injunctions prof cameron stewart. injunctions injunctions are orders made by the courts either...

Injunctions

Prof Cameron Stewart

Injunctions• Injunctions are orders made by the courts either restraining or

requiring performance of a specific act in order to give effect to the legal rights of the applicant. An injunction that prevents a course of action is said to be prohibitive in nature, and this is the traditional essence of injunctive relief - it commands cessation of a wrongful act. Somewhat rarer, yet not too distant from this core principle, are mandatory injunctions that compel some behaviour of the person to whom they are directed. In cases where mandatory injunctions are granted it is clear that the defendant, while not positively engaged in wrongful conduct, has nevertheless, by a failure or omission to act, infringed upon the rights of the applicant. In commanding the doing of an act by such a defendant, the court is in effect commanding the harmful dormancy to cease.

Jurisdiction?

• Exclusive jurisdiction - used solely in support of equitable rights. • Auxiliary jurisdiction - relief when those of the common law

proved to be inadequate. • Statutory reform - Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (UK) which

provided a distinct jurisdiction from both the exclusive and auxiliary operations of equity.

Narrower than the exclusive jurisdiction in that it did not enable the common law courts to issue injunctions in respect of equitable rights, nor did it enable the making of quia timet injunctions. At the same time, it was seen as wider than equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction as there was no requirement of either a proprietary interest or inadequacy of damages

Judicature Act

Judicature Act 1873 (UK) - Section 25(8) stipulated as follows:

[A]n injunction may be granted or a receiver appointed by

an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient that such order should be made; and any such order may be made either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.

Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 66;

Exclusive

• Injunctions granted in aid of equitable rights (such as the equitable obligation of confidence or a beneficiary’s rights under a trust) are said to be awarded in equity’s exclusive jurisdiction.

Auxiliary

• Injunctions granted in aid of common law rights (such as the restraint of breaches of contract or tortious wrongs) or statutory rights are said to be awarded in equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction. The distinction is important because with injunctions in the auxiliary jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first establish that damages at common law are an inadequate remedy, and secondly, it may be the case in some situations that he or she must also show that the right being protected is a proprietary right.

Why does it matter?

• The distinction is important because with injunctions in the auxiliary jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first establish that damages at common law are an inadequate remedy, and secondly, it may be the case in some situations that he or she must also show that the right being protected is a proprietary right.

• However, in the exclusive jurisdiction, neither the inadequacy of damages nor the proprietary in nature of the plaintiff’s right are relevant in assessing whether the injunction should be granted.

Injunctions Protect Rights

Injunctive relief will not be ordered if there has been no violation of the plaintiff’s rights: North London Railway Co v Great Northern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 30

Inadequacy of damages• Graham v K D Morris & Sons Pty Ltd [1974] Qd R 1, Morris was building a

significant construction on adjoining land owned by Graham. A crane on the building site was left to rotate freely and, when the wind blew in a certain direction, its jib encroached over Graham’s property and was suspended over the roof of her house. Campbell J held that the invasion of Graham’s airspace constituted a trespass and that damages at common law were inadequate because the danger of the jib suspended over Graham’s house were very real and would last for 18 months until the construction work was completed. The trespass would also negatively impact on the sale price Graham could get if she wished to sell her home during that time. Morris argued that the grant of the injunction would constitute hardship because it would have to dismantle the crane at considerable expense. His Honour rejected this defence on the basis that the positioning of the crane stemmed from Morris’s negligence and its cavalier attitude towards the building project.

The requirement of a proprietary right

In Attorney-General v Sheffield Gas Consumers Co (1853) 43 ER 119, at 125, Turner LJ, in refusing to grant an injunction, said that ‘[i]t is on the ground of injury to property that the injunction of this court must rest’.

However, in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380, at 395; 162 ALR 294, at 304, the High Court held that there is no general requirement that the right must be proprietary before injunctive relief can be granted.

The requirement of a proprietary right

Most commentators now agree that the availability of injunctive relief in equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction is not limited to the protection of legal rights that are proprietary in nature. A more accurate statement as to the relevance of the proprietary nature of the right in question is given by Spry when he writes as follows:

[A]lthough it is incorrect to assert that an injunction can be obtained only in

aid of property or in aid of a proprietary right, there are cases where in the particular circumstances the only possible reason for equitable intervention happens to lie in the support of what may be described as a proprietary right.

I C F Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies, 7th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2007, p 340.

Types of Injunctions

• Prohibitive or mandatory?• Interlocutory or perpetual injunctions?

Mandatory injunctions• Two kinds• The first is the mandatory restorative injunction which compels the

defendant to repair the consequences of some wrongful act that he or she has committed. In order to obtain such an injunction, the plaintiff must show that, where the wrongful act had not occurred but was merely threatened, he or she would have obtained a prohibitory injunction in relation to the apprehended wrong. For example, in a situation where a house has been built in contravention of statutory planning approval requirements, a mandatory restorative injunction will be granted requiring the defendant to demolish it, provided that, before the house was built, the plaintiff can establish that he or she would have obtained a prohibitory injunction preventing the defendant from building it.

