No. 18-266

In the Supreme Court of the United States

FRANCIS & MARY MARION, CHARLES & MARY PINCKNEY, JOHN & ELIZABETH RUTLEDGE, JAMES S.

THURMOND, AND ESSIE MAE WASHINGTON-WILLIAMS,

Petitioners,

v.

SALLY’S SEAFOOD SHACK, INC.,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

Team Z

Counsel for Petitioners

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Limitation Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12, provides an

independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction.

2. Whether the court of appeals would have properly exercised

appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) had the district

court properly exercised original jurisdiction under the Limitation

Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented i

Table of Contents ii

Table of Authorities v

Opinions Below 1

Statement of Jurisdiction 1

Statutory Provisions Involved 1

Statement of the Case 2

Summary of the Argument 3

Argument 6

I.   THE LIMITATION ACT IS NOT AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 8

A. Key Principles of Statutory Construction Counsel Against Reading the Limitation Act to Establish Independent Admiralty Jurisdiction 9

1. The Language of the Limitation Act Contains No Language Suggesting a Grant of Jurisdiction, and the Court Should Not Infer Jurisdiction Without Evidence 10 2. Contemporaneous Interpretations of the Limitation Act Suggest That It Does Not Augment Ordinary Admiralty Jurisdiction 11 3. Interpreting the Limitation Act to Confer Independent Admiralty Jurisdiction May Exceed the Constitutional Grant of Admiralty Jurisdiction, Violating the Canon of Avoidance 12

B. An Expansion of Admiralty Jurisdiction Under The Limitation Act Would Upset the Balance Between Federal and State Courts, and Unduly Interfere With the Operation of State Tort Law 14

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont’d)

C. Richardson Does Not Establish That the Limitation Act Furnishes an Independent Basis for Admiralty Jurisdiction 15

1. The Richardson Opinion Preceded the Nexus Test Established in Executive Jet and Foremost, and Therefore is No Longer Good Law 17 2. Read in Context, the Richardson Opinion Does Not Hold That the Limitation Act Is an Independent Basis for Admiralty Jurisdiction in Cases That Are Otherwise Unconnected to Maritime Activity 18 3. The Policy Justifications Underlying Richardson No Longer Apply Today 19

II.   IF THE DISTRICT COURT HAD ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION TO LIMIT LIABILITY, THEN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT WOULD HAVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION UNDER § 1292(A)(3) 21 A. The Plain Language of § 1292(a)(3) Contemplates Appellate Jurisdiction Over an Interlocutory Order Granting a Limitation of Liability 22

1. The Phrase “Rights and Liabilities” Contemplates Appellate Jurisdiction Even Where Liability Has Not Been Finally Determined 22 2. The District Court for the District of South Carolina Determined Respondent’s Rights When it Granted Them a Right to Limited Liability 23

B. The Fourth Circuit Had Appellate Jurisdiction Because a Non-Appealable Order Limiting Seafood Shack’s Liability Would Effectively End the Litigation 25 C. The Fourth Circuit Exercising Appellate Jurisdiction Would Be Consistent With The Statute’s Purpose of Increasing the Efficiency of Admiralty Litigation 27

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont’d)

1. In Drafting § 1292(a)(3), Congress Was Primarily Concerned with Efficiency More Broadly, Not Solely Appeals From Trials Bifurcating Liability and Damages Specifically 27 2. Allowing Appeals From Limitation of Liability Orders Would Avoid Unnecessary Proceedings, Supporting Congress’ Goal of Judicial Efficiency 28

Conclusion 30

Appendix A-1

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. v. M/V Sea Producer,

882 F.2d 425, 1989 AMC 2935 (9th Cir. 1989) 2, 25 In re Aramark Sports and Entm’t Servs., LLC,

831 F.3d 1264, 2016 AMC 2138 (10th Cir. 2016) 24, 29, 30 Beebe v. Russell,

60 U.S. 283, 285 (1856) 21 Boumediene v. Bush,

553 U.S. 723 (2008) 12 In re Builders Supply Co.,

278 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ia. 1968) 18, 19 Butler v. Steam-Ship Co.,

130 U.S. 527, 555 (1889) 12 Califano v. Sanders,

430 U.S. 99 (1977) 10, 11 Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines,

871 F.2d 897, 1989 AMC 913 (9th Cir. 1989) 25 Carter v. Allstate Ins.,

743 F. Supp. 2d 103, 2010 AMC 2574 (D. Conn. 2010) 9, 10, 13, 15 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,

519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) 23 City of Fort Madison v. Emerald Lady,

990 F.2d 1086, 1993 AMC 2091 (8th Cir. 1993) 6, 27, 28 Coleman v. Jahncke Serv.,

341 F.2d 956, 1965 AMC 535 (5th Cir. 1965) 24 Complaint of Banker’s Trust Co.,

651 F.2d 160, 1981 AMC 1497 (3d Cir. 1981) 23, 24 In re Complaint of Sisson,

867 F.2d 341, 1989 AMC 609 (7th Cir. 1989) passim

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont’d)

Crawford v. Washington,

541 U.S. 36 (2004) 12 Dahda v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018) 11 David Wright Charter Serv. v. Wright,

925 F.2d 783, 1991 AMC 2927 (4th Cir. 1991) 9, 18 DeLovio v. Boit,

7 F. Cas. 418, 1997 AMC 550 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) 13 Delta Country Ventures v. Magana,

986 F.2d 1260, 1993 AMC 855 (9th Cir. 1993) 9 Evergreen Intern. (USA) Corp. v. Standard Warehouse,

33 F.3d 420, 1995 AMC 635 (4th Cir. 1994) 6, 27, 28, 29, 30 Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co.,

118 U.S. 610, 2001 AMC 595 (1886) 12 Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,

409 U.S. 249, 1973 AMC 1 (1972) 4, 8, 14, 16, 17 Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson,

457 U.S. 668, 1982 AMC 2253 (1982) 14, 15, 16, 17 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,

528 U.S. 167 (2000) 29 In re Garnett,

141 U.S. 1 (1891) 3, 12 In re Glacier Bay,

944 F.2d 577, 1992 AMC 448 (9th Cir. 1991) 20 Goodrich Transp. Co. v. Gagnon,

36 F. 123 (E.D. Wis. 1888) 12 Harris v. Reed,

489 U.S. 255 (1989) 3, 10, 11 Healy v. Ratta,

292 U.S. 263 (1934) 8, 14

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont’d)

Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys.,

572 U.S. 559 (2014) 8 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,

513 U.S. 527, 1995 AMC 913 (1995) 4, 7 Kingstate Oil v. M/V Green Star,

815 F.2d 918, 1987 AMC 1521 (3d Cir. 1987) 6, 25, 26, 27 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

511 U.S. 375 (1994) 11 Latin American Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Hi-Lift Marina, Inc.,

887 F.2d 1477, 1990 AMC 2004 (11th Cir. 1989) 9 Lewis Charters, Inc. v. Huckins Yacht Corp.,

871 F.2d 1046, 1989 AMC 1521 (11th Cir. 1989) 8, 17, 18, 19, 20 Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.,

531 U.S. 438, 2001 AMC 913 (2001) 29 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing,

347 U.S. 409, 1954 AMC 837 (1954) 20 MLC Fishing, Inc. v. Velez,

667 F.3d 140, 2012 AMC 485 (2d Cir. 2011) 8, 9, 13 Republic of France v. United States,

290 F.2d 395 1961 AMC 1082 (5th Cir. 1961) 22, 25, 29 Rice Growers Ass’n of Cal. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Frode,

171 F.2d 662, 1949 AMC 316 23, 25 Richardson v. Harmon,

222 U.S. 96, 2001 AMC 1207 (1911) passim Sisson v. Ruby,

497 U.S. 358, 1990 AMC 1801 (1990) 8, 17 The Maria,

67 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1933) 28, 29 Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts,

921 F.2d 775, 1991 AMC 1356 (8th Cir. 1990) 8, 9, 14

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont’d)

University of Texas Medical Branch v. United States,

557 F.2d 438, 1977 AMC 2607 (5th Cir. 1977) 20 Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc.,

306 F.3d 827, 2002 AMC 2270 (9th Cir. 2002) 25, 26, 29 Waterman S.S. Corp v. Gay Cottons,

414 F.2d 724, 1969 AMC 1682 (9th Cir. 1969) 24

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const., art. III, § 2 12, 13

