Informing the Next Generation Air Force

Information Age Warfare

Industrial Age Information Age

• Mechanised elements (aircraft, ships,

tanks, etc)

• Segregated Air, Land and Maritime

warfare domains

• Independent governance structures

• Individual weapon systems

• Communications systems treated as a

support function to facilitate C2 and

situational awareness

• Reactive analysis

• Distributed, self-forming, self-healing,

resistant to attack, all domain

combat/battlespace cloud

• System of systems enterprise

integrated through domain and

mission-agnostic information links

• Information superiority and control of

the EM spectrum acts as a conventional

deterrence

• Advanced networking and computing

capabilities, utilising plug & play

systems

• Information is a combat mission

• Predictive analysis

• Unique CONOPs for each platform

• Disparate and disconnected systems

that pass as ‘Joint’

• Individually networked platforms,

eg L-16, L-11, IFDL, MADL

• Stove-piped Acquisition process

• Equipment-centric budgeting, focused

on platforms, sensors and weapons

Warfare Evolution

Service aligned,

platform-centric construct

Network-Centric Age

Loosely federated, Joint &

Combined construct

Highly Integrated, interconnected

enterprise that collaboratively

leverages broad information

exchange through

cross-domain synergy

Contemporary Operating Environment: Network-Centric Age

Key Attributes of a Future Air Force Capability

• Information-driven air and space operating

environment

• Rapid transfer and exploitation of data and

information to enable timely decision-making

• Delivery of Joint and Coalition effects at range

across a broad spectrum of air and space

operations

• Persistent strategic effect

• Adoption of Whole Force principles to exploit

advances in technology, niche skills, education and

training opportunities

Future As-is DLOD

Training

Equipment

Personnel

Infrastructure

Doctrine &

Concepts

Organisation

Information

Logistics

Interoperability

Operating Model

• The military cannot ‘train as they expect to fight’ in the information age

• Live and synthetic training is largely piecemeal using stand-alone synthetic systems

• Marginal and incremental gains only are made to Capability by limiting advances in

information technology to augmenting or accessorising current organisation, processes

and equipment

• Reducing number of uniformed personnel without compensating processes or systems in

place to ameliorate workload

• Attrition and lengthy training pipelines are adversely affecting specialised resources

• Information secure facilities isolated from everyday working environments

• Lack of investment in infrastructure ‘as-is’ upkeep

• Intelligence capability is built around the fusion of largely secret intelligence, augmented

loosely by open-source material

• Doctrine and Concepts that do not reflect information-age warfare

• Large deployed footprint required to support traditional HQ structure

• Ability to Collect is overmatching ability to Process and Disseminate

• ISTAR outputs/outcomes are not specified, measured or reported

• Focus on requirements is on network requirement rather that the data or information

requirement

• Fragmented and stove-piped logistics based around platforms, organisations, contracts

and forward/depth

• Support solutions for legacy aircraft are not optimised for high demand requirement (eg

as Collectors)

• Proliferation of stand-alone, non-interoperable systems/capabilities

• Lack of meaningful mechanisms to ensure that critical enablers are available

• No focus for pan-DLOD capability management

• Mission rehearsal through simulation using operational equipment linked to real-world

data

• Ability to ‘train as you fight’ within an operationally representative environment on a daily

basis through the employment of advanced synthetics

• All platforms combat-cloud capable

• All (Air) platforms capable of Collect

• Intellectual edge maintained through investment in education and training focused on

growing innovative leaders and followers able to exploit information-age technology and

operate in the Future Operating Environment

• A Workforce Mix enabled by the Whole Force Concept that provides an optimum, resilient,

agile workforce that is capable of meeting changing demands and an evolving threat

• Mechanisms in place that consider, predict and enact infrastructure measures based on

the needs of the Whole Force

• Intelligence capability built around open-source managed by Big-Data analytics and

augmented by classified intelligence

• Doctrine and Concepts that reflect information-age warfare and enable the direction of a

distributed system

• Greater use of reach-back through greatly improved connectivity

• Smaller deployed support footprint

• Single, clear view of the Defence information environment with requirements driven by

information/data need rather than network

• Real time exploitation of data and information utilising search and retrieve from Big Data

capability

• Routine exploitation of Social Media to influence through shaping opinion and understanding

• Automatic registration and tracking of consumption to predict and move materiel to the

point of need

• Full connectivity to contractors

• An integrated battlespace through an airborne gateway that receives, bridges and

distributes communication services between users, offering interoperability between

dissimilar networks, reach-back, range extension and BLOS

• Open and modular architectures are the norm with exceptions only where necessary

