INDUCING THE DELUGEZaire's Internally Displaced People

by

Ren6e G. Roberts

October 1993

This paper was written by Ren6e G. Roberts, a consultant to the U.S. Connittee for Refugees, who livedfor three years in the Kasal region of Zaire. It is based, in part, on her U.S. Conunittee for Refugees sitevisit to Zaire in July 1993.

@1993 American Council for Nationalities Service

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INDUCING THE DELUGEZaire's Intemally Displaced People

SUMMARY

Since August 1992, ethnic violence has erupted intwo separate regions of Zaire, forcing at least350,000 people to flee their homes. The U.S.Committee for Refugees (USCR) visited the re-gions of Shaba, the Kasai, and the northeast regionof Kivu in July 1993 to assess the situation.

In the southern region of Shaba, some100,000 people have fled because of ethnic vio-lence and are seeking transportation out of the re-gion. USCR found them camped around train sta-tions, hoping to find a place on the next train ouLAn additional 100,000 uprooted people have al-ready left Shaba and are attempting to settle in thecentral region of the Kasai, many of them workingto learn a new language and to find new ways toearn a living.

In the northeast region of Kivu, hundredsof miles from Shaba and the Kasai, another150,000 people have fled a seemingly unrelatedoutburst of ethnic violence. Thousands of peoplethere have no safe place to stay and little hope ofreturning home. USCR found that much of thetension can be traced to consistent nismanage-ment of the country by Zairian president MobutuSese Seko, and to direct manipulation of tensionsby Mobutu and his supporters.

This paper describes the situations in theregions of Shaba and North Kivu, including abrief historical background of each region, anddiscusses the conditions of displaced persons inboth areas. The paper concludes with recommen-dations to respond to the current emergency.

Conditions for displaced persons in Zaireare deteriorating rapidly. Camps for displacedpersons in Shaba that existed in early July duringUSCR's visit were forcibly evacuated and burnedto the ground by the end of July. Displaced fami-lies in the camp in Likasi, the largest and mostwell-organized camp, fled when the local police,under orders from the army, forced them out andburned their shelters behind them.

The world's attention to the chaos inZaire is necessary now to prevent ethnic hatredfrom engulfing the country, leading not only tomore violence in Zaire, but to disorder throughoutthe region if Zairians are forced to flee to neigh-boring countries.

INTRODUCTION

Massive displacement in Zaire is rooted in Zake'spolitical and economic atmosphere. For nearly 30years, Zaire has been ruled by President MobutuSese Seko, who seized power in 1965 after fiveyears of a bloody civil war. The Zairian govem-ment under Mobutu has frequently been character-ized as a kleptocracy, or a system based on theft.Corruption and graft have become increasinglyrampant in all layers of society. For years,Mobutu has managed to suppress most organizedopposition to his regime either by use of force orby offering opposition leaders lucrative positionsin government or local business.

In 1990, encouraged by the fall of dicta-

a Inducing the Deluge

ZAIRE

UPPER ZAIRE

EQUATOR

KIVUKINSHASA

BANDUNDU

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tors in Eastern Europe and angered by themilitary's slaying of up to one hundred students asthey slept in their dormitories at the University ofLubumbashi in the southern region of Shaba,many Zairian citizens began to speak out in favor ofousting Mobutu and installing democracy in Zaire.Surprised by the outcry, Mobutu announced the legal-ization of opposition parties. Hundreds of new par-ties sprang up, many of them allegedly financed byMobutu himself in an attempt to maintain power.

In 1991, the Sovereign National Confer-ence (CNS) gathered these factions together tomove forward with the process of democratiza-tion. In August 1992, the CNS set up a transi-tional government that retained Mobutu as a fig-urehead president and established the High Council,led by a prime minister, as the main legislative body.The CNS elected Etienne Tshisekedi as the transi-tional prime minister. The attempt to limit Mobutu'spower failed, however, because he continued to con-trol many factions of the army.

Dissatisfaction with Mobutu's role hadbeen evident in Kinshasa, the capital, for severalyears. Local newspapers are virulently anti-Mobutu. In February 1991, the army dispersed apeaceful demonstration for democracy, killingdozens of people. Since 1990, inflation hasclimbed to exorbitant annual rates of up to 6,000percent, and riots erupted in January 1993 overMobutu's introduction of a five-million Zaire cur-rency note. Tshisekedi promptly denounced thenote as illegal and inflationary, and merchants re-fused to accept it from soldiers. Six monthslater, in July 1993, mere possession of the notewas regarded with suspicion and anger by the resi-dents of Kinshasa.

