inequitable justice mass forfeiture
TRANSCRIPT
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How Federal
Equitable Sharing
Encourages Local Police and ProsecutorsTo Evade State Civil Forfeiture Law
For Financial Gain
By Dick M. Carpenter II, Ph.D., Larry Salzman and Lisa KnepperInstitute for Justice
October 2011
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INEQUITABLEJUSTICE
Civilforfeitureisthegovernmentpower
totakepropertysuspectedofinvolvementinacrime.Unlikecriminalforfeitureusedtotaketheill-gottengainsofcriminalactivityafteracriminalconvictionwithcivilforfeiture,policecantakepropertywithoutsomuchaschargingtheownerwithanywrongdoing. Ownerscaughtupincivilforfeitureproceedingstypicallyhavefewlegalrights,whilepoliceandprosecutorsenjoyalltheadvantages.Worse,moststateandfederallawsawardthelawenforcementagencies
thattakethepropertyatleastacut,ifnotall,oftheproceeds.Tisdirectnancialincentiveandthelimitedsafeguardsforownerscombinetoencouragethetakingofproperty. Equitablesharingmakesthisbadsituationworse.Troughequitablesharing,policeandprosecutorscantakepropertyfromcitizensunderfederalcivilforfeiturelawinsteadoftheirownstatelaws.Fromtheperspectiveoflawenforcement,thisisagooddeal:Federallawmakescivilforfeiturebothrelativelyeasyandrewarding,withas
muchas80percentofproceedsreturnedtotheseizingagency. Tus,withequitablesharing,stateandlocallawenforcementcantakeandprotfrompropertytheymightnotbeabletounderstatelaw.Ifastateprovidesowners
greaterprotectionsorbarslawenforcement
fromdirectlybenetingfromforfeitures,agenciescansimplyturntofederallaw. RecentresearchpublishedintheJournalof Criminal Justiceshowsthisisexactlywhatagenciesdowhenfacedwithstricterandless
generousstateforfeiturelawstheyturntothefedsandkeeponpocketingforfeituremoney. Andtheproblemisgrowingworse.Between2000and2008,equitablesharingpaymentsfromtheU.S.DepartmentofJusticetostateandlocallawenforcementdoubledfromabout$200millionto$400million.Anddatafromtwostates,MassachusettsandCalifornia,indicatethattheseguresunderestimatethetrueextentofequitablesharingnationwide. Forfeiturereformisdesperatelyneeded
atalllevels.Butforstatereformstohavelastingeects,lawenforcementmustnotbeallowedtouseequitablesharingtodisregardstatelaw.Stateandlocallawenforcementshouldhavetofollowstatelaw.
With equitable sharing, state and local law enorcementcan take and proft rom property they might not be able tounder state law.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
hisreportexaminesafederallawenforcementpracticeknownasequitablesharing.Itenablesindeed,encouragesstateandlocalpoliceandprosecutorstocircumventthecivilforfeiturelawsoftheirstatesfornancialgain.
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INEQUITABLEJUSTICE
TeU.S.DrugEnforcementAgency(DEA)andewksburypolicedepartment,however,haveotherplansfortheCaswellsproperty.Usingapowercalledcivilforfeiture,theyaimtotaketheentirepropertyworthmorethanamilliondollarsbecausesomeguestsstayingatthemotelhavebeenarrestedwithdrugs.Since1994,theCaswellshaverentedtheirroomsmorethan125,000times.Yet,becausedrugarrestshavetaken
placeonroughly30occasionsoverthose6,570days,thegovernmentsviewis:Temotelisours. Incredibly,thegovernmentdoesnotclaimthattheCaswellsareguiltyofanycrime.Indeed,theDEAandthelocalpolicehavenevermadeanallegationthattheCaswellshavebeeninvolvedinanyillegalactivityatthemoteloranywhereelseonlythattheyownthepropertyonwhichotherpeoplehavebeenarrestedforcrimes.1Inordinaryterms,theCaswellsareinnocent.Butwithcivilforfeiture,innocentmeanssomethingelseentirely. Civilforfeitureisthegovernmentpowertotakepropertysuspectedofinvolvementinacrime.Itisdierentfromcriminalforfeiture,whichisusedtotakethe
ill-gottengainsofcriminalactivityafteranindividualisactuallyconvictedofacrime.Withcivilforfeiture,policecantakepropertywithoutsomuchaschargingtheownerwithacrime. Ownerscantrytowintheirpropertybackbyraisinganinnocentownerdefense,butthesearedicultclaimstowin.ypically,ownersmustprovethattheydidnotknowoforconsenttotheuseoftheirpropertyaspart
ofcriminalactivityoreven,asunderfederallaw,thattheytookallactionpossibletopreventitsuseinanillegalmanner.Tisputsownersinthedicult,andoftenimpossible,positionofprovingwhattheydidnotknow. Tus,unlesstheCaswellsaresuccessfulinabattleagainsttheoverwhelmingresourcesoftheU.S.DepartmentofJustice(DOJ)toprovetheirinnocence,theywilllosetheirpropertywithoutcompensationandwithoutbeingconvictedoforevenchargedwithanywrongdoing.TisturnstheAmericanidealofinnocentuntilprovenguiltyonitshead. TeCaswellsplightshowstheproblemsthatstemnotonlyfromcivilforfeiturelaws,butalsofromafederal
Unless the Caswells are successful in a battle against the overwhelmingresources of the U.S. Department of Justice to prove their innocence, they willlose their propertywithout compensation and without being convicted of or evencharged with any wrongdoing.
