 22 B. Jalingo, pp. 9, 33-34, 40-42. 23 “Arewa” is Hausa for “North.” It is an embattled term. For many

Muslims it means the entire former northern region, including theMiddle Belt with its many Christians. Many Middle Belt Christians,however, want to disassociate themselves from that North they regard asfeudal and oppressive, and insist on their own separate identity. By hav-ing aligned himself with this Forum, some feel that Yakubu Gowon, aChristian of Middle Belt origin, is betraying his own people.

24 B. Jalingo, pp. 44-46. Similar warnings about Gowon’s role in ACFhave been circulated by Remi Yesufu, Secretary of the Christian SocialMovement of Nigeria, in which Gowon is portrayed as a hardcoreNortherner and traitor to the Middle Belt. Having met the gentle Gowon anumber of times, I have difficulty seeing him in such a role, though withoutsuch an interpretation his alliance with ACF is also difficult to understand.

25 O. Minchakpu, “Manifesto?” CT, 3/95, p. 8. 26 NS, 20 Apr/94.27 D. Omotunde, 28 Oct/91. 28 Tell, 28 Oct/91.29 Unfortunately, the evidence is not produced.30 For details of this “debate” see Boer, 1979, pp. 478ff; 1984, pp.

142ff.31 O. Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, p. 9.32 NN, 25 Feb/2000, p. 2. 33 NN, 26 Feb/2000, p. 1. 34 I find it interesting that the secular issue here is included in the list

of religious challenges. Usually secular thinkers—and the writers of this

Notes for pp. 69-76 83

report definitely think secularly—do not place the secular under the ban-ner of religion. Given the spirit of the report as a whole, I judge this inclu-sion the result of carelessness rather than a signal of fresh thinking.

35 NIPSS, pp. 11-14. 36 Grissen, pp. 104-107. 37 6 Apr/87, p. 21. Quoted by Yaro, pp. 16-17. 38 I. Yaro, p. 19. Source: Quality, Oct/87, p. 35.39 I. Yaro, p. 24.40 TSM, 27 Sep/92. Kukah, pp. 216ff.41 Original Hausa: “Kiristan Kaduna Duka.”42 TEKAN, 1 June/89.43 Anonymous, TC, 1/90, pp. 13-15. Appendix 12.


Governments in Nigeria are omnipresent. Hence, bothChristians and Muslims consider them to be major forces as prob-lems as well as solutions. In 1987, CAN commented on the inabil-ity of governments to manage Nigeria’s religious volatility: “It iseither that Nigeria’s appreciation of the problem is still weak andfaulty, or that governmental actions on the problem are grosslyinadequate or insincere.” It added, “It is becoming increasinglyobvious that the government either actively or passively supportsthe Muslim jihad being inflicted on Nigeria.”1

The NIPSS report has alerted us that we are dealing with animportant and sensitive problem and that a lot of serious thinkingremains to be done. It presents a classic list of Christian complaintsregarding government actions, which it interprets as “surreptitiousattempts to implement” Muslim plans:

1. Refusal to grant certificate of occupancy to churches,or the revocation of some where already granted.

2. Refusal of autonomy to Christian schools.

THE PERCEIVED ROLE

OF GOVERNMENT

� F I V E

3. Blackout of Christian messages over the media.

4. Protection of deviant Muslim students in educationalinstitutions.

5. Condoning of the provocative use of loudspeakers inmosques and near church locations.

6. Denial of expatriate quotas to Christian institutions.

7. Use of government resources to subsidise annual holypilgrimages to Mecca, and the token attention givento Christian pilgrimages.

8. Granting foreign exchange concessions to Muslims ina situation when even businessmen are denied foreignexchange to travel on business.

9. The importation of 50,000 rams for Muslims duringthe Eid-El-Kabir festival.2

There is little to suggest at the moment that this situation hasimproved since. The complaints and explanations of today differlittle from those of the earlier years of our period. And so NIPSS’warning to governments still stands: “It will not do any good topretend that the religious problem does not exist in Nigeria and itwill amount to both intellectual dishonesty and political irrespon-sibility not to confront the problem frankly and realistically.”3

The main purpose of this chapter is to review how NigerianChristians regard their governments, federal as well as state.

� Government Imposition of Muslim Authorities

A major colonial policy with long-term repercussions was thepractice of subjecting previously independent nations to the rule ofMuslim emirs. These nations, most of them in Nigeria’s Middle Belt,adhered to the Traditional Religion. The majority of the citizens of


many of them later became Christian. That was the situation thatobtained in much of Southern Zaria as well as in Tafawa Balewa,Bauchi State. This colonial policy became a major cause of someriots, if not the major cause. Yusufu Turaki devoted a large part of hisdoctoral dissertation to the subject as it affected Southern Zaria. Inmy dissertation, I give the matter attention in so far as it affected theSudan United Mission. It was a source of grave missionary concern,for it sometimes would lead to a process of Islamisation.

It happened in Bukuru, a mining town just south of Jos. In theearly years of the 20th century, when Jos hardly existed and was partof the Bukuru administrative area, the area was placed under theEmir of Bauchi and assigned a Muslim judge. A Hausa marketsprang up, followed by Hausa teachers. Soon the Muslim call toprayer was heard. Though the area was later released from Zariacontrol, the Jos riot at the end of the century was partially due tothe claims of the Jasawa to the chieftaincy of Jos based on that ear-lier Bauchi regime. Captain Ruxton was one of very few earlyBritish colonial officers who were sympathetic to Christian mis-sions.4 He affirmed—and complained—that the governmentwanted to put the adherents of Traditional Religion everywhereunder Muslim emirs. He tried to resist it.5

Though the first people to object to the above policies weremissionaries,6 during the period of this study, the Nigerian victimsthemselves began to demand the dismantling of such emirates.They became increasingly aware of this arrangement and resentful.Chiwo Avre, probably an indigene of Southern Zaria, described thesituation of the Bajju nation as typical of the other nationalities inthe area. It is a “sad story of contempt and oppression,” he wrote.The Hausa corrupted most of these peoples’ original native namesand called them by derisive names, full of contempt.

Christians were denied the freedom to choose and appointtheir leaders.

The Perceived Role of Government 87

They were denied freedom to manage their own affairs withoutinterference. They were viewed as second-class citizens who hadno equal rights with the people of Zaria [Muslims] to selecttheir district heads, let alone participate in the management ofsocial and economic affairs of their areas. They were turned intoa people whose cultures and customs were so supremely sup-pressed that nothing about their cultural heritage could beheard on the state radio or television. In short, they were forciblymade a people without cultural independence, self-determina-tion and were completely without any hope of self-actualisation,owing to slanted political and administrative arrangements putin place by the Emirate system to perpetually hold them subjects.

However, the situation was not hopeless, for “there was noholding the people down for eternity.” Everything in life is “transi-tory”—and that includes the “powers of the Emirate Council.” Thewedge was provided by the various Kaduna riots and a youngMuslim military governor who recognised the sign of the times.7

But that part of the story is for the next chapter.

� Partiality ___________________________________

A major problem Christians have with the federal governmentand various state governments is their partiality towards Islam.According to Ishaya Audu, “The question of religion in Nigeria”can be solved only “if the government... decides to be totally neu-tral.” The “government should only be interested in religion inprotecting the right of the individual to practise whatever religionhe wants freely.... But as to the issue of promoting one religionover another, government should be very careful and keep out ofthat. They must in all circumstances show that strict neutrality.”“Heads of government must show this absolute impartiality.” Thiswould mean, among other things, that government should stopsupporting religious pilgrimages, whether Christian or Muslim.


Audu presented himself as an example. When he was ViceChancellor of ABU, Christians sometimes expected him to“show them some partiality.” He resisted that temptation veryforcefully, saying,

I believed it was in the best interest of peace of the whole com-munity that I be absolutely impartial and that everybody seesthat I am impartial. And I am happy to say that I think it’strue that that had a lot to do with the relative peace at ABUduring my time. If government can really heed this kind ofrole, then one could hope that the problem that religion cancreate... would be curtailed. I don’t believe that Muslims orChristians operating single-handedly without the assurancethat they may get the backing or connivance of governmentwill really go and attack the other.8

What the professor seems to say between the lines is that thegovernment is not neutral and that heads of departments have notbeen impartial. Governments have, in fact, promoted one religionat the expense of another, that is, Islam at the expense ofChristianity. He also suggested that riots are caused by secret gov-ernment assurances of support. These are powerful accusationseven when couched in the soft language of “the Prof.”

Audu can drop his normal shield of understatement occasion-ally. The Muslim push for theocracy, he insisted, will destroy thenation and must therefore be stopped. The danger of this approachis clear from nations such as Iran, Iraq, Algeria and Egypt. He isoften surprised to see how “responsible Muslim leaders” advocatethis approach, for it is the most effective way of destroying thenation. Over against theocracy, Audu advocated the give-unto-Ceasar approach—“no union between any religion and govern-ment. The two should go their separate ways.”9

I emphasise once again that these are not the words of a suspi-cious fundamentalist church leader and outsider as far as govern-


ment goes. These are the statements of one who has seen first handwhat is cooking at the highest levels and who was raised in aMuslim environment. His words thus carry special weight, alsobecause of his high moral stature.

Abashiya similarly took issue with the government at thisfront. For the country to survive in the face of its various religions,the government should act as the “father of all citizens.” In otherwords, the government must be neutral with respect to religion.Along with Audu, he emphasised that the government must be seento be impartial and not lean one way or another. For Abashiya thatalso implies it should basically take its hands off religion and getout of the pilgrimage business. The government’s involvement inreligious pilgrimage was a “great blunder.” It should provide onlyskeletal pilgrimage services such as issuing visas. He expressed hisappreciation for the call of a “prominent Muslim in Kano” whosimilarly demanded a hands-off policy for the pilgrimage. Thesame would hold true for joining “any organization based on reli-gion,” a thinly veiled reference to the OIC issue.10

And then there is engineer S.L.S. Salifu, who has for yearsserved as a courageous spokesman for CAN.11 In his opinion, gov-ernments in Nigeria have not faced the problem of multiple reli-gions properly. The government is to serve as referee between them.“You blow the whistle when somebody commits a foul. Finish. So,if the government does not lean towards any particular religion, wewill not have all these religious problems.” For Salifu, as for mostof the other Christian voices and, it should be noted clearly, instark distinction from the Muslim call for neutrality or impartial-ity, such a stance would mean that the government

should wash its hands neatly from anything religious. All thepilgrimages, building of mosques, churches, schools, etc.,should be left to Christians and Muslims. If the government isto build a school, it must be a neutral school and it must have


its own neutral character. Also the situation in which govern-ment takes over a Christian mission school and renames it byan Islamic identity is wrong. In Kaduna State some people aretalking about wearing some identities to school to show theirreligion. This does not make sense. So the government shouldsteer clear of religion. No government that has steered the pathof religion in the world has succeeded.12

As always, Ibrahim Yaro put it very bluntly. Everyone “inNigeria knows the type of government operative in this nation hasa very big bias in favour of Islam and thus tends to make itself gov-ernment of the Muslims, by the Muslims and for the Muslims.”“Today in Nigeria, Islam is subtly being groomed as a state religionand is being maintained and propagated by the state from thefunds belonging to all. The recent OIC event is still green in ourmemory and is not yet put to rest.” Quoting from a poorly identi-fied source, Yaro continued, “One could here rightly ask: Is the taskof the Nigerian government the advancement of Islamic religion orthe interest of the nation? Judging from events, one might rightlyconclude in favour of the former.”13

Yaro singled out the situation in Abuja, the Federal CapitalTerritory, by listing eleven examples of pro-Muslim and/or anti-Christian situations as follows:

1. Uncomfortable situation of Christians in governmentoffices, general harassment and insecurity because oftheir religion;

2. Refusal to grant Certificate of Occupancy to Christianchurches;

3. Granting of Certification of Occupancy to an individ-ual Muslim to build a mosque rather than a corporatebody as required by law;


4. Refusal to approve primary school proprietorship forChristians but easily granted to Islamic bodies;

5. Ejection of Christian worshippers from classrooms whenschools are not in session and yet even governmentoffices are used for Islamic worship during official hours;

6. Arbitrary demolition of batches [of churches?] wheresome Christians gather to worship;

7. Plans are on to establish Islamic radio stations which isagainst the law that prohibits private radio stations.Land already acquired covers about thirty-nine hectares.Churches already occupying a portion of the area andvicinity were driven out and are to be resettled.

8. National Mosque land area covers about eleven hectaresas against CAN’s 6.25 hectares.

9. Government schools are headed mostly by Muslimseven when a Christian is better qualified.

10. A [federal government] minister is said to have braggedthat he could do at Abuja what he did to Christians inKano.

11. Recent interviews…to fill up vacancies of the Directorsin various departments were done by a panel of Muslimofficials.14

As the struggle about (im)partiality moved into the era ofsharia revival at the turn of the millennium, at one of the manyconferences organised at the time, Professor Nwabuezer interpretedthe constitution as guaranteeing the equality of all religions beforethe government. Government must not only refuse to adopt a par-ticular religion, but it “must also treat all religions equally, showingno favouritism or preference of any kind for one by way of special


promotion of, or protection for its institutions, doctrines and obser-vances or any kind of state sponsorship.” He further explained that“favouritism or preference exists if a state action is intended to ordoes in its practical effect, advance, foster, encourage or inhibit anyreligion.” Such unwanted situations do not always have to repre-sent force, such as the teaching of any religion in public schools.He then referred to the American Supreme Court that “preventsthe state from being involved in any religious matters such as pro-viding aid, even if all religions are treated equally.”15

Quoting from a court document, the professor approved thenotion that “complete separation is best for the state and best forreligion.”16

These leaders of Christian thought, throughout the periodcovered by this study, identify government impartiality at least par-tially with government withdrawal from the world of religion. If itis to be impartial, it is argued, then government must leave therealm of religion to its adherents and not be involved except in rou-tine matters such as supplying passports and visas as well as ensur-ing justice in the relations between faiths. Religion is personal andprivate and hence has no place in government. These issues willcome up for assessment in a later volume.

A basic Christian complaint is that when a government doesget involved in religious affairs, it loses its impartiality and almostinvariably comes down on the side of Islam. It is claimed that thegovernment does so at several blatantly Muslim fronts such as theOIC and pilgrimage.

� Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)17

The OIC issue became an emotional matter of national pro-portions in January 1986, when a French newspaper reported thatNigeria had joined the organization. The issue has already beenintroduced in Volume 2, so that there is no need for further details.


The government caught Nigeria by surprise. It did not take longfor the matter to bring the nation to a boil.

This government decision to join the OIC was and remainsshrouded in mystery till this time of writing in 2003. PresidentBabangida claimed it had been discussed by military leaders, some-thing the Chief of Staff denied.18 Even the editor of the NewNigerian agreed that the government handled the matter in aclumsy style. “The federal government has yet to confirm or denythe story of our admission. It would appear as if discussions werenot held on a matter as sensitive as this and that is worrying.” If itis true that Nigeria is a member, “the government should not fightshy of saying so.”19

Though this membership created a highly emotional climateof anger and acrimony, a year later the government had done noth-ing to clear up the uncertainty. A TC correspondent tells the storyof the game and the uncertainties it created. There was a questionas to whether Nigeria was present at an OIC summit in Kuwait in1987. The magazine West Africa reported that it was, but our TCcorrespondent learned “from other highly reliable sources” thatNigeria was not represented there. Muslims scurried about toensure representation, but they did not succeed. Apparently, thegovernment hoped to attend in the future but only as an observerin order “to appease both Christians and Muslims.” The corre-spondent commented that “the apparent indecision of governmentand the continued secrecy in which the issue is shrouded, hasremained a source of concern to Christians.”

I remember vividly the surprise and the anger of Christianswhen government involvement with the OIC became publicknowledge. Joseph Obemeata, a columnist in Independence, theweekly of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Ibadan, stronglywarned that this move would be firmly resisted by Christians, forthey understand this as a step towards having Nigeria recognisedas a Muslim country.20


The move was, as Falola put it, “a costly miscalculation.” Heasserted that Nigeria’s joining the OIC secretly “polarised thecountry more than had any other issue in Nigeria’s history.”21

According to a TC correspondent, the issue was “burning on thelips of many Nigerians.”22

A national crisis arose overnight, and leaders of the two religionsreacted predictably. Christians demanded the immediate withdrawal;most Muslims were thrilled and demanded continued membership.Falola’s history of the controversy is well worth reading.23

“Christians immediately mobilised…. Their… objections werewidely publicised in the newspapers and were the subject of ser-mons and church publications…. Churches issued statements andcalled for special prayers, rallies and fasts….”24

The major Christian concerns were the alleged Islamizing pro-gramme of the government, the nature of the OIC itself and thesecularism issue.

To C. O. Williams the issue proved that the governmentintended Islamizing the country. It proceeded “despite the advice ofan overwhelming majority—including some top Muslim leaders.”The issue “completely polarised the country,” he wrote a decadelater. One of the “more terrible” consequences was “the confidentfeeling of the fanatical or fundamentalist group of Muslims that themembership has automatically turned Nigeria into a totally Muslimcountry,” where Christians “have no right to exist.” Membershipwould give the government the right to declare other religions “null,void and of no effect.” It would make it easy for a “Muslim despot”to “blatantly declare Nigeria a Muslim country and attempt to con-vert all places for Christian worship to mosques.”

This government move led on the one hand to “more ruth-less activities” on the part of “fanatical Muslims” during 1986and 1987, including the destruction of church buildings. On theother hand, it led to much greater unity of purpose and, thus,strength among Christians. When the government established a


committee to look into the implications of OIC membership,Babangida assured the nation that his government “[had] noplans of any kind to promote, canvass or impose any religion onthis country.” To do so would have been unconstitutional andhave invited chaos. Williams expressed positive appreciation forthat promise.

The northern branch of CAN discussed the matter during apress conference a couple of years later. The relevant part reads:

We have times without number cautioned on the deliberatebut precarious silence of the Babangida Administration overthe surreptitious involvement and continued membership ofour beloved country in the OIC. The Administration in pre-scribing silence as a solution to an obvious problem can onlysucceed in self-deception.

CAN indicated it was not oblivious of the recent meeting of theOIC in Abuja under a deceptive and pretentious designation of“Islam in Africa Conference” (IAC).25 It stated that “by the recentAbuja conference of the OIC, it has completely dawned on us thatNigeria is not only a member of the OIC but its permanent head-quarters.” It went on to say,

The Usman Dan Fodio jihad flag was moved from Sokototo Abuja during the conference. We have noted the move-ment of the flag along with all that it stands for. TheAdministration is in the last phase of its sponsored forcefulIslamisation of our country. We are carefully watching thesituation. We have come to the conclusion that the assur-ances of the Administration that no religion will beimposed on this country is at best a deceit on Christians.This Administration’s overt and covert patronage andbiased posture towards the advancement of Islam to thedetriment of other religions is clear enough for allChristians to see.26


Our mysterious “J. O.,” promoted to archbishop in 2002, pointedto Nigeria’s joining the OIC as the flash point when

the seed of religious discord was formally sown. This markedthe beginning of a new dimension to religious strife inNigeria. Since then, we have experienced the repeated well-planned large-scale destruction of Christians and their prop-erties. Muslim countries like Iran and Libya seized the oppor-tunity and intensified their campaigns in Nigeria. IncitingIslamic pamphlets and photographs streamed into the country.One particular letter was sent to Muslims in northernNigeria, promising handsome financial rewards for anyMuslim sect or organization that would ensure a quick vio-lent Islamisation of Nigeria. The targets were to be theChristians, their properties and their churches.27

Christians were prepared to believe the very worst. If it had todo with the OIC, nothing was deemed improbable and the mostfantastic alleged Muslim schemes were considered almost certain tobe true. Secret correspondence and documents were circulated thatallegedly came from the highest Muslim echelons and that, if gen-uine, would have been enough to cause international upheavals,especially in the financial world. They certainly would not havebeen designed for public consumption. I include two of them asAppendix 5A and 5B28 to show how some (unknown?) partiessought to raise the level of tension and suspicion in the country.The atmosphere was most fertile for such attempts. OneTownsend, supposedly based in Switzerland, was to have sent sev-eral documents alleged to have been produced by Muslims.Appendix 5B speaks of transfers into the private accounts ofBabangida, Abacha, Alhaji and Lukman of unbelievable amountsof dollars totalling almost $124 billion! In addition, over $24 bil-lion was allegedly transferred into OIC accounts. When somechurch leaders whisper in conspiratory tones that they have docu-


mentary “proof” of Muslim intrigue, these seem to be among thetype of documents to which they refer.

An additional reason for this strong Christian reaction was thatthis is an organization dedicated to the defence of Islamic interests.Indeed, in the preamble to the OIC’s charter, one finds the follow-ing statement of purpose, namely “to preserve Islamic spiritual,ethical, social and economic values… and to consolidate the bondsof… brotherly and spiritual friendship among their people.” Inother words, among its purposes is the promotion of Islamic soli-darity. Membership in such an organization would compromise theChristians and could force them into wars against fellow Christiansin countries such as Sudan. Nigerian funds would be used to pro-mote Islam. Membership would increase the religious polarizationof the country. The move was also seen as a threat to the secularnature of the Nigerian government and thus a “subversion of fun-damental freedoms.” Catholic leaders called on their members toboycott the National Concord, a national daily, because of its sup-port for OIC membership.29 Muslim arguments, reproduced inVolume 2, against its largely religious character are hardly convinc-ing in the light of the OIC’s charter. The editor of NN was morehonest in his acknowledgement that “obviously the OIC has itsroots in a particular religion.”30

When the sharia issue heated up again at the close of themillennium, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lagos, AnthonyO. Okogie, former National President of CAN, reminded thepeople that the sharia “is one of the demands in the constitutionof OIC for membership.” In fact, “the OIC constitutiondemands among other things that the Muslims must be incharge of education and petroleum. All the good, good things.Even finance of the nation. It is all there in the OIC demands.You will remember that I was one of those who shouted againstOIC and then Sharia.”31 He was saying, in other words, that theOIC agenda had not yet died. Muslims were still working on


more fully qualifying Nigeria. One can reasonably suspect thatthe reason they withdrew was only a matter of strategy. Nigeriadid not meet some major conditions but is working towardsthem, with sharia being one point on that agenda.

Various Christian conferences were held that all insisted onwithdrawal on basis of their prevailing secular perspective. J.A.Adegbite, at the time National Chairman of CAN, talked of “ourrelentless unequivocal and categorical opposition to the OIC.” Hepointed out that Nigerian Christians belong to various interna-tional organisations as well, such as the World Council of Churchesand the All Africa Conference of Churches, but they had notdragged the Nigerian nation into them, not even as observer.Similarly, Nigerian Muslims are free to join OIC but without theinvolvement of the nation. It is a private affair. Christians havesuch a strong sense of the privacy of their religion that theChristian Minister of External Affairs at the time, Bolaje Akinyemi,refused to answer any questions about the future of the issue or thathis religion may have played a role in taking some of the sting outof the issue. “My religion,” he commented, “is private to me and isnot a matter of public policy.”32

That other secular theme, the separation of the functions of stateand religion, was the main reason Minchakpu gave for demandingNigeria’s withdrawal from the OIC. This position was “diametricallyopposed to the Muslim position that underlies their support forretaining membership, namely the rejection of such a separation….This is where the problem comes in,” he asserted. The Muslim insis-tence on this principle and their refusal to give in at this point waswhat caused Nigeria’s problems. Minchakpu continued,

I want to state without ambiguity that, as a result of the con-flicting position of the Muslims as against those of the otherNigerians, today we are witnessing glaring evidence of manip-ulation of religion and its attendant…destruction of lives andproperty. That is the truth of the matter.


If Nigerians want unity and peace, they must be willing to addressand solve these issues. “We must be prepared to shed off our reli-gious prejudices.”33

Another related issue was that membership was seen as con-trary to the secularism that informed the constitution. A threat tothat secularism endangers the very existence of the country. Underthe title “A Threat to Our Survival,” Professor Aluko wrote thatjoining the OIC went contrary to the secular nature of the countrythat was supposed to keep Nigeria from dissolution through a reli-gious war.34 Peter Y. Jatau, Roman Catholic Archbishop ofKaduna, warned that “if it will alter the secular status of the coun-try, then I am against it.”35 In a similar vein, one Simpson Ajidarkly warned that joining the OIC “is bound to provoke a reli-gious disaffection among a cross-section of the Nigerian citizenry,”for it runs counter to Nigeria’s secular status as well as to “aspectsof our fundamental freedoms.”36

Tanko Yusuf published a statement on the subject of OIC inKaduna in which he covered all the problems. He “described Nigeria’salleged membership…as unconstitutional and undiplomatic” andexplained that it would be “morally fatal for a secular country likeNigeria to be a member...just because the country was going througheconomic crisis.” He added that we could not afford to be involved in“religious counter trade.” The alleged move must be condemned byall peace-loving citizens of the country, he said, pointing out that sucha move would not only be costly but disastrous. “The peculiar realityof our nation must be clearly understood by influential Nigerians whoseem to forget the multi-ethnic nature of our society.” The OIC couldnot be non-religious as was being claimed, he said, adding that noth-ing pertaining to Islam could be separated from religion. Nobodyobjected to Muslims attending the OIC meeting as observers, but notas representatives of the Nigerian government.

The impression was being created that some Nigerians wantedto change the status of the country during the military regime, a


move which Yusuf said failed during the civilian rule. He called onthe present military administration to come out openly and assurethe nation that they were not in power to change the secular statusof Nigeria but to correct the misdeeds of the former politicians.37

The United Christian Association of Oyo State, an affiliate ofCAN, produced a lengthy document to warn Christians about thesinister plans involving OIC membership. See Appendix 6 for fur-ther commentary.

The issue may temporarily fade away, but it refuses to die. Asthe beginning of the saga was shrouded in mystery and uncertaintyas to who had done what, so was its continuation. Did Nigeriawithdraw? Half a decade since the issue reared its head, Punch con-sidered it significant news that the Secretary General of theNigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, Lateef Adegbite,confirmed Nigeria’s full membership.38 An REC News Exchangeitem reported that Nigeria had withdrawn.39 But in 1995, C. O.Williams complained that the government had still not withdrawn!James Kantiok reports that at one point the government agreed totake that step, but this “was just on paper to pacify the Christians.”The government of Sani Abacha announced in April 1998 thatNigeria was a full member.40 No wonder that as late as 1999 theChairman of CAN in Oyo State was demanding that Nigeria’smembership be “revisited.”41 In March 2003, the time of writingthis paragraph, the matter is still simmering. It has never reallybeen resolved clearly and finally.

� Government Appointments

and Disappointments _________________________

Muslims are not the only ones to complain that Nigerian gov-ernment appointments are partial. While Muslims complain thatthe balance is often heavily in favour of Christians, Christiansargue the opposite. Tanko Yusuf claimed that Christian graduates


roam about aimlessly “mainly because Muslims have been handedthe jobs that…exist.”42

His English may have left something to be desired, butIbrahim Yaro’s point was clear. He wrote about the “privileges”Muslims enjoy “in terms of appointments to executive posts inalmost all the ten northern states.” This trend included “federalappointments from northern states.” Christians, on the otherhand, are bypassed when it comes to appointments.43 It is not onlythat Muslims hold more posts, but they “are in control of thoseposts which make up the backbone of any government.”44

There are several variations of the discrimination theme.People with current appointments can be sacked if they areMuslims who convert to Christ. Binta Jalingo, for example, losther job with the government-owned television station for thatreason.45 Some Christian students applying to certain schools,especially in Kaduna, adopt Muslim names in order to improvetheir chances. Still another variation was people changing religionfrom Christianity to Islam for the very purpose of obtaining anappointment or promotion. CAN reported that Ahmadu Bello,the famous Sardauna of Sokoto, used to try to convert traditionalrulers by making them various promises and then announce tothe world that the people of this chieftaincy had all moved overto Islam. One chief was promised a governorship. He became aMuslim but never was appointed to the promised position.“Trading religion for political position is not new in northernNigeria,”46 commented CAN. In fact, it became a major thrustfor the Sardauna during the honeymoon of Nigeria’s indepen-dence. The Sardauna’s mission has received extensive coverage inVolume 2 and so I restrict myself here only to what Christianshave said about it.

Dean Gilliland correctly commented that the first six years ofNigeria’s independence were marked by “a political situation thatwas so integrated with Islam that a separation would be impossi-


ble.” Politics, government and da’wah or mission were one for theSardauna.47 It was natural for him.

It is no wonder then that Wilson Sabiya frequently railedagainst this allegedly established Muslim tradition. He singled outthree Muslim practices that, in effect, declared northern statesMuslim. First, Muslims were appointed to “executive posts inalmost all the ten northern states, including federal appointmentsfrom the northern states compared to the Christians who are by-passed in terms of appointments.” Secondly, government providedMuslims with “amenities to enable them to fulfill their religiousobligations”—in other words, subsidised pilgrimage. Thirdly, thegovernments confiscated “Christian institutions established toserve everybody regardless of their religious beliefs,” that is, schoolsand hospitals. These, Sabiya concluded, meant that “Christianity iscompletely regarded a persona non grata religion in the northernstates.” As to appointments, he complained that in his day “onlyMuslims were appointed as military governors” of the ten northernstates. Subsequently almost all “executive appointments”—and helists them—went to Muslims as well.48

In his capacity as Chairman of CAN, Gongola State Branch,Sabiya and his secretary, Kenneth Eze, wrote a letter to Babangidacomplaining about the same trends in the police force. “After acareful study of the recruitment and appointment in the PoliceForce,” they wrote, “we discovered that there is a gradual and con-centrated effort to convert the country into an Islamic State.” Thiswas happening in order to prepare the police “to convert the tran-sition programme to a transition into [an] Islamic State.” Christianswere prevented from improving themselves, while Muslims werechosen to take courses for training for Assistant Superintendents ofPolice. Out of the twenty-five recruited for these courses in threenorthern states, only one was Christian! This clearly indicated therewas a plan to Islamise the force. Similar tendencies were foundthroughout the North. Out of fourteen state police forces, only


two were headed by Christians. These Muslim police chiefs “sys-tematically deny Christians promotions, refuse them their rightsand victimise them….” Their official complaints went unheeded.“We are fed up and cannot continue to fold our hands and see thenation perishing.”49

Wilson Sabiya never tired of challenging the president. In 1990,he wrote another letter, co-signed by Ayuba Ndule, the AssistantSecretary of CAN, Gongola Branch. He reminded the president ofhow the people had first welcomed him as the country’s saviour, butthat he soon began to show signs of partiality and dictatorship. Acabinet reshuffle, according to Sabiya, made it “clear that yourmoves were to turn the country into an Islamic State. It is clear thatyou are against the secular state.” Then he listed fifteen importantgovernment positions that were all occupied by Muslims, a methodthat has almost become a tradition in Christian protest literature. Itis not clear which of these were new appointments. But it was clearto Wilson Sabiya that Babangida was turning into a dictator andthat he had “completed the machinery to meet membership of OICas an Islamic state. We have therefore seen that Christians have noplace in the scheme of things. We are left with no alternative but toregister our protest. No Islamisation for Nigeria! We cannot bemade aliens in the land of our birth.”50

It is interesting that a few months later the Action Committeeof TEKAN considered the same lopsided police situation. Sabiyawas chairman of that committee as well, but absent from this par-ticular meeting. The committee asked “whether that action was adesign or an accident.” It concluded, “Most likely, it was the granddesign of the Muslims for a future strategy in the northern states.”This committee also thought to recognise a similar process at workin recent postings of military state governors in the North.51

This concern about one-sided promotions and appointmentshas long been on the Christian agenda. The TEKAN Study Groupsubmission of 1987 complained that


appointments and promotions seem to have religious under-tones. Through discriminatory appointments and promotionsthe impression is created that we are an Islamic state and thatthe land belongs to Muslims. For example, the army has thrownout the seniority principle to bring about religious bias amongits leadership. Senior officers who are Christians have eitherbeen retired or made to serve…under their juniors…becausethey [the juniors] are Muslims.

This was then followed by the familiar list of high positions thatwere allegedly occupied by Muslims.

CAN, Northern States and Abuja branch, also drew attention topolice issues, this time to transfers of officers to their states of origin.“We suspect,” CAN stated, “that the transfer was motivated by twoprominent emirs in the North with very clear political and religiousmotives.” The purpose was said to be “to give room for Christianofficers to be quietly retired, make room for the rigging of electionsand to enable Muslims to finalise their preparation for a jihad.” CANalso claimed to be “aware of the mass importation of mercenaries ofother nations into Nigeria with the ultimate motive of waging ajihad. We wish the jihadists luck!” Then CAN threatened that itsenemies might be surprised about “the extent of our readiness to pro-tect our rights and those of our children with our blood.”52

Kaduna CAN’s letter to Babangida devoted much space to thesame issue. The letter referred to a “gradual but constant phasingout of Christians.” Admiral Ukiwe was replaced “single-handedly”by the president for no other offence than that he ventured toreveal that the OIC was never discussed at administration meet-ings. Professor David West was “unceremoniously removed fromthe petroleum ministry” because he dared to speak about “theArab/Islamic monopoly of OPEC and also in compliance with thedictates of Nigeria’s membership of the OIC.” He was replaced byLukman, a man who was to become Chairman of OPEC.Professor Bolaji Akinyemi “was removed from the External Affairs


Ministry for refusing to be messed up in defending the member-ship in OIC and for meeting with the Israeli foreign minister,”even though the president himself later met with the Israeli headof state. Though internationally recognised for his competence,Joel Garba was removed as Nigeria’s representative at the UnitedNations. These were only a few of the examples that could becited. Then CAN presented a list of twenty-nine highly placedappointees by name, position and religion, a list that featured amere three Christians.

CAN commented, “Mr. President, your recent restructuring ofyour administration seems to be the last phase of the carefullyimplemented design for the ultimate promulgation of Nigeria as anIslamic state.” The letter highlighted two concerns of CAN. One,the president had “preserved for the Muslims and the establishmentpolitical, economic and military power and domination. Youravowed but deceptive claim is to clean the stable, reject the statusquo and establish a new political order. We now know better whatthe new…order is all about.”

Secondly, the president had “a clear mission of Islamising thiscountry and that this is of priority before the middle of this year.”The political part of the document ended with these words:

We seriously suspect that the only reason for restructuring thearmed forces, which is predominantly Christian populationbut…Muslim in leadership and command, is to graduallyphase out Christians from the armed forces and use the controlso secured for the declaration of Nigeria as an Islamic state.

The signatories included not only three bishops, but also TankoYusuf.

The National Executive Committee of CAN addressed thesame problem in a communiqué around the same time as theKaduna CAN letter to Babangida. It accused the government ofnot living up to the constitution by favouring Muslims. This time


it counted thirty-nine “top functionaries recently announced” ofwhich twenty-six (two-thirds) were Muslims, while a total oftwenty-eight—two Christians and twenty-six Muslims—hailedfrom the North. This was a strong imbalance clearly favouringIslam over against Christianity and the north over against thesouth. CAN noted that “the powerful ministries” went to Muslims,“while emasculated ministries are assigned to Christians.” It alsoobserved that “all service chiefs are Muslims.” While CAN encour-aged Christians to take peaceful action, it also stated, “we expectthe government to take appropriate steps to redress the imbalance…at the earliest possible date.”53

� Discrimination in Amenities _______________

Another major complaint of Christians is that the various gov-ernments provide more amenities, licences or permits for Muslimsthan they do for Christians. They spend public funds for the ben-efit of Muslims on a grand scale while Christians go begging. Thisissue covers a wide range of concerns. It is, according to Christians,a blatant case of government partiality.

1. CHURCH BUILDINGS AND MOSQUES

The issue of church buildings provoked much heat over theyears and continues to do so even into the new century. Amongthe more prominent problems are getting land and building per-mits, government-sponsored vandalism, proximity to mosques,mosques built at government expense on public properties, andChristian insistence on church buildings where government hasconstructed mosques.

Minchakpu alleged that

most state governments in northern Nigeria do not allow theacquisition of land for the building of churches. You can neverbe allowed to get a certificate-of-occupancy for a parcel of land


for the building of a church. And this is because most of thesegovernments are controlled by Muslims.

These governments “use public funds belonging to all the adher-ents of all religions in the country in favour of Islam to the detri-ment of Christianity and others.”54

The NIPSS list of classic Christian complaints about govern-ment anti-Christian actions provides some examples of the denial ofpermission to build churches. These examples are also reported inthe 1982 Memo of CAN to the Kano State Government, a statethat generates more Christian complaints than any other. The Kanogovernment took eight years to give approval for rebuilding St.George’s Church! This, of course, led to the 1982 rampage. CANcomplained that even though Christians were the majority in Kano’ssabon gari, there were many more mosques and Muslim prayinggrounds than churches—sixty-three versus thirty-five, to be exact.

The CAN Memo also reported that three church buildingswere pulled down by Kano authorities, while one had to delaycompletion since the case went to court. The Memo reported thateight churches were burnt during the rampage of 1982, along witha Christian bookshop and “other Christian properties.”55

Kano State has produced many tales. Christians in the LGAof Sumaila requested permission to build. They were told to pro-duce 300 signatures of people in the area who were in favour ofsuch a building. The letter was to be routed through the local vil-lage head.56 The Kano State Ministry of Land and Surveyinstructed the Roman Catholic Church “to stop further develop-ments” on their Kundila Housing Estate building project, eventhough they had received permission earlier. The stated reasonwas “a protest by the local people residing around the area.” Thechurch was consoled with the promise that “you will be commu-nicated with further on the issue in due course.”57 The next year,the church received notice that permission had been withdrawn


altogether, for the Ministry had received “several petitions andletters of protests.” “The situation has now reached an alarmingposition that the Commissioner…has no alternative than torevoke the Right of Occupancy for the interest of peace and fairplay.” However, as before, the Ministry posed as the personifica-tion of encouragement: “You are advised to select any suitable sitewithin or near any predominantly Christian community and sub-mit for our immediate consideration, please.”58 No further com-ment needed! The people, it must be understood, are over-whelmingly Muslim.

The NIPSS report continued,

The Christians regard such demands as delaying tactics. Theysay that even when they submit such signatures, their authen-ticity is usually questioned by the authorities, who sometimesput up other conditions such as the demand that the signato-ries should be indigenes of Kano State.

The members of these churches are mostly Southern immigrantsoften without a single indigene amongst them! So it will never hap-pen. Even the noblest features of grassroots democracy can be dis-torted into oppressive instruments.

The Kano shenanigans against Christian churches have no end.Christians accuse authorities of limiting “their constitutional free-dom of worship by attempting to decide how many churches theyought to have.” For example, the request for a church in Wudil wasturned down because “the one in Garko is sufficient to serve yourpurposes.” Garko is thirty to thirty-five kilometres away!59

Then there is the practice of Muslims building a mosque nextto a church. They will mount loudspeakers on them and leavethem blaring during church services.

At the end of the millennium these Muslim shenanigans inKano were still going on. Minchakpu tells us that in 1999 the Kanogovernment had marked 150 churches for demolition. The govern-


ment had written a letter to the churches that charged “the premiseis being used as an illegal place of worship, because the authoritiesnever granted permission for such use.” Muslims in Kano were say-ing “that the spread of the churches is obviously unregulated andeven unwelcome.” Efforts to have the decision rescinded were notsuccessful at the time the report was published.60

Muslims also attempted occasionally to destroy existing churches.Reports from the news service Compass Direct that most likely orig-inate from Minchakpu and which I will treat as such, tell of variousMuslim attempts to get rid of existing churches. The Muslim Emir ofIlorin, Alhaji Ibrahim Sulu Gambari, allegedly called on the govern-ment to “relocate all Christian churches out of Ilorin and to ban thesale of land for buildings to all Christians”! No explanations weregiven for the call, but it heightened tensions in the city. Pastor SundayOmabamu referred to it as “an irresponsible act” that goes against theconstitution, a favourite Christian refrain.61 A similar story is told ofAbuja, but for this you have to turn to a later paragraph.

A bizarre incident took place in Zaria; only a few weeks priorto the Kafanchan ruckus, the Zaria local government was prepar-ing to build a mosque on the grounds of the Anglican St. Michel’sChurch! Not only did this involve the government in building aplace of worship, but it also was a blatant attempt to take over aChristian compound for Muslim purposes! They withdrew fromthis hostile and unbelievable act only “after a clear and certain mes-sage” from the Christian community was sent to them about theimplications of such an action.62 Sometimes one just gets stuck forlack of words or comprehension….

Wilson Sabiya was an aggressive champion of Christians overagainst an aggressive Muslim governor, who was building mosqueswith government funds on public properties throughout Gongolastate. Sabiya, together with his CAN secretary, Kenneth Eze,wrote a strong letter of protest to the governor. The letter dealtwith two issues, namely, that of the mosque on public grounds


and the governor’s demand to erase a Christian notice on a privatebus. The issues themselves and the strong feelings they aroused areso well put that I can serve you no better than to include the doc-ument as Appendix 7A.

In 1989, they wrote a follow-up letter that is attached asAppendix 7B. It dealt with the same unfinished issue of the build-ing of mosques and churches and some additional ones. The gov-ernor did not respond to either of these letters, except with harass-ment—the illegal arrest of Sabiya in a futile attempt to silence him.

Reasons for the government’s displeasure were not only the let-ters but also Sabiya’s being in possession of confidential govern-ment documents. Sabiya explained that civil servants are oath-bound to support the government to do justice. This implies thatthey are obligated to prevent her from injustice. If they can do thisby leaking confidential documents, then they are doing their duty. Sabiya was released quickly due to the hordes of youth and womenwho trooped to the Government House to demand his release.They ignored the pleadings of their Bishop David Windibiziri topractise patience and proceeded with their march. It became veryclear to the government that if they did not release him forthwith,they would have serious disruptions on their hands. And so Sabiyawas soon reunited with his family.

Sabiya and CAN began to sue the government at variousfronts, including one to force the government to either build achapel at the Yola Government House or to demolish the mosquethere. In at least one of the cases, the court ruled in favour of CANby declaring the government action a “flagrant violation” of therights of Christians. On September 3, 1993, Chief Judge B.S.Bansi of the Yola High Court of Justice made the following ruling:

The act of constructing a mosque at the Government Houseout of the public fund of Gongola State without the corre-sponding construction of the church for the applicant andthose he represented who are equally citizens of


Nigeria–Gongola State and the co-owners of the said publicfund, is in my judgement a flagrant violation of their rightunder the 1979 Constitution.

The ruling included the provisions that the church should be sim-ilar to the mosque in quality and funded by the state government.It also included a caution against “further promulgation of dis-criminatory policies by the state government.”

This ruling, Minchakpu commented, “marks the watershed ofthe long battle waged by CAN against the discriminatory policiespromulgated and implemented by successive administrations.” Hejubilated, “the glaring evidence of discrimination against Christianshas now been brought to light.” He invited the federal governmentto stop the discrimination against Christians practised throughoutthe North.63

Sabiya vowed that wherever CAN saw a mosque built in a pub-lic place, they would build a church there. He cited the example ofTakum town, where Muslims were building a mosque in the motorpark. When Christians also started to build a church, the govern-ment stopped both projects. The same thing happened in Mubiand in Jos. Paul Gindiri, a wealthy businessman, popular evangelistand activist in Jos, built a church in the Bauchi Motor Park in Joswithout seeking a permit, when Muslims built a mosque on thepremise. The building of a mosque on the Jos Polo Ground wasstopped when Gindiri started sending his tippers with supplies forthe foundation of a church there.