Statutes

28 U.S.C. 1254(1) 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291 1, 22, 27, 28

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) passim

28 U.S.C. § 1330 10

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) 23

28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) 13, 17

46 U.S.C. § 30101 1, 10, 19

46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-08 26

46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12 passim

Other Authorities

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 5, 24

Kritzer, Herbert M., et al. “Understanding the Costs of Litigation: The Case of the Hourly-Fee Lawyer.” 9 American Bar Foundation Research Journal 559, 561 (1984) 27 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law (5th ed. 2016) 8, 13, 20

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reported at 890

F.3d 1384, 2018 AMC 3333 (4th Cir. 2018). The order of the District Court for the District of

South Carolina is reported at 243 F. Supp. 3d 702 (D.S.C. 2017).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on May 7, 2018. R. at 1a. A petition for rehearing

was denied on June 26, 2018. R at 7a. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September

4, 2018, and granted by this Court on December 3, 2018. This Court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the following statutory provisions, the relevant portions of which are

included in the Appendix:

28 U.S.C. § 1291

28 U.S.C. § 1292

28 U.S.C. § 1332

46 U.S.C. § 30101

46 U.S.C. § 30511

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On the evening of July 17, 2015, eight diners were injured by an explosion at the restaurant,

Sally’s Seafood Shack (hereafter “Seafood Shack,” or “the restaurant.”). R. at 10a. The explosion

allegedly resulted from an accumulation of gas in the kitchen “until something—most likely the

pilot light on the other [gas] range—triggered the explosion.” R. at 14a. At the time of the

explosion, the restaurant was located on a converted fishing boat on the banks of the Cooper River

in Charleston, South Carolina. R. at 2a. Upon exploding, the restaurant quickly sank into twelve

feet of water. R. at 10a. At all times relevant to this litigation, the Seafood Shack was indefinitely

moored on riverbanks that were surrounded by a cofferdam. R. at 9a-10a.

The Petitioners—Francis and Mary Marion, Charles and Mary Pinckney, John and

Elizabeth Rutledge, James S. Thurmond, and Essie Mae Washington-Williams—filed state tort

actions against the Respondent over the injuries they sustained as a result of the accident. R. at

9a. The Respondent, a South Carolina corporation and owner of the restaurant, petitioned the

District Court for the District of South Carolina to limit its liability pursuant to the Limitation Act,

46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12. R. at 2a, 9a. This petition stayed the Petitioners state-court claims, and

the Petitioners filed claims in the federal district court limitation proceedings. R. at 2a, 9a.

In the first phase of a bifurcated trial, the district court concluded that the Limitation Act

provides an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction, and that the Respondent was entitled to

limited liability pursuant to the Act. R. at 2a, 11a. Under the Limitation Act, the district court

determined that the Respondent could limit its liability, if any, to the post-accident value of the

restaurant: $1,000. R. at 2a, 10a. Before determining the extent to which the Respondent was

liable to the Petitioners from this $1,000 in phase two of the trial, the Petitioners timely filed an

interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit challenging the Respondent’s

3

right to limited liability. R. at 2a. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the

Limitation Act provides an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. R. at 4a. Nevertheless,

the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(3). R. at 1a, 6a.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. The Limitation Act does not furnish an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. A

clear consensus of scholars and courts—including every court of appeals that has considered the

question—maintains that the Act contains no grant of jurisdiction whatsoever. The Fourth Circuit

in this litigation is the only appellate court to hold otherwise.

The principles of statutory construction strongly counsel against an interpretation of the

Limitation Act which would massively expand federal jurisdiction. There is no language in the

statute to suggest a grant of jurisdiction, and to presume jurisdiction without an explicit statutory

statement would contravene this Court’s longstanding principle that “federal courts are without

jurisdiction unless ‘the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.

255, 266-67 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). At the time the statute was passed,

neither this Court nor the lower federal courts believed that it contained a jurisdictional grant—

indeed, all of the relatively contemporaneous opinions interpreting the Limitation Act hold that

the Act is “co-extensive” with traditional admiralty law. In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12 (1891).

Further, the interpretation of the Limitation Act the Respondent champions, which would extend

its reach to virtually any tort involving a boat, may exceed the constitutional grant of admiralty

jurisdiction; the canon of avoidance counsels this Court to avoid the risk of exceeding this

constitutional boundary.

4

Moreover, expanding federal jurisdiction under the Limitation Act would unduly interfere

with the operation of state tort law. The Respondent’s interpretation of the Act would countenance

federal jurisdiction over any incident involving an injury connected to a boat, regardless of whether

a federal court could exercise admiralty jurisdiction under this Court’s tests in Executive Jet

Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 1973 AMC 1 (1972) and Jerome B. Grubart,

Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 1995 AMC 913 (1995). This could lead

to untenable consequences by denying plaintiffs relief in what would ordinarily be simple state

tort cases, merely because the defendant was fortunate enough to inflict an injury with a boat. Such

an arrangement would vitiate state tort law regimes and inflict arbitrary injustice on plaintiffs.

The Fourth Circuit relied on Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 2001 AMC 1207 (1911),

to reach the erroneous conclusion that the Limitation Act is an independent basis for jurisdiction.

This reliance was misplaced. First, Richardson is no longer good law because it was decided

before this Court abandoned the strict locality test for admiralty jurisdiction in Executive Jet; thus,

it was decided under a completely different regime of admiralty jurisdiction. Second, when read

in context, Richardson does not establish the proposition that by invoking the Limitation Act, a

defendant can utterly disclaim the traditional tests for admiralty jurisdiction. Third, the policy

justifications for the broad interpretation of the Limitation Act featured in Richardson have

disappeared in the 118 years since the case was decided.

Because the Limitation Act is not an independent source of jurisdiction, this Court should

hold that there is no federal jurisdiction over this case, and allow the Petitioners to proceed with

their claims in state court where they belong.

5

II. The Limitation Act did not provide an independent source of original jurisdiction for the

district court. However, if it had provided such jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit would have

properly exercised appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).

The text of § 1292(a)(3) grants to the courts of appeals jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory

decrees. . .determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals

from final decrees are allowed.” This Congressional grant of appellate jurisdiction contains four

elements: the appeal must (1) be from an interlocutory decree, (2) determine a party’s right or

liability, (3) be from an admiralty case, and (4) be from a case in which appeals from final decrees

are allowed. The first, third, and fourth elements are not at issue. The second of these elements,

the core of this issue, was satisfied when the District of South Carolina entered an order granting

the Respondent, Seafood Shack, the right to limited liability. This order determined the

Respondent’s rights for three reasons.

First, the plain language of § 1292(a)(3) contemplates the exercise of jurisdiction over

appeals from interlocutory decrees granting the right of limited liability such as that granted to the

Respondent. The word “right” as used in § 1292(a)(3) encompasses a right to a limitation of

liability, such as that provided in the Limitation Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12. Black’s Law

Dictionary pertinently defines a right as a “recognized claim to acts or forbearances by

another. . .” that are ultimately operationalized by “the force of a politically organized society. . .”

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). An order granting a limitation of

liability pursuant to the Limitation Act fits squarely within this definition. Even if the word “right”

were to be defined more narrowly as a specific legal claim, see Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.

2014), the district court would still have been determining such a right because the Respondent

6

petitioned the District of South Carolina for their alleged right to limited liability, and the District

Court ruled on that right. R. at 14.

Second, even though the order did not conclusively determine the Respondent’s ultimate

liability, a non-appealable order would have the practical effect of ending the litigation. The cost

of further litigation for the victims grossly outweighs the infinitesimal $1,000 limitation the

District of South Carolina placed upon Respondent’s liability. See R. at 10a. Given this reality,

one can scarcely imagine a rational plaintiff pursuing the case further. See Kingstate Oil v. M/V

Green Star, 815 F.2d 918, 922, 1987 AMC 1521, 1524-25 (3d Cir. 1987).