INTRODUCTION
TeMotelCaswellisafamily-ownedbudgetmotelinewksbury,Mass.,30minutesoutsideofBoston.RussellandPatriciaCaswellhaveownedandoperated
themotelfornearly30years,sincetheytookovermanagementfromRussfatherinthe1980s.Teylivenextdoor,raisingtheirgrandsonandtendingtothebusiness.TeCaswellsexpectedthemotel,nowmortgage-free,toprovideanest-eggforretirement.
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INEQUITABLEJUSTICE
programcalledequitablesharing.Withthisprogram,stateandlocallawenforcementcantakepropertyunderfederalcivilforfeiturelawinsteadofstatelaw.Becausefederallawmakesitrelativelyeasyofteneasierthanmanystatelawstoforfeitpropertyandreturnsagenerousshareoftheproceedstothelocalagency,equitablesharingenablesstateandlocallawenforcement
totakepropertytheymightnotbeabletounderstatelaw.Indeed,researchshowsthisisjustwhatagenciesnationwidedo. 2
AnditiswhathashappenedtotheCaswells.TeewksburypolicedonotstandtogetashareoftheproceedsofMotelCaswellunderMassachusettscivilforfeiturelaw,butratherunderfederallaw.Underanequitablesharingagreement,theDOJwillpayasmuchas80percentoftheproceedsfromthemoteldirectlytotheewksburypolice,leavingtheCaswellswithnothingbutthelossanddestructionoftheirlifeswork.NotonlyisitdoubtfulthattheewksburypolicecouldsuccessfullytaketheCaswellspropertyunderMassachusettslaw,butifthey
did,theywouldreceiveonly50percentoftheproceeds. EquitablesharingthusenableslawenforcementagenciestosidestepprotectionsinstatelawforpropertyownerssuchastheCaswells.TeInstituteforJusticehasjoinedwiththeCaswellsandtheirlocalcounselatSchlossberg,LLC,todefendtheirpropertyandarguesthattheCaswellsareinnocentownerswhosepropertyshouldnotbeforfeited. IJisalsochallengingtheequitablesharingprogramitself.IJarguesthatequitablesharingcreatesunconstitutionalincentivesforlocalagenciestocircumventstatelaw,violatingthe10 thAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitution.Whenfederallawpusheslocallaw
enforcementagenciestoadministerfederalforfeiturelawscontrarytostatepolicy,itdeprivesthecitizensofthosestatesandtheirlegislaturetheopportunitytoeectivelyreinincivilforfeitureabuse.
CIVIL FORFEITURE
AND INCENTIVES FOR ABUSE AlthoughitsuseiswidespreadthroughouttheUnitedStates,civilassetforfeitureisnotwidelyrecognizedorunderstood.Incivilforfeiturethegovernmentsuestheproperty,asifthepropertysomehowactedtoassistinthecommissionofacrime.Inthisway,thegovernmentcanseizepropertydespitetheinnocenceofitsowner.TatiswhycivilforfeiturecaseshaveunusualnamessuchasUnited States v. 434 Main Street, Tewksbury,MassachusettsthecaseinvolvingtheCaswells. Underfederallaw,federallawenforcementagencieskeepallofthepropertyandcurrencytheyseizefortheir
exclusiveuse.Tisdirectnancialincentivewasputintofederallawin1985.Beforethen,federalforfeitureproceedswenttothegeneralrevenuefundoftheUnitedStates,andCongressthendecidedhowsuchrevenuewouldbeappropriated.Before1985,forfeiturerevenuewasmodest.Aftertheprotincentivewasputintothelaw,forfeiturerevenueexplodedandithasbeengrowingeversince. AsFigure1shows,thevalueofassetsintheU.S.DepartmentofJusticesAssetForfeitureFund,thefederalgovernmentslargestforfeiturefund,topped$1billionforthersttimein2008.Itnowstandsatmorethan$1.6billion.
$0
$200,000,000
$400,000,000
$600,000,000
$800,000,000
$1,000,000,000
$1,200,000,000
$1,400,000,000
$1,600,000,000
$1,800,000,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 1: Net Assets, Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund, 2000-20103
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INEQUITABLEJUSTICE
Followingthefederalgovernmentslead,moststatesalsoallowlawenforcementtokeepsomeorallforfeitureproceeds.Asshowninable1,lawenforcementreceives100percentofforfeitureproceedsin26states,whileanother16allowpoliceandprosecutorstokeepatleast50percent.Onlyeightstatesbartheretentionofforfeituremoniesbylawenforcement.4
Inaddition,thefederalgovernmentandmoststatesshifttheburdenofprooffromthegovernmenttotheownertoprovethatheorsheisinnocentofacrimeinforfeiturecases.Inotherwords,withcivilforfeiture,propertyownersareeectivelyguiltyuntilproveninnocent.Teincreasedburden(includingsubstantiallegalcosts)ofprovingonesinnocencecanresultinownersabandoningrightfulclaimstoseizedproperty.Andifownersdonotghtcivilforfeitureandthegovernmentwinsbydefault,lawenforcementagenciesaremorelikelytoengageinit. able2listsstatesaccordingtotheburdentheyplaceoninnocentowners.Inonlysixstatesmustgovernment
proveguilttoforfeitanytypeofproperty.In38states,ownersmustestablishtheirinnocence.Intheothersixstates,theburdendependsonthetypeofproperty. Stateandfederallawsalsomakecivilforfeitureharderonpropertyownersbyestablishingalowerstandardofproof underwhichthegovernmentcantaketheproperty.Testandardofproofinacriminalproceedingisbeyondareasonabledoubt.Tatis,thestatemustdemonstratetothejurythatevidenceshowsbeyondareasonabledoubttheaccusedindividualcommittedacrime.Tishighstandardexiststoprotecttherightsofinnocentindividualswhomightbeaccusedofacrime.
able3showsthestandardsofproofrequiredtoforfeitpropertyundercivilforfeiturelawsinall50states.Onlythreestatesdemandthatthegovernmentshowbeyondareasonabledoubtthatthepropertywaspartofacriminalact.Moststates,27,usealowerpreponderanceoftheevidencestandardbasically,thegovernmentmustshowitismorelikelythannotthatthepropertywasrelatedtocriminalconduct.Tisisalsothestandardinfederallaw.