In spite of his unpleasant experiences with Muslims, Sabiyadenied having a quarrel with them. It was not a question of religionversus religion, he commented, but “between government and reli-gion. Every religion will try to influence government, but it is upto government to be fair to all sides.”64

Sabiya was one of the more activistic clergy who did not hesi-tate to take the government bull by the horns. As evidenced by his


ecumenical positions in both CAN and TEKAN, he had theapproval, if not admiration, of his colleagues in other denomina-tions. Victor Musa of ECWA described the reaction of the GongolaChristians as “excellent.” He pointed out that if it had been aChristian governor arresting a Muslim of Sabiya’s standing, the fed-eral government “would have pounded down heavily on such agovernor.” The Gongola Christians did not take up arms, but “theytook up their Bibles, which is the greatest arm. That is a gooddemonstration of the Christian spirit.”65

A prominent Christian lecturer who had been a member of the1977 Constituent Assembly, Ayuba J. Wudiri similarly gave kudosto Gongola State branch of CAN. With respect to mosques, in thecourse of arguing against the government’s erecting them, hewaded across a wide range of issues and arguments that should bevery familiar to readers of this series by now. Allow me to quote:

Government has no business at all building mosques or churches.It is the responsibility of the various religious groups and there-fore government is wrong in taking over the affairs of a religiousbody. Nigeria is a secular state, whether you like it or not. Callit multi-religious, but it is a secular state and the Constitutionspells this out that government should not engage in religiousaffairs. The question of religious crises…has always been withthe government. It is the government that has been precipitatingreligious crises. It is government officials, the police, the militaryand such other agencies who have been using their position toadvance the cause of Islam in this country. We have documentsto show this. It is governments—military or civilian—that havebeen deliberately waging jihad against the people.

Wudiri continued his comments,

The action which CAN took is normal. What else do you dowhen you see that the government, which is supposed to beneutral is favouring a particular religion and the governor


acting as if he were a governor of Muslims? CAN’s position isin order and it is legitimate. CAN should go the full length tosee that justice is done, and that is to see that a chapel is builtin the Government House to show that the Christians arehuman beings, to show that the Christians have a right togovernment money and whatever government is going to useit for should be fair.66

Leaders move on and, in Nigeria at least, states are re-arrangedor renamed. Sabiya’s place as chairman was taken over by DennisGereng; Gongola State was disassembled; Yola became the capitalof a new state, Adamawa, with deep historical roots in Muslim slav-ery. Five years after Sabiya began his crusade the issue was stillbrewing, with Gereng in charge of the state CAN. Though a courthad ordered the government to build a church in the same com-pound, with the contract to be awarded within eight weeks, theorder had not yet been carried out by early 1994. CAN was nowsuing the government for contempt of court. In the meantime,CAN was waiting to complete this case before it would introducethe next one about another mosque.

The problem in Adamawa, insisted Gereng, was a deliberateone. When that additional mosque was built and CAN complainedto the new governor, Salihu Abubakar, the latter responded thatChristians should wait till they get a Christian governor, who couldthen build them a church. Thus, Gereng continued, “you can seethe type of discrimination that Christians face in this state, despitethe fact that they constitute the majority.”

Throughout all of this, Gereng emphasized the motive andconcern of Christians. The issue was that the constitution providesfor fundamental human rights and equality for all. It does notallow for discrimination or preferred treatment. The government issupposed to treat all people, ethnic groups and religions equally.Government house belongs to all and so, if Muslims need a place


to worship there, Christians have an equal right to it. “We want tomake sure,” he further explained, “that, whatever the governmentdoes to the Muslims in this state, is done to the Christians. This isbecause we believe that we are in the majority. So we will not allowthat treatment meted to us. We want to make sure that our rightsare given to us.”67

We move over to Plateau State’s LGA of Wase, where the LGbuilt a mosque within the premises of the local government admin-istration. The situation in Plateau State being different from that ofYola, the local CAN chapter took an approach directly opposite tothat taken by Sabiya. It is more efficient to simply reproduce theletter from CAN to the Wase authorities than to retell the story.

ERECTION OF RELIGIOUS BUILDING

IN THE LGC SECRETARIAT

Sequel to our meeting with you on Wednesday, 22nd

March, 1989, on the above subject, as the body charged witharticulating, projecting and protecting the interest ofChristians, we observe as follows: That there has been a banby [the] Government of Plateau State on the erection of reli-gious buildings in public places, which has not been lifted.

1. That given the volatile nature of religious issues in thiscountry, the erection of a religious building (mosque) in apublic establishment like the secretariat does not augur wellfor this time in which government…is trying to douse thefire of religious imbroglio.

2. That the erection of a mosque in the secretariat is a delib-erate act of provocation.

3. That CAN does not find amusing the suggestion thatChristians should ask for a place of worship of their own,because this makes nonsense of the gravity of the issue.


Government cannot pretend to be unaware of the problemthis portends for peaceful existence. What happens whereTraditional Religionists, Animists, Atheists, etc. demand fora place of worship of their own?

4. That the circumstances surrounding the approval of the saidsite and subsequent building were obnoxious, nebulous and,therefore, unacceptable. For instance, the site plan and what-ever else was done and approved without the knowledge of theCouncillor for Works, Land and Survey.

5. That Wase has had an administration spanning 13 yearsand all this while the Muslims who work in the LGCSecretariat have always worshipped. Why must they nowhave a building/mosque which by its very existenceimposes itself on non-Muslims and indeed, intimidatesand harasses them?

From the foregoing, we are convinced that the mosquebeing erected…is part of the grand design to harass andintimidate non-Muslims. What does look like part of thescheme to enhance the perpetration of this evil is demonstratedin the composition of the Local Government TraditionalCouncil68 which does not have a single Christian, in spite ofnumerous non-Muslim chiefs in the area. Consequently, wehave resolved as follows:

1. That the mosque presently being erected be demolishedforthwith. And we like to make it unequivocally clear thatthis is non-negotiable.

2. That as a matter of priority, the composition of theTraditional Council provide for a Christian member, as wedo not believe that issues affecting us Christians wouldreceive favourable consideration [otherwise].


3. That we are strongly committed to the principles of justiceand fair play and, if need be, are ready to stake our verylives in the pursuit of same.

We do trust that you and your council members wouldsee the wisdom that had been applied elsewhere in avoidingthe aiding and abetting of any situation that would lead tounnecessary confrontation.

God bless and thank you.

The letter was addressed to the Chairman and copied to allpolitical and ecclesiastical leaders in the state and local government.69

Though NIPSS is quite capable of defending itself, I have notfound any evidence that it fought against the building of a mosqueon its premises. The response of the Jos Christian community wasbasically to take it in stride and to gather the resources to build achurch on the campus as well. Nevertheless, three people took itupon themselves to complain to CAN, Kaduna State Branch,about the “misuse of public funds to build a mosque at NIPSS.”They wanted CAN “to ascertain the legality of building a mosqueat NIPSS at the cost of public money.”70

Along with a cover letter, CAN Kaduna forwarded the letter toJabanni Mambula, in his capacity as Secretary of CAN PlateauState, and asked the latter to check whether the mosque was builtwith public or private funds. If the latter, “we need not raise anyeyebrow about it. If otherwise, CAN in Plateau should take thematter up with the appropriate authorities.” So, the issue was notso much the presence of a mosque on public ground as the sourceof the funds.71

Jos-based TEKAN with the same Mambula as general secre-tary, also recognised the problem. Christians, its Study Committeewrote in 1987, “are clearly treated as being inferior to theMuslims.” Muslims do not need certificates of occupancy for their


mosques and their mosques have “proliferated in government min-istries and parastatals.” Similarly, public educational institutionshave mosques but not chapels.

Nassarawa State is a break-off from Plateau that was engineered,I understand, by Muslims who were unhappy under Plateau’sChristian majority. Akwanga is the second largest town in the stateand is largely Christian—99%, according to the local CAN chapter.The local government began building a mosque in its secretariat.However, Peter Maikasuwa, chairman of the local CAN chapter,wrote a letter of protest to the local government council, warningthem of discriminating against the Christian majority. The lettersaid, “CAN does not oppose freedom of worship, but CAN istotally opposed to the building of a mosque within the secretariat.The secretariat is a public place, and so, no religious group can beallowed to construct a place of worship there.” The chairman of thelocal government claimed that the building had been approved bythe Security and Peace Committee, a body comprised of bothChristians and Muslims, but an unnamed member of that bodydenied that it had approved the mosque. When building proceeded,CAN decided to destroy the mosque and, apparently, assigned thejob to Christian youth. The youths promptly destroyed the struc-ture on December 6, 1997. The government detained six of them.The next day, more Christians took to the streets “to protest theIslamisation policies.” The report ended by stating further con-struction had been “suspended.”72

This incident took place in the middle of already escalating ten-sion and violence between Christian and Muslim ethnic groups inNassarawa State. Conflict between the Christian Bassas and theMuslim Igbirras, according to Minchakpu, began “as a result of gov-ernment political policies that favoured Muslims over Christians.”There were the familiar issues of Christian versus Muslim chieftain-cies with arrangements mostly in favour of Muslims, the appoint-ment of Muslim leaders over Christian areas, use of public funds for


mosques on government property, prevention of the teaching ofCRK while IRK was allowed and, finally, media domination byMuslims. The basic problem was “the government’s inability toencourage co-existence between religious and ethnic groups.” VictorMusa, at this time president of ECWA, a prominent denominationin the area, signed an ECWA statement that stated, “We haveobserved that the government has been promoting Islam over andabove Christianity.” The terrible result of all this unrest and angerwas the destruction of some seventy churches in the area by IgbirraMuslims and “5000 Christians displaced or killed.”73

The virus of discrimination even entered academia. Christiansalleged that the authorities at Bayero University in Kano refusedthem permission to build a chapel by one of their favourite devices:dragging out the issue. The Chapel Building Committee expressed“genuine fear that the delay may be indefinite, in view of theknown and undisguised opposition to…a chapel” as “expressed bycertain sections of the Muslim community. The claim has evenbeen heard that Bayero University is an Islamic University.” TheCommittee regarded the issue as a “test both of the right to reli-gious worship enshrined in the constitution and of the true Federalcharacter of Bayero University,” which happens to be located in theMuslim environment of Kano.74

The issue went to other quarters in academia. Kaduna CANreminded President Babangida that there is a mosque at theUniversity of Nigeria in Nsukka, a campus in the middle of ChristianIbos, while “a church at Bayero University and Usman Dan FodioUniversities are taboos,” both of them located in the far MuslimNorth. The Sokoto and Katsina state governments cancelled fundlaunchings for the building of churches on campuses within theirjurisdictions because of Muslim threats of violence. CAN wrote,

The conclusions to be drawn here are that Christians underyour administration can enjoy their freedom of worship only


at the convenience of Muslims or that the lives and propertyof Christians can only be guaranteed by the negation of theirright to freedom of worship.

Southern universities were not spared friction and violence.According to C. O. Williams, the escalation of violence due to theOIC predicament led to violence centering on the Chapel of theResurrection on the campus of the University of Ibadan, again inOyo State. Muslims burnt the “Statue of Resurrected Christ” justoutside the chapel. They also demanded that the cross on the sameproperty be removed because it could be seen from within themosque, which was built across the street long after all theseChristian structures were put in place.

Christians are a varied lot and often give conflicting signals. OneMike Oko reported that the federal government provided land at theLagos airport for a church building—a public property. When heannounced this development to the congregation of Saint Augustine’sCatholic Church in Ikeja, Lagos, the Reverend John Iyere praised thegovernment to the sky. He explained that the government intends “tomaintain the status quo on the issue of religion in the country,” thevery thing that CAN was denying. While showering his praises on thegovernment, Iyere predicted that “the step would ensure unity, coop-eration and understanding among the nation’s Muslims andChristians.” Not much evidence of that, unfortunately.

The country’s Muslim leadership showed its hand in unmis-takable ways in its first religious steps in Abuja, when that city wasstill in the budding stage. With undue haste and without goingthrough the established protocol, the government constructedMuslim praying grounds in the city and, soon afterwards, amosque on a plot that had been earmarked for a school—all withgovernment funds and labour. According to Matthew Kukah, noone had applied for these facilities, but there they were. Christiansmeanwhile “were busy going through…formalities and waiting to


be allocated lands that did not seem to be easily available.” Withinanother year cooperation between the government and the Muslimcommunity led to the construction of a giant mosque that was des-tined to become the National Mosque. All these amenities werestrategically located within a mile of the city centre. Consider, inaddition, that the main entrances into the new city were designedaccording to Muslim style,75 and you can understand the nervous-ness of Christians with respect to the future of their new capital.When President Shagari was asked whether or not this indicated astrong Muslim bias, he replied, “It is only fitting that I, as the pres-ident of this country, have a place of worship that befits my status.My vice president…is a Christian. If he also wishes to have a befit-ting place of worship, that is up to him.”76

That betrayed a seriously cavalier attitude towards religion andspending. Almost all Christian denominations have worked hard toget property in Abuja, the new capital city. The NKST77 obtained aproperty and spent some millions on buildings before the MuslimWorld League grabbed it away from them. While the church wasnegotiating with the federal minister in charge of these develop-ments, the League continued its manœuvers, ostensibly without theminister’s knowledge. One day “a team of armed policemen,” alongwith government staff led by three highly placed Muslims, came and“bulldozed all the standing structures.” Muslims launched their $43million project that same week with a famous speaker from SaudiArabia. The church wrote a strong protest to the government, accus-ing it of “injustice, religious and political favouritism.” It demandeda new plot and compensation. It received and accepted the new allo-cation, for it was “bigger and in a more strategic position.” Thequestion was raised why Muslims did not take this better plot. Thesuggested answer was, “They are in power and want to display theirnaked powers. Investigation has proven that the government hasallocated a high number of plots to the Muslims for mosques, andonly few to Christians. The ratio is 4:1.”


A. T. Mbachirin, editor of NKST’s newsletter, announced thatNKST could not compete with the overseas funds of Muslims, buthe did appeal to NKST’s friends, especially those abroad, to cometo her rescue.78

Some years later, according to Minchakpu, authorities inAbuja demolished twelve churches. As elsewhere, the governmentclaimed they were illegal structures, built in the wrong places, andwhich did not fit the plan for the new city. Christians claimed thatsome of these churches had been in existence for fifteen years ormore. Ola Makinde of the Abuja branch of CAN wondered whythe government pulled them down just before they were to handover power to a new civilian regime. He felt that it was because thecity administrator was a Muslim who wanted to get rid of them.The government had been demolishing churches for two yearsalready, he claimed.79

There is yet another aspect to this issue of buildings.Though the basic principial demand of the Christian commu-nity, as represented by the “fathers,” is for governments to keeptheir hands off religion, pragmatism and competition withMuslims for government funds often drives Christians in a dif-ferent direction. They demand funds for many Christian activi-ties such as education, health care and even pilgrimage. So it iswith the National Ecumenical Centre project. The governmentwanted to have a national cathedral and a national mosque inthe new capital city Abuja that would befit the splendour of theNigerian nation. Elsewhere in this volume there is reference tothe way President Shagari, without going through the normalchannels, and with great urgency, amassed resources to build themosque that dominates the Abuja skyline. Christians could notagree on the cathedral idea and thus turned it instead into aNational Ecumenical Centre. The government funds were notforthcoming as spontaneously for the Centre as they had for themosque under Shagari.


Thus, the CAN National Executive Committee appealed toPresident Babangida: “We express our profound gratitude for thekeen interest which Mr. President has shown in our project.Obviously, the very high costs of the materials as well as the deval-uation of naira have rendered the ten million naira donation far lessuseful than it would have been if the Government had released itto us as soon as it was promised.” Then they went on to request anadditional twenty million naira, for just the first phase of the pro-ject would cost some eighty million naira. At the end of therequest, CAN added a little dig: “Incidentally, we sincerely trustthat the government will make the new federal capital a full-fledged symbol of unity, genuinely welding together the kaleido-scopic variety of tribes, tongues and creeds in Nigeria.”80

The money has been granted, to my knowledge, up to fortymillion, but in 2003, the building still stood there uncompleted inthe shadow of a majestic mosque as a shameful monument toChristian disunity and corruption à la Tanko Yusuf. In mid-2002,CAN planned yet another fund raiser for the project at which eventPresident Obasanjo was present and promised to support it towardsits completion. The next year, they launched the campaign forN2.5 billion!81 Clearly, in spite of decades of fruitless and shame-ful internal politics that, according to Tanko Yusuf, included finan-cial corruption, the zest for the project had not diminished! Let uspray that this time it is zest for the Centre itself, not for the money.

In the meantime, a new problem is rearing its ugly head inLagos. The state government has outlawed the use of residentialbuildings as house churches, while any new church buildingsrequire government approval. There are, as always, two sides to thisstory. Kola Animashaun, an official in the state’s city planningoffice, explained that the measures were taken to create a “peacefulenvironment.” He added that churches in residential areas couldno longer “hold all-night programmes such as prayer vigils unlesstheir worship halls installed soundproofing.” He threatened to


demolish “illegal church buildings being used as house churches,”since approval had never been given for them. Mike Okonkwo,president of Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria, explained this devel-opment as a “ploy by the Muslim government in the state to per-secute Christians and deny them their right to worship God.”82

Part of this legislation seems, at first glance, reasonable. Ofcourse, approval is needed for new buildings and, of course, noisepollution needs to be contained. All-night prayer meetings canbecome pretty rowdy in Nigeria. At the same time, Nigerian citiesare full of illegal buildings. With religious volatility and noise pol-lution both at such high levels throughout Nigeria, it would not bewise for the government to start their clean up with church build-ings. So, I cannot help wonder whether we are given the entirestory. Both Christians and Muslims are prone to quick accusationsthese days. At the same time, I wonder how noise pollution lawscan be applied to Christians, when Muslims throughout the coun-try continue to broadcast their call to prayer at five in the morningwith their loudspeakers that penetrate every bedroom in the neigh-bourhood, Christian and Muslim. Perhaps we are left with onlyOkonkwo’s explanation. But then, it would still be unwise on thepart of the government as well as unjust. Such blatant partialitywould be beyond comprehension—except when one is aware ofthe ease and blindness with which Nigerian Muslims in powersometimes impose their religion without any qualms or secondthought. The question continues to plague me throughout thisstudy: Is this Islam or just certain types of unfaithful Muslims?Akbar S. Ahmed, writer of Los Angeles Times’ “best non-fictionbook of the year,” opts for the latter. If so, where is the moderatemajority to stop such blatant discrimination?

2. PILGRIMAGE

The issue of government involvement in pilgrimages has beena constant irritant. In Volume 2 we saw that Muslims insist on deep


government involvement. They regard it as a government duty tosupport their religion, including this feature, and as a Muslimhuman right. On the other hand, we have seen earlier in this vol-ume that all the Christian “fathers” oppose such governmentinvolvement and regard it as an expression of government partial-ity towards Islam. Correcting this impartiality demands govern-ment withdrawal from such religious affairs.

Around 1990, CAN threatened to sue President Babangida tochallenge the legality of the 1989 decree which established theNigerian Pilgrims Commission. In an unidentified newspaper clip-ping from that era, we are informed that it was Okogie and C. O.Williams, at the time national president and general secretaryrespectively, who filed the suit. The decree allegedly had severalmajor problems. First, it was against the secular status of the coun-try for the government to be involved in such private religiousaffairs. Secondly, since it was to serve only Muslims, it was a dis-criminatory measure, spending common funds for a section of thepopulation. The measure further gave the impression that Islam isthe state religion. Finally, the measure contradicted a recent pledgethe president had made to the Roman Catholic bishops that hewould not show favouritism to any religion.

One Ogueri wrote a pungent argument against such govern-ment involvement. The government, he reported, had decided tosubsidise the 1992 pilgrimage by some fifty percent. For one thing,the decision included giving pilgrims a very large exchange rateadvantage by pegging the naira to the dollar at about 11:1 insteadof the going rate of 18.5:1. This meant that any nairas exchangedwould yield many more dollars than normally—close to double.Some thirty thousand pilgrims were to benefit to the tune of $1500from the subsidy, which would cost the government a total ofN380 million.

This largesse flew in the face of the ongoing economic recov-ery programme, which included removal of subsidies on various


social services. This exception to a much-touted policy “createsroom for suspicion,” for it brought up the question of the govern-ment’s seriousness with respect to its general policies. The Nigerianeconomy, Ogueri argued, was in shambles, largely due to governmentpolicies. Industries cried out for subsidies to survive the economicchaos created by government, but the latter refused to heed them.And then such largesse to be spent on one social service, a hotly dis-puted one at that? If this amount were divided among allNigerians, he proposed, each would get “something close to N4million.” The subsidy is a “misplacement of priority” and “its reli-gious implications cannot be ignored.” Please read the argumentsthat have by now become traditional on the part of Christians:

Nigeria is a secular society by constitutional provision andshould not accord any recognition to any religion. It is unfor-tunate that federal administrations have taken decisions andcarried out actions which approximate to the elevation ofother religious groups. Government’s role in matters of religionshould stop at the level of ensuring a hitch-free hajj operationand not using taxpayers’ money to finance such a costly ven-ture. Government has a duty to distinguish between its tradi-tional and legitimate role as an institution for public peaceand its illegitimate role as the custodian of the religions of asegment of the society.83

Ibrahim Yaro blasted the government for its support of theMuslim pilgrimage: “By far the most blatant and defiant governmentact of favouritism on behalf of Muslims comes with governmentinvolvement in Muslim pilgrimage.” Then he gave statistics as to thenumber of Nigerian Muslim pilgrims from 1968 to 1985. The low-est number was twenty thousand in 1984, while the highest was onehundred twenty thousand in 1980, figures that probably reflect therapid downturn of the Nigerian economy in the early 80s. Note,Yaro urged, how many “have poured out of the country largely at the


taxpayers expense.” As far as he was concerned, their numbers maytriple, but at “non-Muslim taxpayers’ expense?” He estimated that in1981, the government spent some 130 million naira at a time whenthe naira was still a strong currency, not far from the dollar. Theamount did not include the charges for the huge piles of excess bag-gage with which these pilgrims return, often contraband, accordingto frequent insinuations in the press. In 1984, the low year, “despitethe austerity,” Muslim pilgrims were given a special foreign exchangeallotment of N800 each, while the mere 1300 Christian pilgrimswere allowed only N100 each “by the same government.” EachChristian received one-eighth of what each Muslim received!

Yaro called this

a callous abuse of power. It is difficult to see how such a gov-ernment could even remotely claim to be working towardsunity, peace, harmony and justice for all. Yet, despite all theseunjust privileges granted to Muslims, they still have theaudacity to demand even our blood. And the rest of us havebeen keeping mute for the sake of peace. Yet the Muslimswould not leave us alone.84

Now, I am giving you fair warning and urge you to brace your-self. After the threatened suit, the CAN National ExecutiveCommittee wrote the following to President Babangida:

We warmly appeal to the federal government to promulgate,as a matter of utmost urgency, a decree which will establish aPilgrims’ Commission that will cater for the welfare of pil-grims to all the “Holy Lands.” Such a decree will help to pro-mote a peaceful atmosphere for the practice of the various reli-gions in Nigeria. It may also help to create confidence in thefederal government’s declared desire to foster religious toleranceand create no impression which can be interpreted as prefer-ence of one particular religion.85


CAN did explain her reasoning. It preferred the government to“steer clear” of pilgrimage affairs, but if support is available toMuslims, then it must be for Christians as well. If the governmentinsists on handling pilgrimages, “then, whatever facilities the gov-ernment accords one religious group must be made available toanother religious group. Otherwise a most unpleasant impressionwill be created that the government prefers Muslims.”

Already there were problems with the Christian pilgrimage.Some Christian pilgrims absconded in Israel, causing difficultiesbetween the two governments. There were whispers that Christianswould be barred from going on pilgrimages because of this.Another problem was that the Chairman of the National TaskForce on Pilgrimage allegedly attached little importance toChristians. Whenever Christians came to see him, he was neveraround. CAN felt that the solution to the latter was to create twoboards, one for each religion.86

The Christian pilgrimage programme was established in thelate 1980s. Today, the federal government and many states havetheir Christian pilgrim boards, but since Christian pilgrims are farfewer than their Muslim counterparts, the government money spenton this project is still much less. Furthermore, the establishment ofthese boards can hardly be said to have promoted “a peaceful atmo-sphere.” If anything, tension has increased steadily since then. Butthe Christians did get their boards and some of their money, forwhat is indeed a private spiritual journey. I have a considerablenumber of friends and acquaintances among the pastors who wentalmost completely at government expense to serve as pilgrimageleaders. I also know at least one who has been appointed to a statelevel Christian pilgrim board position who unashamedly advocatesin church conventions that Christians should press money from thegovernment as much as they can. After all, do not Muslims do thesame? From where, I cannot help asking, do Christians take theircues? Has Islam become their new source of revelation?


Matthew Kukah would have none of this. In a speech deliveredto the Fourth Assembly of CAN in 1995 in Abeokuta87 and pub-lished by NS, he spoke about the “embarrassment” caused byChristian involvement in the “pilgrimage business.” It has done“more harm than good” to our faith. We wait, he wrote, “untilMuslims decide on what they want for their faith before we startsaying: Well, the government has done it for Muslims; it must doit for us too.” He continued,

This kind of reactionary policies only increases tension amongus. Why have we been unable to articulate our own policiesourselves in keeping with the dictates of our faith? Since wehave started these imitations, we have continued to fumbleabout from one policy to another.

It is “purely political expediency” that has led to confusionamong Christians. They should “show the difference between eco-nomic and political opportunism and faith. Suffice it to say thatthe time is now for Christians to wake up from their slumber andsincerely examine how they want to live their faith in a plural soci-ety like Nigeria.”88

3. PUBLIC UTTERANCES

C. O. Williams reported that by the mid-70s “attacks onChristians had gathered considerable momentum.” Muslimpreachers began preaching sermons denouncing the Christian faithand ridiculing “cherished Christian beliefs.” They used all the gov-ernment media for this purpose. He adduced an example fromNN, which stated,

The Islamic system of education is the best for the world,because the Western form in particular has not only failed toproduce people of good character and sense of commitment,but has accelerated the development of corruption and aidedthe spread of vices.89


Williams took this to be a serious provocation againstChristianity, though I am not so sure it was far off the mark.

In the pre-CAN years, the CCN churches, located mostly inthe South, would react mainly by drawing the government’s atten-tion to such “totally unprovoked and unnecessary” words andactions. As mentioned earlier, when the Sunday Times published anarticle entitled, “The Bible Is Not That Special,”90 the government“could not help but publish its reaction.” It wrote that it felt “veryconcerned about this and a series of articles of this nature, whichhave the effect of arousing strong religious sentiments.” It warnedthat “these types of publications are strongly condemned and theFMG will continue to ensure that the religious harmony existingin this country is not disturbed.” Muslims were infuriated, accord-ing to Williams. Instead of retreating, “they intensified theirprovocative operations against the Christians, especially in thenorthern part.” In July and August of 1977, “several places of wor-ship in Yola were destroyed by “some Muslim fanatics.”

Haruna Dandaura complained about restrictions on Christianpreaching. Kano’s sabon gari is full of churches, he wrote, butMuslims come in and preach freely without anyone disturbingthem. In fact, they can safely go and preach anywhere in Nigeria.However, Christians “dare not enter the city of Kano to preach: oneis mobbed immediately.”

The Kano CAN Memo provides some concrete examples ofsuch incidents in 1982. In response to Christian preaching, achurch in the Rogo area was burnt by the local people. The benchesof a mission near the Kano-Municipal Brigade were allegedly con-fiscated by the district police officer named Mutari. That same offi-cer also allegedly arrested, beat and locked up several people fromthe Assemblies of God church in Sabon Gari, Kano.91

“Muslims reserve their right to propagate their religion andconvert more to Islam.” So, Dandaura demands, “must theChristians.”92


Oyeniran of UGCAN fame took a strong stand against a banon public preaching that was instituted by some states in order tostop preachers from offending adherents of the other religion.There was a good reason at least to control open air preachers, ifnot ban them, for they often displayed a lack of wisdom, respectand tolerance. Nevertheless, Oyeniran would have nothing to dowith it. He dubbed it “spiritually unconstitutional” and called onChristians to disobey the ban. He declared:

There is no government that can ban or restrict God’s meansof saving sinners. You cannot because of counterfeits ban theservice of God. Any government banning public preaching isin disobedience to the edict of God and true believers of Christwould not obey any government that disobeys God’s law, for itis written, “we must obey God rather than men.” Governmentcan be changed, the constitution could be amended. But thereis no nation that can change or amend God’s constitution andfind rest. It is the decree against God’s law which says, “Goye.” The idea of banning public preaching is not the solutionto religious crises.

He urged that all states lift the ban “with immediate effect” so as toyield “to the wishes of the masses.”

The TEKAN Study Committee of 1987 also rejected any banon public preaching. It “is meant to cater to the wishes of theIslamic fanatics,” it argued. “With the possible exception ofKafanchan, we are not aware of any riot which resulted from pub-lic preaching.” The ban, including that of holding processions, is“meant to prevent Christians from performing the duties requiredby their religion, and to curtail Christian growth. It is strictlyagainst Christians, because through such preaching Christianityhas been growing by leaps and bounds.”

While it is enforced on Christians, “Muslims continue to blockmajor streets every Friday to perform public worship. Every Friday,


Christians tolerate the curtailing of their freedom of movement,but Muslims refuse to tolerate a Palm Sunday procession or anEaster Monday public worship assembly, which occurs only once ayear.” All of this is the result of a government that protects Islambut is “insensitive to the feelings of Christians.”

Preaching is of course only one genre of public utterance. It haslong been a Christian complaint that “certain categories of peopleof certain religious persuasions [read: Muslims] can make com-ments more than capable of causing civil strife and get away withit, but those who believe differently [read: Christians] and say soare incarcerated.” The complainant here is the Plateau State YouthWing of CAN in a letter to the Commissioner of Police in Jos, butit could have been almost any Christian group. The letter, writtenduring the tense days after the aborted Orkar coup, went on to say,

We are in possession of a cassette…in which Muslims havecome out to categorically state that they would train theiryouth in three days to wage war against Christians. We alsorecall the inflammatory comments of Gumi in a QualityMagazine interview to the effect that the country would haveto be divided into two, should a Muslim fail to become headof state; and further that the only panacea for peace is for allthe Christians to become Muslims. Recently too, Alhaji SaniKontagora in a Newslink Magazine interview made similarcomments. According to him, the presidency of this country isnot for a southerner, except they come and kill all the peoplein the North. …While the government was busy absolvingreligious leaders from the coup, Ibrahim Dasuki [the Sultanof Sokoto] said in a BBC and VCA93 interview that he knowsit was Christians who planned the coup and that he woulddeal with them accordingly.

The writer commented that “Till this moment, there is no reportof any of these people being questioned, not to talk of detaining


them. We object to this partial administration of justice.”94 It is asentiment heard frequently.

A related irritant is the freedom with which Muslims will deridethe Christian view of Jesus, while they demand blood when a non-Muslim speaks about Islamic views, even if in a positive or neutralway. That was, after all, the Muslim excuse for beginning theKafanchan riot. In a joint press release, TEKAN and ECWA com-plained bitterly about an Islamic weekly magazine that had an articlein Hausa entitled, “Matar Yesu Ta Je Katsina,” which in English reads,“The Wife of Jesus Went to Katsina.” This write-up is described as“an outright provocation to Christians.” To make matters worse, inthe same weekly, “these Islamic extremists” badmouthed the state’smilitary governor, a Christian, by telling him that he should realisethat “Katsina is not his village.” Readers of Volume 1 will recognisethe crowd of Yahaya in this incident. The signatories were especiallyoffended that the federal government took no action and was silent.That meant “consent.” The release declared, “With such an Islamicextremism and government open hypocrisy, there shall never bepeace, unity and progress in this country.”95

4. EDUCATION

The educational sector is another battlefield. Major issues arethe refusal to permit new schools, the taking over, Islamizing,renaming or closing existing Christian schools, the teaching of reli-gion and the issue of uniforms. In previous pages we have alreadyheard rumblings about these topics.

Professor Adamu Baikie, in a speech delivered at a CANlaunching in 1987, aired the major complaint. “Our schools andcolleges have been taken over by government and yet we see schoolsand colleges established under the umbrella of another religionbeing sponsored and entirely financed and administered by gov-ernment.”96 If Christian schools are not taken over, they may beclosed down or denied permission to open.


In 1982, the Kano chapter of CAN accused the state govern-ment of taking over eight of their schools without paying compen-sation. Their names were all changed to obscure their Christian ori-gins. Though the official syllabus provided for the teaching ofCRK, it was in fact not taught in any of them, while between themthese schools had twelve IRK teachers! Attempts to open newChristian primary and secondary schools “have been either frus-trated or turned down for flimsy excuses.”97

Twenty years later the situation in Kano State remains ambigu-ous. On the one hand, however, there are many more Christianschools. Though in 1982, CAN complained about the difficulty ofopening up new schools, by 2002, statistics in both Christian andsecular press indicate that during the intervening years manyChristian schools were opened. Adamu Muhammad Tahir, a gov-ernment officer, reported the existence of 314 approved privateschools with another 115 applications for additional ones. Therewere also 294 operating illegally. Those statistics show that muchprogress has been made, something that Christians would do wellto acknowledge.

On the other hand, Christians report a wave of closures ofschools and discrimination in Kano. In 2002, Minchakpureported that the government had closed down 122 Christianschools on the grounds that they were operating illegally. Tahirclaimed only twenty-four were closed and explained that theschools did not “fulfill the necessary requirements set by the gov-ernment.” The government wanted to ensure that “only qualifiedteachers and standard educational materials were employed ineducational institutions.” Some, according to him, had only onetoilet for both genders, an issue to which especially Muslimswould be very sensitive. Other schools were grossly overcrowdedand terribly under-equipped: no desks or chairs. In addition,many such schools “had defaulted in the paying of levies and taxespayable by proprietors and their employees.” It was not, he


insisted, a matter of discrimination against Christians. In fact, hespoke of the government’s “pre-occupation to ensure that all pri-vate schools” teach both CRK and IRK.98

That sounded more evenhanded than it really was. AnglicanBishop Zakka Nyam, for one, outrightly rejected these explana-tions. He responded that these closures “are part of the grand planof Muslim politicians and their religious leaders to entrench Islamas state religion in Nigeria.” It is part of the programme to imple-ment the sharia. “They insist that Islamic religious knowledge mustbe made compulsory in Christians schools. How can this be?” heasked and continued,

The government also says we must employ Islamic clerics toindoctrinate our children, and when we say no, they closedown our schools and then claim that we have not met theireducational standards. What kind of policies are these? Shouldwe just embrace anti-Christian educational policies that aredetrimental to our faith? No, this cannot happen.99

A little over a month later, a Minchakpu report also indicatedthat the twenty-four school closures were due mainly because oftheir failure to teach IRK. Tahir stated that the law enforced theIslamic education policy and supported the closure of the schools.There would be more closures, he warned, unless “they adhere tothe Islamic education policy, pay the required education taxes andemploy Islamic clerics to teach Islam.” The tax amounted toN16,000. In addition, there is the insistence on “enforcing theIslamic dress code.”

Joseph Fadipe of CAN in Kano explained that these

closures resulted from Christians resisting the government’s dis-criminatory religious policies that favour Muslims overChristians. It is a plan to spread Islamic law—sharia—toChristian schools. They intend to foist Islam on our children


by all possible means. We refuse this manipulation of religion.We cannot accept the indoctrination of our children with areligion we do not ascribe to. We are determined to fight thisinjustice. We are considering legal action to seek for redressover this matter.

In the meantime, the children no longer attend schools, we aretold, while parents “fear for their future.”100 Unfortunately,Minchakpu does not tell us whether or not government schoolsand Muslim-sponsored schools have met all those requirements oftax, uniform, adequate equipment and CRK teachers. To ask thequestion is probably to answer it—for the uninitiated I shouldprobably add: in the negative. Are they receiving the same treat-ment, closures and all? Let’s not ask too many questions! But, justin case Minchakpu lays his eyes on this page: please be a little moregenerous with your information—as you used to be in TC!

This latest Kano development is surprising in view of therepeated insistence and strong assurance of sharia advocates thatsharia applies only to Muslims. Must we conclude that this assur-ance was a mere cover-up? It does not augur well for the future andonly confirms what Christians have been warning about all along.This development is no surprise to them. In fact, it was expected;if not in this particular form then in some other, and if not inKano, then in some other state—but eventually everywhere.

Ibrahim Yaro complained about the Kaduna government tak-ing over a Catholic school and renaming it Queen Amina College.Matthew Hassan Kukah regarded this and other similar incidentsas part of the campaign

to undermine Christianity by its [Muslim government] atti-tude to Christian symbols. It is still remembered that in manyinstitutions, after the government takeover, the chapels wereturned either into dining halls or they were converted intorecreation halls. Furthermore, the substitution of Christian


names with names that are of historical significance to theMuslims…, all these factors had created feelings of anger inthe minds of many Christians.

Christians resent this even more, according to Kukah, whenthey consider that Muslims themselves have contributed nothingto the educational scene in the country. Their only contributionhas been Arabic schools that are of no consequence to non-Muslims. So they resort to stealing the Christian institutions andconvert them for their own use.101

That is exactly what had happened in 1989 in Kwoi, a town insouthern Kaduna State, not far from either Kafanchan or Zangon-Kataf—in other words, in an area marked by tenseChristian–Muslim relations. The Government Girls’ SecondarySchool in the town, according to the local CAN chapter, was builton land for which the Christians hold the Certificate ofOccupancy. Though my source does not indicate this, I suspectthat the school itself was a victim of government takeover from thechurch. Now Muslim staff and students at the school want tolaunch an appeal fund to build a mosque on the premises. In a let-ter to the authorities, CAN threatened that such a launching wouldlead to “serious consequences.” Tensions rose in the community.Christians were alleged to have burnt some pages from the Qur’anand security forces moved in as a deterrent to violence. CAN con-tinued its threats and warnings, but Muslims continued with theirplans. It was argued that “chapels exist in all other similar institu-tions in the state” and that “every Nigerian has the right to practiseher religion.” Denial of a mosque is denial of the Muslim reli-gion.102 Though I have not been able to follow this story to its con-clusion, the incident is all too typical.

Few northern states were exempted from the educational strug-gle. On December 11, 1998, several hundreds of Muslims attackedthree churches, burnt cars and looted shops belonging to


Christians in Maiduguri, Borno State. It was in protest against thegovernment decision to allow the teaching of CRK in publicschools, a decision it made in view of the fact that IRK was alreadya compulsory subject. This had been a controversial issue for yearsin this state. To avoid further violence, the measure was withdrawn.The governor, a Muslim, explained that he had approved thiscourse because Nigeria is a secular country. However, he continued,“It appears some of our respected ulamas [Muslim leaders] havetaken the matter out of proportion and have continued to orches-trate their clandestine campaign.” CAN reported that it hadinformed the government of this plan of the Muslims, but no pre-cautions had been taken.103 A spokesman declared, “There is noamount of intimidation, threat, or whatsoever that will stop theChristians in the state from requesting their constitutional andlegitimate right of teaching CRK. We are all prepared to die for abetter and truly peaceful tomorrow.”

Occasionally Muslims practise blatant violence with respect toChristian schools even in so-called “tolerant” Yoruba land. Kwarastate has a large indigenous population of Yoruba, the only one inthe North, and was at one time known as the North’s “ChristianSouth,” according to Minchakpu’s story, “Jihad in Kwara.”104

He introduced the story as follows, “The Islamisation processwhich has been entrenched in most states in northern Nigeria, hasnow extended its tentacles to Kwara State.” The story was meant toexpose “the manipulation which led to the closure of threeChristian schools in Kwara and the battle by Christians in thatstate to free themselves from the firm grip of fanatical Muslims inthe corridors of power.” The article itself began by pointing to var-ious signs that Ilorin, the capital, has largely become a Muslim city.

There was a war raging between the state government andChristians over three Baptist schools. These and one communityschool were closed because they allegedly had not obtained writtenapproval before starting. Christians immediately accused the gov-


ernment of discrimination against them. The fact was, according toMinchakpu, that they had received provisional approval. They metall the requirements and were recommended for full approval bythe Inspectorate of Education. Final approval was long in waiting.In fact, the Ministry of Education took sixteen months beforereplying, but when it did, it was a rejection of the applicationswithout reasons given. Before they were ordered closed, HajiaHalimat Yusuf, Commissioner of Education, had visited all threeschools and remarked that they were “very impressive.”Subsequently, she informed the schools that they should be closedtemporarily and later, after “the anomalies created by the ministrywere resolved,” re-opened. They were closed. After further com-munication back and forth, the ministry demanded seven more“itemised particulars and documents” to reconsider. The Christianscomplained of double standards and religious intolerance, but theydid submit the requested documents. Then a letter from the min-istry came with the observation that, though CRK is taught, IRKis not. No teachers were qualified to teach IRK, either. And onlytwenty-one Muslim students were enrolled out of a total of 210.The demand was to “correct” these shortcomings. Christians thenwanted to know why this demand should be made on them, whenthe schools funded by the state do not make the same provisionsfor CRK.

I cannot relate all the particulars of the story, but a courtordered their re-opening. When the schools acted upon that ruling,the police came and forced them to close. In the case of one school,students were “chased out by gun-toting mobile policemen.” It wasonly on the insistence of the same judge that the police were forcedto withdraw. At the time this story appeared in TC, that one schoolwas open, while the other two remained closed.

Dr. Olusola Ajolore, the local CAN secretary, charged that theMinistry of Education had “openly declared its determination toadopt, sponsor and promote Islam at the expense of and to the


frustration of other religions.” The government, he charged, waspartial in its demand for IRK in Christian schools, while “purelyIslamic schools were not compelled to teach CRK,” thus “threat-ening a religious war if the government remained adamant.”

Christians were convinced that the brain behind these devel-opments was the Emir of Ilorin, Alhaji Ibrahim Sule Gambari, whohad already been making “deliberate efforts to curtail Christianity.”The state government felt pressured to “please the Islamic powers”in all departments, including education and police. In spite of thisconviction, in typical Nigerian style, CAN called on the emir “asan enlightened and former judge of the Court of Appeal to prevailon the government to allow people to practise religions of theirchoice.”105 Since this gentleman is also alleged to have advised thegovernment to force all churches out of the city, chances for hiscooperation at this front were slim indeed.

Such developments were taking place not only in the north-ern outpost of Yoruba land, but also deep within their southernhomeland. The United Missionary College in Ibadan, a jointeffort by Anglicans and Methodists established in 1928, was takenover by the government in 1975. After some years, the govern-ment phased out its teacher training programme there andreturned the school to its former owners. Those owners receivedpermission to re-open the school and scheduled an entrance exam-ination for its applicants. As Oladipo Olanipekun tells the story,“Some Muslim fundamentalists had been scheming to thwarttheir effort.” They “did not want the school to come into being.”Compass Direct reports that a Muslim youth organization accusedthe Oyo state military administrator of being a “hypocrite and astubborn Christian who has covertly supported an agenda ofinjustice against Muslims.” They threatened a “crisis of unprece-dented dimension” if the decision to open the school was notrescinded. “On the day of the entrance examination, someunknown people wearing long garments and white caps stormed


the examination hall and forcefully seized the examination papersfrom the children, scaring them away.”

