investigation and review of human elephant conflict in the bardia – katarniaghat corridor, nepal

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Human Elephant Conflict WWF Nepal Program 1 Michael Cordingley Level 2 - Undergraduate Wildlife Conservation B.Sc (Hons) Liverpool John Moores University England Email: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Tel: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx WWF Nepal Program PO Box: 7760, Baluwatar Kathmandu, Nepal Tel: 997-(1)-4434820, 4434970, 4410942 Fax: 997-(1)-4438148 Email: [email protected] www.wwfnepal.org Investigation and review of Human Elephant Conflict in the Bardia Katarniaghat Corridor, Nepal

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Page 1: Investigation and review of Human Elephant Conflict in the Bardia – Katarniaghat Corridor, Nepal

Human Elephant Conflict

WWF Nepal Program 1

Michael Cordingley

Level 2 - Undergraduate

Wildlife Conservation B.Sc (Hons)

Liverpool John Moores University

England

Email: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Tel: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

WWF Nepal Program

PO Box: 7760, Baluwatar

Kathmandu, Nepal

Tel: 997-(1)-4434820, 4434970, 4410942

Fax: 997-(1)-4438148

Email: [email protected]

www.wwfnepal.org

Investigation and review of Human Elephant Conflict in the Bardia

– Katarniaghat Corridor, Nepal

Page 2: Investigation and review of Human Elephant Conflict in the Bardia – Katarniaghat Corridor, Nepal

Human Elephant Conflict

WWF Nepal Program 2

Contents

Cover sheet - - - - - - - - Page 1

Contents page - - - - - - - - Page 2

Abbreviations and Acronyms - - - - - - Page 2

Introduction - - - - - - - - Page 3

Background - - - - - - - - Page(s) 3 - 4

Study Site - - - - - - - - Page(s) 4 - 6

Occurrence of HEC - - - - - - - Page(s) 7 - 13

Dirty Mapping of HEC in the Khata Corridor - - - - Page(s) 14 – 18

Enumeration of HEC - - - - - - - Page(s) 19 – 21

Traditional Means of Conflict Alleviation within the Khata Corridor - - Page(s) 22 - 24

Refining Traditional Conflict Alleviation Techniques - - - - Page(s) 25 - 30

Final Thought - - - - - - - - Page 31

References - - - - - - - - Page 32

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfESG - African Elephant Specialist Group

AsESG - Asian Elephant Specialist Group

AREAS - Asian Rhino and Elephant Action Strategy

BCP - Bardia Conservation Program (Formally the KMTNC)

BDS - Business Development Service

BICP - Bardia Integrated Conservation Program

BNP - Bardia National Park

BZ - Buffer Zone

BZMC - Buffer Zone Management Committee

CFCC - Community Forest Coordination Committee

CFUG - Community Forest User Group

CPR - Common Pool Resource

DDC - District Development Committee

EPDT - Elephant Pepper Development Trust

HEC - Human Elephant Conflict

HQ - Headquarters

HWC - Human Wildlife Conflict

ITCZ - Inter Tropical Convergence Zone

IUCN - International Conservation Union

KMTNC- King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation

KWS - Katarniaghat Wildlife Sanctuary

NP - National Park

NTFP - Non-Timber Forest Products

PAC - Problem Animal Control

PPP - Parks and People Program

SES - Scientific Exploration Society

TAL - Terai Arc Landscape

UC - User Committee

VDC - Village Development Committee

WCS - Wildlife Conservation Society

WWF - World Wide Fund for Nature

Page 3: Investigation and review of Human Elephant Conflict in the Bardia – Katarniaghat Corridor, Nepal

Human Elephant Conflict

WWF Nepal Program 3

Introduction

Human Elephant Conflict (HEC) is increasing with the increasing conversion of elephant habitat

for human use. This increased conflict is becoming a major stumbling block in the conservation

of elephants (IUCN). It is important to understand that as long as humans and elephants share the

same landscape, HEC can never be eliminated, only reduced. Elephants tend to have large home

ranges with traditional migration routes. When these are reduced and disrupted by encroachment,

elephants lose their ability to move with seasonal rains to seasonal feeding grounds, resulting in

pocketed herds, which some experts believe raid crops out of necessity for survival and that herds

living in areas with sufficient natural resources will not raid crops even if they had the chance to

do so. Furthermore, if forest fragmentation continues, resident elephants become squeezed into an

ever decreasing forest patch, thereby increasing their density beyond the carry capacity, placing

strain on the available resources (Chong & Norwana, 2005). If there are insufficient natural

resources and elephants are dependant on raiding, then no matter what types, or combinations, of

mitigation measures are employed they will, being intelligent and resourceful animals, overcome

these mitigation measures, so purely passive (short-term) protection will not work (Nelson et al,

2003). If a lasting solution is to be found habitat loss (Montanye, 2003), as the underlying cause

of HEC, (Desai 2002) must be addressed, and long-term measures taken to reconnect degraded

habitat to a suitable tract of forest. It is only when there exists an alternative to crop raiding that

the mitigation measures will be effective (Chong & Norwana, 2005).

This report aims to investigate the significance of HEC within the Khata corridor that links

Bardia National Park in Nepal to the Katarniaghat Wildlife Reserve in India. To achieve this it

aims to review the current HEC alleviation and mitigation efforts, offering possible combinations

of methods for refining traditional alleviation techniques. From secondary data, the report hopes

to draw on any patters of HEC within the corridor, highlighting any trends of when incidents

occur and the areas most frequently and severely affected by HEC. The report draws upon

primary data obtained through interviews, secondary data from compensation and community

forest schemes and looks at methods employed in other elephant regions from around the world.

Background

The status of the elephants in Bardia National Park (BNP) witnessed an increase in population

after 1994. Formally (pre-1994) these elephants were temporary migrants to the park, spending

three to four months (June – November) in the area, before returning to India. The only 2 known

resident elephants prior to 1994 were 2 bulls, first recorded in 1987. In November of 1994 31

elephants were witnessed crossing the Kauriala River near to the village of Jagatpur. According

to locals a group of elephants (n=17) were witnessed along the banks of the Kauriala River early

one morning in November and later that day another group (n=14) were also seen crossing the

river in the same place (Velde, 1997) 1.

For many years these elephants are believed to have migrated between 4 protected areas2 making

their way along the (now unused) elephant walk of the Chure foothill forests (Byrne, 1991) taking

them from the forest of Uttar Pradesh in India, to the connecting forest of the Kanchanpur,

Kailali, and Bardia districts of Nepal. Elephants used to be seen twice a year, during June -August

as they journeyed towards BNP, and again in October – November journeying back towards the

1 Velde, P. F. 1997. Sourced from the WWF Office, Katmandu, Nepal

2 Corbett National Park (India), Dudhawa National Park (India), Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve (Nepal)

and Bardia National Park (Nepal)

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jungle in the Kanchanpur district. These routes are believed to have been used for the last time in

1994, due to increasing degradation elephants experience difficulties migrating in 1994 and have

come to reside in BNP. During their migration too and from BNP, elephants rarely stopped to raid

crops, instead walking non stop, covering the distance between the Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve

and Bardia National Park in 2 days (Velde, 1997).

