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IMPROVING AIR FORCE SQUADRONS

Recommendations for Vitality

For

General David L. Goldfein

Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force

Prepared by:

Brigadier General Stephen L. Davis

and the

Headquarters Air Force Core Team

January 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1

THE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE ................................................................................................................ 1 PROJECT PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................. 2 PROJECT APPROACH ........................................................................................................................... 2 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................... 3

The Project Team .......................................................................................................................... 3

Project Phases ............................................................................................................................... 3

SQUADRON VITALITY: KEY ATTRIBUTES ....................................................................................... 7

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 7 OVERVIEW: KEY ATTRIBUTES OF VITALITY ............................................................................................ 7

❶ Esprit de Corps ....................................................................................................................... 8

❷ Purposeful Leadership .......................................................................................................... 10

❸ Verifiable Mission Success ................................................................................................... 13

FINDINGS ........................................................................................................................................... 15

SUMMARY FINDINGS .......................................................................................................................... 15

Meta-data Analysis: A Starting Point........................................................................................ 15

Online Survey ............................................................................................................................. 15

Peer-to-Peer and Small Focus Group Interviews ....................................................................... 16

Large Focus Group Sessions ....................................................................................................... 17

Senior Leader Interviews ............................................................................................................ 18

Unique Perspectives .................................................................................................................... 19

If I Could Change Only One Thing ............................................................................................ 20

Spouse and Family-Focused Group Sessions .............................................................................. 20 WHAT AIRMEN SAID ........................................................................................................................... 21

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 21

1-Increase Focus on Leadership .................................................................................................. 22

2-Blow Up Barriers to Success ................................................................................................... 26

3-Give Us Tools and Resources to Succeed................................................................................. 32

4-Strengthen the Team ............................................................................................................... 36

ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................... 43

THINKING SYSTEMICALLY ................................................................................................................... 43

The Culture Challenge ................................................................................................................ 43

The “Just-Tell-‘em” Prescription ................................................................................................ 44

Solutions and Partial Solutions .................................................................................................. 44 TEN LEVERAGE POINTS AND THE FULCRUM ........................................................................................ 45

The Fulcrum: Clarity of Purpose ................................................................................................ 45

Ten Leverage Points .................................................................................................................... 49

1. Organizational Role Clarity: Who’s Supporting Whom, and How ........................................ 49

2. What We Measure: Important vs. Easy .................................................................................. 60

3. Leadership Development That Develops Leaders .................................................................... 70

4. Communication: A Capability and a Responsibility .............................................................. 83

5. Performance Reports Aimed at Performance Improvement .................................................... 86

6. Selection and Promotion Criteria ............................................................................................ 99

7. Airmen’s Development That Does Its Job ............................................................................. 106

8. People and Resources: Enough in the Right Places .............................................................. 114

9. Flexibility in Talent Utilization and Retention .................................................................... 124

10. Modernizing Family and Spouse Support .......................................................................... 128

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 137

APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................... A-1

METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................A-2

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. A-2

The Project Team ...................................................................................................................... A-2

Project Phases: Data Gathering and Analysis, Solution Development, and Implementation.. A-5 SUMMARIES FROM EACH DATA SOURCE ..........................................................................................A-11

Meta-data Analysis Summary ................................................................................................ A-11

Large Group Sessions Summary ............................................................................................. A-23

Evening Events Summary ...................................................................................................... A-32

Perceptions of Senior Leaders at Major Commands ............................................................... A-38

Peer to Peer and Focus Group Interviews Summary .............................................................. A-44

Crowdsourcing Summary ....................................................................................................... A-49

1 of 139 IMPROVING AIR FORCE SQUADRONS Recommendations for Vitality

INTRODUCTION The Strategic Imperative The Air Force that will fight the next major battle to defend our Nation and our Allies will

be the Air Force that we take proactive steps to strengthen today. At the heart of our Air

Force is the squadron—the core warfighting unit of

our service—where our culture resides, innovation

is born, and where we succeed or fail in our

mission execution. “Squadrons are the beating

heart of the Air Force; our most essential team” –

but squadrons are under a level of stress unlike

ever before in our history.

Following the end of the Cold War, the so-called Peace Dividend era resulted in substantial

downsizing of the force and corresponding reductions in the budget as we entered into a

period of strategic atrophy. This reduction in resources was followed by a significant

increase in operations tempo (OPS TEMPO) leading to the longest continuous stretch of

armed conflict in our Service’s history. As a result, our readiness has been steadily

consumed and our competitive military advantage has eroded over the last 25 years. These

readiness challenges were exacerbated by severe budget constraints in the past decade, and

yet the Air Force has continued to deliver on its promises to the Nation. The only way we

have been able to defeat external threats has been through the tremendous efforts of our

Airmen, but now internal threats to our service are emerging.

The first threat is to the Air Force’s overall level of force lethality. Asking our members, in an

increasingly complex and volatile security environment, to continually do more with less,

and to make sacrifices to their home life directly impacts morale; continual wear and tear

on our equipment, facilities, and weapon systems with limited recapitalization impacts our

capability; and the smallest Air Force end-strength in our history impacts our agility.