Table 1: Proceeds Distributed to Law Enforcement Under State Civil Forfeiture Laws
0% Indiana,Maine,Maryland,Missouri,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,Ohio,Vermont
50% Colorado,Wisconsin
60% Connecticut,NewYork
63% Oregon
65% California
75% Nebraska
80% Louisiana,Mississippi
85% Florida
90% Illinois,Minnesota,NewHampshire,RhodeIsland,exas
95% SouthCarolina
100% Alaska,Alabama,Arkansas,Arizona,Delaware,Georgia,Hawaii,Idaho,Iowa,Kansas,Kentucky,Massachusetts,Michigan,Montana,Nevada,NewJersey,NewMexico,Oklahoma,Pennsylvania,SouthDakota,ennessee,Utah,Virginia,Washington,WestVirginia,Wyoming
Table 2: Innocent Owner Burden in State Civil Forfeiture Laws
Owner
mustproveinnocence
Alaska,Arizona,Arkansas,Connecticut,Delaware,Georgia,Hawaii,Idaho,Illinois,Iowa,Louisiana,Maryland,Massachusetts,Minnesota,Mississippi,Missouri,Montana,Nebraska,Nevada,
NewHampshire,NewJersey,NewYork,NorthCarolina,NorthDakota,Ohio,Oklahoma,Pennsylvania,RhodeIsland,SouthCarolina,SouthDakota,ennessee,exas,Vermont,Virginia,Washington,WestVirginia,Wisconsin,Wyoming
Dependsonproperty
Alabama,Indiana,Kentucky,Maine,NewMexico,Utah
Governmentmustproveguilt
California,Colorado,Florida,Kansas,Michigan,Oregon
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INEQUITABLEJUSTICE
Tesethreefeaturesofmoderncivilforfeiturelawencourageabusebymakingtheprocessrelativelyeasy
forlawenforcementanddicultforpropertyownerstodefendagainstandbyprovidingpoliceandprosecutorsadirectnancialincentivetopursueproperty.
FEDERAL EQUITABLE SHARING
Asbadasmoststateandfederallawsare,thefederalequitablesharingprogrammakesthingsevenworse.Equitablesharingisapolicybywhichthefederalgovernmentandlocallawenforcementagenciescansharetheproceedsofaforfeiturethatisprosecutedbythefederalgovernmentafterbeingbroughttoitsattentionby
alocalagency.UnderthefederalComprehensiveCrimeControlActof1984,stateandlocallawenforcementagenciesmayworktogethertoinitiatefederalforfeitureactionsaslongastheconductgivingrisetotheseizureisinviolationoffederallaw,suchaswhenaguestatamotelisarrestedforcertaindrugcrimes. Equitablesharingagreementscanbeusedtoprocessanddividetheproceedsofpropertyseizedduringjointoperationsinvolvingmultiplelawenforcementagencies.Tefederalgovernmenttakesovertheproperty,handlestheforfeiturecaseandthendistributestheproceedstoeachagencyaccordingtotheirroleinthejointeort.
Morecontroversially,thefederalgovernmentcanalsoadoptpropertyfromastateorlocalagencyforforfeiture.
Inadoptiveforfeitures,relativelylaxfederalstandardsapplyandstateandlocalagenciesreceive80percentofproceedsevenifstatelawisstricterandlessgenerous.Tus,evenifstatelawoersstrongprotectionstopropertyownersandbarslawenforcementfromkeepingwhattheyforfeit,stateandlocalagenciescanuseequitablesharingtocircumventthoserulesandtakeandkeeppropertyanyway. InMassachusetts,forinstance,stateandlocallawenforcementagentsarelimitedtoseizingpropertythatwas
usedinandforthebusinessofunlawfullymanufacturing,dispensing,ordistributingcontrolledsubstances.5Tiscontrastswiththefederallaw,inwhichfederalagentscanseizepropertythatmerelyfacilitatesadrugcrimeafar-reachingstandardthatcouldallowthegovernmenttoseizearentalcar,forinstance,ifitwasusedbysomeonewhohappenedtobecarryingdrugsonthem.AlthoughitisstillrelativelyeasytoseizepropertyinMassachusettsas
Table 3: Standard of Proof in State Civil Forfeiture Laws*
PrimaFacie/ProbableCauseAlabama,Alaska,Delaware,Illinois,Massachusetts,Missouri,Montana,RhodeIsland,SouthCarolina,Wyoming
ProbableCauseandPreponderanceoftheEvidence
Georgia,NorthDakota,SouthDakota,Washington
PreponderanceoftheEvidence
Arizona,Arkansas,Hawaii,Idaho,Indiana,Iowa,Kansas,Louisiana,Maine,Maryland,Michigan,Mississippi,NewHampshire,NewJersey,Oklahoma,Pennsylvania,ennessee,exas,Virginia,WestVirginia
PreponderanceoftheEvidenceandClearandConvincing
Kentucky,NewYork,Oregon
ClearandConvincingColorado,Connecticut,Florida,Minnesota,Nevada,NewMexico,Ohio,Utah,Vermont
ClearandConvincingandBeyondaReasonableDoubt
California
BeyondaReasonableDoubt Nebraska,NorthCarolina**,Wisconsin
*Mostcommonly,instateswithtwoforfeiturestandards,thehigheroneisfortheforfeitureofrealproperty.