Bardia’s Elephant Population at the turn of the century (2000 AD)

At the turn of the century the Scientific Exploration Society (SES) carried out expeditions to gain

elephant census information for BNP. Prof. Adrian Lister, of University Collage London, has

provided valuable information on this elephant population.

In his report on the SES expedition to BNP in 2001 Lister recalls 8 male bulls that their team had

recorded in previous years, as well documenting the discovery of a further 5 bulls, and recording

1 loss. These discoveries brought the male bull population for 2001 to approximately 12. At the

time of their visit the SES estimated a minimum population of 53-59 elephants, citing Raj Kumar

as approximating the population at between 50 and 70. Lister (2001) cites Gun (naturalist) as

indicating that, on the 24th of February 1999, he saw 30 elephants at the Tiger Mountain Lodge,

while at the same time, another 30 were seen at the Tented Camp 19km away, a total of 60, Gun

believing there to be a population of 67 – 70 in total (Lister, 2001).

From these approximations Lister uses a reasonable estimator of the elephant population as being

about 70, of which (in 2001) approximately 12 were males, leaving 58 females and their young.

Studies have shown that the female herds typically comprise just fewer than 50% adult females

and just over 50% their offspring (sub-adults, juveniles and calves). In this (2001) case there were

roughly 25-30 adult females, and an adult male/female ration of 1:2 or 1:3. Since elephants do not

form pairs but the bulls mate opportunistically, this is a healthy figure (Lister 2001). The SES

sited a herd of between 20 and 25 individuals on the 7th of March 2001 which included

approximately 3 animals in the age category of 0-2 years. Since there were about 6 adult females

in this herd, this indicates a calving rate of around 1 every four years per female – the textbook

figure. A similar figure is likely from the sighting of a herd of 39 elephants with 5-6 very small

calves or young juveniles in October 2000. Given the estimate of 25-30 adult females, this again

gives a calving rate of about one calf every 4-5 years per female suggesting that the population,

though small, is reproducing healthy (Lister, 2001).

From our own field interviews with locals suffering from HEC (on the 25th of November 2006)

locals reported that a herd of approximately 22 elephants passed through their fields (Dhanaura

UC, Dhodhari VDC) in October 2006. Of this approximate 22, 4 were said to be calves or young

juveniles. Although only rough approximations of numbers these figures to some extent go

towards supporting Lister’s estimated calving rate.

Study Site

Bardia – Katarniaghat Corridor,

The Bardia – Katarniaghat Corridor, also known as the Khata corridor, is a mosaic landscape

composing primary and secondary hard wood forest, sal forest, grassland, scrubland, alluvial

marine beds, and cultivated land. It connects Bardia National Park in Nepal with the Katarniaghat

Wildlife Sanctuary (KWS) in India. The corridor is exclusively located in Nepal and is

surrounded by, and made up of, 5 VDCs: Baganaha, Dhodari, Sivpur, Suryapatuwa and

Thakurdwara. Of these VDCs Dhodhari and Suryapatuwa VDCs contain the majority of the 2

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Human Elephant Conflict

WWF Nepal Program 5

forest corridors that extend southwards from BNP into India. Flagship species like the one horned

rhinoceroses (Rhinoceros unicornis), Bengal Tiger (Panthera tigris tigris) and Asian Elephant

(Elephas maximus) are known to use this corridor to move between Bardia and Katarniaghat. Of

the 2 forest corridors, 1 runs along the eastern boundaries of these 2 VDCs and the second along

their western boundaries. Human Wildlife Conflict (HWC) is likely to occur more frequently

along the forest – cultivation interface of the narrower western corridor due to the corridors

smaller size. Because of this the site was selected as the study site (Map 1), with the eastern forest

corridor falling outside the scope of this report.

BNP, Nepal, was first established as a Wildlife Reserve in 1976 and was made into a National

Park (NP) in 1988. Covering an area of 968sq.km, with a buffer zone area of 327sq.km, it is the

largest NP lying in the low land of southern Terai. The park has a diverse habitat with wide

diversity of flora and fauna and is home to such flagship and umbrella species as the one horned

rhinoceroses (Rhinoceros unicornis), Bengal Tiger (Panthera tigris tigris) and Asian Elephant

(Elephas maximus). The park is flanked by two river systems; Karnali-Geruwa towards the south-

west and Babai towards the south-east. The landscape adjacent to BNP, towards the south is

occupied by continuous forest patches that extend to the Indian border, which are seasonally used

as migratory routes by several mammals (Kharel, undated)3.

Katarniyaghat Wildlife Reserve (KWR), India, is situated on the Indo-Nepalese border in the

Bahraich district of Uttar Pradesh, India. It represents the Terai-Bhabhar Bio-Geographic sub-

division of the upper Gangetic plains. Owing to great vegetation diversity the area is a mosaic of

diverse habitat. The reserve occupies the centre land between other two Protected Areas,

Dudhuwa NP towards the west and Bardia National Park to the north and is characterised by the

centre-landing habitat while migrating from Dudhuwa to BNP a Vice-versa, for rhinos and other

mammals as well (Kharel, undated).

Problems of the study site

The study area has suffered from habitat loss due to fragmentation, degradation, encroachment

and overgrazing with time. It has witnessed a rapid increase in human habitation and cattle

grazing, enhancing biotic pressure on the forest. The loss of continuous forest corridors in these

regions are due to excessive anthropogenic influences (KMTNC, 2001) hindering the

movement/migration especially for mega fauna within the BNP and KWS. Poaching and

harassment to the wildlife are a menace and conflict between the human and wildlife is increasing

due to deterioration in habitat quality along the corridor areas. The fast growing population, as a

result of Immigration and birth rate (growth rate, 2001 3.8% (NIDI, 2006)), is highly dependant

on forest for daily needs of fodder and fuel wood and illegal tree felling and collection of Non

Timber Forest Products (NTFP) is common (Kharel, undated).

3 Kharel, Undated, Sourced from the WWF Office, Kathmandu, Nepal

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Human Elephant Conflict

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Map 1. Study site, western forest corridor within the Khata corridor

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Occurrence of Human Elephant Conflict

Introduction

It is not possible to address the problem of HEC effectively without information about what

it is that the elephants are damaging and where and when these incidents occur (IUCN). Data on Human Wildlife Conflict (HWC) within the Khata corridor, and around BNP, consists of

those incidents that have been reported to a local authority by the community member/members

affected. These local authorities include the Buffer Zone Management Committee (BZMC) and

Community Forest Co-ordination Committee (CFCC). To try and identify when HEC incidents

occur most frequently within the Khata corridor, data sets, on HWC incidents, were collected

from both the BZMC and the CFCC.

Data sets constructed from incidents reported to an authority could potentially give a general

impression of problem elephant activity and allow for comparisons to be made. However, there is

little distinction between ‘visits’ and ‘raids’ by elephants; visits (Osborn 1998, as cited by IUCN)

are cases where elephants transverse the field and do little damage, what damage there is may be

from trampling only, whereas ‘raids’ are cases where crops were fed upon (IUCN).

Data Analysis

Data sets collected from the BZMC are a collaboration of ‘Applications for Compensation’

(Applications submitted by community members to the BZMC for compensation from damages

caused by HWC), apposed to data collected through deliberate field research efforts. Data sets

collected from the CFCC are of incidents of HWC recorded by Samjhana Community Forest

User Group in Laksmipur, which falls outside the BNP Buffer Zone (BZ).

