incorrect operation index

8/2/2019 Incorrect Operation Index

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Laila Utari Ratna PuspitaFakultas Teknik Mesin dan Dirgantara


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In structures, only about 10% of failures are dueto a statistical variation in either the applied

load or the member resistance. The remainderare due to human error or abuse

Human errors are estimatedto have caused 62% of all

hazardous materialsaccidents in US

This index assesses thepotential for pipeline

failure caused by errorscommitted by the pipeline

personnel in designing,building, operating, ormaintaining a pipeline.

Human error can logically

impact any of the previousprobability-of-failureindexes-active corrosion,

for example, could indicatean error

in corrosion control

activities


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Relative Risk Score

Leak Impact Factor

Index Sum

Third PartyDamage

Corrosion DesignIncorrectOperation


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Hazard

identification

MOP potential

Safety systems

Material selection

Checks

Inspection

Materials

Joining

Backfill

Handling

Coating

Procedures

SCADA/Communications

Drug-testing

Safety programs

Surveys

Training

Mechanical errorpreventers

Documentation

Schedule

Procedures


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Structural failure can be defined (in asimplified way) as the point at which

the material changes shape under stressand does not return to its originalshape when the stress is removed

The most readily available measure ofa pipelines strength will normally be

the documented Maximum OperatingPressure or MOP

MOP is determined from stresscalculations, with internal pressurenormally causing the largest stresses

in the wall of the pipe. Material stresslimits are theoretical values,confirmed (or at least evidenced) bytesting, that predict the point at whichthe material will fail when subjected tohigh stress.

*0f 30 (design weighting)


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0 pts

Where routine, normal operations could allow the system toreach MOP

Routine

5 ptsWhere overpressure can occur through a combination of

procedural errors or omissions, and failure safety devicesUnlikely

10 pts

Where overpressure is theoretically possible, but only

through an extremely unlikely chain of events

Extremely

unlikely

12 pts

Where the pressure source cannot, under any conceivablechain of events, overpressure the pipeline

Impossible


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0 pts No safety device present

3 pts On site, one level only

6 pts On site, two or more levels

1 pt Remote, observation only

-2 pts Non-owned, active witnessing

-3 pts Non-owned, no involvement

10 pts Safety systems not needed



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The evaluator should look for evidence that proper materialswere identified and specified with due consideration to allstresses reasonably expected

Documents should show that the corrosion potential, includingincompatible material problems and welding-related problems,was considered in the design

Here, the evaluator determines if design calculations anddecisions were checked at key points during the design process.Two points are awarded for sections whose design process wascarefully monitored and checked



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If inspection is a complete unknown, 0 points can be awarded0-10 pts

An on-site material handler should be taking reasonable steps to ensure thatthe right material is indeed being installed in the right location

0-2 pts

100% inspection of all joints by industry-accepted practices warrants 2 pointsin this example

0-2 pts

Knowledge and practice of good backfill/support techniques duringconstruction warrants 2 points

0-2 pts

The evaluator should award 2 points when he sees evidence of good materialshandling practices and storage techniques during and prior to construction

0-2 pts

This variable examines field-applied coatings and provides an additionalevaluation opportunity for precoated components

0-2 pts


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C1. Procedures (7 pts)

C2. SCADA/communications (3 pts)

C3. Drug testing (2 pts)

C4. Safety programs (2 pts)

C5. Surveys/maps/records (5 pts)

C6. Training (10 pts)

C7. Mechanical error preventers (6 pts)


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Mainline valve checks and maintenance

Safety device inspection and calibrationPipeline shutdown or startup

Pump/compressor operations

Product movement changes

Right-of-way maintenanceInstrument maintenance

Safety device testing

Management of change

Patrol

Surveys

Corrosion control

Control center actions

Lock-out and equipment isolation

Emergency response


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Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) refers to the transmission ofpipeline operational data (such as pressures, flows, temperatures, and productcompositions) at sufficient points along the pipeline to allow monitoring of theline from a single location


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1. Monitoring of all critical activities and conditions

2.Reliability of SCADA system

3. Enforced protocol requiring real-time communicationsbetween field operations and control room; two sourcesinvolved in critical activities; an adequate real-time

communications system(s) is assumed

4. Interlocks or logic constraints that prevent incorrectoperations; critical operations are linked to pressure,flow, temperature, etc.; indications that are set aspermissives before the action can occur


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Level 1 No SCADA system exists or is not used in a manner thatpromotes human error reduction.

Level 2

Some critical activities are monitored; field actions areinformally coordinated through a control room; system is atleast 80% operational.

Level 3

Most critical activities are monitored; field actions are usuallycoordinated through a control room; system uptime exceeds95%.

Level 4

All critical activities are monitored; all field actions arecoordinated through a control room; SCADA system

reliability (measured in uptime) exceeds 99.9%.


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Written companystatement of safety

philosophy

Safety program designedwith high level of employeeparticipation--evidence of

high participation is found

Strong safety performancerecord (recent history)

Good attention tohousekeeping

Signs, slogans, etc., to showan environment tuned tosafety

Full-time safety personnel.


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The scoring of surveys/maps/records can be based on such aspects such as :

Comprehensiveness-

Amount of the systems covered by maps and records

Detail

Level of detail shown (depth, landmarks, pipe specification, leakhistory, etc.)

Clarity

Ease of reading

Timeliness of update

Schedule to update

Document management system

Ensuring version control and ready access to information


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4 pts Three-way valves with dualinstrumentation

2 ptsLock-out devices

2 pts Key-lock sequence programs

2 ptsComputer permissives

1 pt Highlighting of criticalinstruments


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D1. Documentation

The evaluator should check for a formal program ofretaining all paperwork or database dealing with all aspectsof maintenance exists

0-2

pts D2. Schedule

A formal schedule for routine maintenance based onoperating history

0-3

pts D3. Procedures

The evaluator should verify that written procedures dealingwith repairs and routine maintenance are readily available

0-10pts

Modern maintenance practices often revolve around concepts of Predictive

Preventive Maintenance (PPM) programs. The evaluator may wish to judge thestrength of the maintenance program based on the following items :


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