Case#1 De Mesa vs. Pepsi Cola Products,G.R. No. 153063-70 (2005)FIRST DIVISION[G.R. Nos. 153063-70. August 19, 2005]AMELIA D. DE MESA, ARACELI ADATO, RODRIGO ALVARAN, AIDA CASTRO, BALTAZAR ESTRELLES, ANTONIO A. FERRER, DANILO GARCIA, JULIO M. GONZALES, MARRIETA A. JOSE, PEPITA JUNTADO, EDUARDO U. LAGO, NESTOR RODA, JAIME SANCHEZ and JUANITA SANCHEZ,petitioners,vs.PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILS.,INC. and PEPSICO INC.,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NQUISUMBING,J.:For review oncertiorariis theOrder,[1]dated April 18, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142 in Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421. In the saidOrder, the RTC granted herein respondents motion to dismiss the complaints filed by petitioners herein based on the principle ofstare decisis.The instant case arose from the same set of facts as (1)Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 153183 promulgated on July 24, 2002[2]affirming the Court of AppealsDecision, dated April 16, 2002, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53860;[3]and (2)Rodrigo v. Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. and Pepsico, Inc.,G.R. No. 149411, dated October 1, 2001, which also affirmed the Court of AppealsDecisionof May 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62837.[4]The facts are culled from the aforesaidDecisionsof the Court of Appeals as affirmed by this Court.Petitioners are holders of soft drink bottle caps bearing the number 349, allegedly a winning combination in a contest sponsored by respondents Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (PCPPI) and PEPSICO, Inc. (PI).Respondent PCPPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the production, bottling, and distribution of carbonated drinks, while respondent PI is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines and is the major stockholder of PCPPI.D.G. Consultores, a Mexican consulting firm that handled similar promotions in other countries, was tasked to randomly pre-select the winning numbers and send to respondents a list of the 60 winning numbers with their corresponding security codes. The process of selecting the winning numbers was implemented with the approval of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).During the initial promotion period, from February 17 to May 8, 1992, respondents seeded 1000 numbers, 60 of which were winning numbers, 510 non-winning numbers, while the remaining 430 were unused. To ensure that the winning numbers would not be tampered, the DTI required respondents to submit the list of winning numbers including their security codes which was then deposited in a safety deposit box in a bank.[5]Owing to the promotional campaigns success, respondents extended the Number Fever by five more weeks, from May 10 to June 12, 1992. Pepsi again tapped D.G. Consultores to predetermine the 25 additional winning numbers from the list of unused numbers.On May 25, 1992, respondents announced 349 as the winning number for the May 26 draw. Later the same night, Quintin Gomez, Jr., then PCPPIs Marketing Services Manager called DTI Director Madarang informing her that due to some security code problems a mistake had been made in the announcement of number 349 as the winning number.[6]Numerous holders of the supposedly winning 349 crowns were not honored and paid by respondents, which led these rejected crown holders to file separate complaints for specific performance and damages.Civil Case No. 93-68351 was originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, but the plaintiffs in the said case withdrew their complaint, leaving Gerson Mendoza as the sole plaintiff inGerson M. Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc. and Pepsico, Inc.[7]The other plaintiffs re-filed their complaints before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50, entitledRomulo Rodrigo, et al. v. Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc., et al., docketed as Civil Case No. 94-71403.[8]For their part, petitioners herein filed their separate complaints, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142.In theMendozacase, the RTC dismissed the complaint filed against herein respondents for specific performance and damages in connection with the Number Fever fiasco.[9]Mendoza appealed to the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53860, which was dismissed for lack of merit.[10]Unfazed, Mendoza filed with this Court a petition for review, which was denied for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.[11]In theRodrigocase, the RTC likewise dismissed the complaint against herein respondents for specific performance and damages arising from the said promotion.[12]On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 62837, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.[13]A petition for review was subsequently filed with this Court, which was denied for failure to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court. The motion for reconsideration was also denied with finality[14]and entry of judgment was made.[15]However, prior to the resolution of theMendozaandRodrigocases, herein petitioners filed with the RTC, on December 11, 2000, a motion for leave[16]to (1) adopt the previous testimonial and documentary evidence in theMendozaandRodrigocases; or (2) archive the case until final resolution of the said two cases, which were then pending with the Court of Appeals. The RTC granted the said motion on January 8, 2001 and the case was accordingly archived.[17]Meantime, theRodrigocase became final and executory on February 5, 2002 in view of our denial of therein petitioners petition for review oncertiorariand motion for reconsideration.Hence, on February 20, 2002, herein respondents filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss[18]the complaints filed by petitioners herein invoking the principle ofstare decisis. The RTC, in its assailed Order,[19]granted the motion to dismiss ratiocinating as follows:The Court finds the instant motion meritorious under the principle ofstaredecisis. The said doctrine embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity or privy of parties. This is explicitly ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system. Such decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto (Kilosbayan, Inc. et al. vs. Manuel Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995).In the instant cases as well as in Civil Case No. 93-68351 (the Mendoza case), not only are the legal rights and relations of the parties substantially the same as those passed upon in Civil Case No. 94-71403 (the Rodrigo case), but the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case, i.e. the Rodrigo case in Civil Case No. 94-71403, under the rule ofstaredecisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[20]Petitioners now come to us in this petition for review claiming that (1) the principle ofres judicatadoes not apply; and (2) the dismissal of the complaint was premature as petitioners motion to archive the case and the grant thereof was based on the condition that there be a final resolution in theMendozaandRodrigocases.[21]Simply put, the sole issue is whether the present case is barred by this Courts ruling in theMendozaandRodrigocases.Petitioners contend thatres judicatadoes not apply as there is no identity of parties to begin with. Moreover, they argue thatstare decisisis not a hard and fast rule. They insist another review should be taken on the cause of action in this case because the Court of Appeals, in theMendozaandRodrigocases, erred in ruling that the security code determines the real winning crowns. They claim that the trial courts dismissal of their complaint was premature. Lastly, petitioners posit that there was a breached contract between the parties; therefore, respondents should be made to perform their contractual obligation.For their part, respondents counter that the RTC correctly dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground ofres judicata. Respondents contend that, like theMendozaandRodrigocases, the civil cases filed by petitioners arose from the conduct of respondents Number Fever promotion. Petitioners causes of action, testimonial and documentary evidence, are the same as those in theMendozaandRodrigocases. Lastly, respondents point out that the findings of fact in the said two cases are also the same,i.e.: (i) Respondents did not breach any contract since the 349 crowns with security code L-2560-FQ are not winning crowns; and (ii) Respondents were not negligent in the conduct of their promotion and they exerted efforts to ensure the integrity and smooth conduct of the same.The instant petition must be denied.The principle ofstare decisis et non quieta movere[22]is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine ofstare decisisis based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.[23]In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the evidence are exactly the same as those in the decided cases ofMendozaandRodrigo,supra. Hence, nothing is left to be argued. The issue has been settled and this Courts final decision in the said cases must be respected. This Courts hands are now tied by the finality of the said judgments. We have no recourse but to deny the instant petition.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, in Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio,andAzcuna, JJ.,concur.