Muslims had previously taken the matter to court, but, not hav-ing received satisfaction, they “took the law into their hands andphysically prevented the examination from being held.” Christianswere asking too many questions to reproduce here, but some askedwhether this was part of the Muslim jihad “which some people out-side the country are sponsoring.” Some prominent Muslim leaderssupported the action. Said one Alhaji Sanni, a leader among Muslimyouths, “We hailed their extra-legal and extra constitutional step.”Olanipekun asked, “Does anybody need any further evidence abouttrouble-shooting tendencies of some Muslim leaders?”106

The issue of CRK teaching also cropped up in Oyo—andChristians are not always the victims there, nor Muslims always theperpetrators. In Volume 2, I presented the Muslim side of thestruggle. Compass Direct reported that an unnamed Muslim pro-fessor accused Christians of intolerance and extremism and CANof making it impossible for IRK teachers to teach their subject toMuslim students. After all, the educational policy is that all stu-dents “should have unrestricted access to their religious educationin all post-primary institutions.” Furthermore, he claimed thatCAN “intimidated Muslim students by preaching,” while it alsoprevented them from observing their prayers.107

The then Christian governor but now late Bola Ige, was at firstreportedly hesitant about acting on the Muslim complaint thattheir children were denied their rights in Oyo schools. Muslimchildren did not receive instruction in IRK and were, instead,forced to take CRK. After due pressure was exerted by the Muslimcommunity, the state government, dominated by Christians,agreed to distribute free copies of the Qur’an to all Muslim stu-dents and to incorporate IRK in the curriculum. In addition, theyagreed that from then on all secondary schools established byMuslim organisations were to have Muslim principals.108


As the issues pile up, one begins to wonder whether the allegedpeaceful relations between Christian and Muslim Yoruba in theSouth really do exist. If they do, they are surely stretched to theirlimits these years, when the issues appear to grow increasinglymessy and very difficult to unravel. That was the situation with acase of school postings in Ibadan.

The Youth Wing of CAN, Oyo branch, wrote a letter to theMilitary Administrator, Colonel Ike Nwosu, under the title“Religious Intolerance.”109 They alerted the colonel to Muslimattempts either to transfer or remove two high officials whomMuslims were accusing of favouring Christians. Two Muslim teach-ers at St. Patrick’s Grammar School objected to transfers on thebasis of allegations that they were being punished for beingMuslims. Muslim officials were able to convince them that thetransfers were legitimate. Nevertheless, other Muslim leaders stillwanted to get rid of two officials who had had a hand in this mat-ter and who were accused of either being Christian or sympatheticto Christians. Actually, the letter stated, one, a lady, was thought ofas a Muslim, but she had always been impartial. It is true that otherMuslim government officials in the department had used “theirofficial positions to promote Islam, and they have been partial infavour of teachers who are Muslims.” Yet, no one had requestedtheir removal. It was hoped that the administrator would not cre-ate the impression that Muslims could dictate to him about post-ing matters. All of this is put in civil language, but behind it thereis a great deal of mutual anger and mistrust.

Joseph Obeamata, in his column Talking Point, wrote an“Appeal to Col. Nwosu,” supporting the CAN youth letter andproviding much more detailed information that is too complicatedto summarise. However, it is worth a read and is thereforeappended as Appendix 8. It demonstrates the intricacies and thesecret plotting that goes on between the two religions. It is a veiledprocess but often vicious and could easily feed into a riot.


Moving up to tertiary education, we run into battles there as well.Adamawa State, formerly part of the now disbanded Gongola State,was the scene of a skirmish at this level. Gereng, chairman of the stateCAN chapter, reports that the government wanted to establish ArabicTeachers Colleges—please note the plural. When Christians began toobject, it was decided to establish one Christian Teachers College atSong. The idea of the latter barely got off the ground, when anattempt was made to turn this into an Arabic institution as well.Again Christians objected. The result was that the Shua MissionSchool was converted into a Christian Teachers College.110

During an interview with two staff members whose identitiesneed to be protected, I heard various stories about how theMuslim-dominated Ministry of Education was constantly trying tosmother this institution either by closing it down through deviousmeans such as withholding funds or by sheer corruption. FewNigerians would have withstood the pressure as did this principaland fight the good fight.

Muslims had more plans and privileges reserved for them-selves. They sought to turn other public institutions into Muslimones. At one time the Yola Teachers College was to become aHigher Islamic School. The Yola Vocational Training School wasalso picked for the same honour. As to privileges, this and otherschools like it enjoyed special attention in that their teachers “seemto be better treated than the staff in regular schools.” In fact, every-one associated with them was privileged. Principals, teachers andstudents were all “sponsored” by the government. Students were“all taken care of.” They were mostly employees of various localgovernments on study leave, fully paid and fed by the government.These arrangements, said Gereng, were surprising in a state that is“not predominantly Muslim.”

CAN took the case of one school to court. The place belongedto all people, not just to Muslims, Gereng pointed out. He insistedthat “whatever is done in this state must take into cognizance that


there are two major religions. We want them to show us that theyare not preferring Islam to Christianity. After all, we are all equal cit-izens of this state. So we have the right to whatever is the resource.”Gereng spoke much about the rights of Christians in Adamawa.“There is a small group of people who are not interested in peaceand are doing what they know will make us unhappy.” He warned,“They must know that we are human beings. We have our right toexist in this state, our right to determine our lives and everything.The right to possess, to participate and to hold important offices.We are part and parcel of this state.”111

As we move up to university level, we run into some inter-esting manœuvers. When the federal government renamed theUniversity of Sokoto “Uthman Dan Fodio University” after thefamous Muslim crusader, Christians were inspired to rename theUniversity of Lagos “Samuel Ajayi Crowther University,” afterthe first Black Nigerian bishop. The “Students Wing” of CANpublished an open letter to Babangida that is almost humorous inits pretence of peace and appreciation for the renaming of theSokoto university. It is a typical request of a Nigerian for a favourfrom a powerful person. It opens with the statement: “Weapplauded with all other Nigerians when last year theGovernment immortalised Uthman Dan Fodio, who was an out-standing Islamic Reformer, by renaming the university afterhim.” And then the clincher: “We solicit that such a gestureshould be extended to the stature of Bishop Crowther(1809–1891) by renaming University of Lagos to immortalisehim as Samuel Ajayi Crowther University.” They claimed to havecollected ten million signatures to endorse the change. The letterthen went into the details of Crowther’s accomplishments andthen once more stroked the ego of the president with pretentiousflattery: “We implore you, Sir, to use your good office and humanrights disposition to grant this, our popular request.” It closeswith one more completely uncharacteristic of CAN word of


praise for the president’s “commitment to national unity, socialjustice and economic recovery.”112

The educational system in Nigeria has taken a serious nosediveat every level. Lack of basic facilities, including furniture andbooks, lack of maintenance of buildings, lack of discipline amongteachers—all these plague the sector from primary through to uni-versity level, not to speak of cheating and violence. In May 2002,an important secondary school examination was aborted becauseseveral students had hired thugs to beat up the invigilators! Pray,tell, how do you run an educational system with such novelties—or, for that matter, a country?

The unidentified editor of CAN’s publication Leadershipsummed it up for the educational sector. “Who is responsible forthe fact that our educational system is in shambles?” he asked. Tohim, “the answer is obvious—Muslims!”113

I have my own comments on this cheap shot in a later volume. However, in view of all the above, it is entirely understandable that,ever since the government takeover of schools by the regime ofChristian General Yakubu Gowon, the church has been demand-ing their return. The National Executive of CAN remindedBabangida that CAN has repeatedly drawn the attention of thegovernment “to the perilous effects of the takeover” such as “juve-nile delinquencies and unprecedented acts of violence and destruc-tion by students,” all “predicted consequences.” Thus, “once again,we hereby strongly recommend that the government should returnthose institutions to their owners, in order that the urgently neededmoral and spiritual rehabilitation of our nation may start fromwithin their walls.”114 Mambula, in his capacity as general secretaryof TEKAN, circulated this document to the TEKAN churches “fortheir information,” according to a hand-written note on the copy Ihave at hand. A few years later, TEKAN made its own call to“Federal and state governments to return schools that were takenover from churches and missions.”115


5. FEMALE FASHIONS

You will remember from Volume 2 that the issue of femaledress is a sensitive one. Though the discussion goes beyond that ofschools, the school uniform issue is the one that receives the mostattention. Muslims object to the Western styles used for femaleuniforms, whether in hospitals, police, schools or National YouthService Corps (NYSC). We have noted that there were some ragingcontroversies about the issue. Hannatu Monday, a Christian, wasincensed about attempts to impose Muslim-style dress on non-Muslim children. In a lengthy complaint about Muslims reapingwhere Christians have sown, Salifu of CAN Kaduna bitterly statedthe case as Nigerian Christians generally see it. “The Christianbuilds his school. They [Muslims] take it over and say the Christianchildren must wear Islamic dress.”116 It has long been a standardcomplaint amongst Christians and they continue to resist.117

As all the other Christian–Muslim issues, this one also refusesto die. In March of 2003, secondary schools in Oyo State, the heartof the nation’s “tolerance” zone, were twice disrupted by “Muslimfundamentalists who invaded to enforce the use of the veil byfemale Muslim students.” Members of the National Association ofMuslim Youth Organisations (NACOMYO) “had taken to thebeating of teachers and principals, inflicting injuries on them, andcausing pervasive mayhem in [Ibadan], all in an attempt to enforcethe Islamic code of dressing for female students.”

The second time around, students “offered physical resistanceto the veil enforcers, leading to bloody clashes.” Various factionsin the society sprung into action. The union of teachers instructedits members to stay home to avoid further molestation. Studentsmarched to the governor’s office demanding peaceful conditionsin the schools. The editor of TD strongly chided NACOMYO forits “lawlessness and indiscipline.” They should have followedestablished channels for their grievances, it said, even though theeditor realised that governments are “hard of hearing” and under-


stand the language of violence better than that of appeals. He wasespecially offended by NACOMYO’s trying to enforce the veil onthe campuses of church schools, thus “stoking the embers of inter-religious strife.”

But what of the governor of Oyo, himself a Muslim? Muslimstudents and organisations had reportedly written him about thedress issue and the need for upholding the Muslim code. He appar-ently let the matter slide.118 It was another classic case of govern-ment inaction which eventually led to violence.

6. MEDIA

Another point of contention is access to the electronic media.Adamu Baikie, in his address at the launching of CAN declared it:“We have been denied access to the use of the electronic media incertain parts of this country and yet another religion has themonopoly of rendering a near 24-hours religious broadcast in thesame areas.”119 While we occupy ourselves with this charge, it isgood to remember the parallel Muslim complaints registered inVolume 2.

Again, Kano especially was accused of discrimination in thissector. The CAN 1982 Memo held up various states, includingsome with strong Muslim leadership such as Kaduna, Bauchi andSokoto, as examples of fair dealing in the assignment of airtime.These were all in contrast to Kano, where “the situation is entirelydifferent. There are no programmes whatsoever to cater for thespiritual welfare of non-Muslims. Any NTA (Nigeria TelevisionAuthority) quarterly programme will substantiate this submission.”

The next page of the CAN report featured a copy of a three-month scheduling cycle that indeed showed no recognizableChristian programme, while it did contain one and a half hours ofovert Muslim weekly programming. Several other programmeswere heavy on Kano culture, which is Islamic. There were someWestern secular programmes which Muslims might just argue were


Christian, since Christians advocate secularism. CAN had submit-ted “repeated applications for the audition of Sunday programmes,yet our prayers fall on deaf ears.” Even their request “for as little asfifteen minutes” for a Sunday service was denied.

Radio Kano featured over thirteen hours of overt Muslim pro-grammes per week, but Christians had to make do with a merethirty minutes and then only in English, a language understood byvery few Kano indigenes. Even that concession was of very recentorigin.120 In 1994, Open Doors reported that, while Christians weredenied access to these facilities, Ahmed Deedat, a South AfricanMuslim preacher, appeared regularly on TV.121

To buttress their case, CAN printed two letters in their Memo,one from the manager of Kano NTV to CAN and one from CANto the manager. The one from the manager, dated July 9, 1979,“acknowledges receipt of the photostat copies of your letters dated14th August and 13th November 1978 respectively and clarifiesthat we never had the original copies in our records. However, weshall invite you for further discussion as soon as we have fully exam-ined your request and consulted our Programme Advisory Board.”

On February 4, 1981, CAN wrote that they had waited for thepromised invitation, but it still had not arrived. By now two and ahalf years had passed without an inch of progress!122

Not only were the media airing Muslim programmes, but theywere also sometimes accused of openly siding with Muslims and offanning violence on the part of Muslims against Christians. It isone thing for privately-owned media to take sides, but now we aretalking publicly-owned media.

Wilson Sabiya, in his capacity as chairman of CAN, GongolaState Branch, called a press conference after two Muslim-ori-ented newspapers, GTFK and National Concord, published falsestories about a Western missionary’s alleged attempt to burn theQur’an. The first is a government-owned paper; the second wasowned by the now late Abiola. The missionary was said to have


failed, because “his two hands burnt and the Qur’an disappearedunder mysterious circumstances.” Sabiya explained that thesepapers had published these stories because they were trying todemonstrate that Christian missionaries are violent and have dis-respect for Islam. In other words, they were fanning hostility andincreasing tension in the country. Sabiya laid into these twopapers in a deservedly heavy-handed way. He demolished theidentity of the source of their information in such a way as tototally discredit the papers. He strongly advised them to thor-oughly check out their stories before rushing into print the nexttime and thus to protect the image of their religion.123

In the wake of Kafanchan, CAN accused the New NigerianNewspapers and the Federal Radio Corporation in Kaduna, bothgovernment corporations, of favouring Islam in their news cover-age. It even called for the proscription of the papers and askedCAN members to boycott them for a month. Benjamin Kwashi,later to become Anglican Bishop of Jos, demanded a probe into theradio and disciplinary action for Adamu, the editor of NN.124 Inits letter to Babangida, Kaduna CAN charged that the paper, a gov-ernment institution, “sponsored a divisive and emotive debate forthe entrenchment of sharia in our constitution with impunity andalmost brought our fatherland to the brink of bloodshed.”

Ayuba Joji Wudiri, a member of the 1977 ConstituentAssembly representing the Gombi constituency in Gongola State,wrote an eleven-page appeal to the federal government against theone-sidedness and destabilizing activities of the New Nigerian. Hewrote, “All well-meaning progressive thinking Nigerians are awareof the destabilising role the NN and agents of disunity haveembarked upon over the years and especially now during the cru-cial programme of transition to civil rule.” He made further claimsand statements as follows: “The tradition of the NN has been anignoble one. A tradition which is built on parochialism and sus-tained by intense religious bigotry.” The paper “thrives on journal-


ism based on sectional and religious interest of a minute and verybackward but powerful and highly exploitative and ruthlesslyaggressive class of Nigerians. Their modus operandi is manipula-tion of institutions, but [they] are basically afraid of democracy.”The paper “has not only been extremely pro the sharia issue, buthighly selective and purposeful towards a particular tendency interms of news gathering and dissemination.” Then Wudiri pre-sented no less than eleven concrete examples, including dates andquotes. He threw in terms such as “threats, insults, intimidation,falsehood.” He included a quote from the Muslim historian YusufuBala’s The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria who agreed that anNN article “was clearly intended to cause violent religious conflict.”He also quoted the Managing Director Mohammed Haruna as say-ing that “We are unabashedly pro-Sharia and [Haruna] thereforeassures the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly thatwhat you would be right to fight to death for is that sharia remainsentrenched in the constitution.”125

Wudiri asked some obvious but hard questions. Why shouldthis government-owned medium be allowed to play such a desta-bilising role for so many years? Did the government accept this roleor was she working against herself? Was this meant to be a Muslimorgan and an untouchable sacred cow? He answered his own ques-tions partially by recalling the statement of a former managingdirector about the purposes of the paper. They were said to be: (a)“To get across the views of the government of the northern eliteand mobilise them in order to achieve its goals” and (b) “To fightthe Northern case in all disputes at the centre.” The “Northerncase,” of course, includes Islam.

That all of these accusations were not mere imagination isborne out by the authorities of the Federal Radio Corporation ofNigeria, whose management felt the need to decide anew on“objectivity and fairness” in the face of the upcoming elections in2003. It pledged to “rise above partisanship.”126 Why the need for


such elementary and obvious decisions and what is so newsworthyhere—unless, of course, the elementary and obvious have indeedbeen ignored in the past? A Muslim complaint against political dis-crimination by Muslims against fellow Muslims in Katsina unfor-tunately proves the point.127

� Response of Authorities ___________________

The issue under this heading is how governments, their agentsand agencies have responded to threats of crises and to actualcrises. “Agents” here refers to individual officers, emirs and chiefs,as well as the army, police, along with the judicial system and var-ious government-appointed commissions. Governments areblamed for lack of action, untimely action, inept action, evilaction and for partiality in favour of Muslims and/or elite interestgroups. These issues are usually so intertwined with others that itbecomes difficult to classify and treat them all in watertight com-partments without trespassing on related issues discussed underother headings.

Lack of action itself, untimely or inadequate action are fre-quent charges. There are various explanations for these kinds ofactions and reactions. For one, Christians often feel that govern-ments have not accepted the secular status of the country. Becauseof their perceived Islamic orientation, the federal government,along with some state governments, allegedly chafe under the sec-ular constitution Christians insist upon. Without officially object-ing to it or denying it, governments are often seen to be playingwith it or denying it de facto through wrong or no actions. Thestatement of the ABU group in Appendix 4 blamed authorities forthe continuation of riots. The violence continued, the statementcharged, because “successive federal governments have toyed withone of the foundations on which Nigerian unity exists, namely thesecular nature of the state.” A dangerous impression exists that


those “organisations and individuals” who engage in such activities“get away with, at most, only verbal reprimands or appeals to betolerant.” These are charges heard repeatedly.

The role of the police in these events is almost always reportednegatively from the beginning of our period to the end. The NIPSSreport repeatedly put heavy blame on the police. In the case of theMaitatsine riots, “it was action by the law enforcement agentswhich constituted the immediate causes of the disturbances,” thereport asserted. The police did not seem to learn from the experi-ence of earlier riots. Clashes with police escalated but theMaitatsine learned how to fortify themselves so that they becameinaccessible to the police and it took the army to destroy theirstronghold. The persistent failure of the police led to theMaitatsine belief that the police were impotent. But the police werenot the only ones at fault, according to the report. All or most ofthe “law enforcement agencies were characterised by poor manage-ment and utilization of information, absence of coordination,inadequate strategy and weaponry.” In addition, the “discipline,loyalty and training of the policemen also left much to be desired.”All these led to “the chronic ineffective response of the police.” InYola, the public became “so incensed and so disillusioned with thepolice that it was the army which prevented the police from beinglynched” by the people.128

Complaints about police have been aired in connection withalmost all riots by both Christians and Muslims. At best, the forcesimply does not act in time. At worst, it is seen as aiding one sidewhile ignoring the needs of the other. Both parties feel the force isused against them, while it protects the interests of the other. TheKaduna branch of CAN wrote to the president that “since the lawand government have been so incompetent to defend us, we willhave to defend ourselves.” Why did the police and army units usedelaying tactics? Why could the authorities of ABU not controltheir students but felt the need to first consult with the Emir of


Zaria? CAN Kafanchan called for the removal of both the stateGovernor and the Emir of Zaria, both officials in control of police,for failure to protect their subjects.129

Even in the Christian-dominated Plateau State, the police wereaccused of harassing Christians. Under the heading “Relationshipbetween the Police Force and Christians in Plateau State,” the stateCAN chapter wrote a letter to the military governor that was signedby Musa Gotom and J. J. La-Nibetle, vice-chairman and generalsecretary respectively. It stated,

there is a concerted effort of a sinister move by certain interestgroups to destabilise Plateau State, and also to create a state ofcrisis between the police and the Christian groups and a lackof understanding between Plateau State Government andChristian groups.

The specific charges were as follows: (1) “Provocative use” of tear gasat a peaceful Christian gathering at the Polo Ground in March,1986; (2) Arrest and detention of pastors and other “cases of harass-ments and arrests of Christians”; (3) Biased police reports to thegovernment. Two specific letters are referred to; (4) “Excessive infil-tration and monitoring” of Christian activities that create “a state ofmistrust and lack of confidence in the police force and the govern-ment.” The letter further stated that, after “careful analysis, westrongly believe that the police force has always sought to exagger-ate the gravity of the religious situation as an occasion for sinisterintervention.” The writers then pledged loyalty, peaceful intentionsand readiness to discuss any security problems that may exist.130

Similarly, after the 1991 Bauchi riots, the National Executiveof CAN published a statement in which it accused the governmentof “failing in its constitutional responsibility” towards Christians inits “selective negligence.” CAN reminded the government that it is“entitled to the loyalty of its citizenry only if it can protect such cit-izenry. Neither federal nor the state government would appear to


qualify for this loyalty in view of the consistent, sad experiences ofChristians in this country.”

CAN called upon the government to discharge its constitu-tional responsibility by ensuring the security of Christians.131

Even as late as the Kaduna 2000 riots, after the police had expe-rienced so many riots, things had still not improved. Appendix 3 inVolume 1 of this series tells a similar story in connection with anattack on the Baptist Seminary in Kawo, Kaduna. As things becameheated, the principal called the local police chief and told him thatthey were under attack. The police chief, a Muslim, said that therewas trouble everywhere and there was not much he could do. Theprincipal then called the Baptist Mission headquarters in Ibadan andexplained their desperate condition. Through the staff there, theyeventually reached Professor Abaje, at the time both president of theBaptist Seminary in Ogbomosho and personal chaplain to PresidentObasanjo. Abaje approached the president, who, in turn, called thepolice chief in Kaduna. The police chief told him that there had beensome trouble but everything was under control. There has beenextensive debate about this Muslim police chief ’s handling of this cri-sis. Many Christians were convinced he knew about the plans for thisriot in advance. It was generally thought that, at the very least, he didnot handle this situation with the necessary neutrality.

1. TRIBUNALS AND THEIR FINDINGS

Cases of government inaction, half action or even deceitfulaction are often associated with closure to riots. The usual routineis for the state government and, sometimes, the federal governmentto appoint tribunals or panels which are assigned to report on thecauses of the event and provide recommendations for future pre-vention. The assignment often is announced routinely along witha statement that ensures the public there will be no “sacred cows.”However, wrote Minchakpu, “at the end of the day, the findings ofthe tribunals are not made public. Nothing tangible comes out of


the finding of these tribunals.” So, the question is then raised aboutthe involvement of the government or perhaps influential persons.What, or whom, is the government covering up ?132

As everything else in this overheated religious climate,Christian responses and objections to the reports on the variousriots were parallel to those of Muslims. There were two factors thatprevented satisfactory reports. One has already been mentioned:government intentional interference. The other and related factoris the one-sided composition of most of the panels. These two fac-tors basically paralyzed the “report industry.”

In 1982, Christians were already protesting the one-sided com-position of these commissions. In 1987, both CAN and even theKaduna government were most unhappy with the Kaduna RiotsCommittee report on Kafanchan. The government itself accusedthe committee of failure. Similarly, Governor Jega was unhappywith the report on Zangon-Kataf, for it avoided the root causes.

Matthew Kukah, always pungent, relaying interpretations aswell as offering his own of the Maitatsine riots, asserted that thevarious reports were mostly designed to pass the buck. TheAniagolu Tribunal, Kukah reported, concluded there were manygovernment parties involved, including “the state government andits agencies, individuals, organisations, the police and the NationalSecurity Organisation. The Kano governor, Abubukar Rimi, wasindicted for writing to top Maitatasine [leaders] and [for] diningwith his followers.”

Of course, the inevitable Marxist type of interpretation, notentirely wrong, that sees such events as a “by-product of [the]march into semi-industrial urban capitalism” is part of the chorus.Others regard the violent atmosphere as the result of “the collapseof the moral base on which traditional Islamic society had beenfounded.” Especially the Maitatsine riots can be viewed as attempts“to sweep away the accretions which had polluted Islam in the newmaterialistic Nigeria.”133


Kukah went into some detail about how these various entities,including the Kano State Administration, may have actuallyencouraged these riots for their own political advantage. Onceagain, the much beleaguered police were accused of cooperatingwith various political forces by refusing to apply timely forceagainst the rioters.

The truth has always had a hard time surfacing in the contextof these investigative panels. This is not only the complaint ofchurches and other non-governmental parties, but even from gov-ernments themselves. The Kaduna state government rejected muchof the Donli report on Kafanchan. The restlessness in Plateau Stateprompted Governor Dariye to appoint the Dusu Commission toidentify culprits. This, he hoped, would be the last commission everto be appointed for this purpose, for “he was tired of inauguratingjudicial commissions of inquiry.” Justice Felicia Dusu requested thegovernment “to release the findings of previous commissions to thepublic.”134 The Plateau crisis dragged on. About a year and a halflater, no one less than retired Lieutenant General Jeremiah Useni, aformer federal cabinet minister from Plateau State, also referred to“the inability and unwillingness of government to release the whitepapers on the earlier crises” and observed that this failure “had con-stituted a ban in the search for lasting peace.”135

I can only endorse these observations and wonder why it wasnot done. What is keeping the government from doing so? What isthe game being played here? The fact that someone of Useni’sstanding seemed powerless with respect to the release of govern-ment reports makes the issue more puzzling. This question becamestill more acute when Plateau Senator Davou Zang publicly statedthat “the perpetrators of the crisis are known.”136

If the governor has the information, why not simply arrest theperpetrators instead of wasting time and money on panels? Oneanswer is, because of manipulation and dishonesty. Probably both.With politics heating up again in Nigeria, charges of violence and


manipulation by politicians abound in the press during 2003. DanIsaacs suggests that, with elections coming up, politicians are“extremely reluctant to speak out to condemn the perpetrators ofviolence on all sides, for fear of losing support.”137

True, but they have been reluctant all the way along. It is inter-esting that the Dusu Commission of six included only one Muslim,the reverse imbalance Christians frequently complain about inMuslim-dominated states.

2. WRONG ACTION

The NIPSS report contains a rather juicy story of very suspi-cious behaviour on the part of the federal government after theKano 1982 riot. President Shagari had sent an emissary to theKano chapter of CAN “with a gift of N75,000.” The report makesthe following observations: (1) “We were surprised to find that therecords at the executive office of the president do not reflect thisgesture. Top officials did not seem to know of the gift. We wereunable to ascertain the official status of the gift”; (2) “Since no fur-ther action was taken by the president, the churches began to feelthat the money was given to them in order to buy their silence.They felt that this was unfair since the crux of the matter lay in theviolation of their rights. They felt the president should haveaddressed that issue as a matter of urgency”; (3) “The Christiansalso found the amount hopelessly inadequate if it was intended tobe a compensation, considering the amount of damage it wasintended to compensate.”138

Just as Muslims frequently berate the government for one-sid-edly blaming them for riots and thus arresting Muslims, soChristians fault the government. Some Christian leaders werearrested in the wake of Kaduna 2000. Among them were PeterJatau, the Kaduna-based Roman Catholic archbishop and chair-man of northern CAN; Saidu Dogo, northern CAN’s general sec-retary; Methodist Archbishop Benjamin Achigili and eleven more


leaders. A government statement published on November 21,2001, claims that, in a letter they signed, these leaders had con-fessed they had instigated Christians to engage in violence toprotest the implementation of the sharia. At least it was an actionthat would have pleased the Muslim community.

Poor governments! They can never do it right! Achigili rejectedthe accusation and said the accused had “at no time” orderedChristians to embark on violence. Instead, they had “askedChristians to embark on fasting and prayers over the decision toimplement Islamic law.” Besides, he added, “Christianity is a religionof peace and has respect for other religions, so we could not havedone what they are claiming.”139 This sounds like a quotation fromMuslims under similar circumstances! The logic, of course, is notentirely impeccable. The connection between religious doctrine andbehaviour of adherents can be obscure occasionally, to say the least.

� Concluding Comments ______________________

Nigerian Christians clearly are very suspicious of their govern-ments. Parallel to the views of their Muslim compatriots, they areconvinced that the government is controlled by Muslims andintends to destroy them. They see evidence of such intentions allaround them. They contend that the panacea for all their problemsis for the government to strictly adhere to impartiality and secular-ism as enshrined in the constitution.

The question is whether secularism is indeed demanded by theconstitution. Muslims deny it. Those differing interpretations arenot accidental: They are the direct result of their different defini-tions which are, in turn, related to their respective world views.While the next chapter will present Christian interpretations ofsome specific riots, the next volumes will deal with questions of sec-ularism and related issues. You are invited to continue the journeywith me.


� Notes _________________________________________

1 CAN, “Release,” 1987, p. 2.2 NIPSS, p. 30. CAN, 1982, pp. 19-20.3 NIPSS, pp. 5-6. 4 J Boer, 1979, pp.154-155, 528; 1984, pp. 43, 46, 53, 62, 77-79,

91.5 Boer, 1979, pp. 211-212. 6 Boer, 1979, pp. 211-212.7 Avre, 17 Nov/95. 8 Tsado, TC, 5/87, pp. 10-11. See Appendix in forthcoming Volume

5. It is common in Nigeria to expect that people in government positionswill dole out government contracts to their friends, relatives or co-reli-gionists, even among the best of people. Haruna Dandaura tells how hisdaughters expected him to “flood them with contracts” during his tenureas Chief Commissioner of Public Complaints and as Chairman of theCode of Conduct Bureau. He refused and “this beat their imagination.”M. Gaiya, 2003, p.106. These daughters are indeed among the best ofpeople and they considered it normal, not immoral. It is that embeddedin Nigerian culture. Officers who want to uphold government neutralityhave indeed an uphill battle, not only against the much maligned elite,but even against the moral members of society.

9 Tsado, TC, 5/87, pp. 10-11. 10 Tsado, TC, 5/87, p. 10.11 For further information about Salihu see Kantiok, pp. 202-205. 12 Tsado, TC, 5/87, p. 11.13 I. Yaro, p. 30. 14 I. Yaro, pp. 45-46. 15 During the current American administration of Bush Jr., there is a

much-advertised switch to aiding “faith-based” social improvement efforts.16 B. O. Nwabueze, pp. 17-18 17 There is some confusion in the literature as to the official name.

Some documents, even within the same newspaper, refer to it as “Islamic


Conference Organisation” or “ICO.” Regardless of the name used in thedocuments, I will use “OIC,” even in quotes. For a discussion on theweaknesses of OIC see The Economist, 21 Dec/91, p. 76.

18 Kantiok, pp. 260-261. 19 Editorial: “The OIC Affair.” NN, 27 Jan/86, p. 1.20 Independent, 24 Dec/95, p. 2.21 T. Falola, pp. 94-95.22 “OIC: Return to Status Quo?” TC, 2/87, p. 28. 23 T. Falola, pp.93-102.24 T. Falola, p.96.25 Appendix 1. 26 CAN, 11 Dec/89.27 Quoted from “O. J.’s Hidden Massacres, pp. 89-90 in undated cir-

cular from Josiah Publishing. 28 Though Appendix 5B purports to be of Muslim origin, I include

it in this chapter on Christian opinion rather than in Volume 2 that dealswith Muslim opinions. It is Christians who have turned it into publicdocuments by distributing it. I am most skeptical about the veracity ofmost of these documents. At the same time, Nigeria is known for someamazing and outrageous feats. At any rate, they will surely have served thepurpose of some people, Christians or otherwise, who wanted to raise thelevel of tension and suspicion in the country.

29 Falola, pp. 93-100. Kantiok, pp. 292-296.30 Editorial: “The OIC Affair,” NN, 27 Jan/86. 31 F. Adekeye, 6 Mar/2000, p. 11.32 “OIC: Return to Status Quo?” TC, 2/87, p. 20. 33 Minchakpu, TC 1/95, pp. 6-9.34 Quoted in K. A. Balogun, pp. 58-59.35 NN, 26 Jan/86, p. 2. 36 S. Aji, 10 Feb/86, p. 9. 37 “Jolly Tanko Condemns Nigeria’s OIC Membership.” NN, 28

Jan/86.


38 Punch, 5 May/91. 39 REC News Exchange, Oct/91. 40 Kantiok, p. 261. 41 NN, 3 Dec/99. 42 Grissen, p. 2. 43 I. Yaro, p. 30. 44 I. Yaro, p. 30.45 Jalingo, p. 22. 46 CAN, Leadership, pp. 6-7.47 Gilliland, p. 158.48 Sabiya, “The Draft Constitution,” pp. 1, 12. 49 Sabiya and Eze, 20 Apr/88. 50 CAN, 11 Jan/90. 51 TEKAN Action Committee, 17 Aug/88.52 CAN, 11 Dec/89.53 CAN, 24 Jan/90.54 Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, p. 9. 55 NIPSS, p. 30. CAN, 1982, pp. 19, 27-33. 56 Letter from Sumaila Local Government of 1 Nov/82, and signed

by L. B. Abdullahi. Reproduced in CAN, 1982, p. 23. 57 Letter dated 27 Dec/79 and signed by Abubukar S. Mohammad.

Reproduced in CAN, 1982, p. 24. 58 Letter from Ministry of Land and Survey, Kano State, 20 Feb/80,

signatory illegible. Reproduced in CAN, 1982, p. 25. 59 Letter from Wudil Local Government, 12 Oct/82, signed by H. Y.

Danyakasai. Reproduced in CAN, 1982, pp. 21-22. 60 Minchakpu, 1 Nov/99. 61 Minchakpu, p. 2. REC, Sep/99.62 CAN, 1987, p. 1. 63 Minchakpu, TC, 1/94, pp. 10-11. This article contains more

details of the story as well as of the court proceedings. The entire pro-


ceedings are found in TC, 1/94, pp. 16-23. 64 Anonymous, TC, 1/90, pp. 6-11. Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, p. 9.65 V. Musa, TC, 1/90, p. 9. 66 Wudiri, TC, 1/90, p. 12 67 Gereng, TC, 1/94, pp. 4-5. 68 In addition to the regular Local Government Area Council, there

is a council of the chiefs in the area. 69 CAN, Wase Branch. 70 M. Eliot. 71 CAN, 9 Jan/91. 72 REC, Feb/98, p. 3. 73 Minchakpu, 18 Dec/98. This is one major riot that did not make

it into Volume 1.74 NIPSS, pp. 32-33. 75 It is typical of Muslims to attempt to present a Muslim face to a

community. When the Kaduna state government house was fenced in,Governor Abdullahi Mukhtar used the occasion to erect a Muslim dome atthe entrance. CAN asked, “Do we take this to mean a declaration that theseat of government…can only be inhabited by Muslim governors?” It calledon the governor to erect a cross at the entrance as well “to show his neu-trality” and “to reflect the secular character of the state” (CAN, 11 Dec/89).

76 Kukah, 1993, pp. 162-164. The Muslim side of this issue was,regrettably, not treated in Volume 2. However, the Muslim point of viewis expressed in NN, 14 Aug/88 and 2 Mar/89, p. 10. While the former isan article that includes specific lists of allocations, the latter features cor-respondence between government authorities and CAN.

77 Abbreviation for Nongo Kristu u Sudan Hen Tiv, meaning “TheChurch of Christ in the Sudan among the Tiv,” a Reformed denominationserving mainly the Tiv nation. It is a member of the TEKAN fellowship andof CAN. It is one of the few Nigerian denominations that has a non-Englishname, a point currently under heated debate among the constituency.

78 NKST newsletter, Aug/95. 79 Minchakpu, REC July-Aug/99.


80 CAN, 12 Aug/89. 81 ThisDay, 18 June/2002; 17 Mar/2003.82 Minchakpu, 6 May/2002.83 Ogueri, Daily Champion, 22 May/92. I urge the accountants

among us to resist the temptation to check the figures! 84 Yaro, pp. 30-32. 85 CAN, 12 Aug/89. 86 Anonymous, Nigerian Christian, Dec/96, pp. 8-9. 87 Obemeata, 3 Dec/95. 88 Kukah, 12 Dec/95. 89 NN, “Islamic Education System Commended,” 6 Jan/77. 90 30 Jan/77. 91 CAN, 1982, p. 26. 92 Dandaura, 3 Dec/82, pp. 4, 7. 93 Abbreviations for British Broadcasting Corporation and Voice of

America, household words in Nigeria.94 CAN Youth Wing, 29 May/90. 95 TEKAN / ECWA Release, 31 Dec/94. 96 Baikie, p. 42. One wonders who is taking a cue from whom. Is it

merely a coincidence that the nationalization of Christian schools inNigeria coincided with the same process in Pakistan in the early 1970s?Yakubu Gowon should be able to answer that one. The question becomesmore acute when we learn that in some Nigerian states these schools arebeing returned at the same time as they are in Pakistan. See The BarnabasFund Prayer Notes for 20 July/2002 and Donpedro, Vanguard, 22July/2002.

97 CAN, 1982, pp. 15-16, 35.98 Minchakpu, 25 Mar/2002. 99 Minchakpu, 25 Mar/2002.100 Minchakpu, 6 May/2002.101 Kukah, 1993, p. 193.102 B. Umar, 27 Aug/89.


103 REC, 2/99, p. 3. 104 TC, 2/96, pp. 18-21. REC, Sep/96.105 Check also Adedeji, NC, 7 Mar/96 and REC, Sep/99. 106 Olanipekun, 11 Dec/94. REC, Sep/96. 107 REC, Sep/96. 108 P. Clarke, 1984, pp. 158-159.109 Independent, 19 Nov/95, p. 2.110 Gereng, p. 5. 111 Gereng, p. 6. 112 CAN’s “Student Wing.” 113 P. 36. 114 CAN, Letter to the President, 12 Aug/89.115 TEKAN, Communiqué, 2001. 116 TC, 5/87, pp. 23, 20.117 It is not that Christians resent Muslim fashion. Northern

Christian men, including yours truly, will often wear Muslim/Hausadress, some only at formal occasions, while for others it constitutes theirdaily attire. Many no longer associate it with Islam.

118 Editorial, TD, 28 Mar/2003. 119 Baikie, p. 42. 120 CAN, 1982, pp. 16-18, 36, 39-40.121 Open Doors, May/94, p. 2. I am aware of some inconsistencies

between this paragraph and the previous one. That’s how I find it in thedocuments. I have no way of reconciling the conflicting information.

122 CAN, 1982, pp. 39-40. 123 Sabiya, Press Conference.124 Kukah, 1993, p. 194. 125 Quote from NN, 19 Oct/88, p. 7. 126 Ahiante, 29 May/2002. Only the party in power is given cover-

age. The other thirty are blacked out, according to Funtua.127 Funtua, Weekly Trust, 8 Mar/2003.


128 NIPSS, pp. 21-26.129 Kukah, 1993, p. 194. 130 CAN, 8 Sep/87. 131 CAN, 24 Apr/91. 132 Minchakpu, TC, 1/98, p. 89. 133 Some of these explanations are offered also by Paul Ubeck and

Raymond Hickey. See Kukah, 1993, pp. 154-155. 134 “Dariye Inaugurates Crises Probe Panel,” TD, 20 Aug/2002.135 Peter-Omali, 2 Mar/2004.136 “Senator Hails Plateau Peace Summit,” TD, 20 Aug/2002. 137 Isaacs, 20 Dec/2002. 138NIPSS, p. 33. Kukah, 1993, p. 160.139 REC, Jan/2002, p. 2


� Introduction ________________________________

The previous chapters deal with general issues that form thebackground of the riots, issues that contribute to the explosiveatmosphere so conducive to riots. The role of the Muslim commu-nity is analyzed, as well as that of the various governments. In thischapter, I emphasise more the sparks that set off riots, that is, thespecific circumstances and causes as Christians see them. This divi-sion of materials, I am quick to acknowledge, is not always as neatas I would like, for every explanation of immediate causes almostalways harks back to past issues or general situations in Christianminds. Nevertheless, associating the issues with specific riots willhelp develop a more concrete picture.

Not every riot described in Volume 1 will receive treatmenthere. However, all the issues will be covered, some perhaps morethan adequately.

I begin with the reminder that, though our emphasis in thisseries is on the period from the 1980s into the early years of the newcentury, the terror Nigerian Christians complain about at the hands

EXPLANATIONS

FOR SPECIFIC RIOTS

� S I X

of Muslims started long before that. “J. O.” already experienced itas a thirteen-year-old in 1966, few months after my arrival inNigeria. He wrote, “I witnessed a holocaust, massive killings of theChristians then. I witnessed every church in the city we were livingdestroyed. I still remember the Anglican church across from ourhouse where the members were worshipping and the Muslim thugscame in, drove them out and set the church on fire.” His letterclosed with the question, “How much longer shall this continue?”1

In 2003, thirty-seven years after “J. O.’s” early experience, weare still unable to answer that question.

� Focus on Kano ___________________

1. 1982

The Kano 1982 riot, it may be remembered from Volume 1,centred on St. George’s Anglican Church in Fagge. It was the firstof the major Christian–Muslim riot series treated in these studies.In response to this riot, CAN began the tradition of issuing memosto the government to present the Christian viewpoint, a traditionthat continued over the decades as new riots erupted throughoutthe North.

This first major Muslim versus Christian riot in Kano, CANdeclared, was primarily a religious event. An early paragraph states,“These religious disturbances were really persecutions directed atthe Christian community by fanatical Muslims.” They reachedtheir climax in the destruction of Christian church buildings. CANhas remained faithful to this religious interpretation throughout allthe riots and has consistently rejected all attempts to deflect atten-tion and blame from Islam as the culprit. Under the heading “TheEssence of the Disturbance,” CAN declared that it “views thisproblem as one of a direct confrontation between some fanaticalMuslims against the Christians.” It also viewed the conflict as “achallenge to the Constitution.” It was “only a symptom of a great


problem” that has been “gathering momentum for years in Kano.” The immediate Muslim excuse about the location of a church

being close to a mosque is torn to shreds with the information thatthe church was granted a Certificate of Occupancy way back in1932. It has an expiration date in 2004.2 The mosque dates from1968 only. Muslim objections to the nearness of the church reallyhold no water whatsoever.

Why, asked CAN, did Muslim youth go on a rampage? Theanswer was that they had been encouraged by the governmentitself. It has taken over Christian schools without compensation.Permission for opening new schools has been denied for “flimsyexcuses.” Christians have been denied media programming.Church buildings have been denied and demolished whileChristians have been molested. Christians are even denied ade-quate space for their dead. Youths, when they observe such skewedconditions, draw their own conclusions as to the place and rightsof Christians. As CAN interpreted it, “The Muslim sub-cultureand the upbringing of youngsters in Kano State encourages young-sters to hate Christians and tell them [the Christians] that they areunwanted; e.g., the name of a Christian in the mind and lips of anaverage Muslim is kafiri, arne.”3

No one, whether in the community or in government, “con-sidered the existence of the Christians to be anything to be reck-oned with, since they are totally an insignificant minority.”

