is yulgok's theory of mind consistent?

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ACTA KOR ZANA

VOL. 15, NO. 1, JUNE 2012: 147-162

IS YULGOK S THEORY OF MIN

CONSISTENT?

W E O N K I Y O O

In sixteendi century Chosön Korea, T oegye and Kobong initiated a debate over the

relationship between the Fotir Beginnings and the Seven Feelings, their moral

characteristics, and, also, their relationship to other psychological factors. This debate

soon called for a successive debate between Yulgok and Ugye who asked more or less

the same questions by focusing on the moral mind and the human mind rather than the

Four and the Seven. Although Yulgok was debating with Ugye, his real opponent was

T oegye who was then deceased. Yulgok closely studied and rejected most of T oegye stheses on (a) the mutual exclusiveness between the Four and the Seven, (b) the

identification of the Four with the moral mind and, also, of the Seven with the human

mind, and (c) the mutual or reciprocal arousal of // and ki In this article, I shall contend

that Yulgbk s theory of mind is inconsistent in that he mistakenly identified the moral

characteristics of the Four with those of the moral mind. I shall begin by examining

Yulgok s reasons for the rejection of the above mentioned theses. In doing this, we shall

see the relationship between such psychological concepts as mind, nature, and feelings

with respect to ontological concepts such as // and ki In the end, we shall conclude that

Yulgok has to give up the idea that the moral mind shares the same moral characteristics

as the Four and the original nature.

Key words: T oegye, Yulgok, the Four-Seven Debate, die Moral Mind-Human Mind

Debate, Hobal Theory, Korean Neo-Confudanism

1 INTRODUCTION

There were two rounds of the so-caüed Four-Seven Debate in sixteenth-century

hosön Korea, which characterized Korean Neo-Confucianism. The fkst round

Altiiough T oegye and Yulgok were orthodox Neo-Confucians who faithfully followed Zhu Xi steachings, the former often took different routes and arrived at different conclusions from the



148 Acta Koreana Vol 15, No. 1, 2012

was between Yi Hwang (T'oegye, 1501-1570) and Ki Tae-sùng (Kobong, 1527-1572) who debated over the quesfion of whether, and how, the Four Beginnings(Sadan, Ei^) and the Seven FeeHngs (Ch'üchöng, -btf) can be explained interms of li/ti S and ki/qi Ä.^ After a long debate which continued for abouteight years, T'oegye drew a number of conclusions which included the foüowing:(a) that the Four and the Seven are mutuaüy exclusive, (b) that the Four can bereferred to as the moral mind {tosim, it'llO , whereas the Seven can be referred toas the human mind {insim, A'ù), and (c) that in the case of the Four // arousesand ki foüows it, whereas in the case of the Seven ki arouses and ti rides on it.

In contrast, the second round of the Four-Seven Debate was between Yi I(Yulgok, 1536-1584) and Song Hon (Ugye, 1535-1598).^ In die course of hisdebate with Ugye, Yulgok came to deny most of the claims presented by T'oegye:he concluded (al) that the Seven are inclusive of the Four, (bl) that the Four canbe referred to as the moral mind, whereas the Seven cannot be referred to as thehuman mind but rather as the composite of both the moral mind and the human

Four Beginnings and the Seven Fe.elings nor with that between the moral-human mind and theFour-Seven (see Chung, 1995, 44 and 87). Moreover, although he did once men don the Four and

the Seven in terms of li

and ki ,

he did not attempt to provide any detailed explanadon or argument{Zhu^yu-lei [Classified dialogues of Master Zhu] 53:83, The Four, these are the bal oi li, and Úie.Seven, these are die bal oí /è/ ). His proposidon is similar to T'oegye's first proposidon, but theirwordings are slighdy different (see (P2) in note 8 below).2 The term 'Four Beginnings' is from the Book of Mencius S T (2A:6) in which Menciusintroduces the mind of commiseradon, the mind of shame and dislike, the mind of deference andcompliance, and the mind of dght and wrong, as the beginning of benevolence, the beginning ofrighteousness, the beginning of propriety, and the beginning of wisdom, respecdvely. In brief

according to Mencius, the four virtues (i.e. benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom) arethe evidence of the goodness of human nature, and those virtues manifested are called the FourBeginnings or Minds, which Zhu Xi understands as feelings. On the other hand, the SevenFeeUngs (i.e. pleasure, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hatred, and desire) are introduced in the chapter

