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i MEKONG PROJECT 4 ON WATER GOVERNANCE Challenge Program for Water and Food Mekong INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS FOR WATER GOVERNANCE IN THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC Amphavanh Sisouvanh 1 , Lilao Bouapao 1 , Chansamone Sayalath 2 , Sonephet Phosalath 3 , Vidaovanh Phounvixay 1 , Vena Ngonvorarath 1 , Kate Lazarus 1 , Sokhem Pech 4 1 Challenge Program on Water and Food Mekong 2 Ministry of Energy and Mines, Lao PDR 3 Nam Theun/Nam Kading River Basin Organisation, Ministry of Water Resources and Environment 4 Mekong Program on Water Environment and Resilience July 2013

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Page 1: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE ... · management of water. In the Mekong Region, inequitable development of water resources has the potential to threaten

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MEKONG PROJECT 4 ON WATER GOVERNANCE

Challenge Program for Water and Food Mekong

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS:

POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS FOR WATER

GOVERNANCE IN THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Amphavanh Sisouvanh1, Lilao Bouapao

1, Chansamone Sayalath

2, Sonephet Phosalath

3,

Vidaovanh Phounvixay1, Vena Ngonvorarath

1, Kate Lazarus

1, Sokhem Pech

4

1Challenge Program on Water and Food Mekong

2Ministry of Energy and Mines, Lao PDR

3 Nam Theun/Nam Kading River Basin Organisation, Ministry of Water Resources and Environment

4 Mekong Program on Water Environment and Resilience

July 2013

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. ii

LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... iii

LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... iii

LIST OF APPENDICES .................................................................................................................. ii

LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................ ivv

1.0 INTRODUCTION TO MEKONG WATER GOVERNANCE ....................................................... 1

2.0 WATER GOVERNANCE IN LAO PDR ................................................................................. 2

3.0 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS ........................................................ 4

3.1 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT RELATING TO HYDROPOWER AND ITS IMPACTS .................. 4

3.2 MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS IN LAO PDR: ......................................... 5

4.0 INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS ........................................................................................ 17

4.1 MULTI-LATERAL AGENCIES (ADB, WORLD BANK, MRC) ................................................. 21

4.1.1 World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) .......................................................... 21

4.1.2 Mekong River Commission (MRC) ................................................................................. 23

4.1.3 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ............................................................ 24

4.2 BILATERAL DONORS .................................................................................................... 24

4.3 PRIVATE DEVELOPERS/SECTOR .................................................................................... 27

4.4 STATE ACTORS ............................................................................................................. 27

4.5 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT ACTORS ............................................................. 28

4.5.1 Government Agencies ................................................................................................... 28

4.5.2 Administrative (Decision-Making and Policy Development) Processes ........................ 33

4.6 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL AND MINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS RELATED TO WATER

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR OUTCOMES ...................................................... 38

4.6.1 Organizational Capacity ................................................................................................. 38

4.6.2 Coordination/Conflicts between Government Departments ........................................ 42

4.6.3 Non-State Actors ........................................................................................................... 43

4.6.4 External Influences in Implementing National Laws and Policies ................................. 43

4.6.5 Social Activism ............................................................................................................... 43

4.7 ASSESSMENT OF VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL LINKAGES OF STATE AGENCIES ............... 45

5.0 ASSESSMENT OF FACTORS FACILITATING OR LIMITING EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

OF THESE ACTORS’ PERFORMANCE .............................................................................. 46

6.0 SUMMARY AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER FOLLOW-UP ................................ 46

7.0 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 49

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 List of multilateral environmental agreement. 5

Table 2 Summary of relevant laws, regulations, policies and plans. 7

Table 3 Project cycle and resettlement procedures. 16

Table 4 Revenue of Environmental Protection Fund for 2006-2010. 23

Table 5 Top donors (bilateral and multilateral) in Lao PDR over the period 2005 to

2007(commitments in current USD millions). 25

Table 6 Government agencies related to livelihoods, water valuation and dam cascades. 29

Table 7 Non-state actors involved in the THPC/THXPC project areas. 43

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Governance in the Lao PDR in comparison to other countries. 2

Figure 2 Steps in hydropower power concession awards, approval and implementation and

monitoring processes in Lao PDR. (Julia Fraser, based on MacGeorge et al., 2010, WB (2009),

and van den Toorn (2009) with inputs from Jie Tang and William Rex (2010)). 20

Figure 3 Organizational structure: vertical and horizontal linkages 37

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Sample Survey Questionnaire 53

Appendix 2: Sample Survey Questionnaire in Lao language (Separated attachment) 57

Appendix 3a: Power Project in Lao PDR – Developed Before 2000 62

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB Asian Development Bank

AFD Agence Francaise de Developpement

AMWRS Australian Mekong Water Resources Strategy

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

AusAID Australian Agency for International Development

BOT Built-Own-Transfer

CA Concession Agreement

CAR Compensation and Resettlement

CBD Convention on Biological Diversity

CCAI Climate Change and Adaptation Initiative

CCD Convention Combating Desertification

CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and

Flora

DAFO District Forestry and Agriculture Office

DEB Department of Energy Business

DEM District Energy and Mines

DEO District Education Office

DEPP Department of Energy Policy and Planning

DHO District Heath Office

DICTO District Information, Culture and Tourism Office

DMH Department of Meteorology and Hydrology

DOE Department of Electricity

DoE Department of Environment

DPI Department of Planning and Investment

DS Development Strategy

DSEDS National Socio-economic Development Strategies

DWG District Working Group

DWR Department of Water Resources

EDF Electricite de France

EDL Electricite du Laos

EGAT Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EIAD Environmental Impact Assessment Department

EMDP Ethnic Minority Development Plan

EMP Environmental Management Plan

EPF Environmental Protection Fund

EPL Environmental Protection Law

ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

ESIAD Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Department

Exim Export Import Bank of China

FCCC Framework Convention on Climate Change

FS Feasibility Study

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GMS Greater Mekong Sub-region

GOL Government of Laos

ICBP Integrated Capacity Building Programme

IEE Initial Environmental Examination

IFI International Financial Institutions

IOL Inventory of Losses

IPD Investment Promotion Department

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IPP Independent Power Producers

ISA Initial Social Assessment

IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management

LD Law Department

LEnS Lao Environment and Social Project

LMB Lower Mekong Basin

LNCE Lao National Committee on Energy

LNFC Lao National Front for Construction

LNMC Lao National Mekong Committee

LPRP Lao People's Revolutionary Party

LSWO Labor and Social Welfare Office

LWU Lao Women Union

LYU Lao Youth Union

MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

MDBA Murray Darling Basin Authority

MEAs Multilateral Environmental Agreements

MEM Ministry of Energy and Mines

MIC Ministry of Industry and Commerce

MICT Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism

M-IWRM Mekong Integrated Water Resources Management

MLSW Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare

MOE Ministry of Education

MOF Ministry of Finance

MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOH Ministry of Health

MONRE Ministry of National Resources and Environment

MOU Memoranda of Understanding

MPI Ministry of Planning and Investment

MPTC Ministry of Posts & Telecommunication

MPWT Ministry of Public Work and Transport

MRB Mekong River Basin

MRC Mekong River Commission

MW Mega Watt

NA National Assembly

NGOs Non-Governmental Organization

NGPES National Growth and Poverty Eradication

NLMA National Land Management Authority

NNG Nam Nguem

NPSH National Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability of the

Hydropower Sector

NSEDP National Socio-Economic Development Plan

NT2 Nam Theun 2

NT-NKD Nam Theun-Nam Kading

NTPC Nam Theun 2 Power Company

PDA Project Development Agreement

PE Panel of Experts

PEI Poverty Environment Initiative

PIC Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain

Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade

PIPs Public Investment Programs

PMO Prime Minister's Office

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POPs Persistent Organic Pollutants

RAP Resettlement Action Plan

RBC River Basin Committee

RC Resettlement Committee

RD Research Department

RMP Resettlement Management Plan

RMU Resettlement Management Unit

RP Resettlement Plan

SEA Strategic Environmental Assessment

SED Social and Environmental Division

SEIA Social and Environment Impact Assessment

SEMII Social and Environmental Management II Project

SIA Social Impact Assessment

SIDA Swedish International Development Agency

SMMP Social Management and Monitoring Plan

STEA Science Technology and Environment Agency

TA Technical Assistance

THPC Theun-Hinboun Power Company Ltd

THXP Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project

THXPC Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project

ToRs Terms of References

UNDP United Nation Development Program

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

VDC Village Development Committee

WB World Bank

WERI Water and Environment Research Institute

WHC World Heritage Convention

WRCCS Water Resources Coordination Committee Secretariat

WREA Water Resource and Environment Administration

WREO Water Resource and Environment Office

WSI Water Storage Infrastructure

YO Youth Organization

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1.0 INTRODUCTION TO MEKONG WATER GOVERNANCE

Development of unexploited hydroelectric potential of the mainstream Mekong River and its

tributary systems has become a significant strategic issue in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS).

With an estimated hydropower potential of 30,000 MW, dam developments in the Mekong River

Basin (MRB), are expected to meet a considerable share of the region’s energy demand, which is

expected to increase at the rate of 7 percent per year over the next 20 years. A strong demand for

electricity comes from the rapidly industrializing countries of China, Thailand and Vietnam, and

electricity supplied from the hydropower sector is expected to drive growth in industries and

national economies in the region.

Recognizing the high revenue generating potential of hydropower, countries in the Lower Mekong

Basin (LMB) have committed to the development of their vast water resources. Lao PDR itself has

signed over 60 Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) for mainstream Mekong and tributary projects.

Cambodia has developed a master plan, which has identified 14 projects with an electricity-

generating capacity of 5,300 MW, while Vietnam’s Hydropower Master Plan outlines plans for

developing 2,500 MW of electricity over the next decade. These countries have oriented their

investment regimes to facilitate the greater involvement of private sector in the energy industry, in

order to augment gross domestic product (GDP) growth and economic development.

The past decade has seen private investors in China, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Russia

becoming involved in hydropower plans in the region. The process of building large dams in the MRB,

however, is complicated by the highly interdependent linkages that exist between the Mekong River

system, and natural resources and livelihoods in the region. Costs and benefits of dam construction on

livelihood options, agriculture, fisheries, biodiversity, transportation and other sectors have not been

comprehensively evaluated to date. Over 65 million people in the region depend on the Mekong River

system and its tributaries for livelihoods, and construction of dams for electricity generation can have

profound and lasting impacts on their livelihoods and ecosystems. As a result, hydropower

development in the MRB has become a hotly debated issue. Water and hydropower decision-

making, planning and implementation in the region are considered to be ineffective by many actors.

Efforts by regional organizations, such as the Mekong River Commission (MRC), to facilitate dialogue

and inform local governments of the likely impacts of dams have had a little impact on patterns of

dam development.

Water governance refers to the way in which power is organized, shared, and negotiated in society –

the interactions and decision-making processes involved in the development and utilization of water

resources; and the distribution of benefits and involuntary risks from doing so. This includes political,

administrative, and policy structures, both at the formal and informal levels that are embedded in

and influence decision-making and management practices. It also considers the processes of shaping

agendas, design of institutions, implementation of policies and practices, for day-to-day

management of water.

In the Mekong Region, inequitable development of water resources has the potential to threaten

livelihoods that depend on them. Large-scale investment in water infrastructure, such as hydropower

and irrigation, can generate large profits for private firms at the expense of livelihood and resource

security to a majority of the region’s population. Limited interest and accountability of the public sector

can particularly lead to the marginalization of women, ethnic groups and other vulnerable populations,

creating insecure and uncertain futures.

The focus of the study is to increase understanding about the governance of Water Resources

Infrastructure development in the Lao PDR. To achieve this objective, the study included visits to relevant

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agencies at the central, provincial, district, and village levels. The study team also visited the Theun-

Hinboun Expansion project. Basic research tools such as interviews, observations, and document review

were used for the study. A semi-structured questionnaire for "assessing policies and administrative

mechanisms in water governance in Lao PDR" was prepared and distributed to key government staff of

the relevant line agencies, namely, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), the Water Resource and

Environment Administration (WREA), the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), the Ministry of

Planning and Investment (MPI), the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Health (MOH), and the

River Basin Committees (RBCs) during meetings and interviews at district, provincial, and central levels.

The questionnaire consisted of three sections: 1. Respondents’ profiles and experience in policymaking; 2.

Policies and practices relevant to the three issue fields (livelihoods, water valuation and dam cascades);

and 3. Organizational capacity. There were 23 questions in all. (See Appendix 1 for the questionnaire in

English and Appendix 2 for the questionnaire in Lao language.)

Nineteen questionnaires were answered, six by officials in the districts (Khamkert and Hinboun), 12

by provinces (Khammouane and Bolikhamxay), and one by a representative of the central

government in Vientiane. Most officers answering the questionnaires were heads of their division or

sector, while others were technical experts, deputy heads of divisions and sectors, or project

managers. Questions 4 to 10 related to policies and practices in the three issue fields.

2.0 WATER GOVERNANCE IN LAO PDR

The Government of Lao PDR has a formal policy to achieve middle-income country status by the year

2020. In order to reach this goal, the Lao economy (in terms of GDP) needs to grow at a rate of 7

percent per year. Hydropower and mining sectors are considered important strategies to drive the

country toward this target.

Lao PDR is a relatively stable one-party, socialist political system, where, notwithstanding the market

reforms initiated under the New Economic Mechanism in 1986, the state continues to be involved in

a great deal of economic activity. Although traditional political networks remain very powerful, the

authority of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) is institutionalized rather than being heavily

personalistic (Lao PDR Development Report 2010, World Bank [WB]).

Figure 1 Governance in the Lao PDR in comparison to other countries.

a. Governance in Lao PDR in comparison to

East Asia Pacific Average (2008)

b. Governance in Lao PDR in comparison to

other resource-rich developing countries

average (2008)

Governance in Lao PDR, when compared to the East Asia-Pacific average and to the 2008 average for

other resource-rich developing countries, shows weakness in accountability and regulatory quality (see

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Figure 1, World Governance Indicators, WB Institutes). Government effectiveness and the rule of law

also present challenges. Anecdotal evidence suggests that corruption, in the forms of state capture and

administrative rent seeking, is common and increasingly problematic. Yet, even though the Lao

Government remains weak in this area, it has made important advances over the past five years in

strengthening its public financial management system and improving internal oversight mechanisms,

thus boosting general public sector governance institutional quality. Additionally, the State Audit Office1

has been expanded and now reports to the National Assembly rather than to the Government (Lao PDR

Development Report, WB 2010).

During late 2006 and 2007, the Lao Government commenced restructuring of water resource

management agencies. The Water Resources and Environment Administration (WREA) was

established in April 2007 within the Office of the Prime Minister. A Minister to the Prime Minister’s

Office is Head of both WREA and Lao National Mekong Committee (LNMC) (ADB 2010). It absorbed

the responsibilities of the Environment Department from the Science Technology and Environment

Agency (STEA), the Water Resources Coordination Committee Secretariat (WRCCS) and the LNMC

Secretariat. In addition, the Department of Meteorology and Hydrology (DMH) was transferred from

the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to WREA. The WRCCS was upgraded to become the

Department of Water Resources (DWR) and a restructuring of responsibilities previously within the

STEA created the Water and Environment Research Institute (WERI) (ADB 2010).

In March 2009, the Government upgraded and re-mandated the Lao National Mekong Committee

(LNMC) to take on the role of national water apex body (ADB 2010). In addition to its previous

responsibilities for coordination with the programs of Mekong River Commission (MRC), the LNMC

was also assigned to review, recommend and oversee the implementation of national water

resources policy; advise on river basin plans; and create river basin committees.

The LNMC Secretariat, which was relocated from the Prime Minister’s Office to WREA (now known as

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE)) in May 2007, was incorporated into

Department of Water Resources (DWR) in March 2009. The responsibilities of the DWR include, to

implement Integrated Water Resources Management, to support and input from Lao PDR to

international water and environment management programs of the MRC Secretariat through LNMC,

and to support river basin and sub-basin activities (ADB 2010; Lyle c., Steeley C., Sousakoun T., and

Soukaoun K 2008).

When WREA, was formed there were: (i) no agreed upon national water resources policy or strategy;

(ii) no strategic plans or roadmap for the various water using subsectors in development planning;

and (iii) no water legislation in place to properly support contemporary approaches to water

resource management. WREA has therefore focused on strengthening the national capacity for water

resource management (both policy and human resources), and the regulation of environmental

impacts and water use in development activities, with support from the ADB and AusAID, through TA

7013-LAO: Updating the National Water Resources Policy & Strategy (ADB 2010).

In response to hydropower development (as well as mining and commercial plantation) in Lao PDR,

WREA's key role was that of environmental and social regulator, responsible for implementation and

oversight of the Compensation and Resettlement (CAR) Decree adopted by the GoL in 2005 and the

new Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) Decree approved in 2010 (WB 2010; Prime

Minister's office 2005; Prime Minister's Office 2010).

1 The National Audit Office (NAO) was established under Prime Minister’s Decree no. 174 in 1998, which made

the NAO an agency of the Prime Minister’s office. The NAO was later renamed the State Audit Organization.

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Another major restructuring in water governance took place on 15 June 2011, when the National

Assembly approved the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), a new structure to

replace WREA. The current structure consists of 14 departments (Cabinet, Administration and

Human Resources, Monitoring, Planning and Cooperation, Policy Development, Land Allocation and

Development, Land Management, Water Resources, Environmental Protection, Pollution Control,

Forestry Management, Geology and Mining, Meteorology and Hydrology, and Climate Change and

Disaster), four institutes (Institute of Social and Environmental Impact Assessment, Natural

Resources and Environment Data and Information Centre, Institute of Natural Resources and

Environment, and Lao National Mekong Committee) and others. It is expected that the new Ministry

would play a stronger role (than WREA) with its Ministerial functions to fully implement its mandate.

3.0 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS

3.1 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT RELATING TO HYDROPOWER AND ITS IMPACTS

According to the World Bank Lao PDR Development Report 2010 (WB 2010), though the Law on

Investment Promotion (updated 2009) provides the overall framework for concessions in the

hydropower sector, there is some confusion in the mandates of the various institutions involved.