Zaire has long been aligned with theUnited States as one of its strongest and most stra-tegic African allies. Despite pervasive govem-ment corruption, Zaire has received large amountsof foreign aid for development and military pur-poses from Western countries. In 1977 and 1978,the United States, Belgium, and France helped tosuppress a rebel invasion in Shaba. Zaire's centrallocation in Africa, bordering nine countries, andits wealth of mineral resources have made Mobutua strategic ally for Western powers, which sup-ported Mobutu for fear that Zaire might descendinto anarchy and disrupt the entire region of Cen-tral Africa if he lost power. Mobutu successfullyconvinced his allies that the French saying,"Apris moi, le diluge," or "After me, theflood," applies to Zaire. Mobutu's opponentsaccuse him of inducing the deluge in order tostall democratic reforms and to make the coun-try ungovernable.

SHABA

w nreMovement Of xaewns toShaba

For nearly 100 years, ethnic Luba from the Kasairegion have migrated southward to the Shaba re-gion of southern ZaIre.' When Belgian colonistsdiscovered copper in sparsely populated Shabaduring the 19th century, they recruited residents ofthe Kasal, known as "Kasafans," and others fromdistant parts of Africa to work in the mines. Bel-gians preferred working with Kasaians to workingwith Shabans. The arrival of Christian missionar-ies in the Kasai at least twenty years before theyreached Shaba meant that Kasaians were morelikely to have a basic Western education and to bemore accustomed to working with Westernersthan were the original residents of Shaba.

The migration from the Kasai to Shabahas continued steadily through the years becauseof Shaba's stable industry, with employment in themines, educational opportunities, and long-stand-ing family connections between the two prov-inces. Even after the discovery of diamonds in theKasai, later a major source of income for thecountry, diamond mining provided fewer steadyjobs in the Kasal than did copper mining and otherindustries in Shaba. One of the three universitiesin Zaire is located in the city of Lubumbashi inShaba. There are none in the Kasai. Kasalanfamilies have lived in Shaba for several genera-tions, with many claiming parents and grandpar-ents born in Shaba. Many migrants have neverlearned the language of the Kasal, preferring in-stead to speak the local language of Shaba.Kasaians have made Shaba their home.

The number of Kasalans in Shaba hasfluctuated. Shaba has been an economic centerfor Zaire, drawing migrants from all over thecountry, but it has also been a source of politicalunrest. Shaba is the site where Patrice Lumumba,an enormously popular politician, was assassi-nated in 1961, and is the target of attacks launchedby Zairian exile groups in Angola in 1977 and1978. Local politicians have frequently advocatedthe separation of Shaba from the rest of Zaire, andmany Shabans treasure the idea of becoming aseparate country. Many Kasaians continued tomove to Shaba, hoping that Shaba's economic ad-

"Shaba" is used to refer to the southernmost region ofZaire throughout this report. Shaba is frequently re-ferred to by itsformer name of Katanga, which seemsto have a special resonance for many Shabans.

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Mobutu suc-cessfully con-

vinced his alliesthat the Frenchsaying, "Apris

meW le diluge,"or "After me,the floo4" ap-plies to Zake.

vantages will outweigh the risks of political un-rest Before 1992, at least a half million Kasalans,mostly from the Luba ethnic group of East Kasal,lived in Shaba. Local sources report that the min-ing towns of Likasi and Kolwezi, and the regionalcapital of Lubumbashi, were one-third to one-halfKasaian. Some sources estimate that up to a mil-lion Kasalans eventually settled in Shaba.

Because Kasalans have long worked inthe copper mines, they have had an advantageover Shabans that persists to the present day.Kasaians held many of the top positions inG6camines, the state-run copper mining company,including that of chief executive officer, until un-rest began in mid-1992. Many Shabans resent thehigher economic status of Kasaians, frequentlyand bitterly accusing Kasaians of nepotism andcorruption. Yet despite these tensions, Kasalansand Shabans historically have lived togetherpeacefully, working together and often inter-mar-rying.

The Roots of Violence in Shaba

Violence against Kasalans in Shaba began soonafter the election of Etienne Tshisekedi by the Na-tional Conference in August 1992. Tshisekedi ishimself a Kasaan, of Luba origin. After losinghis post in the wake of Tshisekedi's election,Mobutu's former Prime Minister, Nguza Karl-I-Bond, of Shaba's Lunde ethnic group, returned toShaba and made a series of inflammatoryspeeches against the Kasalans. Nguza was oftenjoined by the governor of Shaba, Gabriel Kyungu.Some of their speeches referred to the Kasalans asbilulu-Swahili for "insect"--saying, "We mustput the insects out the door." Kyungu was oftenquoted as saying, "The Kasaians must go, andthen the Katangans can have the nice jobs and thenice houses." Such statements aggravated exist-ing economic tensions between Shabans andKasaians.