Finally, the Fourth Circuit’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction would be consistent with the

statute’s purpose of judicial efficiency. Congress had one primary goal in mind when drafting

§ 1292(a)(3): judicial efficiency. See Evergreen Intern. (USA) Corp. v. Standard Warehouse, 33

F.3d 420, 423-424, 1995 AMC 635, 637-39 (4th Cir. 1994); City of Fort Madison v. Emerald Lady,

990 F.2d 1086, 1993 AMC 2091 (8th Cir. 1993). An interpretation of § 1292(a)(3) allowing for

appeals of limitation of liability orders best comports with the statute’s goal of judicial efficiency.

Disallowing such appeals would force plaintiffs to choose between either discontinuing litigation

or alternatively continuing litigation solely for the purpose of making the case appealable. Further,

disallowing such appeals where the underlying claim is being adjudicated in state court would

further frustrate judicial efficiency by forcing the state court to needlessly adjudicate its

proceedings before an appeal can take place.

ARGUMENT

There is no admiralty jurisdiction over this lawsuit. The court below correctly recognized

that “if the Limitation Act does not confer jurisdiction, there is no other basis for admiralty

7

jurisdiction.” R. at 4a. To establish admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim, a party must prove

three elements: that (1) “the tort occurred on navigable water or [that] the injury suffered on land

was caused by a vessel on navigable water,” (2) the incident may have “a potentially disruptive

impact on maritime commerce,” and (3) the tort shows a “substantial relationship to traditional

maritime activity.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527,

534, 1995 AMC 913, 918 (1995). The circumstances of this case meet none of these requirements.

The Seafood Shack was moored on a river bank, and hence not within “navigable waters.” R. at

11a. Since the restaurant was not engaged in maritime commerce, its sinking could not have any

impact on maritime commerce. R. at 11a. And because the restaurant “operated its business in

pretty much the same way that any other seafood restaurant would operate,” its operation was

unrelated to traditional maritime activity. R. at 11a. The Respondent’s only chance for federal

review is to prove that the Limitation Act furnishes an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction:

otherwise, the Respondent “agree[s] that there would be no other basis for federal jurisdiction at

all.” R. at 4a. The Limitation Act does not include an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction,

and so the district court should have dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.

As the Fourth Circuit astutely observed, this is a unique case. Our position is that the

district court never possessed original jurisdiction in admiralty, and that the Fourth Circuit

consequently lacked jurisdiction, as well. However, § 1292(a)(3)’s requirement that the case be

an “admiralty” one was the lone obstacle preventing a legitimate exercise of appellate jurisdiction

by the Fourth Circuit. If the Limitation Act indeed provided an independent basis for the district

court’s original jurisdiction, then the case would be an admiralty one, and the Fourth Circuit would

thus have been able to legitimately exercise appellate jurisdiction. If this case is indeed within

federal admiralty jurisdiction, then the Petitioners are entitled to an interlocutory appeal under

8

§ 1292(a)(3), because the district court entered an order which determined the Petitioners’ rights

and liabilities.

As both of the issues the Fourth Circuit decided were questions of law, this Court reviews

the issues de novo. See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 572 U.S. 559, 563 (2014).

I.   The Limitation Act Is Not an Independent Source of Admiralty Jurisdiction. The Respondent wants to substantially expand federal admiralty jurisdiction under the

Limitation Act. As this Court has recognized, “in determining whether to expand admiralty

jurisdiction, [it] ‘should proceed with caution.’” Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409

U.S. 249, 272, 1973 AMC 1, 19 (1972) (citation omitted). It has on numerous occasions

“require[d] that [federal courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits

which [the relevant] statute has defined,” reflecting the Court’s “[d]ue regard for the rightful

independence of state governments.” 409 U.S. at 272-73, 1973 AMC at 19 (quoting Healy v.

Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)). In keeping with this tradition, an overwhelming majority of

courts and scholars have concluded that the Limitation Act is not an independent basis for

admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 15-5 (5th

ed. 2016) (“The Limitation Act does not provide an independent source of admiralty jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction must meet the usual tests for admiralty tort jurisdiction.”); MLC Fishing, Inc. v. Velez,

667 F.3d 140, 143, 2012 AMC 485, 488 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Every Court of Appeals to reach the

question, however, has concluded that the Limitation Act does not provide an independent

foundation for federal admiralty jurisdiction.”); Lewis Charters, Inc. v. Huckins Yacht Corp., 871

F.2d 1046, 1989 AMC 1521 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Complaint of Sisson, 867 F.2d 341, 1989 AMC

609 (7th Cir. 1989), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 1990 AMC

1801 (1990); Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775, 1991 AMC

9

1356 (8th Cir. 1990); David Wright Charter Serv. v. Wright, 925 F.2d 783, 1991 AMC 2927 (4th

Cir. 1991); Latin American Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Hi-Lift Marina, Inc., 887 F.2d 1477, 1990 AMC

2004 (11th Cir. 1989); Delta Country Ventures v. Magana, 986 F.2d 1260, 1993 AMC 855 (9th

Cir. 1993).

The Fourth Circuit wrongly decided that the Limitation Act provides an independent basis

for federal admiralty jurisdiction, and hence that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the case.

Instead, the canons of statutory interpretation strongly suggest that the Fourth Circuit’s reading

was wrong, and that the Limitation Act does not create an independent basis for admiralty

jurisdiction. Moreover, interpreting the Limitation Act to massively expand federal jurisdiction

unduly interferes with the operation of state tort law. The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning turned on a

misunderstanding of the Court’s opinion in Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 2001 AMC 1207

(1911). Read in context, Richardson does not stand for the proposition that the Limitation Act

furnishes an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. Furthermore, the case is not controlling

today because it was decided under an outmoded body of admiralty law, and the policy reasons

underlying the decision have eroded with time. MLC Fishing, 667 F.3d at 142-43, 2012 AMC at

488. Since the Limitation Act does not contain any independent jurisdictional grant, this Court

should reverse the determination of the court of appeals and leave the Petitioners “free to pursue

their tort actions in state court.” R. at 3a n.3.

A.   Key Principles of Statutory Construction Counsel Against Reading the Limitation Act to Establish Independent Admiralty Jurisdiction.

The Court has left open the question of whether the Limitation Act serves as an independent

basis for admiralty jurisdiction, and there is no controlling precedent; thus, the question is one of

statutory interpretation. See MLC Fishing, 667 F.3d at 143, 2012 AMC at 488; Carter v. Allstate

Ins., 743 F. Supp. 2d 103, 111-12, 2010 AMC 2574, 2586 (D. Conn. 2010). The core principles

10

of statutory interpretation strongly suggest that the Limitation Act does not establish independent

admiralty jurisdiction. First, inferring jurisdiction from a statute which contains no jurisdiction-

granting language violates the principle that federal courts have limited jurisdiction. Second,

contemporaneous cases interpreting the Act indicate that the Act did not contain an independent

jurisdictional grant. Third, interpreting the Limitation Act as the Respondent suggests may exceed

the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction, violating the canon of avoidance.

1.   The Language of the Limitation Act Contains No Language Suggesting a Grant of Jurisdiction, and the Court Should Not Infer Jurisdiction Without Evidence.

The Limitation Act contains no language granting jurisdiction to federal courts. The

relevant language reads, “[t]he owner of a vessel may bring a civil action in a district court of the

United States for limitation of liability” incurred under the maritime liability sections of the U.S.

Code, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501 et seq., 46 U.S.C. § 30511(a). This is clearly not “the type of language

that Congress ordinarily uses when granting subject-matter jurisdiction to federal courts.” Carter,

743 F. Supp. 2d at 112, 2010 AMC at 2586; see also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977)

(observing that a statute was less likely to contain a grant of jurisdiction because “[n]one of the

codified statutory sections . . . [are] phrased like the usual grant of jurisdiction to proceed in the

federal courts.”). When Congress wishes to grant federal jurisdiction, “it ordinarily does so

explicitly by using the word ‘jurisdiction.’” Carter, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 112, 2010 AMC at 2586.

For instance, 28 U.S.C. § 1330, which permits federal courts to hear cases involving suits against

foreign states, provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to

amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state.”