There is also lack of clear standards and procedures for investors to follow, and absence of capacity in

the government agencies, which may create confusion among potential investors, resulting in a

prolonged concession process, thus jeopardizing transparency and accountability.

In response to constraints in the Law on Investment Promotion, the influx of investors and

government policy to become the "battery of Asia", the Government has introduced more efficient

review and approval processes. First, the GoL adopted the National Policy on Environmental and

Social Sustainability in Hydropower Development (NPSH), 2005. Second, the line ministry was

reorganized in 2007 from the Ministry of Industry and Handicraft to the current Ministry of Energy

and Mines, with explicit emphasis and mandates on these sectors. Third, the Electricity Law was

further revised and updated in 2010. The approval of these laws signals more streamlined decision

making procedures in the hydropower industry. Fourth, besides internal strengthening of MEM, the

former Water Resources and Environmental Administration (WREA), created in mid 2007 as part of

the Prime Minister’s Office, had the mandate of assuming the role of an environmental and social

regulator, responsible for implementing and overseeing the Compensation and Resettlement (CAR)

Decree adopted by the GoL in 2005 and the new Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA)

Decree approved in 2010.

Despite the government’s commendable efforts to develop a coherent and systematic approach to

sustainably develop hydropower and alleviate its impact on poverty, several constraints identified in

the Paper on Water Resources Management in Lao PDR (WREA, 2008) remain to be addressed. These

include:

� Limited legislation and enforcement;

� Lack of a clear policy preference for types of projects;

� Single-project orientation, rather than program-based planning;

� Fragmented water resources management arrangements, limiting legal functioning

and capacity, and creating gaps among related sectors; and

� Data fragmentation, problematic access to information, and other issues limiting

the use of robust information in decision-making and implementation.

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3.2 MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS IN THE LAO PDR

Lao PDR is party to 11 global Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs) (see Table 1 for the lists

of MEAs). In Lao PDR, international agreements are not self-executing, which means that their

obligations must be implemented in the national law (Prime Minister's Office 2007).

Eight of the MEAs to which Lao PDR is a party to include an obligation to develop national policy,

strategies and plans to guide implementation - only the Convention on International Trade in

Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Montreal Protocol don’t do so. Most of

the laws reviewed require the government or government authorities concerned to develop policies,

strategies and action plans on the protection and management of environment and natural resources.

In particular, Article 5.2 of the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) requires that the National Socio-

Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) contain provisions on the management and protection of the

environment and natural resources.

In contrast, Articles 22.1 and 43.3 of the law on water and water resources provide that water

management plans must be in compliance with the NSEDP. This means that economic development has

higher priority than sustainable water resource management. It also means that water management

plans may be subject to revision on the basis of changes in policy, rather than being based on sound

principles of water resources management. These articles of the law on water and water resources are

not consistent with Article 5.2 of the EPL. This inconsistency creates uncertainty for whomsoever

attempts to comply with the existing law and for whoever is responsible for enforcing it (Prime

Minister's Office 2007).

Table 1 List of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)

Biodiversity Atmosphere Chemicals

World Heritage Convention

(WHC, 1972)

Vienna Convention for the

Protection of the Ozone Layer

(1985)

The Stockholm Convention on

Persistent Organic Pollutants

(POPs, 2001)

The Convention on

international Trade in

Endangered Species of Flora

and Fauna (CITES, 1973)

The Montreal Protocol on

Substances that Depleted the

Ozone Layer (1987)

The Convention on

Biodiversity (CBD, 1992)

The Framework for Convention

on Climate Change (FCCC,

1992)

Cartagena Protocol on

Biosafety (2000)

The Kyoto Protocol (1995)

The Convention on

Combating Desertification

(CCD, 1994)

Ramsar Convention of

Wetlands (2010)

Sources: Prime Minister's Office, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)-WREA, Project

MEA 2007, on Comparative Analysis between Multilateral Environmental Agreements and National

Socio-Economic Development in Lao PDR.

MEAs’ obligations have been incorporated into 10 national legal instruments. The obligations, which

have been incorporated into most laws, include monitoring, data collection, and performance

incentives. Issues that are lacking in the majority of the laws reviewed include requirements for:

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preparation of inventories of natural resources; education and public awareness; public participation

in decision-making related to resource management, technology transfer and technical cooperation.

In particular, no law reviewed requires that there be a review of its enforcement and of compliance

with its provisions. Article 31 of the Mining Law and Article 6 and 14 of Electricity Law require project

developers to undertake environmental impact assessments (EIA), but none of the other laws

reviewed contain this requirement. In addition, only hydropower and transportation/road sectors

have developed sectoral EIA regulations (Prime Minister's Office 2007).

All of the laws reviewed contain provisions on institutional arrangements, but not all of them include

conservation and environment protection in the mandates of the responsible institutions, nor do

they assign responsibilities for these functions at all levels, from central ministries to village

administration (Prime Minister's Office 2007).

Table 2 provides a summary of relevant Laws, Regulations, Policies and Plans related to hydropower

development, dam cascades, water valuation, and livelihoods. Each of the relevant laws, regulations,

policies and plans will be further elaborated upon in the following sections.

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Table 2 Summary of Relevant Laws, Regulations, Policies and Plans

Issues fields Law/ Regulation Decree Policy Strategy/Plan Guidelines Description of relevance

Hydropower

development

Law on Electricity

(1997, 2008,

updated 2012)

Regulations of

Environment

Management for

Electricity Projects

Decree on

Implementation of

Electricity Law

The Seventh National

Socio-Economic

Development Plan

(NSEDP) (2011-15)

Power System

Development Plan for

Lao PDR (Final report,

August 2004),

prepared by Maunsell

and Lahmeyer

International

Lao Electric Power

Technical

Standards (MEM,

2004)

There are number of

legislations relevant to

hydropower development,

but the key legislations line

ministries most referred to

are the Law on Electricity,

the Law on Investment

Promotion and the

National Policy on

Sustainable Hydropower,

NSEDP and EIA (SIA)

Decree.

Law on Investment

Promotion (National

Assembly, 2009)

Regulation on list of

investment projects

subject to IEE and

EIA (2010)

Decree on EIA

(2010)

National Policy on

Environmental and

Social Sustainability of

Hydropower Sector in

Lao PDR (NPESSHS -

No.561/CPI, STEA, 2006)

Strategy Plan for

Energy Sector

Development

National

Environmental

Standards (2010)

Environmental

Protection Law

(1999) Wildlife and

Aquatic Animals Law

(MAF, 2007)

Lao on National

Heritage (MCI, 2005)

National Policy on

Sustainable Hydropower

(STEA, 2006)

Renewable energy

development strategy

of the Lao PDR (MEM,

2010)

Dam

Cascades

Decree on

Establishment and

Activities of River

Basin Committee

(No. 293/PM,

15.06.2010)

Two RBCs have been set up

as the result of this Decree

(Nam Ngum and Nam

Theun - Nam Kading RBCs),

but they are still new,

weak, and irrelevant to

hydropower development.

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Table 2 (Cont’d.)

Issues fields Law/ Regulation Decree Policy Strategy/Plan Guidelines Description of relevance

Water

valuation

Law on water and

water resources

(MIH, 1996) – to be

updated in 2013.

Decree on establishment

and activities of water

resources and

environment

administration 149/PM

Draft National Water

Resource Policy,

Strategy and Action

Plan 2011-2015 (1

Oct. 2010)

It is unclear what

law/policy/decree is

relevant to water

valuation, but the draft

National Water Policy

provides a framework for

IWRM which considers it.

Livelihoods Regulations for

implementing

Decree 192/PM on

Compensation and

Resettlement of

People Affected by

Development

Projects

Decree on EIA (2010), but

also incorporates Social

Impact Assessment.

The Seventh

National Socio-

Economic

Development Plan

(NSEDP) (2011-15)

Technical

Guidelines on

Compensation

and Resettlement

in Development

Projects (Nov.

2005)

There are many pieces of

legislation relevant to

livelihoods that are

implemented by different

ministries/ agencies.

Law on Forestry

(MAF, Mar. 2008)

Decree on Compensation

and Resettlement of

People Affected by

Development Projects (No.

192/PM, Sept. 2006)

National Policy on

Health Impact

Assessment (No.

365/MOH, 01 Mar.

2006)

Draft Practical

Guideline on

Health Impact

Assessment in Lao

PDR

Land Law (MoF,

2003)

Decree on developing

small villages into village

development units and

developing bigger villages

into a small city in the

rural area (03/ກມສພມ,

30 May 2011.

Draft National

Strategy for Rural

Water Supply,

Sanitation and

Hygiene (v.3 - Mar.

2011, MOH)

Public

involvement

guidelines, draft

(2009)

National Growth and

Poverty Eradication

(NGPES)

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Hydropower Development Related law and policies

Law on Investment Promotion (2004, updated 2009): The law assigns the Ministry of Planning and

Investment (MPI) and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) as the investment administration

authorities with rights to propose solutions to relevant authorities (sectoral ministries) for their

consideration if they find any violations of law or regulation related to investment (Article 93). The

MPI is mainly responsible for concessions of large projects (e.g., hydropower, mining, commercial

plantation), while the MIC is responsible for general business investment.

Different governmental agencies regulate this cross-sectoral development from different

perspectives. The WREA (now MONRE2) is in charge of reviewing the EIA and regulating water

resources management, the National Land Management Authority (NLMA) formulates integrated

land-use planning, and the MPI and MIC regulate investment. The law states that all activities of

enterprises shall be managed, monitored, and inspected by relevant sectors (Article 93). In the

context of hydropower development (concession business), investors shall submit applications to the

one-stop service of the Investment Promotion Department of the MPI, which will then propose them

to the government or provincial authorities for further consideration (Article 21).

In practice, on a case-by-case basis, MEM (through the Department of Energy Business [DEB]) is also

able to submit proposals and reports directly to the government without going through MPI. But

they do keep MPI well informed. In the case of hydropower development projects, the MPI is

assigned to represent the government and sign MOUs, Project Development Agreements (PDAs), and

Concession Agreements (CAs) on its behalf. The MPI (Department of Law and Department of

Research) also works closely with ministries concerned and local governments through all of the

processes.

According to the law, all project developers must set up and legally register a local project company

with a minimum investment funds of not less than 30 percent of the total project value; all taxes,

royalties, and so forth must be paid through this project company only.

Law on Electricity (1997, 2008, 2012): This law determines regimes of production and distribution of

electricity, with an emphasis on hydropower and its administration. It lays out which government

agencies must approve hydropower projects, based on their size in terms of electricity generation (see

Box 1). It also outlines the procedure for obtaining concessions to operate electricity projects, and the

rights and duties of government agencies responsible for electricity sector administration and

inspection. In order to be eligible to develop hydropower in the Lao PDR, project developers must meet

all requirements outlined in this law when developing a project proposal.

Recently, the government has approved the updated Electricity Law 03/NA, Vientiane, 20 December

2011 (to replace 03/NA, 8 December 2008).

2 MONRE - Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment approved at the 9th National Assembly on 15 June 2011.

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The following articles have been updated or replaced in the updated law:

Articles Headings Key descriptions

17 National Electricity Transmission

Grid

Additional paragraphs are added

26 Investment in operations

relating to electricity

The operation enterprises are now: BOT,

BOOT, BT and state owned. BTF has been

removed.

29 Concession Procedures Clearer procedures: (1) MOU; (2) PDA;

(3)CA

33 Concession Term Possible extension of 10 years’ term has

been removed.

34 Size of electricity enterprises Approval:

< 100KW – District Governor & or

municipality

> 100KW – 15MW – Provincial Governor

(in consultation & with approval of

relevant sectors)

> 15MW – 100MW – Central Government

(in consultation with MPI and MEM)

> 100MW (or more than 10,000 ha of

reservoir sizes, other impacts) – National

Assembly (in consultation with the central

government)

37 Obligations of Concessionaires

39 Exceptions to Concession

Application

41 Contribution to environmental

fund

45 Approval for establishment of

an electricity enterprise in a

locality or in rural areas

49 Electricity prices of rural areas

50 Rights of Concessionaires

64 Rights and responsibilities of

Ministry of Energy and Mines

added

65 Rights and responsibilities of

Provincial and Vientiane

Municipal Energy and Mines

added

68 Inspection Agencies MEM, Provincial and Vientiane

Municipality Energy and Mines, Districts’

Energy and Mines.

81 Effectiveness 60 days after presidential approval.

Environmental Protection Law (1999): As stated in the law, environmental protection consists of all

activities that contribute to the protection of the environment and do not cause damage to the

environment; that ensure a clean and pollution-free environment; and that do not cause adverse

impacts to the health of humans, animals, plants, or to the balance of the ecosystem. The law

defines environmental management and monitoring agencies’ (and clearly sets out their rights and

duties), obligations to protect natural resources; measures for managing exploitation and use of

natural resources (such as protection of biodiversity and protection of cultural, historical, and natural

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conservation sites); and pollution control from business sectors. However, there is no specific

section/clause concerning potential impact and measures for energy sector development.

The Seventh National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) (2011-15): In the energy sector,

the GoL targets the construction of 10 more large dams to produce 5,015 MW of power. Along with

these dams, it aims to complete transmission lines (115 Kv) in the north, central, and south regions

to meet the power demand and, at the same time, ensure that the number of households who

access electricity increases to 80 percent by 2015. The plan targets national growth and intends to

ensure the preservation of natural resources and protection of environment.

National policy on environmental and social sustainability of hydropower sector in the Lao PDR

(NPESSHS - No.561/CPI, STEA, 2006): This overarching policy guides related ministries for sustainably

developing the hydropower sector in Lao PDR, taking lessons from the Nam Theun 2 project. The

policy is founded on three principles: (a) economic sustainability relies on the maintenance of the

renewable resource base and the use of nonrenewable resource rents to support the development

of other factors of production; (b) social sustainability is based on the principles of inclusiveness,

mutual understanding, and consensus; and (c) ecological sustainability relies on the avoidance of

irreversible environmental impacts such as the loss of biodiversity, the accumulation of persistent

pollutants, or the disruption of ecological cycles.

The policy applies to all large hydropower dams, where large dams are defined as having an installed

capacity of higher than 50 Megawatts or inundating more than 10,000 hectares of land at their full

supply level. This national policy applies to hydropower projects constructed after 1990. The Policy is

guided by ten core principles: i) Environmental Assessment; ii) project-affected people; iii)

watershed management and conservation; iv) consultation; v) disclosure; vi) compliance; vii)

revenues; viii) existing hydropower projects; ix) institutionalization; and x) reporting on annual

status of the environment, and social compliance detailing the performance of all hydropower

projects in planning, design, construction and operational phases by Bureau of the Secretariat of

the Lao National Committee on Energy (LNCE).

In sum, hydropower project proposals should go through the MPI as a first window, with the MEM as

the recipient that drives or leads processes as outlined in the investment promotion law and MEM's

Independent Power Producers (IPP) implementation processes. Proposals must follow the Electricity

law, the EIA Decree and other relevant legislations (e.g., the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare on

labor law, the Ministry of Public Work and Transport for approval of access roads, the NLMA for

concession area surveys and development, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry for forest

classification and protected areas). The most common type of concession agreement is built-own-

transfer (BOT). According to an interview with the MPI, tax laws are very important for income

generation; however, these laws are currently unavailable and the MPI (Department of law) is

conducting a study to review them.

Dam Cascades related law and policies

Decree on Establishment and Activities of River Basin Committee (No. 293/PM, 15.06.2010): There

is no direct policy/regulation on the operation of dam cascades. This operation is handled by dam

developers/operators on a contractual, case-by-case basis.

However, the government has announced a new decree on the establishment and activities of the

River Basin Committee (RBC), a non-permanent organization following IWRM principles in line with

the draft national water resources policy, strategy, and action plan. It has a mandate to act as a water

resource executive under the direction of the Lao National Mekong Committee (LNMC) for

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management, development, conservation, rehabilitation, and use of water resources (called “water

resources management”) in river basins. Its key roles are to facilitate consultation and participation

in the development process in river basin areas among all involved agencies, including government,

private sector, communities and other involved parties, and, to ensure sustainable water resource

and ecosystem use, and to apply mechanism for polluter pays principles.

Currently (2010/2011), two RBCs have been established for the Nam Nguem (NNG) River Basin and

Nam Theun-Nam Kading (NT-NKD) River Basin. Both rivers are heavily modified, with cascades of

dams on the main rivers and their tributaries. This implies that the Decree on the establishment of

RBCs has the mandate and jurisdiction to address dam cascades. For example, the Nam Nguem

hydropower and mining forum was initiated to encourage engagement from investors, developers,

donors, and international organizations. However, since these committees are new, they are still

exploring and trying out different models from other countries; for NNG, the French model of river

basin organization is under consideration.

Water Governance and Valuation related law and policies

Draft National Water Resource Policy, Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2015 (1 Oct. 2010): This plan

comprehensively outlines the implementation of an IWRM-based approach through coordinated,

optimized, and sustainable development and use of water resources, protection of the environment, and

improvement of social well-being. The policy will help update the law on water and water resources and

other legislation; it will also help guide water-related aspects of national socioeconomic development

planning and private sector investment management at the central and local levels. The plan also

elaborates on strategies and action plans for the next five-year period (2011 to 2015), prepared in parallel

with the policy.

This policy clearly sets out five principles: a) water is a valuable national asset in which government

has the central authority to regulate its management, development, use and protection; b) water

must be conserved for basic human needs and the protection of ecosystems; c) water rights are

separated from land rights insofar as landowners do not always have the right to use or control water

adjacent to their property; d) water has economic, social, and environmental values, and e) decision-

making on water resources management should be based on consultation and participation level.

In parallel, the strategy outlines key focus areas and sets priority activities for 2011 to 2015. The

action plan elaborates on the programs and activities in action with respect to timeframe and

implementing agencies, consisting mainly of departments within WREA. As of 15 June 2011 (9th

National Assembly), the NA approved a new ministry to replace WREA, called the Ministry of Natural

Resources and Environment. This ministry is currently under formation and will take time to become

fully functional. The government and national assembly are expected to approve the Policy, Strategy

and Action Plan by the end of 2011. The policy formation is supported by the ADB and AusAID

through ADB-TA 70133.