In August and September 1992, Shabansbegan attacking Kasaians in their homes, prima-rily in the cities of Likasi and Kolwezi, but also inthe rural areas around those cities. Kasaians re-port that the attacks started at night, with gangs ofyoung teenagers armed with machetes demandingthat Kasalans leave their homes. After theKasalans fled, the gangs pillaged and burned thehouses. Some local people report that GovernorKyungu himself led one caravan of people to thehomes of Kasaians to initiate the pillage and burn-ing. Many more allege that those who led the at-tacks were trained by the local police with support

from Mobutu's government. Tens of thousands ofKasalans fled in August, September, and October,1992. The attacks diminished within a fewmonths, probably because so many Kasadans hadleft their jobs and their homes.

DISPLACED KASAIANSIN THE SHABA REGION

IUkasi and Kolwezi

In an attempt to escape the violence, Kasaiansjammed railway stations in Likasi and Kolwezi,hoping to board one of the weekly trains to theKasal. Because many roads in Zaire are virtuallyimpassable, the road trip to the Kasai is prohibi-tively expensive and perilous. Years of neglecthave made the railways themselves dangerous,subject to frequent delays, derailments, and ex-treme overcrowding even in normal times. Extratrains, supplied by Governor Kyungu, were wait-ing for the Kasaians when they arrived at the rail-way stations, but many thousands of people wereleft behind.

Those unable to find space on a train in-stalled themselves around the railway stations inso-called "safety zones." So many Kasalans fledthat the decrepit rail system was unable to handlethe massive overflow. Kasaxans have continued toleave their homes and flee toward the stations, in afruitless search for a way out of the region, andhave begun to create settlements near the stations.USCR found whole families camped out directlyon the train platform. During the past year,M6decins Sans Frontibres/Belgium (MSF) and theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)have helped meet their basic needs.

In June 1993, some 75,000 people wereliving around the railway station in Likasi. De-spite the intensely crowded conditions, the dis-placed Kasalans received food, treated water, andmedical care from MSF and ICRC. Indeed, theKasalans in the Likasi camp probably lived in bet-ter sanitary conditions than many other Zairians, afact that may have escalated tensions. MSF re-ported in June that 12.5 percent of the camp resi-dents in Likasi were malnourished, a significantlylower percentage than any other displaced personscamp in the region.

At the time of the USCR visit, most ofthe displaced had been living in the camp fornearly a year, and had begun setting up cottage in-dustries. Men and children collected scrap metal,which they fashioned into buckets, trunks, and

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USCR foundwhole famliescamped out di-

rectly on the trainplatform.

cooking pots that women sold or used for trade.One section of the camp was dedicated to smallmetal-working industry, and the sound of clankingmetal was audible from a distance, as though onewere approaching a factory. Men and womenmade and sold tshitshiampa (the local moon-shine).

These cottage industries generated alarge, bustling marketplace directly in front of therailway station and helped Kasalans earn enoughmoney for passage to the KasaL. The market is soactive and successful that goods beyond thoseneeded for basic survival are readily available.Clothing and material, television sets, and furni-ture are sold alongside the usual fish, flour, and to-matoes. One market vendor, Mbuyi-Mpiana, toldUSCR, "We got all of our things together to sellthem-from our family, from friends. We want tomake enough money to get to the Kasai and havea little something in our pockets. It's not good toarrive empty-handed."

USCR noted that both Kasafans andShabans bought and sold from each other in themarketplace with no serious problems. Such ex-changes supported statements heard from nearlyeveryone USCR interviewed in Shaba, who indi-cated that the recent violence in Shaba had beenartificially created.

Although many Kasaians have lived their

entire lives in Shaba and are hesitant to leavehome for a region with which they are unfamiliar,the displaced people interviewed by USCR in theShaba camps all reported that their main concernis transportation to the KasaL. Passenger trains nolonger operate, but freight trains with the capacityto carry some 2,000 to 3,000 people leave everyten days or so. To find spaces to sit on the jam-packed trains, some of the displaced have resortedto riding on the tops of the trains, putting thern-selves at great risk and resulting in numerous re-ported deaths when trains pass under bridges.Electric trains operate the 200 miles from Likasito Kamina, but in Kamina the trains must switchto diesel power to pull them to the town of MweneDitu and on to Kananga. The trains are frequentlydelayed in Kamina for several days, and the flee-ing Kasalans become stranded.

