intentionality and the non-psychological

International Phenomenological Society

Intentionality and the Non-PsychologicalAuthor(s): C. B. Martin and Karl PfeiferSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Jun., 1986), pp. 531-554Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107668 .

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. XLVI, No. 4, June I986

Intentionality and the Non-Psychological

C. B. MARTIN

The University of Calgary

KARL PFEIFER

The University of Saskatchewan

I

Introduction

We will show that the most typical characterizations' of intentionality, including those discussed by W. Lycan in his article "On 'Intentionality' and the Psychological,"' and also Lycan's own suggested characterization and John R. Searle's more extended treatments of the concept all fail to distinguish intentional mental states from non-intentional dispositional physical states. Accepting any of these current accounts will be to take a quick road to panpsychism!

The cases and arguments we develop are not meant merely to show up errors and inadequacies but are meant to show in detail how the persistent and widespread failure to distinguish between intentionality and non-intentional causal dispositionality has compromised much recent work (including that of Searle's) on intentionality. The clear need to make such a distinction should provide a direction for future work on the subject.

' A notable exception may be the criterion proposed by Roderick Chisholm in his article, "Intentionality" in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, I967). We have been unable to come up with a dispositional parallel for Chisholm's criterion, but it is defective on other grounds, which Lycan discusses.

2 W. Gregory Lycan, "On 'Intentionality' and the Psychological," American Philosophi- cal Quarterly 6 (i969): 305-1 I .

INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL 531



We make a very tentative beginning on such work at the end of the paper.

Some Examples

Consider, then, the following series of parallels, each consisting of a psychological example illustrating a familiar symptomatic characteristic of intentionality, followed by a similar example involving causal dispositionality:

i. Neither

(ia) I want a space ship.

nor

(ib) I do not want a space ship.

implies that there is or is not a space ship. Similarly, neither

(i a') Object A is capable of being affected in a way W by a free falling body of characteristics C.

nor

(ib') Object A is not capable of being affected in a way W by a free falling body of characteristics C.

implies that there is or is not a free falling body of characteristics C.

z. Neither

(za) I hope that it will rain tomorrow.

nor

(zb) I do not hope that it will rain tomorrow.

implies the truth or falsity of "It will rain tomorrow." Similarly, neither

(za') Physical -apparatus A is capable of affecting the clouds so that it will rain tomorrow.

nor

(zb') Physical apparatus A is not capable of affecting the clouds so that it will rain tomorrow.

implies the truth or falsity of "It will rain tomorrow."

3. Although the substantival expression "Pat" designates the same object as the substantival expression "Mike", it does not follow from the truth of

5 3 2 C. B. MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER



(3a) Tom believes Pat denounced Mary.

that

(3b) Tom believes Mike denounced Mary.

Similarly, although the substantival expression "the only pink object 0 at L" designates the same object as the substantival expression "the only object M of mass f at L", it does not follow from the truth of

(3a') Acid A was able to turn litmus paper P into the only pink object 0 at location L.

that

(3b') Acid A was able to turn litmus paper P into the only object M of mass f at location L.3

4. The mental state attributed to the subject in

(4a) Jake fears lions.

needs to be characterized in terms of that (which may or may not be present or exist) to which the mental state is directed. Similarly, the physical disposition attributed to the subject in

(4a') X is soluble in aqua regia.

needs to be characterized in terms of that (which may or may not be present or exist) to which the disposition is directed.

5. Anscombe claims:

I can think of a man without thinking of a man of any particular height; I cannot hit a man without hitting a man of some particular height, because there is no such thing as a man of no particular height. And the possibility of this indeterminacy makes it possible that when I am thinking of a particular man, not every true description of him is one under which I am thinking of him.4

Our understanding of this kind of case suggests these qualifying remarks:

(ia) If I am thinking of a particular, existing man, then he is a man of

3 Toward the end of this article we shall give a general but detailed account of how this and all of the other dispositional parallels we provide give rise to intensionality. C G. E. M. Anscombe, "The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature," in R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy: Second Series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 5965), p. i6i.

INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL 5 33



a particular height and I am thinking of that man who has that height. Therefore, it is misleading to say "I can think of a man without thinking of a man of any particular height." For surely, I am not thinking of a man of no particular height. Rather, when I am thinking of a man who has a particular height, I need not be thinking of him in terms of his particular height.

Similarly,

(5 a') If substance X is soluble in a particular existing solution of aqua regia Y, then Y is at a particular place and X is soluble in that solution of aqua regia in that place. Therefore, it is misleading to say "X is soluble in a particular existing solution of aqua regia without it being in any particular place." For surely X is not soluble in a particular, existing solution of aqua regia that is in no particular place. Rather, when X is soluble in a particular, existing solution of aqua regia Y that is at a particular place, it need not be that X's being soluble in Y is dependent on Y's being at that particular place.

Lycan's Account

So far we have not directly addressed the issue of necessary and/or sufficient conditions for intentionality, though it is obvious that the characteristics illustrated by our examples cannot individually be sufficient for intentionality. Lycan discusses and correctly rejects a number of possibili- ties regarding necessity and sufficiency, so we won't repeat his labors here. What we will do is examine the positive account of intentionality he arrives at and show how it also falls into the pattern we have so far discerned.

Lycan (p. 308) proposes the following:

A p-verb [i.e. a verb which "takes a proposition as its object"] or a modal prefix "It is M that" is intentional if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied:

(i) For every argument p which is not logically incoherent, p entails neither "It is M that p" nor "It is false that M that p."

