information warfare in support of_special_ops, (psychological warfare, electronic warfare etc) via...

7/31/2019 Information Warfare in Support Of_Special_Ops, (Psychological Warfare, Electronic Warfare etc) via Iwar.org.Uk

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45January -February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW

THE INCREASED operational tempo of spe-cial operations forces (SOF) since the eventsof 11 September 2001 and the changing role of theU.S. Special Operations Command have increasedthe need for improved, comprehensive information

operations (IO) support to special operations (SO).Properly coordinated and employed, information op-erations can conserve limited resources, reduce op-erational risk, and significantly enhance SO missionaccomplishment.

Although SOF units have employed informationoperations with notable success, particularly in Af-ghanistan and Iraq, information operations still lackbroad acceptance and integration into SO staff or-ganization, planning, and mission execution, particu-larly at the tactical level. To enhance effective IOsupport to SOF, the SO community must clarify or-ganizational requirements and responsibilities; de-

velop standing IO planning capabilities and manninglevels; and institutionalize the resulting IO processacross operational headquarters (HQ).

On 30 October 2003, Secretary of DefenseDonald H. Rumsfeld signed the U.S. Departmentof Defense Information Operations Roadmap,Which defines IO as the integrated employment ofthe core capabilities of electronic warfare [EW],computer network operations [CNO], psychologicaloperations [PSYOP], military deception, and opera-tions security [OPSEC], with specified supporting andrelated capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, orusurp adversarial human and automated decision-

making while protecting our own.

1

The Roadmapidentifies physical security, information assurance,counterintelligence (CI), and physical attack as IOsupporting capabilities and recognizes the key rolethat IO-related capabilities of public affairs and civil-military operations (CMO) play.

The Roadmap also lists the following integratedIO functions that are of overriding importance:

Deter, discourage, dissuade, and direct an ad-versary, thereby disrupting his unity of command andpurpose while preserving our own.

Protect our plans and misdirect the adversarysplans, allowing our forces to mass effects to maxi-mum advantage while the adversary expends his re-sources to little effect.

Control the adversarys communications andnetworks while protecting ours and crippling his abil-

ity to direct an organized defense while preservingeffective command and control (C2) of our forces.

Support to SO MissionsWhen properly integrated, IO can facilitate and

enhance special operations across the operationalspectrum. At the strategic level, IO support to spe-cial operations can include such actions as mission-focused support from other government agencies,reinforcing policy statements, related elements ofregional security and cooperation programs, and IOsupport from coalition partners. The joint special op-erations task force (JSOTF) can also benefit from

the theater or higher joint task force (JTF) IO cam-paign and the secondary effects of other coalitionoperations on enemy forces and civilians in the jointSO area. These actions significantly shape the SOFoperational environment and, properly leveraged, canhelp accomplish the commanders objectives.

Surprisingly, many SO planners fail to realize thatinformation operations can also significantly enhanceSOF mission accomplishment through focused, co-ordinated tactical activities. For example, using a di-rect-action mission framework, unit planners employ

Information OperationsinSupport of

Special OperationsLieutenant Colonel Bradley Bloom, U.S. ArmyInformations Operations Officer, Special Operations Command

Joint Forces Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

We cannot meet the challenges of todaysoperating environment by engaging in ongoingacademic debates on the nature of information

operations or by maintaining ad-hoc second-tier

staff elements. . . . Establishing and filling coreIO billets in peacetime enhances the qualityand completeness of planning and also builds

key relationships that will enhanceperformance in wartime.


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46 January -February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW

OPSEC, deception, and information assurance toprotect the purpose, scope, timing, and location ofthe operation, while PSYOP conditions the adver-sary, weakening his morale and promoting his beliefin the inevitability of defeat. During actions on theobjective, EW and CNO elements isolate enemycommand, control, communications, computer, andintelligence (C4I) systems to prevent warnings orcalls for reinforcements, while tactical PSYOP de-ters local civilian interference and tactical deceptionsmisdirect the adversarys awareness or response.Following the operation, PSYOP, civil affairs, andthe public affairs office exploit the missions successto increase popular support for U.S. objectives andto reduce the adversarys freedom of operation.

To further this level of integration, commandersshould include IO tasks on the tactical unit synchro-nization matrix with the same level of specificity,command emphasis, and measures of effectivenessas kinetic and maneuver tasks. This requires a dedi-cated IO planning element with requisite skills aswell as the tools and processes for broader collabo-rative integration with other headquarters and sup-porting organizations.

Because many strategic- and theater-level IOplanners lack SOF-specific experience and focus,

and tactical-level SO units possess limited planningand execution assets, the operational-level SOF head-quarters emerges as the key node in planning andsynchronizing IO support to special operations. In aregion assigned to a geographic combatant com-mander, the theater special operations command(TSOC) is the likely candidate to integrate informa-tion operations in support of special operations.