MSF has set up camps for the Kasaansin transit in Kamina. The number of people in thecamp varies from 1,000 to 10,000, averagingaround 6,000. At least five days are required totravel the four hundred miles from Likasi toMwene Ditu, but delays, stoppages, and occa-sional derailments often extend the miserablejourney to two weeks. When USCR visitedMwene Dit, a train from Kamina was expected atany minute. It had left Kamina four days earlier,meaning that for this particular group of displaced

The train platform in Likasi is crowded with people lving on the platform in the hope of catchingthe next train. Thisfamily has been waiting for days for a train to come to take them to the KasaiPhoto: USCRIR. Roberts

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6

Kasaizns saidthey feared thattheir Shaban

neighbors couldturn againstthem at any

minute.

persons the trip had already taken some seven days.Immediately following USCR's visit to

the Likasi camp in early July, local police forciblymoved some 48,000 people from the camp intoschools surrounding the area. Since the schoolswere too small to house so many people, manywere forced to camp near the schools and in thestreets. Although the trains can reasonably ac-commodate some 2,000 people, a final train leftfor the Kasal on July 22 carrying an overwhelm-ing 4,500 passengers. It broke down in a smallvillage that was unprepared to support so manypeople. The already difficult transportation prob-lems became significantly worse.

According to relief workers in the region,Likasi police, under orders from the army, evicteddisplaced KasaYans from the Likasi camp, but theexact motivation they had for moving people isnot clear. Some observers speculated that au-thorities destroyed the camp to hide the situa-tion from a UN team scheduled to visit in Au-gust.

Conditions in the Kolwezi camp weresomewhat worse than in Likasi, a result of its re-moteness and the continuing violence there,which made implementation of MSF and ICRCprograms more difficult. MSF estimated thatabout 23,000 displaced people lived in Kolwesi

Tens pro vided by Mdecims Sans Fronihres provide housing for many displaced Kasalhns inLikasL In many parts of the camp, Kasatans have built extra shelters of local materials.

Photo: USCRIR. Roberts

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camp before Shabans started burning the sheltersin early July during the USCR site visit. Peoplewho were camped around the Kolwezi railwaystation subsequently scattered after the camp wasburned. Some have moved even farther away,making it more difficult for them to receive much-needed aid.

Violence against Kasaians continued.One man who arrived in Kananga from Kolwezisaid of his experience there, "What do I have togo back to? They burned my house, took my job,and stole my possessions."

USCR interviewed a number of Kasaiansin Lubumbashi, the regional capital. The majorityof those interviewed were considering leaving.Although they felt safe at that moment, theKasalans said they feared that their Shaban neigh-bors could turn against them at any minute. Thefear of harassment is strong, and an additional300,000 people could potentially leave Shaba forthe Kasal. While en route, they would likely over-whelm the camps and the perilous train routes; onarrival, they would overburden the Kasai'scrumbled infrastructure and limited industry. De-spite the low status that farming has in Zaire, oneman told USCR, "I'd rather be a [poor] farmer inthe Kasai than a [wealthy] factory worker inShaba."

The malnutrition center in the Mwene Ditu camp islfdled with children like this girl, who areweak and in desperate need of adequatefood. The center provides oral rehydration andnutritional supplements. Photo: USCR/R. Roberts

USCR sawmany visibly

undernourishedchildren, someof whom were

too weak tomove or play.

Displaced Persons in Mwene Ditu

Mwene Ditu, the first major rail station in theKasal region, provides rail access to Kananga inthe West Kasal and truck access to Mbujimayi orKabinda.

Officially, displaced persons can stay inthe MSF camp in Mwene Ditu for one month, alimit set to avoid overcrowding. Unofficially,however, some stay longer. More than 11,000people were living in the Mwene Ditu camp inJune 1993. Many were children, hungry and ex-hausted after five days or longer on overcrowdedtrains. About 29 percent of those living in theMwene Ditu camp are malnourished, and 16.4percent are severely malnourished, according toMSF. USCR visited the center for malnourishedchildren run in Mwene Ditu run by MSF and sawmany visibly undernourished children, some ofwhom were too weak to move or play.

Although these displaced persons havesucceeded in reaching the relative safety of theKasal region, hardships remain. Transportationfrom Mwene Ditu to other villages and towns is amajor concern. In addition to food and medicine,MSF is helping provide transportation by truck toMbujimayi and Kabinda, about 80 and 100 miles

away, respectively. More than a hundred peoplecrowd onto trucks for the two to three hour trip toMbujimayi. Those who want to go to Kabindaface a full 12 hours on excruciatingly bad roads inthe same cramped conditions. A truck toKabinda costs at least $1,000, about $10 perperson, creating a huge financial burden for aidproviders.