(ii) the conjunction of "It is M that p" and "p and q are logically equivalent" does not entail "It is M that q."

(iii) ["It is M that (ix) (Fx)"] does not entail ["(ix) (It is M that Fx)"] and ["It is M that (x) (Fx)"] does not entail ["(x) (It is M that Fx)"].

5 34 C. B. MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER



At the risk of being tedious, but in order to drive home the parallel we are about to make, let us first illustrate Lycan's criterion with some obviously intentional prefix, say the prefix "Fred believes that."5 Moreover, let us take "Something has property F" as our arbitrary instance of "p" in conditions (i) and (ii). Then clearly condition (i) is met since "Something has property F" can be true whether Fred believes it or not.

Likewise, condition (ii) is uncontroversial. "Something has property F" and "Either something has property F and z + 2 = 4, or something has property F and z + 2 * 4" are logically equivalent. Even though "Fred believes that something has property F" is true, it is obvious that it need not be the case that Fred also have the more complex but logically equivalent belief.

Finally, condition (iii) is also met. Our chosen value of "p" neatly fits the first conjunct of this condition. "Fred believes that something has property F" may express a true claim about Fred, but if Fred does nothave some particular thing in mind as bearer of property F - i.e., if he merely believes that something or other has F - then it will be false that there is something of which Fred believes that it has property F.

As far as the second conjunct of (iii) is concerned, let us suppose that "Fred believes that everything has property F" is true. Next we suppose that Fred does not have the particular belief that John, who is totally unknown to him has F. Then "Everything is such that Fred believes it has property F" is false. So as should be, the latter statement is not entailed by the former.

Now we present a parallel in terms of physical, causal dispositions. We will let our prefix be "Physical agent A can bring it about that".

Condition (i) is met, since "Something has property F" can be true whether or not physical agent A can bring about the state of affairs that makes it true.

Condition (ii) is trickier. Suppose "Physical agent A can bring it about that something has property F" is true, and consider the logical equiva- lence between "Something has property F" and "Either something has property F and z + 2 = 4 or something has property F and z + 2 * 4". Does it follow that

(I) Physical agent A can bring it about that either something has property F and z + 2 = 4 or something has property F and z + z * 4.

If the "it is M that" form is desired, this can be rewritten as "it is believed by Fred that".

INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL 5 3 5



is true as well? We are inclined to say not, since (i) has to be understood as entailing

(z) Either physical agent A can bring it about that something has property F and z + z = 4 or physical agent A can bring it about that something has property F and z + z = 4.

The reason: If something can bring about neither of two alternatives (e.g., if both disjuncts in (z) and hence (z) itself were false) then it cannot bring about some one or other of them, either (i.e., (i) would be false, too).

Now, consider the disjuncts which make up (z). These have to be understood as entailing, respectively,

(3) Physical agent A can bring it about that something has property F and physical agent A can bring it about that z + z = 4.

and

(4) Physical agent A can bring it about that something has property F and physical agent A can bring it about that z + z = 4.

Clearly (3) and (4) are both false, since the second conjunct of each is false. Logical truths and logical falsehoods are not the sorts of things that can serve as causal relata. Hence (i) has been shown to reduce to falsehood. Condition (ii) of Lycan's criterion is therefore met by our example.

Finally, condition (iii). "Physical A can bring it about that something has property F", does not entail "There is something such that physical agent A can bring it about that it has property F". For instance, the "physical agent" in question may be an animal with a genetic constitution that can bring about a particular congenital defect F in its offspring. But it is certainly not the case that there is something (what?) for which A can bring it about that it (what?) has a particular congenital defect.

As far as the second conjunct of condition (iii) is concerned, let us suppose that "Physical agent A can bring it about that everything has F" is true and moreover is true partly because A can annihilate some of the non- F's like John. Then "Everything is such that physical agent A can bring it about that is has F" is false - John is a counterexample.

We have shown, then, that the prefix "physical agent A can bring it about that" meets all the demands of Lycan's criterion. Thus Lycan's criterion falls into the general pattern of characteristics of intentionality we have noted already. It applies equally well to physical, causal dispositions and so cannot do the job of demarcating the mental from the physical.

536 C. B. MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER



II A different approach to intentionality appears in some of the recent work of John Searle.6 In what follows we shall first show that Searle's approach, in the end, also falls into the pattern we have already discerned. Then we will pause briefly to examine Searle's claims regarding intentional objects. Finally, we will end this section with a few remarks on a point of agreement with Searle which prepare the ground for our closing section.

Speech Acts and Intentional States Searle begins by emphasizing the distinction between intensionality-with- an-s and intentionality-with-a-t. Intensionality-with-an-s, we are told, is a property of sentences that fail the standard tests for extensionality. The failure of existential generalization over "referring expressions" and the failure of substitution salva veritate of co-referring expressions are ear- marked as most relevant in this context. Intentionality-with-a-t, on the other hand, is to be a property of mental phenomena. It is that property by which the mind is able to represent other things. With these distinctions in the background, Searle claims in several places that the belief that there is a close connection between intentionality-with-a-t and intensionality- with-an-s is one of the most pervasive confusions in contemporary philosophy. Searle expresses this by suggesting that the confusions arise from attributing a property of mental states to sentences or a property of sentences to mental states (WIS, p. 85). Since Chisholm and his commenta- tors characterize both mental states and sentences as intentional-with-a-t, some might be tempted to think that Searle has somehow made an important advance over these philosophers in this regard.