BZMC Data Set

As a result of these data sets being a collaboration of ‘Applications for Compensation’, submitted

by community members, they are susceptible to false claims and other biases. Data includes 6

years of tiger incidents (2000–2005) and approximately 2 years of elephant incidents (2005–

2006) with leopard and rhino incidents mixed into both. From these data sets only applications for

damaged cause by elephants were examined. Applications against other species located within the

elephant data set, leopards (n=11), tigers (n=3), rhinos (n=2) and wild boar (n=1), were removed

leaving only incidents involving elephants (n=203). For the analysis of this report an application

for compensation is taken to represent one incident of HEC. Following on from this logic, this

would advocate that there are no false claims and that the number of applications is proportionate

between areas, despite inherent bias (i.e. Distance to travel in order to submit a claim, amount of

damage etc). For each application the BZMC recorded; UC name, Date, Type of Incident,

Applicants Name, Compensation Amount and Remarks. For the examination of this report UC

name, Date and Type of Incidents were kept, with the Applicants Name, Compensation Amounts

and Remarks being removed due to inconsistencies and lack of relevance.

Applications were classed according to the UC (User Community) the applicant came from; to

get a representation conflict distribution over time applications needed to be ranked according to

date. Dates had been recorded in Nepalese script, using dates according to the Bikram Sambat

(BS) calendar. In order got the date to be analysed more effectively dates were translated into

English script, and, in absence of translation software, manually translated form BS to AD with

the aid of a dual dated calendar.

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Human Elephant Conflict

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To identify when incidents of HEC occurred the data was ranked according to date and classed

according to number of applications submitted in each calendar month (Table 1), and further

divided to show the number of each type of incident per calendar month (Table 2); graphically

represented in a Figure 2. As data collection was ongoing it would be misrepresentative to

compare total number of incidents for both years, as 2006 data was only available up to and

including September. Therefore data from January – September had their totals calculated for

each year so the two years could be fairly compared.

Results

From Table 1 we can see a considerable difference in the number of submitted applications

between the two years for the months of January to September, an 88% decrease (n=120) from

2005 to 2006; a possible indication that elephant mitigation efforts are working or that people

have simply stopped submitting applications, resulting in fewer incidents being recorded.

The lower number of applications submitted in 2006 (n=16) makes deriving any possible trends

about the frequencies of HEC incidents difficult, however the larger number of applications

submitted in 2005 means that any potential trends would be more identifiable. For the whole of

2005 (Jan – Dec), 64.3% of applications were submitted against house damage, 29.3% against

crop damage, with both human injury and human death each accounting for 3.2% of applications.

From Table 1 we can see that of the total 185 applications submitted in 2005, 56 (31%) were

made in March, 48 (24%) were submitted in August and 33 (18%) were submitted in November,

with the remaining 51 applications (27%) being split between the remaining 9 months.

Comparing Tables 1, 2, and Figure 2, we see that of the majority of the 56 applications submitted

in March 2005, 87.5%, (n=49), were applications for compensation against house damage,

leaving 11% (n=6) against crop damage and 1.5% (n=1) against human death.

Following Figure 2 we see that house damage in 2005 continued at a lower rate for the following

4 months, showing consecutive increase through August (n=5), September (n=7) and October

(n=10) before reaching its second peak in November (n=29).

Crop damage occurred rarely during the first half of 2005, with only 6 incidents occurring in

March, possibly as a result of trampling during the high number of house damage incidents for

this month. After this, crop damage reoccurs at its peak in August (n=42) only to fade out to

nothing during September (n=5) and October (n=1).

In 2005 there were a total of 6 applications against human death and another 6 for human injuries.

Of the 6 applications against human deaths, 1 was submitted during March, when incidents of

house damage was high, 2 were submitted during May, and the remaining 3 were submitted

consecutively in August, September and October when crop damage and house damage were both

high, with crop damage being at its peak. Of the 6 applications submitted against human injury, 1

was in February, 1 was in May and 4 were in November, the month where house damage

occurred second most frequently.

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Human Elephant Conflict

WWF Nepal Program 9

Results Table 1. Number of applications for compensation made to the BZMC per calendar month, 2005-06

Month 2005 2006

January 1 1

February 1 4

March 56 0

April 2 0

May 9 3

June 4 1

July 2 6

August 48 0

September 13 1

October 12 NA

November 33 NA

December 4 NA

Total 185 16

Total Jan - Sept 136 16

Note:- NA* = Data Not Available

Table 2. Number of applications for compensation made to the BZMC, by type of incident, per calendar

month, 2005-06.

Human Injuries Human Deaths Crop Damage House Damage

Month 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006

January 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0

February 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4

March 0 0 1 0 6 0 49 0

April 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0

May 1 0 2 0 0 1 6 2

June 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1

July 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 4

August 0 0 1 0 42 0 5 0

September 0 0 1 0 5 0 7 1

October 0 NA 1 NA 1 NA 10 NA

November 4 NA 0 NA 0 NA 29 NA

December 0 NA 0 NA 0 NA 4 NA

Total 6 2 6 0 54 2 119 12

Note:- NA* = Data Not Available

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Human Elephant Conflict

WWF Nepal Program 10

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Human Elephant Conflict

WWF Nepal Program 11

Discussion of the BZMC data

From looking at applications for compensation to identify trends in HEC incidents some patterns

have been drawn upon however large biases, inaccurate and inconsistent data that are dependant

on the complainant means this data may be heavily skewed and should be viewed with caution.

These show that for 2005 higher frequencies of application for compensation were submitted

against house damage in March and November, with higher frequencies of applications for

compensation against crop damage in August. The increased frequency of house damage in

March and November may be proportionate to compensation claims against other HEC incidents,

however may be bias to people being more likely to apply for compensation against house

damage as apposed to crop damage.

One strong bias is reflected in the low number of applications from the UC’s within the BZ on the

western side of the BNP, probably a product of the large distance required to travel to submit

them at the BZMC office at the park HQ in Thakadawra.

The inherent biases associated with the above data supports the justification for the need of

standardised method, and deliberate filed research effort, for enumerating incidents of

HEC as they occur.

CFCC data set

As mentioned, the dataset from the CFCC are recorded incidents of HWC made through a

deliberate effort by Samjhana CFUG members in Laksmipur. Because of these deliberate efforts

this data is potentially more accurate then that from the BZMC. Such datasets could be used to

make comparison of HWC between different areas but the lack of data from other areas prevents

this.

The data set runs from May 2004 to November 2006 and includes only incidents of crop damage.

Only incidents involving elephants (n=154) were examined with incidences involving other

species, rhino (n=5), being removed. Samjhana CFUG members recorded the Date of the

incident, Complainants name, Number and type of animal(s) involved, the area of land the

complainant owns, amount and type of crop damaged and the Time of the incident. Again, the

data set was translated into English from Nepali with dates being translated from the BS calendar

to the AD calendar, for the requirements of this report.

Results

From Figure 2, a product of Table 3, we can see that in 2004 and 2005 incidents of HEC occurred

most frequently during August and September, and that in 2006 the number of incidents peaked

in July (n=19). Trends in the frequency of HEC incidents are similar for 2004 and 2005, with

incidents occurring most frequently in August and the second highest frequency of incidents

occurring in September. Figure 2 also illustrates the times of the year when incidents of HEC are

rare. We see no recorded incidents between December 2004 and June 2005, with only 1 incident

occurring in July 2005 before the year’s peak in August. A similar trend occurs between

November 2005 and June 2006 during which only 3 incidents were recorded in February 2006.