Mbujimayi Camp

Many of the displaced in the KasaY move in withfriends or distant relatives. The Comitid'Assistance aux Refoulds (Committee for Assis-tance to the Repressed, or CAR), an ecumenicalchurch-based group, estimates that 100,000people have fled to the Kasal since the fightingbegan in Shaba in August 1992. Most of the dis-placed disperse after they reach the Kasai andleave Mwene Dit. In July 1993, some 8,000people were living in a camp outside Mbujimayi.An undetermined number remained in the city,sleeping at the post office at night and dispersingduring the day. The 8,000 outside Mbujimayioriginally sought refuge in the center of town, butlocal government authorities forced them out inlate June.

SInducUig the Deluge

8

Government harassment of the displacedin Mbujimayi is eerily similar to the forcibleevacuation of Kolwezi and Likasi that occurred inlate July. As in IUkasi, the displaced were forcedto a location more remote-in this case, about 15kilometers from town. No other villages are vis-ible from the new camp. Though the governmentclaims the forced relocation was based on concernfor the health of the displaced, the conditions inthe new settlement were in many ways evenworse than in their previous camp. The displacedhad little food, difficult access to water, and al-most no shelter in the new location. The distancefrom town was an obstacle to employment andtrade.

The government has said that all reliefaid must be channeled through a governmentcommittee, a requirement that most organizationshave long resisted because of governmental cor-ruption. The government's actions have effec-tively cut off aid from the Comitl d'Assistanceaux Refoulds, which provided most of the reliefprior to the forced relocation. MSF and World Vi-sion planned to start programs in Mbujimayi, buthad not yet done so, apparently due to uncertaintyabout the legal status of the displaced and the ap-propriate channels of aid after their forced move.

USCR accompanied a public health doc-tor on his visit to the head of the local governmentcommittee charged with providing assistance tothe displaced. Government officials told the doc-tor and USCR that they were not providing waterbecause the government committee's water truckhad broken down, and the four trucks theyclaimed to own actually belonged to private citi-zens. For these reasons, they said they were un-able to transport even a few available supplies tothe displaced. The committee, however, ex-pressed interest in receiving assistance from MSFand World Vision.

NORTH KIVU

USCR visited North Kivu, a subregion of Kivu,where some 150,000 people are displaced becauseof violence between ethnic Banyarwanda Zairiansand other ethnic groups. (Although the term"Banyarwanda" is commonly used in Zare toclassify groups of people as foreigners, this reportuses the term to describe ethnic identity withoutregard to citizenship. Many legitimate ZaYriancitizens are "Banyarwandan.")

The region of Kivu has never attractedthe level of attention that Shaba has received, ei-

ther from the government of Zare or from theWest, perhaps as a result of Kivu's remote loca-tion, one thousand miles from the capital of Zake,and its limited economic base. Nonetheless, theregion is ripe for conflict. Kivu borders on four ofZaYre's nine neighboring countries, from Ugandato Tanzania, across Lake Tanganyika. Kivu andsurrounding regions form one of the most denselypopulated areas in all of Africa.

In particular, the subregion of North Kivuborders on Uganda and Rwanda, and for hundredsof years, members of the various ethnic groups ofthe region have migrated back and forth freelyacross the borders that became firmly establishedonly in this century. One such group is theBanyarwanda, a grouping formed by linguisticunity and a complex shared history among threeethnic groups: the Hutu, the TItsi, and the Twa.

History of BanyarwandanMigration

When Europeans redrew the boundaries betweenRwanda and the Congo in the 19th Century, manyBanyarwanda who had been living on the Rwandaside of the old border were annexed into Zairewith the new boundaries. Since that time, addi-tional Banyarwanda have migrated to NorthKivu's fertile soil in three waves.

A first wave of migration began in theearly 20th century, when Belgians recruited resi-dents of their colony in Rwanda to work on farmsand plantations in North Kivu. This aggressive re-cruitment continued and expanded the earlier im-migration pattern.

The second wave consisted of refugeesfrom the conflict resulting from ethnic tensions inRwanda who have come to Kivu since the late1950s. Finally, a group that local people call "in-filtrators" has crossed the border from Rwandainto Zaire in recent years, joining family membersand friends already present.

No sharp lines separate the migrants ofthese movements; one family can span all threecategories. Banyarwanda presently constituteabout half of the population in North Kivu.