Ltyun in the ook of Rites QJJi, «§12), as basic hum an feelings. Moreover, in the first chapter ofthe Doctrine of the Mean {Zhongyong ^iMf), die Seven are reduced to four in number includinpleasure, anger, and sorrow with joy added to the list. Whether the number of the feelings is sevenor four, it is understood as referring to all the feelings that human beings have. Since this is thecase, the Four Beginnings, insofar as they are feelings, must be included in them, too. Thus, therearises a serious problem when T'oegye accepts that they are feelings, but denies that they belong todie Seven Feelings. See Santangelo (1990, 234-270) for an introductory account of the Four-SevenDebate.

3 This debate is often called the Human Mind-Moral Mind Debate because the subject-matterwith which they were largely concerned was the moral mind and the human mind. However, it isalso called, and regarded as a part of, the Four-Seven Debate since the main issues of the former

were originally derived from the latter. Indeed, Song Hon's inidal quesdons to Yulgok were aboutthe acceptability of T'oegye's conclusions and, later on about some issues which dedved from



Yoo: Is Yutgok s Theory of Mind Consistent 14 9

mind, and (cl) that in the case not orüy of the Four but also of the Seven, ki

arouses and li rides on it. T he m ain reason for Yulgok's ob jecdon to T'oegye is

that the latter appears to aHow an acdve role to li w hich is generaHy chara cterized

as having non-material properdes. * In opposidon to T'oegye, he thinks that li by

definidon cannot be acdve. Indeed, their opposing views concerning the onto-

logical status and the role of li m ake aH the difference in their th eorie s.

The present ardcle primarüy examines whether Yulgok's theory of mind is

fuHy consistent. In doing this, I shaH take three steps. Firsdy, I shaH examine

T'oegye's posidons on the claims (a)—(c),^ secondly, evaluate Yulgok's reasons for

objecting to them, and, thirdly, show expHcidy what his own views were on thereladonship between psychological factors such as feelings, mind, etc. In this

discussion, I shaH point out that Yulgok's theory is consistent to a large extent,

bu t that his claim in (bl) that the Fo ur can be referred to as the mo ral m ind is

inappropriate and makes the whole theory inconsistent. I shaH suggest that the

best way to make it fiiHy consistent would be to claim that the Four can be

referred to not as the moral mind, but rather as the composite of the moral mind

and the human mind, as he did for the Seven.

2. T'OEG YE'S HOBAL THEORY^As noted, the Four-Seven Debate begins with Kobong's cridcism of T'oegye's

emendadon of Chöng Chiun's (Chuman, 1509—1561) proposidon which

characterizes the Four Beginnings and the Seven Feelings in reladon to li/li

ä and ki/qi M., respecdvely. T'oegye's first pr op osid on to explain the Fo ur and

the Seven in terms of li and ki is that Th e Fo ur are the bal/fa {W) ̂ of //, and the

Seven are the bal of ki. In this proposidon, only // or ki is referred to in each side

of the sentences. That is, the Four are the bal of li alone, whereas the Seven are

th e bal of ki alone. In other words, the Four are explained in terms of // alone.

Cf TKYU 478-479.5 This is because, although Yulgok was debating with Ugye, the latter was merely representingT'oegye's views to a large extent. For this, Chung (1995, 85) rightly points ou t, ... even thoughYulgok was writing to Ugye, his real debate was with T'oegye; Ugye simply provided him withT'oegye's perspectives. In general, Yulgok's letters are longer and better organized than Ugye's ...^ It has been generally consented that T'oegye and Kobong were deeply concerned with theproblem of the movability of//, but I think that this is not true. This problem was rather a subjectof the debate between Yulgok and Ugye. Since Kobong did not cornment much about T'oegye'sviews on this matter, we have to examine Yulgok's remarks to shed light on this issue.^ Ed. note: The McCun e-Reischauer romani^tion for the term b a l ( ^ ) is pa l , but as the author of this article