The second threat, however may eclipse the first one: the threat to innovate and adapt to the future

fight. The squadron is the engine of innovation for our Air Force, it’s where tactics,

techniques, and procedures are born through calculated risk-taking, learning from

mistakes, and pushing the envelope to increase readiness and lethality. This is our heritage,

but if our culture becomes focused on compliance over mission, we may not be able to

adapt to future challenges.

Undoubtedly, the new future will take recapitalization and predictable investment in

material, but it will also take doing things differently. Agility isn’t won with slogans and

“Squadrons are the beating heart

of the Air Force; our most

essential team.”


speeches. It takes the right culture to elicit exceptional performance, calculated risk-

taking, and innovation, – that culture lives and breathes at the squadron level.

The time is now to revitalize squadrons to ensure success, in today’s fight, and in

tomorrow’s. This must be an Air Force priority – Squadron Vitality.

Project Purpose This squadron revitalization effort, and the team assigned to tackle it, was launched to

develop and implement a comprehensive set of actions that will increase the vitality of all

squadrons, resulting in more cohesive, ready, agile, and capable units required by the

Nation to successfully defend its vital interests in complex operating environments, now

and in the future.

Project Approach Achieving success in this effort is not unlike the approach to achieve success by a squadron: it

requires clarity of purpose, well defined roles and responsibilities, and an actionable

methodology. Foundational to the FA1 team’s approach was to listen to the experts: The

Airmen.

The first step in this strategy was perhaps the most difficult. If we are to revitalize

squadrons, we must first be able to identify what attributes best describe vitality. By

listening to best practices from Airmen in the field and consulting with organizational

experts on team effectiveness, the FA1 team crystalized the key attributes of vitality for any

Air Force unit. These attributes became the working definition of what success looks like:

esprit de corps, purposeful leadership, and verifiable mission success. These are the

attributes for vibrant, effective and innovative squadrons and are described further in the

next section, Squadron Vitality: Key Attributes.

The next step was to fully understand the current state of squadrons. The goal was to

determine the common challenges and opportunities affecting squadron success. Our

Airmen are insightful, and what we heard is presented in the Findings section of this report.

Finally, with the common attributes of successful squadrons defined, and a pulse on the issues

today, the FA1 team then set out to determine the best ways to unleash the power of our

Airmen – now and in the future. The foundational ideas from the field, coupled with careful

analysis and consultation with experts inside and outside the Air Force, resulted in 11

recommended focus areas for change. One of these areas, clarity of purpose, is foundational to

all others and thus is called The Fulcrum. The remaining 10, called Leverage Points, represent the

systemic opportunities that, addressed together, offer the roadmap for increasing squadron

vitality. These systemic opportunities and their accompanying recommendations are

described in the Assessment and Recommendations section of this report.


The Appendices section of this report offers additional detail about methodology,

participants, and the data gathering results.

Methodology The FA1 team began this effort by reviewing the over-arching results (meta-data) from

existing Air Force surveys and other data sources. With this context, the team developed a

targeted online survey, the results of which shaped interview questions and group forums

for field visits across 10 MAJCOMs and 25 bases including the Air Force Reserve and Air

National Guard. Since not every Airman could participate in field visits, the team

established a web-based crowdsourcing website to invite insights from members. After

analyzing the field visit and crowd sourcing results, the team and selected subject matter

experts (SMEs), then determined the areas requiring greatest focus for analysis and solution

development.

The Project Team

The project team included an Air Force Core Team, an Extended Team, Major Command

points of contact (POCs), an Interview Team, and a variety of SMEs and advisors.1

The Core Team, led by a Headquarters Air Force (HAF) General Officer as Focus Area 1

Team Lead and staffed with action officers from the AF/A1, A2, A3, and A4 along with a

Chief Master Sergeant provided by the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (CMSAF),

was tasked with overseeing this project full-time.

The Extended Team was selected for their organizational perspectives and included AOs

from Air Staff offices not already on the core team.

Major Command Points of Contact were the focal points for MAJCOM participation in the

effort.

The Interview Team consisted of 45 Airmen, NCOs, SNCOs, CGOs, FGOs, and civilians

selected by the MAJCOMs to help conduct interviews and facilitate focus groups during

the field visits. Each field visit also included Air Force Core Team members. In all, the team

interviewed 3,886 Airmen.

Project Phases

Data Gathering and Analysis, Solution Development, and Implementation

This project has three phases, the first two of which are complete:

Phase I – Data Gathering and Analysis

This phase included gathering and analyzing data through seven methods: 1) review of

historical meta-data, 2) an online survey, 3) peer-to-peer interviews, 4) senior leader

1 See Appendix A for a full description of the teams and members.


interviews, 5) small focus groups, 6) large, collaborative focus groups, and 7) crowdsourced

Airmen inputs.

1. Review of historical meta-data: Included analyzing surveys (such as climate, exit and

retention surveys) and other relevant data. The team used this data to determine the

initial list of issues upon which the project review should focus.

2. Air Force online survey: Designed to further explore the issues identified in the meta-

data analysis. The FA1 team sent the survey to 79,300 Total Force Airmen, with

14,652 respondents. The survey results further narrowed the team’s focus to the

following topics: Squadron Culture, Manning, Resources, Core Mission Focus,

Squadron Leadership Effectiveness, Team Preparation and Support, Favoritism,

Higher Headquarters Support and Communication, High Operations Tempo at

Home Stations, and Big Opportunities (top priorities for change).