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Human Elephant Conflict

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Figure 2. Number of Recorded HEC Incidents for Samjhana CFUG - Laksmipur

2 2

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Human Elephant Conflict

13

Table 3. Number of Recorded HEC Incidents for Samjhana CFUG–Laksmipur

Discussion

The CFCC data set provides a good example of how deliberate research efforts into enumerating

incidents of HEC can reflect trends. Although the data for the 3 years don’t show the same

consecutive trends, the average of all 3 years would suggest that, for the community of

Laksmipur, HEC incidents involving crop damage occurs mostly in the months of July, August

and September.

The lack of information about HEC incidents involving house damage, human injury and human

death leaves a lot of incidents unchecked and therefore results in the data set show less realistic

findings about the overall trends of HEC. For a better representation of the frequency of HEC

incidents information also needs to be collected on those types of incidents that have been

previously left out, giving a better representation of the realistic trends, as it is likely that

incidents of crop raiding will be highest during harvest time and incidences involving house

damage being more frequent after harvest time when grain and crops are stored.

Once such data has been collected over a period of 3 years or more a better idea of the

distribution of HEC incidents, in both time and space, will be better understood and

management strategies made accordingly.

2004 2005 2006

Jan NA 0 0

Feb NA 0 3

Mar NA 0 0

Apr 1 0 0

May 2 0 0

Jun 2 0 0

Jul 0 1 19

Aug 26 25 0

Sept 21 15 7

Oct 5 2 6

Nov 3 0 12

Dec 0 0 NA

Total 60 43 47

Average 7 4 4

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Human Elephant Conflict

14

HEC in the Khata Corridor -Dirty Mapping-

Introduction:

In response to the incidences of HEC during October 2006 around the community of Dhanaura

(Dhodhari VDC), it was felt that dirty mapping was necessary to determine where HEC occurs

most frequently with greatest severity and that ‘vulnerable areas’, where gaps occurred in

machans lines, needed to be identified.

Method:

To determine the most frequently and severely hit areas interviews were conducted along the

western forest corridor (Map 2), in those communities which were felt to have been most affected

as identified by CFCC Sectary Krishna Pariyar and TAL Co-manager Tilak Dhakal.

These were;

VDC UC

(Dhodhari) Dhanaura

Laksmipur (Bhagaraiya)

Bhangaha

Khata

(Suryapatuwa) Kothiya,

Patharbojhi

Sonaha (Map 2)

Interviews used a set of basic questions to try and determine the time and severity of the last

(most recent) incident of HEC, the number and severity of incidents over the past year and the

opinions of the local people.

To identify gaps in the machan line, sweeps on foot and by bicycle were made along the forest

corridor. Machans had their location’s plotted using a GPS device (Garmin, GPS 12) to accuracy

of 10 meters or below (≤ 10 meter, ≤ 33 feet), which were superimposed onto a map of the area

(Map 3).

Potential sources of bias: Some community members were able to give more information on the

questions asked than others, so a fuller picture was established for some communities then others.

In some communities a group of people would gather and provided input into the questions

answered. However in some circumstances only 1 individual was interviewed and this

information was used under the heading for their particular community. Interviews were

conducted through a translator. In some situations it was necessary to translate out of the Nepali

sub dialect of Tharu, into Nepali and then into English for the benefit of this report. This

translation may have lead to such inherent bias as miss-translation or misinterpretation of words,

and a decreased understanding for the reason for the answers given.

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Results

The results of the mapping suggest that the most affected areas, in 2006, were Laksmipur

(Bhagaraiya), Dhanaura and Sonaha. Table 6 shows the number of elephants involved in the most

recent incidents of HEC at the sites where interviews took place. With the approach of winter

months in Nepal, during the time when the interviews took place, it’s rational to assume that any

elephant migration or movement would be in a southerly direction, to warmer conditions, as they

follow the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). To take this assumption into account Table 6

has been constructed with the most northerly community at the top and most southerly at the

bottom with the rest consecutively following suit.

The first possible identifiable trend lies with those incidents that occurred with between 10 and 13

elephants, during the months of August and September in Dandagaun, Sonaha and Kothiya, with

the difference in the numbers of elephants being accountable to miscounting in low light levels.

First, the number of elephants involved in each incident would indicate that, perhaps, all

3 incidences occurred with the same herd of elephants.

Secondly, in each of these incidences property was damaged, and was said to have been

witnessed being done by an individual tusker, and;

Thirdly, that the incidents occurred consecutively in time and in a southerly direction,

between Dandagaun and Sonaha, would also suggest the same herd. However,

discrepancy enters this trend with the incident that occurred earlier, at a more southerly

point, in Kothiya, suggesting that if the same herd of elephants were involved in each of

the incidents, including Kothiya, then the elephants either double backed or were chased

into Sonaha from Kothiya, or more likely that the incidents in Kothiya occurred after the

incident in Sonaha and that this discrepancy is a result of difficulties in recalling precise

dates of incidents.

A second possible identifiable trend is with the incidents which involved 18 elephants. All are

said to have occurred in the month of August at consecutive points (due south) staring in Khata

moving through to Bhangaha, Pandepur and final to Laksmipur.

From interviews a possible hypothesis can be derived about 1 possible route that this herd of 18

elephants took. It would seem rational that the elephants entered Khata, south of the highway,

from community forest in the west, with the elephants traveling due east. After entering Khata,

the elephants may have been chased back into the same community forest from which they

originally entered, or returned independently. From here they continued south, entering cultivated

land at Bhangaha. From interviews and first hand observations (foot prints) it appears likely that

the elephants, traveling east, having entered from the community forest to the west of Bhangaha,

transversed the cultivated land crossing into agricultural fields east of this point before heading

south, reentering the forest west of Pandepur, north of Laksmipur. Once in this forest incidents of

elephants entering agricultural land at Pandepur suggest they continued heading east, but were

chased back into the same forest above Laksmipur. From incidents that occurred in Laksmipur it

is likely that the same elephants entered their fields from the north, having their route cut off by

the community of Laksmipur which runs west – east. From foot prints at Laksmipur it is

attainable that the elephants took a path through the centre of Laksmipur’s fields, probably

preferring cover provided by the forest and grassland in the north east of the site to the less

vegetated and more populated site to the south east, before heading north back into the forest

from which they had entered (Map 2).

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Map 2. Illustration of possible route that elephants took in August 2006

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Map 3. GPS Locations of Machan across the study site

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Table 4. Findings of the interviews conducted across the Khata corridor into the last incident of

HEC

Community Month of Number of No. of Properties Properties damaged This elephant

Name last Incident Elephants Damaged by a single elephant was a tusker

Dandagaun August 10-12. 5 Yes Yes

Patharbojhi September 22 0 NA NA

Sonaha September 13 1 Yes Yes

Kothia August 12 2 Yes Unknown

Khata August 18 1 Yes Yes

Bhangaha August 18 1 Yes Yes

Pandepur August 18 1 Yes Yes

Laksmipur August 18 0 NA NA

Dhanaura October 22 4 No NA

Discussion

As previously mentioned the findings of this research would suggest that for 2006 the areas most

severally affected by HEC were found to be Laksmipur, Dhanaura and Sonaha. The trend of male

elephants causing the majority of witnessed house and crop damage is supported by other studies.