Livelihoods

The Seventh National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011-15) aims to lift the people of Lao

PDR out of poverty and raise the country from least-developed status by 2020. Its approach is to

carry out rural development and make the country green and clean, abundant in forests (including

rain forests), water, and fresh air. Special focus will be placed on poor and remotely located kumbans

3 Updating the National Water Policy and Strategy (ADB TA 7013-LAO).

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(village clusters) that have minimally benefitted from previous programs. Following this, efforts are

focused on encouraging economic development alongside socio-cultural development, improving the

political system and national defence and security, and alleviating the status of poor households and

villages. These are starting points as per the four targets set by the Politburo (decree No 13/PM).

The following are the targets for 2015:

a. Reduce poverty by headcount to less than 19 percent of the population and by household

to less than 11 percent of the total by 2015;

b. Conduct participatory planning at the village, kumban, and district levels in order to

implement poverty reduction projects effectively;

c. Implement programs through the Poverty Development Fund to include three times the

number of villages and kumbans currently included;

d. Lift villages from their low development levels to become ‘development villages’ according

to four targets and the Prime Minister’s Decree no. 13/PM. These targets include turning

about 50 percent of the large-sized villages in a district into development villages, making

at least one kumban in each district into a small town, and creating conditions for poor

districts to get rid of abject poverty;

e. Resettle displaced people by developing new agricultural lands and living facilities for them

on a permanent basis, completely halt (and reverse) deforestation, and stop shifting

cultivation;

f. Village grouping, resettlement, and livelihoods – cross-cutting issue: Continue kumban

development and village grouping (and resettling) as anti-poverty and rural/human

development approaches;

g. Extend the road network to poor districts so as to permit travel throughout the year –

especially the districts of Dukjeing, Kaleuam, Samoua, Saisathan, Phonthong, and

Saichamphon – and connect all Kumbans and other priority areas by roads;

h. Expand rural electrification to provide access to 80 percent of the households across the

country and extend permanent electrical networks to all municipalities;

i. Employment, youth, and poverty – cross-cutting issue: While the proportion of people

below the poverty line is reducing, the extent of hunger and food-security, especially

seasonal food security, is a concern that the plan will aim to address. The government

recognizes that growing food is not enough to meet food security targets; it is necessary

for people to have entitlements to food year-round on a sustained basis; and

j. Growth, distribution, safety nets, and gender – cross-cutting issue: As growth in some sectors

is not employment-generating (like mining and hydropower), and as these are the

spearheads of development, the benefits of growth must reach the larger masses through

other means. A development approach will be devised that benefits the poor, like the

employment assurance program. Such an approach, when targeted at the poor (focused on

women), can act as a safety net.

The government strongly believes that hydropower development is an appropriate strategy that will

greatly contribute to the GDP and poverty reduction through project-area development or through

the resettlement of villages.

National Growth and Poverty Eradication (NGPES): In line with national socioeconomic

development strategies (NSEDS), the NGPES has dual objectives: enhancing growth and

development, and reducing poverty. The NGPES defines economic growth, sociocultural

development, and environmental preservation as the three pillars of Lao PDR’s development policy,

but implies strong emphasis on economic growth, as is evident from the GoL’s dependency on

private-sector financing.

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The NGPES operational framework defines four sectors – agriculture/forestry, education, health, and

infrastructure (with a focus on rural roads) – on which the government will concentrate.

As stated in the NGPES, poverty is defined as “the lack of ability to fulfill basic human needs; not

having enough food, lacking adequate clothing, not having permanent housing, and lacking access to

health, education, and transportation services” (Instruction no. 010/PM, 25 June 2001). Most areas

with an operational hydropower project will not be covered by the NGPES programs (both funding

and technical support) as government believes substantial support and funds have already been

provided to the affected communities through the project. But, the NGPES will serve as a guiding

document for defining livelihoods and poverty for hydropower project development areas.

Decree on EIA (2010): The Decree is applicable to all investment projects for which environmental

impact assessments are required. There are two types of impact assessments: initial environmental

examinations (IEE) are for small-scale and uncontroversial projects, while EIAs are for large,

complicated, and controversial projects. For hydropower development projects below 15MW, IEEs

are sufficient; any project beyond 15MW must conduct an EIA.

The Decree provides guidelines on the environmental impact assessment process: investment project

screening, selection, issuing certificate, management and monitoring, settlement of environmental and

social disputes, and policies toward persons with outstanding compliance, and measures for violators.

It also defines the duties of key agencies (WREA, local administration, project developers, project-

affected people, and other concerned agencies) in IEE, EIA, and other processes.

Project developers are given total responsibility (including financial responsibilities) for all the steps

in the EIA, including drafting the assessment, conducting consultations with relevant stakeholders at

all levels (from local to national), implementing and monitoring the EIA, and reporting on

compliance. This Decree also emphasizes project-affected people and other stakeholders' rights and

duties when participating in investment project development. The consultation and participation

process are as follows:

� First DRAFT of EIA:

o Project developer, before submitting to Environmental and Social Impact Assessment

Department (ESIAD), must hold public consultation with potential affected villagers

to inform them about the issues; and propose solution. The developer must take the

minutes of all the consultations (with signatures of village headman and villagers),

and attach these to the draft EIA when submitting it to ESIAD/relevant agencies; and

o Project developer must also hold a public consultation at district level, with district office,

and relevant line agencies (both from provincial and district) as well as village headmen,

elders group, Lao Women Union, Lao National Front Construction, to inform them about

the issues and propose solutions. The developer will also take minutes of the meeting

(with signatures of approving authority).

� Project developer shall submit to ESIAD, a set of documents, including Environmental

Impact Assessment (EIA), Social Impact Assessment (SIA), Environmental Management Plan

(EMP), and Resettlement Management Plan (RMP). The Department will review all the

documents, and return them back to the developers for further revision. The biggest

challenge faced by ESIAD is their capacity to review all the documents (EIA, SIA, EMP,

Resettlement Action Plan [RAP]) that are prepared by experts with more than 10-20 years of

experience and provide constructive recommendation, because most of the reviewers are

usually inexperienced new graduates from local universities.

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� Finally, a National Meeting must also be organized to inform the public of the project

commencement. The meeting should be co-chaired by ministers of the relevant ministries

and Provincial Governor. If there are any further comments on the project at this meeting,

developers can decline/accept these for further improvement. The meeting also invites

relevant agencies, and village representatives (village head, elderly group, women union).

Project developers are also responsible for financing the monitoring activities of ministries

or departments concerned (such as the MEM and the MONRE/WREA). In practice,

ministries and departments concerned must submit a budget plan to the project developer

each time to finance their monitoring teams. According to the EIA Decree, the departments

concerned may make unannounced monitoring visits to sites, but, in practice, this has

never happened. It is difficult not to provide notice before arrival, as prior and formal

notification of any visit by government officials is an acceptable and common practice.

This Decree was upgraded in 2010 from the previous Regulation on Environmental Impact

Assessment 2000, with support from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)

through its Social and Environmental Management II Project (SEMII) Project. In 2006, when

the regulation was reviewed, it was recommended to upgrade it to a Decree issued by the

Prime Minister to add weight to the policy for greater compliance. When it was only a

regulation, compliance was low, making enforcement difficult; at that time, the WREA was

only the STEA, with less power than ministries. Although STEA was reformed to WREA in

2007, it still does not have the power of most ministries and provincial authorities, which

makes it difficult for it to enforce or ensure compliance of the EIA.

Decree on Compensation and Resettlement of People Affected by Development Projects (No.

192/PM, Sept. 2006): The decree defines principles, rules, and measures to mitigate adverse social

impacts and to compensate for damages that result from involuntary acquisition or repossession of

land and fixed or moveable assets, including changes in land use, and restriction of access to

community or natural resources affecting community livelihood and income sources (Article 1). The

decree gives the project owners the responsibility to:

� Address adverse social impacts (Article 4);

� Provide compensation (Article 6);

� Provide assistance during relocation and transition periods (Article 7);

� Provide adequate assistance in addition to other compensation for economic

rehabilitation (Article 8);

� Undertake restoration and repair community facilities and infrastructures (Article 9);

� Take responsibility for resettlement site development and mitigate adverse impacts

(Article 10);

� Consider Lao culture and practices (Article 11);

� Conduct public participation and consultation (Article 12);

� Establish grievance redressal mechanisms (Article 13);

� Prepare resettlement costs and budgets (Article 14);

� Provide reporting and documentation to responsible government authorities for

consideration and recommendation (Article 15); and

� Make adequate arrangements for monitoring of the implementation of the

compensation, resettlement, and rehabilitation measures (Article 16).

The Decree also gives ministries concerned the rights and responsibilities to either reward or

sanction project owners based on their compliance of the legislation; however it does not clearly

provide any guidance or procedures on how to monitor and evaluate the project owners’ conduct in

meeting their obligations.

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The Decree obliges project owners to prepare Initial Social Assessment (ISA)/land and assets

acquisition assessment; Social Impact Assessment (SIA); Land Acquisition and Compensation Report;

Resettlement Plan; and Ethnic Minority Development Plan, and submit these to the government

agency (STEA) for approval (Article 15). It does not elaborate on the process of approval in terms of

criteria/guidelines for approval, regular monitoring, and inspection of conducted activities. In

addition, the decree’s definition of those eligible for compensation does not include community

living downstream of the reservoir/dam in terms of potential project impacts to downstream area

(Suhardiman, A. de Silva, S. Carew-Reid, J. (2011).

In practice, ESIA Department (MONRE) is responsible for implementing this Decree, but the current

debate within the government is that ESIA Division/Department only has expertise in the area of

natural resource and environment. In this case, their mandate and authority for implementing and

monitoring social impacts is weak and not that relevant. At the moment, the government has not

decided on which ministries should take full responsibility for the social development part. This is

also why the government has decided to establish the Resettlement Committees (RC) and

Resettlement Management Unit (RMU) at the Provincial/District levels for all the Dam Projects (and

make it as compulsory part of the Concession Agreement). For example, in the case of THXP, RC is

responsible for reviewing and approving of the Resettlement Action Plan for the Theun-Hinboun

Expansion Project (THXP), providing organizational support and direction for the RMU; liaising with

GoL organization on national, provincial, and district levels; ensuring compliance with GoL Laws,

regulation and policy; liaising with THXP regarding GoL concerns and priorities; and organizing

national-level consultation (Bolikhamxay Province, Lao PDR, 2010).

Regulations for Implementing Decree 192/PM on Compensation and Resettlement of People

Affected by Development Projects (STEA, 2005): In line with the decree on compensation and

resettlement of people affected by a development project, the regulations link resettlement

procedures with the project cycle (Article 3). See Table 3.

The regulations outline the procedure for resettlement and compensation and the steps the project

owners have to take to ensure compliance with the existing regulations and procedures, during each

stage of project development (from identification, pre-feasibility, feasibility study, detailed design,

construction and operation). As stated in the regulations: “To implement each step of the project

cycle and resettlement process, the project owner will properly and strictly comply with the

provisions determined in the Technical Guidelines on Compensation and Resettlement” (STEA, 2006).

Table 3 Project cycle and resettlement procedures.

Project cycle Resettlement process

Identification Screening/Initial Social Assessment(ISA)/Terms of

Reference (ToR) for Social Impact Assessment (SIA)

Pre-feasibility study Redefine ToR/assess options for minimizing adverse

impacts/selection of suitable design option

Feasibility study

SIA/Socio-Economic Survey (SES)/Inventory of Losses

(IOL)/Resettlement Plan (RP)/ Ethnic Minority

Development Plan (EMDP)

Detailed study Updated/final RP/EMDP

Construction/operation RP/EMDP implementation and monitoring

Source: STEA 2005.

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These regulations give project owners the central role in formulating and implementing resettlement

plans, highlighting how the government perceives project owners as ad-hoc decision makers in

hydropower projects. Giving project owners full responsibility for conducting resettlement processes

raises potential conflicts of interest that may occur when identifying potential negative impacts,

formulating mitigation/resettlement plans, implementing them, and monitoring their

implementation. Since project owners are interested in developing hydropower dams for profit, they

tend to downplay potential negative impacts from the start, minimize the cost of resettlement, and

overlook operational impacts on existing ecosystems.

The way project owners include public participation, information disclosure, and consultation into

the resettlement process is another issue. The regulations highlight the potential role of local

authorities in encouraging more transparent and deliberative decision-making through community

participation and active involvement in resettlement planning and implementation.

According to the new EIA Decree (2010), Article 14, social management and monitoring plans include

the following:

� The social management and monitoring plan must be consistent with the Decree and

Regulations on Compensation and Resettlement of project-affected people by

development projects and consists of a resettlement plan for the project-affected people

by the investment project, a social development plan, and a plan to restore living

condition, paying particular attention to the healthcare of those who are affected etc; and

� The project developer must strictly implement the social management and monitoring

plan approved by the Water Resources and Environment Administration (now MONRE), in

coordination with the local administration concerned, particularly the Committee of

Resettlement and Restoration of Living Condition. In case it assigns the task to another

company, it must incorporate the terms and conditions of the plan into the contract to

ensure that the sub-contractor implements the plan comprehensively.

As per the Resettlement and Restoration of Living Condition Committees (Article 28, EIA Decree

2010), the Government appoints a Provincial or Capital Resettlement and Restoration of Living

Condition Committee which has the following authority and duties:

� To lead and give directions, supervise, and monitor the resettlement and restoration of

living condition of the project-affected people located in its province or prefecture; in

compliance with the Social Management and Monitoring Plan (SMMP);

� To consider petitions filed by the people, in close coordination with the project developer,

the agencies concerned and report to the government regularly; and

� This committee functions by relying on the budget allocated from the investment project,

the State budget and other sources.

4.0 INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

In the context of Lao PDR, the best way to understand water sector decision-making and the key

actors involved is through understanding the IPP project approval, implementation, and monitoring

processes (

Figure 2).

In the hydropower development sector, two ministries are responsible for concession proposals. The

Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), in particular the Investment Promotion Department

(IPD), the Law Department (LD), and the Research Department (RD), are responsible for registering,

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reviewing, and examining investment proposals and submitting them to the Prime Minister’s Office

(PMO) for consideration and approval. Under the MEM, the DEB (formerly known as Department of

Energy Promotion and Development [DEPD]) is responsible for overseeing private investment

initiatives and hydropower project development while the DEPP (formerly known as DOE) plays a

more strategic and technical role, doing sector planning and policies as well as examining technical

feasibility studies, project designs, advocacy, monitoring and coordinating with relevant sectors.

DEPP is also a representative of MEM to witness the signing of the MOU relevant to electricity

development projects. At the Mekong regional levels, DEPP is designated as the focal point for MRC

database and a member of joint technical review group and advisory committee of MRC’s Initiative

on Sustainable Hydropower (ISH).

For the planning/preparation stages of the investment proposal:

� The MPI collects and registers proposals for public investment from provincial sector

departments;

� The IPD, Department of Energy Policy and Planning (DEPP) (formerly known as DOE) and

Department of Energy Business (DEB) together review investment proposals for their

technical feasibility and the developers’ ability to raise the necessary financing, and then

make recommendations to their ministers, the MPI, and the government. If the project

meets the Electricity Law and relevant policy and if it has sufficient investment funds, the

IPD (or, in some cases, the DEB) will report to the PMO for consideration and approval; and

� Once approved by government, the MPI (acting on behalf of the government) will sign MOU

for further investigation by project developers. The MPI is also delegated by the

government to sign MOUs, PDAs, and CAs as they emerge, subject to government and

National Assembly approval of the investment proposal.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is signed with the developer in order to carry out technical

feasibility studies, which can often be costly and therefore require some assurance that the

developer can proceed if the feasibility studies are satisfactory. MONRE becomes involved here in

reviewing EIA, SIA/SES/IOL, Environmental Monitoring and Management Plan, SMMP RAP, and Ethnic

Minority Development Plan (EMDP). MONRE is also responsible for distributing EIA and related

assessment and plans to ministries concerned for further reviews (e.g., Ministry of Agriculture and

Forestry, Ministry of Public Work and Transport, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Lao

National Front for Construction, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare ). This step is followed by the

granting of a Project Development Agreement (PDA), which gives exclusive mandate to the developer

to negotiate with power buyers. It is at this stage that the benefit to the Lao Government is defined.

According to MEM, PDA is not required by the Lao Government, but is by and large required and

requested for by the Project Developer as evidence for negotiating with the power buyers and

lenders.

During the Concession Agreement negotiations, the DEB usually takes the lead in forming and

heading a taskforce of representatives from other line ministries (including the MOF, the MPI, the

MONRE and sometimes the Ministry of Justice for major agreements). The DEB attempts to ensure

that each concession agreement is harmonized with other existing projects, with modifications

related to the project at hand. The MONRE attempts to ensure an appropriate social and

environmental budget and mitigation measures. National Assembly approval must also be sought for

large and controversial projects or for small projects that cover national protected areas, areas of

cultural importance, or special zones.

At the implementation/operational steps, project developers are held responsible and accountable

for construction, social and environmental implementation, and compliance. They must arrange

public consultations with the participation of all stakeholders (projected-affected people, local

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governments from different line agencies, and other stakeholders) and report on self-monitoring

activities.

According to the EIA Decree, there are different levels and different types of monitoring

requirements: monitoring by project developers, monitoring by government agencies, and

monitoring by external bodies. The most common one is monitoring by project developers, and

monitoring by government agencies. The latter involves regular monitoring by provincial and district

administration, and periodic inspection and monitoring by Department of Electricity and ESIA

Department. Levels of monitoring vary from project to project, in which some even have an

international panel of experts. Procedures for monitoring by external bodies – for example, oversight

by the National Assembly, inspection by the State Inspection Administration, auditing by the National

Audit Administration, and monitoring by the Panel of Experts (domestic, not foreign) – have not been

laid down.

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Figure 2 Steps in Hydropower Power Concession Awards, Approval and Implementation and

Monitoring Processes in Lao PDR. (Julia Fraser, based on MacGeorge et al. 2010; WB

2009; and van den Toorn 2009, with inputs from Jie Tang and William Rex 2010).

