THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE,established by Congress in 1984, came intobeing just as the Cold War began to wane. Bythe early 1990s, the foundations of the formerSoviet Union had cracked, shuddered, and fi-nally collapsed with a rapidity that stunnedexperts and casual observers alike. The battleof the Titans—the organizing principle forinternational relations in the second half of thetwentieth century—was over and the worldanticipated an era of peace. Little thought wasgiven to what peace entailed except that itmeant the end of the perpetual state of tensionand of the underlying threat of nuclear annihi-lation. With the end of the Cold War easternEuropean states would make peaceful transi-tions to democracy, African and Latin Amer-ican states—freed from the demands of theideological war between the two superpowers—would move ahead with peaceful economicdevelopment, and Asian countries would con-tinue to ride the economic wave of the 1980sto a peaceful prosperity.

Within a few years, conflicts erupted in theBalkans,Nagarno-Karabakh,Tajikistan,Chech-nya,Somalia,Ethiopia,Rwanda,Zaire,Liberia,and Haiti. Ethnic tensions intensified in otherparts of Central Asia, Africa, and SoutheastAsia. Fighting continued in Northern Ireland,the Middle East, El Salvador, and Guatemala.It became clear that peace had not broken out;instead, the very nature of conflict had changed.Conflicts became internal, setting neighboragainst neighbor, ethnic group against ethnicgroup, religion against religion. Breaking allaccepted rules of war, these conflicts targetedcivilians and slaughtered noncombatants—men, women, and children—just because theybelonged to the wrong group. As focused asthese conflicts were on their internal quarrels,they also spread like wildfire, threatening toproduce regional conflagrations out of localones. And sometimes it seemed that they wereadopting one of the most pernicious character-istics of wildfire: spreading unseen undergroundonly to ignite in another part of the forest.

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In this transformed world, the work of theInstitute is increasingly wide ranging.Throughits multidisciplinary and practical approach,the Institute seeks to understand the complexcauses of present-day conflict and has focusedon all aspects of the response to conflict—research and analysis; policy development andimplementation; mediation, facilitation, anddialogue; peacekeeping and peace enforcement;rule of law and transitional justice; education;practitioner training; and the challenges of rec-onciliation.Taking seriously its mandate as aneducational organization, the Institute has alsolooked for ways to present this understanding tothe next generation of policymakers and practi-tioners and to the scholars who are teachingthem in colleges and universities across thecountry. In 1996 we gathered the fruits of tenyears’ experience in analyzing conflict and de-signing strategies for its prevention and contain-ment into one volume entitled Managing GlobalChaos: Sources of and Responses to InternationalConflict. Our objective was to present much ofthe best thinking on our past experience andcurrent options and to give shape to the fieldof conflict analysis and management—its newdynamics, security challenges, and actors.

Although many things have changed sincewe assembled the first edition, we consideredretaining the title Managing Global Chaos forthis new volume. The notion of chaos has notlost its power or relevance, bearing in mindthe particular sense in which we use the term.In using “chaos,” we are drawing by analogy onchaos theory in the natural and mathematicalsciences. In this sense, chaos refers to the po-tential of even seemingly minor, distant eventsto have unpredictable and potentially dramaticeffects on the security and stability of otherplaces in a world that is both ever more tightlyinterconnected and, ironically, ever more differ-entiated and decentralized in its political, so-cial, and economic structures. We do not arguethat the world is already chaotic or doomed todescend into anarchy, as some observers claim.1Still less do we posit that cultural clashes,

irrational responses to globalization pressures,and the absence of structured underpinningsthat make behavior comprehensible are causingnew levels of vicious brutality in global con-flict.2 In fact, as Ted Robert Gurr’s chapter inthis volume argues, there are reasons to be cau-tiously optimistic because both the frequencyand the intensity of ethnic and intercommunalconflict declined during the past decade.3 An-other positive sign is that a significant num-ber of the conflicts that did occur were settledthrough negotiation. It is too early to proclaimthe easing of intergroup conflict and movementtoward political settlement as trends. Nor dothese happenings provide grounds for compla-cency, given the fragile nature of many of thenegotiated settlements that were reached andthe obvious potential for brewing discontent insome neighborhoods to erupt into violent con-flict. It is for this reason that we have chosento give this volume the new title of TurbulentPeace: The Challenges of Managing InternationalConflict, a title we hope captures the changingcircumstances of the world in which we live.

Vulnerability and sensitivity to political andsecurity shock effects can be a function of thisvery diversity and lack of centralized authoritystructures. In the Middle East, for example, theunsettled nature of the peace process betweenPalestinians and Israelis, punctuated as it hasbeen by the recurring eruption of violence, hasconsequences that go well beyond the regionand the immediate interests of the parties tothe conflict. One need look no further thanthe impact of the fortunes of the peace processon the price of energy and the pocketbooks ofconsumers in oil-importing nations to appreci-ate the considerable vulnerabilities that are in-volved when a peace process in a critical regionof the world goes sour. Likewise, domesticand secessionist violence brought on by thecollapse of authoritarian governments in Asia,such as Suharto’s regime in Indonesia, con-tributed significantly to the growing instabil-ity of global capital markets and a rapid loss ofinvestor confidence in what came to be known

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as the “Asian crisis.” Civil unrest in countriesas near as Guatemala and Mexico and as faraway as Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia in theHorn of Africa prompted massive flights ofrefugees not just into neighboring countriesbut around the globe. And the United Stateshas come to understand what many other coun-tries have known for some time: the enormousrisks and dangers that are posed by terroristattacks on their military personnel, on their dip-lomats, and even at home as aggrieved groupsand the criminal organizations they give riseto take out their frustrations on us.