These elephants may be dependant on crop raiding out of necessity, however Asian elephants are

attracted to feed on crops because they are more palatable, more nutritious and have lower

secondary defenses than wild browser plants (Sukumar 1990). Because they carry more

nutritional value the optimal foraging hypothesis justifies the taking the risks involved in crop

raiding for the higher pay offs in consumed energy.

Throughout the Khata Corridor it appears that the majority of HEC incidents occur when elephant

herds migrate. However the community Laksmipur appears to suffer from these same migrating

herds and from elephants that reside in India.

The result of the mapping showed that throughout the study site trenches, the use fire and noise to

scare elephants and machans are the most implemented alleviation methods. Despite none of

these techniques having been completely successful the reason for their continued employment is

due to their economic viability and traditionalness, not requiring any out side funding or

equipment. To bring in such ‘outside’ non-traditional techniques would probably meet with some

success at first, but would become unemployed as a result for the need of maintenance and the

need for outside funding and equipment. As a result it is the opinion of this paper that the

effectiveness of traditional techniques should be refined in an attempt to increase their

effectiveness.

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Enumeration of HEC

It’s not possible to address the problem of HEC effectively without information about what it is

elephants are damaging and where and when these damage incidents occur (IUCN). Data on HEC

distribution, frequency and severity needs to be gathered in order to understand the causes and

scale of the problem (Desai, 2002). Attempts to build data sets from recording past incidents of

HEC could potentially project negative, unrepresentative, trends and patterns. Therefore incidents

need to be recorded and analysed in a uniform manner as they occur. In doing so a broad picture

of the key explanatory factors will allow for the development and implementation of effective,

site-specific solutions, mitigation and management plans (IUCN).

From the IUCNs’ and AfESG HEC data collection protocol, three sampling approaches have

emerged where damage incidents can be quantified on the basis of;

METHOD 1: number of “damage events” or elephant incidents reported to an authority

METHOD 2: actual losses to crops due to elephants (measured and quantified by an enumerator)

METHOD 3: perceived losses due to elephants (derived from interviews with farmers) (IUCN).

The IUCN’s present guidelines propose using a combination of these three sampling methods to

obtain primary data from fairly large areas of conflict. This involves reporting of the incident to a

trained and paid enumerator who then visits the site of the incident and interviews the affected

person as soon as possible after the occurrence of the problem. The enumerator makes their own

assessment of the incident but asks the affected person (complainant) to provide him with

retrospective extra details about the incident (IUCN).

To gather this information, some, or if possible all of the area concerned has to be surveyed. Due

to enumerators receiving standardised training, the data they will collect will be of

consistent quality and will therefore be reliable enough for summary and analysis. This

will mean that two things can be achieved: (1) comparisons between different areas

experiencing elephant problems will be valid and (2) management decisions on ‘problem

elephants’ can be made on the basis of good data and do not have to rely on guess work

(IUCN).

This approach yields good distribution and frequency information, allows adequate severity

assessment and also provides for some of the ‘social dimension’ of elephant problems to be

included. The practical advantages of this approach are that it involves local people, provides

employment and does not rely only on the complainant. It has the disadvantage that enumerators

have to be trained and engaged in paid employment, something which requires some

administration of finance and personnel. For the returns, however, it is a relatively inexpensive

scheme to set up and run (IUCN).

HEC Enumeration in Nepal / Bardia

If HEC is to be effectively managed information about HEC incidents is required, however

enumerations of a standard like that proposed in the IUCN’s and AfESG does not yet exist in

Nepal and it is felt that a more stable political situation is required before such a protocol could be

implemented.

A second way to implement HEC enumeration would be to do away with the need for trained

enumerators and to provide each UC, CFUG, or VDC with a standardised spreadsheet for

recording incidents of HEC, which could be collected and used for future research needs. This

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method would be subject to all inherent bias which are not present with the method mentioned

above, but would provide good information into the frequency and distribution of HEC incidents,

with relatively little expense and effort on outside organisations, and allowing for sites to be

compared.

Improving compensation schemes through combining them with HEC Enumeration

Naturally, one of the first reactions to property being destroyed by elephants is a request for

compensation, especially when the animals are legally or effectively owned by the state.

Compensation schemes, almost without fail, have been unsuccessful. A major flaw from the

outset is that they attempt to address the effects, rather then the causes of the conflict and are

typically dogged by the same problems (Nelson et al, 2003) (BOX 1). One of the major problems

with compensation schemes are their susceptibility to fraudulent and inflated claims. This would

occur when compensation is reliant on the information provided by the ‘complainant’ through

their applications for compensation, as it is suspected that the level of complaints about elephants

damage is often disproportionate (i.e. far greater) to its relative contribution to the farming

problem (IUCN).

A possible way of reducing such fraudulent and inflated claims would be through

targeting (i.e. improving) the reliability of the information given in claims on which

compensation is decided. Through the enumeration of HEC, in accordance to the IUCN

& AfESG HEC Protocol, incidents would be recorded in a standardised way by an

impartial party (the enumerator), improving the reliability of the information. This

information could then be used alongside applications for compensation as a tool against

inflated and fraudulent claims as well as making claims more proportionate.

One way of making this work may be through the creation of a receipting process for each HEC

incident that is recorded. For each individual incident recorded by an enumerator, 3 copies of the

‘Elephant Damage Report’ would exist. A copy would stay with the complainant as a ‘receipt’

showing enumeration had taken place, a second copy would be kept by the ‘compensating body’

i.e. the park authority, and the third would remain with the enumerating team for the construction

of data files, incidents spreadsheets and analysis etc.

If the complainants chose to apply for compensation their receipt would serve as;

proof of the elephant damage

proof that the elephant damage had been enumerated

when referenced with the copy kept by the compensating body would ensure it’s a

genuine claim, reducing fraudulent claims

provide standardised and impartial information on damages on which compensation

would be based, reducing inflated claims.

would provide a means of recording to whom compensation would / had been paid

To ensure that claims are processed within appropriate time, complainants should be given a

number of days in which they must submit an application for compensation, preventing back

logging of events. It may also be advantageous to have enumerators trained in giving advice

about applying for compensation i.e. the likelihood of a claim being honoured should an

application be submitted. This would potentially reduce the number of smaller, non-honourable,

claims, saving time and administrative costs.

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If such a receipting system was established it may be necessary to have complainants verify the

information recorded by signature or fingerprint, showing that they agree to what the report says,

strengthening the legitimacy of any claims. In areas with low literacy rates the information may

need to be dictated to the complainant after which they would be asked to verify.

Such a scheme would be reliant on;

All incidents of HEC being recorded by a trained enumerator

Information recorded in a standardised way

Enumerators remaining impartial

That corruption does not exist with enumerators

BOX 1. Problems of Compensation schemes.