Steps Key Actors/ GoL Agencies

Investment

Proposal

• MPI: collects, accepts, registers & reviews investment proposal, in coordination with MEM for its technical and financial feasibility

• MEM: Assesses the technical feasibility of the proposal & ability of the developer to carry out ESIA and raise private financing

• PMO: endorses the investment proposal based on MPI and MEM's recommendation

MPI (DPI) MEM (DEB, DEPP) PMO/Government

1

2

MOU

(Feasibility Study)

EIA (SIA/RAP/

EMP)

PDA

• MEM: Provides technical proposal

• MPI (with technical back-up from MEM) grants Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to developer to carry out technical feasibility studies

• MONRE/WREA: Reviews Env. and Social Impact Assessment

• MPI (with technical back-up from MEM) grants Development Agreement (PDA) - to give exclusive mandate to developer to negotiate power purchase with potential buyer.

• PMO: endorses/approves the investment proposal based on MPI, MEM, MONRE proposed assessment and recommendation

MPI (DL+DR) MEM (DEB, DEPP)

EDL/LHEC MOF MONRE/WREA (ESIAD) PMO/Government

3

Concession Agreement

(CA)

• MPI & MEM: Participate in negotiation and draft Concession Agreement

• MPI & MEM: Ensure harmonization with existing Agreements

• MONRE/WREA: Ensure best proposal for Social and Environmental Impact

• MPI: Grants Concession Agreement, subject to Provincial Government, PMO/Government and National Assembly's Approval

• BOT - Build-Own-Transfer is the common agreement type

MPI (DPI) MEM (DEB, DEPP)

MONRE/WREA (ESIAD) MOF Province

5

Monitoring and

Evaluation

• MEM: Monitors projects under negotiation, construction, and operation

• MONRE/WREA: Periodically monitors social and environmental compliance

• Provinces and districts: Regularly monitors the infrastructure development, social and environmental compliance, and other security matters in the project areas.

MEM (DEB) MONRE (ESIAD) Province + District Project Developers External (PE, others)

4

Implement-

ation

• Implementation mainly undertaken and led by Project Developers for both infrastructure and social and environmental components

• Local Government provides overall support, sets up institution for resettlement and grievance processes, and monitoring of progress.

• Other line ministries/agencies at the provincial and district levels are being mobilized or appointed to support the Project Developer in accordance with their work plan, but some are on an ad-hoc basis, particularly on the social component.

• Central government provides overall oversight with occasional supervision and monitoring by relevant ministries/agencies.

Project Developer Local Government: (Province + District authority)

Other line agencies at provincial & district levels: MEM, MAF, LNMA, MOH, MOES, MLSW, MICT, MPTC, LWU, Lao Youth Union [LYU], LNFC)

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4.1 MULTI-LATERAL AGENCIES (ADB, WORLD BANK, MRC)

4.1.1 World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB)

Multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and bilateral agencies

continue to play a key role in the development of hydropower in the Mekong Region (Middleton, 2009).

They have previously influenced the reorientation of national policies in favor of private-sector

investment and have provided technical studies, advice, and financing to shape the region’s strategic

directions in electricity development. For example, the ADB funded the Se Kong-Se San and Nam Theun

River Basins Hydropower Development Study , which commenced in 1997 and was completed in

September 1998, and proposed at least six hydropower projects for further study (Graecen and Palettu,

2007).

With increased private-sector involvement in the hydropower sector, demand for conditionality-tied

ADB and World Bank loans has declined. As a result, the role of these institutions has changed; they

have committed to the delivery of international best practices for the region and cooperation

initiatives (Middleton et al. 2009). The World Bank and the ADB’s environmental and social policies

and their commitments to public participation have been recognized as international best practices;

however, in recent years, they have been deemed inadequate to mitigate the impacts of large dams.

Existing hydropower projects supported by the ADB and the World Bank, including the Theun-

Hinboun and Nam Song dams in Lao PDR and the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand, have failed to mitigate

the impacts of the projects and to restore people’s livelihoods. The recent Nam Theun 2 hydropower

project in Laos, supported by the World Bank and the ADB, has restored the credibility of their

environmental and social impacts assessment and management practices; however, the project’s

long-term impacts on affected communities remain to be seen.

Since 1996, the ADB has supported the government in introducing integrated water resources

management (IWRM) approaches in Lao PDR. In 2008, the ADB initiated TA-7013-Lao: Updating the

National Water Policy and Strategy, and later in 2009, AusAID co-financed a sum of USD 300,000,

making it a USD 1.3-million TA project. Funding was provided to support the newly established Water

Resource and Environment Administration (WREA), established in 2007, to better streamline

agencies and modernize the water sector in Lao PDR under the mandate of IWRM (ADB website,

30.07.2011). As a result of this TA, the Water Resource Policy Framework (National Water Resource

Policy, Strategy and Action Plan) was prepared and completed. It is now being used as a preliminary

water resource policy (ADB website, 30.07.2011) while awaiting formal approval of the government

and National Assembly, expected by the end of 2011.

The ADB has provided a USD 20-million loan to the government of Laos and a

USD 50-million loan and USD 50-million guarantee to the Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC), a

French-Thai-Lao consortium that created the hydropower complex (ADB, 30.07.2011). These loans

and guarantee are based on government assurance that income from NT2 will be used to lift Lao

citizens elsewhere in the country out of poverty, largely through its existing anti-poverty platform of

public spending and reforms (ADB, 30.07.2011). The ADB also helped to monitor the displacement of

villagers in NT2, and it continues to closely monitor their livelihood restoration.

The World Bank funded the Lao Environment and Social (LEnS) Project4, the largest project currently

implemented by the Environmental Protection Fund (EPF)5. The World Bank also supports the

4 Lao Environment and Social (LEnS) Project aims at building the management and operation capacity of the

EPF for approving, funding, monitoring and evaluating sub-projects, enabling the EPF to utilize NT2 revenues

in an efficient and cost-effective manner.

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hydropower sector through recently approved Technical Assistance for Capacity Building in the

Hydropower and Mining Sectors Project (H539-LA) (Lao PDR Development Report by WB, 2010):

“In particular, the project will finance training and continuing education for government staff as well

as support advanced formal education at the national university of Laos and selected technical

colleges to develop the next generation of hydropower engineers and other skilled sector

professionals. It will also assist the government to move away from the present opportunistic and

enclave nature of the investments to more systematic sector planning with reviewing of hydropower

economic and financial implications, updating and applying least-cost expansion planning, and

establishing integrated river basin planning practice besides addressing cumulative impacts of river

basin development. Finally, it will refine the National Policy on Environmental and Social

Sustainability of the Hydropower Sector (NPSH) in line with the new ESIA Decree and the recent

institutional restructuring as well as build capacity of MEM, for enforcement and monitoring of

compliance with the NPSH and the Compensation and Resettlement Decree.” - Lao PDR

Development Report by WB, 2010

These multilateral banks provide loans and guarantees to support projects, but offers are based on

government assurance that project income from the Project (for example NT2, where ADB provided

USD 20 M loan to GoL and USD 50 M guarantee to NTPC) will be used to lift Lao citizens elsewhere in

the country out of poverty (or other conditions depending on multilateral policy and agreement

between GoL and the banks) (ADB 2011). Multilateral organizations (e.g., ADB) also closely monitor

project implementation (particularly, the social/environmental component and its compliance) to

ensure good progress and ensure that their corporate reputation is well maintained.

These multilateral organizations have also provided grants, loans, and technical assistance to relevant

ministries/department to support policy implementation and capacity enhancement through the

Environment Protection Fund for:

i. Environmental and social monitoring and policy implementation support (provincial

WREA in Savannakhet, Khammouane, and Bolikhamxay were the recipients);

ii. Integrated river basin management (WREA, now MONRE, was the recipient);

iii. Hydropower sector policy support (MEM – DOE, now changed to DEPP, was the

recipient);

iv. Social safeguards management (resettlement policy support) (WREA (MONRE) – ESIAD

was the recipient); and

v. Environmental education awareness (the National University of Laos was the recipient).

The WB provided a grant to support the implementation of the LEnS Project (of USD 7 million) as

part of the NT2, while ADB provided an endowment fund (of USD5.8 million) (Table 4).

5 The EPF was established to be a financially and administratively autonomous organization under the Lao

laws, aiming at strengthening environmental protection, sustainable natural resources management,

biodiversity conservation and community development in the Lao PDR.

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Table 4 Revenue of Environmental Protection Fund for 2006-2010.

Source: Report on the EPF Operation for 2006-2010, EPF 2010.

4.1.2 Mekong River Commission (MRC)

The MRC is a cooperation agreement between four member countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR,

Thailand, and Vietnam) through the 1995 Mekong Agreement on the Cooperation for Sustainable

Development of the Mekong River Basin (the 1995 Mekong Agreement). The Agreement also sets

out a framework for achieving the strategic objectives of IWRM, recognizing that development

decisions by sector agencies in the sovereign riparian countries of the Mekong River Basin may have

trans-boundary consequences and that the MRC, as an inter-governmental river basin organization,

is reliant on the endorsement of its approaches by its member countries. In addition, the MRC is fully

committed to an IWRM-based approach, in which the IWRM-based Basin Development Strategy,

approved in December 2010, will have a significant influence on the implementation of the MRC's

new strategic direction in the next five years (2011-2015) (MRC Strategic Plan 2011).

When MRC was only a Mekong Committee, which was established under the auspices of the United

Nations in 1957, known as inter-governmental agency for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower

Mekong Basin (Graecen and Palettu 2007; MRC 2011), its mission was the comprehensive

development of the water resources of the Lower Mekong Basin, including its mainstream and

tributaries (United Nations 1963; Graecen and Palettu 2007).

Before the Mekong Committee, widespread visions of large-scale hydropower development in the

region began taking root during the Cold War, shaped by US, Soviet, and Chinese planners (Graecen

and Palettu, 2007). Starting in the 1950s, American economic advisors drew up plans for substantial

regional infrastructure development in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Seven huge

hydroelectric dams were planned, which would have carved the Mekong River into a series of

reservoirs over 2,000 kilometers long (Hirsch and Warren 1998, Graecen and Palettu 2007). During

the 1980s, most of the long-range aspects of the Mekong scheme and its key basin-wide projects

were abandoned (Hirsch and Warren 1998, Graecen and Palettu 2007). In 1994, the Mekong

Secretariat issued a study of nine proposed run-of-the-river dams for the Mekong mainstream.

However, the plans were shelved following the opposition by non-governmental organizations (Imhof

2005; Graecen and Palettu 2007).

Mainstream hydropower development is now back again after a long pause. The Government of Laos

(key national leaders), as well as key leaders in Thailand and Vietnam – working together with project

developers, international financial institutions (IFIs), bilateral organizations, and private financiers –

place high hopes on the future revenue streams generated by hydropower export from Laos to

wealthier Thailand and Vietnam. GoL's aim is to become the "Battery of Asia”, a term used by

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Thailand's former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra referring to future hydropower development

plans in Laos (Associated Press 2005, Petty 2005, Graecen and Palettu 2007).

“With escalating interest in hydropower development in the LMB, the MRC approach is to help Member

Countries understand the long‐term implications of the proposed dam construction, and balance the

benefits, impacts and risks. The strategic environmental assessment (SEA) on mainstream dam

proposals concluded in 2010 demonstrated the central role that MRC can play in this discussion by

facilitating dialogue among the major stakeholders, including Governments, civil society and the private

sector, and introducing a more holistic approach to the assessment of risks and opportunities. This role

will continue and intensify in the coming years and also involve application of sustainability assessment

tools developed recently by MRC and its partners.” - MRC Strategic Plan 2011

4.1.3 United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

Through the Poverty-Environment Initiative, UNDP aims to build the long-term capacity of the

government to integrate environmental concerns into national development plans and poverty

reduction strategies and their implementation. It also aims to improve the longer-term ability of

natural and environment resources to support livelihoods and reduce poverty, through the

environment project in Lao PDR (Evaluation of UNDP Lao PDR Environment Programme Final Draft,

UNDP Lao PDR 2009). It will achieve these aims by:

� Strengthening poverty-environment linkages in the 7th

NSEDP in a manner that places

environmental sustainability at the core of the government’s development planning

practices;

� Supporting the Investment Promotion Department and provincial authorities to manage

investments in a manner that seeks to maximize social benefits and minimize

environmental impacts;

� Supporting the WREA to strengthen Environmental Social Impact Assessment (ESIA)

processes; and

� Targeting the National Assembly to enhance its awareness of poverty-environment issues

and to strengthen the capacities of National Assembly members to actively integrate

poverty-environment considerations when reviewing policies and legislation.

4.2 BILATERAL DONORS

The list of donors in Laos is long. Japan, France, and Sweden are top three in commitments

in 2005-2007 (Table 5). Bilateral donors associated with water resources and hydropowers

include Australia, France, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, and Germany.

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Table 5 Top donors (bilateral and multilateral) in Lao PDR over the period 2005 to

2007(commitments in current USD millions).

Source: Mc Carty and Julian 2009

AusAID's delivery strategy (DS)6 outlines its approach to implementing the AusAID Mekong Water

Resources Program. This strategy was created following the Australian Mekong Water Resources

Strategy 2007-11 (AMWRS) that forms part of the Australian Greater Mekong Sub-region Strategy

2007-2011. The AMWRS identified the Mekong River Commission (MRC), the World Bank, and Asian

Development Bank (ADB) as key partners to work with governments. Originally, the strategy did not

mention the important role of non-state actors in the political economy of water resources

development. The new Strategy has broadened its scope to also support non-state actors7.

6 AusAID Mekong Water Resources Program Delivery Strategy 2009-12, March 2009. 7 Non-state actors: science, advocacy, civil society and the private sector.

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AusAID's contribution will address the following important issues in the Mekong (including Lao PDR):

� Capacity building: technical and social capacity building for IWRM;

� Environmental change: climate and other environmental change adaptation;

� Food security: avoiding food insecurity for vulnerable and marginalized people;

� Hydropower assessment: comprehensive assessment of options, including

alternatives;

� Transboundary engagement: more constructive water-related engagement

between all six countries of the region; and

� Corporate social responsibility: encouraging private-sector leadership and

accountability.

This DS specifically supports the Lao IWRM Support Program, working with the Water Resources

Environment Administration (WREA) and the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), ADB, the World

Bank, and, likely, Finland. It was initiated through TA 7013-LAO, co-financed with the ADB.

AusAID has also supported a number of MRC programs, including:

� The Integrated Capacity Building Program (ICBP), including Phase 3 of the MRC

cooperation with the Murray Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) and New Zealand;

� The Mekong Integrated Water Resources Management (M-IWRM) Support

Program (including Phase 2 of the Lower Mekong water use negotiations), with the

World Bank; and

� The Climate Change Adaptation Initiative (CCAI), possibly with U.S. Agency for

International Development and others.

The Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD) provided a USD 3.8 million (or 17 percent) grant, co-

financed with the ADB for the Lao: Nam Ngum River Basin Development Sector Project8 (ADB 2002).

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) is supporting environmental

management in Lao PDR through the Strengthening Environmental Management Project. The

project’s first phase (SEM 1) took place from 2001-2005 and the second phase (SEM II) from 2005-

2010. The SEM II Project is funded by SEK 64.9 million, with contributions from the Lao government

worth SEK 8.5 million of which SEK 1.5 million is in cash. The host agency for the SEM II Project is the

Department of Environment (DoE) located within the Water Resources and Environment

Administration (WREA). The agreement between WREA and Sida was signed on 9 June, 2005. The

ultimate goal is strong environmental management to support national goals of sustainable

development and poverty eradication. By ensuring that economic development is environmentally

and socially sustainable, the project is seeking to make a direct contribution to poverty reduction

(Lazarus and Slunge 2010).

The project aims to fulfill this purpose by achieving six results or outputs, which have been

prioritized by WREA after extensive stakeholder consultations, as follows (Lazarus and Slunge 2010):

� Environmental Law, Policy, and Action Strategies;

� Environmental Management and Impact Assessment and Environmental

Monitoring;

� WREA Capacity and Staff Development;

� Environmental Education and Awareness;

� Environmental Reporting and Data Dissemination; and

� Support to the provinces.

8 ADB Project Administration Memorandum, LAO: Nam Ngum River Basin Development Sector Project, 2002.

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The government of Finland awarded USD 2.9 million to the four countries of the Lower Mekong Basin to

help develop the hydropower program of the Mekong River Commission (MRC). Part of the fund was for

training 40 young professionals at MRC over four years as part of the MRC capacity building

(HydroWorld.com 2011).

The aim of the Belgium cooperation policy in Laos is poverty reduction to contribute to the objective

of the Lao government: to graduate out of the list of Least Developed Countries by 2020. In 2002,

Belgium pledged €15 million for its direct bilateral program for the period 2002-2008. Priority

sectors for cooperation include water infrastructure. “Supplementary Capacity Building to the Lao

National Mekong Committee…the project aims at significantly enhancing LNMC staff skills for

communication, management and technical issues, including riverbank erosion control”. (Office of

the UN Resident Coordinator January 2006).

Lao-German Development Cooperation is more than 40 years old. The cooperation has concentrated

on two priority areas to raise efficiency and relevance with regard to the overall goal of poverty

reduction: 1) rural development; and 2) human resources development. Bilateral German

Development Cooperation is implemented mainly by KfW (German Bank for Reconstruction and

Development), GTZ (German Technical Cooperation), DED (German Development Service) and

InWEnt (Institute for Training and Development). Furthermore, Germany supports activities from

various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and public-private-partnerships. It also contributes

to Lao-related programs of multilateral institutions such as MRC. (Office of the UN Resident

Coordinator 2006).

4.3 PRIVATE DEVELOPERS/SECTOR

Private-sector investment is playing an increasingly important role in hydropower development in

the Mekong Region. Following the Asian financial crisis, new political relationships have emerged in

the region. Private-sector hydropower developers from Thailand, Vietnam, China, Malaysia, and

Russia have begun to participate in plans to develop water resources in the mainstream Mekong

River and its tributary systems. In contrast to previous investment regimes of multilateral funding

agencies and western hydropower companies, which were often associated with various conditions

and environmental and social commitments, revenue-driven private sector involvement has been

well-received by the governments of the LMB countries.

Major investors in hydropower in Lao PDR include multilateral development agencies such as the

World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB); international companies, such as Electricite de

France (EDF), China North Industries Corporation (Norinco), Sinohydro, and Russian State Oil;

companies from neighboring countries, such as Chor Kan Chang (Thailand); and banks from other

countries, such as the Export Import Bank of China (Exim) and Thailand’s Kasikorn Bank (Poverty-

Environment Initiative) (Lao PDR Issues Brief, UNDP 2010). See Appendix 3 for the list of hydropower

development projects from 2000 to 2011, at different stages of IPP implementation processes

(feasibility studies, MOU, PDA, CA).