Mandatory restorative injunctions

• Jessica Estates Pty Ltd v Lennard [2007] NSWSC 1434, at [22], in the context of granting a mandatory restorative injunction where the defendant had almost completed the construction of a house in violation of a restrictive covenant, Brereton J said:

• Factors relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion in this respect include the defendant’s knowledge of the wrongful nature of his or her acts; whether the defendant has hastened the completion of the wrongful acts so as to steal a march on the Court (or the plaintiff); the hardship which would be caused to the plaintiff by the refusal of an injunction; the hardship which would be caused to the defendant by the grant of an injunction; and the extent to which the injuries suffered by the plaintiff are compensable by an award for damages.

• Appeal successful in Lennard v Jessica Estates Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 121, but test a relevant statement of the law

Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652

• Morris carried on a business as a market gardener. • On adjoining land Redland Bricks conducted a quarrying

business which caused subsidence to Morris’s land. • As part of his claim against Redland Bricks, Morris

sought a mandatory injunction to have the land restored to its original state.

• The cost of doing so was £30,000, whereas the future damage to Morris, if no injunction was granted, amounted to £1500.

• The House of Lords declined to grant the injunction.

Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652

• Lord Upjohn, at AC 665–6; All ER 579–80, observed that in granting mandatory injunctions, each case depended very much on its own circumstances.

• First, it must be shown that there is a ‘very strong probability on the facts that grave damage will accrue to [the plaintiff] in the future’.

• Second, damages at common law have to be inadequate. • Third, the cost to the defendant of preventing future occurrences needs to be

taken into account, so that if he or she has acted ‘wantonly’ or ‘unreasonably’ the injunction can be granted even if the cost of remedial work is out of proportion to the actual gain flowing to the plaintiff from such expenditure being incurred.

• However, if the defendant has acted ‘reasonably’, the cost of complying with the injunction and the hardship it creates for the defendant must be weighed up against the loss suffered by the plaintiff.

• Fourth, the injunction, if granted, must be clearly worded so that ‘the defendant knows exactly in fact what he has to do’

Mandatory enforcing injunctions• The second type of mandatory injunction is the mandatory

enforcing injunction which compels the defendant to do some positive act that he or she has promised to do for valuable consideration. In such cases the court will need to be satisfied that the agreement is specifically enforceable and that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to grant the injunction: Burns Philp Trust Co Pty Ltd v Kwikasair Freightlines Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 492, at 496.

• In Businessworld Computers Pty Ltd v Australasian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 82 ALR 499, at 501, it was observed that courts will be extremely reluctant to grant a mandatory enforcing injunction if the agreement would not also have attracted the remedy of specific performance.

Perpetual injunctions

• Injunctions can also be classified according to the period of time for which the order is to remain in force. A perpetual injunction is the injunction granted after a full hearing of the claim on its merits. Because the merits of the case have been argued, the perpetual injunction is intended to finally settle relations between the parties.

Interlocutory injunctions• An interlocutory injunction is a provisional order made at an earlier stage in

the proceedings before the court has had the opportunity to assess the merits of the application.

• Generally, interlocutory injunctions are expressed to be in force until the trial of the action or further order of the court. The term ‘interim injunction’ is often used interchangeably with interlocutory injunction. However, there is a technical difference between the two, in that an interim injunction is more temporary than an interlocutory injunction, and is usually expressed to remain in force until a specified date prior to the final hearing.

• Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 32 ALR 485, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte interim injunction on 9 November 1980 that remained in force until 11 November 1980. On that date the defendant entered an appearance and the court granted an interlocutory injunction pending a final hearing of the matter.

Interlocutory injunctions• In Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1986] 3

All ER 772, at 780–1, Hoffmann J put is as follows:

• The principal dilemma about the grant of interlocutory injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is that there is by definition a risk that the court may make the ‘wrong’ decision, in the sense of granting an injunction to a party who fails to establish his right at the trial (or would fail if there was a trial) or alternatively, in failing to grant an injunction to a party who succeeds (or would succeed) at trial. A fundamental principle is therefore that the court should take whichever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been ‘wrong’ in the sense I have described.

Interlocutory injunctions

• In general, interlocutory injunctions will only be granted after notice of the application has been given to the defendant, so that the defendant has the opportunity to resist the claim. Thus, the hearing of such application is usually ‘inter partes’. However, in urgent cases, interlocutory or interim injunctions can be granted in the absence of the defendant, or ‘ex parte’, as occurred initially in Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd.

Interlocutory injunctions• In considering whether an interlocutory injunction should be

granted the court must apply the test set out in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618, at 622-3, where the High Court noted that the following two requirements had to be satisfied:

• The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief ... The second inquiry is ... whether the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted.


• The prima facie case requirement was discussed in Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corporation Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 729, at 735-7, where Mahoney JA noted the following points: (i) it did not mean a finding that at trial the plaintiff would win; (ii) the term prima facie is used in the sense of ‘likelihood’, and does not refer to a prediction, but rather to the nature of the plaintiff’s case; (iii) the term ‘prima facie’ may mean something less than ‘more likely than not’, and there is no requirement that the plaintiff must show a ‘better than even’ chance of ultimate success; and (iv) a prima facie case must always be established, irrespective of whether the second test of balance of convenience favours the grant of interlocutory relief.