The Kano state government appointed a commission to inves-tigate the causes of this riot. However, Christians objected to itscomposition—as they did in almost all subsequent cases for reasonsalready explained in the previous chapter. CAN’s 1982 Memolisted the names of the members appointed to investigate the1982 crisis and found that only two of the eight were Christians.This imbalance, the Memo suggested, turned it into a vested inter-est body that could not possibly come to objective conclusions.CAN requested that, “in the interest of fair play and justice,” a new

Explanations for Specific Riots 169

and independent body be appointed that “will reflect fair and unbi-ased representation.”4

Similarly, Haruna Dandaura, about the only Christian nativewith any potential clout in this context, expressed in his customarygentle language his doubts about the effectiveness of such anarrangement. The Kano government’s committee to whomDandaura wrote his letter was, he pointed out to them, “made upof men of integrity, men, who although they comprise mostlyMuslims, have been endowed with wisdom and impartiality.” Andwhile he expressed happiness with the “total condemnation of theincident” by the state government, the governor, the emirate coun-cil and the emir, it “remains to be seen,” he wrote, “that the perpe-trators are dug out and adequately punished. People must be madeto understand that Nigeria belongs to everyone of us.”5 Dandaura’sfears, it turned out, were legitimate. Christians were very upsetabout the majority report and the two Christian members pre-sented their own minority version.

The Muslim majority reported causes on both sides of thefence. Muslim causes were the influence of provocative Iranian lit-erature and the “intra-brotherhood squabbles among Muslimsthemselves.” Christian provocation included recent visits of boththe pope and the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury in quick suc-cession, which had created anxiety amongst Muslims. The re-lay-ing of the foundation stone of the new St. George’s Church addedfurther fuel to the fire. The Christian push for secularism and theirevangelistic methods had long been irritants. The fact that theCAN leadership in Kano consisted largely of southerners onlyproved to Muslims that CAN was merely a political bridgehead ofthe Christian south into the Muslim north.

The majority recommendation was to remove St. George’sand pay compensation, even though the church had been certifiedsince 1932. This, according to Kukah, shocked Christians. Theepisode “revealed a deep-seated prejudice against Christians. They


… stopped short of legislating Christianity out of existence inKano state.” They also advised that any new mosque or churchshould have the approval of the local community. The outcome ofsuch a policy was obvious, with Christians being a small minorityin most communities.

The minority report by the two Christians on the panel,Victor Musa and James Sofa, stated that the incident was merelysymptomatic of the general anti-Christian attitude in the state. Ifthe government wished to get to the source of the trouble, itshould review the entire landscape of Christian–Muslim relations.They then proceeded to a discussion of all the forms of discrimi-nation that Christians suffer, which are treated under their appro-priate headings in previous chapters.6 In other words, to theseChristian spokesmen, the general atmosphere was the main expla-nation; the specific provocation was not important when it cameto solving the issue. In this respect the report was very similar toMuslim explanations.

2. 1991

The 1991 Kano riot centred on the coming of the German evan-gelist Reinhard Bonnke. The basic facts of the riot have beenreported in Volume 1. The Kano State Branch of CAN submitted amemo to the investigative panel established by the state government.It reminded the panel that CAN had presented a similar memo afterthe 1982 Kano riot. The discouraging thing was that “almost every-thing therein contained as causes are still relevant today. None of thecommendations were implemented nine years later.”

As to the cause, CAN insisted that “the disturbance was religiousin motive, nature and proceedings.” The mob was chanting Islamicjihad songs, they came from the prayer ground and/or mosque andhad been addressed by Muslim leaders. Various causes were identi-fied in the document. The first one listed was the “derogatory andvery inciting publications” by the Pen and Alkalami, the two Kano-


based twin papers we met in previous volumes. “Their number oneenemy is Christians.” The notion that Kano citizens are 100 percentMuslims played a part as well. It ignored the sizable Christian minor-ity and somehow legitimised terrorizing them. The governmentencouraged discrimination by its treatment of Christian students andcivil servants. The latter work under “degrading contract condi-tions.” The police performed poorly because of their recent deploy-ment to their own states of origin, which made it very hard for themto disregard the pressure of the local Muslim community. The recentdefeat of Iraq in the Gulf War was experienced as a humiliation ofIslam and called for revenge. Government media in Kano fanned thisspirit with their insinuations.

Muslims objected to the use of the Race Course for the cru-sade. With threats from both sides, the state government was in agenuine bind. The author of a write-up in Liberation Times, aKano-based newspaper run by a Baptist pastor, appeared to have nosensitivity for the government’s difficulty. He berated officials for“giving different excuses for not agreeing to release the place.” “Alot of religious politics was brought into a simple administrativeissue. In the process, bitterness and distortion of facts had a fieldday, thereby laying the foundation for the mayhem.”

Of course, this was hardly just a “simple administrative issue;”it was a political trap from which there was nary an escape for thegovernment. Having said that, I am quick to acknowledge that thetrap did not develop by accident. It was the natural result of long-standing government pro-Muslim bias.

In keeping with the CAN memo, one Simeon Ogbonnastrongly rejected the economic interpretation of this riot offered bythe Christian Vice President Aikhomo. “Nothing,” Ogbonna pro-claimed, “could be further from the truth.” It was “religious, pureand simple. It was the fear of conversion that sparked it off.” Thestories of Bonnke’s successes elsewhere had caused fear in Kano.And so “the forces of hell would not have it so. They had to fight;


they had to stop it.” However, those who blame the Bonnke cru-sade “have no case to make,” unless “they can prove that Christianshave no right to stage a crusade in Kano.” The history of theBonnke ministry elsewhere in Nigeria clearly demonstrates that hiscrusades do not encourage violence. “The history of religious vio-lence in Nigeria bears this out. Muslims have all along been theaggressors! Christians have always been at the receiving end.”7

The similarity to apartheid was also noticed here. JosephFadipe wrote a strong article accusing Nigeria’s leaders of hypocrisy.They opposed the white apartheid regime while they practised“religious apartheid” in their own country, especially Kano. Thereason for this situation was that the oppressors within Nigeriabelonged to the same religion to which the “majority of those ingovernment” also belonged. He “marvels” that the governmentsearched for and arrested coup plotters, but failed “to arrest thosefanatical Muslims who always cause religious disturbance. Is it notbecause the killers belong to the so-called state religion and there-fore are sacred cows to the government?”

Daniel Bitrus, a Plateau Christian leader and at the time generalsecretary of the Bible Society of Nigeria, in a letter of condolence toKano Christians, stated that “the main issue is intolerance and theunaccommodating attitude of Muslims to other religions.” Heaccused the Kano government “of taking a shallow and unfair deci-sion by banning all [public] religious activities instead of confrontingthe Muslims with their barbaric action constantly meted out to theChristian community without any provocation.” As already heard sofrequently, he noted that the findings of investigative panels are neverpublished and thus no good ever results from them.8

ECWA has a large compound in Kano. During the riots, staffmembers conducted a prayer walk around the entire compound.Rioters came twenty times to destroy the compound, but theywalked away every time without touching anything. A few daysafter the riot, an alhaji was observed staring at the hospital by a


hospital staff member who asked him what he was after. TheMuslim told him that “he had come with a group. As theyapproached the compound, they stopped in front of it because thecompound was surrounded by pillars of fire. They assumed some-body else had set the place on fire and left.”9

What does that tell us about protection?!The role of the other protectors, the police, left much to be

desired. They were aware of the Muslim threats of violence. TheLiberation Times reporter had read one of the threat letters addressedto the police commissioner and copied to the governor and emir.The police would only have itself to blame, if the crusade was notprevented, it read. When CAN warned the police of the threats,they were variously called “alarmists” or they were “assured of ade-quate security measures being put in place.” Police inaction, accord-ing to our reporter, “encouraged the planners of the riot to unleashtheir reign of terror.” When the first phase of violence broke out, thepolice once again claimed that “everything was under control.” Thepolice were actually seen to be conniving with the Muslim riotersinstead of stopping them. When the Liberation Times reporter askedthe police for assistance, an inspector “stated flatly that his team wasnot sent there to intervene in the crisis but to stay there! (whateverthat means).” The reporter was fair enough to relay that someMuslims had protected Christians at considerable danger to them-selves and that there were some “new breed” Muslims who disap-proved of this violence. Victor Musa, the ECWA pastor, prayed thatthose Muslims be granted political power.10

As a final comment on this riot, I cannot escape the impressionthat Christians were hell-bent on pursuing their course regardless ofthe likely consequences. Though there was no excuse for the intran-sigence of Muslim intolerance, I question the wisdom of Christianleaders who proceeded with their plans under such circumstances.But I also understand their being tired of constant harassment anddenial of their constitutional rights. Given the fact that both parties


insisted on their rights, this was a no-win situation, made worse bythe fact that the demands for their rights were based on conflictingfoundations. It was a case of a traditional Muslim view of religiousliberty versus that of a secular constitution, with neither recognizingthat of the other. This unresolved conflict was to play a partthroughout the next decades and culminated in the re-establish-ment of the full sharia around the turn of the century.

� Focus on Kaduna ___________________

1. KAFANCHAN, 1987

Tsado and Ari were journalists with Today’s Challenge during theKafanchan riots. They published a “Special Investigation” under thetitle “Who Is Trying to Destabilise Islam?” Their story shows howextremely twisted and distorted situations can become when peopleturn into desperate schemers with no holds barred. Under normal cir-cumstances such a story would simply be considered unbelievable.11

During January 1987, the Muslim Circle of the University ofSokoto, the centre of Muslim power and prestige in Nigeria, madean accusation to the Director of National Security Services that theJos ECWA Theological Seminary (JETS) had “designed a grandsubversive strategy against Muslims in the country.” The docu-ments on which the alleged plot was based were appended to theirletter. As the story goes:

It said that the documents were “dangerously provocative” toMuslims. The letter further asserted that it was the failure ofgovernment “to prevent the execution of such mischievousplans” that usually provokes Muslims to react, sometimes vio-lently, against their opponents.

One of the documents is captioned “Committee on Islamic Affairs,Action Division,” and bears the same postal address as JETS.Marked secret, but addressed to no one in particular, this document


stated that five booklets have been published in English, Hausa andArabic, “using the Bible and Koran to confuse the Muslims andshow them the true way.” The document stated that sixty-eight mil-lion copies of the said booklets have been printed for distributionthrough Challenge Bookshops12 in some northern states. It furthersaid that 150 people have been appointed for the project.13 Theundated letter has the stamp of the “Christian Propaganda Wing.”

Another document under a similar letter heading is a letter titled“Islamic School Project.” The letter said one Isa Bello and UsmanBala would be sent for training at BUK Kano and ABU Zaria.14 Itfurther alleged that several intellectuals, including Dr. Yusufu Turaki,Principal of the Seminary, and “10 others to be appointed” will“teach in the school.” Said the document: “Desks, chairs all bought.School session will begin very soon. With a BA with specialization inIslamic Studies. MA Programme to be introduced shortly.”

A third document under the letter heading “ECWA TheologicalSeminary Jos,” is titled “Strategies for Muslim Outreach.” It statedthat “funds have been made available for the establishment ofanother radio and TV production centre for Muslim evangelism.” Itsaid the centre would meet [with] Christian governors “to try to getfunds for such a school.”

A month later, a Muslim newspaper in Lagos, Friday Nur, pub-lished similar materials under the caption “Plans to subvert Islam;Christians Map out Strategies.” It alleged that the aim was “thetotal elimination of Islam from Nigeria.” In the Nigerian context,this is explosive stuff and cannot be ignored by authorities.Nathaniel Olutimkayin, Chairman of the JETS Board, refuted allthese allegations in a press conference, claiming that the allegationswere “malicious lies calculated to whip up sentiments and causereligious confusion in the country.”

It turned out that the government had in hand a letterallegedly written and signed by the JETS registrar to a former JETSstudent, Ebby Cheriyan, an Indian, dismissing him from the


school. Turaki denied that JETS had dismissed Cheriyan, but thelatter had left the school in the company of his father for unknownreasons and destination. Turaki also denied all other allegations. Herequested the government investigate these charges, in view of theirseriousness, but officials declined.

Turaki did investigate. He learnt that Cheriyan had told a fac-ulty member that Muslims were pressing him to convert to Islam.They also promised him a good job and a scholarship for furtherstudies. The registrar who was to have signed was abroad on thevery date shown on the letter. The parents of the young manreported how he had lied to them in various ways and that he justdisappeared. When he did show up after some time, he claimed tohave a job as Research Propaganda Officer with the Dantata Groupin Kano. This, too, was found to be a lie.

Instead, Today’s Challenge discovered, Cheriyan was offered ateaching position in a yet to be established Arabic Teachers Collegein Jos, sponsored by JNI. His name had already appeared on thelist of tutors submitted to the government. He had submitted aJETS testimonial that he had the course requirements for such aposition. This testimonial was indeed signed by the JETS registrar,when Cheriyan told him he was to teach at the Institute of MassCommunication Technology in Jos. Attached to this testimonialwas a letter written by Cheriyan to JNI, thanking them for hisappointment with them and pledging “to work to my fullest capa-bility to serve Islam.” In the end he admitted his role in all of thisand sought forgiveness from his father.

In the meantime, security officers had come to JETS and toldTuraki that they had found no truth in these allegations. Turakithus wondered why “no concrete steps had been taken to stop thefalse rumours, and why the documents, which have been mass-pro-duced, are still being circulated in Muslim circles and paraded inhigh government places across the country.”

Turaki also discovered that the documents


were produced by certain Muslim groups who mastermindedthem, fabricated them, funded and distributed them. Hebelieved Cheriyan was only used as an agent. The fact thatCheriyan’s name was on the staff list of their proposed ArabicTeachers College shows the close association of the JNI withCheriyan and the production of the said documents.

He commented that his investigation made everything appear“sinister and targeted against Christians.” Behind it all wereMuslims.

When TC’s representative called on various government offi-cials about this convoluted story, no one was prepared to talk, allof them giving reasons that sounded more like excuses. Similarly,the top official of JNI, Alhaji Abdulazeez, refused to comment“because of the situation in the country. We are all looking forpeace in the country and more especially reporters and newsmenhave not all been helpful in this respect. Sometimes when you saysomething, they fabricate and twist it to suit themselves to causeconfusion, and we have witnessed enough confusion.”

The Plateau State Military Governor’s Office had written a let-ter to JETS, clearing them of these allegations: “Investigations haverevealed that your Seminary never wrote any of the alleged anti-Islamic documents. However, effort is being intensified to identifythose behind the plot.” But TC could not suppress the question asto the motives behind these developments: Was it a subversiveattempt to cause religious violence and political instability? Forexample, the letter to the director of National Security Servicesstated that the documents “are dangerously provocative” and thatMuslims normally “react” to such “mischievous plans sometimesviolently.” Paragraph four of that letter reads:

For the benefit of doubt, Sir, let’s consider this hypothetical sit-uation. If these millions of booklets were to reach the public toconfuse the Muslims through Challenge Bookshops, and the


Muslims react in one way or the other, would the Muslims beheld responsible or the Christians?

The Challenge reporter pointed out that this letter was writtenonly some six weeks before the Kafanchan riots started during whichmore than 150 churches were destroyed. “Observers wonder if thesefabricated documents and allegations were not some of the long termfactors that led to the riots. They also wonder if some people are notdeliberately sowing seeds of confusion in the country.”15

Indeed, this may have been the case, as we shall see in the nextparagraphs.

Five years later, Turaki stood before a Kaduna State tribunalinvestigating the Zangon-Kataf uprising. Since that body wasaccepting the false Muslim documents described above as relevantto that later event, he had cause to refer to them once again in hissubmission to the 1992 Tribunal. He charged that “Some clandes-tine religious syndicates masterminded, fabricated, produced anddistributed the said documents which were primarily aimed at incit-ing and fanning the embers of religious violence in the country andtarnishing the good name of ECWA and to implicate her andChristianity in general.” He further commented, “It is sad andunfortunate that some Muslim groups could mastermind thesefalse documents to deceive the entire nation and incite Muslimyouths against innocent Christian churches in 1987 and subse-quently.” Such acts “of telling lies and fabrication of falsehood,whether by eye-witness or radio or television or a newspaper or awrite-up, these acts are in themselves strategies of blackmail and ofinciting either religious or communal violence or both.”16

Certainly the Kafanchan branch of CAN thought these inci-dents were related. According to them, the Kafanchan riots “actuallyhave their origins in concerted attacks over the last few months, onthe fundamental basis of the Christian faith by Muslims.” Theseattacks include the widespread distribution of documents and


videotapes about Jesus not being the Son of God and the Bible notHis Word. Some of the videotapes were from a famous SouthAfrican Muslim evangelist, Ahmed Deedat. They were distributedat an International Trade Fair in Kaduna and even were broadcastrepeatedly on Sokoto and Kano government television stations.“When these psychological and spiritual attacks failed to provokeany counter attack from the Christians,” the CAN report explained,the next step taken by the Muslims was to resort to the violence ofthe Kafanchan riots.

The above report by the Kafanchan branch of CAN was part ofa larger package of reports, written by a number of individuals andorganisations, that is bundled together by CAN in its 1987Release.17 Here CAN suggested that the government was support-ing a Muslim jihad. It had plenty of evidence for such a suspicionin the course of this riot. It charged that both police and militaryfailed to protect Christians deliberately by resorting to theirfavourite ploy of “waiting for order from our superiors.” It appeared

that the police was purposely ill-equipped to contain the situa-tion. The military was helpless, because they could only movewhen orders were given. It clearly showed that the authoritywaited for the completion of this phase of the jihad before allow-ing the police and the army to maintain law and order. So,when the order came, it was too late to salvage the situation.

Another indication of government support was the involvementof official vehicles. Muslims were conveying “old tires and jerricansof petrol” for purposes of arson in pickups, some of which belongedto the government. In addition, a car associated with the emir was“following the operation supposedly to report the progress.”

CAN reported a curious feature of the Muslim violence.During its course, “warriors” were constantly shouting that “every-thing in the name of Allah shall end at the palace of Lamido ofAdamawa, the Emir of Yola, the capital of Adamawa State, far east


of Kaduna.” CAN wondered about the significance of this call.The violence also spread to ABU in Zaria. CAN reported that

a university communiqué explained that officials could not controlthe Muslim students because of the influx of intruders from outside.CAN questioned the truth of this claim. Why did ABU authorities“contact the emir before taking security decisions?” The emirseemed to know more about their students than ABU authoritiesthemselves. He stated in a broadcast that the problems were startedby Muslim students. How, wondered CAN, did he know this? Andwhy did he wait eighteen hours before taking any action? “Theremust be more to it than meets the eye.” Similarly, the governor in abroadcast promised decisive military intervention, but why did healso wait eighteen hours before stopping the rampage?18

The CAN report contains a humorous contradiction. In themain report, government media are criticised for exaggerating theviolence. In the “Comments,” the government is criticised for min-imizing it in the media.19 Who wants to be in government?! A ver-itable “no-win” situation.

So far, CAN’s release may seem partial or one-sided, but CANwas smart enough to include a variety of reports in this bundle,even one written by a Muslim school official, that would undercutany such charge. The Muslim was Lawal Garba, the school’sStudents Affairs Officer, who, as one of the first victims, was beatenby the Muslims and received a fractured skull. According to him,Bako did misinterpret the Qur’an and had referred to Mohammedas a false prophet. In addition, Garba reported, Christians wel-comed students from other schools with a banner at the school gatewith the words, “Welcome to the Jesus Campus”—remember, it isa government college, not Christian. All of this was very provoca-tive to Muslims. To top it off, Christian students burnt the collegemosque in response to the Muslim attack.

In the Nigerian context of general volatility and Muslim intol-erance, such behaviour amounts to an invitation to war. It may be


debatable whether anyone should have the freedom to behave likethat in such a volatile context. The lack of wisdom and restraintamong these Christian students is not debatable. Garba’s reportalso clearly indicated the same lack among the Muslim attackers.He ended up giving Christian students the higher marks.20

Another document included in the CAN release is one fromthe ABU Christian community. It provides helpful details of theABU parts of the episode as well as those around Zaria city.Though written independently from the CAN release, it fully con-firms all the explanations and accusations of the “mother” docu-ment. By having appended the document to its release, CAN hasappropriated it as well. Because of its relatively clear and systematiccoverage of the ABU part of the riots, I include it as Appendix 9.

The purpose of this ABU Christian release was to correct theskewed picture the public was given of the flow of events thatincluded “the burning of virtually all the churches in the Zariaarea” as well as three chapels on academic campuses. Though we arepromised “a more comprehensive report at a later date,” I am notaware that it ever materialised.

As far as the ABU situation is concerned, the origin of these riotsis traced to “concerted attacks over the last few months on the fun-damental basis of the Christian faith by Muslims both within andwithout the campus.” This part of the report is similar to explana-tions earlier in this chapter about Muslim tracts and videos that hadbeen widely distributed and also broadcast over government televi-sion in Sokoto and Kano. Muslims shifted to “physical attacks” whenspiritual provocation did not produce the Christian counter attackthey were hoping to evoke. The release gave great detail on how theauthorities were informed well ahead of time of plans to destroychapels and churches, but they consistently refused to take action.When the main ABU chapel was burning, the Vice-Chancellor“appeared either unable or unwilling to effect any action.” The secu-rity agencies similarly used the traditional excuses not to intervene.


The failures on the part of the emir and the governor were classic aswere the shenanigans of the media. It is all there in Appendix 9. AllChristian attempts to avert the mayhem ran into roadblocks of resis-tance, deception, evasion and dereliction of duty. It is just one moresordid story that fits right into the established tradition of the not-so-secret government support of the not-so-covert Muslim jihad totake over Nigeria by hook or by crook—mostly by crook.

Another strong post-Kafanchan statement from another CANofficial was that of Catholic Archbishop Peter Jatau, the KadunaState Chairman of CAN. He recalled that several “religious distur-bances” generated “commissions of inquiries or panels,” but “the cul-prits have never been brought to book. We have sacred cows in oursociety who must never be touched no matter what harm, covert orovert, they inflict on this nation.” The sacred cows, in such state-ments, are seldom clearly identified, but when Christians use theterm, it always refers to Muslims. CAN’s response to the Donlireport was that, though the members were “honourable women andmen,” the committee’s “only achievement was the dereliction of thevital duties assigned to it.” The entire report was “deliberately evasiveand designed to protect, nourish and sustain the cover-up syndromethat denies to all victims of oppression justice, and the sacred-cowconcept that makes the privileged Muslim class bigger than the lawof the land and their whims the law which the ever oppressedChristians must obey.” The committee “lacked the courage to sin-cerely and honestly address itself to the vital issues in its terms of ref-erence and in consequence of this want of courage, its observationsand recommendations were vague, evasive, hypocritical and deliber-ately skewed to please the whims of the Muslims.” CAN furtherobjected that the report failed to identify specific people likeAbubukar Gumi and the Kaduna government media, namely televi-sion and the New Nigerian, all of whom played destructive roles.21

Here is one case in which some of the sacred cows are identi-fied. If the report’s recommendation about the sharia was going


to be accepted, then the government would also have to establishand pay for Christian ecclesiastical courts to apply canonical lawsfor Christians.22

There were a few other academics not included in the CANrelease who also published significant statements about theKafanchan riots. There was the Nerzit Committee of ConcernedCitizens, a group of academics of Southern Zaria origin based atABU. A major concern in their document is the bottled-up feelingsof the locals against “the years of political domination initiated byHausa-Fulani adventurism into Southern Zaria, dating back to the19th century.” They described their case in terms almost exactlyparallel to Muslim complaints about colonial and post-colonialoppression, except that victims and oppressors are reversed. Thegroup argued that “colonial and post-colonial policies have facili-tated the control of the Hausa-Fulani ruling class over the people,”a situation that still had not been addressed. This basic political fac-tor had its repercussions in many sectors and generally led toalleged widespread deprivation and neglect of the area.

Steven Nkom, a sociologist and signatory to both the Nerzitdocument and the ABU inter-religious press statement,23 put itthis way:

What happened at Kafanchan was the local people’s way ofsaying we have had enough of all this rubbish. It was a wayof rebuffing the expansionist bluff of the Hausa-Fulani rulingclass. What the people were saying was: We rejected your waysand attempts to impose your faith then, we still do so now. Wejust want to be left alone.24

A group of Nigerian lecturers at the Theological College ofNorthern Nigeria (TCNN) in Bukuru produced an eloquent andforceful statement about the Kafanchan chain of events. The groupinterpreted the ruckus as a “calculated jihad against Christians”that was planned and executed by some prominent and learned


personalities. They were able to carry out their plan because of theircontrol over the media, which allowed them to distort the facts asto the origin of the fracas and “the extent of the brutality inflictedon Christians.” They picked up on a statement by the ASUU ofABU who spoke of “the obviously premeditated and coordinatedacts of arson and assault” in the cities around the state. The groupthen supported their allegations with a number of points that Isummarise here. They saw a connection with the recent honourreceived by Gumi from Saudi Arabia “for his services in promotingIslam in Nigeria.” The pretext about a Christian preacher publiclyreading from the Qur’an was seen as a farce, since Muslims freelyquote from the Bible, an assertion the document backed up withexamples. The other pretext that the upheaval was the product ofdistorted “social-economic factors” was seen as equally false. If thatwere the case, the riots would have started between the indigenesand the Hausa settlers, not between Christian and Muslim stu-dents. The police would have come out much earlier to preventdeath and destruction if it were a socio-economic event, but theyfailed to show up because it was a religious riot provoked byMuslims. The last point was that the governor took no steps to pre-vent the mayhem from spreading until “the jihadists had com-pleted their assignments.” At that point he ordered the police andsoldiers to get involved. Though the police came after the fact, thegovernor praised them for their performance! Well, yes, if this was(note the lack of the subjunctive “were”) a jihad, of course! Theydid their job.

So, wrote the lecturers, since they rejected the governor’s thesisthat the riots were the result of socio-economic factors, they con-fessed to be “shocked” that the federal government “accepted thefalse report from the police and the Kaduna state government.” Atthis point the document quoted a public statement from PresidentBabangida over the radio, part of which has already featured inVolume 2. Babangida said that though originally the cause was


thought to be “religious differences,” investigations showed other-wise. While the origin may indeed have been religious, the subse-quent killing and destruction throughout the state “were carefullymasterminded by evil men with sinister motives, who saw the inci-dent in Kafanchan as an opportunity to subvert the federal gov-ernment and the nation.”

The authors wondered whether the police and the governorwere among these sinister people, and, perhaps, even the presidenthimself. If not, why were only churches destroyed and Christianleaders killed, except for Kafanchan and Funtua “where a fewMuslims were also tragically affected.” In addition, the subsequentban on religious activities and organisations on educational cam-puses throughout the nation “is a clear indication of the specificallyreligious nature of the troubles.”

All the reports were seen by these TCNN authors as cover-upsto protect the guilty. The latter included Gumi. The Council ofUlama, the national association of Muslim clergy found in mostcountries with large Muslim populations, agreed that the culpritswere Muslims. Yet they claimed that Muslims had been arrestedindiscriminately and they called for “the immediate release of allinnocent Muslims arrested and to stop further arrest and molesta-tion of innocent Muslims.” Since independence, the authorsasserted, “Muslim fanatics have been the cause of any and everyreligious uprising in this country.” Yet, the president wanted peo-ple to believe that the two religions had “coexisted in our societyfor centuries without bitterness and without violence.” It was onlya ploy to divert the attention of people from the truth to refer tothe culprits as “children of Satan” and evil men but to refuse toidentify the real perpetrators or the real cause.

Matthew Kukah once again hit the nail on the head. The ordi-nary locals saw the riots in terms of Muslim insolence and power.Their reasoning went as follows: “We allowed you to settle and gaveyou our lands and even our daughters in marriage. Now how dare


you turn around to spite us? Who do you think you are?” It was thesame argument that Muslim authorities in the northern Muslimcities used with respect to the Christian settlers in their sabon garis.The ruling classes were offended by the challenge to their power. Butthe people of Southern Zaria resented the position of the Hausa “asmiddlemen in the minutest of business engagements, from the pur-chase of their seeds, the purchase of fertiliser to the sale of theircrops.” They were upset by the continued economic climb ofMuslims, while they themselves were on a “downward slope” in theirown country. Even the superior education of their children could notovercome the Muslim means “of economic upward mobility.” It wasin response to this local challenge that the Muslim elite formed theNorthern Elders’ Committee, “a crisis management gimmick by theruling class to save their power base” and to save the “false picturethat the North still remained a united indivisible whole.”25

As to the more remote cause for the riots sparked by theKafanchan incident in 1987, Kukah argued that this was a reactionon the part of the indigenes against the non-indigenous Muslimruling class imposed on them by the colonial regime. In the 1950s,the emir of Zaria had stated that “non-Muslims were meant to feedand sustain the power quest of the ruling class” and likened the par-ties “to the horse and the grass and warned that ‘the grass mustnever be allowed to eat up the horse.’”26 Such amazing statementsand even more amazing attitudes did not stand alone. At anothertime Kukah quoted an earlier emir of Zaria, one Ibrahim, who,referring to the demands of the people of the Middle Belt for free-dom to conduct their own affairs, as “...people who ate dogs andwhose women wore little but a bunch of leaves” and wondered howsuch people could be “led to believe that they could administerthemselves.” The Sardauna, probably the most revered Muslimruler in northern Nigeria second only to Shehu Dan Fodio,allegedly said publicly in the House of Assembly that, “as for slaves,it is only because Islamic power is not strong here that we have not


got slaves to sell.”27 The amazing and brazen attitude on the partof Muslims described in this paragraph must be seen as a majorcause, both remote and immediate, for all the riots that involvedthe colonial imposition of Muslim emirs. As far as NigerianChristians are concerned, brazen it is for sure and amazing only forthose who have not lived with Muslims or not studied their historywithout the burdens of political correctness and secular bias.

The Kafanchan riots, Kukah suggested,

offered a barometer for testing these relations. For, over the years,the ruling class had indeed seen the people from this area as beingresponsible for providing labour to service their class exploits. Butthe years of exposure to missionary education... (despite its lim-ited scope) had sharpened the identities and expectations of theproducts of these institutions with Christianity gradually becom-ing a rallying point for their identities.

Indeed, many Christians from the area had since then worked theirway up into the highest echelons of power. Some challenged thevery basis of Muslim power, as did Yohanna Madaki in the case ofthe emir of Muri,28—but it did lead to Madaki’s dismissal from hisown position of power as well, an indication that it takes sacrificeto challenge the Muslim power base.

Kukah’s impression was that the Muslim community hadexpected that the Kaduna state government would automaticallysupport and defend Islam and all Muslims regardless of the facts athand. After all, the governor and most officials were Muslims firstof all. There was no sense among them that he was governor of allKaduna people and owed them equal protection. Duties of govern-ment were to take second place to the defence of Islam. When,instead, the governor expressed embarrassment about the behaviourof fellow Muslims, they mounted a campaign against him.29

The president initially denied the religious basis of the riots andattributed them to “evil men with sinister motives who saw the inci-


dent in Kafanchan as an opportunity to subvert the government andthe nation,” the same statement picked up by the TCNN lecturers.Both the denial of a religious basis and the suggestion of evil menare, as we have already seen, classical responses of Nigerian govern-ments to riots. The Kafanchan series of riots was interpreted as kindof an attempted civilian coup. The Donli tribunal rejected the sub-missions of various Christian groups relating to national politics,OIC and Islamisation of the country as irrelevant to the situation.

There is no way I can do full justice to all the reactions to theseKafanchan riots without creating an intolerable tome. I refer youto Kukah’s Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria, Chapter6, where he explains not only the background but a whole series ofresponses. There was the government response to the riots them-selves. Then there were the “Review of the Committee’sRecommendations,” “CAN’s Reactions to the Committee’sFindings,” “Muslim Reactions to the Committee’s Findings,” the“Karibi–Whyte Tribunal,” “Interpretation to the Committee’sFindings,” the Northern Elders’ Committee’s response and a con-cluding section. That is a plate too full for us and, as often happenswith full plates, the various foods end up mixed and difficult to dis-tinguish. That was my experience in trying to decipher the chapter.Still, I recommend it; it will be enlightening.

We have already met Chief Daniel D. Gowon in Volume 1.Daniel was chief of Wusasa, a Christian village in the shadow ofZaria, a large traditional Muslim community. He was also brotherto Yakubu Gowon, a former head of state. He could be trusted toknow the inside story. I have included part of his memorandum tothe Kaduna State committee to investigate the Kafanchan riot asAppendix 2 in Volume 1. He emphasised a point that was sure toraise any Muslim’s blood pressure. He openly declared that thereexisted “extremist Muslim groups [that] seem to be questioning thefundamental basis on which this country is founded. It seems as ifthese groups now believe that Christianity has no place in Nigeria


and Christian communities in a ‘Muslim North’ should no longerbe tolerated.” Gowon suggested that the Northern Muslims cannottolerate the existence of a Christian community such as Wusasa,many residents of which have come out of Islam. He tried to forcethem to acknowledge that the North was not a homogeneousMuslim block; it contained various religions, specifically Christiansand Traditionalists. Muslims will not admit that Christians have aright in the northern domain. It is too obvious a denial of the trea-sured concept of a “solid Muslim North.” And so, a hostile group ofMuslims sent the almajirai30 to destroy the offence amongst them.

Like the other witnesses, so Gowon complained that both policeand army failed to take prompt action. They claimed lack of author-ity. As a result, he declared Wusasa as “independent entity withoutprotection, support or sympathy from those assigned to protectthem.” Similarly, he accused the government-owned electronicmedia of promoting the mayhem and thus misusing governmentfacilities by taking sides. He referred to the radio coverage of the riotsas “that misguided and unguarded despicable deed.” The govern-ment television station engaged in what he called “an exercise in sen-sationalism” and “under-reporting” which served only their interest.

The reactions of governments and their commissions ofenquiry were, unfortunately, classic. Kukah tells us that the presi-dent raised the nation’s hope when he announced his intention todeal firmly with the Kafanchan rioters. With the bravado that usu-ally accompanies such announcements, Babangida declared thatthe government would not stand by and watch as “ambitious andmindless power seekers… push us into…civil war.” He added thetraditional formula, “We do not recognise any sacred cow and nonewill be spared. Enough is enough.”31

Little came of it. It came too close to the jugular.

Kafanchan nearly released the genie from the bottle.Therefore, the panels set up were mainly aimed at putting it


back and so did not address the real questions of the riots,which were in the main, perceived as a fundamental chal-lenge to the ruling class, whose interests the governmentseemed set to protect.

Though at first it looked like the president was serious in hisintention, once it became clear that “at the heart of the riots wasthe legitimacy of the ruling class in northern Nigeria,” it became adifferent story. Representatives of this class “managed to turn backthe…government’s determination to get to the roots of the people’sgrievances, and… managed to manipulate the outcome and…con-solidated its position.”32

According to Kukah, the Kaduna state government Donlicommittee, headed as it was by a Christian female, had twounusual strikes against it and did not dare risk the wrath of the gov-ernment. Consequently some of its proposals were only half-hearted, while others seemed to favour Muslims. Muslims wereadvised to cease using the derogatory terms “arne” and “kafiri.” Thecommittee recommended that Friday be turned into a work-freeday since it is the day of Muslim communal worship. Nigeriashould remain in the international Organization of IslamicConference (OIC). The sharia should be applied wholesale toMuslims, while others should have the option of a court of theirchoice. The Muslim demand for Islamic-type uniforms for collegestudents was also supported.33 All of these had long been festeringissues between the two religions. That report, together with its fail-ure to pinpoint the root cause, can only be regarded as blatant one-sided support of Islam.

Byang also wrote a clear analysis of the Kaduna RiotsCommittee Report in which he summarised the disapproval fromboth the Kaduna government and CAN.34

Since most of his analysis echoes much of the above, I merelydraw attention to this material for those who want a complete


report. However, in the same article Byang also treated us to someinside information about the ill-fated committee via an interviewwith Christopher Abashiya, who represented CAN on the commit-tee. Byang asked him about the surprise and disappointment ofmany Christians that he was party to the report. Abashiya explainedthat with an equal number of Christians and Muslims, four each,there were only two alternatives, namely to completely disagree orto strike a compromise. It was almost designed for failure. Completedisagreement would only lead to further polarization in the countryand it would be an embarrassment before the whole world if thecommittee were disbanded without accomplishing anything.Without going into details, Abashiya hinted that the Christianmembers were not united. At least one of them must have agreedwith the Muslims so that Abashiya’s group constituted the minority.He could have refused to accept the report and resign but decidedthat such a step was not helpful either. In view of Muslim threatsthat they would not accept the report in its totality, to achieve any-thing at all, they would have to be evasive. He rejected the chargethat the committee had recommended the implementation of shariain totality. He explained that what they said was that “the imple-mentation of sharia would certainly affect the non-Muslims.”Should it come to this, “then provision must be made to give thenon-Muslims the option to go to their own courts.” In addition, avehicle would also be necessary for conflicts between Christians andMuslims. Such a statement hardly constitutes a recommendation forthe full sharia. Let those who criticise him tell him how they wouldhave handled the situation. Finally, the fact that the chairperson wasa Christian implied she “had to be careful not to be perceived as rep-resenting the interest of Christians.”

Another one of Byang’s interviewees was Engineer Salifu ofKaduna CAN. He repeated the CAN charge that there was suffi-cient evidence to name the principal instigators. Because of the“sacred cows,” the committee refused and thus merely beat around


the bush. If Bako’s preaching had caused troubles, what of thepreaching over the air by Gumi? Christians build a church.Muslims build a mosque next to it and then accuse Christians ofprovocation. Christians build a school. Muslims take it over anddemand Muslim uniforms for the children. Then they accuseChristians of provocation. Christians build a hospital with a crosson it. Muslims say they are provoked. Is it their hospital? Havethey built it? The Donli report was evasive and majored in minorissues not related to the crisis. Christians should praise the gov-ernment for having rejected the report and the governor should be“commended for his straightforwardness. He did not lean towardsany particular group.”

Byang closed his article with the “reliable” information that thegovernment was already backtracking on its promise to pay for theclaims for damaged churches by offering a mere fifty percent.

The dynamics of hostility in Kafanchan had been released andwould not be bottled up again. Mutual provocation came easilyafter the 1987 events. In 1996, Monday Yakunat, a young Christianstreet preacher of considerable oratorical skills in Kafanchan, in thecourse of a session at the motor park, was suddenly hit by someonein the crowd. He fell unconscious. Immediately a group identifiedas Shi’ites managed to transport him on a motorcycle to a housethat served as the local Shi’ite headquarters. This occurrence set intomotion a chain of events that led to a riot in which twenty-sevenMuslims were killed, and eventually to another government inves-tigative committee.

It seems Nigerian Muslims never learn. Somewhere near tothe change of the millennium, another clash took place inKafanchan. The state government sought to install a new Muslimemir over the largely Christian population, the same practice dat-ing back to the early colonial regime that had already inspired somuch protest and violence in the Middle Belt. Christians organ-ised a peaceful protest to change this internal colonialism. “They


blocked the roads leading into the towns and forced the cancella-tion of the installation.” Muslims reportedly attacked theprotestors, killing two persons in the process. This, in turn,sparked a riot and led to the loss of 200 lives.35

2. ZANGON-KATAF (1992)

The general take on the Kataf people, who are mostlyChristian, is very similar to that of Kafanchan and Tafawa Balewa.For decades, a smoldering situation had existed between the localKataf villagers and the Muslim Hausa in the town. These settlers36

arrived around 1650 and were welcomed by the then TraditionalKataf people. Eventually the settlers became the dominant eco-nomic and political power in the area, but they never acclimatizedin the sense of mixing with the local population. They haveremained a distinct subculture. Muslim chiefs and non-indigenousMuslim emirs were imposed on the people. The indigenes com-plained that Muslims referred to them as “arna” and “kafiri,”Hausa terms of utter contempt. The Muslim community resentedthe sale and consumption of both beer and pork on the part of thelocals. While local women were allowed to marry Muslims, theKataf were offended that the reverse was never the case. TheMuslim explanation that this was according to Muslim law hardlyremoved the sting. The situation was indeed very similar to that ofKafanchan and Tafawa Balewa, though the immediate provocationdiffered in each case.

The Kaduna State Branch of CAN, during its World PressConference in 1992, expressed itself in an unusually aggressivetone. They viewed this riot in the larger context of the entire riotseries from the beginning. It was not just local Muslims, but theentire Nigerian Hausa-Fulani Muslim community that was theaggressor against all Christians. All Muslims are expected to sup-port each other in this struggle, including governor and securityapparatus, no matter the nature of the provocation. Islam “uber


alles!” That is why it was so dangerous that, according to CAN, the“National Security System in Kaduna State is firmly controlled byHausa-Fulani officers.”

How did this riot actually start? And who started it? It will bean interesting exercise to compare CAN’s answer to this questionto that of Muslims in Volume 2 and to the flow of events asreported in Volume 1. I will not repeat those here, but to whet yourappetite, let me just intimate that they are by no means the same!CAN, however, was not plagued by different interpretations; it hadno doubts on this score.

It all started on February 6, 1992, the day on which the market,talked about in the earlier volumes, “was to move across the street toa better location already prepared by the LGC.” The claim in italics(which are mine) was in hot dispute. Here’s the CAN version:

On getting to the new site on this fateful day, unsuspecting earlymarket-goers, largely Christian Kataf natives, were attackedby...largely Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers using dangerousweapons such as machine guns and daggers, leading to the lossof lives and massive destruction of property. The situation roseto this uncontrollable level because of the stand taken by Hausasettlers who think they are above the law. Of even greater threatto peaceful co-existence are those who believe they have divineauthority to rule over others and to control and determine theirspiritual, social and economic life. Because of their lofty positionin Government, these very few powerful and well-connectedindividuals, openly vowed to prevent duly constituted authorityfrom implementing decisions taken by the Local GovernmentCouncil in the interests of the larger society.

So far CAN’s explanation of the first installment, but what ofthe next on May 17? Who started that one? Was it a “spontaneousaction, a mere spillover or was it carefully planned?” The documentbacktracks to May 9, the day on which “a letter was written to


Sultan Dasuki to formally notify him of plans to start a jihad.” Itcame from the “ radical” Muslim Nigerian Aid Group of Jama’atulIzalatul Bidi’a Ikamatu Sunna in Zangon-Kataf. It was a “stronglyworded letter in Hausa” and copied to the emir of Zaria, the com-missioner of police and some other security officials, to the chair-man of the Zangon-Kataf LGC, the district head and to “someIslamic groups.” Charged CAN, “Subsequently, they made goodtheir promise to start a war five days after this letter was written totheir spiritual leaders.” That is the background.

The immediate cause for the renewed rioting was “the dra-matic entry into Kaduna” on May 17 of some powerful Muslimpersonalities who carried with them “the wounded and corpses ofsome of the rioters” of Zangon-Kataf, some 400 kilometres away.The vehicle was provided by the governor, himself a Muslim fromZango. The riot was clearly premeditated. It was carried out atnight, which made it difficult to identify the culprits. Those whowere trapped were either killed or severely wounded if they couldnot recite the Muslim confession or some other Arabic passage.

The anonymous author of the lengthy account in TC, 3/1992,reporting on the same “death parade” in Kaduna, suggested this wasstaged for the very purpose of arousing “religious sentiments not justagainst Katafs but all Christians.” And so “a purely communal fra-cas in a village was transformed into a wider religious war coveringthe whole state and resulting in the death of many Christians” anddestruction of their properties, including many churches.

A TC reporter began to notice a recurring pattern, one thatbecame clear to me as well as I moved from riot to riot. The pat-tern was typical. A quarrel arises between Muslims and their neigh-bours in a remote place. The quarrel turns into violence and death.The Muslims then carry their injured ones and corpses to the citieswhere the sight will provoke the Muslim public. Consequently, avendetta is unleashed on innocent and unprotected Nigerians.37

The Kaduna series was classic.