4.4 STATE ACTORS

In Lao PDR, the key state actors involved in determining water resources development are the

Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), the Ministry of Energy and Mines, and the Ministry of

Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE). While each ministry ideally has its own supporting

role, their responsibilities sometimes overlap.

The MPI, the MEM, and the MONRE all interact with private sectors at different stages of the IPP

implementation processes, as the private sector has total responsibility for getting the project

registered, conducting FSs, drafting assessments, getting the EIAs/SIAs certified, and carrying out

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public consultations from villages to regional and national levels in accordance with relevant

legislations.

4.5 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT ACTORS

4.5.1 Government Agencies

Many governmental organizations are involved in water resources and livelihoods related issues.

Table 6 provides some information about the organizations, their mandate/functions and brief

analysis of their strengths and weaknesses in the areas of water resources, water valuation and

livelihoods-related issues.

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Table 6 Government agencies related to livelihoods, water valuation and dam cascades.

Actors Mandate/function Livelihoods Water

valuation

Dam

Cascades Strengths/weaknesses

National

Assembly (NA)

Final reviewer and approval of

investment/development project.

No No No NA hotline is now available for all citizens to call in

and convey their concerns directly to the NA. This

mechanism is becoming increasingly popular as

people realize the importance of communicating

social, environmental and other concerns directly

to the members of the NA and the Government for

action.

Government

(PMO)

Review and approve the

investment/development project

Ministry of

Planning and

Investment

(MPI)

Macro-policy development. Promote and

facilitate investment processes and sign

the agreements on behalf of the

government.

No No No

Ministry of

Energy and

Mines (MEM)

Energy sector development, promotion,

implementation and monitoring.

Yes Yes Yes At the Provincial and District Levels, Provincial

Energy and Mines officer is appointed as Manager

of the Resettlement Management Unit (RMU) that

works closely with the Company to coordinate and

implement the resettlement, social and

environmental plans/activities. The department

plays a crucial role in the grievance processes. It

reports vertically to MEM, and cross-sectorally to

Governor/Vice-Governor and other ministries

through the resettlement Committee mechanisms.

MONRE/WREA

(Central)

Water resource policy development and

implementation. Review, certify and

monitor Social and Environment Impact

Assessment (SEIA).

Yes Yes No MONRE/WREA certifies the Social Impact

Assessment/Social Action Plan, but MONRE/WREA

is not a direct social development agency.

MONRE/WREA does not have full capacity to

assess and implement the Social Action Plan, nor

the Environmental Action Plan as their capacity is

still very limited. Social Impact Assessment is the

most difficult document to review, understand and

provide appropriate comments on.

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Table 6 (Cont’d.)

Actors Mandate/function Livelihoods Water

valuation

Dam

Cascades Strengths/weaknesses

MAF

(Provincial/

district)

Local/Project level: Watershed

management (protection of forests) to

ensure supply of water resources to the

reservoir. Livelihood improvement for the

villagers living in the project areas and

those who are living in resettlement areas

by making new livelihood plans for the

area. MAF role became more viable and

involved after the NT2 experience.

Yes No No MAF's role during the IPP approval processes is limited.

During the IPP approval and implementation (at planning

stages), MAF hardly had any role, and was only involved on

need basis. MAF's role became more important as it got

more engaged in the investment project, after the

experience of NT2, mainly to work closely with the

company on the watershed management plan and

resettlement or livelihood plans for the affected

communities (both resettlers and those living within the

watershed/ reservoir areas).

Electricite

du Laos

(EDL)

State-owned enterprises (found in 1959

under MEM). Owns and operates the main

generation, transmission, and distribution

assets in Lao PDR. Acts as government's

shareholder in the case of IPP projects.

Yes No no

Lao Holding

State

enterprise

State-owned enterprises (established in

2005 for NT2, under MOF). Hold

government's 25percent share in the NT2

project, and have been designated as the

government's agent for six other hydro

projects and one non-hydro project.

No No No

Ministry of

Finance

Sets the ceiling for overall capital spending

as a way to preserve macro-fiscal stability.

No No No

RBCs Introduce the IWRM approach. Promote

cross-sectoral coordination.

No Yes Yes RBCs have full mandate for cross-sectoral coordination,

planning and implementation of IWRM. However, as

they're new, they're in the process of building their

institutional capacities and find appropriate working

model for RBM in Lao PDR. The two newly established

RBCs (Nam Ngum and NT-NKD) are still disconnected from

overall development projects in their Basin. The RBC

setup is very much top-down, with appointment of staff

from central MONRE/WREA deputed to lead them.

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Table 6 (Cont’d.)

Actors Mandate/function Livelihoods Water valuation Dam Cascades Strengths/weaknesses

MOH

(Provincial/

district)

Local/Project level: District Heath Office (DHO) works

closely with Theun-Hinboun Power Company

Ltd(THPC). Health specialists to carry out resettler

health programs, and ensure preventive health

measures, besides monitoring and training local

health workers to fulfill the needs of the affected

communities. Provide adequate staffing for new and

refurbished health care centers.

Yes No No

MOE

(Provincial/

district)

Local/Project level: District Education Office (DEO) to

work closely with THPC education specialist to carry out

resettler education programs (e.g., teacher trainings).

Supply additional teachers when required, and upgrade

teaching staff when needed.

Yes No No

Lao Women

Union (LWU)

(Provincial/

district)

Local/Project level: Mobilizing and representing the

interests of women. Working with company's

consultation teams for women's health (maternal and

child health, sanitation and birth control) and

development projects like savings and credit groups

and literacy programs. Ensure the inclusion of women

in development initiatives. Upgrade the skill and

management capacities of the existing LWU members.

Member of village LWU can become village facilitator.

Yes No No

Youth org.

(Provincial/

district)

Local/Project level: Intermittent input in the consultation

process, youth mobilization, income generation

programs and representative health campaigns. Member

of village youth organization can become village

facilitator.

Yes No No

Lao National

Front

(Provincial/

district)

Local/Project level: Mobilization of communities for

collective work projects, and ensure that all groups,

including ethnic minorities, are involved in activities.

Training of villager leaders, monitoring and

consultation work as required.

Yes

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Table 6 (Cont’d.)

Actors Mandate/function Livelihoods Water

valuation

Dam

Cascades Strengths/weaknesses

Min. of info.

and culture

Local/Project level: Responsible for cultural

issues, and for working with minority ethnic

groups in the project area in cooperation

with the consultation teams and minority

specialist. During the relocation, cultural

considerations, such as rituals for moving

houses, relocating spirits and cemeteries and

physical cultural resources, will need to be

taken into account. GoL responsible for

'chance finds' and archaeological studies.

Coordinates with national department of

archaeology and museums, and MIC in

Vientiane regarding important cultural issues

and items discovered before and during

construction.

Yes No No

Ministry of

communication,

post, transport

and construction

Local/Project level: intermittently involved in

the planning stages and for providing staff to

support the company's infrastructure teams

in the implementation of roads, buildings,

rural electrification, bridges, water supply

and other infrastructure projects related to

resettlement.

Yes

Governor's

office and

administrative

staff

Local/Project level: Key contact and

coordinating person at the district levels.

Participation in planning and coordination

meetings on a regular basis. Works closely

with the THPC Liaison Officer to ensure

qualified district staff are available for project

activities. Manages and tracks funds provided

by THPC for district staff and regular

reporting.

Yes No No

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4.5.2 Administrative (Decision Making and Policy Development) Processes

The flowchart (�������! ��� ����ก���������) is based on the Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project's institutional

rrangement and on interviews with villagers and government officers at different levels: village

(resettlement/affected villages), district, provincial, and central (for further details on each levels, see

4.5.2.1 – 4.5.2.4). The flowcharts illustrate hierarchical, coordination, and functional links based on

the Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project (THXPC) project arrangement, from the village to central

levels.

The government also recently approved a new decree on developing a small village into a village

development unit and a bigger village into a small city in the rural areas (03/ກມສພມ), Vientiane, 30

May 2011. The rationale is to eradicate poverty and improve people’s livelihoods in the rural areas.

This means the village will become the fundamental unit for politics, economics, society, culture,

security and peacekeeping. This new decree will hopefully guide both public and private sectors in

engaging people at the lowest levels (or the communities) in the development process.

4.5.2.1 Village Level

In Lao PDR, village administration comprises a head of the village, deputy heads, units (with heads of

unit), an elder group, a women's group, a youth group, village militia, village police, and other groups

(depending on the condition of each village).

The village administrative structure is formally set up, approved, overseen, and monitored by district

government. However, all members (including village headmen) are non-governmental staff. In most

cases, village headmen are party members, but are not employed as government officials. Village

headmen are responsible for keeping records of individual and household activities and for all

matters happening in the village. They report directly to the district office.

Each village administration is structured as determined by the socioeconomic situation of that

village. Some villages have far more functions/entities than others, but they fundamentally comprise

an elders’ group; a women's union; a youth organization; a village police; village military; and

forestry, agriculture, education, health, transportation, and communication groups.

An informal structure, commonly known as Neo Home or elderly group, is highly respected in village

society. The group consists of elderly skilled and experienced individuals and/or well-known and

respected people whose ancestors have passed on customary laws that link the cultural, spiritual,

and traditional practices of the village and the country. This group of elders plays an important role in

many aspects of village life, particularly in grievances. Villagers first raise issues (both personal and

professional) to the elders for reconciliation; if they cannot be resolved, they are forwarded to the

village headman to process in accordance with the law. In some cases, the reverse is true, wherein

issues are raised to the village chief who directs them to the elders. In other cases, issues require a

joint effort of the village administration and the elder group, together with other mass organizations

such as the women’s union and the youth union, as appropriate.

To a large extent, these key groups participate in project-related activities, such as resettlement,

village planning and development, compensation, livelihood improvement, provision of basic needs

(shelters, utilities, food, health services, and education), and so forth as agreed in the concession

agreement.

They work with government officials at the district and provincial levels, mainly from the provincial

MEM, MAF, Water Resource and Environment Office (WREO), and land management offices, such as

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in the case of the THPC project9. Other agencies (such as the health office, education office, women's

union, or youth organization) are engaged on an ad-hoc or activity basis.

Village Development Committees (VDCs) are established by the GoL and THPC Social and

Environmental Division consultation teams for each village. The VDC represents the range of interests

and opinions in the village and facilitates consensus decision-making at the village level.

A VDC consists of village authorities, village elders’ groups, project implementation coordinators, Lao

Women Union members, other skilled/influential members of the community, and representatives of

all ethnic groups; at least three of these members should be women. The VDC is responsible for

representing the interests and voicing the concerns of villagers in project-affected areas, conducting

public involvement consultations, coordinating mass organizations, developing village development

plans, monitoring and evaluating the resettlement process, organizing villagers for the

implementation of activities related to relocation and rehabilitation of livelihood systems, and

facilitating participation in grievance procedures.

4.5.2.2 District Level

At the district level, District Working Groups (DWG) were established for village resettlement for the

THXP Project. They comprise technical-level government officers. For example, as part of the Khamkert

District Working Group Steering Committee, the Chief of District appointed an officer from the District

Land Management Office as director, one from the District Administrative Office as deputy director, and

one from the District MEM as a chair. The Chief of District also stationed individual officers in the

affected villages to facilitate and support the THPC Social and Environmental Division (SED) team (See

�������! ��� ����ก���������).

DWGs are responsible for collaborating with the THPC project team during the planning and

implementation of resettling the affected people in accordance with the timeframe. They are also

responsible for ensuring that the relevant line agencies, such as the Governor's Office &

Administration, the District Energy and Mines (DEM), the District Forestry and Agriculture Office

(DAFO), the Labor and Social Welfare Office (LSWO), the DEO, the DHO, the District Information and

Culture Office (DICO), the WREO, the Youth Organization (YO), the LWU, the military/army, the Lao

Front for National Construction (LFNC), the police, and the DLTO are involved as required.

The government officer involved receives a salary and per diem from the company when working in

the field and participating in key meetings. Some officers are directly contracted with clear ToRs and

deliverables, and get paid directly by the Company. This level requires a great deal of manpower and

technical expertise in different areas related to livelihood improvement (farming, fisheries, forestry,

handicraft, irrigation, etc.) However, expertise in these areas is lacking, both in quantity and quality.

4.5.2.3 Provincial Level

During the IPP approval process, the central government (mainly the MPI and the MEM) is the

driving force, but at the implementation stages, local government (the provincial governor and the

9 THPC was the first IPP in the hydropower sector of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (“Lao PDR”). THPC’s

shareholders include Electricite du Laos (EdL) 60 percent, Statkraft SF 20 percent and GMS Lao Company

Limited 20 percent. THPC’s Hydropower Plant is located in both Bolikhamxay and Khammouane Provinces

with commercial operations commencing in March 1998. THPC’s hydropower plant is a trans-basin, run-of-

river project, which generates more than 1,100 GWh per year from 210 MW of installed capacity. Pursuant

to a long-term Power Purchase Agreement with Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), THPC

sells at least 95 percent of its net available electricity output to EGAT, with the balance sold to EdL to meet

local power demand (THPC website, 12/10/2011).

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chief of district) takes full ownership. Throughout the project, the resettlement committee (RC),

which is chaired by Provincial Governor or Vice Governor exclusively, guides and makes crucial

decisions unless the issues are too big for the provincial level (wherein they are directed to the

central government). This may be the effect of the Decentralization Decree No.1, which gives

provinces the power to make decisions within their administrative areas.

Other members of the RC are provincial-level Lao National Front Construction, Khamkert District Chief,

Xaychamphone District Chief and Provincial Director of Women's Union. National representation (from

PMO and WREA) is also invited. The RC oversees all GoL activities and commitments and liaises with all

relevant ministries and organizations, including the highest levels of government. It is responsible for

reviewing and approving the resettlement action plan for the THXP; providing organizational support

and direction for the RMU; liaising with GoL organizations at the national, provincial, and district levels;

ensuring compliance with GoL laws, regulations, and policies; liaising with the THXP regarding GoL

concerns and priorities; and organizing national-level consultations. The RC meets every six months to

review resettlement activities and to provide advice on the next six months to GoL agencies and THXP

organizations.

At the practical and operational level, the RMU is established with three government officers: a

manager (usually from the provincial MEM), a deputy manager, and a chair (from the land and

management office). The manager of the RMU also plays the role of secretary to the RC and is

responsible for recording decisions and recommendations at the semi-annual meetings.

The RMU is responsible for coordination of all resettlement activities and for ensuring that the

priorities of the RC are addressed; and that GoL policies, procedures, and regulations are followed in

the day-to-day management of the GoL’s involvement in implementation. It is also responsible for

organizing the GoL’s involvement in resettlement activities, such as consultations and livelihood

restoration programs; monitoring and auditing funds; ensuring that all GoL staff are involved;

ensuring prompt evaluation of land and assets for compensation; organizing provincial and district

meetings; and participating in the grievance procedure.

The RMU coordinates and works with many agencies at both provincial and district levels. Examples

include the Governor's Office & Administration, DEM, DAFO, LSWO, DEO, DHO, DICO, WREO, Youth

Organization (YO), Lao Women Union (LWU), the military/army, LFNC, and Police. This is to engage

cross-sectoral support according to resettlement work plans and budgets. Support from other

agencies is required based on the company's work plan and is often engaged on an ad-hoc basis. The

RMU and the DWG help companies coordinate with different government agencies as required and

resolve problems concerning compensation and grievances of affected people on a day-to-day basis.

4.5.2.4 Central level

The MPI, the MEM, and the MONRE/WREA are the key government agencies at the central level that

drive the IPP Project Implementation Processes (from MOU to PDA, ESIA certificate, and CA) and

consult with line ministries/departments concerned as appropriate. Consultations with ministries

concerned normally involve circulating reports/documents (related sections) to those ministries for

their sectoral policy and expert comments and endorsement. Most consultation meetings are

organized by developers (as part of the IPP Implementation Process requirements) with support from

the MEM (or the MONRE for SEIA approval processes), but it is up to the MEM/MONRE to determine

the stakeholders and meeting agenda. The government (or Prime Minister's Office) is responsible for

approving the MOU, the PDA, and the CA. Finally, projects must also be approved by the National

Assembly. Once the CA is approved and granted to the project developer, it is transferred to the

Provincial Governor and the Chief of districts to set up appropriate institutional arrangements,

providing necessary support to the project and monitoring its progress.

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At the implementation/operation stages, the central government's roles (mainly led by the MEM and

the MONRE/WREA) are to engage periodically in key meetings and to monitor the project's

compliance based on the Concession Agreement.

The following figure shows an organization structure of vertical and horizontal linkages from national

level to the village level; linkage between related government line agencies (including a newly set up

resettlement/reallocation committee in charge of resettlement/reallocation at the provincial level)

and private developer on hydropower development and implementation. The thick arrow lines

represent the power relation between agencies, meaning the thicker the line, the more the authority

that agency has over the others.

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Stakeholders:

Governor, Vice-Governor, Governor's office, MEM, WREO, MAF, CPTCO, LSWO, Land management Office, Health, Education,

Other Interest Groups: MRC IFIs Non-state actors Financiers

Village/Field level:

WCS, WWF, COPE, Save Children Norway, Lao Luxumbourge

Hierarchical

Coordination

Functional

Legend

Stakeholders: Chief of District , Deputy Chief of District, MEM, MAF, CPTCO, LSWO, Education Office, Health Office, Information & Culture Office, WREO, Youth organization, LWU, Military/army, LNFC, Police, land and taxation

Most stakeholder are involved on an ad-hoc basis, assigned by district chief, or as per requirement or in accordance with THPC/RMU work plan on specific

(Monitori

Deputy V. Headman Deputy V. Headman 2 (ຮອງ

National Steering Committee

Unit 1 Unit 5 Unit 15 Unit 20 Unit 10

Women's Union

Elderly Group

Military War Memorial

Association

Youth

Village Development Committees

Police

Resettlement Committee (RC) Chair: P-Governor; P-Vice-Chair: Vice Bolikhamxay/ Khammouane

Resettlement Management Unit (Manager)

Prime Minister (PM)

THPC/THXPC

Village Facilitator

Bolikhamxay & Khammouane

Government

MEM Other GOL Ministries/agencies

WREA/ESIAD

Public Relation office (VTE)

GoL Liaison Office(Na Hin)

Adm. Assistants (VTE)

Monitoring Unit (Na Hin)

Resettlement Unit

Downstream unit (Na

Social Devl. Unit (Na Hin)

Environment Unit (Na Hin)

Infrastructure section

Livelihood section

Construction section

Health

Education section

Community Development

Infrastructure Section

Livelihood section

SED Manager

(Concession Agreement)

Secretary to Party/ Village headman Nongxong Village Khamkert District

Deputy Manger, RMU, Khamkeut

Land Assets Registration and

Support staff Public

District Working Group members of

district line agencies and mass org.