**Statelaweectivelydoesnothavecivilforfeiture.
Moredifculttoforfeita
ssets
In adoptive oreitures, relatively lax ederal standards applyand state and local agencies receive 80 percent o proceedseven i state law is stricter and less generous.
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secureforfeiturefunds. Asshowninables1through3,Holcombandhiscolleaguescategorizedthecivilforfeiturelawsofall50
statesaccordingtoprotmotive,innocentownerburdenandstandardofproof. Fromtheperspectiveofstateandlocallawenforcement,federalcivilforfeiturelawisfairlyeasyandgenerouscomparedtomanystates.Federallawplacestheburdenofestablishinginnocenceonowners,setsthestandardofproofatpreponderanceoftheevidenceandthroughequitablesharingwillreturnasmuchas80percentofproceedstolawenforcement. Holcombandcolleaguesexaminedhowthese
threedimensionsofstatecivilforfeiturelawscorrelatewithequitablesharingpaymentstostateandlocallawenforcementagencies.7Teirresultsareclear:Agenciesinstateswherecivilforfeitureismoredicultandlessgenerousreceivemoreequitablesharingdollars.
comparedtosomestates,statelawplacesagreaterlimitonlawenforcementagenciesthanfederallaw. Further,underMassachusettslawpolicemaykeep
only50percentoftheproceedsofforfeitedproperty;theother50percentgoestoprosecutors.However,underanequitablesharingagreement,localpolicecanreceiveasmuchas80percentofproceeds.FortheewksburypoliceintheCaswellscase,thedierencecouldbehundredsofthousandsofdollars.
CIRCUMVENTING STATE LAW
TeCaswellscaseshowshowlocalpolicecantakeadvantageoffederalequitablesharingtosecureforfeitureproceedstheymightnotbeabletounderstatelaw.But
doesequitablesharingencouragestateandlocallawenforcementtoevadestatecivilforfeiturelaws?Teevidencesaysyes. Ina2011studypublishedintheJournal of CriminalJustice,researchersJeersonHolcomb,omislavKovandzicandMarianWilliamsexaminedtherelationshipbetweenstatecivilforfeiturelawsandequitablesharingreceiptsbystateandlocallawenforcement.6Teyfoundthatinstateswherecivilforfeitureismoredicultandlessrewarding,lawenforcementagenciestakeinmoreequitablesharingdollars.Inotherwords,policeandprosecutorsuseequitablesharingasaneasierandmoreprotablewayto
Under an equitable sharing agreement, local police can receive as much as 80 percent of proceeds.For the Tewksbury police in the Caswells case, the difference could be hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Research ound that in states where civil oreiture is more
difcult and less rewarding, law enorcement agencies takein more equitable sharing dollars. In other words, police andprosecutors use equitable sharing as an easier and moreproftable way to secure oreiture unds.
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INEQUITABLEJUSTICE
First,theHolcombanalysisfoundthatallthree
aspectsofstatecivilforfeiturelawindependentlyimpactthesizeofequitablesharingpayments.
Prot motive:Agenciesinlessgenerousstatesuseequitablesharingmore.Figure2illustratesthiseectforanaverage-sizedlawenforcementagency,oneservingabout300,000people:Each25percentagepointdecreaseinagencyshareofforfeitureproceedsunderstatelawincreasesequitablesharingpaymentsunderfederallawby$6,000.
Tus,anaverage-sizedagencyinastatethatallotsnoforfeitureproceedstolawenforcementwouldbe
expectedtotakein$24,000moreinequitablesharingpaymentsthanasimilaragencyinastatewitha100percentprotmotive.Giventhatanaverage-sizedagencyreceivesabout$120,000inequitablesharingpaymentsannually,anadditional$24,000wouldrepresenta20percentincrease.
Innocent owner burden:Placingtheburdentoshowguiltonthegovernmentwhichistosay,makingforfeitureharderforlawenforcementleadstomoreequitablesharing.Anaverage-sizedagencyinapresumedinnocentstatewouldbeexpectedtotakein$12,840moreinequitablesharingpaymentsthanasimilaragencyinapresumedguiltystate.Tisrepresentsa10percentincreaseinequitablesharingforanaverage-sizedagency.
Standard of proof:Agenciesinstatesthatrequirehigherstandardsofproofforcivilforfeitureagain,makingforfeituremoredicultreceivemoreequitablesharingpayments.AsshowninFigure3,
raisingthestandardofproofbyonelevelisassociatedwithanincreaseinequitablesharingpaymentsof$5,370foranaverage-sizedagency,orabouta4.5percentincrease.
$0
$6,000
$12,000
$18,000
$24,000
75% 50% 25% 0%
Share of Forfeiture Proceeds Kept by Law Enforcement
Under State Law
Figure 2: Rise in Equitable Sharing Dollars for an Average-Sized Law Enforcement
Agency as Share of Forfeiture Proceeds Under State Law Declines from 100 Percent
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INEQUITABLEJUSTICE
Notonlydoallthreeaspectsofstateforfeiturelawindependentlyaecttheequitablesharingactivityofstateandlocallawenforcement,theyalsoactinconcert.Inotherwords,Holcombandcolleaguesfoundthatmakingforfeituremoredicultandlessrewardingleadstogreateruseoffederallaw.Specically:
Whenstatessethigherstandardsofproofandprovidesmallersharesofproceedsmakingforfeiturebothharderandlessrewardingagenciesengageinmoreequitablesharing.