It was classic in more ways. The familiar charge was once againthat the security forces were slow in coming. The police did notintervene “until about 1:30 p.m. the following day.” People wereunder the impression that “police and rioters had reached anunderstanding, since the commanders are their ethnic brothers.”The rioters were left undisturbed until the military took over—butnot until May 18.

The same ethnic power line could be traced everywhere. Boththe army and the SSS (a security force) were “fully controlled” by thesame ethnic group. The state governor himself, also a “Hausa-Fulanisettler,” was “knee-deep in this conflict.” These ties were the allegedreason no Hausa-Fulani were detained, only Katafs.

The religious nature of the riots was demonstrated clearly bythe fact that churches and pastors who were not Kataf at all wereamong the victims. It was directed at all Christians. In addition,the governor called in the Roman Catholic archbishop of Kadunafor consultation. Why, if it were not a religious riot?

The “remote cause,” to use bureaucratese, the long-standingbone of contention of Muslim control over Kataf land, came upagain as well. “A situation in which a minority is more powerfuland dictates to the majority is unacceptable,” CAN proclaimed.The situation “only reminds one of the obnoxious apartheid systemagainst which this country has fought.”38

In the previous chapter we learnt of the general role of govern-ment media in such events. This riot was no exception at this fronteither. The NN showed “brazen partiality” in its editorials of June4 and 5. They openly served “the interests of the Hausa-Fulani.”Government radio stations in Kaduna also came out with “deliber-ate distortion of facts” to such an extent that one could easily gainthe impression that the radio was meant to benefit only Muslims.Thus far CAN.

Yusufu Turaki, an indigene from Southern Zaria and ECWA gen-eral secretary at the time, was invited to appear before the Kaduna


State Tribunal on Religious and Communal Riots, the tribunal look-ing into the debacle.39 He prefaced his submission with a summary ofthe contributions ECWA has made to the nation through its schoolsand hospitals and emphasised the good relations with Muslims thatECWA has always fostered. “Prior to the 1980s,” he affirmed, “thenorthern states had lived in relative harmony and peace, especially thecordial and peaceful co-existence between the Muslims andChristians.” Of late this “balance of peace and harmony” has been“tilted and altered” and replaced with “mistrust, fears and suspicion.”

In the light of that history, he expressed puzzlement at the cur-rent hostility between the two religions. He summarised the lossesECWA incurred during the various riots. Under the heading“ECWA as a Victim of Religious Riots and Blackmail,” Turaki “issad to note” that the “peaceful atmosphere has gradually moved tothat of confrontation, intolerance and violence. Thus ECWA nowstands as a victim of a society which has benefitted from its human-itarian, moral, spiritual and social services, which in consequence,has uplifted the lot of many northerners.”

Turaki expressed dismay that documents associated withthe1987 Kafanchan riots were used by this tribunal five years later.The 1992 tribunal obviously considered them relevant to the situ-ation. It “beats my imagination,” he said, to see that “the same fab-ricated and false documents which Muslim groups have beenparading around the country to boost their propaganda of incite-ment and violence were tendered.” How can this be when thesedocuments were already tendered at the 1987 tribunal, “perhaps bythe same groups or their agents”? These documents and relatedevents had been investigated by the security services and by PlateauState Government; ECWA had been absolved from all the chargesand the perpetrators had clearly been identified as Muslims. Sowhy accept them as relevant for the 1992 riots? This was a seriouscharge against the tribunal indeed. “My honourable self had tostand before your tribunal yesterday in question of this religious


blackmail and bigotry,” he commented. Such procedures indicatedthat the derisive names some people gave to this tribunal, for exam-ple, “kangaroo court,” may not have been so far-fetched.

In consonance with other Christian leaders, Turaki consideredthis riot, as well as previous ones, “religious and communal riots,” anopinion expressed more than once in his document. However, theriots were “primarily communal but with some religious undertones,since the two parties can be divided along religious lines, as the Katafare predominantly Christian, while the Hausa are Muslim.”

Apart from the general climate of violence, what, according toTuraki, were the major factors that led to the Kataf and subsequentriots? He wrote, “Sensitive issues and questions of religion, ethnic-ity, property and security are quite capable of triggering immediateand spontaneous violence.” This should mean that somehow thetwo parties were insensitive towards each other’s concerns in theseareas. Again, “discrimination, bias, stereotype are capable of creat-ing outbursts of riots and violence as one perceives to be lookeddown upon, demeaned or [have his] personality assaulted.” He wasreally saying that domination, bias and stereotype have in fact ledto this violence. People have been looked down upon, demeanedand assaulted. There was no need to spell out exactly the identitiesof perpetrators and victims. The tribunal understood: He wasaccusing the Muslims of oppressing the others, while pretending tobe evenhanded. As he proceeded with his submission, he becameincreasingly concrete and specific.

Turaki’s list of root causes comprised three major subjects, each ofwhich was broken down into smaller categories. Many of the pointsalso apply to most of the other riots. Hence they are important beyondthis immediate situation. In Appendix 10, I give the floor to Turaki ashe presented his list of “Root Causes and Fundamental Issues.”

In his conclusion, Turaki repeated some of the earlier problems.The crisis is a structural one. This was so in the North in general, butespecially in Kaduna State. There were “structures of evil, manipula-


tion, discrimination, preferential and differential treatment, the subor-dination of others under the dominance of others, the creation of firstclass and second class citizens.” He decried the

political imbalance and inequality between the predominantlyMuslim North and the predominantly Christian South ofKaduna State and the lack of full integration of the Christiansand non-Muslims into the mainstream of the State politicalmachinery….The preponderance of Islamic and Hausa culturewhich dominates the State machinery to the near exclusion ofall others is another major socio-political factor causing religiousand ethnic riots and violence. Where others feel deprived anddiscriminated against, justice must listen to them.40

Turaki also was national vice president of CAN at the time andas such he represented CAN at the funeral of Reverend TacioDuniyo, one of the victims of the riots. At this occasion, he pre-sented himself overtly as CAN’s mouthpiece regarding the reasonsfor and causes of these riots. The reasons he gave were indeed iden-tical to many other pronouncements and documents of CAN atvarious levels. Though tempted to merely summarise his mainpoints, I have decided to include them in total here, because theirpassion cannot be captured in summary statements.

1. The number one reason why there are frequent ethnic or tribalriots and violence in the northern states is that the political regimesof many states, whether military or civilian, have consistently anddeliberately refused to create and grant autonomous chiefdoms toethnic groups, the so-called Kabilu41 of the Middle Belt of Nigeria.In the southern part of Kaduna State, there are many ethnicgroups that have, up to the present, been denied outright theirrights to have their own chiefdoms and their own traditionalrulers and thereby cannot govern themselves nor determine theirown political and cultural destiny.


2. Another reason is that the governments in these states give prefer-ential treatment and also grant superior and dominant socio-polit-ical role and status to settler peoples over against the indigenouspeoples. It is the consistent and deliberate denial of any political,social, cultural and even religious rights and autonomy and polit-ical equality, participation, representation and distribution ofresources to the indigenous people that generates discontent.

3. A significant reason is that some state governments have refused toimplement and protect consistently and faithfully the constitu-tional rights of every Nigerian citizen under their domain. Rather,these governments have sided with the strong and powerful sub-national and parochial interests that are increasingly becomingdogmatic and fanatical in denying both religious and culturalrights to those designated as minorities within their states.

4. The predicament of the Christian and the Kabilu in the northernstates is that when he talks, no one takes him seriously. When hecries, no one listens to him. When he begs, no one gives to him. Butwhen he reacts to these, he is crushed to death.

Turaki explained further,

The Christian in the northern states, however and whereverhe is designated as a minority or a Kabilu, loses all constitu-tional rights, whether they are political, social, cultural orreligious. The draconian Islamic laws, governmental practicesand attitude are being systematically applied to Christians.Hence the loss of their human and religious rights.42

It is noteworthy that, though Turaki was addressing theZangon-Kataf riots, he spoke of “states” and “governments”—plu-ral. He was talking about the entire northern situation. The samesituation pertained in several of them that contained kabilu, whowere dominated by Muslims.


There was widespread agreement with these points of Turaki.Yohanna Madaki, another son of the soil, both lawyer and soldier byprofession and former military governor of the defunct GongolaState and Benue State, is famous and popular with the peoplebecause he dared to face up to the Muslim emirate establishment ofMuri and was subsequently “retired” by the army. He expressedhimself in clear terms about the basic problems facing his people.“The main issue in this whole crisis is that of oppression. The issueis that of internal colonialism which is being rejected.” The fact that

people are oppressed in their own land causes discontent. Notethat there is not any general anti-Hausa feeling or any suchthing. No one is against the Hausa or Muslims. The commonHausa man or Muslim is innocent and well liked. Rather, thestruggle is against the in-built domination of the emirate sys-tem which in any case favours only the ruling class.

So let me repeat that the issue is not land. That is inci-dental and brought up to sidetrack people from the real point.The real issue is also not religion. It’s only when they want tobecloud the issue that they bring in religion to recruit thefanatics. The real issue is power—who dominates whom.

This issue was of long standing. “The outcry against domina-tion,” asserted Madaki, “is age-old and successive governments inthe state have done nothing.”43

Chairman of the northern chapter of CAN at the time and nowRoman Catholic archbishop of Kaduna, Peter Jatau, identified threemain causes for the Zangon-Kataf series. The first remote cause,according to him, was political. It was the determination of the indi-genes for self-determination and their own chiefdom. A few of theindigenous groups, Kagoro, Jaba and Maro, had already succeeded,but others were still subject to the emir. “All attempts to secure theirfreedom have been resisted even with imprisonment.” He added,


In Nigeria we condemn apartheid, colonialism and neo-colo-nialism, but why should we practise similar things amongourselves? This is double standard and the attitude of theemirs and Kaduna state government is against the principle ofjustice and fair play…. I don’t think the crisis will end as longas only cosmetic measures are applied.

Jatau told of a 1991 meeting of Christian and Muslim leaders inKaduna about the incessant rioting. It recommended to PresidentBabangida to grant the indigenes self-determination and chief-doms, but the president had taken no action thus far.

The second remote cause was the religious. Churches were tar-geted. Why, if the impetus was not religious? Various pastors andCAN leaders were killed. Imams were used to call Muslims to warand they called prayers for war at various times. Finally, some peo-ple were stopped on the streets. If they could not recite portions ofthe Qur’an, they were either maimed or killed. So, many indica-tions of the importance of religion as a motive.

The third remote cause was ethnic. It referred to the fact thata minority was “lording it over the majority indigenes.”44

An anonymous author in TC put it similarly. There is nothingnew about such clashes in Southern Zaria, he explained. Central toit all “is the issue of political and administrative control of the area.Since colonial times, political power has been with a tiny minorityof Hausas in Zangon Kataf, because the British imposed Zaria emi-rate rule on the people of the area.” Then he dug into past history.Zango, he explained, means “a transit settlement of Hausa traders.”The town was known in the past as a “slave-raiding and tradingpost.” Thus it was part of the Muslim slaving culture that theBritish found on their arrival and that created so much havoc in theMiddle Belt.45 To make sure non-Nigerians understand this situa-tion, the reference is to slave raiding by the Hausa-Fulani Muslimsamong the indigenes in the area, which caused terrible havoc and


suffering. Northern Christians who are aware of their history seethe current Muslim campaign for control as merely a continuationof that pre-colonial pattern.

The British stopped the slave raiding, but they imposed theemir of Zaria on the indigenes.

The history of the area since then has been one of unease, ten-sion, and revolts against political and economic dominationand oppressive Zaria rule. Many Katafs were imprisoned inZaria and some even died in jail in the struggle for their polit-ical and cultural freedom.

Finally, in 1967 a Kataf was appointed district head, the “fruitof years of continuous struggle against the oppressive feudal rule.Before then only Hausa Muslims could be district head and evennow the district is still under Zaria rule and any district head anappointee of the Zaria emir.” There was in effect a “political andcultural philosophy of separate development or ‘apartheid’” that“characterises the Zangon-Kataf Hausa settlement.” From itsbeginning it has been “the exclusive reserve of the Hausa.” Theonly indigenes who lived there were the district head and a fewother non-Hausa officials.

The Kataf and their indigenous neighbours have long yearnedfor “self-determination, to have their own chiefdom with no alle-giance whatsoever to the oppressive rule either from Zaria or Jema’a[Kafanchan] emirates.” Not long before the riots, retired GeneralZamani Lekwot had delivered an application to the government fora chiefdom. Ever since then, he and other indigenous leaders wereallegedly targeted as rebels and subjected to “wrath and intimida-tion.” This lay behind the arrests after the riots. Some have beenfired from their posts in the civil service. The election ofMuhammed Lere as governor made things worse, for he hailedfrom the area and is related to Alhaji Mato, who was regarded as animportant factor in the crisis. Since “their son” was governor, the


Muslims of Zangon Kataf “became bolder and more daring inasserting their dominant and powerful position.” This relationship“led to the earlier crisis” about the market.

The market was located in the middle of the town and toocrowded without room for expansion. The Kataf had long com-plained about various market issues, including “the maltreatment”of their women by the Muslims. When the local governmentwanted to relocate the market, the Hausa opposed the move, prob-ably because “almost all the stalls and shops” were theirs. Theywanted to retain control. They feared losing their privileged posi-tion through redistribution of stalls.

With his relative as governor, Alhaji Mato became brave anddeclared that the market issue was dead. He threatened a bloodbathover government radio if anyone moved it. He and his friends dealtdirectly with the governor and emir, bypassing local authorities,who were indigenes and would favour relocation. The resulting riothas already been told of in Volume 1.

Afterwards, the emir visited Zango to condole the Muslims andeven gave them money, but he returned to Zaria without seeing thelocal authorities or condoling the Kataf. Instead, he summoned theKataf leaders to see him in his distant palace. They refused the sum-mons. The emir then paid them a visit and gave the Kataf an equalsum of money. In the meantime, the Kaduna government had alsobrought relief materials, but again only to the Hausa!

Relationships kept deteriorating. The Kataf started to demandthe return of land said to have been “forcefully acquired” by a pre-vious emir. This set in motion drawn-out procedures and wran-gling that ended up in favour of the Hausa. Life became “disrup-tive,” with “allegations of abductions, forceful ejection of Kataffrom public transport vehicles,” while the “Hausa never shiedaway from boasting about how prepared they were to deal with theKatafs.” Then, when the Hausa began to destroy Kataf farms, theiryouth threatened a jihad. Strangers were bused into town in


preparation for violence and, finally, corpses were displayed in thecity. The situation was simply one of a riot waiting to happen.

As per tradition, the state government appointed a JudicialCommission of Enquiry into the crisis. Again it was headed by aChristian female judge, Justice Rahila Cudjoe. The Kataf boycottedits meetings for they objected to the composition of theCommission—not a single Kataf representative among them.Apart from the chairlady, all members were Muslim appointees ofthe emir of Zaria. It was felt to be biased in favour of the Hausaand expected to reject all evidence provided by the Kataf.46 TheCommission sat in Kaduna, but visited the area twice. During thesecond visit, Alhaji Idiya, a member, in the hearing of his colleaguesallegedly publicly threatened that the Muslims could “finish theKataf community in three days.”47

Among those who submitted memoranda to the Commissionwere the Kataf Youth Development Association of Zaria. Theircomplaint is also worth hearing for its emotional value. Ever sincethe 1980s the following tendency developed:

The Kaduna government appoints people from the strangercommunities of Zangon-Kataf [and others] to be the “repre-sentatives” of the people on the executive council and institu-tions. The occupants of Government House always know thatthese so-called “representatives” disdain the indigenous people,they never mix with them, and although they are born thereand they live in those areas, they know nothing of the lan-guages, customs and traditions of their host communities.These settler communities call the people “arna.” It is theseblatant acts of discrimination by the government that give theminority settlers the audacity to attack the indigenes, when-ever they wish, believing that the government is on their side.

These youths clearly indicated how little they expected from thegovernment in terms of solutions. “In the final analysis,” they wrote,


we are left with the impression that government does notreally care about peace, it only pays lip-service to it.Government does not seem to be really interested in lastingsolutions, it only wants stop-gap measures. Government doesnot seem to be really interested in creating an atmosphere oftrust and mutual respect, because it is unwilling to tread onsome sacred toes. It is the ordinary people who get killed inthese conflicts. It is they who are maimed, injured, renderedfatherless and motherless, whose children are imprisoned.The property owners get compensation, but who can com-pensate the poor for the lives they lose? Who can take awaythe burdens of decades of oppression and injustice throughmonetary compensation? 48

As expected, the Commission exonerated the Hausa andblamed the Kataf for the rioting. The Hausa suffered most of thecasualties and, it concluded, acted in self-defence. This panelrejected the market incident as “nothing but a smokescreen.” Apartfrom making recommendations as to how to treat certain partici-pants in the drama, the panel suggested that Muslims discontinueusing terms like “arne” and “kafiri” to refer to non-Muslims, sincethey are insulting names. Beyond this, it merely urged toleranceand greater education.

According to Mahmud Jega, writing in Citizen, the paneldodged the most sensitive issue, namely that of chieftaincy.49 Thisrequest, it suggested, should be processed through existing chan-nels. But, at least, this suggestion implied some official recognitionof a problem that the Kataf saw as absolutely crucial. That was oneup from the general Muslim denial of this issue.

Another inquiry, the Justice Benedict Okadigbo Tribunal, wasestablished to try retired Major General Zamani Lekwot and otherKataf leaders for their role in the riots. Some of them, includingLekwot, were condemned to be hung. This tribunal likewise was


widely condemned for its one-sided composition and for the sen-tence it meted out.50

Fellow generals pleaded for clemency,51 something outspokenAnglican Bishop Benjamin Kwashi of Jos rejected, since Lekwothad committed no crime.52 Leaders of CAN and even OlusegunObasanjo, at the time a private citizen between his military andcivilian terms of head of state, entered the fray in defence of thegeneral and his fellows. The situation was described by varioushuman rights activists as “a sham, a mockery, a travesty of justiceand a horrendous national tragedy.” Others used terms such as“kangaroo affair.” Madaki, one who has seen the depth of corrup-tion, wrote that “we never knew until now that a judge coulddescend to such a terrible and disgraceful level, and be used againstthe people. In fact, the evidence available is that these judgementswere written for the judges before the action was filed.” Okadigbo“was very, very uneasy each time he realised that an accused personmay be free. He started shouting at counsels, shouting at theaccused, just to make sure that he pleased his masters.”53 A retrialwas widely demanded, for the tribunal was seen as “an instrumentof entrenching the will and wishes of the strong and the privi-leged.” In fact, according to an ECWA statement, unless quicklycorrected, it was capable of “plunging the whole nation into a seri-ous social, political and religious crisis.” Only Katafs were“arrested, detained and brought to trial.” No wonder, since the tri-bunal was stacked with Muslims.

The only other Christian member of the tribunal, GrahamDouglas, a lawyer of national prominence, withdrew and so did thedefence counsels. They found it impossible to operate, given theterms of reference under which the tribunal was established.54

In the national psyche, the issues of alleged crimes “receded inthe face of the complex interplay between religion, ethnic hatredand legal chess-war.” The entire Zangon-Kataf story had become “adeadly addition to the national virus of sectional hatred and divi-


sion. Its trial was complicated, if not muddy, and highly emotional.It was inevitable, therefore, that it would leave many casualties.” Infact, the entire attempt seemed like one grand legal, political andethical mess beyond description. The exhaustive report in TSM onthis extraordinary “legal” mess leaves one with his head spinningand shaking in unbelief. The term “judicial terrorism” justifiablybecame a popular phrase.55

The federal government seemed divided on the issue. No oneless than Vice President Augustus Aikhomu, a Christian, had orderedthe arrest of some prominent Hausa personalities, Alhajis Mato,Danbala A. T. K. and Idia, for their roles in fanning the violence.They had frequently been mentioned in the riot stories. Mato, uncleto Dabo Lere, then military administrator of Kaduna State, is said tohave “threatened bloodshed” during a programme on the federalradio in Kaduna. Many considered this action a most dangerousprovocation in the midst of such violence, designed to intensifyrather than alleviate the volatile situation. The arrest was prevented“because of pressures higher than that of the vice president”! It waseven claimed that these alhajis were among those awarded contractsto reconstruct Zango town. As to the fate of the Christian detainees,General Lekwot and cohorts were at one stage cleared of charges andreleased, but he was “re-arrested a few minutes afterwards” with nofewer than twenty-two new charges against him.56 Eventually thegeneral was released permanently.

The women from southern Zaria continued the struggle bymeans of a demonstration on July 8, 1992, in Kaduna city. WhenNigerians appear in public events, they come out in colourfulregalia, but this time they came in rags to demonstrate their dis-pleasure at the way the government had followed up on the riots.They wore ashes on their foreheads to symbolise mourning for theirhusbands and sons, who “were killed in the hundreds by Islamicfanatics during the riots, while the charcoal on their cheeks symbol-ised the maltreatment of their kinsmen who are either in detention


or have been thrown into the labour market as a result of ongoingvictimisation in the civil service as a result of the incident.”

The purpose of the demonstration was to hold a press confer-ence to inform the world about the chain of events, but the policeformed a barrier between them and the press corps. The leadwoman, Mrs. Chechet, spoke about the “one-sided arrests of peo-ple, especially the Katafs” after the riots. She claimed “more than400 men and women are languishing in … cells and prisons, notbecause they have committed any crime or were caught commit-ting any, but just because they are Katafs. The Hausa-Fulanis whoactually started the problem have not been arrested till date.”

The speaker demanded their immediate release. An acceptablealternative would be the “immediate arrest” of various prominentMuslims who were alleged to have caused the riots, including thesecretary to the federal government and the emir of Zaria. She alsoobjected to the “release of fanatics who were caught actually slaugh-tering people. ‘We condemn this double standard,’ she said.” Anon-negotiable, she declared, was the right of the indigenes to self-determination. “We will not be ruled again by strangers,” sheannounced, “who do not know, would not care to know and do notwant to respect our customs and traditions.”

The Kaduna state government’s response to the demonstrationwas to move the prisoners into more secure detention. Trying toturn the tables on the ladies, the government warned that suchdemonstrations were dangerous and could escalate the crisis.57

Others similarly accused the government of “direct victimisa-tion and intimidation.” Dr. Harrison Y. Bungwan, a Kataf leader,alleged that “most of the Kataf people in positions of authorityhave been arrested.” He claimed to be reliably informed that gov-ernment intended to flush out Katafs from the state civil service ongrounds of doubtful loyalty, including civil servants, local govern-ment employees and teachers. Local government officials wereallegedly tricked into a meeting from where they were conveyed to


prison. While there, they were said to be maltreated. The peoplesupplied them with food, for the government failed to feed them.58

Archbishop Jatau was unhappy about both state and federalgovernment. He was disturbed by their “unwillingness or incapacityto stop such riots. They are always caught pants down.” Their pro-nouncements are “one-sided and discriminatory.” With respect toprevious riots, the government did not rush in relief. However, “nowthat the government thinks the tide has turned against the HausaMuslims, it is treating the situation with bias.” Even during the cur-rent riot series, worse things happened in other communities thanin Zangon Kataf, “but no one is talking about these, only ZangonKataf.” When the president visited the place, he showed one-sidedconcern to the Muslims, none of whom had been arrested, while“prominent Katafs have been arrested and searched.”59

One Austeen J. Tsedason also noticed that one-sided concern.In a letter to the editor he wrote, “The prompt reaction of Mr.President and his immediate order of relief measures, resettlementand full compensation of Hausa-Fulani Muslims leaves us with somany questions.” Among others, “What is so special about thisincident?” Or, “Why did the president order the production of afilm on this incident for all Nigerians to watch? Is it more grievousthan the previous incidents where Christians were brutalised, killedor had their property looted?” Tsedason knew the answers. “Theaction of Mr. President depicts explicitly the role of the Nigeriangovernment in religious matters,” he declared. “In Kano riots,where southerners and Christians lost their lives and property, thepresident described the episode as an act of Allah. But Zangon Kataf,which affected Muslim Hausa-Fulani, is described by him as a mas-sacre. This is an eye opener.”60

In the description of this riot in Volume 1, there is also refer-ence to violence in the federal prison in Zaria. The situation createda high degree of tension in the city, according to Isaiah Ilo, but thistension was not peculiar to this immediate situation. “It may be no


exaggeration to say that all over the North, the existing situationbetween Muslims and non-Muslims is that of simmering tension,mutual suspicion and alleged preparations against an expected daywhen mutual slaughter will be sparked off.” Nigerians, Ilo asserted,were not happy with Babangida’s “pledge to beef up security.” Theywould much prefer that he pledge

that his government will ensure that tacit support is no longergiven to the perpetrators of religious intolerance and vexatiousdomination. Nigerians would have taken to the streets injubilation had the president promised that government wouldnot act in any way that could even be misconstrued as favour-ing a particular religion or ethnic group which has an avowedgoal of subjugating others.

The problem is not one of poor security so much as “the reluctanceof official authorities to use the forces for the protection of the tar-geted citizens.” The beefed-up security could be turned against thepeople.61

Six years later, the matter was still not settled to everyone’s sat-isfaction. During mid-1998, renewed rioting was reported in thearea over land. It was serious enough to warrant the sending of anti-riot police to ensure it would not escalate into yet another major fra-cas.62 Even after the turn of the millennium new unrest flared up.

However, some important steps have been taken in disman-tling what has been called “internal colonialism.” A number of eth-nic groups received their own chiefs. One step at a time. I have nodoubt that this is an inexorable process that in time will reach itsdesired and natural conclusion.

In September, 2001, nine years after the Zangon-Kataf ruckus,the federal government-appointed Oputa panel on human rightsabuses announced they would visit the area, since “peace was yet tofully return.” This was to be a “fact-finding mission” at the invita-tion of the Kataf community, which was “prompted by [continued]


allegations of ‘systematic marginalisation’ by the Kataf” against thestate government. Although the Kataf community had enjoyed first-rate legal representation in the person of Chief Ajayi since the orig-inal riot till this time, the complaints remained. However, on thisoccasion, the Oputa panel was “expected to organise a symbolicpeace parley” between the Kataf and the Hausa. The former hadinformed the panel that they “were ready to make peace and live inharmony with their Hausa neighbours.” The panel included ourindefatigable son of the soil, Matthew Kukah, as well as ElisabethPam, a Christian from Jos.63

3. KADUNA 2000: AUDU’S CLINCHER

The new millenium was greeted with a lot of turbulence inKaduna City in connection with sharia issues, as readers of Volume1 will recall. “Father” Ishaya Audu wondered why the five-dayMuslim demonstration in 2000 in favour of sharia could be sopeaceful, when the “one day of peaceful demonstration againstsharia was met with an orgy of serious violence unprecedented inthe history of Kaduna. Arson, looting, murder and maiminggalore! What could possibly have been the cause of all these?” Tohim it was “obvious that mere advocacy for sharia could not possi-bly be the sole reason why neighbours could suddenly find them-selves at each other’s throats overnight.” And then the clincher:“Some satanic powers must have taken over from sane rationalhuman beings!”

After all the mayhem and the lengthy rationalizations, per-haps Audu’s clincher comes closer to the core than any otherfoundational explanation, while it does not eliminate the socio-logical and other empirical explanations. It certainly echoes thewords of the apostle Paul who declared that “…our struggle is notagainst flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the author-ities, against the powers of this dark world and against the spiri-tual forces of evil….”64


� Focus on Tafawa Balewa ___________________

1. 1991

The most basic and long-time simmering problems in theTafawa Balewa area of Bauchi state are two-fold. First, there is thealleged Muslim suppression of Christians and, secondly, the desireof the indigenes for Sayawa chiefs to replace the Muslim chiefsimposed on them by the colonial regime. These issues, shared withthe people of Southern Kaduna and many other ethnic groups, cre-ated the dynamic of violence started by the 1991 riots which con-tinued in the deep recesses of the psyche of the Bauchi peoples,both Christian and Muslims. They thus also undergirded the sub-sequent events through 1995 right into the new millennium.

In 1996, Minchakpu published a “Special Report” on the 1995riots that shed much light on the earlier ones of 1991. He explainedthat this underlying issue had been smouldering for “over sixtyyears,” with the “Hausa-Fulani Muslims” attempting “by all meansto totally subject the Sayawa to the ambit of their feudal exploita-tive system.” Minchakpu wrote that, prior to colonialism theSayawa were a “politically self-ruled and independent community.”However, the British device of indirect rule “provided the opportu-nity for the Muslim exploiters to subject the Sayawa Christian com-munity to all sorts of exploitations and inhuman treatment.”

The post-colonial period introduced no changes in this regard,since the “Muslim feudalists received the mantle of political lead-ership” from the British. Minchakpu continued, “The attempt bythe Sayawas to free themselves from the clutches of feudal Muslimexploitation was heavily resisted by the exploiters. This degradingposition has continued to be the bane of peace.” This situation wasthe “remote cause” that led to the eruption of April 22, 1991.65

Osa Director interviewed Baba Peter Gonto, the oldest livingSayawa at the time and founder of the Sayawa liberation struggle.Gonto’s story was most enlightening not only for the background


details of the Bauchi situation, but also as a typical example of sim-ilar histories in Southern Zaria and other places. Gonto, allegedlyover 100 years old at this time, claimed that during his youth theSayawas had control over Tafawa Balewa. Though Fulanis came towater their cattle and buy foodstuffs from the Sayawa, they madeno claims on the area and did not settle there. It was the Hausawho only recently began to claim ownership of the area. TheSayawa, according to Gonto, “were very unhappy, because we gavethem land and guaranteed them space and security. Suddenly theystarted agitating and claiming ownership.” The reason for theirclaim was that “they want to grab political power and own every-thing in Tafawa Balewa.” The land is fertile. The large populationis a lucrative tax base for the Bauchi emirate. The Hausa profited“from the sweat of the Sayawa.” Gonto continued, “We are welleducated. So they use us to run the parastatals. But when they findany of them [educated], they impose them to head the ministrieswhile we provide the intellectual manpower. They actually use us.”

Gonto recalled how he started the struggle in 1926. Here isthis part of his story:

I have been convicted three times in the law court. They havealso arrested and detained me over four times. They havesearched my house uncountable times. Even my Holy Bible,along with my property, has been carted away by the securityagents on some occasions.

I assembled all the chiefs from the Sayawa. We had ameeting and agreed that we should be separated from Bauchi.I mean, the agent of the Bauchi emirate who was ruling usshould be sent back and a Sayawa man appointed. I was thensentenced to six months imprisonment, and my comrades alsogot various sentences on trumped-up charges.

Asked whether there was “any religious undertone” in thestruggle, Gonto replied,


In our early contacts with the Hausa-Fulani, the Sayawa werebasically pagans, worshipping idols. At that time we livedwith the Hausa-Fulani without any problem. But with theadvent of Christian missionaries, we adopted Christianity.Then the rivalry started. In essence, religion is the fundamen-tal reason for the oppression and quarrel between us and theHausa-Fulani.

As to the goals of the Sayawa, Gonto claimed that “I have toldall those concerned, including the emirs past and present, that wewant our chiefdom. We don’t want imposition of any district headfrom outside. Our people should rule us, to that extent we will beindependent.” His message to Sayawa youth was to continue the“fight for the dignity and respect of the Sayawa nationality.”66

The Sayawa case was clear, even though the opposite Muslimviewpoint in Volume 2 seemed equally clear! Merely a matter oftaking your pick?

Sayawa Christians were aware that their approach was difficultto swallow for the Muslim community. A report from “a Christianleader from northern Nigeria”67 in the files of the InternationalInstitute for the Study of Islam and Christianity (IISIC) explainedthat there was a Muslim nervousness at the growth of the Christiancommunity. They feared that Bauchi could become predominantlyChristian like its neighbour, Plateau State. Such anxiety easily turnsinto a spark. It is hard enough for Muslims to be in a minority posi-tion, but to see their power position erode before their very eyes isintolerable and may lead to desperate measures. The Bauchi casehas all the earmarks of such desperation.68 So far the remote causesof these Bauchi riots.

The immediate cause of the 1991 riot, the actual spark, accord-ing to local Christians, was the Christian challenge to the Muslimmonopoly of the butcher’s trade, including the abattoir. In this,too, the situation was typical of the entire far North and most of


the Middle Belt. There are a few different versions of the basicstory. The spark was provided when a Muslim unknowinglybought pork from a Christian butcher. When he discovered hismistake and tried to return the item to the seller, the latter refusedto take it back. The Muslim then stabbed and killed the Christianbutcher. A group of butchers comprising both Christians andMuslims in turn killed the customer. When the two corpses wereshown in public by the police, the violence started. At the end,according to the report, some 500 people were dead, with “abouthalf” having been killed by the police. There is a slightly differentversion of this event in Volume 1.

This incident increased tension throughout the North and theMiddle Belt to a flash point. Everywhere Christians and Muslimswere ready to attack each other. We are told, “A huge amount ofarms is moving around the country in the hands of civilians. Peopleare arming themselves and training for guerrilla warfare.”69

The National Executive Committee of CAN issued a state-ment under the title “Enough Is Enough,” a phrase they borrowedfrom Babangida, the head of state. CAN demanded “on behalf ofall Christians in the whole country, the protection of their funda-mental human rights and an end to selective negligence.” After theKafanchan debacle of 1987, CAN had expected that the govern-ment “would have taken adequate preventive measures.”Unfortunately, history repeated itself in Bauchi, when “well organ-ised Muslim fanatics burnt down about thirty-four churches andvicarages. Nearly 100 people were murdered.” The governmentonce again failed in its “constitutional responsibility towards a sec-tion of the Nigerian citizenry.” CAN threatened that the “govern-ment is entitled to the loyalty of its citizenry only if it can protectthe lives and properties of such citizenry” and referred to this prin-ciple as “an age-old doctrine.” At the moment the government didnot appear to deserve such loyalty. CAN then called on the federalgovernment “to discharge its avowed constitutional responsibility


by guaranteeing the security of the lives and properties of allChristians; because Enough is Enough.”70 Indeed, losing thirty-fourchurches to arsonists is enough.71

In his 1996 “Special Report” Minchakpu described the after-math of the 1991 riots and clearly showed their relation to those of1995. He saw the 1991 version and its aftermath as an attempt atethnic cleansing of the Sayawa community, a predominantlyChristian community in a Muslim-dominated environment.

Minchakpu also reported on the “Justice BabalakinCommission” that was appointed to investigate the 1991 riots. Itsrecommendations aimed at solving the basic problem: the Sayawasgiven self-rule by receiving their own chieftaincy, a courageous rec-ommendation. However, the state government, being underMuslim control, “refused to implement these recommendations.”Brief relief came with the appointment of a Christian military gov-ernor who brought a Sayawa son into the state cabinet. This was togive them a sense of belonging. Shortly afterwards, “the almightyfeudalists” had the governor removed and replaced by RasheedRaji, a Muslim. Raji, in turn and in deference to his godfathers,“quickly dropped the Christian commissioner and appointed oneAlhaji Ibrahim [Musa]” in his place.

And then comes another classic example of insensitivity. TheTafawa Balewa LGC decided on a welcome reception for the sameIbrahim Musa who had replaced a Sayawa! Believe it or not, thisreception was to be funded by compulsory payroll deductions fromSayawa civil servants! Sayawa women organised a peaceful protestduring the first week of July, 1995 against this confiscation of theirbreadwinners’ salaries. On the advice of security agents, the recep-tion was cancelled.

To the local Muslims “it was an abomination to allow aChristian have his liberty. They could not accept why SayawaChristians could be so bold as to reject being exploited. Who arethey to question their oppressors and exploiters from doing what


has been ordained by Allah, the business of exploitation, suppres-sion, and engaging in profane acts?” It was at this point that theMuslims began their 1995 riot by setting the central market ofTafawa Balewa ablaze.72

So, the 1991 unrest naturally developed into that of 1995; thelatter being simply an extension or even continuation of the for-mer. It was the same for subsequent riots in Bauchi state whichcontinued into the new millennium.

2. 1995

Having explained the historical dynamics of these riots and theaftermath of the one of 1991, Minchakpu of TC, Madaki, the ex-governor-lawyer and Osa Director of TELL together tell us a greatdeal about the aftermath of the 1995 mayhem.

As to the horrors of murder retold by some individuals inVolume 1, Christians received little consolation or sympathyfrom Muslims. Under normal circumstances, the case of Dogowould attract sympathy almost anywhere, but not amongBauchi’s Muslims. Director tells the reaction of one SalisuHameed Barau, a Hausa-Fulani lecturer at Tatari Ali Polytechnicin Bauchi, who hails from Tafawa Balewa. “In controlled rage,”he demanded to know why Dogo should “complain about theloss of his family. He got what he deserved. After all, he is saidto have slaughtered six Hausa-Fulani in Jaja village during thecrisis.” Director commented, “Such mutual hatred and gorydetails of murder and counter manslaughter are commonplacetales and almost a way of life among the Christian Sayawa andMuslim Hausa-Fulani in Tafawa Balewa.”

Madaki asserted that, though they were alerted and fully awareof events, the police took no action. The subsequent governmentinvestigation, according to him, went completely off the track.Suleiman Musa, chairman of the local government, though awareof the facts, was not interested in the dead or their statistics. He


pretended to have more important things to attend to. He did noteven keep a record of the dead. Tapgun, a Christian, was orderedby his superiors to keep out of the investigation and thus he couldnot make any arrests. Suleiman Musa revealed that a programmehad allegedly been in operation to deprive the Sayawas of theirfarms and homes by pushing them out, an attempt set in motionby no one less than Suleiman Adamu, the emir of Bauchi.73

As per tradition, Governor Raji appointed a military tribunal,but it, too, was beset with problems and irregularities. It was to try“some Sayawa Christian leaders.” He disregarded a Jos FederalHigh Court order to restrain him. That court order was inresponse to the Christian challenge. They had argued that theywould not receive a fair hearing, since the tribunal was “illegallyconstituted” and “there was a tripartite conspiracy between thegovernment of Bauchi State, the Bauchi State judiciary, and theemirate council of Bauchi State to ensure that they did not receiveany fair hearing.” Furthermore, the composition was completelyweighted in that it did not include one representative of theSayawa people. Even the way in which the tribunal was establishedbypassed legal procedure. This was because “there are some pow-erful forces that are desperately looking for ways of eliminating theSayawa leaders and the community in its entirety.” After all theatrocities committed against the Sayawa as reported in Volume 1,“not even one Muslim” was on trial for the violence they perpe-trated. Instead, it is the victims, the Sayawa, who were standingtrial before the illegal tribunal. True, twenty-four Muslims wereinitially arrested, but “within the twinkle of an eye, they were allset free” on bail.

Madaki also identified various illegalities and other irregulari-ties in the trial, many of which would take us too far into legalitiesfor our purposes. A startling one was the involvement in the tri-bunal of investigators of the case. By law, no one who has partici-pated in an investigation is to sit on such a body. However, a


policeman who had participated in the investigations and arrestsalso sat on the tribunal.

Madaki reported what can only be described as fiendishshenanigans, totally irresponsible and illegal, on the part of Bauchiauthorities, including Governor Raji. Reading Madaki’s allegationsleaves one shaking his head in disbelief at the alleged desperatewranglings by the government to cover their own tracks as well asthose of the Muslim community. The strong of heart can find doc-umentation of this activity in the Minchakpu article and inMadaki’s own report as well as in an interview Minchakpu con-ducted with Madaki a year later.74

Minchakpu asked, “For what are the Sayawa being tried? Arethey being tried for being victims? How reasonable is it to thinkthat the Sayawas attacked themselves, killed their wives and chil-dren, set ablaze their houses and churches?” He concluded that“there must be something behind all these manipulations.” Hecharged that Raji, in openly “championing the cause of his fellowMuslims,” was not a representative of “good governance.” Hisdetermination to proceed with this illegal trial “goes to prove thatthere is a hidden religious agenda.”

In view of the alleged falsehood of the charges, it was not sur-prising that the accusers could identify neither the victims ofalleged Sayawa atrocities nor the alleged Sayawa perpetrators. Itwas “established,” according to Minchakpu, “that there was nocase against the Sayawa.” Yet, at the time of Minchakpu’s report,a number of Sayawa Christians had been in detention for overseven months.

Minchakpu’s incredible story continues. He alleged that thegovernor was behind this continued detention “without trial beforea competent court of jurisdiction.” He wrote,

On November 20, 1995, the Bauchi State chief judge, hav-ing played his abracadabra and engaging in wuru-wuru


antics without success, bowed to the rule of law by declaringthat there were no standing charges against the SayawaChristians. He declared that they are illegally held. Yet, he stillrefused to direct that they be released. He instead asked thepolice to screen the Sayawas again.

In addition, Sayawa Christian civil servants were victimised.Three-hundred-fifty-seven Sayawas in the police force posted inBauchi were transferred to other states. The state’s emirate council“decided that the traditional rulers in Toro and Tafawa Balewaexpel all Sayawas domiciled there. These [places] are the abodes ofthe Sayawas. This is in addition to the pressures being mounteddaily by the traditional council on the government to ensure thatthe formula of ethnic cleansing be applied on the Sayawas.”

Minchakpu ended his story with the challenge to the broadercommunity of Nigerian Christians that, by forming a unitedfront, they were the only ones who could prevent the destructionof the Sayawas.

But Minchakpu could not possibly give us all the intricacies ofthe entire story and so TC included a lengthy letter written byMadaki to the governor, his military colleague. Unfortunately, it istoo lengthy for inclusion in this volume. However, in view of theclear picture it presents of the entire unbelievable drama, I pledgeto include it in the promised accompanying CD.75 If you enjoyreading “legal smut,” you will eventually get it there. Go for it!

The media, often accused of fanning riots either by exaggera-tions or falsehood, were reportedly restrained in the case of Bauchi1995. The federal and state governments had agreed to keep the lidon the riots by not broadcasting about it. The alleged reason wasthat spreading the news might also spread the violence, as it haddone in previous cases. So, “mum” was the word.

This, according to the Christian Jonathan Manzo, was the“only saving grace.” The government had the injured brought to


Dass, a nearby village, instead of to Bauchi town, where “restlessreligious fundamentalists and undesirable elements could have cap-italised on the situation to wreak havoc” once again in the town.Instead, medical people were brought in from Bauchi. It was aneffective policy. The conflict became “Nigeria’s Hidden War,” asper the title of Director’s article. It seemed, he wrote, as if the strug-gle was waged on “another planet.” However, to call the riot “unre-ported,” as Director did, is patently false. TC’s Minchakpu gaveample coverage of the event.

