iran and the bomb - strategic considerations in the middle east - j.e. (jennifer) dyer

36
Iran and the Bomb J.E. Dyer For Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors 18 November 2013

Upload: cjhs

Post on 20-Jan-2015

366 views

Category:

News & Politics


1 download

DESCRIPTION

Iran and the Bomb Iran is very close to the point of achieving “breakout”: enriching uranium to weapons-grade purity, and demonstrating the capability to detonate a nuclear warhead. In each of the elements of a nuclear weapon – fissile material, warhead, and delivery system – Iran has made substantial progress in the last decade. That progress has accelerated since the first UN sanctions were imposed in 2007. Today, we have reached the critical point at which Iran’s next decision will be the decision to “break out”: begin enriching uranium to the highest, weapons-grade purity. By some calculations, Iran has enough uranium already enriched to a lower level for at least one bomb, and possibly two. Iran is almost ready, as well, to start up her 40-megawatt plutonium reactor at Arak, which would be a source of 1-2 bombs’ worth of plutonium per year. She is pursuing both the uranium and plutonium paths to a nuclear weapon. Iran performed warhead-related experiments as far back as 2002-2003. She has also improved her missile capability, and today can reach Southeastern Europe and Israel with nuclear-capable missiles. There are strong indications that Iran is developing ICBMs; U.S. intelligence believes Iran will be able to test an ICBM by 2015. Beyond that, Iran is constructing a missile silo complex in the northwestern tip of Venezuela, from which her currently available, nuclear-capable missiles could reach Florida and part of Georgia. Meanwhile, the likelihood that Iran will continue to engage in deception, in order to play for time, has only grown with the inauguration of Hassan Rouhani as the new president. Rouhani has boasted of the successful deceptions he perpetrated on the IAEA and European nations in the mid-2000s, when he was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator. Assuming there will be no military attack by the United States, what events might require Israel to mount a preemptive attack? Three to consider are an impending warhead test in Iran, the impending start-up of the plutonium reactor at Arak, and the impending operational deployment of the Russian S-300PMU2 air defense system, which would significantly change the anti-air threat posed by Iran. The geopolitical consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran cannot be overstated. Other nations in the region (like Saudi Arabia, and possibly Egypt and Turkey) will want to acquire nuclear weapons for deterrence. Nuclear material and the requisite weapons technology are now widely available. But a nuclear Iran would also be able to wage proxy wars – e.g., through Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations supported by Tehran – with even more immunity than Iran has today. Moreover, disarray in the NATO approach to missile defense, caused in large part by the Obama administration’s cancellation of missile-defense plans, will be exacerbated by the growing Iranian threat.

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Iran and

the BombJ.E. Dyer

For Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors

18 November 2013

Page 2: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Fissile material

Delivery system

Warhead device

Page 3: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Fissile material

Enough HEU (U-235) for a warhead test PressTV image

Natanz Natanz + Fordo

Natanz + Fordo + ?

10,357kg LEU (3.5%)

196kg “MEU” (19.75%)

?? Kg HEU (93.5%)

IAEA report: Figures as of 5 November 2013

180-

240k

g

Page 4: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Fissile material

Natanz + Fordo

Natanz + Fordo + ?

196kg “MEU” (19.75%)

?? Kg HEU (93.5%)

IAEA report: Figures as of 5 November 2013

“2 weeks from decision to break-out”Reuters image

Page 5: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Fissile material

“2 weeks from decision to break-out”Reuters image

Newer centrifuges = dramatic acceleration

IAEA report: near-suspension of installations 14 November 2013

Page 6: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Fissile material

Mainstream media conclusion:

Iranians making “concessions” to further negotiationsWorst case:

The “move after next” will be the breakout decision

Test the new centrifuges

Proceed to high enrichment

Page 7: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Fissile material

Plutonium-239 from IR-40 heavy-water reactor

“Fat man” type bomb

1-2 bombs’ worth of P-239 per year

Page 8: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Warhead device

Suspected detonator testing sites

U.S., Western intelligence

Credible Iranian sources

* Sites razed, “sanitized”

Lavizan-Shian *

Parchin *

Najafabad?