considers b a l to be the generatty accepted romanit^ation of this term in W estern Neo-Confudan studies and becauseit appears tater in the articte as b a l in such compounds as h o b a l , m i b a l an d iba l , he has cho sen to use the




whereas the Seven are explained in terms of ki alone. This suggests that, since bydefinition li and ki have no common properties, the Four and the Seven havenothing to do with each other, either. However, Kobong is dissatisfied with thisconsequence because he accepts the traditional Confucian idea that //' is neitherseparable from ki nor mixed with it. Presumably, this idea means that li and ki

cannot be separated from each other in reaHty, although they can be thought of asseparate things or elements. As Kobong suggests, it is undeniable that T'oegye'sproposition does have such a connotation.

Kobong's criticism continued for about eight years (1559-1566) and in

response to it T'oegye emended his own proposition at least four times. ^T'oegye's final proposition reads thus: The Four are the bal oí li and ki foHows it,and the Seven are the bal of ki and // rides on it. Despite the fact that Kobongwrote to T'oegye that he was stul dissatisfied with the final proposition, the latterdid not write back to the former, and their debate seemed to end abrupdy.However, the debate over the Four and the Seven did not reaHy end. In 1572, sixyears after the end of their Debate, Ugye wrote a letter to Yulgok, asking for hisopinion about the vaHdity of T'oegye's final proposition. In answer to this enquiry,Yulgok pointed out that T'oegye adopted a duaHst position' by separating // from

ki or vice versa. He then went on to conclude that T'oegye's theory was defective.Indeed, T'oegye's position is weH known as the hobal {liki-hobal/liqi-hufa S Ä , S ^theory in which he appears to ascribe an active characteristic to both li and ki.

Again, the hobal theory refers to a theory that claims a mutual or reciprocal baP

of both li and ki.

Before examining the theory in detaü, it is important to note that the word baP can be translated, at least, in three ways. In the Four-Seven Debate, theword takes such a form as P bal s) from /in/by Q, The bal of P is Q , or P is

^ As for Chuman's original proposition, (PI), T'oegye made at least four emendations, (P2)-(P5),in accordance with Kobong's consistent criticisms. At the end of their debate, Kobong presentedhis own proposition, (P6). The propositions presented in the debate are as follows: Chuman'sOriginal Propo sition (1537), (PI) The Four Beginnings are the bat horn li, and the Seven feeungsthe bat from kî'\ T 'oegye's First Em enda tion (1553), (P2) The Four Beginnings are the bal oí li,and the Seven feelings are the bal oí ki'; T'oegye's Second Em endation (1559), (P3) The bal oíthe Four Beginnings is // only and [they are] nothing but good, and the bal of the Seven feelings is[not only // but] combined with ki and [they are] good or evil ; T'oegye's Third Emendation (1559),(P4) In the bal of the Four Beginnings, // predominates, and in the bal oí the Seven Feelings, kipredom inates ; T'oegye's Fo urth Em endation (1560), (P5) The F our are the ba l of li and kifollows it, and the Seven are the bal of ki and // rides on it ; Kobong's Final Proposition (1561),(P6) In the bal of feelings, at times // moves and ki is together with it, or at times k i is stimulated

and li rides on it. For the detailed references and, also, the reasons for rejecting each proposition ,see Yoo (2011), Ch. 2, Sec. and Yoo (forthcoming), Ch. IV.



Yoo: Is Yulgok s Theory of Mind Consistent? 15 1

the bal of Q , and so it can be translated as a noun or a verb. There is acontroversy about the word whether we are to translate it as manifest/manifestadon ^ K , issue/issuance or originate/origin flM , or arou se/arousal ^iÖ. ^° Let us take the example of The ¿ö /of P is Q . According to thefirst transladon, Q might be understood as the eventual emergence of thecharacterisdc(s) or attribute(s) d iat P originally had. In this case, P in themanifestadon of P is Q does no t necessarüy play any acdve role, but itscharacterisdc(s) may be actuaHzed in dme. Also, it is also inacdve in the secondtransladon, since to say diat die origin of P is Q is to understand Q as a

consdtuent of P. In this case, P need not be acdve. In the first two transladons,the bal of P does not contain any acdve sense, whereas in the third transladon ithas some acdve conno tadon. That is, according to the third transladon, P in thearousal of P is Q signifies an agent which requires some impetus for acdon.Since one and die same word bat' can be translated differendy in differentcontexts, one should be careful to ascertain the proper meaning of the word.