It is clear, however, that Searle's remarks do not apply to Chisholm and company. Chisholm's program was to illuminate the intentionality of mental states by examining the characteristics of the sentences used to describe or express them. Derivatively, these sentences were called intentional sentences. On this conception, some sentences can be both intentional and intentional, but some intentional sentences are not intensional, and some intentional sentences are not intentional. There is no confusion in this, though obviously both the intentionality and the intensionality of sentences will require explanation in terms of the intentional states of the users of such sentences.

6 John R. Searle, "What is an Intentional State?", Mind 87 (1979): 74-9z. (Hereafter abbreviated "WIS"); "Intentionality and the Use of Language" in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979), pp. i81-97. (Hereafter abbreviated "IUL")




Elsewhere, Searle does make it plain that his claims of confusion are not based on a view that some horrendous category mistake is being commit- ted when, for example, one holds a particular mental state to be intensior- al-with-an-s. Searle, in fact, allows for his own notion of intensionality- with-an-s to be extended to include mental states and, similarly, for his notion of intentionality-with-a-t to be applied to sentences (WIS, p. 88; IUL, n. 5). So in this respect Searle is at one with Chisholm. What Searle's claim of confusion is based on, it turns out, is his view that there is nothing inherently intensional-with-an-s about intentionality-with-a-t (WIS, p. 88). (This view is considered below.) But here again he is at one with Chis- holm, who very early pointed out that intensionality was neither necessary nor sufficient for intentionality.

One of Searle's reasons for making the confusion claim at all is that he believes it explains what is wrong with generally held views concerning the ontological status of intentional objects (also discussed below). He does not name any names except Davidson and then admits that he is abstracting from Davidson something that Davidson never intended (IUL, p. i 86). So it is left unclear just who is guilty of what confusion as a result of failing to make the distinction between intensionality-with-an-s and intentionality-with-a-t.

As a rough preliminary test for intentionality-with-a-t, Searle suggests:

A mental state is an intentional state if and only if the specification of the content of that mental state requires the specification of some object or state of affairs which is not identical with that mental state. (IUL, p. i8z)

Such objects or states of affairs, of course, need not exist. As we have already shown, this very familiar test is satisfied by purely physical causal dispositions and so is inadequate in characterizing the intentional.

Searle now proceeds to develop an important analogy between speech acts and intentional states. We are asked to consider the familiar distinction in speech act theory between a locution's propositional content and its illocutionary force. Let us recycle Searle's examples: I can order you to leave the room, predict that you will leave the room, suggest that you will leave the room, and so on. In such speech act cases, there is a clear distinction between the propositional content that you will leave the room and the illocutionary force with which that propositional content is presented in the speech act. Speech acts can be represented, then, as having the form "F(p)", where "F" marks the illocutionary force and "p" the propositional content.

The first point that Searle makes about speech acts so construed is that some broad notion of satisfaction is applicable to them. Depending on conditions in the world, predictions may be true or false, questions or




orders may be appropriate or inappropriate, etc. - in one way or another, the propositional content may or may not be satisfied in that the object or state of affairs it represents may or may not exist.

The second point Searle makes is that this notion of satisfaction can be qualified in terms of directions of fit and that specific kinds of speech acts have their own characteristic directions of fit.

Briefly, the propositional contents of certain speech acts such as statements, assertions, and descriptions are supposed somehow to match an independently existing world. If there is no match - i.e., the statement is false - it is the statement that is at fault and must be changed, not the world. Hence such speech acts are said to have a word-to-world direction of fit. On the other hand, such speech acts as commands, requests, promises, etc., are supposed to bring about changes in the world so that the world matches their propositional contents. If there is no match - i.e., the order is disobeyed, the promise is broken, etc. - it is the world, in the person of the order disobeyer or promise-breaker, which is at fault. Hence we have here a world-to-word direction of fit.

A final possibility is that of there being no direction of fit, as in such speech acts as apologizing or congratulating for some state of affairs. Although in such cases the truth of the propositional content specifying the state of affairs might be presupposed, the point of the speech act is not to commit the speaker to matching the propositional content with the world or the world with the propositional content.

Having made these distinctions, Searle argues that intentional states, like speech acts, may be characterized in terms of satisfaction and direction of fit. When considering intentional states, he argues, we must distinguish between the representative content and the psychological mode in which one has that representative content. I can believe that you will leave the room, fear that you will leave the room, want you to leave the room, and the like. On a par with the "F(p)" of speech acts, this distinction can be represented by the form "S(r)" where "S" marks the psychological mode and "r" the representative content.

In the same way that speech acts contain representations of states of affairs which may or may not be satisfied, intentional mental states contain representations of their so-called intentional objects ("object" meaning "object or state of affairs"). This representative content, too, may or may not be satisfied depending on whether or not the represented object or state of affairs exists in the world. For example, beliefs may or may not be false or mistaken, desires may be fulfilled or not, and fears may be realized or not. Also, in the case of both speech acts and intentional states, what a representation is directed at in virtue of its representative content may itself be a representation.