Deputy Manger, RMU, Hinboun

Land Assets Registration and

Titling officer

Support staff Public

Village Development Committees

Village Facilitator

District Working Group members of

district line agencies and mass org.

Education

Land and

taxation

Forestry

Volunt Agriculture

Transport

Central

Provincial

District

Village

National Assembly Figure 3 Organizational structure: Vertical and horizontal linkages

(Source: Field survey 2011)

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4.6 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL AND MINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS RELATED TO WATER

RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR OUTCOMES

This section provides an overview of gaps and weaknesses in the existing institutional, policy, and

legal frameworks with respect to regulating and controlling hydropower development projects and

their impacts in the Lao PDR. In most countries of the Mekong Region, sound environmental and

social safeguard policies exist, theoretically to protect environments and livelihoods from adverse

impacts of dam cascades. However, their translation into concrete action has been impeded due to a

variety of internal and external forces and constraints.

From the survey questionnaires, as well as discussions and interviews with key informants, the study

team observed that few people are aware of issues concerning water valuation and dam cascades

and, therefore, are unable to provide sufficient answers and views related to them.

Most survey respondents (11 out of 19) indicated that the main events that bring the three issue

fields (particularly livelihoods) on the policy agenda are 'government policy'; crisis events such as

floods, drought, etc (6 out of 19); growing economic importance (4 out of 19); and finally

international obligation (3 out of 19).

The main groups involved in influencing and making policies were academics and researchers,

officials and community group with equal points (6 out of 19), followed by others such as project

developers/private sector; and the government at central level. Ideas formulated based on

community needs are reported vertically from villages to district to provincial and to central

government in the form of social and economic development plans, and finally to ministers, NGOs

and advocacy groups, legislature, professional groups and public policy (equal points with 3 out of

19).

Most of people/agencies consulted indicated that their main roles are policy making (mostly marked

by provincial officer) for all the three issue fields, followed by policy implementation, and oversight.

Most roles were related to the livelihoods issue field.

The main concerns of the people consulted were livelihood issues for a number of reasons. They felt

that livelihoods would be affected by factors such as floods, river bank erosion, adaptation to new

environment (resettlement), change of livelihood practices (from traditional methods to modern

technology), limited land areas for agriculture production, and more conflicts among villagers over

resources and food production that could lead to social problems (robbery, sale/use of drugs, etc).

Some people also expressed their concern over water valuation because they believe water is a very

precious and important resource for the livelihood of poor families. They were also afraid that water

quantity will decline, and its quality will be degraded, particularly in the reservoir areas, causing

unpleasant smell from the remaining trees and lack of oxygen for fish and other species causing

them to die out. Only few people were concerned about dam cascades, but they also raised an

important question—who (if there are number of project developers in one area) will compensate,

and will compensation be the same or different. Some people also raised other concerns about

unfair compensation, lack of secondary and upper school set-up in the resettlement areas due to

small number of pupils, forcing students to go long distance to attend school, and encroachment of

the protected areas with production areas becoming scarce.

4.6.1 Organizational Capacity

The rapid growth of investor interest and the increase in scale and scope of these investments

impose high demands on the government and its agencies for improved governance with regard to

(a) a clear and functional legal and institutional framework; (b) systematic planning for optimized

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development of natural resources; (c) adequate capacity in negotiation and oversight of

implementation; and (d) mitigation of environmental and social impacts and, eventually, revenue

management and benefits sharing. The government and its agencies are responding by issuing laws

and regulations, restructuring institutions, gradually strengthening their capacity, improving review

and approval processes, enhancing enforcement and monitoring, and increasing transparency and

public consultations. However, governance problems persist, such as the following (Lao PDR

Development Report 2010, WB 2010):

� Individual project proposals are not integrated into broader land and water management

planning;

� Hydropower development is driven by developers on an ad-hoc basis, with sequences not

following the least-cost expansion planning of the government;

� Capacity is lacking in respect to managing the concessioning process, with difficulties in

applying equal terms and conditions to all investors, resulting in great differences in

financial and social returns to government and local communities;

� Financial and human resource constraints limit enforcement of inspection procedures and

monitoring for compliance, particularly at the local level where actual projects and

compensation programs are implemented;

� Procedures for management and tracking revenue and benefit streams have not matched

the surge in tax income; and

� The principal sector agency responsible - the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) - lacks

the logistical resources to adequately supervise the sector.

According to the survey questionnaire distributed, most people/agencies (mainly at the provincial

and district levels) answered that their organizational capacity is fairly strong, adequate and poor.

This implies and confirms that the organization/agencies are still weak in the areas of water

resources development and management.

According to an interview with MPI officials, government policy is appropriate and government

benefits from hydropower generation/concession income and development in project areas, which

are remote. However, policies to support implementation are still lacking; for example, tax laws lack

details and vary from project to project. Some projects even seek exemption from the NA, depending

on the condition. The MPI believes this area requires further study to enhance development policy

and to strengthen the process for greatest benefit to the government.

MONRE/WREA ESIA Department has to review (EIA, SIA, EMP, RAP) all the documents, and return

them to developers for further revision. The biggest challenge faced by ESIAD is their capacity to

review all the documents (EIA, SIA, EMP, RAP) that are prepared by experts of more than 10-20 years

of experience, and to provide constructive recommendation because most of the reviewers (ESIAD

staff) are inexperienced new graduates from local university. In particular, certification of the Social

Impact Assessment/ Social Action Plan is difficult for them, as MONRE/WREA is not a direct social

development agency to appropriately review it. To conclude, MONRE/WREA does not have full

capacity to assess and implement the Social Action Plan or the Environmental Action Plan as their

capacity is still very limited. According to ESIAD, Social Impact Assessment is the most difficult

document for them to review, understand, and comment upon.

According to the survey questionnaire, most people (mainly from provinces and districts) believe

government policies and practices are not adequate to address the livelihoods, water valuation, dam

cascades and other issues, but central government functionaries, on the contrary, believe there are

sufficient policies and laws to address these issues. The areas in which they believe the policies and

practice are inadequate are financial resources, human resources and technical

expertise/experience, administrative arrangements and legal provisions for addressing key issues.

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Some people complained that though there are number of policies and laws, there is little

implementation or enforcement; and if livelihoods of resettlers don’t improve within two to three

years,, what will happen to them. They said the government or company should continue to support

the resettlers, or they would face problems.

The reasons for insufficient government policies and practices to address key concerns in the three

issue fields were limited financial resources to implement projects and programs, limited staff

resources to implement policies, inadequate knowledge of effective program/policy implementation

among affected communities, inadequate provisions in government policies, as well as vague and

weak institutional mandates. A few people also blamed poor coordination within government

departments, conflicts and/or poor coordination between institutions involved and poor mediums of

communication between the parties involved.

4.6.1.1 Weaknesses in institutional mandates

During the IPP Implementation Processes, the MPI and the MEM support one another but they have

different roles, particularly during peak times and in special cases. The MEM (through DEB) is able to

submit proposals and report directly to the government without going through MPI, but it does keep

MPI well informed. During implementation and operation, the MEM lacks the logistical resources to

adequately supervise the sector (Lao PDR Development Report 2010, WB 2010).

According to the EIA Decree, the MONRE/WREA ESIA Department must review and certify the social

impact assessment/social action plan and the resettlement action plan, even though the MONRE's

mandate is for management of water and environmental resources, not social development. The

government has changed the name of ESIAD to Environmental Impact Assessment Department

(EIAD), and the newly approved Decree is termed EIA Decree, not ESIA Decree as used by most

people. But the EIA Decree also contains a social component. As this requirement largely falls outside

the MONRE/WREA expertise, they lack the capacity to review and comment on the environmental

action plans and, in particular, on the social action plan due to their volume and complexity.

The newly established River Basin Committees have a mandate for full cross-sectoral coordination,

planning, and implementation of IWRM. However, being new agencies, they are in the process of

building their institutional capacities and finding appropriate working models for river basin

management in Lao PDR. The two newly established RBCs (Nam Ngum and NT-NKD) are still

disconnected from overall development in their basins. Besides, RBCs are being set up using a top-

down approach, with the central MONRE/WREA appointing staff to lead them.

Previously, WREA did not have the status of a Ministry, therefore, its roles in water resources

management and intervention was marginal compared to other Ministries. The newly-established

MONRE has much wider mandate, but it will require some time for it to become fully operational

and properly respond to mounting issues and enforce its mandates, if and when it is finally

implemented.

The MAF's role has previously been limited and it was only involved on an ad-hoc basis at central and

local levels. However, after the experience of NT2, the MAF's role has grown in importance and it has

become more engaged in investment projects, working closely with companies on the watershed

management plan and the resettlement or livelihood plans for affected communities (both resettled

people and those who remain in watershed/reservoir areas). However, it is still not the central

institution in investment projects, and only participates when invited by the MEM/MPI/MONRE or

WREA.

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4.6.1.2 Human Resources and Capacity

In the implementation of public policy, the ability to govern depends on the human resource capacity

of government agencies – the people who participate in policy making and implementation,

including their collective memory, commitment, technical proficiency and program competence

(Land and Wolf 1990). Recognizing that since people envision, plan and execute tasks, coordinate,

manage and produce inputs and outputs in an organization, the success or failure of an institution’s

performance depends upon the people involved. Given the complexities involved in Water Storage

Infrastructure (WSI) development in the Mekong Region, it is critical that the public sector remains

capable of understanding and addressing the complex issues involved in water governance.

According to interviews with relevant agencies (all agencies) and the survey questionnaires, human

resources (of technical proficiency, experience and programmatic competencies and adequacy in

number) is the greatest concern and needs assistance in the form of support and training

opportunities, particularly at local level (villages, districts, and provinces) where implementation

takes place. It is generally recognized that Laos is still lacking in skilled, experienced, and technical

personnel in many areas, including water resources. The Resettlement Management Unit (RMU) of

THXPC has three staff members: the project manager is a senior expert from MEM who runs the unit

and the other two are more of administrative functionaries. Little expertise in the field of

water/hydropower planning and management is available within the unit. At the implementation

levels dealing with social and environmental issues, the staff members are mainly supplied by

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, with forestry and agriculture backgrounds.

4.6.1.3 Financial Resources

Financial resources are a critical component of program implementation. The availability of financial

resources is influenced by a number of factors, including the amount of funding, funding sources,

systems in place to manage finances, operating expenses, and corruption.

According to the questionnaire, respondents deemed government budget allocation “not adequate”

to implement policies and practices, as funding habitually goes to operating expenses such as staff

salaries and office expenses. While many people agree that local development projects are good, the

financial returns to local governments are unclear, as taxes and royalties are collected by the central

government. Yet, local governments, particularly individual government staff, benefit from

development projects, as they receive per diem or salaries for assignments from the company.

For projects in Lao PDR, investors are responsible and accountable for all public participation. They

must fund public consultations and monitoring of investment projects/activities through direct

payment to relevant agencies in order to participate. This system means relevant departments must

submit budget plans for activities related to monitoring companies' performance, as indicated in the

Investment Promotion Law, the Electricity Law, and the EIA Decree.

In general, MOF allocates the budget according to the government development priorities. The key

government agency that is directly responsible for prioritization of the Public Investment Programs

(PIPs) is the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). The PIPs are prioritized, starting from each

ministry submitting its public investment activities to MPI, while MPI consolidates and prioritizes PIPs

of each ministry to achieve the national development plan, namely, the National Socio-Economic

Development Plan (NSEDP). Hence, the government implements its budget accordingly through the

MOF. According to the 7th

NSEDP (2011-2015), allocation of the government budget is heavily tilted

toward social and infrastructure and construction sectors. Each shares 35 percent of the total

investments, whereas the budget allocated for economic sector accounts for 30 percent.

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4.6.1.4 Technological Resources

A significant factor contributing to an organization’s capacity is infrastructure, particularly in the form

of technology, such as equipment, information systems, hardware/software, and communication

systems. These infrastructures enable public agencies to perform their tasks efficiently and

effectively, and to facilitate communication, coordination and dissemination of critical information.

According to interviews with relevant agencies (all agencies) and the questionnaires distributed,

technological resources (hardware, software, internet access, and other equipment) are inadequate,

particularly at the local level (villages, districts, and provinces) where implementation takes place.

Further discussions with interviewees show that most equipment was acquired through donors or

development partners, not government expenditures. At the village level, most documents are

handwritten. Some interviewees also expressed concern over the lack of proper buildings and office

spaces for working.

4.6.2 Coordination/Conflicts between Government Departments

In the Lao government system, every communication – both vertical and horizontal – is formal and

well-documented, even if it is a request for a meeting. In order to set up a meeting with other

government departments, requests must have clear objectives and red stamps from the

departments involved. E-mail communication is considered inappropriate and informal. Yet,

respondents to the questionnaire at the provincial and district level said communication and

coordination is “fairly strong” between organizations and partners. This answer may stem from not

clearly defining “coordination” and “communication” in terms of their end results and purposes

(such as getting a piece of legislation passed, getting the project approved, etc.) rather than daily

communication such as meeting requests and other enquiries.

Often, however, it is recognized that communication and coordination between sectors and levels

are seen by many government staffs as still weak. Duplications or lack of coordination sometimes

occur. Significant delays in policy/program/project implementation are said to be a result of lack of

communication and coordination. Poor communication and coordination between government

actors has also been recognized as a significant weakness in GMS, and their improvement remains

critical for addressing the impacts of proposed development. Based on hierarchical, formalized

procedures, villagers voice their concerns through the village headman (to be officially recognized),

before these are reported to the district, and province offices as appropriate. Villagers said that this

caused delays in responding to the concerns, and kept them waiting for long time before a decision

(if any) is taken to address their concerns. For example, in the case of THXPC's resettlement issues,

where villagers raised their concerns over limited land areas for farming and other livelihood issues

(in Nongxong village), their concerns have not been easily resolved despite the existence of an

institution for grievance redressal.

In terms of effectiveness of communication and coordination across different sectors, Ministries/line

agencies in the implementation of hydropower or WSI projects, it is obvious that key Ministries have

their roles and mandates, which determine their coordination and communication with each other.

For example, at the preparation stage of hydropower development, the key Ministries take the lead

in distributing/circulating the project-related documents to be reviewed and commented upon by

relevant Ministries, and also set up meetings/workshops to disseminate the project information and

gather comments. However, according to the interview with key agencies, most of the interviewers

said that it is up to the key agencies to communicate and coordinate with relevant line ministries,

and it is up to them to consult or invite agencies concerned accordingly. This implies that there is no

standard system of communication and coordination among line agencies. However, the government

does encourage key Ministries to be more proactive and consult with all relevant Ministries as much

as possible, otherwise, any documents/proposal might not be approved and may be reverted back

for further improvement.

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4.6.3 Non-State Actors

In addition to multilateral and bilateral funding agencies and private sector investors, various other

non-state actors play a key role in water governance, livelihoods and hydropower development

issues in the Mekong Region. These actors include academic and research institutions and networks,

non-governmental organizations, civil society groups, international development organizations, and

technical consultants. While some organizations operate on a regional scale, others are based in

individual countries and localities, and are involved in providing a range of services, from research

and technical studies to consulting to advocacy and information dissemination.

Table 7 summarizes non-state actors involved in the THPC project areas. In the wake of hydropower

projects proposed in the region, these non-state actors have stepped up their role by increasingly

becoming involved in assessing natural and human resource systems in the region, and by facilitating

collaboration between key decision-makers to realize the impacts of dams.

Table 7 Non-state actors involved in the THPC/THXPC project areas.

Actors Roles Livelihoods Water

valuation Cascades

World Wildlife

Fund

Sustainable forest

management

Takes part in

livelihood

restoration,

focusing on

rattan

development

X X

World

Conservation

Society

Protected area X X

Save Children

Norway

Education program - for

kindergarten X X

Culture

Opportunity

for People

Everywhere

Social equity X X

International

River (IR)

Dialoguing with THPC - watch

dog X X

Lao

Luxumbourge

Education program - for high

school X X

4.6.4 External Influences in Implementing National Laws and Policies

Many laws and policies related to water resources development in the Lao PDR are mostly influenced

by external agencies, particularly the multilateral and bilateral organizations. For example, national

water resource policy, strategy and action plan is developed with technical and financial assistance

from ADB and AusAID; the SEIA Decree and guidelines, as well as Resettlement Decree and

guidelines development were also supported by SIDA and UNDP; and the National policy on

environmental and social sustainability of hydropower sector in Lao PDR (NPESSHS - No.561/CPI,

STEA, 2006) was also supported by the World Bank.

4.6.5 Social Activism

In Lao PDR, there are about 46 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that are active in different sectors

(education, agriculture, water resource and forest conservation, environment, health, water and

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sanitation, livelihoods, gender, food security and governance) but mainly at the local levels (focusing

on rural development). (Lao CSOs Directory 2012).

As a one-party socialist state, government criticism is rarely tolerated in Laos. Freedom of press is

limited and the influence of civil society organizations is restricted, while corruption remains high.

These circumstances significantly enhance the risks associated with hydropower development –

particularly for the hundreds of thousands of villagers poised to lose land, fisheries and other

resources as a result. Hydropower development, while generating revenue for the government and

generally proving profitable for private-sector investors, has incurred major environmental and social

costs, a legacy of damage that remains largely unaddressed.

There are no obvious cases of strident social activism in relation to hydropower development in Lao

PDR, but there is the silent unhappiness of affected villagers over inappropriate compensation and

consequences from development projects, which is being addressed by the Project developer and

local government. Other than that, the government has kept all dissent under control.