The hostilities have continued into the new millennium. In2001, Minchakpu reported that the struggle “continued unabatedfor several years.” In a November 2001 article, he reported thatduring the previous two months more than 200 Christians werekilled. In September, an escalation occurred due to Muslims con-spiring with the state government to bring in “Muslim extremists”from Chad to attack Christians. Markus Musa, the chairman ofthe local chapter of CAN, reported, “The Muslim jihadists firstinvaded the two local government areas in August when the stategovernment began the implementation of the sharia.” We are toldthat “Christians have appealed to the federal government, askingfor its intervention in the marginalization, discrimination andpersecution of the Christians in Bauchi state.” The president wasrequested to declare a state of emergency in the area.76

� Focus on Potiskum 1994 ____________________

Minchakpu, ever ready to tell the Christian story, declared thatthe Potiskum riot was just one more example of the manipulationof religion and of the “contradictions inherent in our own politicaland administrative systems in the country.” He told of an officialreport that asserted that this issue was a pretext for “political machi-nations by the Bolewa ethnic group in active collaboration with theHausa-Fulani ethnic groups in Potiskum.” The state’s police com-


missioner claimed that the incident was a case of “manipulation ofthe Islamic religion for political purposes” in the interest of “thefeudal emirate institution, and as such, Islam has become a readytool to suppress the other ethnic groups.” Minchakpu blamed thecrisis on the Nangare local government’s Vice Chairman YusufuUmar Kukuri, who “mobilised the fanatics to carry out the may-hem.” His goal was to eliminate “prominent Kare-Kare personali-ties, who are Christians.” The manipulators were trying to “coverup such satanic acts with a frame-up story of an alleged conversionof a nineteen-year-old Christian girl as the cause of the crisis. Thisis a shame and a disgrace!”77

It was the story about Catherine Abban. The perpetrators ofthe violence, under the leadership of a Qur’anic teacher HassanAdamu, claimed that they were “fighting the cause of Islam.”Their specific claim was that Catherine, a Christian, had con-verted to Islam but was denied the right to do so by both herparents and the police. Her father claimed that the aforemen-tioned Adamu abducted her and hid her while forcefully con-verting her. Minchakpu wondered how these people could berioting because of Catherine, when they had her in their custodyalready for two months. While the riot was running its course, achurch property next to that of Abban was burnt, but his ownwas untouched. He himself was able to move around freely with-out being molested. Clearly, the issue of his daughter had noth-ing to do with the event.

The police declared this motivation a farce and that Catherinewas used as an excuse. The real reason, according to them, was thatthe Muslims were engaging in the manipulation of religion becausethey had lost their power base to local people who had begun aquest for self-determination and had thus become a threat to thelocal “feudal emirate institution.” Here, as elsewhere, Islam became“a ready tool.” It sounds like the stories of Zangon-Kataf andTafawa Balewa. It also is in line with my opinion, expressed earlier,


that these riots, even when the result of manipulation, usually havereligion as an important component.

The police further revealed that the mayhem was organised byVice Chairman Yusufu Umar Kukuri, who had “mobilised thefanatics.” The local CAN chapter claimed that the attack onChristians “was premeditated and well planned through the activecollaboration of the Yobe State military administrator Dabo Aliyu,the emir of Fika, Minister of Agriculture Alhaji Adamu Ciromaand the administration of Nangare LGC.”

The police reported the arrest of fifty people, but Minchakpuclaimed that Yusufu Umar, the brain behind the attack, wasreleased by authorities before an official inquiry even began.Furthermore, the composition of the appointed committee “wasone-sided in favour of the Muslims. Of the five-man committee,four are Muslims, while only one member is a Christian,” eventhough the government allegedly promised to include threeChristians. In response to this imbalance, CAN told the governorthat they did not believe justice would be done and that they wouldnot even submit the customary CAN memorandum.

Yusufu Turaki, in an interview with TC, expressed the opinionthat this attack was a “continuation of the implementation processof the grand design by Muslims to wipe out Christianity in north-ern Nigeria.”78

It was simply one grand chorus about an alleged Muslimdesign that was sung as lustily as its antiphone in Volume 2—orshould it be described as a grand lament?

TEKAN and ECWA published a joint press release on the lastday of 1994, the concluding section of which was devoted to thePotiskum riot. It read as follows:

Our constitution allows religious freedom of worship, but whyare Christians killed, maimed, and deprived of their rights?The recent killing of Christians, destruction of church build-


ings and burning of Christian properties in Potiskum markthe peak and open expression of government’s unwillingness toprotect her citizens. The security was absent. The government-owned dailies refuse to report such happenings. The govern-ment describes such perpetrators of instability as “misguidedelements” or “touts” and not Muslims. But such religious van-dals do not kill Muslims nor destroy mosques, except thechurches and Christians. Is the government really sincere?How shall unity be maintained with such open hypocrisy?Why are these religious riots so rampant only in the far North?Christians and Muslims in the South and Middle Belt buildchurches and mosques side by side and live together in peace.Why are the far North Muslims so harsh?79

� Concluding Remarks ________________________

I promised to attach as Appendix 11 an anonymous articlefrom TC as an appropriate closure to this volume. It is a documentthat hails from the middle of the period covered in this series andsummarises well the attitude of Nigerian Christians throughoutthis period. I also attach as Appendix 12 another article fromMinchakpu. Firebrand anti-Muslim as he seemed during his daysat Today’s Challenge, perhaps due to either maturing or pressurefrom the international news services that distribute his reports, thetone of his writing seems to be growing more mature and bal-anced—as does, perhaps, the attitude of Christians as well. Thetitle of the article, “Christian Retaliation Increasing in Nigeria’sViolence,” shows a Christian stance moving away from the lan-guage of cheek turning, a process already noted earlier, to a moreaggressive stance. Finally, an article written at the end of the MissWorld debacle in 2002 by Father George Ehusani serves as a per-fect bridge between this volume and the next one about sharia andthus constitutes Appendix 13.


Remember that this is only the end of a volume, not the endof the series. It is too early for firm concluding statements.Furthermore, I prefer to leave you readers to develop your ownconclusions to these materials thus far. No doubt, Christian,Muslim and secularist readers will all have come to different con-clusions by now. I caution you to be careful with your conclusions,unless you have read the earlier volumes as well. You may wish tohold all in abeyance until you have read the entire series.

The next step in our adventure will take us into the shadows ofsecularism. In Volume Five, I present the Nigerian Muslim view onsecularism. That discussion will be followed by its Christian paral-lel. See you there! I treasure you as my fellow traveller.


� Notes _________________________________________

1 “J. O.” Letter, 21 Aug/92. 2 With 2004 here, it will be “interesting” to see what will happen

when the church applies for a renewal or extension. Is the Muslim com-munity already making secret plans? All eyes will be on Kano.

3 Hausa terms derived from Arabic that drip with contempt: “pagan,”“worthless people,” “people without religion.”

4 Letter from CAN to the Kano State Commissioner of Education, 4Nov/82, published in CAN, 1982, pp. 37-38.

5 Dandaura, 3 12/82, pp. 7-8. 6 Kukah, 1993, pp. 158-160. 7 Ogbonna, 1991, p. 5. 8 “Bible Society Raps Government.” Liberation Times, Vol. 1, No. 5.9 Liberation Times, Vol. 1, No. 5. 10 Liberation Times, Vol. 1, No. 5. More helpful information regard-

ing the 1991 riot can be found in the following places: Citizen, 21Oct/91, pp. 7, 12-18. Nigeria’s Christian Digest, 20 Mar/91, pp. 11-15.Newswatch, 28 Oct/91, pp. 14-18. African Concord, 28 Oct/91, p. 33.

11 In fact, I would hardly have believed the story if I had not readTsado’s master’s thesis about equally unbelievable corruption in a Nigerianstate government. Tsado has shown he is capable of deep digging inincredibly murky waters.

12 Challenge Bookshops is a chain of bookshops owned by ECWAand thus closely associated also with JETS, a school of ECWA.

13 Nigerians love exaggerated large-scale thinking. Theirs is probablythe only country in the world where such huge numbers could be takenseriously.

14 These are two major northern Nigeria universities.15 Tsado and Ari, TC, 4/87.16 Y. Turaki, 1992. Appendix 10.17 Appendix 1. 18 Though CAN does not refer to it here, a list of Christian leaders


supposedly marked for elimination was making the rounds. 19 CAN Release, 1987, pp. 8-9. 20 Appendix B in the CAN Release.21 Tidings, 2/87. Kukah, 1993, pp. 193-195. 22 Kukah, 1993, pp. 194-195. CAN was not really calling for eccle-

siastical or canon courts. It was only serving the government notice thatif the sharia is enshrined in the constitution, then they will have to facethe demand for canon courts, an implicit promise of a very messy devel-opment what with all the different Christian denominations. CAN wasreally advising the government not to go there but to retain its secularity.

23 Kukah, 1993, p. 191.24 Kukah, 1993, pp. 203-204. I find it hard to accept this as a causal

explanation for the riots sparked by Kafanchan, since the initiative camefrom Muslims. I do accept it as a major explanation for the Zangon-Katafepisode, where the immediate initiative came mostly from Christians. Theoccasion was used to express their pent-up feelings. The connectionbetween the riots and the content of the submission was, in my estima-tion, more psychological and emotional than causal.

25 Kukah, 1993, pp. 203-204.26 Kukah, 1993, p. 186.27 Kukah, 1993, pp. 48-49.28 Kukah, 1993, pp. 185-186. 29 Kukah, 1993, p. 196.30 Youthful students, often children, at the popular Qur’anic schools

found in all Muslim communities.31 His phrase later was used by CAN to haunt the government when

CAN published its statement of 24 Apr/91 under that title.32 Kukah, 1993, pp. 189-190.33 Kukah, 1993, pp. 192-193.34 Byang, TC, 5/87, pp. 16-18.35 Byang, REC, July-Aug/99. 36 The term “settler” is questionable here. Can a people who have

lived in a place for 350 years still be considered settlers? The local


Christians and Traditionalists do so regard them; the “settlers” themselveshave good reason to object to the designation. Where I use it in this chap-ter, I do so only as an expression of local Trado-Christian opinion.

37 Anonymous, TC, 3/92, p. 15. 38 CAN, Kaduna State Branch, 17 June/92. 39 There were some very good reasons for calling Turaki to testify: (1)

He was the general secretary of ECWA, a prominent Christian denomi-nation in the area; (2) He grew up in Kaduna State in an area contiguousto Zango–Kataf; (3) His doctoral dissertation deals extensively with thesubjugation of the southern Kaduna people to the emir of Zaria on thepart of the colonialists.

40 Y. Turaki, 1992. 41 Hausa term for “tribes” or “ethnic groups.” When used by

Muslims in Nigeria, it is a term of contempt and stands over against the“civilised” Muslim culture of the North.

42 Y. Turaki, TC, 3/92, pp. 6-7. 43 Y. Madaki, TC, 4/92, pp. 11-12. 44 Jatau, TC, 3/92, pp. 14-15. 45 See Boer, 1979, pp. 126-129 and 1984, pp. 36-37 for brief but

pungent descriptions of that part of Muslim slave culture in West Africathat is always hidden.

46 TC, 4/92, pp. 4-13.47 Anonymous, TC, 3/92, p. 8.48 Anonymous, TC, 3/92, p. 11. 49 M. Jega, 15 June/92.50 TC, 1/93, p. 4.51 TSM, 14 Feb/93, p. 4.52 TC, 1/93, pp. 6-8.53 Madaki, TC, 3/93, p. 5. 54 TC, 1/93, p. 7.55 TSM, 14 Feb/93, pp. 4, 6-15.56 Anonymous, TC, 4/92, pp. 4-9. Anonymous, TC, 1/93, pp. 4-8.


Nnanna, pp. 7-8. 57 TC, 4/92, pp. 4-8. 58 TC, 4/92, p. 8 59 Jatau, TC, 3/92, p. 15. 60 Tsedason, p. 3.61 Ilo, p. 1. 62 Nigerian News Du Jour, 15 May/98.63 Onwubiko and Nwakamma, 3 Sept/2001. 64 I. Audu, July/2000. Ephesians 6:12 in New International Version.65 Minchakpu, TC, 1/96, pp. 6-7. 66 Director, p. 8. 67 Probably the same “O. J.” we have met in earlier contexts.68 IISIC, June/91.69 IISIC, June/91. 70 CAN, 24 Apr/91. 71 CAN, 8 May/91. This CAN list was distributed by TEKAN

among its members (14 May/91).72 Minchakpu, TC, 1/96, pp. 6-7. 73 TC, 1/96, pp. 9-12. 74 Madaki, TC, 1/96; 1/97. Some of these materials may appear in

the promised Companion CD volume. 75 TC, 1/96, pp. 9ff. See also Y. Madaki, TC, 1/97, for another

lengthy and less technical report.76 Minchakpu, 29 Oct/2001. 77 Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, p. 8. 78 Minchakpu, TC, 1/95, pp. 10-14, 20. For the detailed but unfin-

ished story of Catherine, see Minchakpu’s interview with Abban. The dis-tortions and corruption of the Muslim police, Muslim judges and all othersin the case are beyond belief. The story is too long for inclusion in this book,but I hope to include major sections of it on the promised Companion CD.

79 TEKAN/ECWA Release, 31 Dec/94. Had the authors forgottenChristian behaviour in Kaduna State?


� APPENDIX 11 ___________________________________

ISLAM IN AFRICA CONFERENCE:COMMUNIQUÉ2

Jointly Issued by the Islamic Council, London;The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)And the Newly Founded Islam in Africa Organisation (IAO)

FURTHER DETERMINED to evolve a permanent Islamicbody which has firm roots in and is securely anchored to the long-standing ideals and values of Islam, designed to articulate the hopesand aspirations of Muslims in Africa and coordinate Islamic workvariously undertaken by Muslim communities and organisationsand to initiate projects which would assist in improving the lives ofMuslims on the continent and the Muslim world as a whole, we,the delegates assembled here at ABUJA, this first day of Jumada alAwwal, 1410 (28/11/89), DO HEREBY RESOLVE:

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 233

To call on Muslims throughout Africa to unite as an importantpart of the Ummah which is blessed with the guidance and mercybrought by the Messenger of Allah, Muhammad (PBUH).

To urge Muslims, who have been separated by imposed geo-political barriers of artificial boundaries drawn up by imperialists toserve colonial and anti-Islamic interests, to cooperate with theirbrethren throughout the Muslim world with a view to reinstatinga strong and united Ummah which is determined to fulfil the com-mands of Allah, the Almighty.

To call upon the Ulama to close their ranks and thereby facil-itate unity among the Ummah and to urge them to unite and tostrive to remove all barriers between them and the general Muslimpopulace, especially the youth.

To call on Muslims to review the syllabi in the various educa-tional institutions with a view to bringing them into conformitywith Islamic ideals, goals and principles and to serve the needs oftheir community.

To urge Muslims to pay special attention to the education ofwomen at all levels.

To encourage the teaching of Arabic language which is the lan-guage of the Qu’ran, as well as the lingua franca of the continent andto strive for the restoration of the use of Arabic script in vernacular.

To urge Muslims to establish strong economic ties betweenAfrican Islamic countries and other parts of the Muslim world inorder to facilitate mutual assistance and cooperation in commerce,industry and finance with a view to evolving a sound economic sys-tem based on Islamic principles.

To form a permanent body to be known as Islam in AfricaOrganization under the trusteeship of representatives to be selectedfrom among the participating countries; to perform, among otherfunctions, the state activities and seek to attain the goals and objec-tives as provided for in the annexure to this communiqué.

The Conference salutes and highly commends the efforts

which the Muslim youth are making in the service of Islam andpledges its full support for them in this worthwhile endeavour.

The Conference notes the yearnings of Muslims everywhere onthe continent who have been deprived of their rights to be gov-erned by the Sharia and urges them to intensify efforts in the strug-gle to re-instate the application of the Sharia.

The Conference notes that modalities for the establishment of theAfrican Muslim Media Practitioners Association in Nigeria has beenset in motion. It appreciates this noble move and urges Muslims in themedia organisations to offer it all the support it needs to succeed.

The Conference unanimously expresses its gratitude andappreciation:

To the government of peoples of Nigeria for the interest shownin the Conference and, in particular, extends its thanks to thePresident, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria,General Ibrahim Babangida for the stimulating inaugural addresswhich he sent to the conference and [which] was delivered byGeneral Sani Abacha, the Chief of Army Staff of Nigeria;

To the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and theIslamic Affairs and the Islamic Council, London and theOrganisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) for sponsoring andorganizing the Conference;

• • •

INSPIRED by the Unity of Allah, the Creator and Lord of theUniverse; MOTIVATED by the Qur’anic declaration, “Verily, thisyear (Islamic) Ummah is one...,” and DETERMINED to complywith Allah’s directive contained in the Qur’anic ayah,“And hold fastto the rope of Allah, and do not break up into factions,” the PAR-TICIPANTS at the Islam in Africa Conference on this First day ofJumada al-Awwal, 1420 A.H., (28/11/89), DO HEREBYRESOLVE to found the Islam in Africa Organization (IAO) withthe following as its objectives, viz:


• To undertake vigorous human resource developmentprogrammes.

• To serve as a mouthpiece for the articulation of issues ofcommon concern to Muslims in Africa and the Muslimworld generally.

• To commission experts to write the history of Islam inAfrica and of Muslims and their institutions fromauthentic Islamic view-point and to retrieve literaryworks and artifacts pertaining to this.

• To establish Islamic Tertiary and Vocational Centreswhich are designed to train Da’wah workers who will betrained to acquire trades and skills which will equip themto be self-employed and productive.

• To ensure the continuity of the noble work initiated atthis Conference.

• To cooperate with other national or international Islamicorganisations for the attainment of its stated objectives.

• To promote unity, spiritually and materially, amongMuslims all over the world, particularly in Africa.

• To promote peace, harmony and general human devel-opment and strive to remove all forms of discrimination.

• To support, enhance and coordinate Da’wah work allover Africa and propagate the knowledge of Islamthroughout the continent.

• To encourage research efforts on Islamic matters andpublicise the research findings.

• To undertake and encourage the translation into variousAfrican languages of Islamic works, their publication anddistribution.

Appendix 1 235

• To support the establishment and application of theSharia to all Muslims.

• To encourage vigorous participation of Muslim Youthsin all spheres of its activities and to ensure that womenare accorded their due rights and roles in society inaccordance with the Sharia.

• To ensure the appointment of only Muslims into strate-gic national and international posts of member nations.

• To eradicate in all its forms and ramifications all non-Muslim religions in member nations (such religions shallinclude Christianity, Ahmadiyya and other tribal modesof worship unacceptable to Muslims).

• To ensure that only Muslims are elected to all politicalposts of member nations.

• To ensure the declaration of Nigeria (the 24th Africanand 46th World member of the OIC) a Federal IslamicSultanate at a convenient date any time from 28th

March, 1990, with the Sultan of Sokoto enthroned theSultan and Supreme Sovereign of Nigeria.

• To ensure the ultimate replacement of all Western formsof legal and judicial systems with the Sharia in all mem-ber nations before the next Islam in Africa Conference.

• To organise an Islam in Africa Conference regularly aswell as seminars, symposia, conferences, workshops andcolloquia.

Towards the attainment of these ends, therefore, a SteeringCommittee, with membership drawn from the following countriesas well as the Islamic Council, London and the Organisation of theIslamic Conference (OIC), has been set up, viz: Nigeria, Niger, The


Gambia, Mauritania, Senegal, Libya, Tanzania, Sudan, Tunisia.The permanent headquarters of the Islam in Africa

Organization (IAO) shall be in Abuja, Nigeria. The SteeringCommittee has been assigned the special task of the details estab-lishing the IAO in Nigeria, including structures and constitutionwithin six (6) months. The Conference decided that the SteeringCommittee should also work out detailed plans for transforming anational political party in each member nation into a NationalIslamic Party, and that the National Republic Convention (NRC)of Nigeria should be made to serve this purpose in Nigeria as theonly recognised National Islamic Party of Nigeria. These politicalparties so approved shall be the only ones to produce leading gov-ernment (executive and legislative) functionaries. The NRC ofNigeria and other parties shall have their names changed to reflectthe Islamic nature of their purpose.

The Conference further agreed and decided that the IAOshould, for the time being, operate from the facilities of the IslamicCouncil, London, and not from that of the OIC (that has becometoo controversial in Nigeria).

The joint Conference finally ratified the admission of Nigeriaas a full member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference,OIC, and thanked the government and people of Nigeria for hav-ing generously donated US$21 billion to the Islamic DevelopmentFund of the OIC, and sincerely requested the federal governmentof Nigeria to implement all policies and programmes of the OICto show the whole world that Nigeria is truly an Islamic nation.

Appendix 1 237

� APPENDIX 2 ___________________________________

RE: PROMOTING RELIGIOUS PEACE AND SECURITY

IN NIGERIA: MEETING OF DISTINGUISHED ELDERS

AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS3

Jabani Mambula

The Committee;

I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation oncemore for this opportunity given to leaders and religious leaders inthis country once more to discuss and find out ways of preventingreligious intolerance and rioting in the northern part of the coun-try. I send this memo as my personal view after serious consultationwith all the ten Church denominations in the fellowship ofChurches of Christ in Nigeria TEKAN and other denominationswho are either Associate Members or otherwise. I will write thepoints raised one by one from a Christian point of view as follows:

1. While talking about religious riots in the northern states, weshould make it clear that it is “Some northern states” and notlump them all together. To be more direct is to say the farnorthern states. Middle Belt where Christians are more innumber have never experienced Religious riots.

2. Of all the riots none have been caused by Christians becauseChristians have more control over their members than theMuslims who fight amongst themselves as well as against theChristians. To call a spade a spade, the riots, though some feel[they] have been political, [are] purely religious because eitherthe more fanatical Muslims wanted to eliminate the more tol-erant Muslims or eliminate the Christians so the totalIslamisation of Nigeria could be effected, which I feel isimpossible. Because after every riot against the Christians, allthe Churches experienced tremendous growth in membership


from backsliders as well as new converts and are more deter-mined to suffer for Christ as Jesus said in Matthew 5:11-12.

3. The late Sardauna of Sokoto, though a very staunch Muslim,had never advocated Islamisation by violence. We admirehim for his tolerance and Islamisation by persuasion and, infact, he achieved more than any of the fanatical leaders inconversion to Islam. This method has been comprehensivelyused by Christians and is still the method in Christian evan-gelization. So the method of approach by the presentMuslims should change, the alternative of which would becontinued disturbances which will wreck this nation, espe-cially the North.

4. The historical discrimination against Christians is wellknown as follows:

(a) Denial for building places of worship especially in thefar northern states.

(b) Denial for Religious Teaching in schools for Christianpupils.

(c) Denial for places of burial in some far northern states.

(d) The recent dismissal of four highly-ranked Christianworkers in NNDC because they set aside a short timeto pray during office hours and are all replaced byMuslims.

(e) Many promotions and lucrative appointments in theNigerian army have been done by luring Christianofficers of Northern origin into Islam.

(f ) Out of my ten Church denominations, none has gota plot in Abuja though most of their applications havebeen in since 1980. All these Churches are fully regis-tered with their Certificates of Incorporation.

Appendix 2 239

(g) Seizure of schools and hospitals and refusal to returnthem to the owners in spite of the fallen standards.

(h) Denial of the rights of indigenes to be appointed asDistrict Heads or Village Heads who are of Christianreligion in favour of their Muslim brothers, e.g.Tafawa Balewa and Southern Zaria.

(i) Building of Mosques in Government houses and pub-lic places like motor-park stations, etc., including thePresidential Complex at Abuja, but no provision for[a] Christian Chapel.

(j) Non-recognition of Israel at Ambassadorial level to give asense of security to Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land.

(k) The continued claim by the Muslims, e.g. Gumi, that:Christianity is nothing; no Christian can become theHead of State; Christians constitute only 15% of thisnation, or Jesus is a bastard. Such outrageous claimsare against all reason since out of the four zones ofNigeria, only one zone is predominantly Muslim, i.e.the far northern states (Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, Borno,Bauchi); Christians are the majority in the MiddleBelt, West and the East.

(l) In the creation of Local Governments, States likeKano, Sokoto, Katsina though predominantly in theSahel area which are thinly populated are given moreLocal Governments as against the thickly populatedareas of savannah in the Middle Belt where Christiansare the majority.

(m) Continued claims by the Muslims that Nigeria mustremain in the OIC and imposition of Sharia in thecountry’s Constitution.

(n) Wrong detention by the Military regime of prominent


Christians after the abortive coup of April 1990, butnothing has been done to Muslim fanatics who openlyinsulted the Government [saying] that Babangida’sGovernment is an infidel government and his followerswill not recognise it and that the battle line has beendrawn (Tell Magazine, No. 4, May 6, 1991, p.18).

5. CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria) has written andwarned the Government about the continued injusticesunder 4 a-n above but there has been no change.

6. Unjust removal of some development in predominantlyChristian areas to predominantly Muslim areas like:

(a) Customs area office from Plateau to Bauchi

(b) Headquarters Central Bank to Bauchi

(c) NITEL Headquarters to Bauchi

(d) NEPA Headquarters to Bauchi

7. The future of Nigeria as far as children are concerned will bebleak in that the Government has encouraged the States tohave two types of uniforms in schools—one for Muslims andone for Christians. This serves no purpose.

8. The Christians have never been given credit for their love forpeace. And Muslim riots are blamed on both sides—it is unfair.

9. Christians now fear living in certain parts of northern statesfor their lives and properties being destroyed. In fact, for-eigners from Chad, Niger and the Cameroons live more com-fortably than Nigerian Christians.

10. The Government should strictly administer this nation as inthe Constitution which guarantees freedom of religion, secu-larity of the State, quota system in appointment of the topposts in the Government by merit, etc.

Appendix 2 241

Recommendations

1. Let the Government strictly rule according to theConstitution and the secularity of the country should be reli-giously maintained.

2. Return all the Schools and Hospitals to the rightful ownersunder the former condition.

3. The historical discrimination under paragraph 4 a-n shouldbe rectified within the life of this regime.

4. The Quota system should be strictly adhered to in appoint-ments to top positions in the Military, Civil Service,Government institutions etc.

5. The Government should stay clear from indulging in reli-gious affairs.

6. This forum created at the initiative of MAMSER should begiven every encouragement and continue to advise theGovernment especially on Religious issues.

7. State appointments in key positions e.g. the Governor, theArmy Commander, the Police Commissioner, and the StateDirector of SSS must be mixed—Christians and Muslims ineach State of the Federation to avoid making biased, onesided decisions.

8. Northern Christians should be given their fair share in theappointments in ICCA and Federal Parastatals like NNPC,Ministers, and Bank Directors, etc.

9. The Muslim–Christian School Uniforms should be abolishedwith immediate effect so the Northern people could feel oncemore together.

10. The far north Muslims should not frown whenever MiddleBelt is mentioned.


11. Relationship with the State of Israel should be normalised toavoid discrimination especially against the Christian pilgrimswho have to go through other countries to obtain their visasand for the diplomatic coverage in case of trouble.

12. Muslims should stop building Mosques in public places likethe Government houses, motor parks, markets, etc.

13. Teaching of Christian Religion in some far northern statesshould be reintroduced.

14. Inflammatory utterances by key Muslim leaders againstChristians should be stopped.

15. The idea for Islamisation of this Nation by all means must stop.

16. The OIC and Sharia matter should be dropped.

17. Each registered Religious body with their certificate of incor-poration should be given plots to build their places of wor-ship in Abuja.

18. The abduction of young Christian girls must stop.

19. The use of the word “arne” for Christian believers shouldstop and whenever an acceptable animal is slaughtered by aChristian, it should be eaten by a Muslim and vice versa.

20. Whoever committed arson or murder as in the case of killinginnocent school children in Bauchi should be publicly executed.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude by saying that I was very muchencouraged by the successful meeting we had on the 11th July, 1991at Kaduna. I still remember the word from one of our elders that“Ranar wanka ba’a boya cibi” and the startling revelations that fol-lowed, which made both the Christians and Muslims alike to speak

Appendix 2 243

frankly and honestly with each other and the genuine truth pre-vailed over the devilish suspicion which had been dominating sim-ilar meetings in the past. Such similar meetings as ours should beimmediately held whenever there is rumour or happenings as inBauchi and Katsina and the blame appropriately directed on theculprits with corresponding punishments. Any state Governor whohas failed to maintain peace, be he a Military man or a civilian,should be removed immediately in case of a Military man, and sus-pension followed by election in case of a civilian Governor.Politically, there should be no discrimination—where Muslims aregenuinely the majority, don’t force Christians on them and viceversa. The present committee of 6 should be enlarged to 8. I wishthe present committee God’s guidance as they will be looking intoevery aspect of such submission and incorporate all the genuineideas to bringing a lasting peace and security to this Nation espe-cially in the troubled northern states.

Humbly submitted,Reverend J. P. MambulaGeneral Secretary TEKAN25/7/1991


� APPENDIX 3 ___________________________________

RECENT HAPPENINGS AND EVENTS IN THE COUNTRY:

A submission by the TEKAN Study Group to the Panel of Investigation4

We of the TEKAN Study Group abhor and condemn in nouncertain terms the mayhem, violence, arson and unprovokedwanton destruction of churches and personal houses and propertyof Christians, and the unjustifiable infliction of injuries and heart-less manhandling of Christians. We heartily condole and sympa-thise with the victims of this savage behaviour and destruction.

We also want to thank the government for the appointment ofa panel to look into the matter. However, we wish to make itknown that we object to the composition of the panel. In the inter-ests of impartiality, and to inspire confidence in the panel, the fed-eral government should include three members from CAN on thispanel. The behaviour of the Kaduna state government and its agen-cies has left much to be desired. There seems to have been tacit sup-port for the riots through deliberate non-intervention in them.Because the state government’s impartiality is questionable, a neu-tral body should have been appointed.

Religious War

The dangers that would result from a religious war erupting inthe country cannot be overemphasised. It is a war that nobodywins. Examples abound—Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Sudan,Chad, etc…. We must therefore do everything in our power to pre-vent a religious war in this country. We must show, by the just trialand punishment of the instigators of these riots, that we will notsanction such a war.

Appendix 3 245

Provocation

We totally disagree with the contention that the events inKafanchan were provoked by Reverend Abubakar Bako quotingfrom the Qur’an. Knowledge of the Qur’an is not the exclusive pre-serve of Muslims. Just as Muslims use the Holy Bible to attempt toprove that Muhammed is the last Prophet, so Christians quote theQur’an to prove that Jesus is the Word of God and that He wasconceived by the Holy Spirit. Books written by Muslims quote theHoly Bible profusely; so, too, books written by Christians fre-quently refer to the Qur’an. There are books written comparing theHoly Bible and the Qur’an. Indeed, universities and colleges offercourses on the comparative study of religions.

Nor are we aware of any quoting of the Qur’an in order to dis-parage Islam or show disrespect for Muhammed, the Prophet ofIslam. Reverend Bako quoted the Qur’an to demonstrate the supe-riority of Jesus Christ as testified to even in the Qur’an, not to castaspersions on Muhammed or Islam.

The claim of provocation is therefore hollow and empty.Moreover, Islamic preachers (e.g. Sheikh Gumi and many others)quote from the Holy Bible. Does this give Christians the right togo and assault such Muslim preachers? Of course not! The MSSmust not be allowed to escape with such a hollow argument. Thegovernor himself, in an appeal for peace, quoted from both theBible and the Qur’an. There is no exclusive ownership of religiousbooks; if they are truly from God, and not merely a production ofthe opinions of human beings, they are for all people.

The Security Forces

It is very important and pertinent that the non-intervention ofthe security forces and the state government be investigated. Forthe rioters to have had a free hand to ravage and destroy for at least18 hours, unrestrained by the presence of any of the armed forces,is utterly baffling. It is an absolute indictment of the Governor, the


Commissioner of Police, the Army Commander and the Directorof the State Secret Service, and is sufficient justification for theirremoval from office. We call for the removal of these… authorities,for as long as they hold their positions, the investigation will not beable to come out with the truth of their behaviour, to expose theirrole in the events, and to determine how far the non-interferenceby the security forces encouraged the rioters. For a section of thecitizenry to have been exposed, without protection, to destruction,violence and arson for 18-24 hours is very serious. It is thereforevery important that the mystery surrounding the inaction of theauthorities be unravelled. The truth cannot be found out with theauthorities remaining in office. It will give them the opportunity tocover up. What is more suspicious is that even the traditional rulerswho are the fathers of the nation also failed to act. All these inac-tions point, we feel, to a hidden conspiracy.

Students’ Society

It is becoming more and more obvious that students at theinstitutions of higher learning are being used by certain groups ofpowerful individuals for personal ends. We call on the governmentto examine carefully the involvement of students with the Societywhile at these institutions. Our institutions of higher learningshould not become a military reserve camp to recruit rioters to per-petrate violence against society by the enemies of society. We can-not build a stable and peaceful egalitarian society if our institutionsof higher learning are converted to centres for breeding riots andviolence to be used by people whose sole aim is to get the countryto serve their evil designs.

Rumours

It is very necessary that we carefully check some false pro-nouncements, capable of encouraging violence, which have beenmade by certain religious leaders. For example, we are not sur-

Appendix 3 247

prised that these riots came at a time when certain powerful reli-gious leaders were showing great interest in the religious composi-tion of the country. Only last year, a respected Muslim religiousleader claimed that 85% of Nigerians are Muslims. He laterchanged that claim to 80% and finally this year reduced it to 70%.Evidently, Islam is losing ground fast and therefore is in need of ajihad to reverse the trend. Christians naturally become the victimsof such a jihad, for the Islamic losses are considered to be the resultof conversions to Christianity.

The Soul That Sins, It Shall Die

It is a deliberately false and misleading excuse to claim that theriot at Kafanchan caused the riots at Kaduna and Kano. What hasthe quarrel at Kafanchan to do with an innocent soul in Kaduna orKano? If we are to adopt a system of vicarious guilt, Nigeria willcease to be a nation. Any person using the riot at Kafanchan as anexcuse for his violence elsewhere must be punished severely. Thegovernment must come out clearly on this issue. Innocent peopleshould not be made to suffer because of violence unconnected withthem. If we say that a crime by a Muslim in Sokoto or Maiduguriis a crime by all Muslims in Nigeria, or that a crime committed bya Christian in Gongola or Abeokuta is a crime by all Christians,then where are we heading as a nation? Surely to self-destructionand total chaos! How can an innocent person be declared a crimi-nal from crimes to which he was not privy? We are becoming ahaven for religious fanatics and a gilded cage for innocent and law-abiding citizens. We urge the government to check this dangeroustrend before it is too late.

Injustice Is License for Criminals

Systematic injustice towards Christians has become a licencefor Islamic religious fanatics to constantly commit arson and vio-lence against Christians. [These fanatics] have also found out that


no matter what they do against Christians, Christians do not retal-iate and the government and law enforcement agencies do not pun-ish them, contrary to… the Penal Code Law which states:

Whoever destroys, damages or defiles any object of worship orany object held sacred by any class of persons with the inten-tion of thereby insulting the religion of any class of personswith knowledge that any class of persons is likely to considersuch destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to theirreligion, shall be punished with imprisonment for a termwhich may extend to two years or with a fine or with both.

How many times have churches been set ablaze and howmany times has an object like a cross, which is sacred toChristians, been destroyed or damaged? How many times haveChristian places of worship been defiled? How many times haveChristians and their religion been insulted? Who among the per-petrators of such crimes has been imprisoned or fined? Thus,through acts of commission and omission, action and inaction,has the government not only encouraged but aided and abettedsuch actions against Christians.

In the same manner, section 213 [of the Code]: “Whoever vol-untarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in theperformance of religious worship or religious ceremonies shall bepunished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to oneyear, or with a fine or with both.”

How many times have Christian religious processions beenstoned? How many times have Christians assembled for religiousworship been stoned and…beaten up? How many among the per-petrators of such acts have been jailed? To the best of our knowledge,[no one] has been punished. The government and law enforcementagencies are thus accomplices in these crimes against Christians.They have in effect declared Christians persona non grata in the landand thereby have exposed them to all manner of evil treatment.

Appendix 3 249

Religious fanatics have taken this as a licence to become lawless andto consider their religion the religion of the government.

Other injustices also contribute to the impression that Islam isthe religion of the government. Appointments and promotionsseem to have religious undertones. Through discriminatoryappointments and promotions the impression is created that we arean Islamic state and that the land belongs to Muslims. For exam-ple, the army has thrown out the seniority principle to bring aboutreligious bias among its leadership. Senior officers who areChristians have either been retired or made to serve in the govern-ment under their juniors who were given leadership positionsbecause they are Muslims.

Thus, today we have leadership as follows:…5

In addition, most policy-making positions are reserved forMuslims. Such biased appointments therefore are a psychologicalbooster for crimes against Christians.

Citizens’ Rights

The Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights of everycitizen. However, the following rights are denied to Christians:

1. The right to plots to build places of worship in somestates.

2. The right to religious education for their children instates like Kano, Sokoto, Borno and others.

3. The right to freedom of religion. Schools which the gov-ernment took over from the churches have been givenIslamic names and now operate as Islamiya schools.

Ban on Public Preaching

The ban placed on public preaching is meant to cater to thewishes of the Islamic fanatics. With the possible exception of theevents at Kafanchan, we are not aware of any riot which resulted


from public preaching. There was none. The ban placed on publicpreaching and procession is therefore meant to prevent Christiansfrom performing the duties required by their religion, and to cur-tail Christian growth. It is strictly against Christians becausethrough such preaching Christianity has been growing by leaps andbounds. Moreover, while the ban is placed on Christian activity,Muslims continue to block major streets, roads and highways everyFriday to perform public worship. Every Friday, Christians toleratethe curtailing of their freedom of movement, but Muslims refuse totolerate a Palm Sunday procession or an Easter Monday publicworship assembly, which occurs only once a year. The government,to protect the feelings of the Muslims, bans such acts and becomesinsensitive to the feelings of Christians.

All these acts by the government have created the impressionthat Christians are aliens in the country. Christians are clearlytreated as being inferior to the Muslims. Muslims do not even needa certificate of occupancy to build a mosque. Mosques… have pro-liferated in government ministries and parastatals. Schools and gov-ernment institutions of learning have mosques but no chapels. Lawswhich are made to be obeyed are flagrantly violated. We are becom-ing a lawless nation to accommodate Islamic religious fanaticism.

The Current Crisis

While we agree with President Babangida that the present ram-page was meant to lead to the overthrow of his government, it isnevertheless based on religion. According to an investigation ofthose arrested in Gongola, the Commissioner of Police of GongolaState found that

These young men… would appear to belong to an organiza-tion whose objective is to destroy the secular government andentrench a pro-Iranian Islamic government. According tothem, this is a long-term effort which has already been set in

Appendix 3 251

motion. The young men are members of a larger organizationexisting in all parts of the country. This and the act of theyoung men are not capable of causing a breach of the peace,but constitute a threat to the security of the nation.

Since the revolution “has already been set in motion” and par-ticularly since it is “a larger organization existing in all parts of thecountry,” we have clearly not yet seen the end of the matter. It isvery necessary that the security forces perform the duties which areexpected of them. It is our prayer that the government will fullyimplement the provisions of the Constitution. The governmentthat fails to implement the Constitution and to enforce obedienceto the law of the land is calling for disaster and chaos.

We of the TEKAN churches and indeed all Christians pray thatthe day will never come when our turning the other cheek reaches 70times seven. If the government allows the provocation of Christiansto reach 70 times seven, she will have only herself to blame.

Mr. Chairman and members of the panel, we are praying foryou earnestly. We pray that God will guide and give you wisdom toget to the root of the problem and to be able to discover the truecauses of the riots. We hope that those involved, no matter howpowerful, will be brought to justice. Let us save our country fromnever-ending bloodshed.

May God bless.


� APPENDIX 4 ___________________________________

THE VIOLENT POLITICS OF RELIGION

AND THE SURVIVAL OF NIGERIA6

Press Statement by ABU Lecturers

Since last Friday, 6th March, 1987, violent attacks have beenlaunched against life, property and places of worship in most of themajor cities and towns of Kaduna State. Churches and mosques;hotels and cinemas; businesses and vehicles; private homes and per-sons have been attacked, smashed up and systematically set on firein an unprecedented campaign of violent religious politics clearlyaimed against the survival of our country.

In these seven days many people have been killed and wounded.Many more have been harassed, molested, completely frightened andmade totally insecure. Over a hundred churches and a few mosqueshave been burnt down completely. Right now in Zaria, almost all eco-nomic, educational and other activities have stopped. Hundreds ofpeople are on the roads and motor parks and railway stations lookingfor transport to travel back to their hometowns for safety and security.The basis of normal life has been severely shaken. In spite of reportsand warnings from concerned individuals and organisations, threedays after the start of the violence, police and security forces werecompletely absent from the scene. Citizens were left completely at themercy of the violent mobs. This apparent abdication of responsibilityby the Government must be taken very seriously.

This type of violent campaign of Muslims against Christians isunprecedented in the history of our country. It directly threatensher continued survival as a single entity.

We, the undersigned citizens of Nigeria, who have no othercountry but this one, have witnessed and personally experiencedthis violent attack against one of the foundations on which ourcountry exists, namely the secular nature of the Nigerian State and

Appendix 4 253

its duty to protect the rights of everyone to practise his/her ownreligion without any hindrance.

In January 1986, some of us were forced to issue a signed state-ment warning over the handling of Nigeria’s relations with theOrganization of Islamic Conference, and the way Israel and theVatican were being used by sinister and reactionary forces to under-mine the unity of our people and the sovereignty and integrity ofour nation. In that statement, entitled “Nigerian Foreign PolicyShould Actively Foster Nigerian Unity Based on Our AfricanIdentity and Destiny,” it was pointed out that this campaign of sys-tematic manipulation of religious sentiments is being conductedfor the sinister and reactionary purpose of diverting the attentionof the people of this country from the urgent tasks of economicreconstruction and the working out of…[Next few words illegible.]

In the long term, the purpose of this campaign of politicalmanipulation of religious sentiments is to entrench religious con-flicts in all facets of our national life, so that the Nigerian agents ofimperialism, working under the cover of Christianity and Islam,financed by Zionism and Arab reactionaries, can always hold theunity of this country to ransom, build up the forces for its destruc-tion, and ultimately break it up so as to give a serious blow to themovements for democracy, social and national liberation, which arenow making great advances all over Africa. The individuals, groupsand organisations waging this campaign against the unity of thepeople of this country are particularly afraid of and very hostile topopular mobilization and debate, at the grassroots level, over whoand what is responsible for what has gone wrong with this countryin the last 25 years, and how these retrograde and backward forcesand elements can be overcome for genuine economic, social andpolitical progress. They therefore wear the cloak of religion in orderto confuse and divert the attention of our people from their harshconditions of existence, and from how to positively transform theseconditions in a permanent and systematic fashion.


Our experience of the current events and all evidence availableto us have convinced us that the violence and arson of the last sevendays was not the brain work of hooligans. It is believed to be thelatest stage of a campaign which started about ten years ago in theso-called “Sharia Debate”7 in 1976–77.

At that time it was aimed at creating political constituencies forpolitical leadership, whose records showed that they had nothing tooffer our people. This strategy failed and therefore they now turnagain to the manipulation of religious sentiments and religioussymbolism to cover up their complete bankruptcy and failures.

Right now we can see behind the killing, maiming and arson areturn to the 1976–77 scenario. Only this time the level of violenceand the threat to national security and survival is much higher. Butjust as 1976–77 was only two to three years away from a return tocivilian democracy, so 1986–87 is also only two to three years awayfrom a return to civilian democracy in 1990. The basic difference,however, is that progressive development among the people ofNigeria and the rest of Africa over the last ten years has made thesebackward and reactionary forces more determined to entrench reli-gious conflict in Nigeria… and to ultimately wreck it….

… this campaign has reached this totally unacceptable and verydangerous level because successive federal governments have toyedwith one of the foundations on which Nigerian unity exists, namelythe secular nature of the Nigerian State and its sacred… [not legi-ble]. A strong impression has been created that some organisationsand individuals can, with arrogance and impunity, incite andthreaten people of other religious beliefs and will get away with, atmost, only verbal reprimands or appeals to be tolerant.