• In various cases judges use the expression ‘serious question to be tried’ rather than ‘prima facie case’. Thus, in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, at 68; 229 ALR 457, at 466, Gleeson CJ and Crennan J, observed that a plaintiff had to establish ‘that there is a serious question to be tried as to the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief’.

American Cyanamid Co Appellants v. Ethicon Ltd

• American Cynamid sought an in junction to prevent a breach of patent over absorbable sutures

• Trial judge gave injunction; Court of Appeal overturned on the basis that there was no prima facie case

• House of Lords – upheld appeal and granted the injunction


• Lord Diplock - In those cases where the legal rights of the parties depend upon facts that are in dispute between them, the evidence available to the court at the hearing of the application for an interlocutory injunction is incomplete. It is given on affidavit and has not been tested by oral cross-examination. The purpose sought to be achieved by giving to the court discretion to grant such injunctions would be stultified if the discretion were clogged by a technical rule forbidding its exercise if upon that incomplete untested evidence the court evaluated the chances of the plaintiff's ultimate success in the action at 50 per cent. or less, but permitting its exercise if the court evaluated his chances at more than 50 per cent.


• The use of such expressions as 'a probability,' 'a prima facie case,' or 'a strong prima facie case' in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious, in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried. It is no part of the court's function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial.


• In relation to the ‘balance of convenience’ requirement, the court must weigh up the comparative injury that will arise from granting or withholding an injunction pending trial of the action, seeking out the major risk of damage and, in particular, of any irreparable damage. In Cayne v Global Natural Resources plc [1984] 1 All ER 225, at 237, this aspect was referred to as ‘the balance of the risk of doing an injustice’. In assessing the risk of damage, it does not matter that, at the stage of the interlocutory application, the plaintiff has suffered no damage, provided that actual damage will reasonably result if the interlocutory injunction is not granted: Swimsure (Laboratories) Pty Ltd v McDonald [1979] 2 NSWLR 796.

Example

• In Hermescec v Carcagni [2008] NSWSC 183, Hermescec purchased an Italian restaurant in Newcastle – the Benevenuti - from Carcagni. Soon thereafter, Carcagni opened up a competing Italian restaurant – the Grifone - a short distance away from the Benevenuti. Hermescec claimed that this constituted a breach of a covenant in restraint of trade that was agreed to when Carcagni sold his restaurant. He initiated proceedings for an injunction to enforce the restraint. Even though Hermescec established that he had a strong case against Carcagni, the application for an interlocutory injunction failed on the grounds of the balance of convenience. On this issue, Barrett J, at [21]-[23], said

Example• If an interlocutory injunction is granted, Grifone would have to close down pending

the court’s final decision on the entitlement of [Hermescec] to relief by way of permanent injunction or damages or both. That would be a drastic result. If Grifone were able to stay open with an injunction in place, it could only be on the basis that the company of which [Carcagni] is sole shareholder and director was no longer the operator and [Carcagni] himself was no longer the manager. On [Carcagni’s] evidence, such a situation would be impossible to achieve in any real sense, given that Grifone is in substance a one-man business operated by [Carcagni], albeit with the assistance of employees. The practical result of an interlocutory injunction would be suspension of [Carcagni’s] Grifone business … [T]his is a case in which any injunction pending trial would produce the very result to be put in issue at a final hearing. Such an interlocutory injunction would affect rights in a permanent fashion on evidence which may be supplemented and may be found to bear some different complexion at the trial. At this stage, therefore, ‘the balance of the risk of doing injustice’ favours [Carcagni], even though the prospects that he will in due course be subjected to a permanent injunction and also be ordered to pay damages and costs appear, at least at this stage, to be strong.

Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148

• Bond made beer in nonrecyclable containers• Beverage Container Act 1975 (SA) meant that

they couldn’t sell its beer I SA• They alleged a breach of s 92 Australian

Consititution (which they later succeeded in proving)

• They sought an interim injunction to allow them to sell the beer in


• Mason ACJ - I consider that there is a serious question to be tried. And, although the evidence does not give a comprehensive picture of the plaintiffs' trade and the manner in which it is likely to be affected by the new deposit regime, I am inclined to think that the new regime will affect the plaintiffs' interstate trade adversely and cause them loss for which they cannot be compensated adequately


• In the present case the balance of convenience does not favour the grant of an injunction restraining the commencement of prosecutions. Although the plaintiffs' share of the bottled beer market is small it is possible that non-compliance with the statutory requirements during the period which will elapse between now and the determination of validity will present a significant hazard to the environment in South Australia. If an injunction were granted the statutory sanction for the provision of the incentive for consumers, members of the public and commercial organizations to return the plaintiffs' bottles would be significantly reduced. Moreover, the grant of an injunction may also be seen, incorrectly, as constituting some sort of immunity or protection to retailers of the plaintiffs' beer against subsequent prosecution. The injunction sought is not confined to a restraint on enforcement of the Act against the plaintiffs. A further and significant factor is that the defendant, though maintaining the validity of its legislation, has not threatened to launch prosecutions.