Certain patterns of events—for instance,“failed” or “failing” states, warlord predation,and secessionism—also produce a pattern ofresponses, giving rise, in turn, to changed pat-terns of violence and conflict. Similarly, thesuccess or failure of response mechanisms op-erating in the name of an amorphous “inter-national community” can have decisive “feed-back” effects—positive or negative—in regionsbeyond the locus of an immediate conflict sce-nario. As the wars in the Balkans in the 1990sreveal all too vividly, no region—in this caseWestern Europe—is immune to unrest alongits borders, and “foreign wars” may be justhours away by air or road. Some regions andsubregions may approach chaotic conditionsright under the noses of others that are thrivingin the newly liberalized global system, freedfrom the burdens of bipolar, East-West con-frontation. The “chaos” phenomenon in secu-rity and conflict studies closely parallels themore widely recognized economic and politi-cal repercussions of globalization under theintegrative influence of the new technologiescombined with uneven local and regional ca-pabilities to adapt to resulting change.

The sovereignty of individual states and therespect for the sanctity of state borders thatcharacterized the fundamental nature of inter-state relations over the past 350 years are alsobeing eroded or, at the very least, redefined.4States are challenged from within as subna-tional groups declare their separate identities

and seek separate recognition. It is increas-ingly evident that this phenomenon is notconfined to the “new” states of the developingworld, but also affects some very old states inEurope and Asia. States are also challengedfrom the outside by supranational, intergov-ernmental, or nongovernmental bodies thathave asserted the right to intervene—by forceif necessary—in the domestic affairs of sover-eign states in order to defend individuals frommass violence or to protect them from grossviolations of human rights.5 The extraneousand seemingly uncontrollable forces broughtabout by rapid technological innovation andchange also challenge the authority of statesin other ways.The “traditional” media—radioand television—also affect conflict processesand pressures for intervention through theso-called CNN effect.6 But so too do newcommunications technologies. It is a cliché tosay that the Internet has suddenly made usall—at least those of us who have access tocomputers—citizens of a global cyber-villagewhere information and chat rooms are accessedat the mere click of a finger. The velocity ofinformation flows, financial transactions, in-ternational investment, and even environmen-tal change is not only changing our percep-tions of how we see ourselves as citizens andhow we relate to our own governments. It isalso affecting the legitimacy of governmentsand the capacities and prospects of some statesto thrive or even to survive. The point here isnot to argue whether the change in nationalsovereignty is a good or bad thing, but to rec-ognize that the diffusion of power throughoutthe international system has added whole newlayers of complexity to efforts to maintain inter-national order.

This diffusion of power in all of its variedmeanings makes it all the more important thatwe take a multifaceted and multidimensionalapproach to conflict analysis and conflict man-agement. This approach needs to recognizethat states no longer have the legitimacy andthe monopoly on power and the use of force

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that they once enjoyed and that as some statesbreak apart or are wracked by internal conflictthe unsettling consequences and shock wavescan spill across borders, infect the surroundingregion, and even reverberate into the interna-tional system.

One of the challenges for both students andpractitioners of international conflict manage-ment is to make intellectual sense out of all ofthis chaos and complexity and to understandthat there are real alternatives and a wide rangeof potential response strategies to different con-flict situations.7 To point out that the world andits conflicts are complex is not very helpful ifwe stop there. The task of the policy analyst,wherever he or she sits—in the classroom, inthe State Department, in the United Nations,or in the office of a nongovernmental organiza-tion in some war-torn society—is to understandwhat drives and sustains these seemingly in-tractable conflicts so that interventions aimedat helping the parties resolve these conflicts orassisting the victims do not make the situationworse or further exacerbate tensions.

The levels-of-analysis approach, developedin Jack Levy’s opening chapter to this volume,offers a useful framework that gives some in-sight into the “causes”or “vectors” that influenceconflict processes and contribute to the escala-tion of violence. In practical terms, no seriousscholar or professional authority argues for a “single-factor” explanation of conflict andwar. Leading scholars on war causation—fromGeoffrey Blainey, Raymond Aron, and BernardBrodie8 to Michael Howard, whose classicessay is included in this volume—argue againstsingle-factor analyses, which have never beenuseful in explaining war events except in termsof circular or tautological arguments (e.g., warsoccur because there is nothing to prevent them).Still less are they useful today when politicalleaders in war-torn societies have become evermore entrepreneurial and creative in describ-ing their struggles in terms that will “sell,”shading the rhetoric to the market if need be.And just as there is no single cause of conflict,

there is no single solution. Understanding com-plexity and the dynamics of the various levelsis as important to the analysis of conflict reso-lution as it is to the analysis of conflict.

A CHANGING LANDSCAPE

In this present volume, although we continueto use a multidimensional chaos paradigm, wedo so within a geopolitical landscape that haschanged markedly since the mid-1990s.Specif-ically, we are speaking here of five emergingdynamics that characterize the setting for con-flict analysis and management in the currentperiod and run through the different sectionsof this book.

The first of these is the return of geopoli-tics, those endemic and hegemonic conflictpatterns between states that have long charac-terized the international system, together withrising concerns about how such contests will beconducted in today’s technological environ-ment. For much of the first post–Cold Wardecade, analysts focused, and not without rea-son, on ethnic and internal wars that haveformed the overwhelming majority of contem-porary conflicts. Like a pendulum, this focusmay occasionally have gone too far, to the ex-tent of obscuring the vital linkage between in-ternal wars and the regional “bad neighbor-hoods” in which they occur and which oftenconstitute the leading triggers of the conflict’soutbreak or provide a lethal milieu for its spread.The concentrated focus on internal conflictmay also have distracted us from appreciatingthe continued salience in certain regions of en-demic, interstate rivalry or hostility based onthe sorts of factors (concern for regional pri-macy, changing power relations, security dilem-mas, regime legitimacy contests, the absenceof universally accepted regional or subregional“rules of the game”) that scholars have longrecognized as conflict spurs or accelerants.