Iftheburdenofproofisonowners,raisingtheshareofproceedsreturnedtolawenforcementreducesuseofequitablesharing,asonewouldexpect.However,iftheburdenofproofisonthegovernment,makingforfeituremoredicult,agencieswillturnmoretoequitablesharingeven if the prot motive increasesunderstatelaw.Tissuggeststhatplacingtheburdenongovernmenttodemonstrateguiltisasignicant
impedimentforlawenforcement.
Raisingthestandardofproofleadstolargerincreasesinequitablesharingwhenownersarepresumedinnocentthanwhentheyarepresumedguilty.Tesetwoproceduralbarrierstoforfeitureworktogethertoencouragemoreequitablesharing.
Importantly,allofthesendingsheldtrueandevenbecamestrongerwhenHolcombandcolleaguescontrolledforvariousfactorsthatcouldmuddyresults,suchasdrugarrestsandviolentcrimerates.8Tismeans
thatagenciesarenotengaginginmoreequitablesharingbecausetheyfacealargerdrugorcrimeproblemthanotheragencies,butbecausetheyfacedierentincentivesunderstatelaw.aketwopolicedepartmentsalikeinsize,mission,crimeratesandsoon.Oneisinastatewitheasyandgenerousforfeiturelaws.Teotherisinastatethatmakesforfeituredicultandlessrewarding.Tesecond
willengageinmoreequitablesharingthantherst. TeHolcombresultsshowthatwhenmakingdecisionsabouthowtoconductforfeitures,stateandlocallawenforcementconsiderboththerelativeeaseoftheprocessandthepossibilityofnancialreward.Tisiscompellingevidencethatpursuitofprotisakeymotivatorincivilforfeiture.
TeHolcombresultsalsoaccordwithotherresearch.AnearlieranalysisofequitablesharingpaymentsandstatelawsbyKovandzicandJohnWorrallreachedasimilarconclusion.9AndastudybyCharlesKucheralsofoundthatstricterstatelawsareassociatedwithmoreequitablesharing,thoughitdidnotndastatisticallysignicanteectfromtheshareofproceedsreturnedtolawenforcement.10
Figure 3: Rise in Equitable Sharing Dollars for an Average-Sized LawEnforcement Agency as State Standard of Proof Becomes Stricter
When making decisions about how to conduct oreitures,state and local law enorcement consider both the relativeease o the process and the possibility o fnancial reward.
This is compelling evidence that pursuit o proft is a keymotivator in civil oreiture.
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IntheirJournal of Criminal Justicearticle,Holcomb,KovandzicandWilliamshighlightsomeoftheconcernstheirndingsraise:
Tedependencyofpoliceonpublicresourcesfortheiroperationsisanimportantcheckonpolicepower.Self-generatingrevenuesbythepolicethroughforfeiturepotentiallythreatenstheabilityofpopularlyelectedocialstoconstrainpoliceactivities.Perhapssuchconcernspartiallyexplainthedierencesinstatelaws.Ifthelegislatorsandthepublicwishedforforfeituretobeveryeasyandrewardingtolawenforcement,everystatewouldhavelowstandardsofproof,limitedinnocentownerprotections,andallproceedswouldgoexclusivelytothepolice.11
Ofcourse,noteverystatemakesforfeitureeasyand
rewarding.Butthroughfederalequitablesharing,stateandlocallawenforcementcancircumventstringentstatelawstosecureforfeituremoniesanyway.
GRADING THE STATES
A2010report,Policing for Prot: e Abuse of CivilAsset Forfeiture,12gradedstatelawsaccordingtohowwelltheyrespectpropertyrights.Lawsthatsethighstandardsforforfeitureandreturnsmallsharesornoshareofforfeitureproceedstolawenforcementearnedhighmarks.
Buttheselawgradestellonlyhalfthestory.AsHolcombandothershaveshown,agenciescananddouseequitablesharingtocircumventgoodlaws.SoPolicing for Protcreatedevasiongrades,essentiallyrankingthestatesaccordingtohowmuchtheyengageinequitablesharing,13andthencombinedlawandevasiongradesintoanalgradeforeachstate. able6ranksstatesaccordingtotheirevasiongrade,andalsonotestheirlawandnalgrades.Lookingatequitablesharingalone,theworststatesareCalifornia,Georgia,NewYork,Ohioandexas,allofwhichreceivedFevasiongrades.Florida,Illinois,Michigan,NorthCarolina,VirginiaandWestVirginiaarenotfarbehind
withevasiongradesofD.Bycontrast,Delaware,Idaho,Maine,NorthDakota,SouthDakotaandWyomingseerelativelylittleequitablesharing. Teevasionandlawgradesaregenerallyconsistentwithresearchndings:Stateswithstricterlawstendtoseemoreequitablesharing.Forexample,onlyeightstatesearnedlawgradesofBorbetter.Fiveofthosestatesearnedaverageorbelow-averageevasiongrades.NorthCarolinaandOhiostandoutasstateswithfairlystronglaws(gradedA-andB+),butverypoorevasiongrades(DandF). CaliforniaandNewYorkalsoshowedsharpdisparitiesbetweenstatelawgradesandequitablesharingactivities.