Interlocutory mandatory injunctions

• Gummow J in Businessworld Computers Pty Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 82 ALR 499, at 502-503:

• • [M]andatory injunctions generally carry a higher risk of injustice if granted at the

interlocutory stage [because]: they usually go further than the preservation of the status quo by requiring a party to take some new positive step or undo what he has done in the past; an order requiring a party to take positive steps usually causes more waste of time and money if it turns out to have been wrongly granted than an order which merely causes delay by restraining him from doing something which it appears at the trial he was entitled to do; a mandatory order usually gives a party the whole of the relief which he claims in the writ and makes it unlikely that there will be a trial … An order requiring someone to do something is usually perceived as a more intrusive exercise of the coercive power of the state than an order requiring him temporarily to refrain from action. The court is therefore more reluctant to make such an order against a party who has not had the protection of a full hearing at trial.

Interlocutory mandatory injunctions

• For some time it was said that a plaintiff seeking an interlocutory mandatory injunction would need to show that there was a ‘high degree of assurance’ that he or she would succeed at trial: Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham [1971] Ch 340, at 351; [1970] 3 All ER 402, at 412. However, this test has now been rejected.

• Tymbook Pty Ltd v State of Victoria [2006] VSCA 89• Burke v Frasers Lorne Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 988, at [4], Brereton

J said that ‘the same considerations apply to an interlocutory mandatory injunction as to any other interlocutory injunction, although the mandatory nature of the relief sought, and the potential consequences if it later be undone, is often telling on [the issue of] the balance of convenience’.

Interlocutory injunctions in the context of defamation

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill, at CLR 68-9; ALR 466-7, after referring to the basic principles governing the granting of interlocutory injunctions, Gleeson CJ and Crennan J said:

In the context of a defamation case, the application of those organising principles will require particular attention to the considerations which courts have identified as dictating caution. Foremost among those considerations is the public interest in free speech. A further consideration is that, in the defamation context, the outcome of a trial is especially likely to turn upon issues that are, by hypothesis, unresolved. Where one such issue is justification, it is commonly an issue for jury decision. In addition, the plaintiff’s general character may be found to be such that, even if the publication is defamatory, only nominal damages will be awarded.

Undertaking as to damages

• A usual condition of granting an interlocutory injunction is that the plaintiff must give an undertaking as to damages. The undertaking operates as a protection to the defendant should the court later rule that the interlocutory injunction should not have been granted. The undertaking binds the plaintiff to compensate the defendant for any damage suffered by the defendant on account of the granting of the interlocutory injunction. If the plaintiff refuses to give the undertaking, the interlocutory injunction will be refused: First Netcom Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2000) 101 FCR 77

Undertaking as to damages

• Thus, in Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd v Surfers’ Paradise Forests Ltd [1977] Qd R 261, an undertaking given by an insolvent company that was in receivership was taken to be worthless and interlocutory relief was denied. However, the interlocutory injunction will be granted if a satisfactory third person provides the undertaking. It may be the case that the defendant or third party may also have to provide adequate security so as to ensure that the undertaking is not rendered worthless or less valuable by subsequent events leading up to the final hearing of the matter.

QUIA TIMET INJUNCTIONS• Generally, injunctive relief relates to some infringement or

alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s rights. However, inunctions can be granted in relation to circumstances where there has not yet been an infringement of rights. Injunctions granted on the basis that there is a threat that the plaintiff’s rights will be infringed are known as quia timet injunctions. The expression ‘qui timet’ means ‘since he fears’. The essential purpose of a quia timet injunction is to prevent a wrong being committed: Proctor v Bayley (1889) 42 Ch D 390, at 398. Traditionally the quia timet injunction was only available in relation to equitable rights, but is now seemingly available in respect of all matters by virtue of the injunction provisions of legislation implementing the judicature system

QUIA TIMET INJUNCTIONS

• In Redland Bricks v Morris, at AC 665; All ER 579, Lord Upjohn observed that a quia timet injunction arises in the following two types of case: (i) where, as yet, no harm to the defendant has occurred but it is threatened or intended, and (ii) where harm has been done by the earlier actions of the defendant, and the plaintiff has been compensated, but the plaintiff fears that future wrongs may be committed by the defendant

QUIA TIMET INJUNCTIONS

• In assessing whether to grant a quia timet injunction the courts have framed the test for the likelihood of an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights with expressions such as ‘reasonably certain’ in FCA Finance Pty Ltd v Moreton Central Sugar Mill Co Ltd [1975] Qd R 250, at 253, and ‘very strong probability’ in Redland Bricks v Morris, at AC 665; All ER 579. As to the necessary loss or damage that is threatened, it has been said by the courts that it must be ‘grave damage’ in Thynne v Petrie [1975] Qd R 260, at 262, ‘substantial’ in FCA Finance v Moreton Central Sugar Mill, at 253, and ‘very substantial’ in Hooper v Rogers [1975] Ch 43, at 50; [1974] 3 All ER 417, at 421

INJUNCTIONS AND CONTRACTS

• Generally, the equitable enforcement of contractual rights is by means of an order for specific performance which requires the defendant to carry out his or her contractual obligation. This is the order that is usually sought in relation to positive contractual obligations. However, where there is a negative contractual obligation, the injunction is the usual equitable relief that is sought. A negative contractual obligation is one where inactivity on the part of the promisor is the essence of the obligation. Negative contractual obligations can be express or implied. The classical illustration of an enforceable negative contractual obligation is a reasonable restraint of trade.