Yulgok cridcizes T'oegye's proposidons on the Four and the Seven for diereason that diey appear to ascribe an acdve connotadon to //. He understands bat' as the third transladon meaning arouse /arousa l. If we replace them, we

have the proposition that The F our are the arousal of Ii and ki foHows it, and theSeven are the arousal of ki and Ii rides on it. This proposidon contains fouracdve expressions, i.e. //s arousing, /è/s fouowing, /è2's arousing, and /fsriding. As for this, Yulgok appears to claim diat we can talk of /è/sarousing, /z's riding, and /è/s foHowing, but no t of /z's arousing . Thereason for this claim is not clear at au. In any case, he thereby accepts the rightside of die prop osido n d iat die Seven are the arousal of ki and Ii rides on it,whüe refusing the left side that the Four are the arousal of Ii and ki foHows it.This is indeed Yulgok's posidon throughout the debate with Ugye. Yulgok saysthat the reason for refusing the latter phrase is that it ascribes some acdve sense toIi itself He thinks that this ascripdon of movabüity to Ii eventuaHy impHes that Ii

10 Apart from tiiese translations, Jin (1987, 351 f.) prefers to translate it as em ana te/emanation .There is also anotiier question whether die same translation is applicable to all the places of bal iïi(P1)-(P6). For this problem with the translation of the word, see Yoo (2011), 37-39. In any case, it is odd that he accepts ¿'s riding for some reason and refuses ¿'s arousing asbeing active because both phrases may be equally read to have an active connotation. The onlyway to sort out diis seeming inconsistency is to interpret ¿'s dding as somehow having aninactive connotation: that is, riding here does not mean a man on the ground climbing onto a

horse, but a m an who is already sitting on a horse. In the latter case, the man and the horse do notnecessadly involve any pdodty in time, but coexist side by side. This is a possible interpretation,




and ki can be prior or posterior to each other in time.'^ This is unacceptable toYulgok because, according to the Chung-Chu tradifion of Neo-Confucianism bywhich he abides, ¿is neither subject to change nor can it be involved in tim e.

On the other hand, Yiügok's interpretafion of T'oegye's bal as arousal doesnot quite show why T'oegye endeavors to distinguish the Four from the Seven byexplaining them in terms of i and ki, respecfively. In fact, the consequence thatresults from T'oegye's view is better understood, if we translate the balzs originor source . According to dus translation, the Four and the Seven are under-stood as having different origins. If this is the case, then T'oegye can have a soHd

ground for claiming that, although both the Four and the Seven are surely feeHngs,they are mutuaüy exclusive.

If so, what is it that makes them different from each other? According to theNeo-Confucian idea, i has the moral characterisfic of pure goodness, whereas ki

can be both good and evü. The Four are good since they originate from Ii . Incontrast, the Seven are both good and evü since they originate from ki. Inconsequence, au of the Four are good, whereas some of the Seven are good andothers bad. Of course, if T'oegye maintained that the Four were good because of// and the Seven bad because of ki, then this problem wovild not arise. However,

he undoubtedly aüows that some of the Seven are good. Thus, there arises aproblem of how to disfinguish the goodness of all the Four Beginnings from thegoodness oí some of the Seven Feelings.