When combined with the recent attentionin the scholarly and policy communities to

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so-called rogue actors and the reality of con-tinued, if not accelerated, diffusion of sensi-tive weapons technologies to unstable regions,the return of geopolitics points to a legitimateglobal concern for dampening regional inter-state confrontations. Similarly, it points to thevalue of enhancing efforts to erect confidence-and security-building measures and antipro-liferation regimes ranging from small arms tonuclear weapons. The return to open warfareand overt nuclear testing in South Asia is onlythe most dramatic illustration of this concern.In 1998–2000, the Horn of Africa witnessedthe largest-scale and costliest conventional in-terstate warfare on the African continent sinceWorld Wars I and II, as the Eritreans andEthiopians engaged in a seemingly pointlesstest of wills over an impoverished and barrenlandscape where the border was never demar-cated. In the Taiwan Straits, the struggle forlegitimacy and to decide who will set the termsfor the ultimate reunification of China has pro-duced open threats of the use of force on oneside and of unilateral secession on the other.Accordingly, this new edition of the volumeincludes expanded coverage of the sources ofand responses to regional conflicts that pertainto this pattern.9

The second emerging issue that we havechosen to highlight in the volume is that one-dimensional debates about interventionismand isolationism miss a much richer reality ofchallenges and trade-offs in conflict manage-ment revolving around questions of sociopo-litical context, timing, sequencing, and graspingthe stages and cycles in the life of a conflict. Alltoo often, we believe, the intervention debatehas been handled as if the only real issue ismilitary intervention, as distinguished fromother types of third-party-assisted processesby a range of external actors. Worse, withinthe ambit of the military intervention field, thedebate has been framed as if the issue is sim-ply a “yes or no” matter and, within that, an upor down vote on support for UN peacekeeping.This sort of framing of the question trivializes

the real issues of public policy choice. In thisvolume, we have insisted on a broader look atthe concept of intervention, touching on issuesof feasibility and strategic management; theconcept of mediatory peacemaking as a strate-gic enterprise; ethical imperatives; the impar-tiality dilemma; the specific types of peace-keeping that have worked and those that havenot; the phasing of intervention; the range ofexternal, third-party, roles (official and nonof-ficial) in conflict management; and the prob-lems associated with intervention that freezesor prolongs conflicts rather than actually man-aging or resolving them.10

Of particular importance in looking at thiscomplex equation is the effort to pull togetherfrom case studies the lessons learned frompost–Cold War experience. The purpose is tomake a start in identifying certain principlesand concepts that can lead to doctrines of bestpractice in third-party interventions (1) bydifferent sets of actors, (2) by using differentinstruments and techniques, (3) in distinct typesof societies, and (4) at various points in theconflict life cycle. Once again, the value of tack-ling the conflict management agenda in thisway is that it links theory directly to practicalapplication. In practice, the question most likelyto arise is not, “Which kind of interventionworks better, NGO-led track-two initiativesto open a channel between the sides or a big-power effort to summon the parties to a CampDavid summit?” Rather, the question will likelybe, “How do we know when the first option is needed or when only the second has hope of success?”

A third emerging theme this volume treatsis the continuing and still unresolved dialogueamong scholars and practitioners about theinteraction between conflict management, onthe one hand, and democratization, the rule oflaw, civil-society institution building, and otherelements of what can broadly be called gover-nance (or nation building), on the other hand.11

Negotiated political transitions (e.g., from com-munist dictatorship, from apartheid, from

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oppressive military or one-man rule) place asharp focus on the significance of these issuessince they impose on peacemakers and warringparties alike a seemingly stark choice betweenpriorities (reconciliation, power sharing, jus-tice, accountability to local or international au-thorities, adherence to democratic norms anduniversal legal principles, the quest for peaceand stability). Given the predominant role ofWestern governments and publics and Western-oriented intergovernmental and nongovern-mental organizations in the peacemaking field—and the reality that most violent conflictsoccur in or between transitional or developingsocieties—the potential clash of values andpriorities is further underscored.Western diplo-mats and activists naturally bring with themcertain expectations about democratic practicesand human rights standards. The idea thatpeace can and should be imposed by outsidersis itself derived from this set of Western-derived assumptions and priorities.

Increasingly, the scholar and the practitionerare beginning to ask awkward but essentialquestions about the proper sequence and pri-orities to be adopted in addressing these ques-tions. Must basic governance questions be resolved and fundamental political or socialchange occur before there can be stability andpeace? Or is the greatest source of contempo-rary chaos and political turbulence the weak-ening of state institutions and capabilities andtheir replacement by rival and even less legiti-mate power sources? If the former thesis iscorrect, then peacemaking and conflict man-agement should consciously be placed on theback burner until political conditions ripen notfor negotiated settlements but for legitimategovernance, which will bring in its wake a justorder. If the latter hypothesis is true, then thefirst order of business is for the internationalcommunity to lend support to the strengthen-ing of the sovereign and legitimate capacity ofstates in deeply troubled societies. Under thisapproach, it is democratic norms and Westernsensibilities that must be placed on the back

burner in the interests of reestablishing politi-cal order and arresting unguided turbulence bykeeping an external hand on the levers of poweruntil local authorities can reassert themselves.We have not attempted to resolve this debate—a modern version of age-old debates in po-litical theory—but rather try to reflect it fairlyin the context of conflict management theoryand practice.12

The fourth emerging theme is the need formore explicit recognition—by practitioners andscholars alike—that there is much truth to thenostrum “it depends” when analyzing conflictsources and appropriate remedies. The simplefact is that societies and polities differ dramat-ically in their capacity to cope with external orinternal shocks and pressures. A typology ofsocieties and conflicts could advance thinkingin the academic and policy communities aboutwhat works, when and where. What triggersthe outbreak of an uncontrollable conventionalwarfare in one context could inspire the launchof a fast and effective special mission by theEuropean Union or the Organization for Se-curity and Cooperation in Europe in anothersetting. Some regions are replete with security-related institutions and mechanisms adept atforestalling, preempting, and channeling con-flicts before they turn violent. These security-surplus or security-exporting regions—sadlytoo few in number—stand in marked contrastto security-deficit regions where supplies of tin-der and matches far outweigh the stock of fireextinguishers.