3. Peer-to-peer interviews: These were held at each MAJCOM HQ base and a second

base nominated by that MAJCOM, and included one-on-one discussions where the

interviewer’s rank matched that of the interviewee (so, they truly were “peer-to-

peer”). The Core Team and a select group of Airmen of all ranks, both Enlisted and

civilian, led these discussions.

4. Senior Leader interviews: Researchers from RAND conducted interviews with Senior

Leaders at MAJCOM, NAF, Center, and Air National Guard headquarters. The Core

team interviewed Wing Commanders and Command Chiefs at all bases. At some

overseas locations, the Core Team also interviewed NAF Commanders and

Command Chiefs.

5. Small focus groups: The FA1 team conducted small focus groups, comprised of up to

ten Airmen or civilians based on assigned duties (e.g. Grp/Sq/CCs, MAJCOM/NAF

staff, Superintendent, First Sergeant) who answered questions that fell within their

experience and rank level. A team of Airmen—uniformed and civilian—conducted

these sessions. The team also conducted 16 small group sessions designed to explore

spouse and family issues related to squadron revitalization.

6. Large, collaborative focus groups: The team conducted 15 large (100-person) focus

group sessions. Participants ranged in age and experience levels, from Airmen to

Colonels, from civilians to active duty, and from Reservists to Guardsmen. These

events were structured to ensure anonymous inputs using silent brainstorming

techniques and then collaborative solution development within small, diverse

teams.

7. Crowdsourced Airmen inputs: Since field visits couldn’t reach every Airman, the team

established an Air Force web-based ideation and crowdsourcing tool (milSuite),

which provided an avenue for Total Force Airmen across the Air Force to generate

ideas and solutions for revitalizing squadrons.


Quick wins were identified and communicated to senior leadership throughout the data

gathering effort. These were opportunities that had the potential for rapid approval and

were believed to provide initial positive results within one year.

Phase II – Solution Development

This phase employed cross-organizational working groups that formed hypotheses about

the systemic causes of key issues and developed solutions to address them. The working

groups focused on targeted topics, such as: Airman and Family Resilience, Airmen

Development, Leadership Effectiveness, Morale and Esprit de Corps, Manning and

Squadron Structure, Performance Management, Inspections/Measurement, and Roles,

Responsibilities, and Goals. The working groups included SMEs and advisors from across

the Air Force, Airmen from the interview teams, and other personnel who had assisted

with data gathering and interviews.

Phase III - Implementation

Still to be completed, this phase will include support for assisting in the execution and

tracking of approved recommendations. Some members of the Core Team will remain in

place for this effort.


SQUADRON VITALITY:

KEY ATTRIBUTES Introduction What attributes most depict “squadron vitality”?

The FA1 team asked themselves and others that question many times over the course of

this initiative. Although the team’s thinking was informed by its experienced Air Force

team members and organizational science, the team also learned about vitality–both its

absence and its presence–from the many Airmen who completed surveys and shared their

views during field visits. Ultimately, three key attributes crystalized and are described

here. These became the FA1 team’s working definition of success.

Unpacking the three key attributes that comprise vitality helps shape outcome-oriented

strategies rather than simply recording and responding to the many ideas and opinions

revealed in interviews, group sessions, and surveys. The attributes of vitality apply to any

Air Force unit or team, not just squadrons2. The resulting three-part model can be used to

sharpen the Air Force’s aim at the goal of revitalizing squadrons – the foundation for

restoring readiness and increasing the lethality of the Air Force.

Overview: Key Attributes of Vitality Vitality is composed of three attributes, two of which are subjective and human-centric,

although quite measurable. The third attribute is objective: a squadron’s actual outcomes,

its main reasons for existence.

1. Esprit de Corps among a squadron’s Airmen is the first attribute. Across time and

across cultures, it is a common denominator among successful warfighting forces.

2. “Purposeful Leadership” is the second attribute. It means that (1) the squadron

understands its purpose and (2) each supervisor in the squadron, additionally,

achieves several, critical purposes, as a leader.

2 For simplicity, we’ll use the term “squadron” here, though we mean to include other groups as

well, such as squadron-like organizations that have a similar purpose and capabilities as squadrons,

but may not carry a number designator to identify the unit. Likewise, we refer to “Airmen” (capital

“A”) intending the full inclusion of the entire Air Force—including Active, Guard, Reserve and

civilians.


3. “Verifiable Mission Success” is the third attribute. It is the consequence of ongoing

esprit de corps and ongoing purposeful leadership. Such outcomes require

squadrons’ leaders to possess a thorough understanding of the squadron’s

purpose–beyond mere compliance with AFIs, and sometimes instead of it.

❶ Esprit de Corps

“Esprit de corps” is a common military term. Its dictionary definition is “a feeling of pride,

fellowship, and loyalty shared by the members of a group.”

It’s an attractive concept, but we need to understand what generates esprit de corps before

considering ways to create or strengthen it in the squadron. Unbundling it into its

component parts may help create an actionable framework. Consider these three possible

elements: membership, respected unit and higher purpose.

Assuming these attributes of esprit de corps also enable assessment, then a periodic survey

would give us visibility to squadrons’ esprit de corps from Airmen’s perspectives.

At a summary level, we believe that each Airman should be able to say,

“I’m a warfighter who belongs to a valued team doing meaningful work!”