[1]Rollo, pp. 29-30.[2]Id. at 190.[3]Id. at 153-168.[4]Id. at 315.[5]Id. at 304.[6]Id. at 306.[7]Id. at 143-152.[8]Id. at 289-300.[9]Id. at 143-152.[10]Id. at 153-168.[11]Id. at 190.[12]Id. at 289-300.[13]Id. at 301-314.[14]Id. at 316.[15]Id. at 317.[16]Records, Vol. 2, pp. 896-899.[17]Id.at 909-910.[18]Id. at 1015-1020.[19]Rollo, pp. 29-30.[20]Ibid.[21]Id. at 11.[22]To adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established.[23]Castillov. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138231, 21 February 2002, 377 SCRA 509, 515.

Case#2 Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153 (2006) [Only the dissenting opinion of J. Puno]DISSENTING OPINIONCORONA,J.:The life of the law is not logic but experience.1Our collective experience as a nation breathes life to our system of laws, especially to the Constitution. These cases promise to significantly contribute to our collective experience as a nation. Fealty to the primary constitutional principle that the Philippines is not merely a republican State but a democratic one as well behooves this Court to affirm the right of the people to participate directly in the process of introducing changes to their fundamental law. These petitions present such an opportunity. Thus, this is an opportune time for this Court to uphold the sovereign rights of the people.I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently explained the rationale for upholding the peoples initiative. However, I wish to share my own thoughts on certain matters I deem material and significant.SantiagoDoes Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997 Delfin PetitionThe COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners purportedly on the basis of this Courts ruling inSantiago v. COMELEC2that: (1) RA 6753 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative regarding amendments to the Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative regarding amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law was validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the initiative provision.However,Santiagoshould not apply to this case but only to the petition of Delfin in 1997. It would be unreasonable to make it apply to all petitions which were yet unforeseen in 1997. The fact is thatSantiagowas focused on the Delfin petition alone.Those who oppose the exercise of the peoples right to initiate changes to the Constitution via initiative claim thatSantiagobarred any and all future petitions for initiative by virtue of the doctrines ofstare decisisandres judicata. The argument is flawed.Theponenciaof Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments relating tostare decisis. Hence, I will address the argument from the viewpoint ofres judicata.Res judicatais the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.3It has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits and (4) there must be identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action between the first and second actions.4There is no identity of parties inSantiagoand the instant case. While the COMELEC was also the respondent inSantiago, the petitioners in that case and those in this case are different. More significantly, there is no identity of causes of action in the two cases.Santiagoinvolved amendments to Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution while the present petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of Article VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, therefore, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the present petition for initiative was barred bySantiagoand, on that ground, dismissed the petition.The present petition and that inSantiagoare materially different from each other. They are not based on the same facts. There is thus no cogent reason to frustrate and defeat the present direct action of the people to exercise their sovereignty by proposing changes to their fundamental law.Peoples Initiative Should NotBe Subjected to ConditionsPeoples initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves exclusively. Neither Congress nor the COMELEC has the power to curtail or defeat this exclusive power of the people to change the Constitution. Neither should the exercise of this power be made subject to any conditions, as some would have us accept.Oppositors to the peoples initiative point out that this Court ruled inSantiagothat RA 6735 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and, thus, no law existed to enable the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution. This reasoning is seriously objectionable.The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of place. It was unprecedented and dangerously transgressed the domain reserved to the legislature.While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining the validity and sufficiency of a petition to amend the constitution,5that procedure cannot unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege.6In the same vein, this Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the peoples right to directly propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and other grammatical but insignificant omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the people will be severely emasculated, if not rendered illusory.Peoples Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution Directly Should not be Unreasonably CurtailedIf Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mererepresentativebodies, can propose changes to the Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic itselfthe peoplemay not do sodirectly.Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of direct democracy as opposed to representative democracy. The system of initiative allows citizens to directly propose constitutional amendments for the general electorate to adopt or reject at the polls, particularly in a plebiscite. While representative government was envisioned to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations,7the exercise of direct democracy through initiative reserves direct lawmaking power to the people by providing them a method to make new laws via the constitution, or alternatively by enacting statutes.8Efforts of the represented to control their representatives through initiative have been described as curing the problems of democracy with more democracy.9The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.10Unless the present petition is granted, this constitutional principle will be nothing but empty rhetoric, devoid of substance for those whom it seeks to empower.The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the Constitution is a fundamental right and must be jealously guarded.11The people should be allowed to directly seek redress of the problems of society and representative democracy with the constitutional tools they have reserved for their use alone.Accordingly, I vote toGRANTthe petition in G.R. No. 174513.RENATO C. CORONAAssociate Justice

Notes:1Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616.2336 Phil. 848 (1997).3Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134787, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA 1.4Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, vol. I, 2001 edition, p. 419.5Sec. 30, Petitions and initiatives by the people, 16 Am Jur 2d 380, citingState ex rel. Stenberg v. Beermann, 240 Neb. 754, 485 N.W. 2d 151 (1992).6Id. citingCoalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 83 Ill. 2d 236, 47 Ill. Dec. 363, 415 N.E. 2d 368 (1980).7Balitzer, Alfred,The Initiative and Referendum: A Study and Evaluation of Direct Legislation, The California Roundtable 13 (1981). The American Founding Fathers recognized that direct democracy posed a profound threat to individual rights and liberty. The U.S. Constitution was designed to provide a system of government that would prevent either a tyranny of the majority or a tyranny of the few. James Madison warned against the power of a majority or a minority of the population united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interest of the community.8Gilbert Hahn & Steven C. Morton,Initiative and Referendum Do They Encourage or Impair Better State Government?5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1977).9Florida Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Initiatives and Referenda: Issues in Citizen Lawmaking (1986).10Sec. 1, Article II, Constitution.11In re Initiative Petition No. 362 State Question 669, 899 P.2d 1145 (Okla. 1995).