Relations Between Banyarwanda andOder Edmic Groups

Banyarwanda in Zafre have maintained their dis-tinct culture over the years, and other ethnicgroups in North Kivu widely regard them as "for-eigners." Nonetheless, at independence in 1960,

* Inducing the Deluge

lawmakers in Zaire, which was then known as theCongo, accorded citizenship to anyone who hadbeen in the country for ten years, that is, since1950. That same standard for citizenship was alsoused at "Zarianization" in 1972, when Mobutuchanged the country's name to Zaire, and changedmany place names in the interest of "authenticity."

In 1981, however, the laws surroundingnationality were rewritten to extend Zairian na-tionality only to those who could trace their ances-tors' presence in what is now Zaire to the year1885. Ancestry would be hard to prove for allpeople in border regions of Zaire, but the law wasdirected mostly at Banyarwanda in Kivu.

Some observers suggest that lawmakerschanged the law in reaction to the departure ofMobutu's head of the Presidential Secretariat, aBanyarwandan Ttsi, as a gesture of anger againstall Banyarwanda. The law effectively strippedmost Banyarwanda of their citizenship-leavingthem essentially stateless. It also had the effect ofcodifying the "foreign" status of the Banyarwandain the eyes of their neighbors, the Hunde, theNyanga, and the Nande.

Tensions between the Hutu Banyarwandaand the Hunde and Nyanga people intensified dur-ing the 1980s. The Hunde and Nyanga are asomewhat small minority in the region (approxi-

mately 10 percent of the population) and the Hutuand Tutsi together almost a majority (approxi-mately 50 percent), but the Hunde have held abouthalf of the local government positions. Democra-tization would probably force many Hunde chiefsout of positions of power. Despite their strongerposition in government, the Hunde are muchpoorer than the Banyarwanda.

North Kivu has become densely popu-lated, a result of immigration, creating competi-tion for scarce land between the Banyarwanda andthe Hunde. The Banyarwanda are traditionallyfarmers, and the Hunde are traditionally hunters,creating conflict between them over the amount ofland that should be left uncultivated for hunting.Land tensions were further exacerbated during the1970s when Bisengimana Rema, a Tutsi, wasMobutu's head of the Presidential Secretariat Be-cause of his position, other ethnic groups believedthat the Banyarwanda were enjoying unmeritedfavor, and envy of Rema's political power furtherexacerbated animosities toward all Banyarwanda.Hunde people told USCR that they no longer canmake a living for themselves by hunting, becausethe land is occupied by Hutu and Thtsi farms.

During the Sovereign National Confer-ence, the debate over nationality intensified, andin 1991, local authorities in North Kivu began a

Violence between rival ethnic groups in North Kivu has left many villages ke this one almostcompletely destroyed. When USCR traveled through this village, it was eerily silent, having beendeserted by its inhabitants. USCR/R. Roberts

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A pervasivesense of law-lessness and

disorder marksNorth Kiva.

This young Hutu girl is one of at least 1,000 displaced persons living in a Catholicparish in Mweso. Photo: USCR/R. Roberts

process of identifying ZaYrian nationals. Hundechiefs, working from their homes, conducted aregistration process. Many Banyarwanda wereafraid to go to registration sites; others believedthat the registration was only for Hunde, Nyanga,and Nande. Those who tried to register often foundthat they were no longer considered Zaiians.

Violence in North Kivu

Today, a pervasive sense of lawlessness and disor-der marks North Kivu. The region is deeply splitalong ethnic lines, and each group has its own ver-sion of the region's problems. Although unbiasedsources are difficult to find, some details are con-sistently reported.

On March 20 and 21, 1993, members ofthe Hunde and Nyanga ethnic groups attackedHutu people living in the zone of Walikale. At-tackers entered the market on March 20 with ma-chetes, bows and arrows, and shotguns and pro-ceeded to kill all of the Hutu people they couldfind. The next morning, attackers killed moreHutu attending church services and burned numer-ous homes. The HutufTutsi community in NorthKivu estimates that 1,000 people were killed inthose two days alone. By April 10, the violencespread south and east to Masisi, where Hutu andTutsi constitute a large majority.

Witnesses say most of the attackers werecivilians. The role of the military during the at-tacks is unclear. Hunde charge that the Hutu andThtsi paid soldiers for special protection of theirhomes and property. The Banyarwanda insist thatthe military played an active role in several massa-cres of Hutu and Tutsi, and pillaged their homes.Whether members of the military participated ornot, it is clear that they did nothing to stop the vio-lence. In fact, the military may well have profitedfrom the situation. Several people told USCR thatsoldiers were selling cattle in Goma at a drasti-cally reduced price, presumably because they con-fiscated them illegally.

USCR's Findings in North Kivu

In July 1993, USCR found that areas to the east ofWalikale and Masisi--havens for people in flight--had become sites of new attacks from both sides.The area just east of Walikale and Masisi, knownas the Buito, was deserted except for a few placesof safety such as churches and a British tea planta-tion.