Table 6: State Forfeiture Grades, ranked by Evasion Grade
EvasionGrade LawGrade FinalGrade
Maine A B+ A-
NorthDakota A B B+
Idaho A D- C
SouthDakota A D- C
Delaware A F C
Wyoming A F C
Vermont B B+ B
Connecticut B C+ C+
Oregon B C C+
Louisiana B D C-
Minnesota B D C
RhodeIsland B D C-
Utah B D- C-
Alaska B F D+
Montana B F D+
SouthCarolina B F D+
Iowa C D- D
Maryland C B C+
Missouri C B C+
Colorado C C+ C
Nebraska C C C
Wisconsin C C C
Indiana C B+ C+
Mississippi C D D+
NewHampshire C D D+
Alabama C D- D
Arizona C D- DArkansas C D- D
Hawaii C D- D
Kansas C D- D
Kentucky C D- D
Nevada C D- D+
NewJersey C D- D
NewMexico C D- D+
Oklahoma C D- D
Pennsylvania C D- D
ennessee C D- D
Washington C D- D
Massachusetts C F DNorthCarolina D A- C+
Florida D D+ D
Illinois D D- D
Michigan D D- D-
Virginia D D- D-
WestVirginia D D- D-
Ohio F B+ C-
California F C+ D
NewYork F C- D
exas F D D-
Georgia F D- D-
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INEQUITABLEJUSTICE
TeDOJsAssetForfeitureFundisthelargestfederalforfeiturefund,14anditsreportingonequitablesharingpaymentsprovidesaconsistentpictureofequitablesharingactivityacrosstimeandacrossstates.However,itisnottheonlysourceforequitablesharingfunding.StateandlocalagenciescanalsosecureequitablesharingrevenuefromtheDepartmentofreasury,otherfederalsources,othernon-federalagenciesandinterestincome.Tus,theDOJdataunderestimatetheextentofequitablesharingactivity.
Foramorecompletepictureofequitablesharingactivity,wemadeFreedomofInformationAct(FOIA)requestsoftheDOJforannualagency-levelequitablesharingreportsfortwosamplestates:MassachusettsandCalifornia.Eachyear,participatingagenciesmustsubmita
CaliforniaearnedaslightlyaboveaveragelawgradeofC+butisthemost-activestateforequitablesharing.NewYorkslawsearnedagradeofC-,poorbutbetterthan35states;thestateearnedanFforevasion. Attheoppositeendofthespectrum,sixstatesearnedgradesofFfortheirlawsalone.Tesearethestateswiththeworstlawsandthereforetheleastincentivetoparticipateinequitablesharing.Andinfact,veofthosestatesearnedaBorbetterevasiongrade,showingrelativelylittleequitablesharing.Massachusetts,theloneexception,receivedaCevasiongrade. AhandfulofstatesIllinois,Michigan,Virginia,
WestVirginia,GeorgiaandFloridahavebothbadstatelawsandconsiderableequitablesharingactivity.
EQUITABLE SHARING ON THE RISE
Stateandlocallawenforcementareusingequitablesharingmorethanever.Te Policing for ProtreportchartsthegrowthofequitablesharingpaymentsfromtheDOJsAssetsForfeitureFundtostateandlocallawenforcement.AsFigure4shows,thesepaymentsdoubledfromabout$200millionin2000to$400millionin2008.
$0
$50,000,000
$100,000,000
$150,000,000
$200,000,000
$250,000,000
$300,000,000
$350,000,000
$400,000,000
$450,000,000
FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008
Figure 4: Equitable Sharing Payments to States from the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund, 2000 to 2008
The Policing or Proftreport charts the growth o equitablesharing payments rom the DOJs Assets Foreiture Fund tostate and local law enorcement. These payments doubledrom about $200 million in 2000 to $400 million in 2008.
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reportinwhichtheyindicatehowmuchequitablesharingfundingtheyreceivedfromallsources,howmuchtheyspentandwhattypesofexpenditurestheymade.TesedataalsoshowequitablesharingontheriseandtheyrevealmorerevenuegeneratedthroughtheprogramthantheDOJdataalone. able4showsthetotalequitablesharingfundsreceivedbylawenforcementagenciesinMassachusettsandCaliforniafortheyearsforwhichwehaveagency-levelreports.15Fromthelowin2002,Massachusettsagencieshaveconsistently,albeitunevenly,takeningreateramountsofequitablesharingfunds,andfundsreceived
morethandoubledfrom2002to2010,asshowninFigure
Table 4: Equitable Sharing Funds Received by Law Enforcement Agencies in Massachusetts and California
Massachusetts California
2001 $5,109,275 NA
2002 $2,272,184 $31,048,184
2003 $3,518,571 $28,061,106
2004 $3,299,339 $34,501,468
2005 $8,023,267 $41,533,361
2006 $3,881,541 $47,774,115
2007 $5,189,510 $57,776,804
2008 $7,009,598 $117,556,365
2009 $5,356,407 $138,346,184
2010 $4,938,971 NA
otal $48,598,663 $496,597,587
AverageperYear $4,859,866 $62,074,698
5.Moreover,thesedatarevealmoreactivitythanDOJpaymentsalone.In2010,forinstance,Massachusettsagenciesreceived$2,375,152inequitablesharingpaymentsfromtheDOJ,16but$4,938,971fromallsources. ForCaliforniaagencies,equitablesharingreceiptshaveconsistentlygrownovertime,withaparticularlylargejumpbetween2007and2008,asshowninFigure6.From2002to2009,equitablesharingreceiptsmorethanquadrupledforCaliforniaagencies.AndaswithMassachusetts,datafromtheagency-levelreportsrevealmoreequitablesharingactivity:$59,308,447fromtheDOJin2009,17comparedto$138,346,184fromall
sources.
$0
$1,000,000
$2,000,000
$3,000,000
$4,000,000
$5,000,000
$6,000,000
$7,000,000
$8,000,000
$9,000,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Police
Sheriff
Task Force
Prosecutor
Other
Agency Total
Figure 5: Equitable Sharing Funds Received by Agency, 2001-2010, Massachusetts
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$0
$20,000,000
$40,000,000
$60,000,000
$80,000,000
$100,000,000
$120,000,000
$140,000,000
$160,000,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total
Police
Sheriff
Task Force
Prosecutor
Other
Inthe10yearsfrom2001to2010,Massachusettslawenforcementagenciestookin$48.5millionthroughequitablesharing,asshowninable1.Overeightyears,from2002to2009,Californialawenforcementagenciestookin$496.5millionthroughequitablesharing.Massachusettsagencieshavetakeninanaverageof$4,859,866annually,whiletheannualaverageforCaliforniais$62,074,698.