The distinctions between directions of fit, Searle points out, also carry over to intentional states. Beliefs, for example, have what might be called a mind-to-world direction of fit. Like statements, beliefs may be false; when they are, the mismatch is remedied by changing the belief. Inten- tions or desires, though, are analogous to promises and commands; if the intentions or desires are not fulfilled, it is not the intentions or desires that are at fault. These intentional states, then, have a world-to-mind direction of fit. Finally, intentional states such as sorrow or joy over some state of affairs have neither direction of fit. One is neither responsible for bringing about changes in the world to make it match the representative content of one's sorrow, nor is one responsible for changing the representative content of one's sorrow in order to make it match the world.

To sum up, Searle's account of intentionality as a property of certain mental states amounts to this: intentional states consist of a representative content in a certain psychological mode. The key notions in the elabora- tion of this account were "being directed at", representation, satisfaction, and direction of fit.

Compelling as Searle's account of intentional mental states appears, we will now show that all those notions he relies on have their analogues in non-intentional, purely physical causal dispositions and, hence, that they cannot give us an account of the intentional.

Let us consider the notion of "being directed at" first. The sense in which intentional mental states are directed at objects or states of affairs "in the world" is, for example, the sense in which my intentional mental state of my wanting a motor vehicle license plate bearing my social insur- ance number is directed at such a license plate. I can have that want whether or not such a license plate exists, now or ever. However, purely physical dispositional states have this kind of directedness as well. If a physical object is capable of being affected in a certain way by a free falling body of certain characteristics then it has the capability of being so affected whether or not such a free falling body actually exists, now or ever.

Now consider satisfaction. My hope that it will rain tomorrow is satisfiable or capable of being realized in the sense that it will be realized or satisfied if it actually does rain tomorrow and will not be satisfied if it does not rain. Again, purely physical dispositional states are satisfiable in just this sense. The capability a physical body has to affect another body in a certain way will be realized or satisfied if it actually does affect the other body in that way and will not be satisfied if it does not affect the other body in that way, say, because the suitable standing conditions do not occur.




As far as representation is concerned, we are told that both speech acts and intentional states have a representative content in virtue of which they represent objects and states of affairs. We do not learn much from Searle about the representative content of intentional states except by way of speech act parallels and examples discussed in terms of directedness and satisfaction, and for these we already have our physical analogues.

"The notion of representation," Searle admits, "is conveniently vague. As applied to language we can use it to cover not only reference, but predi- cation and other truth conditions or conditions of satisfaction generally. Exploiting this vagueness we can say that intentional states represent their various conditions of satisfaction in the same sense that speech acts represent their conditions of satisfaction." (WIS, p. 8o) In this same "vague sense," however, we can also say that physical causal dispositions "represent" the objects or states of affairs that the dispositions are for. Searle in fact also makes the stronger claim that the notion of representation can be entirely dispensed with in favor of satisfaction.7 Searle's conception of representation, inasmuch as it is vague or reducible to his other notions, is a conception of something that has a counterpart in the physical realm.

We are not of course saying that a notion of representation is not the correct way to go in characterizing intentionality. We are only saying that Searle's conception is too wish-washy to do the job. We will have more to say about representation later.

Finally, let us consider directions of fit. The dispositions of some physical objects are not suited for the survival of those objects. Consider for example the disposition of fragility. When the state of affairs that that disposition is for is not actualized, the object having that disposition has in some sense been spared. Objects having such dispositions are at the mercy of the world. In that sense such dispositions can be considered faulty, and must be changed if the objects having them are to survive. (Perhaps beliefs that fail to match the world must be changed if people having them are to survive.) Thus, we have here what amounts to a non-intentional capacity- to-world direction of fit.

Some physical things, on the other hand, have capacities that put the world at their mercy. Consider the corrosive capability of a powerful acid. When the state of affairs that that capacity is for is not actualized, the world has in some sense been spared. Here, then, we have what amounts to a world-to-capacity direction of fit.

7 WIS, p. 9i. See also p. 7z5 of Searle, "Intentionality and Method," The Journal of Phi- losophy iI (i98I): 7z0-733.




There are also dispositions which do not seek to destroy either their possessors or the world. For example, the disposition of litmus paper to change color in the presence of acid puts neither the litmus paper nor the world at risk. Such a disposition would have neither a capacity-to-world nor world-to-capacity direction of fit, in the senses indicated above.

Lest someone be unhappy with this particular analogy, let it be noted that we have merely matched Searle, metaphor for metaphor, in order to establish a direction of fit. Of course something more is going on in the intentional cases. But to describe it only in terms of direction of fit is to underdescribe it.

So far, then, Searle does not seem to be an advance over the criteria we have already discussed in his characterization of intentionality. Despite the fact that Searle's notions of "being directed at", representation, satisfaction, and directions of fit may partition in various ways what we ante- cedently know to be mental, they partition the physical in similar ways. In sum, then, Searle's notions do not give us conditions sufficient to distinguish intentional mental states from non-intentional dispositional physical states.