Page 9: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Warhead device

IAEA concerns: “Possible military dimensions”

Nuclear explosive device:

Procurement

Design

Component testing – Detonator development/testing

Timeframe: 2002-2003

18 November 2011

Page 10: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Warhead device

The North Korea connection 18 November 2011

2011 – Reports of NK nuclear scientists in Iran 2002-07

2010 – NK uranium bomb warhead tests?

2013 – Head of Iranian nuke program in NK for third warhead test (RAND: probable uranium bomb test)

Page 11: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Delivery system

IAEA: “Possible military dimensions”18 November 2011

Nuclear payload for Shahab missile:

Engineering studies

Prototype components manufactured

Fuzing/arming/firing system

Timeframe: 2002-2003

Page 12: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Three components of a nuclear weapon:

Delivery system

UK Intel: Iran tested nuke-capable MRBMs 29 June 2011

Secret testing:

Solid-fuel Sejjil: 800km

Shahab, Sejjil tests to 2,000km

US surv. present but no US reporting

Timeframe: 2010-2011

CRS Report dated 6 December 2012

Page 13: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Threat radius: 2,000km

Page 14: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Threat radius: 2,000km

Silo site:Paraguana Peninsula Reported December 2010

Page 15: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Tabriz

Khorramabad

Semnan?

Underground missile silo sites

Page 16: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Shahrud

New ICBM testing site Reported August 2013

Semnan Rocket Complex

Expanded in 2009-10 with North Korean assistance

Extending range of Iranian missiles

Page 17: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Additional considerations

Iranian deception

Delayed IAEA recognition

Trigger points for Israeli strike

Regional reaction

Page 18: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Deception: Hassan Rouhani

2003 agreement with EU-3

Violated immediately and continuously

Rouhani boasted of it

“We did not stop [the enrichment as agreed with the EU-3], we completed the program!”

Page 19: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

How far behind was IAEA?

Graphic: Institute for Science and International Security (Nov 2009)

Page 20: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

How far behind was IAEA?

Aug-Dec 05

Rouhani totals 2005(Installed)

Operational centrifuges

Page 21: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

ShahrudSemnan Rocket Complex

Tunnels, underground facilities

. Qom (Fordo)

Najafabad?

Page 22: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Trigger points for Israeli strikeImpending warhead test

Arak reactor start-up

Similar to Osirak 1981

Installation of S-300 air defense system

Page 23: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

IRIAF air base

SA-5

Hawk

HQ-2

S-300 changes the game

Page 24: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Regional reaction

The nuclear picture

Page 25: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Regional reaction

??

? ??

The nuclear discussion

Missile defense

Page 26: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Regional reaction

The nuclear discussion

Missile defense

Page 27: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Regional reaction

The nuclear discussion

Missile defense

Meaning/purpose of NATO

Would have deployed in 2013

Page 28: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Regional reaction

The nuclear discussion

Missile defense

Meaning/purpose of NATO

Mobile interceptors in design – 2017?

Deployments to Romania, Bulgaria?

US Army cancels MEADS-Patriot follow-on

Turkey ambivalent – turns to China for air defense system?

Page 29: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Regional reaction

Proxy wars

Iran offered “missile umbrella” in 2011

“Extended deterrence”

During the Cold War, worked better against United States than against Soviet Union

Page 30: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

The game will change

We can pay now…

… or we can pay later.

Page 31: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Iran and

the BombJ.E. Dyer

For Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors

18 November 2013

Page 32: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

This slide left blank

End of presentation

Page 33: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

S-300 changes the game

Page 34: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Tabriz

Dezful

Esfahan

Hamadan

Mehrabad

Tehran

Natanz

Arak

Bushehr

Iran Air Bases and Fixed-Site SAM Coverage

CIA map/Author graphic depictions

IRIAF air base

SA-5

Hawk

HQ-2

Page 35: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

Iran Air Bases and Fixed-Site SAM Coverage

CIA map/Author graphic depictions

IRIAF air base

SA-5

Hawk

HQ-2

Page 36: Iran and the Bomb -  Strategic Considerations in the MIddle East - J.E. (Jennifer) Dyer

IRIAF air base

SA-5

Hawk

HQ-2