IO IntegrationIn peacetime, the TSOC performs SO planning

and normally maintains operational control (OP-CON) of SOF engaged in most theater security andcooperation actions. In a contingency, the TSOCmight serve as the core of a stand-alone JSOTF, aJSOTF under a designated JTF, or as a combinedforces special operations component (CFSOC) withcontrol over multiple subordinate U.S. and coalitionJSOTFs. In an emerging war-on-terrorism role,the TSOC might also serve as a forward C2 nodefor forces OPCON to U.S. Special OperationsCommand.

Whatever function the TSOC fills, permanent-ly adding trained IO planners and standardized IOintegration processes is critical to maximizing IOsupport to special operations. Among the key en-

USArmy

Surprisingly, many SO planners fail to realize that information operations canalso significantly enhance SOF mission accomplishment through focused, coordinated tactical

activities. For example, using a direct-action mission framework, unit planners employ OPSEC,deception, and information assurance to protect the purpose, scope, timing, and location

of the operation, while PSYOP conditions the adversary.

A PSYOP officer passes outmaterial in Gereshk, Afghan-istan, 12 December 2003.


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abling factors are Defining specific operational IO requirements. Obtaining appropriate permanent and aug-

mented manpower to meet those requirements. Developing a staff organization and standing

operating procedures to smoothly coordinate IOsupport.

The TSOCs peacetime operational requirementsare to generate or revise contingency plans(CONPLANs), operations plans, and functionalplans in support of the theater mission; to plan andexecute the SOF portion of the theater security andcooperation plan; and to provide input for higher HQforce-development initiatives. Although TSOC doesnot routinely employ all of the IO primary, support-ing, and related capabilities in peacetime, permanentlyassigned IO expertise in each core capability (at aminimum) is a key factor in adequately addressingthese requirements.

Establishing and filling core IO billets in peace-time enhances the quality and completeness of plan-ning and also builds key relationships that will en-hance performance in wartime. Doing so lessensdependence on an often-delayed joint manning docu-ment (JMD) fill of personnel with varying experi-ence and capabilities. Also, an aggressive peacetime

IO plan, focused on influencing key adversaries, canpositively alter the operating environment and poten-tially reduce the occurrence of crises.

In the event that an outside headquarters, suchas an Army special forces group or naval specialwarfare task group is tasked as a stand-alone JSOTFin theater, these same expanded peacetime TSOCcapabilities would provide a resident, theater-specificIO planning cell to physically (or virtually) augmentthe JSOTF. While U.S. Strategic Commands JointInformation Operations Center has this push ca-pability, there is only one SOF-oriented team avail-able for global support.

One viable method for a TSOC commander tomeet peacetime IO planning requirements is to forma permanent cell of personnel with PSYOP, EW,CNO, and IO-related intelligence expertise under thesupervision of a deputy J3 for information operations(DJ3IO). Although intelligence is not a core IO ca-pability, gathering and analyzing IO-relevant data re-quires specialized training and experience in nodaland human factors analyses. The TSOC IO cell be-comes a critical functional component of the TSOC

joint planning group.PSYOP and civil affairs will require additional

manning beyond the IO planning group. As separate

USArmy

Because many strategic- and theater-level IO planners lack SOF-specific experience andfocus, and tactical-level SO units possess limited planning and execution assets, the operational-

level SOF headquarters emerges as the key node in planning and synchronizing IO support tospecial operations. In a region assigned to a geographic combatant commander, the TSOC is the

likely candidate to integrate information operations in support of special operations.

A Marine intelligence officerdiscusses operations withsoldiers and Marines nearKandahar, Afghanistan.


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48 January -February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW

SOF components, PSYOP and civil affairs units intheater are subject to TSOC operational control andtheater coordination in the same manner as otherservice SOF (in the absence of a standing JTF, joint

CMO task force, or joint PSYOP task force). Per-sonnel assigned to meet specific coordination andreporting requirements cannot function effectively asdual-hatted IO planners.

Because of the zero-sum-gain nature of man-ning, certain IO functions might be covered in peace-time through secondary functional expertise. Withthe requisite functional training, a planner allocatedto a J2 CI billet could fill the command operationssecurity coordinator position while an equally trainedJ35 or J5 planner could meet peacetime deception-planning requirements. Although this option reducesadditional manpower requirements, the ideal solution

remains having dedicated functional personnel as-signed to each core IO capability.

Contingency IOContingency operations (CONOPs) substantially

expand a TSOCs functions. In addition to sustain-ing peacetime responsibilities and maintaining broadertheater situational awareness, the TSOC will oftenform the initial core of the JSOTF. In this role, theTSOC could be responsible for such functions as

Battle tracking.

USArmy

The collaborative end result for the SOF IO cell is often a layering of IO capabilities insupport of subordinate operations. In some cases, the JSOTF might undertake broader action

to achieve a nonlethal or psychological effect supported by other core SOF missions.

Operational-level SO feasibility assessments. Preliminary mission analysis. Subordinate mission tasking. Orders and annexes development. Subordinate CONPLAN review and approval. Vertical and horizontal liaison (shared aware-

ness). Deconfliction and review of supporting plans. Targeting and fires planning. Combat assessment and feedback processes. Developing future plans.The collaborative end result for the SOF IO cell

is often a layering of IO capabilities in support ofsubordinate operations. In some cases, the JSOTFmight undertake broader action to achieve a nonle-thal or psychological effect supported by other coreSOF missions. The SOF IO cell is responsible for

integrating the operation into the broader JTF or the-ater IO plan.Augmentation. The TSOC (either JSOTF or

CFSOC) normally requires increased IO manningto meet expanded responsibilities in a contingency.Other situation-unique factors also determine IOneeds, including

The operational scenario (geospatial, politicalenvironment, and rules of engagement).