… this campaign of violent religious politics has reached thevery dangerous levels it has because several powerful media organs,particularly the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, Kaduna,have been allowed to be used by a tiny backward oligarchy whichsurvives on inciting one section of Nigeria against another.

Appendix 4 255

Anybody who listens … since January 1986 and particularly sinceMonday, March 9, 1987, knows that something sinister and vio-lent was being systematically planned against the unity of…Nigeria and against the peace and stability of the country.

We, the undersigned, therefore want to warn, in a verysolemn way, all our brothers and sisters… that we are fast comingto the brink of catastrophe. The events of the last seven days arevery serious and very dangerous for our individual and collectivesurvival. All those citizens committed to the unity of this coun-try, for which so much blood has been shed, have to stand up andmake a choice between fear, timidity and inertia in the face of sys-tematic destruction of the foundation of our nation, and a deter-mined struggle to crush these forces of destruction and save ourcountry and our future.

We call on the Federal Military Government (FMG) to shedall ambiguities and hesitation, and to declare and reaffirm that theNigerian State is SECULAR and one of its most fundamentalresponsibilities is to protect the right of every citizen and resident topractice the religion of their choice. We call on the FMG to imple-ment this decisively and clearly in practice by identifying publiclyand punishing according to the law all the rich and powerful indi-viduals who are known to be behind this campaign of violent reli-gious politics aimed at destroying our country.

We call on the FMG to ensure, in all parts of the country, thesecurity of life and property and places and of freedom of belief andworship of everyone.

We call on the FMG to affirm and promote the exercise of thefundamental human rights of individuals and the collective self-defence of all the people against any form of aggression, be it exter-nal or internal.

We call on the FMG to make, as a matter of utmost urgency,full reparations to all those who have suffered damages. In particu-lar, we ask… [not legible] that the right of facilities for worship by


all religious groups is restored and guaranteed in all places wherethey have been destroyed.

We are convinced that the sinister and utterly reactionaryforces behind this campaign of violent religious politics with theaim of destroying our country are made up of a tiny oligarchydetermined to maintain its power, wealth and privileges at all costs,including violent and well-organised mobs in the name of religion.We are also convinced that the majority of the people of this coun-try and the popular organisations are capable of being mobilised toovercome them and defend the unity of our people and theintegrity of our country. We therefore call upon the NigerianLabour Congress to mobilise all the workers of this country arounda campaign against religious and all sectional politics.

LONG LIVE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA8

Appendix 4 257

� APPENDIX 5A _________________________________

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CHRISTIANS, JEWS & MONOTHEISTS

Corporate Headquarters 5HR, 1211 Geneva 1 Switzerland

15th February, 1990

Proposals for Restoration of Religious Peace and Harmony to Nigeriato Prevent Continued Oppression of Christians, Ahmadiyyas andOther Religious Groups by Moslem Fanatics and Fundamentalists9

Dear Sirs and Madams:

For a start, it is necessary to inform you that our agents stum-bled upon by chance, copies of strategic documents here untoattached. On a closer perusal, you’ll agree with us that it is imper-ative that all hands must be on deck to ensure that NigerianMoslem Fanatics and Fundamentalists do not have their way toIslamise Nigeria.

We have now seen an urgent need for all Christians irrespec-tive of their denominations to rise up as one and support theAhmadiyyas in fighting the Moslem Fanatics and Fundamentaliststo a standstill. There is no sacrifice too great to make; you shouldall be ready to demonstrate to the world that you are stronglyagainst the Islamisation of Nigeria.

All efforts and activities geared towards achievement of thisobjective should start now, any demonstrations or dissent byChristians and Ahmadiyyas after 15th March, 1990 may be toolate. May God bless you all.

Very Sincerely Yours,Adam TownsendGeneral Secretary, ICCJM.


P.S. As a result of the very short time left for execution of projects, andthe most strategic nature of attached information and documents, itwas decided that one of our trusted agents should personally deliverdocuments as appropriate to you in Nigeria.

Appendix 5A 259

� APPENDIX 5B _________________________________

ARAB AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL BANK10

International Head Office: 5 Midan Al Saray,Al Koubra Garden City, Cairo

Telephone: 25094 - 25095 - 25096Telex: ARBFR 92071 - AAIB 93531

SPAC 22 TSQ/AAIB 3rd August, 1989

The General SecretaryThe Islamic CouncilLondon, SWIX 8BX

Dear Sir,

Re: Enquiries Concerning Identification of Operators of“Special Secret Deposit Account Nos: …

Thank you for your enquiries conveyed per letter IC/8HOS/4dated 8th June, 1989. Our inability to make an immediate responseas requested for was occasioned by a policy known to you, whichrequires us to first clear such issues and requests with the ExecutiveCouncil of the OIC, and the Governing Board of our bank; it isnow our immense pleasure to inform you that we have been fullyauthorised to answer questions raised by you as follows:

(i) Special Secret Deposit Account No. … Is operated by GeneralIbrahim B. Babangida of Nigeria, status of the account as at30/6/89 is US$57.48 billion.

(ii) Special Secret Deposit Account No. … Is operated by Lieut-General Sani Abachi of Nigeria, status of the account as at30/6/89 is US$15.2 billion.

(iii) Special Secret Deposit Account No. … Is operated by AlhajiAbubakar Alhaji of Nigeria, status of the account as at 30/6/89


is US$17.8 billion, and(iv) Special Secret Deposit Account No. … Is operated by Alhaji

(Dr.) Rilwanu Lukman of Nigeria, status of the account as at30/6/89 is US$24.9 billion.

Also, we confirm that the sum of US$21.0 billion was transferredthrough us by three Swiss banks as federal Government of Nigeria’sspecial donation to the Islamic Development Fund of the OIC forthe total Islamisation of Nigeria in particular and Africa in general.

Finally, we make bold to state that from the foregoing, you’ll see ata glance that Nigeria’s “major billionaires” are powerful Muslims.

It is hoped we have been of service to you.

May the Almighty Allah bless you abundantly.

Yours faithfully,For: Arab African International Bank

Ahmad S. KareemGeneral Manager (International Operations)

Appendix 5B 261

� APPENDIX 6 ___________________________________

THE CHRISTIAN AND THE OIC11

Produced by:

The United Christian Association of Oyo State(An Affiliate of CAN)c/o P.O. Box 4011or SW9/6234, Ring Road,P.M.B. 5671, Ibadan. Tel. 022-341147

Do You Know

(i) That OIC’s first main Objective is “to promote Islamic soli-darity among member states” (Article II Section A (I)?

(ii) That Article VI section 5 states “That headquarters orSecretariat-General shall be in Jeddah pending the liberationof “Bait UI Magdis” (Jerusalem)? It is therefore set to fightIsrael by any means. Nigeria is therefore being made anenemy of Israel by its membership of OIC. Is this why we areyet to renew diplomatic relations with her?

(iii) That the OIC by Article of its charter on membership presumesthat all member-States are Moslem States (Islamic States)?

(iv) That the Islamic summit conference, i.e., conference of Kingsand Heads of States apart from its periodic meetings are “…alsoheld whenever the interest of Moslem nations warrants it toconsider issues of vital concern to the Moslem and to coordi-nate the policy of the organisation accordingly” (Article IV)? Itis therefore basically religious and discriminatory. Nigeria as asecular state cannot be party to such discriminatory policies.

(v) That by virtue of Article IV future Nigerian Heads of State andMinisters for External Affairs can only be Moslems if we main-


tain our membership of the OIC, thereby mortgaging our futureand subjugating the teeming Christian masses perpetually?

(vi) That Article VII (I) states that “All expenses on the adminis-tration and activities of the secretariat shall be borne bymember states according to their national incomes”?

(vii) That activities of the OIC through its Islamic solidarity fundsinclude helping in establishing Islamic Universities as has beendone in Niger, Uganda and Malaysia, building of mosques,organising seminars on various aspects of Islam giving supportto publications of Islam both in Moslem and other countries?

(viii) That the above, i.e. (vii), implies that Nigeria’s resourcesbelonging to all and sundry will be used to propagate thecourse of Islam?

(ix) That the decision to join the OIC was not done by the AFRCor the Executive Council, but possibly by a faceless Moslemmafia?

(x) [Here outdated census statistics are presented, the projectedstatus in 1986 being Christians 51% and Muslims 45% ofthe population.]

(xi) That a conference of World Islamic Organisation took place inMecca in 1974, and that the following measures were outlinedto be pursued vigorously as the operation-win-world-for-Islam?

(a) Moslem Organisations should set up centres to resistChristian Missionary activities.

(b) Islamic Radio and Television stations should be established.

(c) All Christian activities no matter the secular expressionshould be stopped.

(d) Christian Hospitals, orphanages, schools and Universitiesshould be taken over.

Appendix 6 263

(e) Moslem organisations should set up intelligence centresabout Christian activities.

(f) All Christian literature should be banned in Moslem countries.

(xii) That the above measures, that is (xi) are being systematicallycarried out in Nigeria to the letter, using the vehicle ofGovernment machinery in most instances viz.

(a) In some states, deletion of the names given to Christianschools by their previous founders and sometimes the sub-stitution of Muslim names for Christian names.

(b) Taking over of Christian schools and hospitals.

(c) Arabic inscriptions and emblems on Nigeria’s currencynotes and some items of the Nigerian Armed Forces.

(d) Refusal to grant Certificate of Occupancy for churchbuildings in some parts of the northern states.

(e) Unprovoked attacks launched by Moslems againstChristian groups with burning and destruction of churchesin the North.

(f ) Large sums of Arab money unlawfully entered into thiscountry to propagate Islam and to make Moslem proselytes.

(g) Setting up Islamic Affairs Department in the Office of thePresident during the Shagari regime.

(h) In almost all regimes, Moslem ministers have always beenput in positions that are crucial to economic distribution ofthe country, while the Christian ones are put only wherebrainwork is needed.

(i) Relegation or retirement of Christians in places of author-ity in the public service during Shagari and Buhari regimeswith the substitution or supercession by lesser experiencedand lesser qualified. Muslims even in economically vitalareas of the administrations.


(j) Various edicts in States banning public preaching and theregistration of churches and organisations.

(k) Importation of very large quantities of the Koran into thecountry and the contrasting difficulty in importing theBible and Christian religious materials by Christians.

(l) Substitution in some hotels of the Koran for Bibles in eachof the rooms.

(m) The plan for the introduction of Sharia legal system in thesouthern states of Nigeria.

(n) Appointment of the Grand Khadi (a custodian of IslamicLaw) for Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory belonging toall and sundry and not Moslems only.

(o) Grand Khadis, Khadis and Alkhalis who are custodians ofIslamic law are given the status of government representa-tives and officials and maintained at government expensewhile there are no ecclesiastical courts for Christians.

(p) Training of Moslem revolutionaries in Libya and otherArab countries either directly or indirectly as University &College students.

(q) Granting of tacit ambassadorial status to the PalestinianLiberation Organisation (P.L.O.) while such legitimateright to Israel has been unjustifiably denied.

(r) THE SMUGGLING OF NIGERIA INTO THE OICTHROUGH A RELIGIOUS PALACE COUP D’ETAT?The Christians shall be undaunted in the defence of theirlegitimate rights as citizens of their beloved country. Nodecrees or intimidations from government and/or Moslemsshall deter us until Nigeria withdraws from the OIC. Afterall the blood of the matter, “JESUS, STILL LEAD ONTILL OUR REST BE WON.”

Appendix 6 265

� APPENDIX 7A _________________________________

LETTER FROM CAN, GONGOLA STATE BRANCH

TO MILITARY GOVERNOR OF GONGOLA STATE, ISA MOHAMMED12

18 October, 1988The Military Governor Sir:

Construction of Mosque at Government House

We had hoped to have had an opportunity to welcome you tothe state. But all our effort failed as we were told that you are toobusy until after you have taken the rounds. Then came the TradeFair. Despite the fact that we have not been able to pay a courtesy callon you to welcome you, we are constrained to write to you on cer-tain developments in the state which we feel are of unpleasant taste.

Military Governor Sir, shortly after you arrived in the state youordered the Secretary to the Government to write to the ChristianCorpers Fellowship to erase a writing they have on their privatelyowned bus—“Gongola For Jesus.” The bus does not belong to theGovernment. They use it to propagate their religion. Your letterwas copied to the President of Christian Association of Nigeria,Gongola State Branch.

When the President of the Christian Association of Nigeriareceived the letter he was puzzled. The bus has been there since1983. Governors have come and gone; no attention was paid to thewriting. Why was the Governor interested in what people write ontheir bus immediately at his arrival? The Governor did not eventake into account that there were predecessors before him. Why hasthe writing on the bus become a priority for the Governor? A writ-ing that existed since 1983?

While we were still puzzled, unable to make head and tail ofthe issue, there was another development. The Governor orderedthe construction of a mosque at Government House. The message


then became clear. The order to erase the writing on the private busand copied to the President of Christian Association of Nigeria wasto give Christians a signal that your Government is out to attackChristianity and to promote Islam. We know that in this countrythere are religious fanatics and extremists, but we have not knownany Government in this country that ever assumed that posture.The impression you…created is saddening.

We do not believe a government should claim a GovernmentHouse, which is meant for all, for a particular religion. AnyGovernment that will convert a Government House to a seat ofworship of a particular religion is certainly following the path ofreligious fanaticism and extremism. Why should a government ofall people put on the gown of a particular religion?

We want to remind the Governor that we have had fourMuslim Governors in Gongola: Jega (twice), Mamoud, Barde andBamanga, and three Christian Governors: Juta, Madaki and Jangand none have displayed religious fanaticism and extremism.

We strongly object to the building of a mosque or church inthe Government House especially when the rumour is that it isgoing to cost N340,000.00k. We hope it is untrue.

Thus we are praying the Governor to “Cancel the contractgiven to Alhaji Suleiman Lawan P.O. Box 7 Mubi.” GovernmentHouse is not for a particular religion.

We want peace and tranquility in Gongola. A religious contro-versy will not auger well for this country, how much more forGongola. Why should a Government promote a religious domination?

We want also to state clearly that erasing of a writing on aPrivate Bus and building a mosque at the Government House is notthe priority of Gongola. The Government is the Government ofthe citizens of Gongola, by the citizens of Gongola and for the cit-izens of Gongola. The Governor was not sent to Gongola to reformreligion or to inflame religious passion. We want equal treatmentof religion because we are a secular state, no religion has advantage

Appendix 7A 267

over another. If the priority of your Government is to promote reli-gion, then promote all religions.

We therefore urge the Governor to emulate his predecessorsand keep off religious issues and foster unity among the people ofGongola. We need unity and not religious strife.

We therefore pray that you will continue and even improve onwhat your predecessors have done – promote unity, peace and reli-gious harmony.

It is the issue that is creating headache at the ConstituentAssembly. One therefore wonders if the whole aim is to createGongola into an Islamic state.

Certainly to build a Christian Church at Government Houseis to convert the Government into a theocratic government, andthus a theocratic state.

We hope the Governor will turn his attention to weightierissues than concern himself with erasing a writing on a PrivateBus, a very, very trivial and frivolous issue, and the building of amosque at Government House. Honestly it is ironical that it issomebody with a name “Isa Mohammed” that will bring religiousconfusion. We are sick and tired of Government treating Islam asthe religion of Government and treating Christianity as an alienreligion to be wiped out.

Thank you.

Signed by Wilson Sabiya (Rev), President and Kenneth Eze (Rev), Secretary.


� APPENDIX 7B _________________________________

TO MILITARY GOVERNOR OF GONGOLA STATE, ISA MOHAMMED13

February 9, 1989

Building a Church at Government House

Sometime last year (1988) we wrote to you against building amosque at Government House, Yola.

However, we have discovered that the mosque is complete atthe cost of N75,080.60. We have hoped that, since building ofworship places is the priority of your government, you would haveby now started building a church at the Government House.

Since there is nothing forthcoming, we of the CAN, GongolaState Branch, demand as of right [now] an equitable amount ofmoney for us to undertake the building of the church ourselves.The equitable amount is N165,173.10. We demand this as perour…Constitution….

The data from school enrolments and taxpayers and other reli-able data show that Christians in Gongola State constitute 72% ofthe population. Hence the demand for the money above as theequitable share…for building a church at Government House.

It is highly unfortunate that we see your Government is delib-erately out to promote Islam and to disparage Christianity. This isevident from your orders:

1. To erase a Christian slogan on a privately-owned bus. Thatwas a message and signal that Christians have no right to dis-play their religion.

2. The building of a mosque at government house, thus declaringIslam the religion of the state-controlling Government House.

3. The donation of N45,000 to an Islamiya Primary School ismeant clearly to spite Christians.

Appendix 7B 269

4. The sponsored write-ups in the NN against CAN and ex-Governor David Jang.

5. The now perfected plan to build a mosque in each of theLocal Government Secretariats. That at Mubi has reached theroofing stage.

6. The silence of the Government in the face of a diabolicalaccusation of Government and CAN; of “the outrageous andunbelievable collaboration between government and CAN tokill and maim Muslims at Tingno and Waduku.”

The silence of your Government on this tells a lot about yourview of your mission here. The only irony is that the Cabinet thatcollaborated with CAN, except the Governor, is still there. Yoursilence on the accusation is a tacit acceptance on your part that theGovernment under Governor Jang collaborated with CAN to killand maim Muslims of Tingno and Waduku. Since theGovernment tacitly accepts the accusation, we have no alternativebut to take an appropriate action to clear the name of CAN. CANhas never produced nor will ever produce a maitatsine. Violencehas no place in Christianity.

Signed by Wilson Sabiya (Rev), President and Kenneth Eze (Rev), Secretary.


� APPENDIX 8 ___________________________________

APPEAL TO COLONEL NWOSU

Joseph Obemeata14

The Education Committee of the Christian Association ofNigeria Youth Wing, Oyo State Branch, has sent an appeal to theOyo State Military Administrator, Colonel Ike Nwosu. If Muslimofficials who would seem to have constituted themselves into aformidable ring around the Oyo State Military Administrator havenot suppressed the letter, it should have been received by now bythe Oyo State Military Administrator. It can only be hoped that theOyo State Military Administrator, Col. Ike Nwosu, would take theappeal of Oyo State Christian youths seriously. It is in the interestof peace and stability that no unjust and unfair action is takenagainst some government officials merely because some Muslimleaders demand it on religious grounds.

Christian youths sent a letter of appeal to the Oyo StateMilitary Administrator because of the demand by some Muslimleaders in Oyo State that the Oyo State Government should rede-ploy or remove the Director-General of the Oyo State TeachingService Commission (TESCOM) and one other Director-Generalagainst whom a petition has been written by some Muslims. Thetwo Directors-General have been vaguely accused of beingChristians who are sympathetic to the cause of Christianity.

It should be recalled that during a transfer exercise recently,TESCOM transferred two teachers from St. Patrick’s GrammarSchool, Ibadan. One of the teachers who is a Muslim and had beenin St. Patrick’s Grammar school, Ibadan, for over thirteen years,petitioned that his transfer was punitive. He had had frequent trou-bles in the school and had been accused of inefficiency and ofundertaking divination in the school during school hours forclients from outside the school.

Appendix 8 271

The teacher mobilised influential Muslims inside and outsideOyo State Government to fight his cause. According to investiga-tions, those who intervened on behalf of the teacher were informedthat a Director General who is a Muslim had requested TESCOMto transfer a female teacher of Islamic Religious Studies who hadproblems in her schools to St. Patrick’s Grammar School, Ibadan,which is near her home.

TESCOM obliged and the Director of Personnel who is aMuslim moved the teacher to St. Patrick’s Grammar School,Ibadan. Since the school did not need two teachers of IslamicReligious Studies, the Islamic Religious Knowledge teacher whowas in the school had to be moved to a school where there wasvacancy. It is significant to note that all those who effected thetransfer of the teacher in question are Muslims. Reports indicatedthat those who intervened agreed that the transfer was routine andnot punitive.

Even if it were true that the two Directors-General favouredChristianity and that the teacher in question had been deliber-ately transferred from a Christian school where he had been asource of frequent trouble, Muslim leaders have no moral justifi-cation to complain.

At the national level, Muslims in positions of authority areknown to use the facilities and resources of government to promotethe cause of Islam. The officials who asked TESCOM to rescind itstransfer order used their official positions to fight the cause ofIslam. Only recently, a top official of the Oyo State Ministry ofEducation who is a Muslim, directed the principal of a Christianschool to ensure that a particular Muslim was elected into theschool’s PTA executive committee and that he should be put incharge of the finances of the PTA of the school.

If the two Directors-General who are being opposed by someMuslim leaders are to be redeployed or removed, then, in the inter-est of justice and fair play, all the Oyo State officials who have used


their official positions to promote the cause of Islam should simi-larly be redeployed or removed.

The impression has been created that some teachers had beenplanted in St. Patrick’s Grammar School, Ibadan, to cause troublein the school. Those who put them there do not want them to bemoved from the school even when they have been in the school fortoo long and are not doing their work well.

If the Oyo State Military Administrator removes or redeploysthe two Directors-General, the already deplorably low level of disci-pline among teachers will decline much further. Teachers, especiallythose of them who are Muslims, will no longer have respect for theauthority of TESCOM when they realise that they can alwaysattribute any measure by TESCOM to “religious intolerance.”

It will be worse still when they realise that they can alwaysmobilise their religious leaders to pressurize government to takeaction against certain officials. Furthermore, principals who are notMuslims will no longer be able to control those of their teacherswho are Muslims. Whatever they do will be attributed to religion.

Col. Nwosu should realise that he would [do] an irreparabledamage to the Oyo State school system if the Director-General ofTESCOM, Mrs. J. Olatunji, is redeployed at this time. She hasbeen long in education in Oyo State and she understands the OyoState school system more than any one else that the MilitaryAdministrator may have in mind for the post.

Mrs. Olatunji has been impartial in handling the affairs ofschools and teachers. Christians have had cause to accuse her offavouring Muslims, but they did not demand that she should beredeployed or removed. That some Muslim leaders are up in armsagainst her is clear evidence of her impartiality.

Even though some Christians may hold the view that Mrs.Olatunji has sympathy for Islam because she is married to a Muslim,she is more refined, more tactful and fairer than anyone else thatcould be brought to take her place. She is the only one who, for

Appendix 8 273

now, can sustain orderliness in the Oyo State school system.If anyone else is put in charge of TESCOM at this time, there

will be a disruption of the school system of Oyo State. Col. IkeNwosu should know that because of the rare qualities of Mrs.Olatunji, the members of the Nigeria Union of Teachers in OyoState refer to her as a mother even when they disagree with her.

Furthermore, the Oyo State Military Administrator shouldrealise that if he takes any action against the two Directors-Generalthat some Muslim leaders have complained about, he would beconfirming the widely held view that he has been dancing to thetune of some Muslim leaders who, conscious of their real or imag-inary influence over the Oyo State Military Administrator, havebecome unduly pompous and their demands have increased inquantity and intensity.


� APPENDIX 9 ___________________________________

A RELEASE FROM THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

Ahmadu Bello University15

1. Preamble

In view of the gravity of the events which took place in andaround Zaria on the 10th and 11th of March, 1987, involving theburning of virtually all the churches in the Zaria area, and in viewof the fact that the public is not being given a correct picture ofthese events, we, the Christian Community at Ahmadu BelloUniversity, Zaria, wish to place on record this brief account of whathappened as well as what we feel about it. A more comprehensivereport will be released at a later date.

2. Origin of the Crisis

The events which finally culminated in the burning down ofthe Christian chapels at the College of Advanced Studies, Zaria,and those on the Kongo and Samaru campuses of the AhmaduBello University, Zaria, as well as virtually all the other churches inShika, Samaru, Wusasa Tudun-Wada and Sabon-Gari, Zaria, actu-ally have their origins in concerted attacks, over the last fewmonths, on the fundamental basis of the Christian faith byMuslims both within and without the university campus.

Among such attacks were written and widely-publicised docu-ments which stated that:

i. “Jesus is not the Son of God”ii. “The Holy Bible is not the Word of God.”

These were later followed up by the widespread distribution ofvideotapes by Ahmed Deedat of Durban, South Africa, whichdwell on the above themes. These videotapes were widely publi-cised at the last Kaduna International Trade Fair and have been

Appendix 9 275

broadcast repeatedly on Nigerian Television Authority, Sokoto andKano. When these psychological and spiritual attacks by theMuslims on the Christians failed to provoke any counter-attackfrom the Christians, the next step taken by the Muslims was toresort to physical attacks on Christians and Christian churches.

3. Immediately Preceding Events

i.) The university community had information as early as 6:00P.M. on 10th March that Muslims were planning to burn theChapel at 5:00 A.M. on Wednesday, 11th March 1987.Additional reports were received that there were also plans toburn down other churches in Zaria.

ii.) The president of the Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS)briefed the security office on the main campus on the situa-tion about 9:00 P.M. on 10th March 1987.

iii.) On receiving these reports, Christian students gathered in theChapel to pray all night (Tuesday 10th to Wednesday 11th

March).

iv.) Immediate moves were made on the part of Christian leadersto convene an emergency meeting of the Religious AffairsCommittee of the university with a view to working out waysof stopping the Muslims from carrying out their plans whichthey feared would jeopardise peace and orderliness of boththe university campus and the entire nation.

v.) These moves were not received with the urgency and senseof concern they deserved on the part of the Muslim mem-bers of the committee. While the Christians were pressingfor an immediate meeting aimed at a peaceful dismantlingof the state of alarm, the Muslim members would prefer tomeet at 8:00 A.M., after the Chapel and churches wouldhave been burnt.


vi.) The Christian leaders were rather taken back to note that eventhough Muslim leaders had prior information on these plans,they had made no effort to convene a meeting of the ReligiousAffairs Committee of which they are the Muslim representa-tives, or at least inform their Christian counterparts. Thisbecomes more disturbing when one calls to mind that therationale for setting up the committee was to prevent religiousdisorder on the campuses.

vii.) News also reached the Christian leaders late on Tuesday nightthat the Christian chapels at the College of Advanced StudiesKongo, Advanced Teachers College and Women TeachersCollege campuses had been burnt down and Christians seri-ously injured.

viii.) About 2:00 A.M. the Christian leaders persuaded their stu-dents to leave the Chapel building and premises so as to avertany confrontation and possible loss of lives, in the event ofthe Muslims arriving to burn the Chapel as they hadplanned. Even though greatly upset and in a state of angerwhich could have evoked retaliation when pushed to thewall, as in this case, these Christian students exercisedChristian civility and left the Chapel.

ix.) When at 6:30 A.M. over two hundred (200) Muslims armedwith swords, clubs and other instruments of arson arrived atthe Chapel to carry out their plans, the Christian leaderspromptly went to the Vice-Chancellor’s house to request…[that he] take immediate steps to contain the situation. TheVice-Chancellor said that he was aware that the Chapel wasbeing burnt by the Muslims, but appeared either unable orunwilling to effect any action that would contain the situation.

Appendix 9 277

4. Steps Taken by the Christian Community

4.1 Before the Burning of the Churches

After getting wind of the plan by the Muslims against theChristian community on the evening of Tuesday, 10th of March,1987, the Christian community met in their various churches to:

i.) Pray for the peace of Nigeria

ii.) [Illegible]

iii.) Pray for the peace of Kaduna State, Zaria, and the campusesof Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

iv.) Appeal to fellow Christians not to take the law into their ownhands because JESUS CHRIST preaches peace, love, andcompassion to both Christians and non-Christians.

v.) Urge members to stay away from places of worship if theseplaces were eventually attacked.

4.2. After the Burning of the Churches.

When the churches were finally being burnt down by theMuslims, the Christian community:

i.) Attempted to evacuate pastors and chaplains of the churchesand chapels together with their families to safety but discov-ered that some of them had already been physically attackedand seriously injured while their houses had been burnt withall their personal belongings.

ii.) While the burning of churches by the Muslims was goingon the Christian community leaders made many desperateattempts to get the Divisional Police Office in Samaru andin Sabon-Gari, Zaria, to take appropriate measures to arrestthe situation. However, the church leaders were told by the


police officers on duty that they had no order from aboveto intervene.

iii.) The leaders of the Christian community appealed to theirmembers to keep calm and not to retaliate but to show thelove of JESUS CHRIST towards the Muslims.

iv.) At about 1:00 P.M. the Christian community on the Samarucampus sent a delegation to the Vice-Chancellor to requestfor security coverage.

v.) When, after a period of about four hours, there were no signsof either police or soldiers on campus, the community wenten masse peacefully to the Vice-Chancellor’s lodge. The Vice-Chancellor gave assurances that the Military Governor ofKaduna State had visited the campus and had promised tosend police and military patrols.

vi.) On Thursday, the 12th of March, 1987, the entire Christiancommunity on campus met to appraise the security situationon campus. The gathering was informed that only nine (9)policemen, some of whom were unarmed, had been sent topatrol the far-flung campuses of the university located atShika, Samaru, Kongo, Gyellesu and the Teaching Hospital.

vii.) The final step taken by the Christian community was to meeton Thursday 12th March, 1987, to issue a release on the reli-gious crisis on campus.

5. Extent of Physical Damage

[The first line is illegible.]… a number of fellowship centres, aChristian Children’s Centre and Christian Nursery Schools. Inaddition, private houses and personal belongings of some Christianmembers of the community were burnt down. So also were restau-rants, poultry houses, automobile workshops, boutiques, vehicles

Appendix 9 279

and commercial houses known to belong to Christians. Along withthese, there was massive destruction of hotels and cinema houses.To cap it all, many Christians were accosted and physicallyattacked for refusing to denounce their faith. One of the worstcases of this brutality was meted out on the Reverend Dr. BenjaminOrumah, the Chaplain of the Chapel of Salvation, KongoCampus. He received several bodily wounds, his head was brokenand he was left for dead. In all these, the Christians remained calm.

6. The Role of the Authorities

6.1 The University Administration

Despite the fact that the university authorities knew well aheadof time of the plans by the Muslims to burn down the Chapel andother places of worship in Zaria, they took no effective precau-tionary measures. Further, when it was known that the actualdestruction had commenced in the College of Advanced Studies(CAS), the Kongo Campus, the Advanced Teachers College (ATC)and the Women’s Teachers College (WTC), no serious attemptswere made to limit the damage and prevent its spread to other cam-puses of the university. In addition, at no time was the Fire Brigadecalled in. When the arson finally started on the main campus inSamaru, the university authorities made no effort to control it.

6.2 The Religious Affairs Committee

It is pertinent to note that although there is a Religious AffairsCommittee in the university, properly constituted by the universityauthorities, all efforts by the Christian members of that committeeto convene a meeting before the crisis began failed. The major fac-tor responsible for this failure was the lukewarm attitude of the twoMuslim members of the committee.


6.3 The Law Enforcement Agents

Intelligence reports of the impending crisis were relayed to thepolice authorities by several members of the Christian communitywell before the crisis started but they did nothing. Even after thecrisis had blown open and the law enforcement agents wereinformed by individuals and the university authorities, the policeand all the other security agents made no move to stop the arson.

6.4 The Emir of Zaria

From the information available to us, supported by the Vice-Chancellor’s [the line is illegible] impending crisis and was beingbriefed of developments as they occurred. The impression was thatthe Emir was in control and yet the arson was not contained untilit engulfed the entire town and its environs.

7. Official Statements

7.1 The Vice-Chancellor

The first official release by the Vice-Chancellor was signed at12:50 P.M. on 11th March, 1987, more than eighteen (18) hoursafter the Chapel of Salvation was burnt at the Kongo Campus. Inthe said release a deliberate attempt was made to exonerate theMuslim community on the campus and lay the blame on “an influxof intruders from the Samaru village” and a nebulous group of“people” who, for no reason whatsoever, just “went and set theChapel ablaze.”

7.2 The Government

Even though the broadcast of the Governor of Kaduna State inthe afternoon and evening of the 11th of March was apparently welldirected, it came too late to be effective and therefore gave theimpression that it was intended mainly to prevent reprisals, espe-cially as the security promised the Christians did not materialise.

Appendix 9 281

The statement of the Chief of General Staff as relayed by theFRCN Network News at 5:00 P.M. on the 11th of March seemedoverly concerned with preventing the Press from carrying out itsbounden duty of reporting the truth. The statement also deliber-ately played down the widespread nature of the crisis and the extentof the damage incurred. These observations are most disconcerting.

8. The Media

8.1 Newspapers

The reports ensuing immediately after the crisis made no men-tion of churches, and the number of affected buildings was grosslyunderstated: a clear attempt to downplay the scope and conceal thereligious nature of the crisis.

8.2 Radio

Despite the massive loss of property involved in the actions,the radio carried no reports of the incidences until the officialbroadcast of the Governor at 3:00 P.M. on the 11th of March.

8.3 N.T.A.

The television reports in the evening of the 11th were a delib-erate attempt to suppress information about the crisis while thenews report of the 12th March was a gross misrepresentation of thefacts. The filming was directed away from the scenes of the damageand focussed most unprofessionally on the Governor and hisentourage, suggesting that the spectators were the actual newsitems. [another illegible line]


In view of the foregoing, the Christian community at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and environs

hereby resolve that:

1. In order to guarantee the continued existence of Nigeria as aunited nation, every citizen of the country must be guaran-teed freedom of religion and religious expression.

2. Since the Christians have never been known to start any reli-gious riots, the Government should check the excesses of theMuslim rioters.

3. If the University authorities and the state and federal govern-ments are serious about protecting the lives and property ofthe individual citizens of this country, they must immediatelyprovide effective security measures on the A.B.U. campusesand in their environs.

4. The Probe Panel set up to investigate the crisis is not ade-quate and, therefore, a Judicial Commission of Inquiryshould be set up immediately to identify the culprits andbring them promptly to book.

5. The federal government, if it is serious about getting to theroots of the religious disturbances in the country, should pub-lish immediately the reports of all the Commissions ofInquiry on previous religious crises and the views ofGovernment thereon.

6. The News Media have not been allowed to adequately reportthe events. Therefore, the Government should allow the pressto carry out responsible and accurate reporting of the crisis.

7. The Government should make deliberate efforts to restorethe confidence of the Christians of Nigeria, especially thosein the northern states, on its ability and willingness to pro-

Appendix 9 283

tect, in accordance with its constitutional duties, all citizensof this country.

8. For the continued existence of the peoples of this country asa united nation, the federal government must hold theMuslim community of Nigeria, whose members carefullyplanned and executed this beastly act, wholly responsible forthe disaster, and must compel them to pay whatever it coststo adequately compensate individuals and institutions for allthe losses sustained.

9. Since it is apparent that Christian staff and students are nolonger wanted at the campuses of the Ahmadu BelloUniversity, the Government should provide a guarded returnof the Christians to their states of origin.

10. Christians everywhere should continue to live according tothe tenets of their faith by LOVING THEIR GOD ANDLOVING THEIR NEIGHBOURS including the Muslims.


� APPENDIX 10 _________________________________

MY PERSONAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE TRIBUNAL:SUBMISSION TO THE KADUNA STATE TRIBUNAL

ON RELIGIOUS AND COMMUNAL RIOTS, 1992. 11 AUGUST 1992.16

Reverend Dr. Yusufu Turaki

A. On Religion

1. Where someone’s religion is known not to be respected or islooked down upon, and is also not accorded any importantsocial status by a substantial number of another religious orethnic groups;

2. Where a particular religion is usually being used in a deroga-tory sense, profanation of its sacred places and religious ritesby a substantial number of another religious or ethnic group;

3. Where someone’s religion is seen as a minority religion by adominant group and in consequence, discrimination anddenial of religious rights and freedom are practised against such;

4. Where a state machinery uses its own political power toensure the dominance of one religion over against anotheror where a powerful and dominant group captures or usesthe state machinery to advance the cause of its religion at theexpense of others;

5. Where religions and religious personalities are attacked orabused publicly by one religious group, the followers areusually aroused in their religious sentiments and can bepotentially explosive and violent;

6. Where religious groups use crude and anti-social methods ofpropagation that are provocative and confrontational.

Appendix 10 285

B. On Ethnicity

1. Where an ethnic group is ascribed an inferior status andsocio-political role as a second class citizen;

2. Where the culture and tradition of one ethnic group arelooked down upon, demeaned and held in contempt byothers;

3. Where an ethnic group is discriminated against by virtue ofits religion, culture, background or section in society;

4. Where there is uneven social, political and economicdevelopment of ethnic groups and areas of the same geo-political entity;

5. Where there is a dominant-subordination relationshipbetween ethnic groups which leads to social deprivation.

C. On Political Arrangements

How was the colonial social order established in northernNigeria? The colonial order was characterised by the followingwhich also have long-term consequences in post-colonial Nigeria.

1. The Colonial Administration of northern Nigeria practisedinternal colonialism by placing some ethnic groups underthe rule of others. This fact had created an historical deep-seated hatred and feelings between ethnic groups.

2. In some areas and in some cases, despite the fact that GreatBritain granted political independence to those she con-quered and ruled since 1900 to 1960, there are still manyethnic groups and tribal groupings that are yet to be politi-cally and culturally independent… today. They are still sub-ject to some Emirs and do not have their own chiefs orchiefdoms. This fact can generate deep-seated resentmentsand hatred between ethnic groups.


3. The continued imposition of some Emirs or Chiefs uponsome ethnic groups in the northern states and especially inKaduna State without regard to their culture, religion, tra-dition and political wish is a serious matter of social justicein a modern democracy. These ethnic groups have beenpleading over the decades to political powers that be tohave their own Chiefs and Chiefdoms just as other tribeshave, but have been denied their cultural and politicalrights. The perpetuation of this internal colonialism inmodern Nigeria is one of the fundamental sources of reli-gious and communal conflict, violence and injusticeagainst the disadvantaged peoples.

4. Unless some ethnic groups in Kaduna State, such as: theBajju, Kataf, Kagoma, Nimzam, Ikulu, Chaikwai, Kurama,etc., have their own chiefs and chiefdoms as it is by the samerights with which other tribes and ethnic groups were given,there cannot be social justice as their cultural, political andreligious rights have been deliberately and consistentlydenied them.

5. I have also observed with great dismay the preponderance ofcultural, religious and political discrimination in some partsof the northern states, and especially in Kaduna State. Thiscan be observed in the analysis of the pattern of politicalappointments, the religious and cultural domination of theState’s media houses as is reflected by the views and opinionsof the dominant ethnic and religious group.

Appendix 10 287

� APPENDIX 11 _________________________________

RESOLVING THE RELIGIOUS TENSION: NO SHORT CUTS17

Anonymous

Official explanations and responses to recent protests by theChristian Community suggest that the government thinksChristian leaders are either unrepentant trouble-makers or polit-ical quacks who are ignorant of the simple rudiments of nationalgovernance. President Ibrahim Babangida seemed to say as muchwhen he queried the rationale behind the spontaneous uproarthat greeted his lopsided cabinet reshuffle in which he single-handedly removed Christians and replaced them with Muslims.Merit, he claimed, informed his actions in the current arrange-ment whereby all the Service Chiefs, the Inspector General ofPolice, the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff, Defence Minister,Secretary to the federal government and other key ministers areall Muslims.

Government apologists have also been trying to narrow downthe protests to personalities, alleging that it was purely on accountof Generals Domkat Bali and Joshua Dogonyaro who wereremoved from strategic positions.

In all, both the President and his vocal clique of professionaladvocates have been saying that those raising dust and asking ques-tions are a group of contemporary misfits who cannot move withthe changing times in view of their religious bigotry.

Several issues, however, immediately come to mind. First and foremost, critical minds are asking whether the

President’s cabinet shuffle could have been the other way round.That is, in spite of his claims to religious neutrality, is it conceiv-able that Babangida could have appointed an all-Christian ServiceChiefs in the year 1989? The answer is in the winds.


The President’s men look back into recent history and bring upblind statistics, viz, that all the service chiefs were Christians duringYakubu Gowon’s reign (1966–75) and that Muslims did not com-plain then. What they also do not point out, however, is the factthat that arrangement was more a product of historical coincidencethan the political manœuverings of an individual: most of the seniormilitary officers then were Christians. In any case, was there thisserious atmosphere of sectarian suspicion and unease as it is today?Has any Christian head of state in this country ever given room forsuspicions as this administration had done? Did Gowon stealNigeria into the World Council of Churches as Babangida smug-gled her into OIC? Wasn’t it a Christian head of state that brokeNigeria’s diplomatic relations with Israel, even though a large sec-tion of Christians did not and do not approve of it?

Again critics point out that the concerted efforts to reduce thematter to personality issues between Bali and Babangida is a delib-erate attempt to whitewash cracked walls. For it is hard to believethat millions of Christians, usually peaceful, even complacent, couldbe tricked into street protests on account of an individual whothough a noble and notable soldier, was not really publicly knownto have pursued Christian political interests. Thus Bali’s case is rele-vant only because it tends to validate suspicions that Babangida’s so-called yardstick of merit actually means religious chauvinism.

Keen watchers believe that what Babangida has done is to bluffthe Christian constituency in his power schemings. He certainlythinks that in the balance of political power, Christians can bespited without any serious consequences.

Painful as this might sound, such a disposition does not reallycome as a surprise to people who have been following the trend ofaffairs in Nigeria. It is evident that hitherto Muslims have held thebalance of violence. All the Maitatsine bloodbaths, the incessantpockets of street violence, open air provocative utterances and themassive burning and desecration of Christian worship places were

Appendix 11 289

all associated with Muslims. Furthermore, open and concealed per-secution in form of denial of Certificate of Occupancy to buildchurches, refusal of some state governments to grant Christians per-mission to operate voluntary agency schools whilst at the same timefunding Islamic educational institutions with government money,open manipulation of facts and situations by authorities in favour ofMuslims (e.g. ABU Students Elections of 1988) and bastardising ofpublic institutions to serve narrow religious interests (e.g. NewNigerian, Triumph) were all associated with Islam. Up till todayKano Radio and TV and the federal government-owned NTA Kanodo not air even one second of Christian programmes. The Christiancommunity in Bayero University cannot put up a chapel.

The catalogue of violent deeds and misdeeds by Muslim fanat-ics in and outside of government is endless. Having acquired a rep-utation for violence therefore, government has been deferring tothe Muslim populace and doing all it can to pamper, please, pacify,placate, assuage or appease them.

On the other hand, Christians who have always held the bal-ance of peace have perhaps been adjudged incapable of any coher-ent political action that could seriously threaten the stability of anygovernment. This explains the series of actions and inactions byvarious governments across the country that cut at the heart ofChristian interests. The January street protests by Christians there-fore is a culmination of a century of wrongs.

From this perspective, many people even argue that the reli-gious problem principally is not a problem between Christians andMuslims. Rather, it is a problem with government and governmentofficials who are abusing their offices to deal out religious favours ortrying to build political constituencies using religion as a bedrock.

With specific reference to this administration, some peopleeven contend that the religious tension is being fuelled deliberately.Such people claim that the President is using religion consciously tocreate instability in order to perpetuate himself in power. How else,


they say, can you interpret a situation in which a particular govern-ment consistently engages in actions that create distrust and discordamong its citizens? Such views contend that even secondary schoolkids would have anticipated that the recent administrative changeswould leave room for wide suspicions. That the President wentahead with them shows that he is trying to play Christians againstMuslims in order to cling to power in the divide and rule tactic.