Suzanne Sinsahera and her daughterPauline told USCR the story of their family. Oftheir six family members, three women werelodged at the Catholic Church. "We were home,"they said. "Men passed by carrying household

& Inducing the Deluge

goods on their backs. Then, we saw the housesthey had already burned. When we saw that, wetook what we could and left." Three young menin their family, aged 20 to 25 years, went into hid-ing in the countryside, one with his wife and threechildren. Though they are near their home, theysay they cannot return because others have movedinto their house.

While the few displaced persons stayingin churches receive some food and medical carefrom the parish priest, many others receive nohelp at all. Those hiding in the hills subsist ongrass and leaves, or sneak into fields to find food.In the months since the violence began in NorthKivu, the situation has become increasingly vio-lent and chaotic. Hunde and Nyanga continue toattack Banyarwanda, while Hutu counter with at-tacks of revenge. The escalating chaos has pro-duced 120,000 to 150,000 displaced people whohave no safe place to go as the fighting spreads,according to MSF and OXFAM. Hospitals USCRvisited reported large numbers of wounded, oftenby shotguns or machetes. "The guns they use arenot good,' one woman told USCR. "They don'tkill outright unless they hit directly in the hearLUsually, people are wounded, and then the at-tacker comes and kills you with a machete."

Although the violence that caused thou-

sands to flee was based on ethnic differences, thedisplaced Hutu and Hunde endure similar hard-ships. For the most part, the Hutu and Tutsi takerefuge in churches, and the Hunde move into va-cant homes. Hundreds of people, both Hunde andHutu, walk miles each day in search of safety. Insome parishes, Hutu people have taken refuge inthe church, while the village outside is inhabitedby Hunde people who are also fleeing theirhomes. People sometimes stay in one place for afew nights, or a few weeks, then move back home,then leave again. Some Banyarwanda are con-tinuing east into the zone of Rutshuru, but in gen-eral, the displaced have no clear destination.

In addition to their present needs, the dis-placed will have a difficult time re-establishingtheir lives at home even if the fighting abates.Widespread reports of attacks against farmershave made most people afraid to work in theirfields. Many left crops unharvested and missedthe opportunity to plant more as the new plantingseason ended. The loss of two consecutive har-vests could be devastating to the region, whichprovides food for the entire country. It is anotherominous indication that conditions in Zaire willlikely worsen, and that massive displacement in anisolated corner of Zaie, such as Kivu, adverselyaffects Zaians of all ethnic groups.

Displaced Zafreans on Mweso Roadt Photo: USCRIR. Roberts

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Conclusions and Recommendations

Zaire is home to more than 200 ethnic groups.While ethnic tensions have always existed, theemergence of violence in two separate areas of thecountry within a single year, after years of relativeethnic calm, raises serious questions about thesources of tension. In Shaba, the blatant involve-ment of local government officials in inciting andperpetrating violence against Kasaians clearly im-plicates the national government.

In North Kivu, where evidence of gov-ernment manipulation is less clear, the question ofwhy ethnic tensions exploded is more diflicultUSCR believes that while external manipulationof events in Kivu is difficult to detect, it exists onseveral levels. The 1981 law denying citizenshipto Banyarwanda, many of whom had lived inKivu for generations, is the action of the centralgovernment and has solidified a once amorphoustension in Kivu. The application of that law in1991 during the process of identifying Zairian na-tionals made the theoretical denationalization ofBanyarwanda a reality. The lack of military inter-vention to stop recent ethnic violence in the regionsuggests government negligence or complicity.

The government paralysis resulting fromMobutu's intransigence, the collapse of theZairian economy, and the collapse of infrastruc-ture, resulting from many years of neglect andtheft, have left people desperately clinging towhatever hope they can. Sometimes those hopesinclude the illusion that if one ethnic group ispushed from a region, such as the Kasafans fromShaba or the Banyarwanda from Kivu, those leftbehind might gain a better life. The central gov-ernment, and most particularly its main actor,Mobutu, bears responsibility for its part in themismanagement of the Zairian economy and theeffect that its collapse has had on the lives ofZairian people in every region of the country, in-cluding Kivu and Shaba.

As long as govemrnental power resideswith Mobutu Sese Seko, there is little hope that theprocess of democratization can continue, or that thoseresponsible for Zaire's decline will tum the countryfrom its path of destruction. The mxre than 300,000people currently displaced in Zae, who seek dili-gently to live their lives in security in Zaire's multi-ethnic state, may be only the first wave of the delugethat Mobutu has implicitly waned about for years.As he struggles to maintain his threatened position,hundreds of thousands more people could becomedisplaced within the borders of Zaire, or flee intoone of nine neighboring countries.