Enemy capabilities (C4I structure and weap-ons systems).

PSYOP and Civil Affairs soldiersvisit a village near Kandahar,Afghanistan, September 2003.


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The composition of friendly forces (a JTF withcorresponding major support commands, a numberof subordinate JSOTFs, coalition partners, or higherHQ battle rhythm).

This expansion of responsibilities is in addition toa standard doubling of peacetime manpower to

meet shift requirements through JMD fills or a Re-quest for Forces from service component IO ca-pabilities.

Integration. The most efficient way to integratethe expanded IO cell during a contingency seemsto be to transition from a centralized cell under theDJ3IO in peacetime to a diffused IO organizationthat fills coordinating positions in the joint operationscenter, J2 analysis, J3/J5 plans section, joint fires el-ement, the special plans group, and other key boards,bureaus, and centers as required in wartime.

After reaching a predetermined level of capabil-ity and manning through augmentation, the DJ3IO

disperses key personnel to other staff sections toman semipermanent workspaces. The remainingmembers of the J3 IO cell not directly tasked to in-tegrate with other staff sections retain theater-leveloperational oversight; integrate and deconflict SOFinformation operations with the JTF or theater IOplan; and prioritize SOF allocated IO resources tosubordinate unit tasks. The DJ3IO functions as thefocal point to ensure that IO personnel are availablewhere operational requirements and the battlerhythm dictate.

A word of caution: although the DJ3IOs trainingand background qualify him to fill a deputy chief ofplans billet, commanders should avoid this tempta-

tion. Assigning the DJ3IO to another primary dutydetracts from his ability to synchronize and deconflictinformation operations or to add his influence to shortsuspense issues in a complex operational environ-ment.

For planning and coordination, each SO force-pro-viding unit down to the Army Special Forces group,Air Force SO squadron, and Navy special warfaretask element should have a dedicated IO coordina-tor in peacetime. The IO coordinator should have abroad-based knowledge of IO capabilities to supportSOF and, ideally, be a trained and functionally cer-tified IO planner for his service component.2 Most

services are discussing initiatives to place permanentIO billets at this level.

In a contingency environment, tactical unitsbelow the JSOTF level will find it difficult to filla robust IO JMD because of the higher headquar-ters demands on IO force-providers. Mission pa-rameters dictate what IO planning skills are essen-tial for tactical mission accomplishment. To offsetunit shortages, service component SOF can requestIO support teams from their services IO com-mands.3

Because of the paucity of IO personnel and ex-perience at levels subordinate to the CFSOC orJSOTF, the SOF tactical IO planners primary re-sponsibilities are generally limited to

Mission analysis to identify desired IO effects. Tentative support and targeting requirements. Course of action refinement.

Information operations subject matter exper-tise to the commander.The IO planners core product to the CFSOC or

JSOTF headquarters is an IO support request thatCFSOC or JSOTF information operations plannersdevelop into specific actions and asset allocations.Once the CFSOC or JSOTF information operationscell allocates available resources, the subordinateSOF IO cell completes final coordination and inte-grates the scheduled action into the tactical unit syn-chronization matrix. Adequate command emphasis,training, collaborative tools, and liaison are necessaryfor this critical interaction between layered IO cells.

Moving ForwardThe SOF community must maximize IO assets

and capabilities at the operational level during bothpeacetime and contingency operations to enhanceeffective IO support to special operations. We can-not meet the challenges of todays operating envi-ronment by engaging in ongoing academic debateson the nature of information operations or by main-taining ad-hoc second-tier staff elements.

Planners at all levels need to engage their chainsof command in discussions of IO challenges andwork cooperatively to implement the best solutions.The goal should be to rapidly establish a flexible, du-

rable organizational framework to deliver focused,coordinated IO products and capabilities that en-hance SOF mission accomplishment, ultimately re-ducing risk to special operators.MR

NOTES1. Department of Defense, Information Operations Roadmap, 30 October 2003.2. Ideally, the DJ3 would be an O5/O4 staff position filled by a broad-based IO inte-

grator function, such as one from Army Functional Area 30.3. Army, 1st Information Operations Command (Land), Army Intelligence and Secu-

rity Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Navy, Fleet Information Warfare Center, Naval Am-phibious Base, Norfolk, Virginia, on-line at ; Air Force, Air ForceInformation Warfare Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, on-line at .

The most efficient way to integratethe expanded IO cell during a contingency

seems to be to transition from a centralized cellunder the DJ3IO in peacetime to a diffused

IO organization that fills coordinating positions

in the joint operations center, J2 analysis,J3/J5 plans sec-tion, joint fires element, thespecial plans group, and other key boards,

bureaus, and centers.

IO INSUPPORT OF SO

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