There are two possible responses that might here be made on behalf of Searle. Searle maintains that he is not concerned with how intentional states are realized - an ontological question - but rather with their "logical properties":

How are intentional states realized? Are they neural configurations in the brain, modifications of a Cartesian ego, Humean ideas and images floating around in the mind, words occurring to us in thought, or causal dispositions to behave? Such questions are simply irrelevant to the logical properties of intentional states. It doesn't matter how an intentional state is realized, as long as the realization is a realization of its intentionality. How the representative content and the psychological mode of an intentional state is realized in one's psyche is no more a crucial question for us to answer than it is crucial for us to answer the analogous questions about how a certain linguistic act is realized. A linguistic act can be realized in speaking or in writing, in French or in German, on a teletype or a loudspeaker or a moviescreen or a newspaper. But such forms of realization do not matter to their logical properties. We would, with justification, regard someone who was obsessed by the question whether speech acts were identical with physical phenomena such as sound waves as having missed the point. The form of realization of an intentional state is just as irrelevant to its logical properties as the form in which a speech act is realized is irrelevant to its logical properties. The logical properties of intentional states arise from their being representations, and the point is that they can, like linguistic entities, have logical properties in a way that stones and trees cannot have logical properties (though statements about stones and trees can have logical properties) because intentional states, like linguistic entities and unlike stones and trees, are representations. (WIS, p. 8i)

It might be thought, in the light of these remarks, that what we have shown is somehow not deleterious to Searle's account. After all, he does




not preclude the possibility that causal dispositions may be the realization of intentional states. However, such a move does not really meet our objection. Clearly not all causal dispositions have to do with the mental. But what was proposed as characteristic of intentional (mental) states has been shown to be a feature of causal dispositions in general - even those that would not even remotely be considered as candidates for being realizations of intentional states. In Searle's language, though contrary to his claims, has he not in effect given us "logical properties" shared by "stones and trees"?

There is a crucial disanalogy between speech acts and intentional states that makes the form of realization of intentional states an important con- sideration as far as their logical properties are concerned. For linguistic acts to be realized in any form whatsoever, we require the existence of intentional states such as beliefs, desires, etc., not only to give specific content to the linguistic acts, but also for there to be things that can be counted as realizations of linguistic acts at all. Sound waves and ink marks must be intended and understood in certain ways before they can be realizations of linguistic acts. Intending and understanding are, of course, intentional states. Since any physical thing used as a sign may be arbitrar- ily intended in any number of ways, the actual form of realization of a linguistic act is, as Searle says, unimportant.

However, intentional states themselves do not require additional intentional states to link them with their realizations in the way that linguistic acts do. This suggests that there is a more intimate and non-arbitrary connection between intentional states and their realizations than there is between linguistic acts and their realizations. Hence, discovering what form of realization an intentional state (as opposed to a linguistic act) takes may very well be important to our understanding of the nature of intentionality, and indirectly of linguistic acts.8

The possibility of a second move in response to our conclusion that Searle's account of intentionality is inadequate is implicit in the following passage from Searle:

When we have ascribed to our beings the capacity for having intentional states we have already ascribed to them the capacity for relating their intentional states to objects and states of affairs in the world. The reason for this is that a being capable of having intentional states must be capable of an awareness of the conditions under which its intentional states would be satisfied. For example, a being capable of having desires must be capable of an awareness of the satisfaction or frustration of its desires, and a being capable of intentions must be capable of recognizing the fulfillment or frustration of its intentions. And this can be gener-

8 We believe that this shows a need to rehabilitate the role of the experiential in giving an account of intentional states. A few preliminary moves in this direction are made in section III below.




alized: For any intentional state, a being that has that state must be able to distinguish the satisfaction from the frustration of that state. This follows from the fact that an intentional state is a representation of the conditions of its satisfaction. (IUL, p. 193)

The move is this: To the characterization of intentionality in terms of satisfaction conditions, add the requirement that the owner of an intentional state must also be capable of being aware of or of recognizing the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of his state. That is, that he must have some sort of recognitional capacity.

So awareness and recognition are brought in as reinforcement, and pre- sumably stones and trees do not have that. But having awareness of or recognizing such-and-such about an intentional state sounds suspiciously like having a representation of a representation.

If awareness of satisfaction conditions itself has satisfaction conditions and how could it not? - then clearly that aspect of awareness of satis-

faction conditions is something mindless physical objects are equally capable of. Thermostats, for example, have a causal disposition to switch off furnaces when their disposition to deliver a certain number of kilo- joules into the ambience has been "satisfied". Plants turning to the light display a similar switch-off satisfaction capacity.

Invoking awareness or recognition, then, would not help. And that is as it should be. Being intentional themselves, awareness and recognition cannot be used as supplementary parts of a general account of intentionality, unless it is assumed that there is something special about these intentional states in contradistinction to those that have already been characterized in terms of the notions derived from speech act theory. But that would be to admit that the characterization was not after all adequate.9

Intentional Objects

Some might feel that although Searle's account of intentionality is inadequate, he has nonetheless made an important contribution to the topic in his treatment of intentional objects. In what follows it will be shown that such a view of the matter is unjustified.

Searle believes that his account points to a simple solution to the tradi- tional question of the ontological status of intentional objects. Tradition- ally, intentional states have been held to be about intentional objects. Indeed, being about intentional objects is what made them intentional states. Depending on one's ontological predilections, intentional objects

Let us emphasize that our criticism here is not that Searle's account is circular if taken as an analysis. We are claiming, simply, that the account is not correct. The speech act derived notions, as Searle explains them, do not exclude physical causal dispositions. Something else is needed to do that.




might be variously conceived of as mental subsistents, actual objects (world permitting), intermediaries between the mind and actual objects, meinongian entities, merely possible objects in merely possible worlds, etc.

Searle claims that intentional objects are none other than the actual objects in virtue of which an intentional state is satisfied. If there is no such object then the intentional state does not have an intentional object, though it still contains a representation. The analogy he gives is that of reference failure in statements. Reference failure does not require us to postulate meinongian entities for the statements to be about. Likewise, the failure of intentional states to be satisfied should not incline us to erect an "intermediate meinongian entity or intentional object" for them to be about.