However, there are some external NGOs or social activists outside of Laos that are quite active in

trying to pressure the Mekong countries (particularly Laos) to make better and more transparent

decisions with regards to the planned hydropower projects in the Lower Mekong Basin. Examples are

as follows.

Save the Mekong Coalition brings together non-government organizations, local people, academics,

journalists, artists and ordinary people from within the Mekong countries and outside. The Coalition

urges the Mekong governments to keep it flowing freely to save this critical source of food, income and

life for present and future generations. The Coalition has:

� Collected 23,110 signatures on "Save the Mekong" petition to the Prime Ministers of Cambodia,

Laos, Thailand and Vietnam on 19 October 2009;

� Released a press release on 13 October, 2010, headlined "Save the Mekong Call: Cancel

Xayaboury Dam on Mekong River’s mainstream, Halt MRC PNPCA Process";

� According to Save the Mekong Coalition:

o On 11 November 2010, the Finnish Service Centre for Development Cooperation and

other Finnish NGOs wrote to the Finnish Minister of Foreign Trade and Development

Cooperation seeking endorsement of the MRC's Strategic Environment Assessment,

"that the MRC countries defer the decisions on the mainstream dams for at least ten

more years, in order to do more comprehensive assessments and find alternative

energy solutions".

o On 20 January 2011, Australian civil society sent a letter to Australia's Foreign

Minister Kevin Rudd, "asking the Government of Australia to help ensure that the

Xayaburi prior consultation process (PNPCA) is rigorous, open and transparent for

the people of the Mekong", as Australia is one of biggest donors to the MRC.

o On 18 March 2011, 21 international organizations and academics wrote to the

Australia's Minister of Foreign Affairs expressing their concern about the Xayaburi

Dam and the grievous failure of its PNPCA process. As the process has been funded

by the Australian Government, the signatories called on Australia and other donors

to use their leverage to call for an improved process and a delay in decision-making.

o On 23 March 2011, NGO Forum on Cambodia, along with other Cambodian

organizations, sent a letter to the Cambodian National Mekong Committee asking

them to halt the Xayaburi Dam's decision-making process for a period of ten years

due to the transboundary impacts the dam has on Cambodia.

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o On 3 May 2011, prior to the 18th

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, the Save the Mekong Coalition put out a statement

calling for ASEAN leaders to act immediately to cancel the Xayaburi Dam.

The above are some key examples of social activism that tries to put pressure on the government of

Laos, as well as the Lower Mekong countries to make better decisions on the planned hydropower

development for the benefit of all. However, in term of its effectiveness, it has some implications for

the need to review the hydropower process, and holds back the government a little.

IR is another non-profit organization, which is quite active in protecting rivers and rights around the

world. In Laos, they have been very critical about the operation and implementation of the Theun

Hinboun, NT2, and the preparation of the planned hydropower in the Mekong River. However, the

Lao Government and developers perceive IR as river watchdog, which is too critical of the

hydropower development in general and does not provide any constructive inputs to help improve

the situation.

4.7 ASSESSMENT OF VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL LINKAGES OF STATE AGENCIES

There is heavy coordination among various ministeries both vertically and horizontally at different

stages of hydropower development from preparation to implementation and operation, but it is

mainly limited to key government agencies and the project developer.

During the preparation or project approval stage, most decision making is done at the central levels. The

leading agencies are MPI and MEM, Department of Electricity and Department of Energy Promotion and

Development. And the main decision maker is the Central Government (Prime Minister, Deputy Prime

Minister and Ministers), with some consultation from line agencies concerned, particularly MONRE,

(formerly WREA) for IEE and EIA approval, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and

National Land Management Authority for calculation of compensation, local administration (provinces,

districts and villages), as well as potential affected people/villages for their consensus. However,

consultation and involvement of wider public or interested stakeholders/civil society is still limited.

According to the IEE and EIA processes, government tasks the Project developer with undertaking

stakeholder consultations at all levels, with the support of and in the presence of agencies concerned.

Horizontal coordination (in this case, invitation to participate at different stages) is up to principal

Ministries (i.e., MEM, MPI and MONRE/WREA) who decide when and at which points to engage with

other relevant ministries as in this case, the roles and responsibilities of other ministries is not clearly

defined. The effectiveness and efficiency of communication between ministries and sector agencies

on the economic, social and environmental impacts and benefits of hydropower projects during their

planning and implementation is still limited due to their limited capacities, human and financial

resources. This process is guided by the relevant laws and official guidelines, and supported and

coordinated by the key agencies (e.g., MONRE/WREA and MEM) but funded and implemented by the

investors. During interviews, key government officers accepted the fact that their ministries cannot

lead, particularly the implementation process, due to the above reasons, and that is why the

government had granted the private sector the right to take a lead in determining the economic,

social and environmental impacts and benefits of a project. On the other hand, the private sectors

also found this a major constraint, but if they let the government agencies take the lead in this

process, they risk possible delays and quality deliveries of activities that could have an impact on

their reputation and funds.

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Consultation does take place and proves to be very useful. However, results of the interviews suggest a

need for improvement in this process. Some local officials said consultation was very important,

particularly at the early stages of project development, so that at later stages, there is less resentment

by the public or affected communities toward the project developer and the government on livelihoods

issue. They wished for a better consultation mechanism. They see a project as a source of capacity

building or training ground for the governmental staff at all levels (this includes central-level

government staff).

5.0 ASSESSMENT OF FACTORS FACILITATING OR LIMITING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND

EFFICIENCY OF THESE ACTORS’ PERFORMANCE

The factors that limit the effectiveness and efficiency of an actor’s performance are as follows:

i. Although policies and regulations have been developed and cover a wide range of

issues, it is recognized that there are gaps in implementation and interpretation.

Contradictions between certain policies exist. Examples include the delineation

between large- and small-scale hydropower development (based on electricity-

generating capacity) and non-hydropower sectors (based on monetary values).

Furthermore, there is still confusion about roles and responsibilities between agencies.

Enforcement of laws and regulations for actors involved is not sufficiently strong. Some

stages of the consultation process are more like informing, rather than consulting.

Strategies and guidelines are developed in consultation with relevant line agencies, but

less with users at different levels;

ii. Shortages in human resources continue, particularly in managerial and skilled labor,

which inhibit development as set out by the government; and

iii. Salaries of government staff are low (not sufficient to support them and their families),

thus affecting performance.

6.0 SUMMARY AND SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER FOLLOW-UP

The government of Laos is striving to become the "Battery of Asia" by developing hydropower as a

potential source of energy to export and, thereby, boost the country's economy. It hopes that by

increasing the country’s GDP, its current efforts will contribute to poverty alleviation and lift the

country from its current least-developed country status by 2020.

Theoretically, it is hoped that hydropower development would provide better lives, facilitating

improvements in housing, utilities, roads, market access, employment, income, healthcare services,

education, and, most importantly, fertile land for rice production and gardening. In practice, a lot of

effort is still required to achieve these good intentions. While the government has passed many

legislations to support the hydropower sector, implementation of these legislations varies from

project to project, case by case.

At the preparation and approval stages, most decisions are made at the central level (led by the MPI,

the MEM, and the MONRE/WREA). Once projects reach the operational stage of implementation,

most decisions in regard to social and environment components and grievance processes are made

at the local level by the Provincial Governor and District Chief.

There is heavy coordination both vertically and horizontally at different stages of hydropower

development from preparation to implementation and operation, but it is mainly limited to key

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government agencies and the project developer. In term of effectiveness and efficiency of

coordination, it is a gradual process that government tries to improve, given that hydropower

development sector is new, and cuts across a number of sectors. In theory, provincial government is

expected to coordinate and report to ministries concerned for decisions and support from the

central government. However, based on the NT2 experience, the government or Prime Minister

realized the difficulties of this horizontal coordination and decision-making. The Government,

therefore, has given MEM, MONRE/WREA, and Provincial Governor equal power to report directly

(vertically) to the Prime Minister on urgent matters relating to hydropower development projects

across countries. This means the local government (particularly the governor), needn't go through

the Ministries for urgent decision making. In addition, between MEM and MONRE (formerly WREA),

the latter is only an administration unit as of now, and has little power as compared to MEM. It is

therefore difficult for MONRE/WREA to exercise its mandate effectively. MONRE's role is currently

being restructured after its reform, and it will take some time for this new ministry to mature and

become fully operationalized.

According to the IEE and EIA processes, government rests the responsibility (both technically and

financially) upon the Project developer to undertake stakeholder consultation at all levels, and be

accompanied or supported by concerned agencies. In most cases, consultation and involvement of

wider public or interested stakeholders/civil society in the development project is still limited.

During the implementation and operation stages, local administration (provincial, district and

villages) is the key decision-maker, implementing as well as monitoring the activities as per the

Concession Agreement. The local administration is also responsible for reporting the progress to the

central government, particularly on the resettlements of affected communities. The Central

government is responsible for periodical oversight, guidance and monitoring. However, it is the

Project developer that is responsible for the planning and implementation of all social,

environmental and livelihoods-related activities. At the provincial and district level, there are many

line agencies taking part in the project implementation/field activities. Some officers are

assigned/appointed on a long-term basis and temporarily reside in the resettlement villages, and

some are involved/participate on an ad-hoc basis based on the project work plan and requirement

agreed upon in the Concession Agreement. But long-term participation of government staff

members in the THXP also means a shortage in their offices.

Limited capacities (human resources, experts in social and environmental field, and financial

resources) of the local administration are a real challenge. Local government officials, who are field

coordinators for the project activities, coordinate with villagers on behalf of the government to

deliver the government/project policies, inform about the situation and planned activities, besides

consulting with villagers to collect information and get their feedback. For government, this is a valid

form of community participation and consultation in the project, and is commonly practiced.

However, some people interviewed said public consultation and participation could be improved to

ensure maximum benefits to both the nation and the affected communities.

Some suggestions for the improvement of water governance in the context of hydropower

development would include (i) promoting exchange of experience and lessons on governance issues,

including communication and coordination between stakeholders, aimed at increasing benefits and

reducing social, economic, and environmental cost of WSI development; (ii) promoting meaningful

consultation and participation of stakeholders, including relevant line agencies, the affected and

concerned communities, private sector, and NGOs, to reduce objections and increase support, for

achieving the stated project objectives; (iii) increase in the right training, tools and resources to

manage the projects, (iv) promoting a holistic approach for development and management, taking

into account all dimensions of development, including institutional, social, human, cultural,

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economic, environmental, and financial aspects, to ensure sustainable development; and (v)

encouraging, supporting, and increasing the confidence of the private sector to do a good job in

supporting the economy, livelihoods improvement activities, and environmental protection.

VALIDATION WORKSHOP OUTCOME:

The validation workshop on 19 October 2012 recommended the following points for

consideration:

• Sectors/Ministries concerned should be more involved and assigned to work on and

implement the sector-specific activities for improving the livelihoods of the resettled people.

• Project developer together with responsible agencies should constantly review the

resettlement policy to ensure that the resettled people are compensated fairly and timely.

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Itemid=2 (accessed on 1 August 2011).

Save the Mekong Coalition 2011.

http://www.savethemekong.org/main_detail.php?langss=en&cid=2 (accessed on 30 August

2012)

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52

UNDP Lao PDR 2010. Poverty‐Environment Initiative (PEI) Lao PDR Issue Brief, Investments

in Hydropower.

http://www.undplao.org/whatwedo/Projectdocs/2011/PEI%20Policy%20Briefs/PEI%20brie

f%2006_2010_Hydropower_english_small.pdf (accessed on 1 August 2011).

UNDP 2011. Lao PDR ‐ National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy (NGPES).

http://www.undplao.org/newsroom/publication/Ngpes/Lao%20PDR%20-%20NGPES%20-

%20Main%20Document.pdf (accessed on 1 August 2011).

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Appendix 1: Sample Survey Questionnaire

CASE ID # ___________ For Office Use Only

QUESTIONNAIRES FOR ASSESSING

POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISMS IN WATER GOVERNANCE

IN CAMBODIA, LAO PDR AND VIETNAM

Interviewer’s ID Name and No.: _______________________________

Date Interview Began: ______________________________________

Length of Interview: ________________________________________

Your participation in this project is completely voluntary. You may skip or refuse to answer any

survey question that makes you feel uncomfortable.

A. RESPONDENT’S PROFILE AND EXPERIENCE IN POLICY MAKING

1. Specify your role in the policy-making process in water resources development and water policy.

Agency:

_______________________________________________________________________________

Position:

_______________________________________________________________________________

Role:

_______________________________________________________________________________

2. Which level of administration/organization do you belong to:

Central Government Ministry or Department Provincial Government

District Government Community/Village Level

Administration

University/Research Organization NGO/Civil Society Group

International Development Organization

3. To whom do you report to?

_______________________________________________________________________________

B. POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELEVANT TO THE THREE ISSUE FIELDS

4. What have been the main events that resulted in the three issue fields (livelihoods, water

valuation and dam cascades) being on the policy agenda?

Crisis event (flood,

drought …)

Government

policy

Lobby

International

obligations

Trade partners’

pressure

Pressure from

donors

Pressure from NGOs

and international

community

Growing

economic

importance

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5. Who are the main people and groups involved in influencing and making policies in the three

issue fields?

Ministers Legislature Officials

Networks Professional

groups

Foreign

governments

Academics and

researchers

International

organizations

Industry

NGOs and

Advocacy groups

Political parties Religious

leaders

Mass media Pubic policy Community

Group

6. What is your organization’s role within the three issue fields?

Livelihoods Water Valuation Dam Cascades

Policy Making Policy Making Policy Making

Policy

Implementation

& Oversight

Policy

Implementation &

Oversight

Policy

Implementation &

Oversight

Compliance

Monitoring

Compliance

Monitoring

Compliance

Monitoring

Research Research Research

Advocacy Advocacy Advocacy

Economic

interests/Invest

Economic

interests/Investing

Economic

interests/Investing

None None None

7. In your opinion, what are three key concerns related to the following issue fields?

Livelihoods: _______________________________________________________________________

Water Valuation: __________________________________________________________________

Dam Cascades: _____________________________________________________________________

8. Do you believe that existing government policies and practices adequately address above-

mentioned concerns?

Very effective Adequate Not adequate

Not at all

9. In what area do you believe the performance of government policies and practices are

inadequate?

Legal provisions for addressing key issues Administrative arrangements

Financial resources Human resources and technical

expertise/experience

Institution’s motivation and commitment Selection of the appropriate

strategy

Other (please specify)

___________________________________________________________________________

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10. If government policies and practices are insufficient to address key concerns in the three issue

fields, what are the reasons?

Inadequate

provisions in

government

policies

Limited technical

resources to

implement

projects/programs

Alternate

priorities of

government

agencies involved

Vague and weak

institutional

mandates

Inadequate

knowledge of

effective

program/policy

implementation

Pressure from

external/private

sector actors

(companies,

investors and

donors)

Limited staff

resources to

implement

policies

Poor coordination

within

government

departments

Poor mediums of

communication

between parties

involved

Limited financial

resources to

implement

projects and

programs

Conflicts and/or

poor coordination

between

institutions

involved

Inadequate

knowledge of

policy/program

implementation

among affected

communities

C. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

11. How would you rate your organization’s capacity to enforce policies and/or implement activities

within the three issue fields?

Strong Fairly strong Adequate

Poor Not at all

12. Does your organization have a clearly outlined strategic planning process for setting clear

organizational goals, and for directing the efforts of staff and other stakeholders toward

achieving its objectives?

Yes, I’m involved in the process Yes, but I’m not involved in the process

No Don’t know.

13. Is there an ongoing process for scanning the environment to consider potential threats and

opportunities?

Yes No Don’t know.

14. Does all staff have an opportunity to suggest changes within your institution? Does the

institution use feedback to improve itself?

Yes No Don’t know.

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15. Are departmental lines or divisions within groups coordinated to improve performance? Or are

departmental lines heavily guarded , serving as an impediment to collaboration?

Strong Fairly strong Adequate, but needs improvement

Poor, and impedes performance Not at all

16. How would you rate the level of communication, and flow of information between various levels

(top down and bottom up) within your institution?

Strong Coordination is limited/poor Don’t know.

17. In your opinion, are adequate budgets allocated for implementing plans and programs by your

institution?

Yes No Don’t know.

18. Are financial resources used optimally by your organization?

Yes No Don’t know.

19. In your opinion, are adequate timelines specified for implementing plans and programs by your

institution?

Yes No Don’t know.

20. Is your institution equipped with all technological resources (i.e. computers, information

systems, library, software etc.) to carry out its function?

Yes No Don’t know.

21. To what extent does your institution monitor and evaluate its programs?

Programs are monitored and evaluated regularly

Programs are monitored and evaluated periodically

Programs are not monitored at all.

Don’t know.

22. Does your institution have adequate formal and informal operational linkages with other like-

minded organizations?

Yes No Don’t know.

23. How would you assess communication and coordination between your organization and partner

organizations?

Strong Fairly strong Poor, and impedes performance of tasks

Thank you for your participation.

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Appendix 2: Sample Survey Questionnaire in Lao language (Separated attachment)

ບດສອບຖາມບດສອບຖາມບດສອບຖາມບດສອບຖາມ

ກນໄກດານນະໂຍບາຍ ແລະ ການບ ລ ຫານຄມຄອງຊບພະຍາກອນນ າໃນ ສກນໄກດານນະໂຍບາຍ ແລະ ການບ ລ ຫານຄມຄອງຊບພະຍາກອນນ າໃນ ສກນໄກດານນະໂຍບາຍ ແລະ ການບ ລ ຫານຄມຄອງຊບພະຍາກອນນ າໃນ ສກນໄກດານນະໂຍບາຍ ແລະ ການບ ລ ຫານຄມຄອງຊບພະຍາກອນນ າໃນ ສ....ປປປປ....ປ ລາວປ ລາວປ ລາວປ ລາວ

ຊ ຜຖ ກສ າພາດ:_______________________________________

ວນທ :________________________

ການເຂາຮວມໂຄງການແລະການສອບຖາມຂອງທານແມນເປນໄປຕາມຄວາມສະໝກໃຈຂອງຜກຽວ .ທານມສ ດທ ຈະບ ຕອບຄ າຖາມໃດນ ງກໄດຖາທານຄ ດວາທານບ ສະດວກທ ຈະຕອບ.