We believe it is becoming essential in theconflict management field to speak candidlyabout these distinctions. Erudite discourse onthe limits of UN peacekeeping or the promiseof nongovernmental initiatives for postcon-flict peacebuilding needs to be situated withintypologies of conflict settings. To illustrate,peace initiatives that have borne fruit in North-ern Ireland and South Africa would not likelygain the same traction in societies such asSierra Leone and Afghanistan, where the vitalinfrastructure of civil society remains far less

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developed and institutionalized. Remedies de-pending on the presence and conduct of stable,coherent actors make sense in places where suchactors are the key decision makers.13 Thoseremedies can lead, however, to illusions andwishful thinking when, literally, there is no onein charge.To take another example, in assessingthe context for the insertion of peacekeepers,the policymaker needs the benefit of a plain-spoken analysis about the intentions and ca-pabilities of local actors and, as Doyle suggestsin his chapter, to weigh this judgment againstthe likely capacity of the outside force to copeover the lifetime of the intervention.

These four themes—the return of geopoli-tics, the debate on intervention, the push andpull between conflict management and post-conflict governance issues, and the recognitionthat different societies require different peace-making strategies—run through this volume.14

Their presence testifies to the fact that we areonly just beginning to understand how to reachpeace. Some peacemaking efforts over the pastdozen years have been successful: Cambodia,El Salvador, Guatemala, and even the seem-ingly intractable conflict in Northern Ireland,which yielded at last to the persistent media-tion by three distinguished outsiders—formerU.S. senator George Mitchell, former Finnishprime minister Harri Holkeri, and GeneralJohn de Chastelain of Canada. Some efforts,however, have not met with the same success.Conflict reignited yet again in Angola despitethe agreements that had been reached at Lu-saka, despite UN engagement, and despitestrong U.S. support for the UN mediator.TheU.S. effort to broker peace between the Israelisand the Palestinians in the last days of the Clin-ton administration was badly derailed by theoutbreak of violence in the region. And someefforts—involving the same region, the sameplayers, and the same mediators using the sametechniques—have produced very different re-sults. In the Balkans, for instance, U.S. assistantsecretary of state Richard Holbrooke, withthe aid of NATO, used coercive peacemaking

to strong-arm the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, andMuslims into agreement. The same coerciveapproach failed, however, during the Serb-Kosovar Albanian negotiations in Rambouilletand as a result brought NATO into direct armedconflict with the Serbs. In general, the recordover the past decade points to a highly mixedtrack record, with most cases falling somewherein between pure success and downright failure.

With the passage of time, assessments of therecord of international interventions becomemore, not less, problematic. For example, thelessons of Cambodia are more difficult to readthan we initially thought. Did the collapse ofthe power-sharing arrangement between HunSen and Prince Norodom Ranarridh mean thatdemocratic elections after conflict produce atbest an unstable result, prey to renewed con-flict? Or did the decision to include the KhmerRouge in this early government leave gapingwounds that prohibited reconciliation? Or werethese all necessary steps toward a sustainablepeace—steps in a long, slow process requiringpatience, persistence, and open-ended com-mitment by all concerned? Did the interna-tional community do too much or too little tomake peace endure in Cambodia? Can out-siders help to bring peace at all, and if so, howcan they help?

This brings us to our fifth overarchingtheme. Over the past decade, we have learneda great deal about the complications of reach-ing a negotiated agreement and of creatingfrom that negotiated settlement a sustainablepeace.15 We have learned about the fragility ofagreements, the difficulties in coordinatingan international response, the challenges ofimplementation, the influence of spoilers, theunpredictable results that elections can pro-duce, and the strong resistance to reconcilia-tion. It is clear that we live in turbulent timesand that a negotiated conflict settlement oftenleads to a turbulent peace.This peace is not anend state in itself but needs to be nurtured intoits next phase: a stable, functioning govern-ment, society, and culture in which conflicts

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are settled through negotiation rather thanthrough violence.

This turbulence refers not only to postcon-flict situations. At the lower end of the conflictspectrum, we are reminded of an interestingfeature of post–Cold War conflict events: theoccurrence in places such as Central Asia, In-donesia and the Philippines, Central Africa,and the Balkans of violent, turbulent situationsthat hover somewhere between war and peace.We do not propose in this volume a new theoryfor explaining and responding to political vio-lence below the threshold of outright war. Anumber of our chapters on conflict sources shedan especially bright light on the phenomenonof turbulence.16 Managing such turbulencecannot simply be swept aside as somehow be-neath the proper concern of the internationalcommunity: this turbulence is the breedingground for other phenomena that affect thehealth of the global system—criminality of all sorts, the rise of predators and warlords(“rogues,” to some), environmental and healthdisasters17—and that postpone indefinitely vi-tally needed investment, growth, and improvedstandards of governance. Low-level violenceof this sort is capable of dismantling and de-stabilizing negotiated settlements, reversingfragile progress. Yet the remedies for sustainedturbulence in rough neighborhoods are by nomeans obvious in our postimperial and post-colonial age.

Christoph Bertram points out that it is im-possible to recognize the full character of yourown period as you live through it.18 Living ina period of transition, as we do now, makesthis recognition even more difficult. We do nothave a term for our age beyond the weak de-scription “the post–Cold War period.” We do know, however, that our age is marked by change and by the roiling seas produced bychange. We hope that the contributions in thisvolume serve to underscore the gravity of thechallenge and the long road that still lies aheadin security and conflict studies.

STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

As discussed above, there have been impor-tant developments over the past five years,both in the scholarly fields related to conflictmanagement and on the ground where warand peace occur.This volume seeks to capturethese changing dynamics. It includes somecontributors to Managing Global Chaos, whohave rewritten their chapters to reflect thesechanges. It also includes many new authors,who have been commissioned to treat new is-sues and to reflect the widened range of view-points in areas of lively debate. Unfortunately,the hard limits of space forced us to drop anumber of excellent chapters, including theseven case studies, that were included in the ear-lier volume. For students interested in the evo-lution of thought and practice in the field ofconflict analysis and management, these chap-ters are well worth seeking out from ManagingGlobal Chaos.

This volume focuses on two dimensions ofthe conflict field: sources and responses. Ofthese two dimensions, the first has attractedthe most attention from scholars within thefield of international relations. In recent years,however, attention to responses to conflict hasincreased, driven by a growing desire amongstudents and faculty on the one hand and pol-icymakers and practitioners on the other handto come up with workable solutions to seem-ingly intractable conflagrations. The unceasingexplosions of internal conflicts in the 1990s mayhave presented very difficult challenges to prac-titioners but they also touched the lives of indi-viduals around the world as the news networksreported on mass civilian killings in Rwanda,Bosnia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In the faceof these contemporary wars, student and fac-ulty concern expanded beyond understandingthe causes of these conflicts to identifying andapplying solutions. This volume, as did its pre-decessor, dedicates a major part of its pages tothe practical, political, ethical, and operational

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considerations of conflict management. Rec-ognizing that all sorts of diverse institutionsplay a role in responding to conflict, the bookexplores many different kinds of institutionalcapacities and devotes several sections to theuse of both coercive and diplomatic methodsof making or encouraging peace.

Analyzing conflict and peacemaking is noteasy. Each conflict is unique and has its ownset of causes and dynamics. Consequently, eachresponse has to be unique.There are some tools—general though they may be—that can helpto conceptualize the field and thereby increaseunderstanding of these complex factors. It isto some of these tools that we now turn.

Table 1 (“Illustrative Strategies for Manag-ing a Turbulent World”) relates various conflictmanagement strategies and techniques, includ-ing the use of force, negotiated interventions,and track-two diplomacy, to the discussion ofsources of conflict. The first section of thebook is based on the typology in Jack Levy’schapter, which is itself modeled on the workby Kenneth Waltz that defined a levels-of-analysis approach to the study of conflict.19

Using Levy’s three different levels of analysis—the systemic, subsystemic, and individuallevels—the left-hand column of the table dem-onstrates that there is potentially a wide rangeof factors that can influence conflict processesand that for any given conflict a variety of dif-ferent factors and forces can play out acrossthese different levels. Using the same levels-of-analysis approach, part I of the volume cap-tures the wide array of conflict sources from arich variety of scholarly and disciplinary back-grounds and in some respects speaks to the left-hand column of the table. Although some ofthe writers in this section of the book stress thecontinued importance of systemic sources ofconflict—that is, sources of conflict that arisefrom the anarchic nature of the internationalsystem and transnational forces and processesthat increasingly operate at the global level—others point to the importance of subsystemic

factors, including the growing importance ofculture, ethnicity, identity, and personality inconflict processes, especially within states.

Part II of the volume examines the ongoingdebate about intervention, focusing primarily,though not exclusively, on the role of coerciveversus noncoercive strategies and instruments ofintervention.The essays in this section bring adiverse range of opinions and insights to theongoing debate among scholars and practition-ers about intervention methods, techniques,and timing,particularly when military interven-tion is an option. At one end of the spectrumis the viewpoint that international interven-tion to end intrastate conflicts is inconclusiveand generally tends to be counterproductive.At the other end some argue that the interna-tional community has a moral commitment tointervene when confronted with evidence ofgenocide and massive human rights abuses. Asthe essays in this section demonstrate, these de-bates play out at different levels—the political,the moral, and the practical or expedient. Asthe introductory essay to part II argues, how-ever, much of the debate tends to focus on theuse of force, ignoring the fact that there areother strategies and instruments of interven-tion, ranging from formal diplomacy to a widevariety of track-two interventions. Further-more, intervention strategies—whether theyinvolve the use of (or the threat to use) forceor diplomacy or some other method of nego-tiation and mediation (i.e., peaceful interven-tion techniques)—must be carefully tailoredto the appropriate source of conflict or level ofanalysis, explicitly recognizing that many dif-ferent factors and forces are at play in anygiven conflict.

In part III we focus on the role of negotia-tion, mediation, and preventive statecraft asspecific tools and methods of conflict man-agement. Negotiation is rightly viewed as ameans to an end (diplomatic negotiations in thearea of arms control, for example, are directedat developing new arms control regimes; a

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Tab

le 1

.Illu

stra

tive

Stra

tegi

es fo

r Man

agin

g a T

urbu

lent

Wor

ld

Sour

ces o

f Con

flict

(s

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)

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rs

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pro

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crim

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net

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tion,

popu

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rciv

e Str

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(see

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t II)

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alan

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,alli

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san

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-as

sista

nce p

rogr

ams,

sanc

tions

New

offe

nse-

defe

nse

stra

te-

gies

and

tech

nolo

gies

(e.g

.,m

issile

def

ense

,inf

orm

atio

nw

arfa

re,h

igh-

tech

wea

ponr

y)

Inte

rnat

iona

l crim

inal

cou

rts,

Inte

rpol

,bila

tera

l coo

pera

-tio

n ag

ains

t crim

inal

maf

ias

Neg

otia

tion,

Med

iatio

n,an

dO

ther

Pol

itica

l Ins

trum

ents

(see

Par

ts II

and

III)