'2 TKYU 421-422 , But, since the theory that Ii arouses and ki follows it implies the priorityand posteriority [in time], how come this will not damage [the theory of] Ii? ... to say that [something] is aroused from Ii is the same as to say that nature is aroused and becom es afeeling, bu t if we say that Ii arouses and ki follows it means that ki does not interrupt at thebeginning of the arousal, but follows // after it arouses, how can it be true? (The words in bracketsare m ine.)13 See TKYU 413, 420, 478-479 etc. Once again, this is Yulgok's understanding of T'oegye's useof // but I am inclined to diink that his understanding is mistaken. As seen, T'oegye claims that dieFour and the Seven Feelings can be divided into two different categories and explained in terms of// and ki , whereas Kobong claims that they must not be. It seems to me that the reason for theirmaking such contrary claims, despite the fact that diey share many of Zhu Xi's views, is thatT'oegye's division of the Four and the Seven in terms of i and ki is conceptual, whereas Kob ongas well as Ytilgok construe him to have an actual division in mind. Again, T'oegye's separation ofthe Four from the Seven or i from ki is conceptual in the sense that it is a separation in tiiought,but n ot in reality. For a detailed discussion of diis point, see Yoo (2011), 46-52 .I * It is, however, to be noted that Yulgok thinks of T'oegye's bains 'arousal' or 'movement' rather

than as 'origin.'15 Chung (1995, 70) righdy states tiiat T'oegye gave a more positive view of die Seven Em otions,



Yoo: Is Yulgok s Theory of Mind Consistent? 153

Yulgok's crificism is that, if that is die case, then there are two sources and,

also, two types of the goodness of human nature . He thinks that the Four and the

Seven are not two different sorts of feeHngs. ̂ For Yulgok, the Seven refer to au

the human feeHngs irrespecfive of whether they are good or evü. The Four refer

only to good feeHngs among them.'^ Of course, this idea is closely related to his

understanding of the relafionship between ti and ki. He claims that ti and ki can

never be separated from each other and that they are always combined with each

other. Elsewhere, Yulgok expresses this mysterious characterisfic of ti and ki as

the eccentric composite of ti and ki MMÍ.Í&. Although he does not admit

T'oegye's ascripfion of movabüity to ti or of its separability from ki, he neverdenies its existence as someth ing distinguishable from ki.

3 TH CHARCTERISTICS OF T H E M IN D

By referring to one of his letters to T'oegy e, enfitled Sadan ch itchöng sot (The Fo ur-

Seven thesis), in which K ob on g states that Although the human mind and the

moral mind can be spoken of in this way, the Four and the Seven cannot be

spoken of in this way, '^ Ugye says to Yulgok that It seems to me that if the

human mind and the moral mind can be spoken of in this way, then the Four andthe Seven can be spoken of in this way, t o o . ' ' The first thing to do in order to

understand his remarks is to understand the phrase in this way. According to

K o b o n g , he means to say that, althou gh the relafion between the moral mind and

die human mind can be contrasted as the contrast between pure /z and ''die

composite of ti and ki, the relafion between the Four and the Seven cannot be

unders tood in this way.^° Thus, in this wa y refers to the contrast between pure

/ / ' and the composite of // and ki. The main po int of the disagreement between

Ugye and K o b o n g is that the former idenfifies the Seven with the htiman mind,

whereas the latter does not.^' The above quesfion raised by Ugye is the starting

IS See TKYU, 526-532.

1' riCYU, 420, 424-^25.

18 TXYU, 146-147, 412.

1' TKYU, 412. T'oegye did not say anything about this matter in his debate with Kobong, and so

this is Ugye's original claim.

TKYU, 146-147.

21 In fact, in his first letter to Yulgok, Ugye agrees with Kobong by saying that it is all right to say

that the moral mind 'is' the Four, but it is not right to say that the human mind 'is' the Seven

{TKYU, 402). However, it must be a simple mistake. Is in the above qubtadon should beunderstood as an idendficadon of some sort, that is, most presumably, an idendficadon of their



Yoo: Is . Yulgok s Theory of Mind Consistent? 155

the mind in that the human mind does not include the moral mind. That is,

although the hximan mind is said to have the same characteristics as physical

nature and the Seven, it does not include its counterpart, i.e. the moral mind.From this perspective, Yulgok concludes that the relationship between the moral

mind and the hum an m ind is different from that between the Four and the Sevenand, also, from that between the original nature and the physical nature.