Case#4 Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, G.R. No. 95770 (1993)Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LEONARDO EBRALINAG, JUSTINIANA TANTOG, represented by her father AMOS TANTOG; JEMILOYAO & JOEL OYAO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ELIEZER OYAO; JANETH DIAMOS & JEREMIAS DIAMOS, represented by parents MR. & MRS. GODOFREDO DIAMOS; SARA OSTIA & JONATHAN OSTIA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FAUTO OSTIA; IRVIN SEQUINO & RENAN SEQUINO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LYDIO SEQUINO; NAPTHALE TANACAO, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL TANACAO; PRECILA PINO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. FELIPE PINO; MARICRIS ALFAR, RUWINA ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. HERMINIGILDO ALFAR; FREDESMINDA ALFAR & GUMERSINDO ALFAR, represented by their parents ABDON ALFAR; ALBERTO ALFAR & ARISTIO ALFAR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. GENEROSO ALFAR; MARTINO VILLAR, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. GENARO VILLAR; PERGEBRIEL GUINITA & CHAREN GUINITA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. CESAR GUINITA; ALVIN DOOP, represented by his parents MR. & MRS. LEONIDES DOOP; RHILYN LAUDE, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. RENE LAUDE; LEOREMINDA MONARES, represented by her parents, MR. & MRS. FLORENCIO MONARES; MERCY MONTECILLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. MANUEL MONTECILLO; ROBERTO TANGAHA, represented by his parent ILUMINADA TANGAHA; EVELYN, MARIA & FLORA TANGAHA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ALBERTO TANGAHA; MAXIMO EBRALINAG, represented by his parents, MR. & MRS. PAQUITO EBRALINAG; JUTA CUMON, GIDEON CUMON & JONATHAN CUMON, represented by their father RAFAEL CUMON; EVIE LUMAKANG & JUNAR LUMAKANG, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LUMAKANG; EMILIO SARSOZO, PAZ AMOR SARSOZO & IGNA MARIE SARSOZO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. VIRGILIO SARSOZO; MICHAEL JOSEPH & HENRY JOSEPH, represented by parent ANNIE JOSEPH; EMERSON TABLASON & MASTERLOU TABLASON, represented by their parent EMERLITO TABLASON,petitioners,vs.THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU,respondent.G.R. No. 95887 March 1, 1993MAY AMOLO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. ISAIAS AMOLO; REDFORD ALSADO, JOEBERT ALSADO & RUDYARD ALSADO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ABELARDO ALSADO; NELIA ALSADO, REU ALSADO & LILIBETH ALSADO, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. ROLANDO ALSADO; SUZETTE NAPOLES, represented by her parents ISMAILITO NAPOLES & OPHELIA NAPOLES; JESICA CARMELOTES, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. SERGIO CARMELOTES; BABY JEAN MACAPAS, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. TORIBIO MACAPAS; GERALDINE ALSADO, represented by her parents MR. & MRS. JOEL ALSADO; RAQUEL DEMOTOR & LEAH DEMOTOR, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. LEONARDO DEMOTOR; JURELL VILLA & MELONEY VILLA, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. JOVENIANO VILLA; JONELL HOPE MAHINAY, MARY GRACE MAHINAY and MAGDALENE MAHINAY, represented by their parents MR. & MRS. FELIX MAHINAY; JONALYN ANTIOLA and JERWIN ANTIOLA, represented by their parents FELIFE ANTIOLA and ANECITA ANTIOLA; MARIA CONCEPCION CABUYAO, represented by her parents WENIFREDO CABUYAO and ESTRELLITA CABUYAO, NOEMI TURNO represented by her parents MANUEL TURNO and VEVENCIA TURNO; SOLOMON PALATULON, SALMERO PALATULON and ROSALINDA PALATULON, represented by their parents MARTILLANO PALATULON and CARMILA PALATULON, petitioners,vs.THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU and ANTONIO A. SANGUTAN, respondents.Felino M. Ganal for petitioners.The Solicitor General for respondents.GRIO-AQUINO,J.:These two special civil actions for certiorari,Mandamusand Prohibition were consolidated because they raise essentially the same issue: whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers" in the Philippines.In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides:Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National anthem.Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provided.Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremonyprovided by this Act and in accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing,shall subject the educational institution concerned and its head to public censureas an administrative punishment which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag-ceremony provided by this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing,shall cause the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution responsible for such failure.The implementing rules and regulations in Department Order No. 8 provide:RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public and private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and lowered at sunset. The flag-staff must be straight, slightly and gently tapering at the end, and of such height as would give the Flag a commanding position in front of the building or within the compound.2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which event the ceremony may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the afternoon of the same day. The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be conducted in the following manner:a. Pupils and teachersor students and faculty memberswho are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. At command, books shall be put away or held in the left hand andeverybody shall come to attention. Those with hats shall uncover. No one shall enter or leave the school grounds during the ceremony.b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthemaccompanied by the school band or without the accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be played by the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being raised,all persons present shall stand at attention and execute a salute. Boys and men with hats shall salute by placing the hat over the heart. Those without hat may stand with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall give the salute prescribed by their regulations. The salute shall be started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last note of the anthem.c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem,the assembly shall recite in unison the following patriotic pledge(English or vernacular version), which may bring the ceremony to a close. This is required of all public schools and of private schools which are intended for Filipino students or whose population is predominantly Filipino.English VersionI love the Philippines.It is the land of my birth;It is the home of my people.It protects me and helps me to be, strong, happy and useful.In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;I will obey the rules of my school;I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;I will be a true, Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.xxx xxx xxxJehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" (p. 10,Rollo) which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God" (p. 8, Rollo). They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves fromidols 1 John 5:21" (p. 9,Rollo). They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10,Rollo). They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control (p. 10,Rollo).This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of 1955, has been raised before this Court.The same issue was raised in 1959 inGerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 2 (1959) andBalbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960). This Court in the Gerona case upheld the expulsion of the students, thus:The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar.In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing anon-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to develop, among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship.The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority.The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. (pp. 2-3).Geronawas reiterated inBalbuna, as follows:The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru Republic Act 1265 to promulgate said Department Order, and its provisions requiring the observance of the flag salute, not being a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of religion. (Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150).Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling inGeronahave been incorporated in Section 28, Title VI, Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which took effect on September 21, 1988 (one year after its publication in the Official Gazette, Vol. 63, No. 38 of September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of Section 28 gives legislative cachet to the ruling inGerona, thus:5. Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be dismissed after due investigation.However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the above provision of the new Administrative Code of 1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No. 1265 and the implementing orders of the DECS.In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge. Division Superintendent of Schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS, and Dr. Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso, Assistant Division Superintendent, recalling this Court's decision inGerona, issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated November 17, 1989 (pp. 147-148,Rolloof G.R. No. 95770) directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of Private Educational institutions as follows:1. Reports reaching this Office disclose that there are a number of teachers, pupils, students, and school employees in public schools who refuse to salute the Philippine flag or participate in the daily flag ceremony because of some religious belief.2. Such refusal not only undermines Republic Act No. 1265 and the DECS Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955 (Implementing Rules and Regulations) but also strikes at the heart of the DECS sustained effort to inculcate patriotism and nationalism.3. Let it be stressed that any belief that considers the flag as an image is not in any manner whatever a justification for not saluting the Philippine flag or not participating in flag ceremony. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Philippine says:The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)4. As regards the claim for freedom of belief, which an objectionist may advance, the Supreme Court asserts:But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)5. Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to participate in the daily flag ceremony or to obey the flag salute regulation spelled out in Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955, shall be considered removed from the service after due process.6. In strong language about pupils and students who do the same the Supreme Court has this to say:If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow Citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it! Having elected not to comply with the regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 15.)7. School administrators shall therefore submit to this Office a report on those who choose not to participate in flag ceremony or salute the Philippine flag. (pp. 147-148,Rolloof G.R. No. 95770; Emphasis supplied).Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano dialect promising to sing the national anthem, place their right hand on their breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46,Rolloof G.R. No. 95770 and p. 48,Rolloof G.R. No. 95887), but they refused to sign the "Kasabutan" (p. 20,Rolloof G.R. No. 95770).In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents, as disclosed in his letter of October 17, 1990, excerpts from which reveal the following:After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's Witnesses' parents on October 2, 1990 and yesterday due to their firm stand not to salute the flag of the Republic of the Philippines during Flag Ceremony and other occasions, as mandated by law specifically Republic Act No. 1265, this Office hereby orders the dropping from the list in the School Register (BPS Form I) of all teachers, all Jehovah Witness pupils from Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.xxx xxx xxxThis order is in compliance with Division Memorandum No. 108 s. 1989 dated November 17, 1989 by virtue of Department Order No. 8 s. 1955 dated July 21, 1955 in accordance with Republic Act No. 1265 and Supreme Court Decision of a case "Genaro Gerona, et al., Petitioners and Appellants vs. The Honorable Secretary of Education, et al., Respondents and Appellees' dated August 12, 1959 against their favor. (p. 149,Rolloof G.R. No. 95770.)In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to attend public schools." (p. 47,Rolloof G.R. No. 95770.)1st IndorsementDAANBANTAYAN DISTRICT IIDaanbantayan, Cebu, July 24, 1990.Respectfully returned to Mrs. Alicia A. Diaz, School In Charge [sic], Agujo Elementary School with the information thatthis office is sad to order the droppingof Jeremias Diamos and Jeaneth Diamos, Grades III and IV pupils respectivelyfrom the roll since they opted to follow their religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law(R.A. 1265) and DECS Order No. 8, series of 1955, having elected not to comply with the regulation about the flag salute they forfeited their right to attend public schools (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Philippines 15). However, should they change their mind to respect and follow the Flag Salute Law they may be re-accepted.(Sgd.) MANUEL F. BIONGCOGDistrict Supervisor(p. 47,Rolloof G.R. No. 95770.)The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students of the Daanbantayan National High School, Agujo Elementary School, Calape Barangay National High School, Pinamungajan Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central School, Canasojan Elementary School, Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School, San Juan Primary School and Northern Central Elementary School of San Fernando, Cebu, upon order of then Acting Division Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso, prompted some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the Secretary of Education Isidro Cario but the latter did not answer their letter. (p. 21,Rollo.)The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not recall the expulsion orders of his predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some more children of Jehovah's Witnesses.On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions forMandamus,Certiorariand Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship (p. 23,Rollo). The petitioners pray that:c. Judgment be rendered:i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of herein petitioners from their respective schools;ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the petitioners from their classes or otherwise implementing the expulsion ordered on petitioners; andiii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-admission of petitioners to their respective schools. (p. 41,Rollo.)and that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the expulsion of the petitioners and to re-admit them to their respective classes.On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders from this Court (p. 57,Rollo).The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor Manuel F. Biongcog to be impleaded as respondents in these cases.On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p. 98,Rollo) defending the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents on the grounds that:1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and anti-social school children and consequently disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's Witnesses that the DECS' rules and regulations on the flag salute ceremonies are violative of their freedom of religion and worship.3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates respect and love of country, for which the flag stands.4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations in question do not warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on the basis of their own self-perceived religious convictions.5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified, besides having scriptural basis.7. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987).Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year old decision of this court inGeronaupholding the flag salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to be trifled with.It is somewhat ironic however, that after theGeronaruling had received legislative cachet by its in corporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to re-examine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech**and the free exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-531).The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare (J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings (Annex F,Rolloof G.R. No. 95887, p. 50 andRolloof G.R. No. 95770, p. 48). Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.The situation that the Court directly predicted inGeronathat:The flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an exemption. (Gerona, p. 24.)has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared inGerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked inWest Virginia vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):. . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . When they [diversity] are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . . assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.)Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).InVictoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor group:. . . It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interests" intervenes. (Sherbert vs. Berner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct. 1790.)We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court inNon vs. DamesII, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Philippine flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and our own flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a beautiful sight to behold that made our hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained freedom and sovereignty of our nation.Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorariand prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order which was issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.Quiason, J., took no part.Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.Separate OpinionsCRUZ,J.,concurring:I am happy to concur with Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino in her quietly eloquent affirmation of a vital postulate of freedom. I would only add my brief observations concerningGerona v. Secretary of Education.In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that promulgated it was apparently laboring under the conviction that the State had the right to determine what was religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual what he could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not a religious image but a symbol of the nation, itwas implying that no one had the right to worship it or as the petitioners insisted not to worship it. This was no different from saying that the cult that reveres Rizal as a divinity should not and cannot do so because he is only a civic figure deserving honor but not veneration.It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to worship or whether to worship at all. This is a personal decision he alone can make. The individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a tree (or a flag), and the State cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to do so. As long as his beliefs are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest, he cannot be prohibited from harboring them or punished for doing so.In requiring the herein petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony, the State has declaredex cathedrathat they are not violating the Bible by saluting the flag. This is to me an unwarranted intrusion into their religious beliefs, which tell them the opposite. The State cannot interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right or wrong, the meaning they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps by their own acknowledged superiors. But certainly not the State. It has no competence in this matter. Religion is forbidden territory that the State, for all its power and authority, cannot invade.I am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."But in the case at bar, the law to which the petitioners are made to conform clashes with their own understanding of their religious obligations. Significantly, as theponencianotes, their intransigence does not disturb the peaceful atmosphere of the school or otherwise prejudice the public order. Their refusal to salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge does not disrupt the flag ceremony. They neither mock nor disdain it. The petitioners simply stand at attention and keep quiet "to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings." It is for this innocuous conduct that, pursuant to the challenged law and regulations, the teachers have been dismissed and the students excelled.Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels.PADILLA,J.,concurring:I concur in the Court's decision penned by Madame Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino that school teachers and students who cannot salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the country, on grounds of religious belief or conviction, may not on this ground alone be dismissed from the service or expelled from the school.At the same time, I am really concerned with what could be thefar-reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning aprivilegedoreliteclass of teachers and students who will hereafter be exempt from participating,even when they are in the school premises, in the flag ceremony in deference to their religious scruples. What happens, for instance, if some citizens, based also on their religious beliefs, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees to the government? Perhaps problems of this nature should not be anticipated. They will be resolved when and if they ever arise. But with today's decision, we may have created more problems than we have solved.It cannot also be denied that the State has the right and even the duty to promote among its citizens, especially the youth, love and country, respect for the flag and reverence for its national heroes. It cannot also be disputed that the State has the right to adopt reasonable means by which these laudable objectives can be effectively pursued and achieved. The flag ceremony is one such device intended to inspire patriotism and evoke the finest sentiments of love of country and people.In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble) ends. For aselect fewto be exempt from the flag ceremony and all that it represent seven if the exemption is predicated on respect for religious scruples, could bedivisivein its impact on the school population or community.I would therefore submit that, henceforth, teachers and students who because of religious scruples or beliefs cannot actively participate in the flag ceremony conducted in the school premises should be excluded beforehand from such ceremony. Instead of allowing the religious objector to attend the flag ceremonyand display therein his inability to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the Republic, he or she should remain in the classroom while honors to the flag are conducted and manifested in the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within school premises; or if the flag ceremony must be held in a hall, the religious objector must take his or her place at the rear of (or outside) the hall while those who actively participate in the ceremony must take the front places. This arrangement can, in my view, achieve an accommodation and, to a certain extent, harmonization of a citizen's constitutional right to freedom of religion and a valid exercise of the State's fundamental and legitimate authority to require homage and honor to the flag as the symbol of the Nation.#Separate OpinionsCRUZ,J.,concurring:I am happy to concur with Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino in her quietly eloquent affirmation of a vital postulate of freedom. I would only add my brief observations concerningGerona v. Secretary of Education.In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that promulgated it was apparently laboring under the conviction that the State had the right to determine what was religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual what he could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not a religious image but a symbol of the nation, itwas implying that no one had the right to worship it or as the petitioners insisted not to worship it. This was no different from saying that the cult that reveres Rizal as a divinity should not and cannot do so because he is only a civic figure deserving honor but not veneration.It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to worship or whether to worship at all. This is a personal decision he alone can make. The individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a tree (or a flag), and the State cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to do so. As long as his beliefs are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest, he cannot be prohibited from harboring them or punished for doing so.In requiring the herein petitioners to participate in the flag ceremony, the State has declaredex cathedrathat they are not violating the Bible by saluting the flag. This is to me an unwarranted intrusion into their religious beliefs, which tell them the opposite. The State cannot interpret the Bible for them; only they can read it as they see fit. Right or wrong, the meaning they derive from it cannot be revised or reversed except perhaps by their own acknowledged superiors. But certainly not the State. It has no competence in this matter. Religion is forbidden territory that the State, for all its power and authority, cannot invade.I am not unaware of Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma."But in the case at bar, the law to which the petitioners are made to conform clashes with their own understanding of their religious obligations. Significantly, as theponencianotes, their intransigence does not disturb the peaceful atmosphere of the school or otherwise prejudice the public order. Their refusal to salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge does not disrupt the flag ceremony. They neither mock nor disdain it. The petitioners simply stand at attention and keep quiet "to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings." It is for this innocuous conduct that, pursuant to the challenged law and regulations, the teachers have been dismissed and the students excelled.Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message as clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels.PADILLA,J.,concurring:I concur in the Court's decision penned by Madame Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino that school teachers and students who cannot salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the country, on grounds of religious belief or conviction, may not on this ground alone be dismissed from the service or expelled from the school.At the same time, I am really concerned with what could be thefar-reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning aprivilegedoreliteclass of teachers and students who will hereafter be exempt from participating,even when they are in the school premises, in the flag ceremony in deference to their religious scruples. What happens, for instance, if some citizens, based also on their religious beliefs, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees to the government? Perhaps problems of this nature should not be anticipated. They will be resolved when and if they ever arise. But with today's decision, we may have created more problems than we have solved.It cannot also be denied that the State has the right and even the duty to promote among its citizens, especially the youth, love and country, respect for the flag and reverence for its national heroes. It cannot also be disputed that the State has the right to adopt reasonable means by which these laudable objectives can be effectively pursued and achieved. The flag ceremony is one such device intended to inspire patriotism and evoke the finest sentiments of love of country and people.In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble) ends. For aselect fewto be exempt from the flag ceremony and all that it represent seven if the exemption is predicated on respect for religious scruples, could bedivisivein its impact on the school population or community.I would therefore submit that, henceforth, teachers and students who because of religious scruples or beliefs cannot actively participate in the flag ceremony conducted in the school premises should be excluded beforehand from such ceremony. Instead of allowing the religious objector to attend the flag ceremonyand display therein his inability to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the Republic, he or she should remain in the classroom while honors to the flag are conducted and manifested in the "quadrangle" or equivalent place within school premises; or if the flag ceremony must be held in a hall, the religious objector must take his or her place at the rear of (or outside) the hall while those who actively participate in the ceremony must take the front places. This arrangement can, in my view, achieve an accommodation and, to a certain extent, harmonization of a citizen's constitutional right to freedom of religion and a valid exercise of the State's fundamental and legitimate authority to require homage and honor to the flag as the symbol of the Nation.#Footnotes** The flag salute, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge are all forms of utterances.

Case#5 Ayala Corporation vs. Rosa Diana Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 134284 (2000)SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 134284.December 1, 2000]AYALA CORPORATION,petitioner, vs.ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,respondent.D E C I S I O NDE LEON, JR.,J.:Before us is a petition for review oncertiorariseeking the reversal of a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 4598 entitled, Ayala Corporation vs. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation, dismissing Ayala Corporations petition for lack of merit.The facts of the case are not in dispute:Petitioner Ayala Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Ayala) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City with an area of 840 square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 233435 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po andSyKa Kieng married to Rosa Chan.The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions.Among the Special Conditions of Sale were:a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to the vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latters approvalb) the construction of the building shall start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979.Before such completion, neither the deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released even if the purchase price shall have been fully paidc) there shall be no resale of the propertyThe Deed Restrictions, on the other hand, contained the stipulation that the gross floor area of the building to be constructed shall not be more than five (5) times the lot area and the total height shall not exceed forty two (42) meters.The restrictions were to expire in the year 2025.Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng failed to construct the building in violation of the Special Conditions of Sale.Notwithstanding the violation, Manuel Sy and Sy KaKieng, inApril 1989, were able to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Rosa-Diana) with Ayalas approval.As a consideration for Ayala to release the Certificate of Title of the subject property, Rosa-Diana, on July 27, 1989 executed an Undertaking promising to abide by said special conditions of sale executed between Ayala and the original vendees.Upon the submission of the Undertaking, together with the building plans for a condominium project, known as The Peak,Ayala released title to the lot, thereby enabling Rosa-Diana to register the deed of sale in its favor and obtain Certificate of Title No. 165720 in its name.The title carried as encumbrances the special conditions of sale and the deed restrictions.Rosa-Dianas building plans as approved by Ayala were subject to strict compliance of cautionary notices appearing on the building plans and to the restrictions encumbering the Lot regarding the use and occupancy of the same.Thereafter,Rosa-Diana submitted to the building official of Makati another set of building plans for The Peak which were substantially different from those that it earlier submitted to Ayala for approval.While the building plans which Rosa-Diana submitted to Ayala for approval envisioned a 24-meter high, seven (7) storey condominium project with a gross floor area of 3,968.56 square meters, the building plans which Rosa-Diana submitted to the building official of Makati, contemplated a 91.65 meter high, 38 storey condominium building with a gross floor area of 23,305.09 square meters.[1]Needless to say, while the first set of building plans complied with the deed restrictions, the latter set exceededthe same.During the construction of Rosa-Dianas condominium project, Ayala filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 139 for specific performance, with application for a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order against Rosa-Diana Realty seeking to compel the latter to comply with the contractual obligations under the deed of restrictions annotated on its title as well as with the building plans it submitted to the latter.In the alternative, Ayala prayed for rescission of the sale of the subject lot to Rosa- Diana Realty.The lower court denied Ayalas prayer for injunctive relief, thus enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the construction of the building.Undeterred, Ayala tried to cause the annotation of a notice oflis pendenson Rosa-Dianas title.The Register of Deeds of Makati, however, refused registration of the notice oflis pendenson the ground that the case pending before the trial court, being an action for specific performance and/or rescission,is an actionin personamwhich does not involve the title, use or possession of the property.