Even more ominous is the suggestion that Babangida’smanœuverings might have for him personal imports beyond 1992.Some people claim that the President is using the Islamic con-stituency, which he feels for now is the strongest and safest, notonly to survive through the transitional period, but also as a spring-board towards political ambitions beyond 1992. Such theory statesthat the Muslims are a willing ally for now, because he seems to bedancing along their own paths of ultimate Islamisation of Nigeria.

Although this view might sound far-fetched, some people insiston it especially because Babangida is amassing more power to him-self as the transitional period glides to an end instead of gradually dis-engaging from power himself. Whatever the case, many Christiansinsist that it amounts to political hypocrisy for Babangida to haveexpressed surprise that people still talk in terms of religion in this age.“What administration has done the most in terms of igniting thereligious flame?” people ask. “Is it not this government?”

Although the religious problem has been a long-standing issueespecially in the northern parts, it became a national problem onlywith the immoral stealing of Nigeria into the OIC in 1986. In thisrespect, Babangida must be held directly accountable for themounting tension since then. Now instead of taking practical stepsto redress the situation, the government seems to be degeneratingfrom one foul action into another. For example, it is Babangida’sgovernment that amended, through the back door, the 1979Constitution to give the Muslim Sharia law wider jurisdiction thandesirable in a multi-religious society. This action contributed greatly

Appendix 11 291

to the cantankerous Sharia debate at the Constituent Assembly thatnearly set the nation ablaze. Only last year, Babangida’s governmentalso came out with a decree establishing a pilgrims commission tocater exclusively for Muslims. So now if government’s actions areperceived through the religious lens, that is not without justifiablefoundations. Babangida’s government is squarely responsible for itsown woes.

So what is the solution? “No short cuts,” informed analystsmaintain. Wishing away the problem, sermonising, enactingdecrees, expressing good intentions in public, intimidating citizensand such other cosmetics won’t help. The solution lies purely ingovernment not only playing it fair in its actions and policies, butbeing seen to be so. As long as government is biased, as long as afew Islamic hawks pull the strings, as long as some sacred cows cando anything and get away with it, then it’s a matter of time: the reli-gion time bomb will one day explode—and all those nurturing itnow will not escape the devastation. May God forbid.


� APPENDIX 12 _________________________________

CHRISTIAN RETALIATION INCREASING IN

NIGERIA’S RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE18

Obed Minchakpu

(Compass) Seventeen Christians from various denominationsin Aba, a city in Nigeria’s southern Abia State, were arrested in lateJanuary over reprisal attacks on Muslims. Sources said Christianswere reacting to “incessant” attacks on Christians in northernNigeria by Muslim extremists. Abia state police authoritiesreported that the central mosque and several Muslim businesseswere damaged in the January 18–19 attacks.

20 Muslims Injured

One of the Muslim victims, Alhaji Idi Ningi, told Compass that20 Muslims were injured and are currently receiving treatment inthree hospitals in the city. “Hundreds of our people have escapedto the police barracks,” Ningi said. “They are taking refuge at thecentral police station. Many of them are also women and children.”However, the…police commissioner told Compass that he had vis-ited the area and the situation was not very serious and has beenbrought under control.

Muslims and Christians Concerned

But both Muslims and Christians are concerned about theincreasing religious violence taking place throughout Nigeria.Senator Adolphus Wabara…called on the Nigerian government tofind a lasting solution to the religious conflicts in the country.Alhaji Tanko Bello, a Muslim community leader in Aba city, saidthey have never supported the attacks on Christians in northernNigeria. He blamed his fellow Muslims there for creating the con-flict.

Appendix 12 293

Clashes on January 11 between Muslims and Christians inCentral Nigeria’s Plateau state left two Muslims and one Christiandead. Joel Nimfa, a Christian leader in the Kanam community, waskilled in his farmhouse when Muslim bandits attacked the farmand other Christian settlements. According to a police report, twoMuslim leaders were beheaded when they led a group of bandits toattack a Christian village.

Conflicts between Muslims and Christians flared up in Plateaustate in September 2001, beginning in Jos, the state capital. Thecrisis escalated and continued throughout 2002. Both sides areshowing an increasing frustration with the religious conflict.

Christians File Lawsuit against Government

Christian leaders in the northern state of Kaduna have filed alawsuit against the Nigerian government, the Kaduna state govern-ment, and a Nigerian newspaper, ThisDay, over last November’sreligious riots.

The crisis was ignited by an article in ThisDay that led to thedeath of an estimated 1,000 people and the destruction of about125 churches in the city of Kaduna.19

Dr. Joseph Bagobiri, Catholic Bishop of Kafanchan andChairman of the Kaduna state chapter of CAN, announced thecourt action…, saying, “CAN has taken stock of all thechurches and property of Christians destroyed during the riotswith a view to demanding compensation from the governmentand ThisDay.”

Demanding Compensation

He added, “While we pursue this case, we would leave the fateof the casualties to God, since vengeance is for Him. We are alsoaware that no amount of wealth can pay for a single human life,and that is why we are demanding compensation for destroyedchurches and not for lives.”


The Kaduna state governor called on the federal governmentto take measures to stem the rising wave of religious fundamental-ism. “The nation is sitting on a religious time bomb that canexplode any moment with devastating consequences,” saidGovernor Alhaji Ahmed Makarfi. “We go to the pulpits or the ros-trum either in the churches or in the mosques, and in the name ofour Creator make speeches, which can bring about violence in thiscountry. We forget that we shall all give account to the almightyAllah for all our actions,” Makarfi said.

In northern Nigeria’s Adamawa state, a dispute between aMuslim cattle rancher and a Christian farmer led to the death of atleast nine people. Muslim–Christian clashes allegedly broke outwhen a Muslim rancher allowed his cattle to destroy the crops ofthe Christian farmer. An unknown number of Christians gatheredand retaliated. Local sources said there has long been hatredbetween the two religious communities.

Appendix 12 295

� APPENDIX 13 _________________________________

FANATICS, BANDITS AND THE FAILURE OF THE STATE20

Reverend Fr. George EhusaniSecretary-General of the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria

In the midst of widespread protestation from many level-headed Nigerians, and at the consternation of the internationalcommunity, a fundamentalist ill-wind has continued to blowthrough the northern states of Nigeria like a devastating cyclone,consuming lives and property and aggravating the general state ofdistress in the land. The latest mayhem in November 2002 onceagain devastated Kaduna, and shockingly extended to Abuja, thenation’s capital, which we thought was the last bastion of neutral-ity in matters of religion and ethnicity. Abuja, our symbol of unity,has lost its innocence. Abuja, the melting pot of Nigeria, has beenviolated by bandits and fanatics!

The perpetrators of this crime in Kaduna and Abuja last monthclaimed that they were venting their anger over the botched MissWorld Competition in Nigeria, and the unholy comment of a jour-nalist in ThisDay Newspaper against the person of the holy prophetMuhammed. And in spite of passionate pleas for forgiveness by theNewspaper management, the fanatics went to town to avenge thealleged offence on all non-Muslim Nigerians and their properties! Itsounds incredible, but why else were Churches razed and Christianskilled in Kaduna? Why else will cars and shops belonging to non-Muslims be destroyed in Abuja? Is it the Christian Association ofNigeria that sponsored the Miss World Competition? Or doesThisDay belong to the Catholic Archbishop of Kaduna?

Since February 2000, Sharia-related violent riots during whichhundreds of lives are lost, and churches, shops, cars and housesbelonging to Christians and southerners are burnt, have become aregular feature in Kaduna, Kano, Jos, Zaria and Bauchi, where a


large population of Christians live alongside Muslims. But what wehave been witnessing in Nigeria in the last few years is actually thefailure of state and the collapse of governance. There is nothing onthe ground to demonstrate that ours is not a land run over by polit-ical bandits, ethnic warlords and religious fanatics. The average cit-izen now seems to have lost confidence in the capacity of those inpower to protect lives and property.

Where one part of the country can decide to enforce criminalelements of the Islamic legal code that are clearly at variance withthe nation’s constitution, cutting off the limbs of petty offenders,condemning poor adulterers to death by stoning, and harassingthose who do not share their faith every so often, the impressioncreated is that no one is in charge of our affairs, and there is no lawand order in place. With a selfless, visionary and prudent leader-ship, the thousands of deaths we have recorded, and the millions ofNaira worth of property that have been destroyed in the last fewyears, could have been avoided.

I hold the current leadership of the Nigerian State responsiblefor the massive destruction of lives and property in Kaduna, Jos,Kano, Zaria, Bauchi and elsewhere, over the Sharia controversy,and at the hands of Islamic fundamentalists, because the presidentand his team have remained indolent and insensitive in the face ofa very explosive situation. I hold President Obasanjo and his teamaccountable for the blood and tears in Kaduna and other parts ofthe North, where non-Muslims have lost their right to live inpeace, for it is the primary duty of government to protect innocentand law abiding citizens from the nefarious activities of hooligans,bandits and fanatics. I hold those in power responsible for the painand anguish that is the lot of the innocent citizens of northernNigeria who for the umpteenth time have been rendered refugeesin their own country, because I expect them to own up to theirineptitude and resign from their high office, if their being in officemakes no difference for the internal security of the nation.

Appendix 13 297

True, after three and a half years in government, the presentcrop of leaders have done little to improve the lot of Nigerians. Theeconomy remains comatose in a country that is otherwise abun-dantly blessed by the creator. Unemployment, especially youthunemployment, has soared, as a result of which the mass of ouryoung people are losing hope and losing patience. Our schools,hospitals, and other social infrastructure are in an embarrassingstate of decay. The population itself is more divided today than itever was, since the end of 1967–1970 civil war. And now religiousviolence has been added to our multiple woes. Yet in the midst ofall these calamities, our leaders are carrying on business as usual.

Our public office holders are feeding fat on our scarceresources, selling the poor for a pair of sandals and playing gameswith the fate and fortune of our children. There are allegations andcounter allegations of bribery, running into hundreds of millions ofNaira, and involving high-ranking members of the legislature andthe executive. Young Nigerians have become angry, restive and vio-lence prone. They are capitalising on anything they can find to venttheir anger. Yesterday it was ethnicity. Today it is religion.Tomorrow it may be political affiliation. And there are politicianswho fan these flames of violence for their own selfish politicaladvantage. But where does all this leave Nigeria?

In the midst of the madness of today, peace-seeking Nigeriansand civil society groups must begin to take the elected representa-tives of the people to task with regard to their commitment or oth-erwise to creating the enabling environment for peace and socialwell-being. The saner elements in our society must begin to takethe president, the governors, the local government chairmen andthe lawmakers at all levels to task on their capacity or otherwise toformulate and defend such legal instruments and pursue such poli-cies that will make for peace, security and prosperity.

It is not enough for us to desire peace for our land. We mustbe peacemakers as well. We must be committed to designing


strategies to forestall, manage and resolve conflict situations. Wemust work hard and make sacrifices towards the attainment of thepeace of our dream. The men and women of goodwill in Nigeriamust constantly be on the watch to ensure that in our evolvingdemocracy, such agents of destabilisation as the gang of Islamicfanatics in the North and their collaborators elsewhere do nothijack our commonwealth for selfish political gains, and transformour land to a theatre of war, a war with no discernible reason andone without frontiers.

In the midst of the madness of today, those who still have theirheads in place must reflect together and rise up in defence of thesecular nature of our national constitution, or else Nigeria maysoon become another Algeria. A stitch in time saves nine, they say.This latest event in the tragic drama of the Nigerian state is onemore reason why it is necessary to hold a round table or a nationalconference to discuss the terms of our social contract as a nation….We must salvage our country for once from the hands of bandits,hooligans and fanatics. The time to act is now!

Appendix 13 299

� Notes _________________________________________

1I remind you of my earlier warning that English is not the first lan-guage for most of the authors of these documents. Nigerian English some-times differs from that of the Queen, whether in vocabulary, spelling,style, punctuation or grammar. Whole paragraphs are sometimes markedwith my unmerciful computer’s green! Some of the most glaring differ-ences have been adjusted.

2 See Chapter 3. 3 See Chapter 4. 4 See Chapter 4. This appendix constitutes most of Chapter V in

TEKAN’s Towards the Right Path for Nigeria, pp. 56–64. It is out of printand not likely to be reprinted.

5 Then follows a list of 18 of the highest positions in the federal gov-ernment all held by Muslims.

6 See Chapter 4. A press statement by some lecturers of AhmaduBello University, Zaria, Friday, 13th March, 1987. This document wasappended to the 1987 CAN News Release.

7 For information about this debate, see J. Boer, 1979, pp. 478ff and1984, pp. 142ff.

8 This document is signed by twenty-two lecturers, both Christiansand Muslims.

9 See Chapter 5. 10 See Chapter 5. 11 See Chapter 5. 12 See Chapter 5. 13 See Chapter 5. 14 See Chapter 5. 15 See Chapter 6. The release was originally published as an inde-

pendent document, but it also constitutes “Appendix E” in the 1987Release of CAN, Kaduna State branch, from where it is copied here.

16 See Chapter 6 in the section Zangon-Kataf.


17 See Chapters 4 and 6. 18 See Chapter 6. 19 J. Boer, 3 Mar/2003. Footnote is Boer’s; it is not original.20 See Chapter 6.


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Achi, Louis and Peter-Omale Funmi. “20 Feared Dead in Jos PDP WardCongress Fracas.” TD, 3 May/2002.

Adedeji, Wole. “Kwara Shuts Three Schools.” NC, 7 Mar/96.

Adekeye, Fola. “Sharia Will Lead to Open War.” Newswatch, 6 Mar/2000,pp. 10-13.

Ado-Kurawa, Ibrahim. Sharia and the Press in Nigeria: Islam versus WesternChristian Civilization. Kano: Kurawa Holdings Ltd., 2000.

Ahiante, Andrew. “2003: Radio Nigeria Pledges Objectivity, Fairness.”TD, 29 May/2002.

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Aba - 293Abacha, Sani (Head of State) –

101, 234, 260Abaje, Professor – 154Abashiya, Christopher – 14, 36,

81, 90, 192Abban, Catherine – 224, 231Abdulazeez, Alhaji – 178Abia State - 293Abiola, Mosheed – 148Abubakre, R.D. – 33Abubukar, Salihu – 114Abuja – 91, 96, 110, 120-122,

232, 237, 239, 265, 296Academic Staff Union ofUniversities (ASUU) – 185Academics – 75Accusations – 63Achigili, Benjamin – 157-158

Adamawa State – 114, 143-144, 295Adamu, Hassan – 224Adamu, Suleiman – 220Adegbite, J.A. – 99Adegbite, Lateef – 101Advanced Teachers College, Zaria

– see Teachers CollegeAfrican Traditional Religion

(ATR) – 66-68, 86, 216Aggression – 37, 39, 194, 226Ahmadiyya – 43, 258Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) –

see UniversitiesABU Christian Community -182

Ahmed, Akbar – 124Aikhomu, Augustus (Vice

President) – 172, 209Ajayi, Chief – 213Aji, Simpson – 100

INDEX

Ajolore, Olusola – 139Akinyemi, Bolaje – 99, 105-106Akwanga – 118Alcohol – 194Al-Gabid, Hamid – 42-43Alhaji, Abubukar – 260-261Aliyu, Dabo (Governor) – 225Alkalami – 171-172Al-Khatab, Umar B. – 41All Africa Conference of Churches

– 99Allahu Akbar – 48-49Almajirai – 190, 229Aluko, Professor - 100Anger – 30Animashaun, Kola – 123Aniagolu Tribunal – see TribunalsAnthropology – 68Apartheid – 173, 197, 203-204,

206Apostasy – 41Arab African International Bank –

260-261Arab League – 43Arabic - 233Arabic Teachers College, Jos – see

Teachers CollegeArewa Consultative Forum – 73-74Ari, Yusufu – 175Arna – 191, 194, 206-207, 243Arrests/Imprisonment – 153, 186,

204, 207-211, 215, 220-221,225, 240-241, 249, 251, 293

Arson - 219, 221, 243, 247-248,

275-284, 289, 296Audu, Ishaya – 13,88-89, 213Avre, Chiwo – 87Awolowo, Obafemi – 32

Babangida, Ibrahim (Head of State) – 31, 42-43, 62, 94, 96, 103-106, 119, 123, 125, 127, 144-145, 149, 185-186,188, 190-191, 203, 211-212,234, 241, 260, 288-292

Bagobiri, Joseph - 294Baikie, Adamu – 133, 147Bajju – 87-88, 287Bako, Abubukar – 62, 181, 185,

193, 246Bala, Yusufu – 150Bali, Domkat – 288-289Bansi, B.S. – 111-112Baptist Mission – 154Baptist Seminary, Kawo – 154Baptist Seminary, Ogbomosho –

154Barau, Salisu – 219Barnabas Fund – 59Bassa – 118Bauchi (city and state) – 220-221,

296-297Bauchi, Emir of – 87, 215, 220Bayero University – see

Universities Belin, David – 71Bello, Ahmadu – 15, 41, 44-45,

58, 102-103, 187, 239


Bello, Tanko - 293Bendel State University – see

UniversitiesBible – 180, 275Bible Society of Nigeria – 173Bitrus, Daniel – 173Bolewa – 71, 223Bonnke, Reinhard – 71, 171-173Borno State – 138Braithwaite, Tunji – 69Braungart, Susan – 42Browneye, Ray – 14Bukuru – 87Bungwan, Harrison – 210Bush, George Jr. (President) – 159Bush, George Sr. (President) – 52Byang, Danjuma – 32, 191-193

Canada – 12Canon Law – 184Canterbury, Archbishop of – 170Cemeteries – 169, 239Chaikwai - 287Challenge Bookshops – 176, 178Chanchangi, A.A. – 53Chapel of Salvation, ABU – 280-

281Chapel of the Resurrection,

University of Ibadan – 120Chechet, Mrs. – 210Cheriyan, Ebby – 176-178Chiefs/chieftaincy – 118, 202,

204, 207, 212, 214-216, 218,240

Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) National - 16-17, 23-26, 37, 41, 49, 51, 106-107, 113, 120, 123, 125, 127-129,145, 153, 200, 208, 217, 241, 296 Abuja - 122Borno – 138Gongola/Adamawa – 16,

103, 104, 111-114, 143, 148, 266-268

Kaduna – 34, 36, 65, 85, 105-106, 117, 119, 137, 146, 149, 152-155, 157, 179-182, 191-192, 194-196, 294

Kano – 108, 130, 134-135, 147-148, 157, 168-171

Kwara – 139-140Lagos – 144Nassarawa – 118Northern Zone – 21-23, 90,

96, 102, 105, 145, 147, 157, 202

Oyo – 101, 141-142, 271-274Plateau – 115, 117, 132, 153

Christian Corpers Fellowship - 266Christian Council of Nigeria

(CCN) – 37, 130Christian Reformed Church - 14Christian plans – 36, 175-176Christian Victory – 52, 58Church buildings – 34, 46, 49,

85, 90-92, 95, 97, 107-124,

Index 321

137, 168-169, 171, 82, 186, 193, 197, 203, 217-218, 221,225-226, 239-240, 243, 245,249-251, 253, 256-257, 264-265, 267-270, 275-284, 289-290, 294, 296

Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) – 25-26, 28

Ciroma, Adamu – 225College of Advanced Studies,

Zaria – 275, 277Colonialism – 86-88, 203, 214,

233, 286Comet, The – 50-51Common sense – 33Communism – 55Companion CD – 18, 222Competition – 122Conference of World Islamic

Organisation – 37Conspiracy – 41-42, 220, 223Constituent Assembly – 16, 50,

113, 149-150, 268, 292Constitution – 113-114, 126,

131, 150-151, 158, 168, 175,201, 225, 240-242, 250, 252,291, 297, 299

Contempt – 87, 186-188, 194, 199, 201, 205-206, 210, 249,285-286

Conversion – 41, 47-48, 71, 80, 102, 177, 224, 239

Corruption – 30, 123, 129, 143, 145, 159, 183, 221-222, 228,

231, 290, 298Coup – 132, 189, 251, 265Covenant of Umar – 41Cross – 120, 193, 249Crowther, Samuel – 144Crusade – 37Cudjoe Tribunal – see Tribunals Cudjoe, Rahila – 206

Dan Bauchi, Aliyu – 47, 58-59Dan Fodio, Usman – 41, 44, 96,

144, 187Danbala, A.T.K. – 209Dandaura, Haruna – 15, 37, 130,

159, 170Dariye, Joshua (Governor) – 156Dass village - 223Dasuki, Sultan Ibrahim – 132, 196Deedat, Ahmed – 148, 180, 275Demonization – 45, 52, 71, 186,

224Demonstrations – 209-211, 213,

290Dialogue – 38, 70Director, Osa – 214, 219, 223Discrimination – 41, 45, 62, 91-

92, 102-104, 107-151, 171-172, 199, 201, 206, 239, 242, 244, 262, 264-265, 267,270, 272, 285-287

Dogo, Joel – 219Dogonyaro, Joshua - 288Dogo, Saidu – 157Dolom, Amunkitou – 24-25


Domination – 30-33, 50Donli Report – see Tribunals Douglas, Graham – 208Dress, female – 146-147, 164. See

also Uniforms.Duniyo, Tacio – 200Dusu Commission – see TribunalsDusu, Felicia – 156Ecclesiastical courts 84, 192, 229,

265 Education – 122, 129, 133-151,

207, 233, 235. See also Schools.

Egypt – 46Ehusani, George – 226, 296-299Elections – 105Electronic media – see MediaElite – 76El-Zakzaky – 40Emirs – 247Emotions – 61, 63, 94Enahoro, Anthony – 29Equality – see Religions, Equality

of Ethnic/ethnicity – 64-65, 70-71, 76, 286

Europe – see WestEvangelical Churches of West

Africa (ECWA) – 16-17, 113,133, 173, 179, 198, 208, 225

Expatriate quotas – 86Eze, Kenneth – 103, 110-111,

266-270

Fadipe, Joseph – 135, 173Fagbemi, Fati – 64Falola, Toyin – 95Fanatics/fanaticism – 37-39,

57,65, 74, 95, 130-131, 138, 168, 173, 186, 201, 209-210,217, 223-225, 238-239, 241,248, 250-251, 258, 267, 290,296-299

Favouritism – see Government (im)partiality

Fellowship of Christian Students -276

Fika, Emir of - 225Fire – 174Flag – 49, 96Fom, Alexander – 26-27, 69Foreigners – 76, 223, 241Friday – 191, 251Friday Nur – 176Fulani – see Hausa-FulaniFundamentalists/fundamentalism

– 38, 47, 49, 69, 95, 140, 146, 258, 295-297

Funds, overseas – 122, 264Funtua – 186

Gaddafi, Muhammad – 46Gambari, Ibrahim – 110, 140Garba, Joel – 23-24, 106Garba, Lawal – 181-182Garko – 109Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo – 148Gereng, Dennis – 114, 143-144

Index 323


Gilliland, Dean – 102Gindiri, Paul – 112Girls – 50, 81, 224, 243Gongola State – 110-114, 266-

270Gonto, Peter – 214-216Gotom, Musa – 153Government – 44, 62-63, 72, 74,

79, 85-165, 180, 217, 226, 249, 253, 256, 263, 270, 283, 290-292, 297-298

Government appointments – 62, 101-107, 116, 206, 236, 239,241-242, 250, 264, 287-288

Government compensation – 157,170, 193, 205, 207, 211, 284, 294

Government confiscation – 103, 133, 136-137, 140, 143, 145-146, 163, 169, 193, 240,242, 250, 264

Government funds – 50-51, 86, 97-98, 103, 107-108, 110, 114, 117, 120, 122-123, 125-128, 133, 157, 237, 260-261, 263, 269, 290

Government (im)partiality – 88-93, 96, 107-108, 113-114, 118-119,121, 125, 140, 142-144, 147, 150-151, 158, 200,211-212, 241, 245, 250, 267,269, 272-273, 285, 290, 292

Gowon, Daniel – 17, 189-190Gowon, Yakubu (Head of State) –

17-18, 20, 45, 73-74, 83, 145, 163, 189, 289

Greek philosophy – 67, 82Gulf War – 172Gumi, Abubukar – 53, 77-81,

132, 183, 185-186, 193, 240,246

Hajj – see PilgrimmageHarassment – 153Haruna, Mohammed – 150Hatred – 169-170, 208, 219Hausa-Fulani – 31, 65, 70-71, 75,

87, 184, 187, 194-195, 197, 200, 202-205, 210-211, 214-216, 219, 223, 295

Health care – 122Hooligans – 75, 255, 297, 299Hospitals – 45, 78, 103, 193,

263-264 Teaching Hospital, Zaria -

279Human rights – 57, 114, 144,

174-175, 200-201, 212, 217,248, 250, 256

Humiliation - 172

Ibrahim, Ishak – 46Idiya, Alhaji – 206, 209Igbirra – 118-119Ige, Bola – 66-67, 141Ikulu - 287Ilo, Isaiah – 211-212Ilorin – 110, 138

Index 325

Ilorin, Emir of – 110, 140Imposition of Muslim rulers – 86-

88, 184, 187, 188, 193-194, 200, 202-204, 210, 212, 214,216, 240, 286-287

Infidels – 31, 34, 46, 49Institute of Mass Communication

Technology, Jos – 177International Commission of

Christians, Jews & Monotheists – 258-259

International Herald Tribune – 42-43

Intimidation – 46, 73, 116, 138, 141, 150, 210

Intolerance – see Tolerance/intolerance

Iran – 62, 97, 251Isaacs, Dan – 157Islam in Africa Conference (IAC)

– 40, 51, 96, 232-237Islam in Africa Organisation

(IAO) – 232-237Islamic Affairs Department - 264Islamic Council – 52, 260Islamic Development Fund – 51,

261Islamic Movement – 81, 133Islamization – 65, 79, 81, 85-87,

95-97, 100-101, 103-106, 113, 118, 121, 132-133, 135,138-139, 162, 183, 225, 232-239, 243, 252, 258, 261,263-265, 268, 291, 299

Israel – 43, 75, 262, 289Iyere, John – 120Izala – 52-53, 78-79Jaja village - 219Jalingo – 65Jalingo, Binta Faruk – 72-74, 102Jama’atul Izalatul Bidi’a Ikamatu

Sunna – 196Jama’atul Nasril Islam (JNI) – 47,

177-178Janfa, Silas – 24Jang, David (Governor) - 270Jateau, Peter – 100, 157, 183,

202-203, 211Jega, Governor – 155Jega, Mahmud – 207Jesus – 133, 180, 240, 246, 275,

278-279Jibril, Abdullahi – 47-48Jihad – 37, 45-46, 53-55, 58, 69,

85, 96, 105, 113, 138, 141, 171, 180, 183-185, 196, 203,205, 223, 248, 299

“J.O.” – 59, 97, 168John, Haruna – 66Jos – 66, 74, 87, 112, 153, 294,

296Jos Ecwa Theological Seminary

(JETS) – 175-178Josiah Publishing – 59Justice Babalakin Commission –

see TribunalsJustice Benedict Okadigbo

Tribunal – see Tribunals


Kaduna (city & state) – 39, 49, 76, 102, 136, 153-157, 210, 213, 245, 253, 278, 281, 294-297

Kaduna, Governor of – 181, 183, 185-186, 188, 193, 196-197,246

Kaduna State Tribunal onReligious and Communal Riots –

see TribunalsKafanchan – 34, 36, 62, 65, 75,

81, 110, 131, 133, 149, 153, 155-156, 175-194, 198, 229,246, 248, 250, 253-257, 275

Kafanchan College of Education –181

Kafanchan, Emir of – 180Kafiri – 53, 169, 191, 194, 207Kagoma - 287Kagoro, Chief of – 31Kanam - 294Kano (city & state) – 32, 35,37,

39, 47-49, 71, 108-110, 130,134-136, 147-148, 155-157, 168-175, 296-297

Kantagora, Sani – 132Kantiok, James – 101Kareem, Ahmad - 261Kare-Kare – 224Karibi-Whyte Tribunal – see

TribunalsKataf - 287Kataf Youth Development

Association – 206-207

Katsina State – 119, 133, 151Khomeini, Ayatollah – 79Killing – 48-49, 66, 69, 71, 73,

119, 203, 209, 212-213, 217,219, 225, 243, 253, 255, 270, 294, 296-297

Kukah, Matthew – 17, 120, 129, 136-137, 155-156, 170, 186-189, 191, 213

Kukuri, Yusufu – 224-225Kundila Housing Estate – 108-

109Kurama - 287Kwara State – 138-140Kwashi, Benjamin – 149, 208Kwoi – 137Kwoi Government GirlsSecondary School – 137

Lagos (city & state) – 123-124Lamido of Adamawa – see Yola,

Emir La-Nibetle, Justin – 153Lar, Solomon – 25Lawan, Suleiman - 267Lekwot, Zamani – 49, 204, 207-

209Lere, Muhammed (Governor) –

204-205, 209Liberation Times – 172, 174Libya – 97Literature – 42, 97, 130, 170,

176, 178, 235, 246, 264-265London – 37

Index 327

Lukman, Rilwanu – 105, 261

Machunga, Akila – 16Madaki, Yohanna (Governor) –

16-17, 188, 202, 208, 219-222

Maiduguri – 138Maikasuwa, Peter – 118Maitatsine – 27, 152, 155, 270,

289Majority/minority – 115, 118,

171-172, 216, 240, 244, 248Makarfi, Ahmed (Governor) - 295Makinde, Ola – 122Mambula, Jabanni – 16, 65, 81,

117, 145, 238-244Manipulation – 36, 40, 46, 62,

64, 66, 68-76, 99, 136, 138, 150, 156-157, 186, 189, 199-200, 221, 223-225, 254-255, 290-291

Manzo, Jonathan – 222Marriage – 194Marxism – 63, 69, 155Mato, Alhaji – 204-205, 209Mbachirin, Abraham – 122Mecca – 37, 41, 263Media – 129, 147-151, 172, 222,

234, 283, 287Electronic Media – 42, 45,

78, 86, 92, 102, 119, 147, 149-150, 169, 180-183, 190, 197, 209, 255-256, 263, 75-276, 282, 290

Press – 74, 119, 148, 226, 282

Mercenaries - 105Middle Belt – 86-87, 193, 238,

242Military – 72, 78, 106, 113, 152,

180, 190, 197, 247. See also Police, Security.

Minchakpu, Obed – 71-72, 74, 99, 107, 109-110, 112, 122, 134-136, 138-139, 154, 214,218-219, 221-226, 293-295

Miss World – 226, 294, 296Missions/missionaries – 23, 42,

87, 148, 188, 216, 263Mitchell, Edwin & Jody – 42, 52,

59-60Mohammed – 181, 246, 296Mohammed, Isa (Governor) –

266-270Monday, Hannatu – 146Mosque – 34, 46, 60, 86, 90-92,

95, 107-124, 137, 169, 171, 181, 193, 226, 240, 243, 251, 253, 263, 266-270, 293National Mosque - 121

Mubi – 112, 270Mubi, Emir of – 16Multi-ethnic – 100, 199, 203Multi-religion – 49, 90, 113, 190,

291Muri, Emir of – 188Murtala Muhammad International

Airport – 120


Musa, Ibrahim – 218Musa, Markus – 223Musa, Suleiman – 219-220Musa, Victor – 17, 113, 119, 171,

174Muslim Circle – 175Muslim north – 190, 238-239,

241-242Muslim Parliament of GreatBritain – 33Muslim plans – 35ff, 50-54, 59Muslim Students Society (MSS) –

48-49, 62, 246-247Muslim World League – 121

Nangare – 224-225Nassarawa State – 118National Association of Nigerian

Students (NANS) – 49National Concord – 98, 148National Conference of Nigerian

Women – 50National Council of Muslim

Youth Organisations (NACOMYO) – 146-147

National Ecumenical Centre – 122-123

National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) – 34-35, 41, 48, 64-66, 76-77, 85-86, 108-109, 117, 152, 157

National Islamic Party of Nigeria – 51

National Republic Convention – 51

Naugle, David – 57Nduke, Paul – 63Ndule, Ayuba – 104Nepotism – 159Nerzit Committee of Concerned

Citizens – 184Neutrality – 88-90New Nigerian – 94, 98, 149-150,

183, 197, 270Nigeria Inter-Religious Council

(NIREC) – 51Nigeria Standard – 74Nigerian Aid Group – 196Nigerian Labour Congress - 257Nimfa, Joel – 294Nimzam – 287Ningi, Idi - 293Nkom, Steven – 184Noise pollution – 124Nongo Kristu u Sudan Hen Tiv

(NKST) – 122, 162Non-Muslims – 40, 80, 88Northern Elders – 17, 187, 189Northern Nigeria – 83, 297Nwabuezer, Professor – 92-93Nwosu, Ike (Governor) – 142,

271-274Nyam, Zakka – 135

Obasanjo, Olusegun (President) – 76, 123, 208, 297

Obemeata, Joseph – 94, 142,

Index 329

271-274O’Connell, James – 64, 66-67Ogbonna, Simeon – 172Ogueri – 125-126 Okadigbo, Chuba – 76Oko, Mike – 120Okogie, Anthony – 98, 125Okonkwo, Mike – 124Okoroma, James – 49Olanipekun, Oladipo – 140-141Olatunji, Mrs. J. – 273-274Olutimkayin, Nathaniel – 176Omabamu, Sunday – 110Omotunde, Dele – 74Open Doors – 148Oppression – 12, 30, 41, 46, 56,

87, 183, 187, 201-204, 207, 210, 212-216, 218, 258, 286-287, 298

Oputa Panel – see TribunalsOrganisation of Islamic

Conference (OIC) – 17, 40, 43, 51-52, 54-55, 75, 81, 93-101, 104-106, 120, 159-160,191, 232, 240, 243, 254, 260-265, 289, 291

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)– 105

Orumah, Benjamin - 280Oyeniran, A.O. – 131Oyo State – 140-141, 146-147,

271-274Oyo State Teaching Service

Commission (TESCOM) – 271-274

Paden, John – 58Pakistani Islamic Revolution – 40Palestinian Liberation

Organisation – 265Pam, Elisabeth – 213Paranoia – 41Pastors – see

Preaching/preaching/pastorsPeace/harmony – 73, 213, 235,

238, 241, 244, 252, 256, 258, 267-268, 278, 290, 298-299

Pen, The – 171-172Penal Code - 249Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria

– 124Persecution – 47-48Pilgrimmage – 86, 88, 90, 93,

103, 122, 124-129, 240, 243,292

Plateau State – 47, 115, 117-118, 132, 153, 156, 178, 198, 216, 294

Polarization – 98Police – 47, 53, 64, 66, 81, 103-

104, 113, 121, 139, 152-156,172, 174, 180, 185-186, 190,196-197, 210, 212, 217, 220-225, 231, 247, 251, 253,278-279, 281, 293- 294. See also Military, Security.


Political Bureau – 76Political correctness – 65, 188Politics – 23, 28, 63-66, 70-72,

78, 101-103, 156-157, 172, 202-203, 223, 237, 253-257,286-287, 290-291, 298.

Pope – See Roman CatholicPork – 194, 216-217Potiskum – 48, 71, 223-226Power – 33Pragmatism – 122, 128-129Prayer (meetings) – 123-124, 141,

158, 173, 203, 239, 276, 278Preaching/preachers/pastors –

129-132, 193, 197, 250-251,265, 278

Press – see MediaProvocation – 133, 153, 170-171,

173, 175-176, 178, 180-182,185, 193-194, 196, 209, 246,252, 276, 285

Public utterances – 61-62, 129-133, 180-181, 185, 240, 243,246, 249-251, 266, 275, 285

Queen Amina College – 46, 136Queen of Apostles College – 46Qur’an – 137, 141, 148-149, 181,

246, 265

Rabiu, Ishaku – 53Raji, Rasheed (Governor) – 218,

220-221Reason – 33

Religion – 63-64, 66, 72Religion, Freedom of – 118-119,

132, 137, 139-140, 175, 182,201, 225, 241, 250, 254, 256, 283, 285

Religion, Personal/private – 93, 99, 125

Religions, Equality of – 92, 114-117

Religious Affairs Committee, ABU – 280

Religious Knowledge – 119, 133-136, 138-139, 141, 239, 243,250, 272

Revenge/retaliation – 172, 293-295

Rimi, Abubukar – 155Riots – 11, 47-48, 56, 62, 64-66,

68, 71, 74, 76, 81, 87, 89, 153-154, 157, 167-231, 238,241, 283Kaduna 2000 – 213Kafanchan 1987 - 175-194,

253-257 Kano 1982 – 168-171Kano 1991 – 171-175Potiskum 1994 – 223-226Tafawa Balewa 1991 – 214-

219Tafawa Balewa 1995 – 219-

223Zangon-Kataf 1992 – 194-

213Roman Catholic – 75, 98, 108, 170

Index 331

Rumours – 247-248Ruxton, Captain – 87

Sabiya, Wilson – 16, 103-104, 110-112, 114-115, 148-149, 266-270

Salifu, S.L. – 21, 90, 146, 192Samaru – 47, 275-284Samuel Ajayi Crowther University

– see UniversitiesSanni, Alhaji – 141Sardauna – See Bello, AhmaduSayawa – 17, 214-216, 218-222Schools – 42, 45-46, 48, 78, 85-

86, 90-91, 102-103, 119, 133-151, 163, 169, 193, 250,263-264, 269, 290. see also Education.

Secular/secularism – 12, 33, 57, 63-64, 66-67, 69, 83-84, 95, 99-101, 104, 113, 125-126, 138, 147-148, 151, 158, 162,170, 175, 188, 227, 229, 241-242, 251, 253, 255-256,262-263, 267, 299

Security forces – 137, 155, 175, 178, 182, 194-198, 212, 215,218, 226, 246-247, 249, 252-253, 281, 283, 297. See also Police, Military.

Separation of Religion and Government – 89-93, 99, 102-103, 113, 122, 125-126, 242, 268

Settlers – 186-187, 194-195, 197,201, 203, 206, 229-230

Sharia – 43, 50, 75, 98-99, 135, 150, 158, 175, 183, 191-192,213, 223, 234, 236, 240, 243, 255, 265, 291-292, 296-297

Shegari, Shehu (President) – 37, 121-122, 157

Shehu, Emman – 40-41Shi’ite – 193Shika – 275, 279Shown, Dakum – 25-26Shua Mission School – see

Teachers CollegesSlavery – 187, 203-204, 230Social structures – 77Social-Economic-Political factors –

185, 200Sofa, James – 171Sokoto State – 96, 119Sokoto, Sultan of – 43, 49, 132,

236Southern Zaria – 87, 184Spiritual forces - 213St. Augustine’s Church – 120St. George’s Church – 35, 37, 39,

108, 168, 170, 228St. Michel’s Church – 110St. Patrick’s Grammar School –

142, 271-274Students – 62, 102, 181, 265Sudan United Mission (SUM) –

14, 87


Sulaiman, Ibraheem – 32Sumaila – 108Sunday Times – 130Suppression – 41, 72, 214, 219,

224Suspicion – 30, 56Syncretism – 67-68, 82

Tafawa Balewa – 65, 70, 81, 87, 153, 194, 214-223

Tahir, Adamu – 134-135Takum – 112Taliban – 64, 82Tapgun, Patrick - 220Tarayyar Ekklesiyoyin Kristi a

Nijeriya (TEKAN) – 16, 50, 62-63, 65, 69, 81, 104-105, 117, 131, 133, 145, 225, 38-252

Teachers – 271-274Teachers Colleges – 143

Advanced Teachers College, Zaria – 277

Arabic Teachers College, Jos –177-178

Shua Mission School – 143Women’s Teachers College,

Zaria – 277TELL – 74Terrorism – 47-48Theocracy – 39, 89, 268Theological College of Northern

Nigeria (TCNN) – 184-186ThisDay – 294, 296

Thompson, Adewale – 32Threats – 140, 150, 174, 195,

209, 252, 255Tingno village - 270Today’s Challenge – 24, 175, 177-

179, 226Tolerance/intolerance - 30, 34-35,

46, 48, 57, 74, 77, 138, 141, 146, 173-174, 198, 207, 212,239

Townsend, Adam – 97, 258Trade, international – 54Tribunals – 24, 173, 183, 190,

193, 220, 225, 245, 283Aniagolu Tribunal - 155Cudjoe Tribunal - 206-207Donli Report – 156, 183,

189, 191-193Dusu Commission - 157Justice Babalakin

Commission – 218Justice Benedict Okadigbo

Tribunal – 207-209Kaduna State Tribunal on

Religious & Communal Riots – 155, 179, 197-199, 285-286

Kano 1982 – 169-171Karibi-Whyte Tribunal - 189Oputa Panel – 212-213

Tsado, Jacob – 175, 228Tsedason, Austeen – 211Tudun Wada, Zaria - 275Turaki, Yusufu – 16, 87, 176-177,

Index 333

179, 197-202, 225, 230, 285-287

Ukiwe, Admiral – 105Ulamas – 138, 186, 223Uniforms – 48, 91, 133, 135,

146, 191, 193, 241-242United Christian Association of

Oyo State – 101, 262United Missionary College - 140United States – 12, 93Universities – 119, 247, 263

University, Ahmadu Bello - 47, 49, 75, 151-152, 181-182, 185-185, 253-257, 275-284

University, Bayero - 49, 119, 290

University, Bendel State – 48University of Ibadan – 120University of Lagos – 144University of Nigeria, Nsukka

– 119University, Samuel Ajayi

Crowther – 144University, Usman Dan Fodio

– 119, 144Useni, Jeremiah - 156Usman Dan Fodio University –

see UniversitiesUsman, Yusufu Bala – 69

Vatican – See Roman CatholicVeil – 146-147

Vice-Chancellor, ABU – 277, 279, 281

Violence – 30, 35, 45, 47, 69, 74,77, 118-120, 137-138, 140-141, 145-151, 156-158, 173-174, 198-199, 226, 245, 247-249, 253-257, 270, 290,293-299

Wabara, Adolphus - 293Waduku village - 270Wadumbiya, B.S. – 39, 69-70Wase – 115-117Weapons – 49, 195, 217, 277West(ern) – 53-55West, David – 105Wholism – 64, 77Williams, Charles – 37-39, 51,

67, 95-96, 101, 120, 125, 129-130

Windibiziri, David – 111Wolterstorff, Nicholas – 33Women – 50, 111, 187, 194, 205,

209-210, 218, 233, 293Women’s Teachers College, Zaria

– see Teachers CollegesWorld Council of Churches

(WCC) – 99, 289World Islamic Organisation – 40-

41, 263World Muslim Council – 41World of Islam Festival – 37World view – 33, 57, 67, 82, 158Wudil – 109


Wudiri, Ayuba – 113-114, 149-150

Wusasa – 189-190, 275

Yakunat, Monday - 193YarAdua, Major General – 53Yaro, Ibrahim – 34-36, 45-46, 58,

79-80, 91, 102, 126-127, 136

Yobe State – 64Yola – 111-112, 114Yola Teachers College – 143Yola Vocational Training School –

143Yola, Emir of – 180Yoruba – 138, 140, 142Yoruba Elders Council – 32Youth – 63, 81, 169, 216, 234,

236, 271Yusuf, Halimat – 139Yusuf, Jolly Tanko – 14-15, 26,

30-32, 35, 44-45, 53-55, 58, 78-79, 100-102, 106, 123

Zamfara, Governor of – 50Zang, Davou - 156Zangon-Kataf – 39, 49, 65, 70-

71, 81, 155, 179, 229, 194-213

Zaria – 88, 110, 275-284, 296-297

Zaria, Emir of – 152-153, 181, 183, 187, 196, 204-205, 210,281

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