ກກກກ. ປະຫວດແລະປະສບການໃນການສາງນະໂຍບາຍປະຫວດແລະປະສບການໃນການສາງນະໂຍບາຍປະຫວດແລະປະສບການໃນການສາງນະໂຍບາຍປະຫວດແລະປະສບການໃນການສາງນະໂຍບາຍ

1. ກະລນາລະບບດບາດ \ໜາທ ຂອງທານໃນຂະບວນການສາງນະໂຍບາຍກຽວກບການພດທະນາຊບພະຍາກອນນ◌ ◌ າ ແລະ ນະໂຍບາຍ ຂອງຊບພະຍາກອນນ າ.

ໜວຍງານ:_____________________________________________________________________

ຕາແໜງ:______________________________________________________________________

ໜາທ :_________________________________________________________________________

2. ສ ານກງານ ຫລ ອງການໃດທ ທານສງກດຢ

ສນກາງ ແຂວງ ເມ ອງ

ບານ ມະຫາວ ທະຍາໄລ\ສນວ ໄຈ ອງການທ ບ

ຂ ນກບລດຖະບານ

ອງການຈດຕງສາກນ

3. ທານລາຍງານເຖງໃຜ___________________________________________________________

ຂຂຂຂ. 3ປະເດນຫລກຂອງນະໂຍບາຍ ແລະການປະຕບດຕວຈ ງປະເດນຫລກຂອງນະໂຍບາຍ ແລະການປະຕບດຕວຈ ງປະເດນຫລກຂອງນະໂຍບາຍ ແລະການປະຕບດຕວຈ ງປະເດນຫລກຂອງນະໂຍບາຍ ແລະການປະຕບດຕວຈ ງ

4. ຍອນຫຍງ 3 ປະເດນລມນ :

a. ການດ າລງຊ ວ ດ (Livelihoods), b. ຄນຄາຂອງນ າແລະຊບພະຍາ ກອນທາມະຊາດ (Water valuation),

c. ກມເຄ ອນໃນອາງໂຕງດຽວກນ (Dam cascades)

ຈ ງຖ ກນ າເຂ າມາໃນວາລະຂອງການສາງນະໂຍບາຍການພດທະນາ ແລະການບ ລ ຫານຊບພະຍາກອນນ າ?

(ທານສາມາດເລ ອກໄດຫາຍໆຂ ອ ງຕາມປະສບການແລະຄວາມເຂາໃຈຂອງທານ)

ໄພພບດ )ນ າຖວມ ,ແຫງແລງ(

ນະໂຍບາຍຂອງລດຖະບານ

ການຂດຂວາງແບບບ ເປນທາງ ການ

ສນຍາຜກມດລະຫວາງປະ ເທດ

ການກດດນຈາກຄຄຄາຕາງຊາດ

ການກດດນຈາກກຜໃຫທ ນ

ການຂະຫຍາຍຕວທາງດານເສດຖະກດ

ການກດດນຈາກອງກອນເອກະລາດທ ບ ຂ ນກບລດຖະບານ

ສ ງອ ນໆ )ກະລນາລະບ( ____________________________________________________________

5. ບກຄນຫລ ກມຄນໃດທ ສາມາດເຂາໄປມສວນຮວມໃນການຜກດນໃນການສາງນະໂຍບາຍທກຽວຂອງກບ 3 ປະເດນຫລກທ ໄດກາວມາຂາງເທ ງນນ.

(ທານສາມາດເລ ອກໄດຫາຍໆຂ ອ ງຕາມປະສບການແລະຄວາມເຂາໃຈຂອງທານ)

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ລດຖະມນຕ ຜອອກກດໝາຍ

ພະນກງານລດ

ເຄ ອຄາຍສງຄມ ນກຊຽວ

ຊານ

ລດຖະບານຕາງຊາດ

ນກວ ຊາການ ແລະນກຄນຄວາ

ອງກອນນາໆຊາດ

ກມອດສາຫະກາ

ສ ສານມວນຊນ

ພກການເມອງ

ຜນ າທາງດານສາດສະໜາ

ຊມຊນ ນະໂຍບາຍລດ

ອງກອນອ ດສະຫລະທ ບ ຂ ນກບລດຖະບານ )NGOs(

ສ ງອ ນໆ )ກະລນາລະບ( ____________________________________________________________

6. ໃນ 3 ປະເດນດງກາວນ ອງກອນຂອງທານໄດມ ບດບາດແນວໃດ?

(ທານສາມາດເລ ອກໄດຫາຍໆຂ ອ ງຕາມປະສບການແລະຄວາມເຂາໃຈຂອງທານ)

ການດ າລງຊ ວ ດ

(Livelihoods)

ຄນຄາຂອງນ າແລະຊບພະຍາ ກອນທາ

ມະຊາດ (Water

Valuation)

ກມເຄ ອນໃນອາງໂຕງດຽວກນ (Dam cascades)

ສາງນະໂຍບາຍ

ສາງນະໂຍບາຍ

ສາງນະໂຍບາຍ

ປະຕບດ ແລະ ນ າໃຊນະໂຍບາຍ

ປະຕບດ ແລະນ າໃຊນະໂຍບາຍ

ປະຕບດ ແລະນ າໃຊນະໂຍບາຍ

ຕດຕາມການນ າໃຊນະໂຍບາຍ

ຕດຕາມການບງຄບການນ າໃຊນະໂຍບາຍ

ຕດຕາມການບງຄບການນ າໃຊນະໂຍບາຍ

ຝາຍວ ໄຈ ຝາຍວ ໄຈ ຝາຍວ ໄຈ

ຜຜກດນນະໂຍບາຍ ຜຜກດນນະໂຍບາຍ ຜຜກດນນະໂຍບາຍ ຝາຍເສດຖະກດແລະ

ການລງທ ນ ຝາຍເສດຖະກດແລະ

ການລງທ ນ ຝາຍເສດຖະກດແລະການ ລງທ ນ

ບ ແມນທງໝດ ບ ແມນທງໝດ ບ ແມນທງໝດ ສ ງອ ນໆ )ກະລນາລະບ( ____________________________________________________________

7. ທານຄ ດວາ ,ຂ ໃດໃນ 3 ຂ ນ ທ ທານໃຫຄວາມເປນຫວງຫລາຍທ ສດ? ຍອນຫຍງ?

ການດ າລງຊ ວ ດ ການດ າລງຊ ວ ດ ການດ າລງຊ ວ ດ ການດ າລງຊ ວ ດ (livelihoods):__________________________________________________________

ຄນຄາຂອງນ າ ຄນຄາຂອງນ າ ຄນຄາຂອງນ າ ຄນຄາຂອງນ າ ແລະຊບພະຍາກອນແລະຊບພະຍາກອນແລະຊບພະຍາກອນແລະຊບພະຍາກອນ (Water valuation)::::______________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________

ກມເຄ ອນໃນອາງໂຕງກມເຄ ອນໃນອາງໂຕງກມເຄ ອນໃນອາງໂຕງກມເຄ ອນໃນອາງໂຕງ (Dam cascades)::::_________________________________________________

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8. ທານຄ ດວານະໂຍບາຍ ແລະການປະຕບດທ ຜານມາຂອງລດ ແລະ ພາກສວນທ ກຽວຂອງພຽງພກບສ ງທ ທານເປນຫວງ ແລວຫລ ຍງ?

ມ ປະສ ດຕພາບສງ ພຽງພ ບ ພຽງພ ບ ມຫຍງເລ ຍ

9. ທານຄ ດວາມຂງເຂດໃດແດທ ນະໂຍບາຍແລະການດ າເນ ນງານ ຂອງພາກສວນທ ກຽວຂອງຍງເຮດບ ທນໄດດ ເທ າທ ຄວນ:

ກດໝາຍທ ກຽວຂອງ ການຈດການບ ລ ຫານ

ງບປະມານ ຊບພະຍາກອນມະນດ ແລະ ວ ຊາການທ ມ ປະສບການ

ແຮງຈງໃຈ ແລະ ຄວາມຕງໃຈເຮດຊ ງໃດໜງເພອບນລເປ າໝາຍ ຂອງສ ານກງານ ການເລ ອກນ າໃຊຍດທະສາດ /ຍດທະວ ທ ທ ເໝາະສມ

ສ ງອ ນໆ(ກະລນາລະບ)____________________________________________________

10. ທານສາມາດບອກໄດບ ວາຍອນສາເຫດອນໃດ, ນະໂຍບາຍ ແລະ ການປະຕບດງານຂອງພາກສວນທ ກຽວຂອງຈ ງຍງ ບ ມ ຄວາມສາມາດທ ຈະແກໄຂບນຫາຫກໃນ 3 ປະເດນດງກາວນນ?

(ທານສາມາດເລ ອກໄດຫາຍໆຂ ອ ງຕາມປະສບການແລະຄວາມເຂາໃຈຂອງທານ)

ນະໂຍບາຍຂອງລດບ ຄບ

ຖວນພຽງພ

ບ ມນກວ ຊາການພຽງພທ ຈະບ ລ ຫານ / ປະຕບດໂຄງການ

ບລ ມະສ ດອ ນຂອງອງການຈດ

ຕງລດຖະບານທ ກຽວຂອງ

ໜາທ ພາລະບດບາດຂອງໜວຍ ງານບ ມ ຄວາມຈະແຈງແລະບແຂງແຮງ

ຄວາມຮຄວາມສາມາດບ ພຽງພທ ຈະປະຕບດວຽກງານຫລ ນະໂຍ ບາຍ

ຄວາມກດດນຈາກບ ລ ສດນາຍທ ນ ແລະ

ຜໃຫທ ນຊວຍເຫລ ອລາ

ບ ມ ພະນກງານພຽງພທ ຈະປະຕ

ບດງານໂຄງ ການ

ການປະສານງານລະວາງກມ ອງບ ດ ພ

ການສ ສານຫວາງພາກສວນທ

ກຽວຂອງຍງບ ດ ພ

ຂາດງບປະມານໃນການຈດຕງ ປະຕບດ

ມ ຂ ຂດແຍງແລະການປະສານງານທ ບ ດ

ລະຫວາງອງກອນຫລສ ານກງານທ ກຽວຂອງ

ຊມຊນຂາດຄວາມຮຄວາມສາມາດໃນການ

ປະຕບດນະໂຍບາຍ /ໂຄງການ

ສ ງອ ນໆ )ກະລນາລະບ( ________________________________________________________________________

ຄຄຄຄ. ຄວາມເຂມແຂງຂອງອງກອນຄວາມເຂມແຂງຂອງອງກອນຄວາມເຂມແຂງຂອງອງກອນຄວາມເຂມແຂງຂອງອງກອນ ////ສ ານກງານສ ານກງານສ ານກງານສ ານກງານ

11. ໃຫທານປະເມນຄວາມອາດສາມາດພາຍໃນອງກອນຂອງທານຕກບການບງຄບໃຊນະໂຍບາຍແລະການປະຕບດໂດຍອ ງໃສ 3 ປະເດນສ າຄນ( 1 . ການດ າລງຊ ວ ດ, 2 . ຄນຄາຂອງນ າແລະຊບພະຍາ ກອນທາມະຊາດ, 3. ກມເຄ ອນໃນອາງໂຕງດຽວກນ).

ແຂງແຮງ ຂອນຂາງແຂງແຮງ ພຽງພ

ບ ແຂງແຮງ ບ ມ ຫຍງໝດ

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12. ທານຄ ດວາອງກອນຂອງທານມຍດທະສາດການວາງແຜນໃນການສາງເປ າໝາຍຂອງອງກອນທ ຈະແຈງເພອນ າພາພະນກງານ ແລະພາກສວນກຽວຂອງຕາງໆ ໃຫບນລເປ າໝາຍນນໄດບ ?

ມ ,ແລະຂາພະເຈ າໄດເຂ າຮວມຂະບວນການ ມ ,ແຕຂາພະເຈ າບ ໄດເຂ າຮວມຂະບວນການ

ບ ມ ບ ຮ

13. ທານຄ ດວາອງກອນຂອງທານມຂະບວນການໃນການກວດສອບຫລ ທວນຄ ນບ ສ າລບການຊອກຫາໂອກາດແລະຄວາມສຽງຕກບສະພາບແວດລອມ?

ມ ບ ມ ບ ຮ

14. ພະນກງານທງໝດພາຍໃນອງກອນຂອງທານໄດມ ໂອກາດໄດແລກປຽນຂ ຄ ດເຫນນ າກນ ຫລບ ?ແລວອງກອນຂອງທານ ໄດມ ການສະທອນຄ ນຂ ມນເພອແກໄຂບນຫາໃຫຈະແຈງຂ ນບ ?

ມ ບ ມ ບ ຮ

15. ໃນແຕລະໜວຍງານຂອງທານມການປະສານງານກນຫບ ເພອການປບປງການດ າເນ ນງານ?

ຫລ ວາແຕລະໜວຍງານມ ການຄວບຄມຫາຍຈ ງເຮດໃຫການຮວມມຕາງໆບ ໄດດ . ສງ ປານກາງ ທາມະດາ ,ແຕຕອງມການປບປງ

ບ ດ ເລ ຍ ,ການປະຕບດງານ ຫຍງຍາກ ບ ມ ຫຍງເລ ຍ

16. ໃນການປະເມນລະດບການສ ສານ ແລະການເຊ ອມຕຂ ມນຂອງແຕລະຂນ )ແຕເທ ງຫາລ ◌ ມ ,ແຕລມຫາເທ◌ ງ (ໃ ນໜວຍງານ ຂອງທານເປນແນວໃດ?

ສງ ການປະສານງານມຂ ຈ າກດແລະບ ດ ເທ າທ ຄວນ ບ ຮ

17. ທານຄ ດວາການຈດສນງບປະມານເພອການປະຕບດໂຄງການ /ແຜນງານຂອງອງກອນທານ ພຽງພຫລ ບ?

ພຽງພ ບ ພຽງພ ບ ຮ

18. ທານຄ ດວາການນ າໃຊງບປະມານຂອງອງກອນຂອງທານມປະສ ດທພາບ ແລະເໝາະສມຫລ ບ ?

ແມນແລວ ບ ແມນ ບ ຮ

19. ທານຄ ດວາໄລຍະເວລາໃນການປະຕບດວຽກງານໃນໂຄງການຂອງທານພຽງພຫລ ຍງ?

ພຽງພ ບ ພຽງພ ບ ຮ

20. ອງການຂອງທານມສ ງອ ານວຍຄວາມສະດວກດານຂ ມນຂາວສານພຽງພຫລ ບ ເຊ ນ:ຄອມພວເຕ,ຫອງສະໝດ,ຊອບແວ ແລະອ ນໆ

ມ ມ ,ບ ພຽງພ ◌ ບ ມ ບ ຮ

21. ອງກອນຂອງທານມການກວດກາແລະປະເມນຜນແບບໃດ?

ເປນປະຈ າ ເປນໄລຍະ ບ ມ ເລ ຍ

ບ ຮ

22. ອງກອນຂອງທານມສາຍພວພນທ ເປນທາງການແລະບ ເປນທາງການກບອງກອນອ ດສະຫລະ ອ ນໆຫລ ບ ?

ມ ບ ມ ບ ຮ

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23. ທານສາມາດປະເມນການຮວມມ ແລະການປະສານງານລະຫວາງອງກອນຂອງທານກບອງ ກອນຜຮວມມອອມຂາງ ໄດບ ວາມຄວາມເຂມແຂງພຽງໃດ?

ເຂມແຂງ ເຂມແຂງປານກາງ ບ ເຂມແຂງເລ ຍ,ຂດຂວາງການປະຕບດງານ

24. ອງກອນຂອງທານໄດມ ສວນຮວມແນວໃດໃນແຕລະໄລຍະຂອງໂຄງການ ການສາງເຄ ອນໄຟຟານ າຕກ? ກອນສາງໂຄງການ ທາງກງ ທາງອອມ

ໄລຍະຈດຕງປະຕບດ ທາງກງ ທາງອອມ

ໄລຍະປະເມນ ທາງກງ ທາງອອມ

25. ທານຄ ດວາຂ ສະເໜຂອງທານ(ກຄ ອງກອນຂອງທານເອງ)ໄດຖ ກພຈາລະນາໂດຍໂຄງການໃນລະດບໃດ ໃນແຕ ລະວາລະການປ ກສາຫາລ

ສງ ປານກາງ ໜອຍຫາຍ ບ ມ ເລ ຍ

26. ຕາມຄວາມເຂາໃຈຂອງທານ ທານຄ ດວາຄວາມທກຍາກ ແມນຫຍງ? ສ ງທ ຈ າເປນສ າລບການດ າລງຊ ວ ດ ກຄ ເພອຫດຜອນຄວາມທກຍາກ ມ ຫຍງແດ?

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

27. ຕາມຄວາມເຂາໃຈຂອງທານ ທານຄ ດວາການສາງເຄ ອນໄຟຟານ າຕກຈະສາມາດຫດຜອນຄວາມທກຍາກ ແລະ ປບປງຊ ວ ດການເປນຢຂອງຜໄດຮບຜນກະທບ ແລະ ປະເທດຊາດ ໄດ ຫ ບ ໄດ ແນວໃດ?

____________________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________

**********************************************

ຖາຫາກວາມຄ າຖາມຂ ໃດບ ຈະແຈງ ,ທານສາມາດຕດຕຫາ ນ .ອາພາວນ ໄດທ ເບ :

(020-54-836-693)

ແຟກແບບສອບຖາມທ ເສດສມບນແລວມາທ ເບ : (021-453-182) /

ອ ເມຣ: [email protected]

ຂ ຂອບໃຈຂ ຂອບໃຈຂ ຂອບໃຈຂ ຂອບໃຈ

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Appendix 3a: Power Projects in Lao PDR – Developed Before 2000

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Appendix 3b: Power Projects in Lao PDR – Operational (August 2011)

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Appendix 3c: Power Projects in Lao PDR – Under Construction (August 2011)

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Appendix 3d: Power Projects in Lao PDR – Planning Stage (PDA Stage) (August 2011)

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Appendix 3e: Power Projects in Lao PDR – Feasibility Stage (MOU Stage) (August 2011)

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