[2]The Land Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the ruling of the Register of Deeds saying that an action for specific performance or rescission may be classified as a proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting title to the land or the use or occupation thereof for which a notice oflis pendensmay be held proper.[3]The decision of the LRA, however,was overturned by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157.In G.R. No. 112774, We affirmed the ruling of the CA on February 16, 1994 sayingWe agree with respondent court that the notice of lis pendens is not proper in this instance. The case before the trial court is a personal action since the cause of action thereof arises primarily from the alleged violation of the Deed of Restrictions.In the meantime, Ayala completed its presentation of evidence before the trial court.Rosa-Diana filed a Demurrer to Evidence averring that Ayala failed to establish its right to the relief sought inasmuch as (a) Ayala admittedly does not enforce the deed restrictions uniformly and strictly (b) Ayala has lost its right/power to enforce the restrictions due to its own acts and omissions; and (c) the deed restrictions are no longer valid and effective against lot buyers in Ayalas controlled subdivision.The trial court sustained Rosa-Dianas Demurrer to Evidence saying that Ayala was guilty of abandonment and/or estoppel due to its failure to enforce the terms of deed of restrictions and special conditions of sale against Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng.The trial court noted that notwithstanding the violation of the special conditions of sale, Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng were able to transfer the title to Rosa-Diana with the approval of Ayala.The trial court added that Ayalas failure to enforce the restrictions with respect to Trafalgar, Shellhouse, Eurovilla, LPL Plaza, Parc Regent, LPL Mansion and Leronville which are located within Salcedo Village,shows that Ayala discriminated against those which it wants to have the obligation enforced.The trial court then concluded that for Ayala to discriminately choose which obligor would be made to follow certain conditions and which should not, did not seem fair and legal.The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court saying that the appeal is sealed by the doctrine of the law of the case in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157 where it was stated that]x x x Ayala is barred from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions in question pursuant to the doctrine of waiver and estoppel. Under the terms of the deed of sale, the vendee Sy Ka Kieng assumed faithful compliance with the special conditions of sale and with the Salcedo Village Deed of Restrictions. One of the conditions was that a building would be constructed within one year. However, Sy Ka Kieng failed to construct the building as required under the Deed of Sale.Ayala did nothing to enforce the terms of the contract. In fact, it even agreed to the sale of the lot by Sy Ka Kieng in favor of petitioner Realty in 1989 or thirteen (13) years later. We, therefore, see no justifiable reason for Ayala to attempt to enforce the terms of the conditions of sale against the petitioner.x x xThe Court of Appeals also cited C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled, Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation which relied onC.A. G.R. S.P.No. 29157in ruling that Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed restrictions in dispute.Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner, the Court of Appeals clarified thatthe citation of the decision in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488, February 27, 1996, was made not because said decision isres judicatato the case at bar but rather because it is precedential under the doctrine ofstare decisis.Upon denial of said motion for reconsideration, Ayala filed the present appeal.Ayala contends that the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157 that it is estopped from enforcing the deed restrictions is merelyobiter dictainasmuch as the only issue raised in the aforesaid case was the propriety of alis pendensannotation on Rosa-Dianas certificate of title.Ayala avers that Rosa-Diana presented no evidence whatsoever on Ayalas supposed waiver or estoppel in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157.Ayala likewise pointed out that at the time C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157 was on appeal, the issues of the validity and continued viability of the deed of restrictions and their enforceability by Ayala were joined and then being tried before the trial court.Petitioners assignment of errors in the present appeal may essentially be summarized as follows:I.The Court of Appeals acted in a manner not in accord with law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in holding that the doctrine of the law of the case, orstare decisis, operated to dismiss Ayalas appeal.II.The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law and departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it failed to expressly pass upon the specific errors assigned in Ayalas appeal.A discussion on the distinctions betweenlaw of the case,stare decisisandobiter dictais in order.The doctrine of thelaw of the casehas certain affinities with, but is clearly distinguishable from, the doctrines ofres judicataandstare decisis, principally on the ground that the rule of thelaw of the caseoperates only in the particular case and only as a rule of policy and not as one of law.[4]At variancewith the doctrine ofstare decisis, the ruling adhered to in the particular case under the doctrine of thelaw of the caseneed not be followed as a precedent in subsequent litigation between other parties, neither by the appellate court which made the decision followed on a subsequent appeal in the same case, nor by any other court.The ruling covered by the doctrine of thelaw of the caseis adhered to in the single case where it arises, but is not carried into other cases as a precedent.[5]On the other hand, under the doctrine ofstare decisis, once a point of law has been established by the court, that point of law will, generally, be followed by the same court and by all courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised.[6]Stare decisisproceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.[7]The Court of Appeals, in ruling against petitioner Ayala Corporation stated that the appeal is sealed by the doctrine of thelaw of the case, referring to G.R. No. 112774 entitled Ayala Corporation,petitionervs. Court of Appeals, et al.,respondents.The Court of Appeals likewise made reference to C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled, Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, Inc.in ruling against petitioner saying that it is jurisprudential under the doctrine ofstare decisis.It must be pointed out that the only issue that was raised before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157 was whether or not the annotation oflis pendensis proper.The Court of Appeals, in its decision, in fact stated the principal issue to be resolved is:whether or not an action for specific performance, or in the alternative, rescission of deed of sale to enforce the deed of restrictions governing the use of property, is a real or personal action, or one that affects title thereto and its use or occupation thereof."[8]In the aforesaid decision, the Court of Appeals even justified the cancellation of the notice oflis pendenson the ground that Ayala had ample protectionshould it succeed in proving its allegations regarding the violation of the deed of restrictions, without unduly curtailing the right of the petitioner to fully enjoy its property in the meantime that there is as yet no decision by the trial court.