Let us now consider Yulgok's explanation of the Four and the Seven in terms

of li and ki. T'oegye states that the Seven originate from the com posite of li and ki,

whereas the F our originate from // alone. Based on this ontological ground, he can

claim that the Four are always good because they have their origin in li whereasthe Seven are either good or evü because they have their origin in the com posite

of // and ki. However, for Yiügok, the F our are included in the Seven and refer to

the good feeHngs in them, which originate from the composite of // and ki. Thus,

neither the Seven nor the Four originate from li alone. This is different fromT'oegye's view.

As seen above, T'oegye describes the Seven as originating from ki alone and,

consequently, faces the difficulty of reconciling the goodness of the Four and thatof the Seven. However, this is not a problem for Yulgok. He understands that,

since the Seven originate from the com posite of both li and ki, they include notonly the goodness but also the evilness of the feelings. Moreover, since the four

are the names that refer to the good feeHngs of the 'Seven feelings,' we can

conclude that the rest of the Seven that remain are evü. The same sort of account

is given in the case of nature , which is also divided into the original nature and the

physical nature. Yulgok thinks that the original nature has the characteristics of li

in the physical nature. This is to say that the original nature refers to the aspect of

li orüy in the physical nature which refers to the com posite of the com posite of li

and ki.^^ Just as the Four are said to be parts of the Seven, the original nature

refers to some part of the physical nature.^^

Although this Hne of reasoning sounds vaHd, it does not apply to the case of

the mind. That is, although the moral mind is said to have the moral characteristic

of goodness, it is not the case tha t it refers to the aspect of // only. Yulgok oftenemphasizes the necessity of the presence of both li and ki in the arousal of the

mind. In any case, it is clear that the mind cannot be aroused in the absence of

either li or ki. A ccording to Yiügok, the moral mind is described as referring principaHy to //' and the human mind as referring principaHy to ki. Such

expressions as principaHy to //' and principaHy to /èz suggest that, althoughboth types of the mind are aroused in the composite of // and ki, the moral mind

TKYU, 487-488.



156 Acta Koreana Vol 15 No. 1 2012

has the characteristic of Ii whereas the human mind has the characterisdc of ki .

This is surely different from the case of the Seven that include the Four, or from

the case of the physical nature that includes the original nature. Since the moral

mind and the human mind do not have any common characterisdcs or properdes,

we have to say that they are mutuaHy exclusive of each other. However, as noted

repeatedly, Yulgok never says that the two types of the mind can be aroused in Ii

or ki alone. On the contrary, he keeps emphasizing that they are always aroused

in the composite of them.

4. A SINGLE ORIGIN OF TH E M IND

In his first letter to Yulgok, Ugye writes that, since the mo ral min d is derived from

the correctness of Heaven and destiny, and the human mind from the personal

orientadon of the physical form, it is au right to explain the Four and the Seven in

terms of Ii and ki respecdvely. One might legitimately take him to be suggesting

that the correctness of Heav en and destiny and the personal orientadon of the

physical form are two different sources of the m ind. M oreo ver, he seems to

idendfy the former with i and the latter with ki . Indeed, he explains the two types

of the m ind in term s of // and ki in a number of passages.^^ However, Yulgokconsistendy insists that they are not derived from two different sources, but from

one and the same source, i.e. from the composite of Ii and ki . This insistence is

based on his beHef that Ii and ki are inseparable from each other.^' In a simüar

vein, he talks of ki as that which arouses and Ii as tha t w hereby it is aroused.^

Granting that whatever moves involves its principle whereby it is moved, his

remarks might be taken to mean that there cannot be i without ki or ki without Ii.

This close connecdon or the inseparabüity between Ii and ki enables Yulgok

to claim the mutual reladonship of the moral mind and the human mind. He

states as foHows:

What is the meaning of the remark that the human mind and the moralmind are related to each other as beginning and end? Now, even thoughman's mind originates from the correctness of Heaven and destiny,sometimes it does not conform to it, but becomes infused with selfishintendons: this is the case of beginning with the moral mind and endingwith the human mind. [However,] somedmes man's mind which originatesfrom the personal orientadon of the physical form, but which does not goagainst the right // s not different from the moral mind. The case in which

2 8 TKYU, 481-484. Cf Chung 2011), 97-98.

2 9 Cf. Chung 1995), 90-91 .