Injunctions to Enforce Negative Stipulations

• An important illustration of injunctive relief being sought to enforce negative contractual obligations is with restraints of trade in the context of personal service contracts. The typical example of such cases occurs when X, a person with particular skills and talents, promises to provide those skills and talents for the benefit of Y (the positive contractual obligation), but also promises not to provide those skills and talents for the benefit of anybody else (the negative contractual obligation). If X attempts to breach the negative contractual obligation, Y will seek to enforce it by obtaining injunctive relief to prevent X performing those services for some other person. The usual reason that X wants to breach the negative contractual obligation is that he or she no longer wants to perform the positive contractual obligation and wants to offer his or her skills and talents to Z. Y’s motivation for seeking the injunction is that, if X is prevented from offering his or her skills and talents to Z, X will decide to perform his or her positive contractual obligation. Y will rarely seek to obtain an order against X for specific performance of the positive contractual obligation because it will, in most cases, be refused on the basis that contracts for personal services are rarely specifically enforced


• Lumley v Wagner (1852) 42 ER 687. The background to this seminal case was a cut-throat battle between the managers of two London opera houses for the services of Johanna Wagner, a famous opera singer.

• Lumley, the manager of the established Her Majesty’s theatre, was first to contract Wagner for a three-months’ season in 1852.

• Significantly, Wagner was held to have also promised that during that period she was ‘not to use her talents at any other theatre, nor in any concert or reunion, public or private, without the consent of Mr Lumley’.


• Before her contract with Lumley started, Gye, the manager of the recently established Covent Garden opera theatre, negotiated a contract with Wagner for the opera singer to perform at Covent Garden.

• Performance by Wagner of her contract with Gye would have meant breaching the negative contractual obligation in her contract with Lumley. Lumley sought, and obtained, an injunction to prevent her from doing so.

• Lord St Leonards, at 693, observed that the effect of the injunction was only to prevent Wagner from appearing at Covent Garden and that it did not require her to fulfil her obligation to Lumley at Her Majesty’s theatre, something which his Lordship said he could not directly enforce, although he conceded that the injunction could well tempt Wagner to perform her contract at Her Majesty’s theatre.

• She didn’t sing at all which was a disaster for both theatres


Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209, - Warner Bros movie studio obtained an injunction against Bette Davis, precluding the legendary movie star from starring in movies produced by other movie studios for a period of three years. Branson J, at 219-20, conceded that Davis could well be tempted to continue to make movies with Warner Bros, but ruled that this was no grounds for refusing the injunction. A crucial factor in his Honour’s decision was the fact that Davis was an intelligent and capable woman who could readily obtain alternative employment if she resolved not to work for Warner Bros. The fact that this alternative employment would be less financially rewarding than acting was not relevant


In Page One Records Ltd v Britton [1967] 3 All ER 822, members of the pop group ‘The Troggs’ entered into a management and agency agreement with Page One Records for a term of five years and promised not to engage anyone else to be their manager and agent. The Troggs sought to engage another manager and agent. Page One Records sought an injunction to prevent them from doing so. In refusing the application, Stamp J, at 827, after referring to Warner Bros v Nelson, said:

[W]here a contract for personal service contains negative covenants, the enforcement of which will amount either to a decree of specific performance of the positive covenants of the contract or to the giving of a decree under which the defendant must either remain idle or perform those positive covenants, the court will not enforce those negative covenants.


• Stamp J doubted that The Troggs could continue to function without the services of a manager and agent or seek other employment, and that they would need a manager and agent to function successfully as a pop group. According to Stamp J, at 827, this was so because:

• • The Troggs are simple persons, of no business experience, and could not

survive without the services of a manager … I entertain no doubt that they would be compelled, if the injunction were granted, … to continue to employ [Page One Records] as their manager and agent … [I]t would be a bad thing to put pressure on the Troggs to continue to employ as a manager and agent one, who, unlike the plaintiff in those cases [such as Lumley v Wagner and Warner Bros v Nelson] who had merely to pay the defendant money, has duties of a personal and fiduciary nature to perform and in whom the Troggs, for reasons good, bad or indifferent, have lost confidence and who may, for all I know, fail in its duty to them.

Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd (1937) 56 CLR 605

• Cowell had a ticket to the races (a bare licence)• He got removed• Can a licence be revoked without permission?• Can you get an injunction to prevent the revocation?• A bare licence will not ordinarily be specifically

performed• Wood v Leadbitter (1845) 13 M & W 838 suggested

that if the license is under seal that it grants an interest in the land (grants) which equity will protect with specific performance and an injunction


• HC says there is no grant – deed makes no difference to a bare licence – so this is not a basis for an injunction

• Latham CJ - In my opinion, the first ground upon which Hurst's Case was decided (that there was in that case a licence coupled with an interest) cannot be supported.