Disproportionately low compensation

Expensive and slow administration (because of the need to train assessors and

cover large areas), resulting in compensation taking a long time to be paid

Inability to cover all claims

Absence of sufficient funds to cover all claims

Unequal disbursement (e.g. only to some people), creating social disputes and

resentment

Need for stringent controls etc. verification needed for fraud prevention

Inability to reduce the level of conflict because the root causes of the problems

are not being addressed or tackling, leading to no apparent end point

Schemes inability to build positive relationship between local communities and

wildlife authorities

High potential for considerable abuse of blatant corruption through; bogus claims,

Inflated claims etc

An immediate increase in claims when schemes are first started, suggesting either

corruption, or a decrease in crop guarding, or both

The Reduction in the incentive for self defence by farmers in light of a

compensation scheme, which can even exacerbate the scale of the problem

The inability to quantifiable some socio-economic and opportunity cost for

people affected by the threat of elephants

The only positive comment was that incentives of crop damage were reported,

allowing the areas of high conflict to be identified (Nelson et al, 2003)

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Traditional Methods of Conflict Alleviation within the Khata Corridor and

around BNP

The term ‘traditional methods’ is vague, encompassing all self-defence measures taken by local

farmers (with local variations) to protect their crops from elephant damage. The term loosely

encompasses local methods used before local authority involvement in HEC management and

before the evolution of what are considered ‘modern techniques’. Many of these methods have

been used for centuries and are still largely used today (Nelson et al, 2003). Hoare & Du Toit

(1999) see that the major problem associated with traditional methods, particularly in the long

term, is the ease with which elephants become habituated, whereas Osborn & Parker (2002) in

looking at both passive and active traditional methods of Problem Animal Control (PAC) believe

the overall strength of these (traditional) methods lies in their simplicity, which allows farmers to

repair and adapt methods as to when elephants become habituated to them. This simplicity also

means that farmers can make many of the components themselves, and can buy any manufactured

equipment.

Chaudhary, 20044, recorded traditional alleviation methods used around the southern boundary of

BNP, identifying 6 individual methods, which can be categorised into 3 groups;

1) Guarding, through the use of Machans and Atuwas

2) Physical barriers in the form of Trenches, Fences and Burning wood logs

3) Community Protection by scaring the elephants off farm land by chasing them with

flames and tin hitting

Guarding through the use of Machans and Atuwas (Chaudhary 2004)

Machans and Atuwas work as lookout towers from which elephants can be seen entering fields,

providing an elevated platform from which large areas of farm and cropland can be observed.

The Machan, one of the most popular means used by farmers is a cottage (platform with roof)

that is usually erected prior to the ripening of crops for guarding purposes. Generally built in

fields they can accommodate 1-2 persons who use them to look for elephants entering their fields.

The sound of elephants entering and grazing alerts those on look-out in the machans, when

elephants are seen other locals are alerted so that a joint effort can be made to chase the animals

off the land. Conservation partners, mainly WWF, PPP and CARE Nepal, along with park

authorities have helped in the funding and erecting of 3 story high (20- 25m) machans to help

combat the issue of HEC. These machans cost around Rs. 200,000 each, and can accommodate 5-

7 people, and are safer then locally constructed ones.

Atuwas are often built in trees, and are a traditional type of machan built to guard crops, where

locally made beds (Khatiya’s) are hung up on tree branches with a thatched grass roof. Only one

guard can accommodate a single Atuwa which are common along the eastern bank of the

Khauraha River, south of the park headquarters.

Physical barriers in the form of Trenches, Fences and Burning wood logs

4 Sourced from Bardia Conservation Program (previously the King Mahendra Trust for Nature

Conservation) office, Thakurdwara, Bardia, Nepal

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Trenches are common along the park boundaries, usually dug by locals to prevent elephants from

crossing onto agricultural land. If deep and wide enough to prevent elephants from crossing

trenches can initially be effective, however become ineffective due to lack of maintenance and

the many passages, made by locals, over them to allow them access into parks (Chaudhary,

2004).

The southern boundary of the BNP is fenced off with barbed wire, however in places this has

found to have been trampled by elephants. Many people are interested in the use of electric fences

as a mitigation effort, using solar panels to power them in locations where electricity is

unavailable (Chaudhary, 2004). Electric fences have been used in certain locations, including

between the army base and the Bardia Conservation Program (BCP) close to the park HQ in

THakurdwara, but lack of maintenance has hindered their success and a lack of ownership by

local people has resulted in people taking fence post and wire, as man seeks to meet his own

needs over those of the commons (Hardin, 1968).

Locals have also been known to use ‘biofences’ to guard their crops, which are fences consisting

of dense or thorny vegetation cover (sometimes both), planted linearly through which animals

find it difficult to penetrate. Equally a biofence can be constructed from cut natural and

biodegradable materials such as cane. A report by the BICP5 reported that in general, owners of

both machans and biofences are satisfied with the efficacy of the measures. A questionnaire by

the BICP reports that machans, biofence and trenches were rated as being ‘mostly effective’ by

more then 50% of the respondents (BICP, 2001)6.

People believe elephants are scared of fire and people usually burn wood logs at the entrance

points of fields when animals appear to be entering (Chaudhary, 2004). Although it is true that

most wild animals avoid fire, fires at field boundaries, or at entry points, serve as a short term

deterrent, as elephants soon become habituated. Burning wood logs is unsustainable for any

length of time without large tracts of forest being cut down (Nelson et al, 2003). It appears that

the only purpose of burning wood logs at the edges and entrances to fields, are in circumstances

when community patrols are taking in affect, and the fires improve visibility at night. One

possible way of combating this problem may be to set up biogas plants which would allow

lanterns to be burnt instead of wood.

Community Protection

Local people often chase elephants through in a combined community effort, when elephants are

noticed on or near cropland, locals are informed and together chase the elephants away using fire

bundles and by making noise. They believe that the sound and smell of smoke is unpleasant to

elephants and claim it is an effective method in protecting crops. Locals in Thakadwara, Shivpur

and Suryapatuwa claim they have successfully protected their crops using this combined

community effort and machan guarding. (Chaudhary 2004).

Noise produced from tin hitting, hitting empty metal boxes and drums is another common

technique used by farmers to scare elephants from their land. Empty metal boxes are connected

with strings in some places in the field or in the surroundings from where they can be heard if

elephants approach (Chaudhary 2004). Producing noise to scare elephant’s works initially but

again their intelligence means they soon become habituated once they realise there’s no real

danger.

5 BICP - Bardia Integrated Conservation Program, replaced by TAL - Terai Arc Landscape Project - TAL

6 BICP, 2001. Sourced from the WWF office, Kathmandu, Nepal

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Community involvement

It is of fundamental importance to include those who are most affected by the problem in the

solution. The initiatives to construct elephant-proof trenches, establish electric fences and to

adopt other measures to prevent crop degradation needs to be taken at the individual and

community levels so that people living on the periphery of elephant habitats can look after the

maintenance of the barriers (Talukdar & Barman, 2003).The maintenance issue of fences and

trenches seems to best addressed through small projects as incentives to maintain and enforce

preventative measures. This is best achieved by transferring ownership of the management

strategies to the local communities that are affected, especially where strategies are ‘high-tech’

and prone to needing maintenance (Nelson et al, 2003).

Further more, awareness programmes for the villages need to be carried out by NGOs and

government agencies to enlist the support and participation of the people in the protecting of

elephants and minimizing conflict. Anti-elephant depredation squads involving villages need to

be set up especially in those months when elephant depredation is known to escalate (Talukdar &

Barman, 2003).