Atrstglance,itappearsthatCaliforniapoliceandprosecutorsengageinagreatdealmoreequitablesharingthantheirMassachusettscounterparts.However,thedierencecouldsimplybeduetoCaliforniasmuchlargerpopulation.Terefore,tocomparethestatesmoredirectly,westandardizedthedatabyconvertingtheequitablesharingnumbersintopercapitareceipts,asshowninable5and
Figure 6: Equitable Sharing Funds Received by Agency, 2002-2009, California
Figure7.Wealsousedonlytheyears2002to2009,since2001and2010werenotavailableforCalifornia.Asthetotalsrowsindicate,CaliforniaalmostalwaystookingreateramountsofequitablesharingpercapitathanMassachusetts,theoneexceptionbeing2005.Inlateryears,CaliforniasnumberssubstantiallyoutpacedthoseinMassachusetts. Tistrendisalsopresentwhencomparingagencytypes,exceptforprosecutors.Inthecaseofthelatter,
MassachusettsprosecutorsconsistentlyreceivedmoreinequitablesharingreceiptspercapitathanthoseinCalifornia. Althoughthiscomparisonlooksatonlytwostates,itisconsistentwithnationalresearchndingssuchasthosebyHolcombandhiscolleagues,asCaliforniaplacesstricterstandardsonforfeitureandreturnsasmallershareofproceedstolawenforcementthanMassachusetts.
Table 5: Equitable Sharing Per Capita 2002-2009, Massachusetts and California
Massachusetts
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Police 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.89 0.50 0.61 0.71 0.55
Sheri 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
askForce 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Prosecutor 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.30 0.06 0.16 0.33 0.23
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 0.35 0.55 0.51 1.25 0.60 0.80 1.08 0.81
California
Police 0.38 0.45 0.46 0.56 0.66 0.69 1.51 2.01
Sheri 0.31 0.2 0.26 0.22 0.27 0.35 0.62 0.62
askForce 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.30 0.19 0.37 0.72 0.62
Prosecutor 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.18
Other 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.24 0.31
Total 0.88 0.79 0.96 1.15 1.31 1.58 3.20 3.74
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CONCLUSION
Neitherthefederalgovernmentnormoststatesoertheircitizensmuchprotectionfromforfeitureabuse.Lowlegalstandardsforlawenforcement,combinedwithplacingtheburdentoprovetheirowninnocenceonpropertyowners,putpeoplecaughtupincivilforfeitureproceedingsataseriousdisadvantage.Tenancialincentivesbuiltintostateandfederallawsaddfueltotherebyencouragingpoliceandprosecutorstopursueproperty,evenattheexpenseofotherlawenforcementpriorities. Tefederalgovernmentsequitablesharingprogram
makesthisbadsituationworse.Itensuresthatevenifstatesraisethebarandlowerincentivesforcivilforfeiture,lawenforcementcancircumventtheselimits.Indeed,researchshowsthisisexactlywhatpoliceandprosecutorsdowhenfacedwithstricterandlessgenerousforfeiture
Figure 7: California Per Capita Equitable Sharing Outpaces Massachusetts
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Massachusetts
California
lawstheyturntothefedsandkeeponpocketingforfeituremoney. Tatiscompellingevidencenotonlyoftheproblemcreatedbyequitablesharing,butalsothatincentivesmattertolawenforcement.Whendecisionsaremadeaboutcivilforfeiture,theeaseoftheprocessandthepossibilityofnancialrewardarekeyfactors.Butallowinglawenforcementtoself-generaterevenueunderminesdemocraticcontrols,distortslawenforcementprioritiesandputsthepropertyofinnocentcitizensliketheCaswellsatrisk.
oprotectinnocentcitizensandensuretheimpartialadministrationofjustice,forfeiturereformisdesperatelyneededatalllevels.Butforstatereformstohavelastingeects,lawenforcementmustnotbeallowedtouseequitablesharingtodisregardstatelaw.
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ENDNOTES
1 SeeCompl.forForfeitureIn Rem,United States v. 434 Main Street,No.09-
11635-RGS(D.Mass.Sept.29,2009).2 Holcomb,J.E.,Kovandzic,.V.,&Williams,M.R.(2011).Civilasset
forfeiture,equitablesharing,andpolicingforprotintheUnitedStates.Journalof Criminal Justice, 39,273-285.
3 Williams,M.R.,Holcomb,J.E.,Kovandzic,.V.,&Bullock,S.(2010).Policingforprot:theabuseofcivilassetforfeiture.Arlington,VA:InstituteforJustice.
4 Dataforables1through3comefromHolcombetal.,2011,andWilliamsetal.,2010.
5 Mass.Ann.Stat.94c47(c)(3).
6 Holcombetal.,2011.TisarticleupdatesanearlieranalysisreportedinWilliams,etal.,2010.
7 Holcombandcolleaguesdrewonanationwidesampleof536lawenforcementagenciesandexaminedequitablesharingpaymentsfrom2000to2004,averagingpaymentsacrosstheve-yearperiodtosmoothoutanyatypicallylargeorsmallannualpayments.Teyalsodividedeachagencysve-yearaveragebythesizeofthepopulationitserves,arrivingatapercapitameasureofequitablesharingpayments,sothatthemeasureisnotskewedbylargeragencies.Forfurtherdetailsonmethods,seeHolcomb,etal.,2011.