The absence of any explicit reference to jurisdiction in the Limitation Act is evidence that

the Act does not confer jurisdiction. The Court’s jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of federal courts

11

establishes a “longstanding and venerated presumption that federal courts are without jurisdiction

unless ‘the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 266-

67 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . It is to

be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.”). When a party alleges that a statute

grants jurisdiction to federal courts, the Court looks to the language of the statute to find evidence

supporting such a grant. See id. The Court’s interpretation of the statute is animated by the

conviction that the language of the statute controls—that “[t]he statute means what it says.” Dahda

v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1491, 1498 (2018). A necessary corollary of this principle is that

statutes usually do not mean what they do not say. Thus, the absence of jurisdiction-granting

language is often strong evidence that a statute does not grant jurisdiction. See Califano, 430 U.S.

at 105-06 (holding that the relevant statute does not confer independent federal jurisdiction to

challenge agency action, because “the actual text of [the statute] nowhere contains an explicit grant

of jurisdiction,” and so “there is no basis for concluding that Congress . . . actually conceived of

the Act in jurisdictional terms.”).

The Fourth Circuit wrongly presumed, on the basis of this sparse language, that federal

courts can exercise jurisdiction under the Act. If Congress wished to permit independent admiralty

jurisdiction to the federal courts under the Limitation Act, it would have used the word

“jurisdiction” somewhere in the Act. It did not. The absence of any language suggesting that the

Limitation Act grants jurisdiction is itself evidence that it does not.

2.   Contemporaneous Interpretations of the Limitation Act Suggest That It Does Not Augment Ordinary Admiralty Jurisdiction.

Historical precedent also supports the view that the Limitation Act does not convey

independent admiralty jurisdiction. When the Court seeks to interpret a historic law, it often looks

12

to contemporaneous jurisprudence to understand the original meaning of the text. Cf. Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (examining English common law cases to discern the meaning

of “witnesses” in the Sixth Amendment). An examination of historical evidence reveals that most

contemporaneous jurists believed that the Limitation Act did not expand admiralty jurisdiction.

The earliest cases in which the Court considered whether the Limitation Act furnishes an

independent grant of jurisdiction are unanimous: it does not. See, e.g., Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co.,

118 U.S. 610, 625, 2001 AMC 595, 610 (1886) (“[W]here, as here, the tort is not a maritime tort,

there can be no jurisdiction in the admiralty.”); In re Garnett, 141 U.S. at 12 (“The law of limited

liability, as we have frequently had occasion to assert, was enacted by [C]ongress as a part of the

maritime law of this country, and therefore it is co-extensive . . . with . . . that law.”) (quoting

Butler v. Steam-Ship Co., 130 U.S. 527, 555 (1889)). Early opinions by lower federal courts reflect

the same understanding. See, e.g., Goodrich Transp. Co. v. Gagnon, 36 F. 123, 128 (E.D. Wis.

1888) (the Limitation Act “has reference only to maritime losses in respect to which relief can be

given in a court of admiralty.”). These cases serve as a useful barometer for assessing

contemporaneous judicial interpretations of the Limitation Act. The fact that these cases, with one

voice, state that the Limitation Act does not furnish an independent basis for jurisdiction is another

strong indication that it does not.

3.   Interpreting the Limitation Act to Confer Independent Admiralty Jurisdiction May Exceed the Constitutional Grant of Admiralty Jurisdiction, Violating the Canon of Avoidance.

The Court is “obligated to construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems if it is fairly

possible to do so.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008) (internal citations, brackets,

and quotation marks omitted). This is the canon of constitutional avoidance. The admiralty

jurisdiction of federal courts derives from two sources: first, Article III, § 2 of the U.S.

13

Constitution, which extends federal jurisdiction to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime

Jurisdiction”; second, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), granting district courts original jurisdiction of “Any

civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” The constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction

is doubtless greater than the statutory grant, although its precise boundaries are unsettled. See

Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3-1 (5th ed. 2016) (citing DeLovio v. Boit,

7 F. Cas. 418, 1997 AMC 550 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815)).

Although there is no clear test as to the constitutional limits of admiralty jurisdiction, the

Respondent’s interpretation of the Limitation Act to “confer federal jurisdiction over controversies

that do not occur on or over navigable waters ‘might well exceed the scope of the constitutional

grant of admiralty jurisdiction.’” MLC Fishing, 667 F.3d at 143, 2012 AMC at 488 (quoting

Carter, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 113, 2010 AMC at 2588). Like the defendant in Carter, the Respondent

here wishes the Court to “extend[] federal admiralty jurisdiction to reach any tort involving a boat.”

See Carter, 743 F. Supp. 2d at 113, 2010 AMC at 2588. This construction would produce results

that are almost certainly outside the constitutional scope of admiralty jurisdiction. Suppose that a

defendant instructed her employee to transport her boat along the highway by hitching it to a truck,

and that the employee negligently fastened the boat to the truck, causing it to detach and kill the

driver of the car behind her. Under Respondent’s interpretation, the defendant could use the

Limitation Act to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court to limit her liability—liability for

tortious conduct that involved no connection with traditional maritime activity, and may have

occurred hundreds of miles from any navigable waterway. This result is untenable. If there are

any limits whatsoever to the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction, the Respondent’s

interpretation would surely exceed them. The canon of avoidance counsels against such a risk.

14

B.   An Expansion of Admiralty Jurisdiction Under the Limitation Act Would Upset

the Balance Between Federal and State Courts, and Unduly Interfere With the Operation of State Tort Law.

The Respondent’s interpretation of the Limitation Act would “displace state responsibility

and choke the federal judicial docket on the basis of federal concerns that in truth are only

‘imaginary.’” Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 685-86, 1982 AMC 2253, 2267

(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). As this Court has repeatedly recognized, “[t]he power reserved to

the states, under the Constitution, to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts

may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of the

Constitution.” Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 272-23, 1973 AMC at 19 (quoting Healy, 292 U.S. at 270)

(emphasis added). The initial justification for granting federal courts admiralty jurisdiction is “to

protect and promote maritime commerce by the application of uniform rules on navigable

waterways.” Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations, 921 F.2d at 780, 1991 AMC at 1363. However,

when considering a situation “which is only fortuitously and incidentally connected to navigable

waters and which bears no relationship to traditional maritime activity,” and state courts “could

plainly exercise jurisdiction over the suit, and could plainly apply familiar concepts of [state] tort

law without any effect on maritime endeavors,” there is no justification for federal jurisdiction.

Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 273, 1973 AMC at 19.

In short, the Court’s jurisprudence on admiralty jurisdiction prudently recognizes the

inherent trade-off between federal admiralty jurisdiction and state common-law tort jurisdiction.

Of course, in some circumstances, this trade-off is necessary to achieve the goals of uniformity

and predictability. But where state courts could resolve an issue without disrupting the uniformity

of laws governing maritime activities, for the federal courts to usurp their jurisdiction would be a

15

“substantial—and purposeless—expansion of federal authority.” Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at

684, 1982 AMC at 2266 (Powell, J., dissenting).

The Respondent’s interpretation of the Limitation Act, which the court below adopted, is

the epitome of a purposeless expansion of federal authority. As discussed above, the Respondent

would permit federal admiralty jurisdiction “to reach any tort involving a boat.” Carter, 743 F.

Supp. 2d at 113, 2010 AMC at 2588. This interpretation would reach any number of possible state

tort claims. As this Court has recognized, torts often emerge in the most “fortuitous

circumstances.” Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 675, 1982 AMC at 2259. Suppose, for example,

that a plaintiff suffered a classic slip-and-fall accident at a museum while enjoying an exhibit that

placed her on the deck of a historic boat because the defendant’s employee had negligently failed

to place a sign cautioning patrons that the floor was wet. Under the Respondent’s interpretation,

the museum could limit its liability to the value of the boat. If the Court were to adopt the regime

the Respondent advocates, whenever a defendant was fortunate enough to injure a plaintiff in an

accident involving a boat, she could limit her liability and deny the plaintiff the relief state tort law

would have ordinarily provided. Such an invasion of state court jurisdiction “would also be

inconsistent with the principles of federalism espoused by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet.”

Sisson, 867 F.2d at 350, 1989 AMC at 624. This expansion would “ero[de]. . . federalism—a basic

principle of the Constitution and our federal Union.” Foremost Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 677-78, 1982

AMC at 2261 (Powell, J., dissenting). This Court should not countenance such an erosion.