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Refining Traditional Conflict Alleviation Techniques Machans, Trenches and Chili-grease Fences

Introduction

Dirty mapping of HEC within the Khata corridor showed machans and trenches to be the most

implemented alleviation methods against HEC. Despite many of the machans in the study having

been constructed with the aid of outside organisations, removing them from being a traditional

alleviation method on economic grounds, the original concept of a machan started as a traditional

alleviation method, and trenches still remain as a traditional alleviation method. Such alleviation

methods will continue to be used by locals in these areas as they are economically viable and can

be implemented independently away from outside organisations or funding.

Refining such techniques so they are more affective against elephants, whilst maintaining that

they are economically viable, can be implemented independently away from outside organisations

and fall under the definition a traditional method could make these techniques more successful at

reducing HEC. Here this report reflects on possible ways or refining machans and trenches by

looking at modern techniques and how their principles can be adapted to suit the need of

traditional methods, as well as looking at other traditional methods such as chili-grease, and

possible combinations of traditional methods.

Manchans and Atuwas

The use of lookouts (machans & Atuwas) to alert community members of elephant presence so

they are collectively able to drive them away is one example supporting Nelsons (2003) idea that

a combination of techniques works better then any individual technique working in isolation. The

disadvantages of manually guarding crops in this way are the sociological impacts it has as a

result of a loss of sleep and time which results in loss of earnings. One way of reducing the

negative sociological aspects of actively guarding crops may be to incorporate a disturbance

method in the form of Trip wire alarms, primarily to deter elephants and as a secondary method to

alerting locals to elephants entering their fields (O’Connell-Rodwell et al, 2000).

Trenches

As Chong (2005) points out, the major drawback with trenches is their susceptibility to

weakening through soil erosion which in turn can provide elephants with a crossing point as the

trench walls collapse and fill in the trench. Therefore it would be rational to assume that through

‘refining’ trenches by reducing their susceptibility to erosion, they would become more effective.

Trenches have been dug at 5 of the 8 sites where interviews took place (Bhangaha, Dhanaura,

Laksmipur (Bhagaraiya), Khata and Patharbojhi), none of which have been completely successful

in preventing elephants from entering onto cultivated land. Trenches vary considerably between

sites with the most suitable trenches appearing to be those dug around the community of

Laksmipur. The trench around the community of Laksmipur appears to be of adequate depth and

width to prevent elephants from crossing. However, these trenches are dug into sandy earth soils

and surrounding vegetation has been removed. As a result there is little shade and a lot of direct

sunlight onto the surface of the soil so the walls soon become dry and brittle, becoming

insufficiently strong and easily broken down.

The trench at Patharbojhi is readily identifiable despite its age (10 years old), most likely as a

result of it being dug into the type of erosion resistant clay soil suggested by Nelson. One

important aspect to note, however, is that this trench is heavily shaded by surrounding vegetation,

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receiving little direct sunlight. Where this trench falters is in its inadequate dimensions that allow

elephants to cross it.

Economically viable ways of refining trenches

Trench dimensions

Sukumar (1989) recommends dimensions for trench construction as being 2m x 2m x 1.5m; this

is for a symmetrical trench 2 meters across at the top, 2 meters deep and 1.5 meters wide at the

bottom, with both walls being equally steep (Figure 3a). Chong (2005), citing Blair and Nache

(1979a), recommends dimensions for trench construction as being 2.4m x 1.8m x 1.2m, this is for

an asymmetrical trench which is 2.4m wide at the top, 1.8m deep, and 1.2m wide at the bottom,

with a vertical internal wall (scheme side) and the external side (forest side) sloping at about 56°

(Figure 4b).

Figure 3. Scale diagram of Sukumar’s (1989) recommended dimension for trench construction

Figure 4. Scale diagram of Chongs (2005) recommended dimensions for trench construction, based on

Blair and Nache (1979)

Where Sukumar aims to create a trench that is both un-crossable and impenetrable to elephants,

the idea with Chongs trench is to create a trench wide enough that the elephants cannot walk over

it, with a bottom that’s narrow enough so that the elephant cannot walk along the trench, as they

will be more likely to find weak points along the trench in that way. A sloping external wall helps

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create the illusion of a higher internal wall, prevents erosion, and enables elephants that have

entered the trench to leave it (Chong 2005).

Comparing these dimensions we see only small differences in trench depth (0.2m) and widths

(0.3m bottom) (0.4m top) with the biggest differences in the trenches being the angles of their

external wall. The vertical internal wall in Chongs design may be difficult and expensive to

construct, possibly requiring additional strengthening. However, it’s rational to assume that the

dimensions of Sukumar’s’ trench creates an angle an elephant cannot climb up or down, whilst

maintaining slightly more structural stability.

The type of trench used will determine which wall, if any, would need strengthening. In the case

of Sukumar’s trench, its external wall may need strengthening as it would acquire the full weight

of trespassing elephants from above and would receive any damage inflicted by elephants. In

contrast Chongs trench would need its internal wall strengthening, as its external walls permit

elephant’s entry into the trench, its internal wall would be left vulnerable to elephant damage.

Trench Spoil

The deposition of the trench spoil can affect the effectiveness of the trench. The position of the

spoil is debated, on sloping ground the spoil should be placed on the side of the trench with the

lower elevation so that it won’t be deposited into the trench from overland flow, on flat ground it

should be placed on the agricultural side to prevent elephants from kicking the spoil into the

trench in order to fill it (Chong 2005). Blaire and Nache (1979b) suggest that the spoil should be

placed on the forest side of the trench around 1.2 meters away. This is to create a narrow space

between the spoil mound and the trench. This narrow space will restrict the elephants’

movements and prevent them from kicking in the external side of the trench to fill it in.

Cover crops

A cover crop on the walls of trenches may help strengthen them by binding the soil together

(Chong 2005), whilst also providing shade maintaining soil moisture. Broadly defined, a cover

crop is any plant grown to improve any number of conditions associated with sustainable

agriculture. For the needs of stregthening the walls of a trench, a cover crop would be esablished

to bind the soil, anchoring it in place, improving soil quality and decreasing soil erosion.

A monoculture of a subtrapoical perennial species may be the most disirable to establish, not

dying back exposing the soil to erosion in the first couple of years, providing continuouse

strength. Such a cover crop would need to be established in quick succession after a trench is dug

to prevent too much drying out, it maybe necessary to provide temporary shade to prevent drying

by covering the trench allowing time for the crop to germinate. Dr TB Shresta, on the subject of

cover crops, suggested that a locally known grass species, known as Caus Casu Grass, has been

used in strengthening sloping ground to prevent soil erosion due to its large root network (pers

comm, 2006).

Pebble and wire constrictions

The location of the Khata corridor amongst the Karnali river network means there is a large

deposition of alluvial debris throughout the area in the form of large loose stones (pebbles). The

District Development Committee (DDC) has utilised the larger of these stones to construct walls

by enclosing them within wire baskets to buffer the effects of erosion on riverbanks. Such

constructions could be used to strengthen vertical walls of trenches, or to create free standing

blockades, obstructing entry points onto crop land.