Y o o I s Yu lgok ' s Theory o f Mind Cons i s t en t? 157

it [man's mind] goes against the right I i , but recognizes its mistake and doesnot foüow the selfish deskes is a case of beginning with the htiman mindand ending with the moral mind.^'

Yiügok thinks that the moral mind can become the human mind and, also, the

human mind can become the moral mind. This suggests that the two types of the

mind are not two different entities, but two different names for one and the same

enfity. If he conceived, as Ugye did, that the moral mind and the human mind

were derived from two different sources, he would not be able to claim thek

mutual reladonship. For to say that the moral mind is derived from i and that the

human mind is derived from k i is to say that, by definition, they do not share any

common properfies. Again, since in general I i refers to som ething non-physical

and k i to something physical, there is no bridge to connect them, as is the case in

the Cartesian understanding of soul and body. Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible,

in such a case to think of the way in which the two t5^es of the mind can become

each other. On the contrary, Yulgok's theory of thek mutual relationship on the

basis of the inseparabüity of i and k i appears sound and consistent.

However, Yulgok's idenüficafion of the two types of the mind with those of

feeHngs and, also, w ith tho se of na ture raises a difficult pr ob lem for his theo ry of

mind. When he idenfifies the Four with the moral mind and the Seven with thecomposite of the moral mind and the human mind,^^ it is not immediately clear

what this identificadon is about. We can be sure that it is not meant to claim the

Hteral identification of the mind with feelings because he expHcidy distinguishes

thek functions as psychological factors. Rather, considering his frequent mention

of such factors in term s of // an d /o r k i , he might be intending to compare thek

origins and also thek moral characters. We have seen that Yulgok admits that the

Seven include the Four and that the original nature includes the physical nature,

but denies that the moral mind includes the human mind. He claims this because

he thinks that the two types of feeHngs and those of nature have thek originsrespectively in pure I i or the com posite of I i and k i . In particular, it is to be noted

that, when the Four and the original nature are said to be derived from pure //, the

existence of k i is not presupposed at au. On the contrary, when the two types of

the m ind are said to refer princip aüy to /z or princip aüy to k i , they presuppose

the' existence of the com posite of b oth I i and k i in thek arousal. If so, can we

accept his idendficadon of the Four and the original nature with the moral mind?

TiCyU, 405; 407-408.TKYU, 404.



158 Arta oreana Vol 15 No. 1 2012

I once though t that his idenfificafion of the Seven with the com posite of themoral tnind and the human mind was inappropriate.''^ At the fime, as opposed toYulgok's claim, I thought that, since the Seven and the human mind had themoral characterisfics of goodness as weü as evüness, the former should beidenfified with the latter, not with the composite of the latter and the moral mind.From this, I also thought that, since Yiügok denied that the hum an m ind includedthe moral mind, but admitted that the moral mind was good, he would beunderstood as claiming that the human mind was evü. If so, the two m inds whichwere defined as having contrary properfies would not have the mutual relafion-

ship of becoming each other as beginning and end. Therefore, I reached theconclusion that Yulgok's theory of mind was inconsistent.

How ever, I was wrong at the time in thinking that the hum an mind is only evü.If both li and ki are presupposed in the arousal of the moral mind as weü as thehuman mind, both of them must have the moral characterisfics of goodness asweü as evilness. In this case, there is no problem at au with Yvdgok's claim thatthe two types of the mind can become each other as beginning and end.^'* Again,since the two types of the mind are merely names for the actual manifestafions ofthe mind, they neither refer to their different origins nor to different moral

characterisfics. In consequence, Yulgok's theory of mind is not inconsistent in thismatter.