C.   Richardson Does Not Establish That the Limitation Act Furnishes an Independent Basis for Admiralty Jurisdiction.

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion turned on a misinterpretation of the significance of

Richardson v. Harmon. When the Supreme Court decided Richardson over one hundred years

ago, the test for the existence of admiralty jurisdiction was “exclusively one of ‘locality.’” Sisson,

16

867 F.2d at 349, 1989 AMC at 622 (citing Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 253, 1973 AMC at 4; Foremost

Ins. Co., 457 U.S. at 674, 1982 AMC at 2258). This meant that determining whether a court had

admiralty jurisdiction depended entirely on the location where the tortious conduct occurred—“[i]f

the wrong occurred on navigable waters, the action [was] within admiralty jurisdiction; if the

wrong occurred on land, it [was] not.” Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 253, 1973 AMC at 4. This locality

test excluded admiralty jurisdiction in cases involving a collision between a vessel on navigable

waters and any “structure on land,” because there the “wrong”—that is, the injury to the

structure—necessarily occurred on land. Richardson, 222 U.S. at 101, 2001 AMC at 1209.

In Richardson, a steam barge traversing navigable waters collided with a bridge, severely

damaging it. 222 U.S. at 100, 2001 AMC at 1208. The owner of the bridge sued the owner of the

barge in state court; the barge owner removed to federal court by claiming a limitation of liability

under the Limitation Act. 222 U.S. at 100, 2001 AMC at 1208. The Court sustained the admiralty

jurisdiction of the lower court, stressing that the purpose of the Limitation Act is to protect ship

owners engaged in maritime activity from excessive liability so as to encourage the development

of the shipping industry. 222 U.S. at 102-05, 2001 AMC at 1209-11. However, the Court

emphasized the narrowness of its holding: the opinion extended only to the facts of the case, where

“the owner[] [incurred] liability for a tort permitted or incurred through the master or crew,

although nonmaritime, because due to [sic] a collision between the ship and a structure upon land.”

222 U.S. at 106, 2001 AMC 1212.

This narrow holding does not establish that the Limitation Act furnishes an independent

basis for admiralty jurisdiction for three reasons. First, the laws encompassing both admiralty

jurisdiction generally and the specific facts at issue in Richardson have been replaced entirely,

meaning that Richardson is no longer binding precedent. Second, even if Richardson is

17

controlling, the case does not establish that a defendant can invoke admiralty jurisdiction simply

because she happens to own a boat. Third, the policy justifications for the Richardson decision no

longer apply today.

1.   The Richardson Opinion Preceded the Nexus Test Established in Executive Jet and Foremost, and Therefore Is No Longer Good Law.

Two subsequent changes in the law of admiralty jurisdiction have entirely obviated the rule

in Richardson. First, the Court abandoned the rigid locality test for admiralty jurisdiction. Instead,

it developed a test by which a federal court can exercise admiralty jurisdiction if there is a

“sufficient nexus” between the alleged wrong and “traditional maritime activity.” Foremost Ins.

Co., 457 U.S. at 674, 1982 AMC at 2258; Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 261, 1973 AMC at 6. Second, in

1948, Congress passed the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, which extended admiralty

jurisdiction to cases involving injuries “to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable

waters, even though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land.” 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a).

Because Richardson was decided in the context of a radically different body of admiralty

law, it is not binding precedent today. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized this; in Sisson

v. Ruby, it explicitly left open the question of whether the Limitation Act is an independent source

of jurisdiction. 497 U.S. at 359 n.1, 1990 AMC at 1802 n.1 (1990) (“We need not decide [whether

the Limitation Act provides jurisdiction because] § 1333(1) is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.”).

If Richardson remained binding precedent, the Court would not have intentionally left the question

open. Many circuit courts that have considered the question have reached similar conclusions

about Richardson’s irrelevance in modern jurisprudence. See Sisson, 867 F.2d at 349, 1989 AMC

at 622 (“We question the applicability of Richardson v. Harmon to the present case.”); Lewis

Charters, 871 F.2d at 1052, 1989 AMC at 1530 (“Richardson was decided before the Supreme

18

Court explicitly included a nexus requirement in the test for admiralty jurisdiction under Section

1333.”); David Wright Charter Serv., 925 F.2d at 785, 1991 AMC at 2929.

2.   Read in Context, the Richardson Opinion Does Not Hold That the Limitation Act Is an Independent Basis for Admiralty Jurisdiction in Cases That Are Otherwise Unconnected to Maritime Activity.

When considered in context, Richardson emphatically does not stand for the proposition

that the Limitation Act furnishes an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction in any ordinary

tort case that happens to involve a boat. Several circuit courts that have addressed whether the

Limitation Act is an independent source of jurisdiction suggest a more sensible reading. In

Richardson and other Limitation Act cases decided before Executive Jet, “admiralty jurisdiction

under the Limitation of Liability Act—although purportedly invoking a separate basis of

jurisdiction—did not ignore completely the [ordinary] requirements of admiralty jurisdiction.”

Sisson, 867 F.2d at 349, 1989 AMC at 622-23. Instead, defendants invoking the Limitation Act

faced a “somewhat relaxed” test for admiralty jurisdiction, which required that they prove that “the

vessel involved in the tort bear a ‘relation’ to navigable waters,” but not that “the damage occur

on navigable water.” 867 F.2d at 349, 1989 AMC at 622-23.

For example, in In re Builders Supply Co., 278 F. Supp. 254, 255 (N.D. Ia. 1968), a district

court found that it lacked admiralty jurisdiction over a case involving a boating accident that

occurred in a non-navigable body of water, and as such did not satisfy the locality test. The

defendant argued that it had independent jurisdiction under the Limitation Act, and pointed to

cases where courts found admiralty jurisdiction under the Act over injuries caused by ocean-faring

yachts which were temporarily stored on land. Id. at 258. The court, however, concluded that the

Limitation Act extended to the yachts only because there was an “obvious underlying connection

with navigable waters in that the yachts were usually used on the Atlantic Ocean”—whereas the

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boats in the case before it had never been used in navigable waters. Id. Thus, in view of the

Richardson decision and subsequent opinions under the locality regime, the Limitation Act was

not a per se source of jurisdiction—rather, it permitted a relaxation of the strict locality rules in

certain delimited circumstances.

3.   The Policy Justifications Underlying Richardson No Longer Apply Today.

As referenced above, the Richardson decision was a solution to a very specific problem:

while vessel owners could use the Limitation Act to restrict their liability in cases where their

vessel damaged another vessel, they could not do so when their vessel damaged a land-bound

structure. See Richardson, 222 U.S. at 101, 2001 AMC at 1209. In considering whether the

Limitation Act should extend to collisions with land-based structures, the Court lamented that the

Act “is not as definite as desirable,” but found that failing to afford vessel owners the option to

limit their liability under the circumstances would be inconsistent with the “manifest policy of

Congress to further encourage the shipowning industry.” 222 U.S. at 102-04, 2001 AMC at 1209-

10. However, as numerous courts have concluded, “[t]he reasons for the Supreme Court’s liberal

construction in 1911 no longer exist today.” Lewis Charters, 871 F.2d at 1053, 1989 AMC at

1531. There are two main reasons for this conclusion.

First, as discussed in the previous section, the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act

provides for ordinary admiralty jurisdiction over the specific scenario at issue in Richardson: it

permits jurisdiction where a vessel on navigable water has caused an injury “even though the injury

or damage is done or consummated on land.” 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a). This extension “removed

[the] inconsistency of the strict locality test,” ensuring that when a vessel on navigable waters

collided with something, whether another vessel or a structure, admiralty jurisdiction would lie.

Lewis Charters, 871 F.2d at 1050, 1989 AMC at 1526. In doing so, the legislation “eliminate[s]

20

the need and reason for the rule established by” Richardson. Sisson, 867 F.2d at 349, 1989 AMC

at 622. Thus, legislative means have solved the specific policy concern animating the Richardson

decision. Id.

Second, and more generally, the Richardson Court’s “liberal construction” of the

Limitation Act was based on its assessment of “the Congressional aim to lessen or remove certain

economic burdens on American shipowners.” Lewis Charters, 871 F.2d at 1053, 1989 AMC at

1531. Congress passed the Act shortly after Great Britain passed a similar law limiting shipowner

liability; the intent of the statute was to make “the American [shipping] industry competitive with

that of Great Britain.” In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 580, 1992 AMC 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1991).