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Trench / Fence Combinations

Chong (2005) further suggests that the erection of an electric fence, angled over the internal wall

of the trench on the scheme side, may further enhance its effectiveness. However, electric fences

carry high economic expenses and fall outside the category of being a “Traditional” alleviation

method. Therefore the erection of a Chilli Grease String Fence may provide a cheaper and

potentially equally affective alternative whilst still retaining itself as a “Traditional” method.

Chilli Grease fences as olfactory repellents

The irritant in chillies (Capsicum spp) has been the focus of research for olfactory elephant

repellents (Nelson 2003). Oleo-resin capsicum spray – Capsicum-based repellents (in aerosol

form) have a history of success in reducing bear attacks on humans in North America and in use

against human criminals (Osborn & Rasmussen, 1995) with the atomised cloud producing a

severely irritating effect on any mucous membrane it comes into contact with (e.g. eyes, mouth,

and respiratory tract). Osborn & Rasmussen (1995) tested the spray on wild African elephants in

Zimbabwe showing a positive repellent reaction. Chilli-grease as a repellent is also being tested

in Zimbabwe on simple types of barriers and fences around crops, similarly, noxious smoke from

burning ‘brickettes’ made with chilli seeds and elephant dung is also being tested in Zimbabwe

(Hoare, 2001).

Chili grease fences

Around BNP the Business Development Services (BDS) introduced a highly marketable and

potent hybrid chilli species as a means for better income generation in the area, as well as being

unpalatable to many wild animals, reducing HWC. This Chilli hybrid, known as NS–1701 (Indian

Variety), is a premium chili hybrid that has a very high tolerance level to viruses and thrips,

whilst performing well under high temperatures it is suitable for being grown all year round. It

has spreading plants, well branched, with fruits 7-8cm long and 0.8cm in girth that turn green

after 75 days (immature) and then dark red after 85 days (mature), that have a high pungency

(75,000 SHU) (www.namdhariseeds.com/ns1701).

A chilli grease fence would potentially consist of 4 major components; String, Posts, Chillies and

Grease. String could either be made locally from wood fibbers, or bought relatively cheaply

(compared to other fence materials i.e. barbed wire, plane wire) from rural markets. Posts could

be cut from stands of bamboo, providing they were sustainably managed. Chillies could be grown

with the specific intention of using them on these fences, leaving the grease as the only resource

that would potentially have to be sourced from outside rural areas (second hand motor grease may

be preferable, as it may be free or cheap to acquire).

The variables involved in using chilli grease fences would include 1) the rate at which chilli

grease (dried chillies mixed with grease) would have to be reapplied to string fences to ensure its

effectiveness in deterring elephants, and, 2) the quantities of chillies needed to produce chilli

grease with a potency high enough to deter elephants. These variables have been tested in

countries in Africa as a means of conflict alleviation against African Elephants by the Elephant

Pepper Development Trust (EPDT), and current studies in using olfactory replants against HEC

in Cambodia are currently being carried out by the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS).

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Conclusion:

Giving advice on digging trenches

From the information gathered it would seem advisable to give local communities information on

refining the digging of trenches. This would potentially improve the effectiveness of their

trenches and could also be used for refining previously dug trenches. Advice would be given on

trench components based on previous findings. From the discussion above, this report would

suggest giving the following advice;

The location of the spoil mound is subjective so will be different for each site. Advice should

follow that outlined by Chong (2005), which is; Spoil: On sloping ground the spoil should be

placed on the side of the trench with the lower elevation so that it won’t be deposited into the

trench from overland flow, on flat ground it should be placed on the agricultural side to prevent

elephants from kicking the spoil into the fence in order to fill it. To create a narrow space

between the spoil mound and the trench, to restrict the elephants’ movements and prevent them

from kicking in the external side of the trench to fill it in, spoil should be placed on the forest side

of the trench around 1.2 meters away (Blaire and Nache 1979b).

Despite the above advice being accurate, the accurate digging of trenches in rural communities is

impractical. Because it is likely that communities won’t have the aid or measuring equipment like

tapes these dimensions will have to be given via other means. Bamboo poles can be cut to aid in

measuring the trench dimensions. One Bamboo pole cut between 1.8 and 2m long would serve

for measuring the depth and the width at the top of the trench. A second bamboo pole cut between

1.2 and 1.5 meters would serve for measuring the width at the bottom of the trench and for the

location of the spoil mound.

For locals to have the ability to cut these bamboo poles close to the correct lengths they first need

some way of measuring close to these lengths. These lengths could be measured and marked onto

the corner or a community building by TAL / Park or CFCC staff using a tape measure, against

which community members could then cut bamboo poles. Alternately people could be advised to

use their bodies to determine these lengths. The length for the pole to measure depth and width

this length could be equal to the point on a wall where a persons’ fingertips reach when they have

one pointing vertically upwards. The length for the pole to measure to the width at the bottom of

the trench could be equal to the height of a persons’ waist (belly button) or top of their leg.

Measuring the angles for the trench can also be achieved through similar methods using the same

bamboo poles. Because we advise Sukumar’s angle for the internal wall of the trench, we know

that, the width at the bottom of the trench (1.5m) is 0.5 meters narrower then the width at the top

of the trench (2m). Because the trench is symmetrical this places 0.25m as the footprint of the

sloping internal wall (Figure 5). By measuring this same distance from the lip of the trench, using

Trench Dimensions

Depth - - - Between 1.8 and 2 meters

Width Top - - Between 1.8 and 2 meters

Width Bottom - - Between 1.2 and 1.5 meters

Internal wall angle - Between 83° (Sukumar 1989)and 90°

External wall angle - Between 56° (Chang 2005) and 90°

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a bamboo pole, into the void of the trench and a attaching a weighted string (weight require so the

string will be taut) 2 meters in length, to get the correct angle the trench wall needs to be cut

within the lip of the trench and where the weighted string lies (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Scale diagram of how weighted string and bamboo can help establish the desired internal angle

of a trench, based on trench dimension from Sukumar (1989)

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Final Thought…

Despite the lack of hard scientific evidence to support claims that Bardia’s

elephant population has; increased, have been forced to take residency within the park,

and that may have passed the parks carrying capacity - having to raid crops out of

necessity, there is some evidence to suggests so, supported by continuous incidents of

HEC.

To address the problem of HEC it’s essential to have data on what it is the

elephants are raiding and where and when incidents occur, so strategic implementation of

both short and long term alleviation methods can be initiated. This data needs to be

collected through deliberate, standardized, field research efforts, ideally using trained

enumerators, as HEC incidents occur. Data on the ecology of both the park and the

elephants is needed, so a better understanding of how they interact can be understood,

ensuring that potential alleviation methods don’t further restrict the elephant’s

movements.

Understandings of the economic and sociological implications for those people

affected by HEC needs to be achieved. People with little money will continuously turn to

traditional alleviation techniques that are economically viable for them, that aren’t

dependant on outside equipment or funding. The significance of traditional techniques

needs to be recognised, and efforts made to support these people in refining them so they

become more effective in reducing conflict.

Michael Cordingley (2007)

Report and Contact Information:

This report was constructed as part of a 6 month internship with the WWF- Nepal program that ran from

the 28/08/2006 – 28/02/2007 AD by Michael Cordingley.

For any more information or details please contact:

Michael Cordingley via.

Email – [email protected]

Or Dr Sara Parker, Seniour Lecture at Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, England

Email – [email protected]

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