Specifically:

Membership


The need for belonging and camaraderie is considered a fundamental human motivation3,

as recognized by the Air Force’s drive for inclusiveness.

3 For example, as in David C. McClelland’s well-known “Three Needs Theory” (David McClelland,

Human Motivation, Cambridge University Press, 1988).


It is a truism that warriors fight as much for their brothers and sisters in arms as they do for

their cause4. If that’s so, then a sense of belonging . . . of having fellow Airmen one would

fight for . . . is important to esprit de corps.

Respected Group


Squadrons and their flights are teams. Part of one’s personal pride comes from pride in the

team to which one belongs. If a squadron has an impressive history, then its members have

a reputation to uphold, if they know about it. And if a squadron doesn’t have much

heritage, then they have a reputation to create. Either way, it will be the team’s continuous

high performance that invites respect and helps Airmen feel part of a valued team. Such

performance demonstrates a sense of duty and commitment to the organization and builds

a sense of pride within the team.

Higher Purpose


Experience and research tell us that high performing teams have much in common,

including team goals that are both clear and elevating. 5 Such goals also have a unifying

effect, reinforcing membership in an important unit. A team is not a team because of its

high-performing predecessors. A “team”, in fact, is a group of individuals who need one another

to succeed. So, when members do not share a goal(s), then they are formal members of a

team only in the same sense that Sam’s Club or private fitness center members are teams.

There is no emotional connection to a common purpose.

Good leaders know their team members want to make a difference, to be part of something

greater than themselves, and that’s certainly true of Airmen. The more Airmen understand

“the wins” for their team and where their role fits in, the more meaningful their work

becomes. Whether the security officer defending a base, the mechanic ensuring equipment

is ready and safe, or the fighter pilot who joins the fight, every Airman plays their role in

the Air Force’s contribution to the Joint fight. Every Airman is a warfighter.

4 Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War. (2003). Ssi.armywarcollege.edu. Retrieved 13

July 2017, from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=179. Army War College’s

Leonard Wong and associates show that American warfighters do fight for higher causes and for

each other. 5 A landmark meta-study showed that one predictor of team performance was team goals that

are both clear and elevating. (Teamwork: What Must Go Right/What Can Go Wrong, by Carl

Larson and Frank M J LaFasto, Sage, 1989.)

https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=179


But universally, some assigned work is clearly trivial, and it is de-vitalizing. Other work

only appears trivial, but is actually critical. Good leaders excel at assigning meaningful

work, and then connecting their people with their work’s higher meaning.

❷ Purposeful Leadership

Good squadron leaders lead their teams to achieve the team’s purpose, but those leaders also

understand their own personal purpose more broadly. That personal purpose includes

strengthening the individuals and the teams they lead–a longer-term investment that

includes creating an environment of calculated risks that reaps benefits even from mistakes,

and building the

resilience of Airmen,

their families and

support networks.

Purposeful leadership

requires attention to

four focus areas every

day – all which can be

evaluated effectively

with the right tools

(discussed in the

recommendations

section of this report).

Success on Purpose

“The team I lead establishes, understands, measures, and achieves well-defined wins

and clarity of purpose.”

Wise leaders ask: Why does my team exist – what purpose are we meant to achieve? What

“wins” should we target to better serve that purpose? And, how will we recognize success?

Answering these questions provides focus but also the meaning all Airmen want as context

for their work. As discussed earlier, meaning is a key ingredient in sustaining esprit de

corps. For Airmen, meaning can come from knowing and serving their squadron’s purpose;

correspondingly, it can come from knowing and achieving outcomes – wins – that that will

improve the squadron’s ability to serve its purpose.

This concern with purpose also serves the Air Force’s drive for agility. Leaders who know

where they are going and what they are trying to achieve are the ones who can adapt and

optimize their routes; others are stuck with step-by-step directions that may or may not

best serve ever-changing conditions. Agile, purpose-focused leadership is known as


“mission command,” among military theorists6. It can apply to standard, secure-that-

objective type of operational outcomes; but, it can also apply to leadership of an ongoing

process such as contract management.

The knowability – and measurability – of achieving “success on purpose” is essential. Or else,

achieving “success” too easily defaults to compliance and error avoidance. If the easy-to-

count overshadows the important-to-count, then we will get too many easy things and not

enough of the important ones.

Time Invested in People

“My lasting contribution is my team. Developing and retaining better technicians,

leaders, and teammates is among my most important achievements.”

Leaders’ time invested in their people is time invested in the future–a future that those

leaders will not directly share. It’s the pay-it-forward philosophy of leaders who aim to

enable tomorrow’s results, while achieving results today.

Coaching one’s subordinates is among the time investments made by leaders who seek

responsible results, and it’s the prerequisite to empowering those subordinates. That’s an

important point: coaching and empowerment are inextricable. It is a widening circle of

trust: a leader’s coaching improves a subordinate’s skills and judgement; a subordinate’s

improved skills and judgement justifies increased responsibility and authority; and then

the cycle begins again.

Unfortunately, this all takes time away from the leader’s duties–unless developing people

is considered one of those duties.

Productive Mistakes

“I create an environment where Airmen take calculated risks

toward mission success, and I trust them to exploit inevitable mistakes.”

History is filled with examples and declarations of the importance of allowing and learning

from errors. The trick is creating an environment that induces people to do it–not just telling

them to. Effective leaders create that environment.