Needless to say, the American maritime industry and its competitive position are substantially

different today than they were in 1851. Accordingly, courts have described the Act as “hopelessly

anachronistic.” University of Texas Medical Branch v. United States, 557 F.2d 438, 441, 1977

AMC 2607, 2608 (5th Cir. 1977). There are several reasons why the law as it stands is “especially

inappropriate.” Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437, 1954 AMC 837, 859 (1954)

(Black, J., dissenting). First, the expansion of mechanisms to limit liability, such as “insurance,

bills of lading statutes that put substantive limits on liability for cargo loss, and the ability to limit

claims by contract” have rendered a broad statutory limitation of liability unnecessary. Thomas J.

Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 15-1 (5th ed. 2016). Second, to the extent that a

limitation on liability should be available to shipowners, such a limitation “should be drawn to

take advantage of economic efficiencies and economies of scale in procuring and paying for

insurance to cover potential losses.” Id. Of course, the Court cannot and should not ignore the

statute. But the reasons the Court interpreted the statute broadly in 1911 have lost their force

today.

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In short, there is no reason to believe that the Limitation Act is an independent source of

jurisdiction. First, the relevant principles of statutory construction strongly counsel against an

interpretation of the Act that would unnecessarily expand federal jurisdiction, defy contemporary

understandings of the Act, and possibly exceed the Constitutional grant of jurisdiction. Second,

interpreting the Act to extend federal jurisdiction to virtually any tort involving a boat would

trample on the ability of state courts to apply their own tort law within their borders, upsetting the

balance between federal and state law in a way that is inconsistent with this Court’s

precedent. Third, the reliance by the court below on Richardson is thoroughly misplaced; the case

is no longer good law, does not hold that the Limitation Act discards the normal tests for admiralty

jurisdiction, and was decided based on policy concerns that are inapplicable today.

II.   If the District Court Had Original Jurisdiction Over the Petition to Limit Liability, Then the Fourth Circuit Would Have Appellate Jurisdiction Under § 1292(a)(3).

The text of § 1292(a)(3) grants to the courts of appeals jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory

decrees… determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals

from final decrees are allowed.” This Congressional grant of appellate jurisdiction contains four

elements: the appeal must (1) be from an interlocutory decree, (2) determine a party’s right or

liability, (3) be from an admiralty case, and (4) be from a case in which appeals from final decrees

are allowed. The first, third, and fourth elements are not at issue. The District Court for the District

of South Carolina’s order granting the Respondent a limitation of liability was an interlocutory

decree because it is a judgment determining an issue of law but not conclusively resolving the

case. Beebe v. Russell, 60 U.S. 283, 285 (1856) (“A decree is understood to be interlocutory

whenever an inquiry as to matter of law or fact is directed, preparatory to a final decision.”). If

the Limitation Act were to provide an independent basis for the District Court’s exercise of

admiralty jurisdiction, then it would necessarily follow that this case would be an “admiralty case”

22

within § 1292(a)(3). Furthermore, this case would be appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 had

the district court properly exercised original admiralty jurisdiction.

The second of these elements, the core of this issue, was satisfied when the District of

South Carolina entered an order granting the Respondent, Seafood Shack, the right to limited

liability. This order determined the Respondent’s rights for three reasons. First, the plain language

of § 1292(a)(3) contemplates the exercise of jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory decrees

granting the right of limited liability such as that granted to the Respondent. Second, even though

the order did not conclusively determine the Respondent’s actual liability, a non-appealable order

would have the practical effect of ending the litigation. Finally, the Fourth Circuit’s exercise of

appellate jurisdiction would be consistent with the statute’s purpose of limiting unnecessary

proceedings.

A.   The Plain Language of § 1292(a)(3) Contemplates Appellate Jurisdiction Over an Interlocutory Order Granting a Limitation of Liability. 1.   The Phrase “Rights and Liabilities” Contemplates Appellate Jurisdiction

Even Where Liability Has Not Been Finally Determined.

In admiralty cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) grants to the federal courts of appeals appellate

jurisdiction over those interlocutory orders determining rights of parties and those interlocutory

orders determining liabilities of parties. Despite the statute’s use of the conjunction “and” in the

phrase “rights and liabilities,” this element should be read disjunctively. See Republic of France

v. United States, 290 F.2d 395, 397, 1961 AMC 1082, 1084 (5th Cir. 1961) (exercising appellate

jurisdiction over an interlocutory decree denying a limitation of liability, despite a lack of a final

ruling by the district court on liability); see also In re Aramark Sports and Entm’t Servs., LLC, 831

F.3d 1264, 1275, 2016 AMC 2138, 2149 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[F]ederal courts have been consistent

23

in giving the statutory language its plain meaning: all that is required is that a right or liability of

a party have been determined.”) (emphasis added).

A disjunctive use of the word “and” is commonly used in both the English language

generally and in jurisdictional statutes specifically. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), granting

diversity jurisdiction to federal district courts, uses the conjunction “and” in precisely the same

manner as § 1292(a)(3). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) lists four different scenarios in which a district court

may appropriately exercise diversity jurisdiction. After listing the third such scenario, the statute

uses the word “and”. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3). Indisputably, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) does not require

all four subsections to be satisfied. See generally Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)

(“The current general-diversity statute, permitting federal district court jurisdiction over suits for

more than $50,000 ‘between ... citizens of different States,’ 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), thus applies only

to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each

defendant.”). The common linguistic thread between these two statutes is their phrasing of

jurisdiction in terms of situations where jurisdiction is appropriate, rather than in terms of elements

that a prospective litigant must satisfy. Thus, even though the district court below did not yet

conclusively determine the Respondent’s ultimate liability, the Fourth Circuit’s exercise of

jurisdiction would nonetheless have been appropriate because the district court determined the

Respondent’s right to limited liability. See Rice Growers Ass’n of Cal. v. Rederiaktiebolaget

Frode, 171 F.2d 662, 663, 1949 AMC 316, 317 (9th Cir. 1948) (“The question is, is any right of

[the litigant] finally determined by the decree fixing the limit of liability?”).

2.   The District Court for the District of South Carolina Determined Respondent’s Rights When It Granted Them a Right to Limited Liability.

The word “right” as used in § 1292(a)(3) encompasses a right to a limitation of liability,

such as that provided in the Limitation Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12. See generally Complaint of

24

Banker’s Trust Co., 651 F.2d 160, 163-64, 1981 AMC 1497, 1497-98 (3d Cir. 1981); Waterman

S.S. Corp v. Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724, 727, 1969 AMC 1682, 1684-85 (9th Cir. 1969); Coleman

v. Jahncke Serv., 341 F.2d 956, 957, 1965 AMC 535, 536-37 (5th Cir. 1965). Black’s Law

Dictionary pertinently defines a right as a “recognized claim to acts or forbearances by

another. . .” that are ultimately operationalized by “the force of a politically organized society. . .”

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). An order granting a limitation of

liability pursuant to the Limitation Act fits squarely within this definition because it grants a right

to a litigant against liability above the salvage value, requiring courts to forbear from assigning

damages above that specified amount. If the district court had properly exercised its original

jurisdiction, then it emphatically would have been determining the Respondent’s rights under

§ 1292(a)(3).

Moreover, if the word “right” were to be defined more narrowly as a specific legal claim,

see Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), the district court would still have been determining

such a right. Courts have found appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(3) where a district court

decided an ancillary claim or cause of action in the case without deciding the ultimate issue of

liability. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. v. M/V Sea Producer is a prime example. 882 F.2d 425, 1989

AMC 2935 (9th Cir. 1989). In All Alaskan, a shipper commenced an action for cargo damage

against a vessel for negligently allowing $1.5 million dollars of crabs to thaw. Id. at 426-27, 1989

AMC at 2937-38. However, the district court, by classifying All Alaskan’s claim as contractual

in nature, ultimately held that a third party’s foreclosure on the vessel’s mortgage had priority over

the shipper’s claim. Id. Although the district court did not rule on the vessel’s contractual liability

to the shipper, it nonetheless determined a specific legal claim—that a mortgage foreclosure had

lien priority over the contractual claim. Id. The District of South Carolina’s interlocutory order

25

parallels the one from All Alaskan Seafoods. Here, we are likewise dealing with a specific legal

claim—a right to limited liability under the Limitation Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-12. The

Respondent petitioned the District of South Carolina for their alleged right to limited liability, and

the district court ruled on that right. R. at 14. Even under this narrow definition of the word

“right,” the district court undoubtedly determined one. See Rice Growers, 171 F.2d at 663, 1949

AMC at 317; see also Republic of France, 290 F.2d at 397, 1961 AMC at 1084 (exercising

appellate jurisdiction over denial of a limitation of liability petition).