Con

cert

-bas

ed st

rate

gies

of

nego

tiatio

n (e

.g.,

Con

cert

of

Eur

ope)

Dip

lom

atic

eng

agem

ent/

isola

tion,

pres

sure

s and

in-

cent

ives

for a

dher

ence

to ar

ms

regi

mes

,eng

agem

ent

Neg

otia

ted

unde

rsta

ndin

gsan

d ag

reem

ents

(e.g

.,th

roug

hth

e G

-8 a

nd o

ther

foru

ms)

,pr

even

tive

dipl

omac

y

Neg

otia

ted

unde

rsta

ndin

gsan

d ag

reem

ents

(e.g

.,th

roug

h th

e G

-8 a

nd o

ther

foru

ms)

,pre

vent

ive

dipl

omac

y

Inst

itutio

ns an

d R

egim

es

of S

ecur

ity an

d C

onfli

ctM

anag

emen

t (se

e Par

t IV

)

Col

lect

ive s

ecur

ity/c

oope

rativ

ese

curit

y

Stre

ngth

ened

arm

s reg

imes

,ex

pand

ed/n

ew c

olle

ctiv

e se

-cu

rity

inst

itutio

ns

Arm

s con

trol

regi

mes

and

conf

iden

ce-b

uild

ing

mea

sure

s

Inte

rnat

iona

l reg

imes

and

othe

r kin

ds o

f int

erna

tiona

lgo

vern

ance

resp

onse

s to

en-

hanc

e co

oper

atio

n at

bot

hgl

obal

and

regi

onal

/sub

re-

gion

al le

vels

Peac

ebui

ldin

g (s

ee P

art V

)

Kan

tian

conf

eder

atio

n of

dem

ocra

tic st

ates

New

/exp

ande

d in

stitu

tions

for r

egio

nal e

cono

mic

coo

p-er

atio

n an

d in

tegr

atio

n

Front 7/8/01 2:12 PM Page xxiv

Lev

el 2:

Stat

es a

nd S

ocie

ties

Tran

sitio

nal s

tate

s

Stat

e co

llaps

e

Eth

nopo

litic

al/r

elig

ious

ex

trem

ism

War

lord

eco

nom

ies

Rog

ue st

ates

Peac

e en

forc

emen

t,co

nflic

tsu

ppre

ssio

n,ta

rget

ed sa

nc-

tions

,coe

rciv

e di

plom

acy

Rap

id re

actio

n fo

rce,

mili

tary

prot

ecto

rate

s

Rap

id re

actio

n fo

rce,

safe

have

ns,c

oerc

ive

dipl

omac

y,de

terr

ence

,pre

vent

ive

dipl

omac

y

Targ

eted

sanc

tions

,boy

cotts

,ar

ms e

mba

rgoe

s

Coe

rciv

e di

plom

acy,

dete

r-re

nce,

prev

entiv

e di

plom

acy,

supp

ort f

or ar

med

opp

ositi

on,

sanc

tions

Med

iatio

n,di

alog

ue,t

rack

-on

e an

d -t

wo

dipl

omac

y,fin

anci

al in

duce

men

ts,a

idan

d tr

ade

cond

ition

ality

Mul

tilat

eral

and

bila

tera

l as-

sista

nce

prog

ram

s,fin

anci

alba

il-ou

ts,a

id a

nd tr

ade

con-

ditio

nalit

y,ad

min

istra

tive/

polit

ical

pro

tect

orat

es

Neg

otia

ted

auto

nom

y,cr

oss-

cultu

ral n

egot

iatio

n,ci

rcum

-ne

gotia

tion,

min

ority

righ

tspr

otec

tion

polic

ies,

aid

and

trad

e co

nditi

onal

ity

Ext

erna

l mon

itorin

g an

dtr

ansp

aren

cy

Isol

atio

n/en

gage

men

t,su

ppor

tfo

r non

viol

ent o

ppos

ition

Col

lect

ive

secu

rity

initi

ativ

es,

regi

onal

org

aniz

atio

ns (m

em-

bers

hip

indu

cem

ents,

thre

ats o

fex

pulsi

on o

r non

mem

bers

hip)

Tem

pora

ry m

ultil

ater

al

gove

rnan

ce st

ruct

ures

Con

stitu

tiona

l and

ele

ctor

alre

form

s,po

wer

shar

ing,

fed-

eral

ism,c

onso

ciat

iona

lde

moc

racy

Cod

es o

f con

duct

for m

ulti-

natio

nals

Inst

itutio

nal a

rran

gem

ents

base

d on

com

mon

inte

rest

(e.g

.,K

ED

O )

Goo

d go

vern

ance

,rec

onci

lia-

tion,

reco

nstr

uctio

n,de

velo

p-m

ent a

ssist

ance

,civ

il-so

ciet

yin

stitu

tion

build

ing,

rule

of

law,

trut

h co

mm

issio

ns,

prev

entiv

e di

plom

acy

Supp

ort f

or re

conc

iliat

ion

mea

sure

s (po

litic

al,s

ocia

l,re

-lig

ious

,etc

.),st

reng

then

ing

civi

l soc

iety

,stre

ngth

enin

gm

inor

ity ri

ghts

pro

tect

ion,

mon

itorin

g go

vern

ance

st

ruct

ures

(e.g

.,au

tono

my

orpo

wer

-sha

ring

arra

ngem

ents

)

cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

Front 7/8/01 2:12 PM Page xxv

Tab

le 1

.Illu

stra

tive

Stra

tegi

es fo

r Man

agin

g a T

urbu

lent

Wor

ld(c

ont.)