They understand that the point is to win, not simply to avoid losing; innovation and

agility–and winning–are practically impossible without the occasional wise risk (and

benefit) of errors.

These leaders guide the experience of errors toward ah-ha moments for the individuals

committing errors (development) – or toward a broader discovery: an ah-ha moment for all

6 For example (and recommended), Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in

The U.S., British, and Israeli Armies, by Eitan Shamir, Stanford University Press, 2011.


concerned (innovation). So, making a mistake is a good thing – assuming it is not a disastrous

one, and assuming it leads either to development or to better ways of doing things.

Ideally, an error made by one person can lead to learning by many people. But a

subordinate’s mistakes handled badly by a leader can teach the wrong kind of lesson to

bystanders, which is: “Take no risk, try nothing new.” Good leaders know that how they

handle subordinates’ mistakes –even the dumb mistakes –will influence other

subordinates’ experimentation and risk-taking, long after those leaders have moved on.

Good leaders also don’t shy away from appropriate and calculated risks which means they,

too, might make mistakes. And they, too, must learn from them.

Airmen and Family Resilience

“I understand the challenges facing Airmen, and I provide

the family support and work-life balance needed for resilience.”

Good leaders care about their team members’ families7 and support networks, and they do

so for more than simple reasons of humanity. The unique challenges of military life mean

leaders must support Airmen’s families for two practical reasons, as well.

The first one is about resilience: Airmen who deploy or are otherwise gone for a long time

have to wonder, “Is my family really okay?”

If their families are okay, then those Airmen can focus on their tasks at hand. The burden of

being gone from home, especially in dangerous environments, is made lighter by knowing

that the Air Force – and other Airmen’s families – have their backs.

The second one is about retention. Airmen’s decision to stay with the Air Force is often

family-related. Do they really want to move, again, and deal with all that goes with that? A

family connected to the Air Force, and to the importance of the mission, may want to retain

that connection.

So, for leaders in the Air Force, their commitment to those things that result in Airman

and family resilience is not just an act of compassion. It is a leadership responsibility.

In a recent interview, General Goldfein said, “We are focused on families, which exhibit a

very special kind of courage when they endure the long hours, separations, and hardships

that have become part of an Air Force at war.”

7 For simplicity, we’ll say “families” here – but are including that meaningful and close support

network that most people have in one form or another.


❸ Verifiable Mission Success

While both esprit de corps and purposeful leadership are key contributors to unit success,

they are not why squadrons exist. Squadrons exist to achieve their few, uniquely vital

mission outcomes. These outcomes are the results

that come from the many things squadrons must

do. Either enabled by other squadrons, or by

enabling others, each squadron’s vital mission

outcomes result in the lethality we bring to the Joint

fight.

For leaders to lead in the right direction, and for

teammates to rally around the right things,

knowing the small handful of mission outcomes a

squadron is resourced to produce, and then

scorekeeping on those few outcomes is essential.

Verifiably successful mission outcomes – both now

and in the future – are the ultimate indicators of a

squadron’s vitality.

These key attributes of squadron vitality set the

context for this report. In the following chapters, the

FA1 team offers its assessment of the most significant leverage points and corresponding

recommendations that will drive increased squadron vitality and its resulting lethality Air

Force-wide.


FINDINGS Summary Findings The Focus Area 1 (FA1) team used a variety of methods to gather Airmen’s perspectives on

the opportunities and challenges of revitalizing squadrons. This section discusses the key

themes from each method. Additional detail about these methods is found in Appendix A.

The section following this one, What Airmen Said, offers a comprehensive, qualitative

assessment of Airmen’s views considering all of the primary data sources described below.

Meta-data Analysis: A Starting Point

The FA1 team conducted comprehensive analysis using the data from existing Air Force

surveys. This analysis helped the team determine which issues Airmen found to be most

relevant to squadron revitalization. This gave the team insight into recurring themes, which

were then used to determine the initial list of issues on which to focus.

The team also mined this data for “Top Suggestions” on Squadron revitalization. In order

of frequency mentioned, they are:

Meta-data Analysis

Top Suggestions

Increase manning to fill at required levels

Better train and equip Airmen at Technical Training to increase their capabilities

Balance manpower with mission requirements

Assess manpower before implementing new programs

Overhaul civilian hiring and firing processes

Thoroughly vet changes before implementing new programs

Protect benefits from reductions, and improve Base services availability and quality

Increase pay to match inflation and increase housing allowance to match reality

Address pay and benefits gap between Active Duty/Guard/Reserve

Improve budget and funds allocation rules, processes, and guidance

Reduce number of Computer Based Trainings (CBT) to allow for more hands-on AFSC-

specific training

Reduce taskings and requirements to match reduced manpower

Reduce ancillary training and currency requirements

Overhaul the Physical Fitness Assessment

More performance focus in the Evaluation Systems

Online Survey

Using the above themes to identify key focus areas, the FA1 team initiated a targeted online

survey available to approximately 80,000 Airmen; the response rate was nearly 18.5%

(approximately 15,000 Airmen). This survey was the first opportunity Airmen had to share


their views on revitalizing squadrons. When asked to identify the top 5 “issue areas as most

significant, that if addressed, would provide the biggest return on investment for the effort

to revitalize Squadrons and ensure their success,” they identified the following:

Peer-to-Peer and Small Focus Group Interviews

The Peer-to-Peer and Small Focus Group interviews asked Airmen at 10 MAJCOMs and the

Air National Guard Bureau to respond to questions on the focus areas derived from the E-

mail Survey results. They were either interviewed individually or in small groups of

Airmen with similar ranking (e.g., NCOs, FGOs, civilians, etc.). The most common themes

emphasized in the interviews include:

Squadrons need more manpower and fewer additional duties and taskers. Airmen spoke

of an imbalance between what is being asked of squadrons, and the resources available.