B.   The Fourth Circuit Had Appellate Jurisdiction Because a Non-Appealable Order Limiting Seafood Shack’s Liability Would Effectively End the Litigation.

Although a strict, textualist reading of § 1292(a)(3) would be sufficient for the Petitioners

to prevail, the Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit have nonetheless embraced a broader understanding

of the statute’s reach, whereby the federal courts of appeal will possess jurisdiction over

interlocutory appeals that would end the litigation as a practical matter. See All Alaskan Seafoods,

882 F.2d 425, 1989 AMC 2935; Carman Tool & Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines, 871 F.2d 897,

898, 1989 AMC 913, 914 (9th Cir. 1989); Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 2002

AMC 2270 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts have found appellate jurisdiction under this theory where an

interlocutory order’s practical effects render further pursuance of a legal claim “an empty rite.”

Kingstate Oil v. M/V Green Star, 815 F.2d 918, 922, 1987 AMC 1521, 1524-25 (3d Cir. 1987);

All Alaskan Seafoods, 882 F.2d at 429, 1989 AMC 2935, 2937. This standard is particularly well

suited to admiralty law because of the high frequency of limitations of liability, and should

therefore be adopted as the guiding standard for § 1292(a)(3). See Wallis, 306 F.3d at 834, 2002

AMC at 2276 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Limitation of liability provisions are common in maritime

cases. . .”).

26

The federal courts of appeals may permissibly exercise jurisdiction where, absent an

appeal, “an economically rational plaintiff will not ordinarily pursue the case to judgment, and the

correctness of the district court’s determination…will never be reviewed.” Wallis, 306 F.3d at

834, 2002 AMC at 2276. In Wallis, the plaintiff brought suit under the Death on the High Seas

Act (“DOHSA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–08, against a cruise ship from which her husband died.

Id. at 830, 2002 AMC at 2271-72. The district court limited the DOHSA claim to a mere $60,000,

and the plaintiff subsequently appealed. Id. Although the district court did not ultimately reach

the issue of liability, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless entertained the appeal, in part because an

economically rational plaintiff would not continue to pursue the litigation absent an ability to

appeal. See id. at 834, 2002 AMC at 2276. In exercising its jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit rejected

a narrow reading of § 1292(a)(3) that would ultimately have the practical effect of leaving

limitations of liability unappealable. See id.

This sound reasoning is not limited to the Ninth Circuit. The Third Circuit has also

recognized that such exercises of jurisdiction are appropriate. Kingstate Oil, 815 F.2d at 922, 1987

AMC at 1524-25. In Kingstate Oil, the district court ordered the sale of a vessel to cover the costs

of claims against it. Id. at 920, 1987 AMC at 1522. However, multiple third parties with additional

claims against the vessel intervened, taking lien priority over the original claimants. Id. Yet again,

the reviewing court read § 1292(a)(3) flexibly, exercising jurisdiction despite a lack of any ultimate

ruling on liability. Id. The Third Circuit reasoned that appellate jurisdiction should therefore exist

because the third parties’ lien priorities effectively ended the litigation. Id. at 922, 1987 AMC at

1524-25.

The present case fits squarely within this line of cases for two reasons. First, the cost of

further litigation for the victims grossly outweighs the infinitesimal $1,000 limitation the District

27

of South Carolina placed upon the Respondent’s liability. See R. at 10a, 14a. Lawyers cost money.

See Kritzer, Herbert M., et al. “Understanding the Costs of Litigation: The Case of the Hourly-Fee

Lawyer.” 9 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH JOURNAL 559, 561 (1984) (“It should not be

surprising that the dominant component of out-of-pocket costs is lawyer fees.”). Given this reality,

one can scarcely imagine a rational plaintiff pursuing the case further. See Kingstate, 815 F.2d at

922, 1987 AMC at 1524-25. Second, and even more particular to this case, the plaintiffs here are

eight injured individuals. R. at 2a, 9a. Even if the plaintiffs obtained legal services free of charge,

each individual would receive a maximum of $125 at the conclusion of litigation. If plaintiffs are

routinely facing such odds, admiralty cases featuring limitations of liability could quickly become

unappealable absent a more rational understanding § 1292(a)(3).

C.   The Fourth Circuit Exercising Appellate Jurisdiction Would Be Consistent With The Statute’s Purpose of Increasing the Efficiency of Admiralty Litigation. 1.   In Drafting § 1292(a)(3), Congress Was Primarily Concerned with

Efficiency More Broadly, Not Solely Appeals From Trials Bifurcating Liability and Damages Specifically.

Congress had one primary goal in mind when drafting § 1292(a)(3): judicial efficiency.

See Evergreen Intern. (USA) Corp. v. Standard Warehouse, 33 F.3d 420, 423-424, 1995 AMC

635, 637-39 (4th Cir. 1994); City of Fort Madison v. Emerald Lady, 990 F.2d 1086, 1993 AMC

2091 (8th Cir. 1993). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, an appellant must normally appeal from “final

decisions” determining both liability and damages. This statute similarly has judicial efficiency

in mind, preventing “the entanglement of the district and appellate courts in each other’s

adjudications in an unruly and ultimately inefficient way.” Evergreen, 33 F.3d at 423, 1995 AMC

at 639. However, Congress soon realized that in some cases, “the dangers and inefficiencies

inherent in interlocutory appeals are outweighed by the benefits to be gained by an immediate

28

consideration of the disposition of the particular matter in the court below.” Id. at 423-24, 1995

AMC at 639. Thus, Congress enacted § 1292(a)(3) to avoid the “long, burdensome, and perhaps

unnecessary damages proceeding[s].” City of Fort Madison, 990 F.2d at 1089, 1993 AMC at 2095.

Traditionally, admiralty cases were bifurcated at the trial court level: the court would first

adjudicate the issue of liability, and if it found liability it would then refer the case to a special

master to adjudicate damages. Id. Although Congress primarily had this factual situation in mind

when it drafted § 1292(a)(3), the broader purpose of improving judicial efficiency supports

interpreting the statute to include appeals of limitation of liability orders. See The Maria, 67 F.2d

571 (2d Cir. 1933).

2.   Allowing Appeals From Limitation of Liability Orders Would Avoid Unnecessary Proceedings, Supporting Congress’ Goal of Judicial Efficiency.

An interpretation of § 1292(a)(3) allowing for appeals of limitation of liability orders best

comports with the statute’s goal of judicial efficiency for two distinct reasons. First, disallowing

such appeals would force plaintiffs to choose between either discontinuing litigation or

alternatively continuing litigation solely for the purpose of making the case appealable. Both of

these pathways would frustrate judicial efficiency. Second, disallowing such appeals where the

underlying claim is being adjudicated in state court would further frustrate judicial efficiency by

forcing the state court to needlessly adjudicate its proceedings before an appeal can take place.

Where a district court has severely limited a party’s liability in an admiralty case, a plaintiff

lacking the right of appeal has two options. If a hypothetical plaintiff continues litigation to the

liability or damages stages solely to obtain the right of appeal under §§ 1292(a)(3) or 1291, and

the reviewing court ultimately affirms, these further proceedings will have been rendered

effectively meaningless. The result is more proceedings that could ultimately have been avoided

29

with “an immediate consideration of the disposition of the particular matter in the court below,”

frustrating judicial efficiency. Evergreen, 33 F.3d at 423-24, 1995 AMC at 639; see also The

Maria, 67 F.2d at 571 (“[Section 1292(a)(3)] was primarily intended to avoid the expense and

delay of a reference to compute damages, since it is always possible that the libelant may later turn

out to have no right to recover at all”). Alternatively, a rational plaintiff, upon considering that

their maximum recovery would only be marginally better than zero, might decide to cease the

litigation altogether. See Wallis, 306 F.3d at 834, 2002 AMC at 2276. In doing so, unsettled legal

questions surrounding limitations of liability are left unanswered, also frustrating judicial

efficiency. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 192

(2000) (characterizing mootness as more flexible than Article III standing, in part because the

judiciary “abandon[ing] the case at an advanced stage may prove more wasteful than frugal.”).