Sour

ces o

f Con

flict

(s

ee P

art I

)

Lev

el 3:

Lea

ders

hip

and

Hum

an A

genc

y

Bad

lead

ers

Spoi

lers

Elit

e cu

ltura

l cog

nitiv

e ba

rrie

rs to

coo

pera

tion

Coe

rciv

e Str

ateg

ies a

nd

Inst

rum

ents

(see

Par

t II)

Coe

rciv

e in

terv

entio

n an

ddi

plom

acy,

targ

eted

sanc

tions

Mili

tary

con

tain

men

t,le

gal

thre

ats,

asse

t sei

zure

s

Inst

itutio

ns an

d R

egim

es

of S

ecur

ity an

d C

onfli

ctM

anag

emen

t (se

e Par

t IV

)

Den

ial/e

xpul

sion

for m

ulti-

late

ral i

nstit

utio

ns

Mul

tilat

eral

ince

ntiv

es a

ndpr

essu

res

Peac

ebui

ldin

g (s

ee P

art V

)

Crim

inal

cou

rts/

trib

unal

s

Pow

er sh

arin

g or

con

tinue

diso

latio

n

Con

flict

tran

sfor

mat

ion

ini-

tiativ

es,c

ivil-

soci

ety

build

ing

Neg

otia

tion,

Med

iatio

n,an

dO

ther

Pol

itica

l Ins

trum

ents

(see

Par

ts II

and

III)

Supp

ort f

or n

onvi

olen

t op

posit

ion

Eng

agem

ent o

r iso

latio

n an

dde

legi

timiz

atio

n

Secr

et d

iplo

mac

y an

d ba

ckch

anne

ls,co

nfid

ence

-bui

ldin

gm

easu

res,

inte

rnat

iona

l sup

-po

rt fo

r risk

taki

ng b

y th

epa

rtie

s the

mse

lves

,tra

ck-t

wo

wor

ksho

ps

Front 7/8/01 2:12 PM Page xxvi

mediated intervention by a third party in anintrastate conflict is directed at ending violenceand perhaps establishing a detailed road mapthat charts the way to a lasting peace settle-ment). However, such factors as the timing andsequence of negotiations, the choice of nego-tiating partners, the selection of a mediator(s),and the forum within which negotiations areconducted can exercise a decisive influence onoutcomes, including whether a settlement orarms control treaty is reached or not.The essaysin part III discuss the utility of different nego-tiation and mediation instruments at both dip-lomatic and unofficial levels and the impactdifferent kinds of negotiated interventions canhave on peace processes.

Table 1 illustrates that more than one set ofintervention strategies or response mechanismsmay be necessary to address sources of conflictat different levels of analysis.Furthermore, thesedifferent strategies and responses may, in fact,complement one another and therefore shouldnot be viewed as mutually exclusive options.Part IV of the volume develops this theme, ex-amining the role of international institutionsand regimes in the conflict management equa-tion.The essays in this section suggest that al-though international organizations such as theUnited Nations remain highly relevant to themaintenance of international peace and secu-rity, there is growing recognition that their ac-tivities and efforts must be complemented byan increasingly diverse portfolio of institutions,including regional and subregional organizationsand nongovernmental organizations. The es-says in this section also attempt to distill muchof the knowledge and experience gained overthe past decade about the utility of these dif-ferent institutions and their comparative ad-vantages in different conflict settings.

Once a negotiated agreement is reached,there may be the temptation to conclude thatthe job is done. Nothing could be further fromthe truth. As the essays in part V demonstrate,the challenges of consolidating the peace andmoving from a settlement to a genuine process

of reconciliation are as formidable as they arevaried. During the consolidation phase of apeace process, important choices have to bemade, such as whether to prosecute those ac-cused of war crimes or whether to use othermeans (e.g., truth commissions) to achieve na-tional reconciliation. There is no easy answerto, or ready-made formula for addressing, thesechallenges. However, in the five years since thepublication of Managing Global Chaos, scholarlyand policy understandings of what these pre-cise challenges are and what the prioritiesshould be in moving from settlement to rec-onciliation have grown enormously.The greatlyexpanded list of topics covered in this sectionreflects our enlarged understanding about notonly the scope of these challenges but also theobvious limitations to social and political engi-neering carried out on a local or even a nation-wide scale.

Figure 1 (“The Life Cycle of InternationalConflict Management”) takes a different per-spective, relating many of the different ap-proaches to conflict management available topeacemakers to different points on the conflictcycle. It does not incorporate sources of con-flict, as table 1 does, but instead focuses on thedynamics of conflicts and the timing of appro-priate responses. The bell curve on the chartrepresents in idealized form the pattern of aconflict, showing how a conflict escalates towardthe outbreak of violence and then de-escalatestoward rapprochement and reconciliation.Thecurve also indicates the types of conflict man-agement techniques that may be effective atparticular points of the conflict cycle. For in-stance, at the bottom of the curve, before vio-lence has broken out or after settlement hasbeen reached, approaches that stress develop-ing capacity to handle disputes peacefully—institution building, good governance, trans-parency, rule of law, fact finding, education,practitioner training, development assistance—may be not only appropriate but essential tothe prevention of conflict or consolidation ofpeace. At the higher end of the curve, after

INTRODUCTION xxvii

Front 7/8/01 2:12 PM Page xxvii

the outbreak of large-scale violence, the antag-onists may be closed to these kind of approachesand respond only to strong incentives and dis-incentives of both a political and a more coer-cive nature: mediation, political and economicsanctions, and military engagement in thepeace mission.

In looking at this curve, it is important to re-member that individual conflicts rarely followthis idealized pattern. Some double back onthemselves, swinging from tenuous settlementto renewed conflict, as happened in Angola inthe 1990s. Some never quite develop into full-

fledged conflicts, but simmer uneasily for years,as happened in Indonesia before the outbreak offighting over East Timor. Even so, the chartdoes provide a useful means of understandinggeneral conflict dynamics and identifying ap-propriate approaches to conflict management.