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There is no permanent solution for thesituation of Zaire's uprooted people until the fullpowers of Zayre's government pass to duly electedrepresentatives of its people. But until that time,in the short term, there are steps that can be takento alleviate temporarily the unacceptable condi-tions under which uprooted people are now forcedto live. 'b meet these humanitarian needs, and tohelp alleviate the tensions that have caused themto flee, the U.S. Committee for Refugees makesthe following recommendations:

To the Government of Zaire:

1. USCR calls on Zaire officials, particularlythose aligned with President Mobutu, to cease in-flammatory statements and other provocative ac-tions that have instigated much of the civil unrestcausing the displacement of 350,000 Zairians.The tinder box that is Zaire could rapidly catchfire, creating a world-class disaster, if such provo-cations to violence do not end.

2. Zaire officials should cease their reprehensiblepractice of destroying camps for displaced per-sons. Local officials in Shaba and Kasai shouldstop forcing displaced persons out of camps andshould allow displaced persons to establish theircamps in appropriate locations accessible totowns, employment, water, and health care.

3. ZaIre government officials should allow inter-national relief organizations and local church or-ganizations to provide relief directly to beneficia-ries, without working through governmentchannels that have been ineffective at best and arecorrupt and prejudiced at worst

To the Organization of African Unity:

The Organization of African Unity, with diplo-matic and financial support from the internationalcommunity, should station military monitors inKivu to restore order, protect up to 150,000 up-rooted persons in the region, and enable relief or-ganizations to render assistance.

To the United Nations:

1. The United Nations Special Representative toZare should report fully and quickly on its inves-tigation of the massive population displacement in

Zaire and the emergency humanitarian conditionsin which many displaced are forced to live. TheUN representative should include in the report anyevidence of the Zaire government's role in insti-gating much of the violence that has forced hun-dreds of thousands to flee their homes.

2. The United Nations Security Council shouldformally condemn recent steps taken by Zairianauthorities to destroy camps for displaced persons.The UN must not allow President Mobutu to hidehuman rights abuses or to remove evidence of themassive displacement his policies have caused.

3. The UN should equip its special envoy to Zairewith adequate staff and resources to station teamsof human rights monitors in Shaba, Kasai, andKivu regions of Zaire on a continuous basis.

To International Relief Agencies:

1. Additional relief agencies should consider pro-viding assistance in Zaire or supporting the effortsof organizations already working there. Interna-tional relief organizations should work in coordi-nation with indigenous organizations, particularlylocal churches and church-based organizations inZaire.

2. Relief agencies should closely monitor foodshortages and nutritional conditions throughoutZaire in coming months. Massive displacement offarmers in Kivu will likely affect the nation's foodsupply, and add to the suffering endured byZainans in all parts of the country.

To the Government of the United States:

1. The United States should explicitly condemnthe destruction of camps for displaced persons byZairian authorities, and should push the UnitedNations to report evidence of complicity byMobutu and his supporters in the violence leadingto the original population displacement. Previous

statements by U.S. government officials thatMobutu "bears responsibility for the continuing...human suffering" are helpful but do not go farenough in criticizing specific steps taken byMobutu and his supporters to provoke civil unrest

2. Because violence and population displacementin Zaire are the product of deliberate efforts tostall democratic reforms and undermine the legiti-mate government of Prime Minister EtienneTshisekedi, the U.S. State Department should seekto bolster Zare's transition to full democracy bygranting formal recognition to the constitutionallyelected government of Prime Minister Tshisekedi.U.S. condemnations of Mobutu should be accom-panied by a clear affirmation of support forTshisekedi's government.

3. The United States should provide adequatefunds to support NGO programs delivering hu-manitarian assistance to Zaire's displaced popula-tion. Sustained funding is necessary because thecrisis itself is likely to persist and enlarge, givenZalre's current political climate. Thousands ofdisplaced families who were receiving adequaterelief assistance three months ago are no longerreceiving sufficient care due to the destruction ofcamps by Zaire authorities, and new infusions ofrelief supplies are needed.

The massive population displacement occurring inZaire is largely an artificially induced product ofZaire's internal politics, which are dominated byPresident Mobutu and his strategy of intransi-gence. Mobutu's attempts to hold power and stalldemocratic reforms by stirring violent unrest andnational anarchy are no secret to close observersof events in Zaire. Domestic tranquility will notlikely return with Mobutu in power, and the po-tential for ever greater numbers of internally dis-placed and refugees from Zaire looms large.

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