[9]From the foregoing, it is clear that the Court of Appeals was aware that the issue as to whether petitioner is estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions has yet to be resolved by the trial court.Though it did make a pronouncement that the petitioner is estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions, it also mentioned at the same time that this particular issue has yet to be resolved by the trial court.Notably, upon appeal to this Court, We have affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals only as regards the particular issue of the propriety of the cancellation of the notice oflis pendens.We see no reason then, how the law of the case orstare decisiscan be held to be applicable in the case at bench.If at all, the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed of restrictions can only be considered asobiter dicta.As earlier mentioned, the only issue before the Court of Appeals at the time was the propriety of the annotation of thelis pendens.The additional pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that Ayala is estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions even as it recognized that this said issue is being tried before the trial court was not necessary to dispose of the issue as to the propriety of the annotation of thelis pendens.Adictumis an opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point, not the proffered deliberate opinion of the judge himself.[10]It is not necessarily limited to issues essential to the decision but may also include expressions of opinion which are not necessary to support the decision reached by the court.Meredictaare not binding under the doctrine ofstare decisis.[11]While the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling thatthe present petition is not barred by C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Inc. under the doctrine ofres judicata,neither, however, canthe latter case be cited as precedential under the doctrine ofstare decisis.It must be pointed out that at the time the assailed decision was rendered, C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 was on appeal with this Court.Significantly, in the decision We have rendered in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation[12]which became final and executory on July 5, 1999 we have clearly stated thatAn examination of the decision in the said Rosa-Diana case reveals that the sole issue raised before the appellate court was the propriety of the lis pendensannotation.However, the appellate court went beyond the sole issue and made factual findings bereft of any basis in the record to inappropriately rule that AYALA is in estoppel and has waived its right to enforce the subject restrictions.Such ruling was immaterial to the resolution of the issue of thepropriety of the annotation of the lis pendens.The finding of estoppel was thus improper and made in excess of jurisdiction.Coming now to the merits of the case, petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings when it failed to expressly pass upon the specific errors assigned in its appeal.Petitioner reiteratesitscontentionthatthetrialcourtsfindingsthatAyalahas waived its right to enforce the deed of restrictions is not supported by law and evidence.We find merit in the petition.It is basic that findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence.[13]We are constrained, however, to review the trial courts findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals chose not to pass upon, inasmuch as there is ample evidence on record to show that certain facts were overlooked which would affect the disposition of the case.In its assailed decision of February 4, 1994, the trial court, ruled in favor of respondent Rosa-Diana Realty on the ground that Ayala had not acted fairly when it did not institute an action against the original vendees despite the latters violation of the Special Conditions of Sale but chose instead to file an action against herein respondent Rosa-Diana.The trial court added that although the 38 storey building of Rosa-Diana is beyond the total height restriction, it was not violative of the National Building Code.According to the trial court the construction of the 38 storey building known as The Peak has not been shown to have been prohibited by law and neither is it against public policy.It bears emphasis that as complainant, Ayala had the prerogative to initiate an action against violators of the deed restrictions.That Rosa-Diana had acted in bad faith is manifested by the fact that it submitted two sets of building plans, one which was in conformity with the deed restrictions submitted to Ayala and MACEA, and the other, which exceeded the height requirement in the deed restrictions to the Makati building official for the purpose of procuring a building permit from the latter.Moreover, the violation of the deed restrictions committed by respondent can hardly be denominated as a minor violation.It should be pointed out that the original building plan which was submitted to and approved by petitioner Ayala Corporation, envisioned a twenty four (24) meter high, seven (7) storey condominium whereas the respondents building plan which was submitted to and approved by the building official of Makati is that of a thirty eight (38) storey,91.65 meters high, building.At present, the Peak building of respondent which actually stands at 133.65 meters with a total gross floor area of 23,305.09 square meters, seriously violates the dimensions indicated in the building plans submitted by Rosa-Diana to petitioner Ayala for approval inasmuch as the Peak building exceeds the approved height limit by about 109 meters and the allowable gross floor area under the applicable deed restrictions by about 19,105 square meters.Clearly, there was a gross violation of the deed restrictions and evident bad faith by the respondent.It may not be amiss to mention that the deed restrictions were revised in a general membership meeting of the association of lot owners in Makati Central Business District the Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA) whereby direct height restrictions were abolished in lieu of floor area limits.Respondent, however, did not vote for the approval of this revision during the General Membership meeting which was held on July 11, 1990 at the Manila Polo Club Pavilion, Makati, Metro Manila and again on July 12, 1990 at the Hotel Mandarin Oriental, Makati, Metro Manila.Hence, respondent continues to be bound by the original deed restrictions applicable to Lot 7, Block 1 and annotated on its title to said lot.In any event, assumingarguendothat respondent voted for the approval of direct height restrictions in lieu of floor area limits, the total floor area of its Peak building would still be violative of the floor area limits to the extent of about 9,865 square meters of allowable floor area under the MACEA revised restrictions.Respondent Rosa-Diana avers that there is nothing illegal or unlawful in the building plans which it used in the construction of the Peak condominium inasmuch as it bears theimprimaturof the building official of Makati, who is tasked to determine whether building and construction plans are in accordance with the law, notably, the National Building Code.Respondent Rosa-Diana, however, misses the point inasmuch as it has freely consented to be bound by the deed restrictions when it entered into a contract of sale with spouses Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng.While respondent claims that it was under the impression that the deed restrictions were no longer being enforced by Ayala, the Undertaking[14]it executed belies this same claim.In said Undertaking, respondent agreed to construct and complete the construction of the house on said lot as required under the special condition of sale. Respondent likewise bound itself to abide and comply with x x xthe condition of the rescission of the sale by Ayala Land, Inc. on the grounds therein statedx x x.Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, they must be complied with in good faith.Hence, Article 1159 of the New Civil Code providesObligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.Respondent Rosa-Diana insists that the trial court had already ruled that the Undertaking executed by its Chairman and President cannot validly bind Rosa-Diana and hence, it should not be held bound by the deed restrictions.We agree with petitioner Ayalas observation that respondent Rosa-Dianas special and affirmative defenses before the trial court never mentioned anyallegation that its president and chairman were not authorized to execute the Undertaking.It was inappropriate therefore for the trial court to rule that in the absence of any authority or confirmation from the Board of Directors of respondent Rosa-Diana, its Chairman and the President cannot validly enter into an undertaking relative to the construction of the building on the lot within one year from July 27, 1989 and in accordance with the deed restrictions.Curiously, while the trial court stated that it cannot be presumed t