iran and the bomb - strategic considerations in the middle east - j.e. (jennifer) dyer
DESCRIPTION
Iran and the Bomb Iran is very close to the point of achieving “breakout”: enriching uranium to weapons-grade purity, and demonstrating the capability to detonate a nuclear warhead. In each of the elements of a nuclear weapon – fissile material, warhead, and delivery system – Iran has made substantial progress in the last decade. That progress has accelerated since the first UN sanctions were imposed in 2007. Today, we have reached the critical point at which Iran’s next decision will be the decision to “break out”: begin enriching uranium to the highest, weapons-grade purity. By some calculations, Iran has enough uranium already enriched to a lower level for at least one bomb, and possibly two. Iran is almost ready, as well, to start up her 40-megawatt plutonium reactor at Arak, which would be a source of 1-2 bombs’ worth of plutonium per year. She is pursuing both the uranium and plutonium paths to a nuclear weapon. Iran performed warhead-related experiments as far back as 2002-2003. She has also improved her missile capability, and today can reach Southeastern Europe and Israel with nuclear-capable missiles. There are strong indications that Iran is developing ICBMs; U.S. intelligence believes Iran will be able to test an ICBM by 2015. Beyond that, Iran is constructing a missile silo complex in the northwestern tip of Venezuela, from which her currently available, nuclear-capable missiles could reach Florida and part of Georgia. Meanwhile, the likelihood that Iran will continue to engage in deception, in order to play for time, has only grown with the inauguration of Hassan Rouhani as the new president. Rouhani has boasted of the successful deceptions he perpetrated on the IAEA and European nations in the mid-2000s, when he was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator. Assuming there will be no military attack by the United States, what events might require Israel to mount a preemptive attack? Three to consider are an impending warhead test in Iran, the impending start-up of the plutonium reactor at Arak, and the impending operational deployment of the Russian S-300PMU2 air defense system, which would significantly change the anti-air threat posed by Iran. The geopolitical consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran cannot be overstated. Other nations in the region (like Saudi Arabia, and possibly Egypt and Turkey) will want to acquire nuclear weapons for deterrence. Nuclear material and the requisite weapons technology are now widely available. But a nuclear Iran would also be able to wage proxy wars – e.g., through Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations supported by Tehran – with even more immunity than Iran has today. Moreover, disarray in the NATO approach to missile defense, caused in large part by the Obama administration’s cancellation of missile-defense plans, will be exacerbated by the growing Iranian threat.TRANSCRIPT
Iran and
the BombJ.E. Dyer
For Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors
18 November 2013
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
Delivery system
Warhead device
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
Enough HEU (U-235) for a warhead test PressTV image
Natanz Natanz + Fordo
Natanz + Fordo + ?
10,357kg LEU (3.5%)
196kg “MEU” (19.75%)
?? Kg HEU (93.5%)
IAEA report: Figures as of 5 November 2013
180-
240k
g
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
Natanz + Fordo
Natanz + Fordo + ?
196kg “MEU” (19.75%)
?? Kg HEU (93.5%)
IAEA report: Figures as of 5 November 2013
“2 weeks from decision to break-out”Reuters image
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
“2 weeks from decision to break-out”Reuters image
Newer centrifuges = dramatic acceleration
IAEA report: near-suspension of installations 14 November 2013
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
Mainstream media conclusion:
Iranians making “concessions” to further negotiationsWorst case:
The “move after next” will be the breakout decision
Test the new centrifuges
Proceed to high enrichment
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Fissile material
Plutonium-239 from IR-40 heavy-water reactor
“Fat man” type bomb
1-2 bombs’ worth of P-239 per year
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Warhead device
Suspected detonator testing sites
U.S., Western intelligence
Credible Iranian sources
* Sites razed, “sanitized”
Lavizan-Shian *
Parchin *
Najafabad?
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Warhead device
IAEA concerns: “Possible military dimensions”
Nuclear explosive device:
Procurement
Design
Component testing – Detonator development/testing
Timeframe: 2002-2003
18 November 2011
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Warhead device
The North Korea connection 18 November 2011
2011 – Reports of NK nuclear scientists in Iran 2002-07
2010 – NK uranium bomb warhead tests?
2013 – Head of Iranian nuke program in NK for third warhead test (RAND: probable uranium bomb test)
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Delivery system
IAEA: “Possible military dimensions”18 November 2011
Nuclear payload for Shahab missile:
Engineering studies
Prototype components manufactured
Fuzing/arming/firing system
Timeframe: 2002-2003
Three components of a nuclear weapon:
Delivery system
UK Intel: Iran tested nuke-capable MRBMs 29 June 2011
Secret testing:
Solid-fuel Sejjil: 800km
Shahab, Sejjil tests to 2,000km
US surv. present but no US reporting
Timeframe: 2010-2011
CRS Report dated 6 December 2012
Threat radius: 2,000km
Threat radius: 2,000km
Silo site:Paraguana Peninsula Reported December 2010
Tabriz
Khorramabad
Semnan?
Underground missile silo sites
Shahrud
New ICBM testing site Reported August 2013
Semnan Rocket Complex
Expanded in 2009-10 with North Korean assistance
Extending range of Iranian missiles
Additional considerations
Iranian deception
Delayed IAEA recognition
Trigger points for Israeli strike
Regional reaction
Deception: Hassan Rouhani
2003 agreement with EU-3
Violated immediately and continuously
Rouhani boasted of it
“We did not stop [the enrichment as agreed with the EU-3], we completed the program!”
How far behind was IAEA?
Graphic: Institute for Science and International Security (Nov 2009)
How far behind was IAEA?
Aug-Dec 05
Rouhani totals 2005(Installed)
Operational centrifuges
ShahrudSemnan Rocket Complex
Tunnels, underground facilities
. Qom (Fordo)
Najafabad?
Trigger points for Israeli strikeImpending warhead test
Arak reactor start-up
Similar to Osirak 1981
Installation of S-300 air defense system
IRIAF air base
SA-5
Hawk
HQ-2
S-300 changes the game
Regional reaction
The nuclear picture
Regional reaction
??
? ??
The nuclear discussion
Missile defense
Regional reaction
The nuclear discussion
Missile defense
Regional reaction
The nuclear discussion
Missile defense
Meaning/purpose of NATO
Would have deployed in 2013
Regional reaction
The nuclear discussion
Missile defense
Meaning/purpose of NATO
Mobile interceptors in design – 2017?
Deployments to Romania, Bulgaria?
US Army cancels MEADS-Patriot follow-on
Turkey ambivalent – turns to China for air defense system?
Regional reaction
Proxy wars
Iran offered “missile umbrella” in 2011
“Extended deterrence”
During the Cold War, worked better against United States than against Soviet Union
The game will change
We can pay now…
… or we can pay later.
Iran and
the BombJ.E. Dyer
For Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors
18 November 2013
This slide left blank
End of presentation
S-300 changes the game
Tabriz
Dezful
Esfahan
Hamadan
Mehrabad
Tehran
Natanz
Arak
Bushehr
Iran Air Bases and Fixed-Site SAM Coverage
CIA map/Author graphic depictions
IRIAF air base
SA-5
Hawk
HQ-2
Iran Air Bases and Fixed-Site SAM Coverage
CIA map/Author graphic depictions
IRIAF air base
SA-5
Hawk
HQ-2
IRIAF air base
SA-5
Hawk
HQ-2