Searle claims that seeing intentional objects as identical with actual objects is his discovery of something that others failed to see because they were confused. This however is a misleading way of presenting the position. It is evident that he is using "about" in a very rigid sense: sentences or intentional states are about such-and-such only if such-and-such actually exists. But not everyone shares that use. Not even Searle it seems. Two paragraphs before claiming that intentional objects are just actual objects, Searle states:

Any representation is internally related to its object in the sense that it could not be that representation if it did not have that object. Thus for example, an identity criterion of my belief that it is raining is that it must have as its intentional object the state of affairs that it is raining. (1UL, p. i 85)

We take it that Searle would not wish to be understood as saying that he has only true beliefs!

One purpose of saying what statements or intentional states (e.g., beliefs) are about, is to classify them. This purpose is frustrated if we allow it to be a trivial truth that all statements involving reference failure and all unsatisfied intentional states are likewise about nothing. Indeed, Searle's own division of mental states into intentional and non-intentional ones would be frustrated: "if I have a pain, ache, tickle, or itch, such conscious states are not . . . 'about' anything in the way that our beliefs, fears, etc., must in some sense be about something" (WIS, p. 74).

Searle would say that different statements involving reference failure have different propositional contents and different intentional states involving reference failure have different representative contents. How are these representative contents differentiated if not in terms of what they are about? It appears that the problem of the ontological status of intentional objects has been rephrased and not resolved.




The very same problems that arose for "intentional object" arise, on Searle's own account, for "representative content object". Nothing has been gained by Searle's verbal maneuver.

Intentional States Not Inherently Intensional

Searle stresses throughout that intensionality is primarily a feature of sentences and not of mental states. However, in deference to usage, he does suggest one clear way in which mental states themselves might be intelligi- bly viewed as intensional:

It is fairly easy to extend our criteria of intensionality [for sentences] to apply to intentional states. If the satisfaction of the state requires the existence of the objects represented and if the satisfaction value of the state is not altered by the substitution of other representations of the same object, then the state is extensional. (IUL, n. 5)

This extension of criteria provides the key for understanding Searle's surprising claim that intentional states are not inherently intensional. A more detailed parallel between statements and mental states than offered by Searle will illustrate how Searle is correct in his claim that intentional states are not inherently intensional. At the same time, we can develop in clearer detail a model for intensionality. (See Table i.)

When Searle speaks of statements he does so in terms of speech acts. So "statements " in this context should be read as "statement-makings". In a parallel way, "beliefs" should be read as "belief-havings". And for our parallel, "capacities" should be read as "capacity-havings".

Let us then make the following parallels:

The statement-S-making by X depends upon the mode of representation incorporated in the statement-S-making that makes for it being statement-S-making.

The belief-B-having of X depends upon the mode of representation incorporated in the belief-B-having that makes for it being belief-B- having.

The capacity-C-having of X depends upon the property or set of properties incorporated in the capacity-C-having that makes for it being capacity-C-having.




TABLE i The Parallel Between Statements and Mental States

Statements Beliefs

(I) "Caesar crossed the Rubi- (i) (that) Caesar crossed the con." Rubicon.

(z) "The conqueror of Gaul (z) (that) the conqueror of crossed the Rubicon". Gaul crossed the Rubicon.

(3) "Caesar" happens to name (3) A Caesar-representation the same individual as "the would happen to be conqueror of Gaul." directed at the same indi-

vidual as a conqueror-of- Gaul-representation.

(4) (i) and (z) are different (4) (I) and (z) are different statements. beliefs.

(5) The utterer of (i) may not (5) The believer of (i) may not have the label "conqueror have a conqueror-of-Gaul- of Gaul" or its constitu- representation in his head, tents in his vocabulary or in which case (z) would not conceptual framework at be a belief he could have. all, in which case (z) would not work as a statement for him.

(6) The utterer of (i) may have (6) The believer of (i) may the label "conqueror of have the conqueror-of- Gaul" in his conceptual Gaul-representation in his scheme, but he may not head, but may not believe have (3) as a belief and so that (3) or some suitable would not assent to or state variant thereof is true and (z). so would not have (z) as a

belief.

(7) Nonetheless (I) and (z) (7) Nonetheless (I) and (z) have the same satisfaction have the same satisfaction condition. condition.

How toughly we hold to this tough line in all three instances depends upon the circumstances. We do allow different people at the same time or the same person at different times to make the same statement or hold the same belief where modes of representation differ, and we do allow differ-




ent objects or the same objects at different times to have the same capacities where their properties differ. It depends upon what else is true of the people or the objects.

It can still be so that a representation that makes for a particular statement-making or belief-making for a particular person at a particular time would not do so for another person or for the same person at another time. Similarly, the property or set of properties or state that makes for a capacity-having for a particular object at a particular time would not do so for another object or for the same object at another time. Therefore, not all other representations of the same object could be substituted and still make for the same statement-making or belief-having for this person at this time. Nor could all other sets of properties or states directed to the same causal manifestation be substituted and still make for the same capacity-having.