• Inter-agency interoperability is commonplace

• Mechanisms in place to manage interdependencies across Commands

• Clear lines of responsibility and accountability for pan-DLOD capability management,

supported by robust C2

DLOD Framework Analysis

Provenance evidenced by Air Command-commissioned Niteworks studies and Industry engagement

DLOD Framework Analysis

Change Description DLOD

Training

Equipment

Personnel

Infrastructure

Doctrine &

Concepts

Organisation

Information

Logistics

Interoperability

Operating Model

• Connect training (individual, collective, mission rehearsal) to combat /battlespace cloud, using real-world data where appropriate to enhance the learning

experience

• Ensure resilience through retaining an ability to operate in reversionary modes in a network degraded environment

• In parallel with the cultural revolution necessary to inculcate an information-led approach to Defence capability, continue the evolutionary path of enhancing

capability through the acquisition of extant and emerging technological architecture

• Create a compelling Personnel offer with tailored career paths to enhance recruitment and improve retention

• Recruit innovative and creative thinkers, including from outside the traditional background and age range

• Broaden the network of Industry partnerships

• Upgrade 1st Generation infrastructure to enable a 4th Gen+ network

• Improved ability to reach-back will increase requirement for home-based infrastructure

• Although largely enabled by Air and Space domains, the combat/battlespace cloud is a Joint user capability and must be developed as such

• To maintain political relevance and interest ensure that, by informing the future Air Force Vision, the aspirations remain affordable and achievable

• Adopt a Whole Force approach, to include Industry secondments and Reservist schemes, to grow and maintain a cadre of Suitably Qualified and

Experienced Personnel (SQEP)

• Flatten organisational structures to improve agility and reduce decision-making processes

• Define an Information Sponsor for Defence

• Space and cyber capabilities are integral to successful future operations, offering national resilience and redundancy

• Defensive cyber is essential to support digital trust and information assurance

• Exploit best practice from extant and emerging commercial models

• Reduced scale Defence capability demands greater cost-effectiveness, which is best achieved through consideration of improved interoperability early in the

acquisition cycle

• Top-down cultural revolution required to draw the MOD away from focussing on equipment capability and towards information-driven capability

• Agile acquisition, to include commercial engagement from the outset

• Partners Across Government (PAG) approach to relationships

Provenance evidenced by Air Command-commissioned Niteworks studies and Industry engagement

Airborne Communications Node (ACN) Network: Stage 1 UK MOB Deployed Operations A2AD

Permissive Airspace EW Threat GBAD

Air C2 / DCA / ISR Air C2 / SEAD / ISR

OCA / Deep

Strike / ISR

F-35 with MADL

secure TDL

Minimal

transmission to

maintain LO

• Tactical & Operational Air C2

• ISR Reach-back

• Mission Data Reach-back

• Global Eng & Logs Support

Multiple ACNs to optimise battlespace coverage

DOB

NASOC

ACN

ACN

ACN

ACN

BLOS Reach-back

Typhoon with L-16,

V/UHF Voice, possibly

SATCOM

SPEAR weapons

for tactical stand-

off Link-Equipped

Platforms

Airborne Communications Node (ACN) Network: Stage 2 UK MOB Deployed Operations A2AD

Permissive Airspace EW Threat GBAD

Air C2 / DCA / ISR Air C2 / SEAD / ISR OCA / Deep

Strike / ISR

F-35 with MADL

secure TDL

Minimal

transmission to

maintain LO

• Tactical & Operational Air C2

• ISR Reach-back

• Mission Data Reach-back

• Global Eng & Logs Support

All Platforms providing ACNs to optimise battlespace coverage

NASOC

ACN

BLOS Reach-back

Typhoon with L-16,

V/UHF Voice, possibly

SATCOM

SPEAR weapons

for tactical stand-

off

DOB

CONUS

A more developed scenario might see all platforms fitted with ACNs or coherent integrated communications solutions which would offer

a more meshed network for greater resilience across all environments

Air Operational Battlespace

UK MOB Deployed Operations A2AD

A more developed scenario might see all platforms fitted with ACNs or coherent integrated communications solutions which would offer

a more meshed network for greater resilience across all environments

Permissive Airspace

(with exception of Cyber threat)

CEMA

Contested CEMA &

GBAD

Threat

CONUS

UK

• Airborne Communications Node • Modular payloads – plug & play

• Minimise platform integration

• Minimise airworthiness challenges

• Absorb fast commercial technology change

• Network Air’s operational battlespace

• Mitigate contested EW spectrum for A2AD

• Every platform a ‘node in the Network’

• Self-forming, self healing

Airborne Communications Node (ACN) Network: Stage 2

Information Dominated Battlespace: Air

Use Case 1: Operating in a Contested Environment

Use Case 2: Homeland Defence - Maritime