Many Airmen stated that secondary duties are increasingly overburdening the squadrons,

who are not manned for the additional workload.

Improve squadron leadership involvement and accessibility. Airmen want leaders who

get to know them, mentor them, and provide them with guidance. The “Commander sets the

tone for the organization” and is the “key person to drive the attitude of the unit.”


Squadron Commanders need more empowerment from Higher Headquarters (HHQ).

Airmen noted that the idea of empowering Squadron Commanders is heavily tied to a risk-

averse culture that punishes Airmen for mistakes rather than enabling learning, and the

willingness (or lack of) to push decision-making down to the lowest levels.

Improve leadership development. The Air Force needs to focus on developing leadership

skills such as effective communication, providing feedback, and time management. Airmen

thought that leadership development should be structured and occur throughout their

careers—particularly early on.

Improve training. Airmen feel training is important, but they want to know that it is

related to their roles, job-specific, and worth their time since it takes them away from the

mission.

Increase team and morale-building social events. Squadron events are positive for team-

building and morale; however, “the camaraderie is not what it used to be” as time dedicated to

these events is limited by increased ops tempo and manpower shortages.

The Air Force culture is too risk averse; failure needs to be allowed to enable learning.

Airmen see the culture as overly risk-averse – not only at the leadership level, but across all

ranks. Many acknowledged that failures are not viewed as learning opportunities, but

rather punished.

Large Focus Group Sessions

The Large Focus Groups aggregated ideas from Airmen of all ranks and across all bases.

Suggestions were offered without regard to rank or status, and the top themes at each

location represented a general consensus across all demographic groups. The most

common themes included:

Have open lines of communication and exchange of ideas at all levels. Improve

communication across squadrons by opening channels shop to shop, flight to flight, and

bottom to top. Communication creates buy-in and a sense of cohesion and belonging.

Encouraging idea sharing also leads to better ideas (iron sharpens iron).

Pick the most qualified person for a position. Squadrons must put the right person in the

right job in order to improve performance. Time-in-grade and rank does not always signify

that a person has the necessary experience, temperament, or capability for a job.

Provide more squadron morale events. Airmen want more opportunities for squadrons to

interact as a team, either through collaborative work processes or morale-boosting events

and activities. “Create more opportunities across the squadron for interaction and informal

meeting. This will encourage networking and create a more united squadron.”

Leaders need to get out from behind the desk and get to know their people. Leadership

accessibility was a common theme: “Actively communicate with members in the unit. Know

squadron members and take the time out to visit and check on all Airmen.”


Delegate decisions to the right level. Airmen felt that Squadron Commanders should

empower their subordinates to take ownership of their processes, thereby eliminating

levels of review and expediting decision-making. Commanders should trust shop leads

(first line supervisors) to manage their people, hours, and resources.

Rightsize the workload to match manning (no "do more with less" expectations). If

squadrons cannot have the manpower necessary to fulfill their requirements, then the

requirements need to change. Too much work and not enough bodies contributes to an

unsustainable ops tempo. Airmen emphasized the need to fill administrative roles.

Reward and recognize Airmen for high performance. Rewards and recognition can

incentivize Airmen to improve their performance. Airmen felt that leaders should be

empowered to recognize their people appropriately.

Provide for more professional development training and formal education. Airmen

would like to see more opportunities for training and development, particularly on

leadership skills: “Ensure that squadron leadership teams have undergone leadership training and

have the experience to be effective and efficient.”

Senior Leader Interviews

The senior leader interviews focused on individuals in senior leadership at MAJCOMs,

Numbered Air Forces, Centers, and Air National Guard headquarters. Senior leaders

included both officers (O-6 to O-9) and civilians. There were 82 participants in total.

Following are the top themes that emerged from the discussions:

Leadership involvement is critical to promoting squadron culture. Interviews across

Commands stressed that the commander sets the tone for the squadron. One senior leader

stated, “When you talk about mission accomplishment and teamwork, I think the commander has to

set the priorities for his unit.”

Undermanning is a problem. Airmen feel that squadron undermanning in endemic.

Impacts include: More errors and inefficiencies from lack of trained personnel (particularly

on administrative tasks, formerly done by Commander’s Support Staffs), less work/life

balance, and greater pressure to perform ancillary duties.

Squadron Commanders need more control over resources. The benefits of giving

commanders this control would be that funds would go where they are needed;

commanders could respond quickly to opportunities or issues; resourcing control would

empower commander; and it would help the commander better understand resourcing.

Maintaining mission focus requires defining the core mission in terms everyone can

understand and prioritizing critical vs. non-critical tasks. One Airman stated, “Everyone

assigned to a squadron…ought to be able to tell you what their mission [is] and how they fit into

it…that requires squadron leadership to be able to do that.