8 Foralistofallcontrolvariablesandtheireectsontheanalysis,seeHolcomb,2011.
9 Worrall,J.,&Kovandzic,.(2008).Ispolicingforprot?Answersfromassetforfeiture.Criminology and Public Policy, 7,219-244.
10 Kucher,C.(2005). Asset forfeiture: State restrictions and equitable sharing.MastersTesis,UniversityofNewHampshire,Durham,NH.
11Holcombetal.,2011,p.283.
12Williams,etal.,2010.
13Tisgradewascreatedinamulti-stepprocess.First,athree-yearaverageofequitablesharingwascreatedusingdatafrom2005,2006and2007.Second,theequitablesharingtotalsforeachstatewereadjusted,orstandardized,bydividingeachstatesequitablesharingtotalbyitsaveragerateofdrugarrestsfor2005,2006and2007,takenfromtheFBIsUniformCrimeReport.(Drugarrestratereectsthenumberofdrugarrestsper1,000peopleinthepopulation.)Tird,becausetheadjustedequitablesharingdistribution
wasskewed,thedataweretransformedintonaturallogstonormalizethedistribution.Fourth,theloggeddataweretransformedintoz-scoresandgradesassignedwherez-scoresoflessthan-1.5=A,-1.5to-.5=B;-.5to.5=C;.5to
1.5=D;andgreaterthan1.5=F.
14Eachyearfrom2000to2008,theDOJsforfeiturefundcontainedroughlytwicetheassetsasthereasuryDepartmentsfund.SeeWilliamsetal.,2010,p.32.
15CaliforniaandMassachusettsdatawererequestedfromtheDOJatdierenttimesandfordierentpurposes,resultinginaslightlydierentcoverageof
years.
16U.S.DepartmentofJustice.(2010).Massachusetts.RetrievedJuly1,2011,fromhttp://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/2010ar/states/massachusetts.htm.
17U.S.DepartmentofJustice.(2009).California.RetrievedJuly1,2011,fromhttp://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/2009ar/states/california.htm.
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LISA KNEPPER
LisaKnepperisadirectorofstrategicresearchat
theInstituteforJustice,helpingtomanageandcreatepolicyandsocialscienceresearchonissuescentraltoIJsmissionschoolchoice,privatepropertyrights,economiclibertyandfreespeech. Previously,KnepperservedastheInstitutesDirectorofCommunications,securingnewscoverageinoutletsnationwide,includinge New York Times,e Wall StreetJournal,Newsweek,USA Today,CBSEvening NewsandNationalPublicRadio. BeforejoiningIJ,KnepperworkedatHillandKnowlton,servedasamediarelationsandpromotionsadviserforentertainmentandtechnologycompanies,
andwasaprogramcoordinatorattheInstituteforHumaneStudies.KneppergraduatedfromTeOhioStateUniversity,withadegreeinpoliticalscienceandeconomics.
DICK M. CARPENTER II, PH.D.
DickM.CarpenterIIservesasadirectorofstrategicresearchfortheInstituteforJustice.HeworkswithIJstaandattorneystodene,implementandmanagesocialscienceresearchrelatedtotheInstitutesmission. Asanexperiencedresearcher,Carpenterhaspresentedandpublishedonavarietyoftopicsrangingfromeducationalpolicytothedynamicsofpresidentialelections.Hisworkhasappearedinacademicjournals,suchasRegulation and Governance,Economic DevelopmentQuarterly,Independent Review,Urban Studies,Journal ofSpecial Education,e Forum,Education and Urban Society,Journal of School ChoiceandLeadership,andmagazines,suchasRegulation,Phi Delta Kappanandthe American School
Board Journal.Teresultsofhisresearchhavebeenquotedinnewspapers,includingtheWall Street Journal,Chronicle ofHigher Education,Denver Post,Education WeekandtheRockyMountain News. CarpentersresearchforIJhasresultedinreportssuchasDisclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of CampaignFinance Reform,Designing Cartels: How Industry Insiders CutOut Competition,Victimizing the Vulnerable: e Demographicsof Eminent Domain AbuseandDoomsday No Way: EconomicTrendsand Post-Kelo Eminent Doman Reform. BeforeworkingwithIJ,Carpenterworkedasahighschoolteacher,elementaryschoolprincipal,publicpolicyanalystandprofessorattheUniversityofColorado,
ColoradoSprings.HeholdsaPh.D.fromtheUniversityofColorado.
LARRY SALZMAN
LarrySalzmanisastaattorneywiththeInstituteforJustice.HejoinedtheInstituteinApril2011andlitigatescutting-edgeconstitutionalcasesprotectingindividualrights,includingfreespeech,propertyrights,andeconomicliberties,infederalandstatecourts.HeisoriginallyfromSanDiego. Hiscommitmenttobothentrepreneurshipandlaw
isreectedinhiscareerpriortojoiningIJ.Salzmanco-foundedanecommercecompanywithhisfamilyin2000,whileattendinglawschoolatnight,andreturnedtothebusinessforseveralyearsasCEOuponitssalein2007.Duringtheinterim,hewasanattorneywithPacicLegalFoundation,inSacramento,Calif.,litigatingpropertyrightscasesinfederalandstatecourts,andservedasaclerktoJudgeBohdanA.FuteyontheU.S.CourtofFederalClaims. Salzmanreceivedhislawdegreein2002fromtheUniversityofSanDiego,wherehewasAssistantEditoroftheSan Diego Law Review.HereceivedanundergraduatedegreeinFinancefromArizonaStateUniversityin1993.
AUTHORS
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