Let us elucidate this claim further by working out in more detail parallel models for intentional-state-having individuals and capacity-having objects in order to explain how intensionality of statements about such entities arises. Consider the following two cases for comparison:

i. The person, having

a) a certain internal environment,

b) who is disposed thereby to respond

c) such that certain visual, auditory, etc., states or processes in his head are directed at and have satisfaction conditions with a direction of fit with respect to a kind of thing or situation,

d) but is not disposed thereby to respond

e) such that some other visual, auditory, etc., states or processes in his head would be directed at and have satisfaction conditions with a direction of fit with respect to the same kind of thing or situation,

f) though they would for himself, with a different internal environment, at another time, or would for other persons with different internal environments.

z. The object, having

a') a certain internal environment,

b') which is disposed thereby to respond

c') such that certain of its states or processes are directed at and

54 8 C. B. MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER



have satisfaction conditions with a direction of fit with respect to a kind of thing or situation,

d') but is not disposed thereby to respond

e') such that some other of its states or processes would be directed at and have satisfaction conditions with a direction of fit with respect to the same kind of thing or situation,

f') though they would for itself, with a different internal environment, at another time, or would for other objects with different internal environments.

(Of course, someone might suppose the imposition of "internal environments" to be inessential. But that would be, in each case, to play with magic.)

Those states or processes of a person that are directed and have satisfaction conditions with a direction of fit may be called "representations" and different representations may be for the same thing or situation, that is, co-referring.

Those states or processes of an object that are directed and have satisfaction conditions with a direction of fit may be called "representations" and different representations may be for the same thing or situation, that is, co-referring.

Because of an internal background of dispositions of the person or the object one representation may work differently from another representation though it be co-referential.

Though the statement that the person believes something of something in terms of a particular representation be true, this truth will not be preserved in a statement in which a different co-referring representation (that does not "work" the same way for the person) is substituted.

Though the statement that some object is causally disposed to some way affect something in terms of a particular representation be true, this truth will not be preserved in a statement in which a different co-referring representation (that does not "work" the same way for the object) is substituted.

This model shows how it is through causal dispositions of the person or object (leaving magic aside in each case) that co-referring representations may work differently for an individual and so give rise to the intensionality of statements about the person's or object's representations with their directedness, satisfaction, and direction of fit.

It also shows how it is that though a person's belief (unless it be a belief concerning a belief or want, etc.) is not itself intensional, yet a statement about that person's belief may be.




And it shows how it is that though an object's causal disposition (unless it be a causal disposition to affect a causal disposition) is not itself intensional, yet a statement about that object's causal disposition may be.

(The model we have just developed suggests that Table i may be sup- plemented with a column for capacities as in Table z below.)

TABLE z

Capacities

(I) To turn the only blue object at L into the only pink object at L. (z) To turn the only blue object at L into the only object of mass m at

L. (3) The only-pink-object-at-L kind happens to have as its instance the

same object as the only-object-of-mass-m-at-L kind. (4) (i) and (z) are different capacities. (5) The object having capacity (i) may not be of a kind suitable for

being causally operative with respect to mass at all, in which case (z) would not be a capacity it could have.

(6) The object having capacity (i) may be of a kind suitable for being causally operative with respect to mass but may not in fact be operative with respect to mass (at the time) - that is, it would not be operative with respect to the object at L qua color and mass in tandem - and so would not have (z) as a capacity.

(7) Nonetheless (i) and (z) have the same satisfaction condition.

The notion of a representation is a functional notion. If we ask "What is it that is the representation?" in the cases of belief, want, hope, etc., it is not easy to specify - especially if the believer, wanter, hoper is sound asleep. We seem to be hypostatizing a state or set of states of the individual in terms of certain functional characteristics of directionality and satisfaction. Similarly, with causal disposition, the representation would not be easy to specify, though we seem to be hypostatizing a state or set of states of the object in terms of certain functional characteristics of directionality and satisfaction.

We can feel there is a distinction between the notion of representation in belief-having and other intentional cases and the notion of representation in capacity-having. But we have tried to show that such a distinction cannot be made out in terms of "being directed at", satisfaction, and direction of fit, nor can it be made out in terms of intensionality. So the source of the distinction must be found elsewhere.

5 5 0 C. B. MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER



Somewhat ironically, if we were to leave our discussion at this point, someone might interpret it as an argument for panpsychism, in that the characterizations of intentionality that we have discussed apply to anything (mental or physical) that has causal dispositions. For some, this may be a happy result - for us it is a reductio ad absurdum and an invitation to look elsewhere for an account of the intentional.

III

We can now make a very small (and we hope seminal) beginning to characterizing intentionality in a way that does not equally apply to the non- intentional and that is not available on Searle's account.

An important fact to be noted at this point is that some intentional states are such that their incorporated representation is directed to (and their satisfaction condition is satisfied by) a unique particular thing or state of affairs - and not to anything else which happens to be just like it. Any characterization of intentional states must allow for such a role to be played. In general, causal dispositions and capacities (and hence, too, their analogues) are not suitable for playing such a role. Causal dispositions and capacities are for things or states of affairs of a kind. For their realization or satisfaction it does not matter whether we have this object or state of affairs or another exactly like it.

If someone wants his rubber ball, he wants just that rubber ball and not just anything exactly like it. Searle's recognitional capacity is no help, however, if an exact replica of the rubber ball is presented. The man might be satisfied though his want for his rubber ball would not be. He has been fooled into accepting something other than what he wanted. Recogni- tional capacities just are not built to distinguish between similar things.

Language is not magic. The use of marks and sounds does not create the capacity to have intentional states that range over a specific individual (as opposed to something like it), whether it is oneself or something other than oneself.