In these rapidly changing times, none ofthe essays in this volume can provide the lastword on any given subject. But they do repre-sent, in our opinion, some of the best thinkingand research on the topics they address. Ourbasic aim for this book is to provide a closerrepresentation of post–Cold War realities and

xxviii CHESTER A. CROCKER, FEN OSLER HAMPSON, AND PAMELA AALL

Figure 1. The Life Cycle of International Conflict Management

Source: Adapted from figure 2.1 in Michael S. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 38.

War

Crisis

Unstablepeace

Stablepeace

Crisis diplomacyMediation/negotiationSanctions and other coercive diplomacyMilitary deterrenceInternational appeal/condemnation

cease-fireoutbreak of violence

settlement

confrontation

rapprochement

rising tension

reconciliationRoutine diplomacyEducationPractitioner trainingCapacity buildingRegime/institution building

Conflict PreventionConfidence-building measures/arms regimesFact-finding/special envoysHumanitarian, economic, military assistanceFacilitation/peace conferences/conciliation

PeacemakingMediation/negotiationCoercive diplomacy

Peace enforcementPeace imposed by threat or use of force, not always with consent of partiesSanctions and arms embargoes

PeacekeepingOutside lightly armed military forces with consent of partiesOther security forces bolsteredRepatriation of refugees and other humanitarian assistance

Postconflict peacebuildingForeign aid/humanitarian assistanceJudicial measures/rule of lawRestoration or creation of government, society, infrastructureJoint or reconciled institutions (government, education, legal, military, media, civil society, etc.)Economic developmentEducation and training in preventive measures

Front 7/8/01 2:12 PM Page xxviii

INTRODUCTION xxix

experience while also capturing some of whatwe are learning and offering some snapshots ofa moving target: the full complexity of con-temporary conflict management in a turbulentworld. We hope that the essays and insights inthis volume will therefore not only illuminatebut also stimulate and provoke.

NOTES

1. For example, see Robert D. Kaplan, “TheComing Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (Feb-ruary 1994): 44–76.

2. For a critical view of a range of writings onchaos and anarchy, see Yahya Sadowski, The Myth ofGlobal Chaos (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-tion, 1998). Sadowski argues that the end of the ColdWar may have changed the world, its ills, and theirremedies less than imagined by what he terms the op-timists and pessimists.

3. See the chapter by Ted Robert Gurr (chap-ter 11) in this volume.

4. See, for example, J. A. Mathews,“Power Shift,”Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 ( January-February 1997):51–66.

5. Kofi Annan, Annual Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, General Assembly, OfficialRecords, Fifty-Fourth Session, September 20, 1999.

6. See the chapter by Warren Strobel (chapter 40).7. See the chapters by Bruce Jentleson (chapter

15), Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (chapter 21), JosephNye (chapter 22), Louis Kriesberg (chapter 25), SaadiaTouval and I. William Zartman (chapter 26), P. Ter-rence Hopmann (chapter 27),Raymond Cohen (chap-ter 28), Harold Saunders (chapter 29), Rolf Ekeus(chapter 31), and Alain Destexhe (chapter 38).

8. Geoffrey Blainey, Causes of War (New York:Free Press, 1973); Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Gar-den City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966); and Bernard Brodie,War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), esp.276–340, “Some Theories on the Causes of War.”

9. See chapters by Michael Howard (chapter 2),Charles Kupchan (chapter 3), Geoffrey Kemp (chap-ter 5), Michael Brown (chapter 13), Lawrence Freed-man (chapter 20), Michael Krepon and LawrenceScheinman (chapter 36), and David Yost (chapter 34).

10. See the chapters by Phil Williams (chapter 7),Paul Collier (chapter 10), Connie Peck (chapter 33),William Schabas (chapter 35), Mary Anderson (chap-ter 37), and John Paul Lederach (chapter 49).

11. On the challenges of democratization, see thechapter by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (chap-ter 8).

12. Among the chapters that deal with this tensionbetween governance and conflict management arethose by Edward Luttwak (chapter 16), Pamela Aall(chapter 23), Fen Hampson (chapter 24), MichaelDoyle (chapter 32), William Schabas (chapter 35),Roy Licklider (chapter 41), Pauline Baker (chapter44), Roland Paris (chapter 45), Timothy Sisk (chapter46), and Neil Kritz (chapter 47).

13. On the role of leadership in peacemaking, seethe chapter by Janice Gross Stein (chapter 12).

14. This volume makes its own contributions to-ward this agenda, but we also want to point interestedreaders to other work that shares the aim of derivingconcepts of best practice, such as Melanie C. Green-berg, John H. Barton, and Margaret E. McGuinness,eds., Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration toPrevent Deadly Conflict (Lanham, Md.: Rowman andLittlefield, 2000); and Barnett R. Rubin, ed., Cases andStrategies for Preventive Action (New York: CenturyFoundation Press, 1998).

15. For a sampling of the breadth of lessons learnedover the past decade, see the chapters by ChesterCrocker (chapter 14), Stanley Hoffmann (chapter 17),Richard Betts (chapter 18), Richard Haass (chap-ter 19), Nicole Ball (chapter 42), Stephen John Sted-man (chapter 43), and R. Scott Appleby (chapter 48).

16. See the chapters by Phil Williams (chap-ter 7), Mohammed Ayoob (chapter 9), Paul Collier(chapter 10), Ted Robert Gurr (chapter 11), andMichael Brown (chapter 13).

17. On criminality and other political economypathologies of conflict, see the chapters by Jean-MarieGuehenno (chapter 6), Paul Collier (chapter 10), andVirginia Haufler (chapter 39). On the relationshipbetween environmental degradation and conflict, seethe chapter by Nils Petter Gleditsch (chapter 4).

18. Christoph Bertram, “Naming a New Era:The Interregnum,” Foreign Policy (summer 2000).

19. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: ATheoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1959).

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