These outcomes are particularly troubling given the high frequency of limitations of liability in

admiralty cases. See Wallis, 306 F.3d at 834, 2002 AMC at 2276.

The possible existence of contemporaneous litigation in both state and federal courts

further counsels towards allowing this brand of interlocutory appeal under § 1292(a)(3). In Lewis

v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., this Court held that a state court may permissibly adjudicate the

merits of an action against a ship owner even though a federal district court is adjudicating the ship

owner’s claim to limited liability. 531 U.S. 438, 455-56, 2001 AMC 913, 924-25 (2001). The

state court proceedings would be stayed until the federal district court has reached a decision, but

the stay would be lifted if the district court were to deny the limitation. In re Aramark, 831 F.3d

at 1276, 2016 AMC at 2149. The federal district court’s decision on the limitation will then have

a res judicata effect on the state court proceedings. Republic of France, 290 F.2d at 397, 1961

AMC at 1084. Absent the ability to immediately appeal, the ship owner would ultimately have to

30

navigate state court proceedings that could be rendered meaningless by a federal appeal. See In re

Aramark, 831 F.3d at 1276-77, 2016 AMC at 2149-50. This Court should thus avoid “the

entanglement of the district and appellate courts in each other’s adjudications in an unruly and

ultimately inefficient way” by holding that § 1292(a)(3) applies to appeals of limitations of

liability. Evergreen, 33 F.3d at 423, 1995 AMC at 639.

The District of South Carolina determined the Respondent’s rights by granting them

limited liability under the Limitation Act. This conclusion would be compelled regardless of the

interpretive method applied to § 1292(a)(3). We thus ask this Court to reverse the Fourth Circuit,

and hold that, had the District of South Carolina properly exercised original jurisdiction, the Fourth

Circuit would have consequently been properly exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(3).

CONCLUSION

This case is not properly in federal court. The Limitation Act, the only possible basis for

admiralty jurisdiction, does not furnish an independent basis for jurisdiction according to the vast

majority of the courts and scholars that have considered the question. The text of the Limitation

Act contains no jurisdiction-granting language, and this Court should not infer a grant of

jurisdiction without textual evidence. Moreover, historic precedent indicates that courts did not

believe the Limitation Act conferred jurisdiction around the time the statute became law. And the

interpretation the Respondent suggests, which could extend admiralty jurisdiction to any tort

involving a boat, may exceed the Constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction. For the same

reason, the Respondent’s interpretation would vitiate state tort law and arbitrarily deny relief to

plaintiffs unfortunate enough to have been hurt by a defendant who owns a boat. Contrary to the

Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, Richardson v. Harmon does not establish that the Limitation Act

31

confers jurisdiction—the case is no longer good law, does not establish that the Limitation Act can

create admiralty jurisdiction absent some connection to maritime activity, and is no longer

supported by compelling policy considerations. This Court should not greatly expand the

jurisdiction of federal courts to deny the Petitioners the relief they are due in state court.

If, however, the Limitation Act does establish admiralty jurisdiction, then the Fourth

Circuit properly exercised appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). The plain language

of § 1292(a)(3) contemplates appellate jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory decrees

affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties. The Respondent’s Limitation Act petition

meaningfully affected the Petitioners’ right to prosecute their legal rights in state court. Moreover,

because granting a limitation of liability reduced the Petitioners’ possible recovery to a fraction of

the damages they suffered, it effectively ended the litigation, making an interlocutory appeal the

most sensible course of action. These points are consistent with the entire purpose of § 1292(a)(3),

which is to promote judicial efficiency. If the Court adopted the Respondent’s position, every time

a district court granted a limitation of liability to a defendant, the plaintiff would be left with a

Sophie’s choice: the plaintiff could choose to bear the high costs of continued litigation, solely

for the purpose of getting a reversal on appeal (which, if successful would only lead to more

duplicative litigation on remand) or abandon the case entirely. This is both unjust to plaintiffs and

the pinnacle of judicial inefficiency.

32

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse the Fourth

Circuit and hold that the district court did not have admiralty jurisdiction under the Limitation Act,

or, in the alternative, that the Fourth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(3).

Respectfully submitted, _____________________________________

Counsel for Petitioners

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APPENDIX

28 U.S.C. § 1291: Final Decisions of District Courts

The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.

***

28 U.S.C. § 1292: Interlocutory Decisions

(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:

(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court; (2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property; (3) Interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.

(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.

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APPENDIX (Cont’d)

(c) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction—

(1) of an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree described in subsection (a) or (b) of this section in any case over which the court would have jurisdiction of an appeal under section 1295 of this title; and (2) of an appeal from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement which would otherwise be appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final except for an accounting.

(d) (1) When the chief judge of the Court of International Trade issues an order under the provisions of section 256(b) of this title, or when any judge of the Court of International Trade, in issuing any other interlocutory order, includes in the order a statement that a controlling question of law is involved with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to that Court within ten days after the entry of such order. (2) When the chief judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims issues an order under section 798(b) of this title, or when any judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims, in issuing an interlocutory order, includes in the order a statement that a controlling question of law is involved with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to that Court within ten days after the entry of such order.

(3) Neither the application for nor the granting of an appeal under this subsection shall stay proceedings in the Court of International Trade or in the Court of Federal Claims, as the case may be, unless a stay is ordered by a judge of the Court of International Trade or of the Court of Federal Claims or by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or a judge of that court.

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APPENDIX (Cont’d)

(4)

(A) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court of the United States, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion to transfer an action to the United States Court of Federal Claims under section 1631 of this title. (B) When a motion to transfer an action to the Court of Federal Claims is filed in a district court, no further proceedings shall be taken in the district court until 60 days after the court has ruled upon the motion. If an appeal is taken from the district court's grant or denial of the motion, proceedings shall be further stayed until the appeal has been decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The stay of proceedings in the district court shall not bar the granting of preliminary or injunctive relief, where appropriate and where expedition is reasonably necessary. However, during the period in which proceedings are stayed as provided in this subparagraph, no transfer to the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the motion shall be carried out.

(e) The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).

***

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): Diversity of Citizenship; Amount in Controversy; Costs

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—

(1) citizens of different States;

(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection of an action between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state who are lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and are domiciled in the same State; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and

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APPENDIX (Cont’d)

(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.

***

46 U.S.C. § 30101: Extension of jurisdiction to cases of damage or injury on land (the “Extension Act”)

(a) In general. The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States extends to

and includes cases of injury or damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land.

(b) Procedure. A civil action in a case under subsection (a) may be brought in rem or in personam according to the principles of law and the rules of practice applicable in cases where the injury or damage has been done and consummated on navigable waters. (c) Actions against United States.

(1) Exclusive remedy. In a civil action against the United States for injury or damage done or consummated on land by a vessel on navigable waters, chapter 309 or 311 of this title [46 U.S.C. §§ 30901 et seq. or 31101 et seq.], as appropriate, provides the exclusive remedy. (2) Administrative claim. A civil action described in paragraph (1) may not be brought until the expiration of the 6-month period after the claim has been presented in writing to the agency owning or operating the vessel causing the injury or damage.

***

46 U.S.C. § 30511: Action by owner for limitation (the “Limitation Act”)

(a) In general. The owner of a vessel may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for limitation of liability under this chapter [46 U.S.C. §§ 30501 et seq.]. The action must be brought within 6 months after a claimant gives the owner written notice of a claim. (b) Creation of fund. When the action is brought, the owner (at the owner's option) shall-

(1) deposit with the court, for the benefit of claimants—

(A) an amount equal to the value of the owner's interest in the vessel and pending freight, or approved security; and

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APPENDIX (Cont’d)

(B) an amount, or approved security, that the court may fix from time to time as necessary to carry out this chapter [46 U.S.C. §§ 30501 et seq.]; or

(2) transfer to a trustee appointed by the court, for the benefit of claimants—

(A) the owner's interest in the vessel and pending freight; and (B) an amount, or approved security, that the court may fix from time to time as necessary to carry out this chapter [46 U.S.C. §§ 30501 et seq.].

(c) Cessation of other actions. When an action has been brought under this section and the owner has complied with subsection (b), all claims and proceedings against the owner related to the matter in question shall cease.

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