A pre-linguistic child may want its rubber ball. We may note the child's special regard for the particular object. While having it in view, it may reject another just like it offered as a substitute. Though, if we replace it, unknown to the child, with one just like it, the child's recognitional capacities cannot save it from being fooled into accepting something other than what it wanted.

And if the child is presented with its rubber ball and ten others indistin- guishable from it, the child could feel the frustration of being unable to tell which was the ball he wanted.

How may a representation be incorporated in an intentional state so as to be directed to a particular entity and not just something of a kind? Or,

INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL 5 5 I



to put the matter in another way, how is the satisfaction condition satisfied by the particular individual only and not just anything exactly like it?

A rough provisional account is the following. The representation incorporated in such an intentional state is directed

to something (a particular something and not just anything like it) as being or as having been seen, heard, felt, tasted by the agent or something causally related to what was seen, heard, etc., or as having a unique spatio-temporal relation to the agent itself. (The latter would be a kind of method of triangulation-in-space, by which the agent uses itself as a fixed point from which to place, and refer to, something else that need not be causally related to the agent.) It is also by perception that the person comes to a notion of itself. Only when it feels itself, does what it feels with its limbs feel back. This is how it may learn and retain the geography of that sensitive part of the world that is itself. No doubt this exploration starts in the womb.

The basic method, then, is perceptual in its initial representation and projective by the traces of perceptual memory acting as representations of what was seen, heard, etc., rather than as of anything exactly like it. It is this that forms the representation of a particular individual, and the satisfaction conditions can be satisfied only by that individual. Recognitional capacities are totally ill-equipped for that task.

Finally, we should be ready to acknowledge the most obvious and subs- tantive difference between intentional states and non-intentional dispositional states which is quite simply that the experiential is essentially involved in the former.

To have a belief, want, desire, hope, etc., is, typically, to be in dispositional states (having characteristic satisfaction conditions and direction of fit like any other disposition) but differing from the non-mental, non-intentional in virtue of the experiential kind of input activating such states and the experiential kind of output of the activated state. What makes the intentional state to be of the kind it is will be the kinds of experiential input that tend to activate it and the kinds of experiential (or experien- tially loaded behaviour) output it tends to produce - and, of course, the story is incomplete.

Can intelligence machines have intentional states?

The role of sensory experience is relevant here. The person (and no doubt other sentient creatures as well) has the capacity to acquire the capacity of dealing with sensory experience in an extrospective way. How, in detail, this is done would require more knowledge of the human

5 5 z C. B. MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER



brain than we now possess. We can only try to say what is done in terms of the very general model.

There is an introspective use and an extrospective use of sensory experience. The introspective use occurs when the person reacts to sensory experience itself as the "object" of the person's differentiating and classificatory responses in terms of the features of that sensory experience. The extrospective use of sensory experience occurs when the person in virtue of having sensory experience differentiates and classifies and antici- pates in terms of the features of things in the physical world that are not that sensory experience. The simple answer to the question, "How is it that we can do this?" is "Because we are built to have the capacity under suitable sensory stimulation to acquire these further introspective and extrospective capacities." The very general model can be vouchsafed by a philosopher, but the full details must await the results of other disciplines. This notion of a capacity to acquire further capacities is shown in molten glass having, unlike some other things, the capacity under suitable cooling to acquire the further capacity of fragility. Our "innate linguistic capacities" are capacities to acquire after suitable sensory stimulation and resul- tant structural brain alterations to acquire certain kinds of linguistic capacities.

That we come to acquire this capacity for the extrospective use of sensory experience is literally a matter of survival. If we had only the introspective use we simply would not survive. Consider in a relatively complex visual situation attempting to keep up with each and every alter- ation of one's visual experience as one turns one's head. The introspective set of mind has to be turned on rarely if one is to be informed of what is in one's immediate environment - and that information is crucial for one's very survival.

Sensory experience is not classified data used in judging objects. That is the wrong model. In virtue of having sense experience, one is led causally to form judgments concerning objects. Our judgments of ourselves and other physical objects and states of affairs have their very character and colour from the constant reinforcement of sensory experience. Sensory experience is a very specially rich causal source, for the trace of sensory experience in sensory recall or reliving may later be productive of more judgments concerning the object of past observation than one could man- age to make or even be capable of making at the time of observation.

The ultimate fix for the unique object of an intentional state, when it has one, can be a matter of what form the sensory experience takes, what form the object takes, and what form the causal relation between the object and the sense experience takes. The clearest case of failure would be that of hallucination.

INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL 5 5 3



We are built by nature to have the capacity, under suitable sensory stimulation (certainly sensory deprivation would not help), to acquire capacities such that the role of sense experience informs the representations incorporated in our intentional states in such a way that essentially they have their own interpretive parameters and do not require interpretive bounds to be set by us or by anyone else. Must we be forced to remem- ber that it is limited experience that limits interpretive bounds of the intentional states of the deaf and the blind?

So the answer to the question, "Can intelligence machines have intentional states?" is "Of course, if, amongst no doubt other things, sensory experiences play the same role with them as they do with us." We won't ask for flesh and blood.'0

Earlier versions of this paper were read at the University of Sydney and La Trobe Univer- sity in the summer of i98z. We wish to thank John Fox, Bernard Linsky, and Steven Dehaven for their comments.




intentionality and the non-psychological

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