• Starke J - Again the fallacy is, I think, in the assumption that the ticket issued to the plaintiff conferred on him a right to some ascertainable property in equity: it did not do so in equity any more than at law. The relationship created by the issue of the ticket was merely contractual. It was immaterial whether the ticket was under seal or not, for the licence to hear and see the performance was not coupled with any grant or interest in any ascertainable property, either in equity or at law. Consequently, it should follow that the licence to hear and see the performance was revocable.

• Dixon J - It could not constitute a licence coupled with a grant. For it does not purport to confer any interest in any corporeal thing.


• Second ground – there is an implied contractual term not to revoke which can be protected using spec perf and injunctions

• Latham CJ – In this case the plaintiff relies upon an equitable replication containing an allegation that the defendant for consideration agreed not to revoke the licence to enter and remain upon the racecourse. Whether this replication is good or not depends upon whether such an agreement, if proved, prevents in equity the revocation of the licence in such a sense as to make entirely ineffectual anything purporting to be a revocation of the licence. Except in Hurst's Case[22] there is no authority for the proposition that such a licence cannot be revoked at law in cases where no proprietary interest has been granted. The question is whether there is any principle of equity which prevents the effectual revocation of such a licence even though the revocation be a breach of contract. No authority apart from Hurst's Case has been cited to show that this is a principle of equity. Whether the replication is good or bad depends, not upon rules of pleading, but upon whether the facts alleged constitute a good answer in equity to the plea raised by the defendant that the plaintiff was a trespasser. If his licence was effectually revoked, though wrongfully, he was a trespasser, and the removal of him from the racecourse without the use of undue force did not constitute an assault. The plaintiff can escape from the position of being a trespasser only by showing that the licence was not effectually revoked. The only argument to support this proposition is to be found in the contention that the defendant cannot be heard to rely upon his own wrongful act in revoking the licence which he had agreed not to revoke. If the principle to be applied is a principle that the defendant cannot rely upon his own breach of contract, then that principle would surely have been mentioned in the reports of decided cases. No reference, however, has been made to any cases decided upon the basis of this principle.


• McTiernan J - The substance of the agreement pleaded is that the respondent for valuable consideration permitted the appellant to go upon its racecourse to see all the races to be run at the meeting and to remain there for that purpose until the conclusion of the meeting. That agreement is not of the class which equity will enforce. The stipulation which is in the negative form expressed substantially the same obligation and does not give the appellant any equity to the performance of the promise in specie. In my opinion the contract pleaded created no equity in the appellant which enabled him to say that, in the contemplation of a court of equity, he would not be a trespasser although the respondent assumed to revoke his licence to go on the land and see all the races


• Starke J – maybe - The plaintiff had a licence given for value, coupled with an agreement not to revoke it. That was an enforceable right, and it was a breach of contract to revoke the licence. The replication in the present case expressly alleges that for a certain consideration the defendant "promised the plaintiff that it would not during the period of the race meeting and before the conclusion thereof revoke the said licence." On demurrer, that allegation must be accepted as a fact, however improbable it may be as a matter of proof. It is, of course, true that a court of equity had jurisdiction to restrain the violation of stipulations in contracts. Normally, it so restrained the breach of purely negative stipulations, but exercised a wide discretion in the case of affirmative stipulations (Doherty v. Allman[68]). But rights in property and contractual stipulations must not be confused. In Hurst's Case the plaintiff did not establish any right at law or in equity in any ascertainable property, but at best the breach of a contractual obligation. Assuming that a court of equity had jurisdiction to restrain and would by injunction have restrained such a breach—and cases may be put even of rights "to hear and see performances," for instance, a contract for a box or a seat during a season of opera, in which equity might so act—still, the contract would not create a licence coupled with a grant or interest in any ascertainable property, which is the relevant consideration. The question is not whether a court of equity would grant an injunction for a breach of the contract, but whether an action of trespass is maintainable.


• Dixon J – maybe - Is there a liability in equity? Does any equity arise out of the plaintiff's situation entitling him to relief against the consequences of the defendant's reliance upon its legal rights? Would the Court of Chancery have granted an unconditional injunction restraining the defendant from justifying the assault complained of in the plaintiff's action on the ground that he was a trespasser? If so, in New South Wales the justification pleaded by the defendant is well answered by a replication on equitable grounds setting forth the facts which would entitle the plaintiff to such an injunction. Under the Judicature system the justification would be well answered by a reply setting out facts which formerly would have entitled the plaintiff to an injunction restraining the defendant from relying at law on such a justification, even if the injunction would have been conditional and not absolute.

• But I am unable to believe that any equity exists as a result of which the plaintiff could meet the defendant's justification. This opinion I base upon the substantial ground that a patron of a public amusement who pays for admission obtains by the contract so formed and by acting on the licence it imports no equity against the subsequent revocation of the licence and the exercise by the proprietor of his common law right of expelling the patron. The rights conferred upon the plaintiff by the contract possess none of the characteristics which bring legal rights within the protection of equitable remedies, and the position of the plaintiff at law gives him no title under any recognizable equitable principle to relief against the exercise by the defendant of his legal rights. No right of a proprietary nature is given. The contract is not of a kind which courts of equity have ever enforced specifically. It is not an attempt to confer a right by parol agreement which at law might have been effectually granted by a deed. There is no clear negative stipulation the breach of which would be restrained by injunction.