The selection process could be improved. Perceptions on the current commander selection

process were mixed. The selection process generally works well, but more 360-degree

feedback and better job preparation prior to command is needed.

Inadequate manning contributes to a higher ops tempo for mid-level leaders

(CGOs/NCOs). The lack of manning and increased TDY/deployments were cited as major

reasons for higher ops tempo for mid-level managers. “When the Squadron Commander takes

leave, the first lieutenant takes over the squadron of 400 people…we’re developing a crisis

management leader, not a true leader.”

Headquarters helps squadrons by removing bureaucratic obstacles. Some senior leaders

felt that HHQ does help squadrons by removing obstacles to success: “Our job is to remove

impediments or consolidate them, or where they cannot be removed, make it easier [for

squadrons] to meet those requirements.”

Unique Perspectives

The need for appropriate manpower, to empower Squadron Commanders, and to reduce

additional duties were commonly-cited themes across all of the demographic groups.

However, there were a few notable distinctions, which largely correlate to the

organizational position and perspective of those demographic groups:

Senior Leaders: Senior leaders viewed themselves as a resource to overcoming bureaucratic

impediments. However, FGOs and CGOs at the squadron level viewed senior leaders as

imposing bureaucratic impediments, such as “taxing” manpower from squadrons or

assigning them too many taskers.

Some senior leaders viewed squadron leadership as already empowered, but not fully

exercising the authorities already given to them. This contrasted with many Airmen,

including squadron leaders, who feel unempowered. A few senior leaders expressed a

reluctance to give additional decision-making authorities to squadron leadership,

particularly related to financial decisions, because of a view that some squadron leaders do

not have the big picture or the financial management skills to effectively handle these types

of decisions. Most senior leaders agreed that additional training is needed for squadron

leadership to develop these capabilities.

Enlisted: Enlisted Airmen were the only demographic group to identify “unit identity

issues” (which was generally about promoting unit heritage and history) as a top theme. A

subset of the Enlisted demographic, E-1 to E-4 Airmen, was the only demographic group

(aside from civilian Airmen) to list “leadership accessibility and involvement” as their top

issue.

Civilians: Civilian Airmen were the only demographic group that did not include

“bringing back the Commander’s Support Staff” as a top theme.


Guard and Reserve: Guardsmen and Reservists, in contrast to active duty Airmen, had

greater focus on the “core mission” as a top theme. As these groups are generally part-time

workers and have limited hours to accomplish their official duties, they are impacted more

by tasks that take their attention from the squadron’s mission.

If I Could Change Only One Thing

In order to find out what Airmen thought was most important to squadron revitalization,

the FA1 team asked them to answer the following question: “If you had a magic wand and

could change only one thing to make squadrons better, what would that one thing be?”

This forced Airmen to prioritize their top issue(s). Three data-gathering venues allowed the

opportunity to ask this question. The top 5 results are provided below.

Top 5 “If I Could Change Only One Thing” Themes

Large Focus Groups Peer-to-Peer & Small Focus Groups

Senior Leaders

Manning Allocation Sq/CC Needs More Empowerment from HHQ

Provide Adequate Resourcing and Manning to Squadron

Bring Back CSSs and Warrant Officers

Need More Manpower Empower Commanders to Lead and Manage

Training Frequency, Effectiveness, Methods

Too Many Additional Duties and Taskers

Bring Back and Resource the CSS

Airmen Development Need Proper CSS/Orderly Room Reduce Additional Duties/Ancillary Training

Team Building Activities Finance: Other Change Squadron Culture

As the team looked at the top responses across the interview groups, the commonalities

were clear. Manpower was a top priority, whether it was about having the right people in

the right place or having enough people in general. In large group sessions, there was more

discussion about better leveraging and allocating of existing manpower. In other sessions,

greater emphasis was placed on increasing the manpower assigned to a squadron (in

practice, not just on paper). Bringing back and properly resourcing the CSS was also a top

priority for Airmen at all levels and across all bases.

Spouse and Family-Focused Group Sessions

The FA1 team was also asked to pay special attention to spouse and family issues, in order

to better understand how they relate to squadron vitality. These separate sessions focused

primarily on family/spouse-related topics and comprised a mix of active duty participants

(both married and single) and Air Force spouses. Discussion topics varied across each base,

especially when the mix of participants favored more active duty Airmen. In general, these

were the most common themes across all bases:

Deployment – Preparation and Support: Four major points arose under this theme: (1)

Support for greater time between deployments; (2) Include the spouses in the deployment


prep process; (3) Provide more information resources and networking during deployments;

and (4) Decrease the time it takes to release Airmen for post-deployment leave.

Events & Activities – Involving the Spouses: Families and spouses (includes single

Airmen and childless spouses) want to participate in squadron activities and events

without being “voluntold” to do it. In addition, many spouses have their own careers or

other daytime obligations, so they’d like squadrons to be more aware of the impact on their

time.

Supporting and Involving Children: Members and spouses wanted to see more

opportunities for children to get to know the squadrons and other kids, and to focus on

creative ways to support military children during deployments.

Communication – More Involved Squadron Leaders: Spouses want to see more

communication from squadron leadership (especially during deployment), specifically

from the commander or first sergeant.