How ever, I stul think that his theory is inconsistent, bu t for a different reason.In fact, I am now inclined to think that his idenfificafion of the m oral mind withthe Four cannot be accepted. For, as opposed to the Seven, which include theFour, the human mind does not include the moral mind. The thing is that, if themoral mind is always aroused in the composite of li and ki and so their presencemust be presupp osed , we cannot say that it has the characterisfic of // or goodnessonly. In fact, for Yulgok the moral value of the mind is not determined until it isactuaüy aroused. This impHes that its moral value is not rooted in its origins such

as li or ki but it is evaluated and named after it is actuaüy aroused in pracfice andput under observafion. Indeed, Yulgok's theory that the moral mind and thehuman mind can become each other supports this Hne of interpretafion. The samesort of account can be given of the human mind. That is, the moral value of thehuman mind is not fixed in advance because of its origin, but determined after itis actuaüy aroused in pracfice. In odier words, they do not have any fixed moralvalue of goodness or evüness. Once again, the moral values of the moral mindand the human mind are not fixed, but fiexible. In other words, we cannot saythat they are dependent on their origins because they do n ot have different origins

33 Yoo (2011), 76-77 .




but one and the same origin. That is, both of them originate from the compositeof // and ki Therefore, we can now conclude that the moral mind cannot beidendfied with or, rather, referred to, as the Four.

Again, it is inappropriate for Yulgok to idendfy the Four with the moral mind.And it seems to me that the only way for him to sort out the impHcit problemwith this idendficadon is to give up the idea that the moral mind and the Fourhave the same sort of moral characterisdc of goodness. Otherwise, he unwillinglyhas to accept the view that the moral mind refers to the good part of the humanmind as in the cases of the Four-Seven feeHngs or the original-physical nature. In

fact, if one were to be consistent with the two views that the moral mind wasderived from li and that it had the moral characterisdc of goodness, one wouldhave to hold them together. Since Yulgok has never claimed the former view, aHhe has to do is to give up the latter view. In sum the problem that he nowconfronts has been raised because he rejects the former and admits the latter, butthe two views must be held together, not separately.

If despite aH the andcipated problems, one desperately wants to maintain theidendficadon of the m oral mind with the Four, one has to accept Ugye s view thatthe reladonship between the moral mind and the human mind is the same as that

between the Four and the Seven, or between the original nature and the physicalnature. For Ugye, the moral m ind, the Four, and the original nature share thesame moral characterisdcs, as the human mind, the Seven, and the physical naturedo. Moreover, he admits that the latter psychological factors include the formerones. However, as stated above, for Yulgok since the moral mind is derived fromthe composite of both li and ki and since it is not included in the human mind,^^it cannot be said to share the same moral characterisdcs with the Four as weH asthe original nature.

5. C O N C L U D I N G R EM A RK S

In this ard de , I have tried to evaluate the consistency of Yulgok s theory of mindby examining his idendficadon of the m oral characterisdcs of the m oral mind withthose of the Four. As mendoned, this idendfication is not to claim that the moralmind refers to the same psychological factor as the Four, but that they share thesame moral characterisdc of goodness which has its origin in li We haveconcluded that his idendficadon is inappropriate and that he should give it up inorder to maintain his theory of mind to be consistent as whole.

35 Moreover, the m oral mind is no t a name for a psychological activity that originally has acharacteristic of goodness, but a name for, some phenomenon that is found to have such a



160 Acta oreana Vol 15 No. 1 2012

Indeed, there seems to be a merit that can be obtained from giving up the

identification. We have briefiy stated earHer that the mind is said to cover the

unaroused state of nature as weH as the aroused state of feeHngs or deHberadon.

Since an unaroused state, i.e. a state before confronting external objects, is good,

whereas an aroused state, i.e. a state after confronting external objects, is either

good or evil, the mind must have the moral characteristics of goodness as weH as

evilness. It is not clear whether the mind here refers to the moral mind or the

human mind. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that i t has to have both of the moral

characteristics. Thus, Yulgok's characterization of the moral mind as pure

goo dne ss w itho ut any evilness confHcts with his thesis that the mind com m and snatu re, feelings, and deHberation. In cons eque nce, the suggestion to give up th e

identification of the moral mind with the Four also helps his theory of the mind

to be consistent. Although there seems to be this much merit, we stiH have to wait

for another occasion to see whether there are any other consequences that wiH

resvüt from giving up the identification. Indeed, there remain such questions, most

im porta ndy , as to wh ethe r and h ow far it wiH im pro ve or dam age his theory as a

whole.

Submitted: 5 March, 2012Sent for revision: 26 Apdl, 2012Accepted: 2 May, 2012

W E O N - K I Y O U (phü[email protected]) is a professor in the department of




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