Curro v Beyond Productions Pty Ltd (1993) 30 NSWLR 337

• Tracey Curro was prevented from taking up a position with the 60 Minutes program on the Nine Network, while she was still contracted to work for the Beyond 2000 program on the Seven Network.

• The Court of Appeal, at 348, viewed Curro’s conduct in signing a contract to work on the 60 Minutes program as a ‘flagrant and opportunistic’ breach of her contract with Beyond Productions, and held that the injunction would not force her to choose between performing her contract with Beyond Productions or remaining idle.

Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd v Williams [2008] NSWSC 822

• Sonny Bill left the Bulldogs and went to play for Toulon in Union

• Interlocutory Injunction sought• Serious Question> yes contract was still on foot and

it was a negative stipulation• Irreparable harm> no replacement could match his

star power• Balance of convenience> overseas? House in Sydney• Williams settled the case

Injunctions to enforce statutory rights

• Where there has been a breach of statute, there are a number of possibilities in so far as obtaining an injunction is concerned. First, the legislation may expressly or impliedly exclude any remedy other than those which it expressly provides for, thereby excluding the remedy of an injunction: Ramsay v Aberfoyle Manufacturing Company (Australia) Pty Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 230, at 239-40, 255-6.


• A second possibility is that the statute directly confers upon a person or category of persons the right of enforcement. This often occurs in the context of local government legislation. Thus, in Cooney v Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council, the local council was authorised by s 587 of the then Local Government Act in New South Wales to seek injunctive relief to restrain the defendant from using premises for the purposes of a trade or business contrary to the provisions of a residential proclamation


• The third possibility is that, if no private right is infringed by a breach of statute, a person will be able to seek injunctive relief if he or she can bring themselves within the principles of Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109

• In exercising its discretion to grant relief, a court will grant an injunction only if the breach of statute also amounts to an infringement of public rights: Ramsay v Aberfoyle Manufacturing Company (Australia), at 239. Repeated infringements of the statute may constitute an infringement of public rights. In Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers , at AC 481; All ER at 83, Lord Wilberforce stated that the granting of relief in such cases was ‘an exceptional power confined … to cases where an offence is frequently repeated in disregard of a, usually, inadequate penalty or to cases of emergency’. In Newport Borough Council v Khan [1990] 1 WLR 1185, at 1193, Beldam LJ observed that the discretion to grant the injunction is not based upon the defendant’s deliberate and flagrant flouting of the law. Rather, the court needs to draw the inference that the defendant’s unlawful acts will continue unless and until effectively restrained by the law and that nothing short of an injunction will suffice to so restrain the defendant

Mareva orders

• In Fourie v Le Roux [2007] 1 All ER 1087, at 1090, Lord Bingham of Cornhill described the purpose of Mareva orders as follows:

• • Mareva (or freezing) injunctions were from the beginning, and

continue to be, granted for an important but limited purpose: to prevent a defendant dissipating his assets with the intention or effect of frustrating enforcement of a prospective judgment. They are not a proprietary remedy. They are not granted to give a claimant advance security for his claim, although they may have that effect. They are not an end in themselves. They are a supplementary remedy, granted to protect the efficacy of court proceedings, domestic or foreign.

Mareva orders• The Mareva order was initially known as a Mareva injunction.

However, in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380, at 395-6, 401; 162 ALR 294, at 304, 308, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ pointed out that the word ‘injunction’ was inappropriate and should be replaced with the word ‘order’ on the basis that the doctrinal basis of an injunction differs from that of the Mareva order. The difference stems from the fact that an injunction protects a claimant’s legal or equitable rights whereas the purpose of a Mareva order is to prevent the frustration of the court process: RFD Ltd v Harris [2008] WASCA 87, at [37]. In Cardile v LED Builders, at CLR 412; ALR 318, Kirby J preferred the term ‘asset preservation order’. In England a Mareva order is generally now referred to as a ‘freezing order’

Jurisdiction• The most controversial issue surrounding the Mareva order when it first

appeared was the question of the jurisdiction of the court to make such an order. The Mareva order’s effect was to prevent an alleged debtor from freely dealing with his or her assets. However, established authority had long ago declared that a person ‘cannot get an injunction to restrain a man who is alleged to be a debtor from parting with his property’: Lister v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1, at 14. Initially the English courts asserted that the then successor provision to s 25(8) of the Judicature Act 1873 granted them jurisdiction to make Mareva orders. Section 25(8) and its equivalent provisions in Australian jurisdictions enable the court to grant interlocutory injunctions in any cases where it is just and convenient to do so

• Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 66

Requirements for obtaining a Mareva Order

• In Glenwood Management Group Pty Ltd v Mayo (1991) 2 VR 49, at 49-54, Young CJ indicated that there are three basic requirements to be satisfied before a court will grant a Mareva order. They are: (i) that the plaintiff a good arguable case; (ii) that there is a risk of dissipation or secretion of assets so as to render any judgment which the plaintiff may obtain nugatory; and (iii) that the balance of convenience favours the grant of a Mareva order. His Honour, at 54-5, also observed that ‘the three elements overlap and that the granting of a Mareva [order] is always a matter of discretion’. For example, ‘as the strength of the arguable case diminishes so the balance of convenience moves in favour of the defendants and vice versa’.

A risk of dissipation of assets

• The risk that the defendant will dissipate assets before judgment refers to the underlying basis of the Mareva order and has been described as ‘the heart and core’ of the Mareva order: Barclay-Johnson v Yuill [1980] 3 All ER 190, at 194. There must be a real danger that the defendant will default if judgment is obtained against him or her

The plaintiff’s cause of action• A Mareva order can only be obtained if the plaintiff has a cause of action

that is justiciable within the jurisdiction. If the Mareva order is not ancillary to some such pre-existing cause of action it will not be granted. In Siskina v Distos Compania Naviera SA [1979] AC 210, at 256; [1977] 3 All ER 803, at 824, Lord Diplock said:

• • A right to obtain [a Mareva order] is not a cause of action. It cannot stand

on its own. It is dependent upon there being a pre-existing cause of action against the defendant arising out of an invasion, actual or threatened by him, of a legal or equitable right of the plaintiff for the enforcement of which the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court. The right to obtain [a Mareva order] is merely ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of action. It is granted to preserve the status quo pending the ascertainment by the court of the rights of the parties.

Balance of convenience• In exercising its discretion whether or not to grant a Mareva order the court weighs up

the strength of the plaintiff’s cause of action and the risk that the defendant will dissipate his or her assets against various discretionary factors such as delay and whether there has been a full and frank disclosure by the plaintiff. In Cardile v LED Builders, at CLR 380; ALR 311, the High Court said:

• • Discretionary considerations generally also should carefully be weighed before an order

is made. Has the applicant proceeded diligently and expeditiously? Has a money judgment been recovered in the proceedings? Are proceedings (for example civil conspiracy proceedings) available against the third party? Why, if some proceedings are available, have they not been taken? Why, if proceedings are available against the third party and have not been taken and the court is still minded to make a Mareva order, should not the grant of the relief be conditioned upon an undertaking by the applicant to commence, and ensure so far as is possible the expedition of, such proceedings? It is difficult to conceive of cases where such an undertaking would not be required. Questions of this kind may be just as relevant to the decision to grant Mareva relief as they are to a decision to dissolve it. These are matters to which courts should be alive.

Anton Pillar Orders• The Anton Piller order derives its name from the case of Anton

Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Lt• An Anton Piller order is similar to a Mareva order in that it seeks to

preserve property and prevent the defendant frustrating the administration of justice. But, rather than ensuring that the judgment debt will ultimately be met by the defendant, it aims to gather and protect crucial evidence to the plaintiff’s case, which may be yet to commence. The Anton Piller order enables this by ordering the defendant to allow the plaintiff access to the defendant’s premises so that the plaintiff may inspect, copy and collect material which is necessary for it to successfully bring its case but which it fears will be destroyed: Long v Specifier Publications Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 545, at 547 d [1976] 1 Ch 55

Jurisdiction

• In Simsek v Macphee (1982) 148 CLR 636, at 640-1; 40 ALR 61, at 65, Stephen J, in a single instance decision in the High Court, stated that the power of the court to grant an Anton Piller order stemmed form the court’s inherent jurisdiction. In other cases it has been said that the jurisdiction rests either on the inherent jurisdiction of the court or the statutory conferral of powers to aid the operation of the courts, such as s 23 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth): Microsoft Corp v Goodview Electronics Pty Ltd (1999) 46 IPR 159. In all Australian jurisdictions the court rules now explicitly confer power upon the court to grant Anton Piller orders

Requirements for an Anton Piller Order

• In Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd, at Ch 62; All ER 784, Ormrod LJ set out the essential elements of obtaining this ex parte relief as follows:

• • First, there must be an extremely strong prima facie case.

Secondly, the damage, potential or actual, must be very serious for the applicant. Thirdly, there must be clear evidence that the defendants have in their possession incriminating documents or things, and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy such material before any application inter partes can be made

Requirements for an Anton Piller Order

• The ‘clear evidence’ of both possession and risk of destruction required under the third element is certainly the greatest challenge to the plaintiff. Despite an early generosity in granting Anton Piller orders by the courts, it is apparent that more is needed these days than a mere suspicion that the defendant will shred the evidence. An Anton Piller order is not an investigatory order: Microsoft Corp v Goodview Electronics Pty Ltd (1999) 46 IPR 159, at 164; Hytrac Conveyors v Conveyors International Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 415, at 418

The rights of the defendant• A defendant who is confronted on his or her doorstep by a party of

persons wishing to execute an Anton Piller order faces a fairly onerous task in resisting them. Refusal to comply with the court’s order is, of course, contempt and this will be found even when the defendant has refused to comply in order to launch an ultimately ill-fated application to have the order dissolved. The order may be challenged on the ground that any of the requirements the plaintiff was supposed to meet - including the manner of the order’s execution - have not been properly addressed. Given the high importance which the court places upon a plaintiff in respect of meeting these requirements prior to an order being granted, it is extremely unlikely that such an order will be set aside upon application by the defendant

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