Key Spouse Program: The Key Spouse Program is supposed to help improve

communication between Squadron Commanders and spouses/families, but many feel that

it needs improvement. Spouses want to see reforms to the program and more consistency

in how it functions across squadrons and bases.

What Airmen Said Introduction

This section focuses exclusively on inputs from the many Airmen who contributed to the

FA1 effort. While the previous section in this chapter offered a summary of the key themes

from each primary data gathering source, this section provides a comprehensive,

qualitative assessment of Airmen’s views considering all data sources.

As the FA1 team listened to Airmen, it became clear that they are keenly interested in doing

their jobs at the highest level of excellence. Many are committed to a career in the Air Force.

It was also clear that, as a group, they see opportunities for change that will improve all

squadrons’ vitality and increase the Air Force’s contribution to the lethality of the armed

forces. Some of the changes they talked about would mean better leveraging best practices

already in place in parts of the Air Force. Others signal more systemic challenges, including

those pertaining to policies and cultural drivers.

The FA1 team saw common themes emerge across diverse locations, missions and Airmen.

Broadly, these themes include:

1. Increase focus on leadership

2. Blow up barriers to success

3. Give us the tools and resources to succeed

4. Strengthen the team


For almost every big theme that points toward change, the FA1 team also heard many

examples of best practices and units working hard to overcome current challenges. Some of

those are mentioned here, but many more are reflected in the recommendations offered in

the next chapter.

1-Increase Focus on Leadership

Airmen called out three aspects of leadership as directly connected to squadron vitality:

leadership mastery and excellence, engagement, and mission clarity and focus. To improve

their skills, leaders need more training, preferably experiential, at every stage of their

careers. Too many leaders are not well-connected to the people doing the actual work; they

need to spend more time engaging with their Airmen. To sharpen mission clarity and

focus, leaders need to come up with better ways to communicate about and measure

progress towards the mission.

Improve Leadership Mastery and Excellence

When it comes to leadership mastery and excellence, Airmen see room for improvement in

training and development, on-the-job-learning, and leader selection. All three areas could

benefit from increasing emphasis on experiential learning.

Train and Develop Leaders at All Levels

Airmen felt that leadership development should be taking place at all levels of the Air

Force hierarchy, including within squadrons. Airmen view the squadron as the key place

where future leaders are developed because leaders need to experience—and understand—

the organization at the grass roots level before advancing. In the early stages of leadership

development, growth through hands-on experience within the squadron is more beneficial

than academic approaches. Airmen emphasized that successful squadrons develop future

leaders by rotating them to gain perspective and experience, providing the right kinds of

training and ensuring that leaders are developing good relationships with subordinates.

Airmen want more leadership training at all stages of their careers, especially early on (e.g.,

Flight Commanders, Section Chiefs, Flight Superintendents, Front Line Supervisors, etc.).

They think that, “Officers, Enlisted and civilian, do not receive much leadership training early [in

their careers].”

Airmen strongly prefer experiential training and practical skill development, especially

when tailored to their postings. Airmen expressed enthusiasm for:

Developing non-technical skills (i.e.,

effective communication with

subordinates).

More experiential training for first time

commanders (i.e., internship-like

programs).

“We are doing ‘everyone

development,’ not deliberate

development.”


Improved developmental education courses that focus more on practical leadership

competencies.

Intentional leadership development, not a one-size-fits-all program. The perception

right now is that, “We are doing ‘everyone development,’ not deliberate development.”

Train and Empower Leaders to Take Calculated Risks

Experience is a great teacher, but commanders are not able to learn if their superiors do not

allow them to make mistakes. Airmen have observed that a single mistake can derail a

career; Squadron Commanders may be fired for

making one “bad” decision.

Fear of failure leads to an organization that can’t

learn and can’t move. As one Airman put it, “If

the Doolittle Raid had to happen tomorrow it would

not happen, because our people [commanders/leaders]

are so risk averse.” Another said, “We are so risk

averse that we’ve become bogged down by analysis. At

some [point], we need to act.”

Airmen want to see a culture of accountability that supports leaders when they make non-

catastrophic mistakes and teaches them how to learn from failure. Removing the “one-

mistake Air Force” stigma and fear of negative career repercussions will help promote

innovative leaders and an encouraging culture.

Improve How We Vet and Select Leaders

Experienced leaders are outstanding leaders. Subordinates quickly recognize—and are

quick to dismiss—leaders who are unprepared or without the skillset for their position.

There is a perception among Airmen that not all of those selected for leadership positions

should be in those positions, either because they lack necessary experience or because the

system for selecting leaders focuses on the wrong criteria. Airmen would like to see

changes to the selection process because they have observed that poor leaders with strong

records make it through while great leaders with weaker records do not. Airmen’s

suggestions for improvement include 360-degree feedback and better evaluation of people

skills.

Increase Leadership Engagement

Airmen want more and better interaction with their leaders. They think that the best

squadrons have leaders who interact with Airmen frequently and who know them and

their jobs well. Airmen also want their leaders to be highly skilled at interpersonal

communication. They want clear and timely information about all aspects of Air Force

work and life. They especially feel the need for feedback on their performance, whether

“If the Doolittle Raid had to

happen tomorrow it would not

happen, because our people

[commanders/leaders] are so risk

averse.”


they are doing well or badly. They believe mentorship is an effective way to hone

communication skills and increase engagement.

Improve Leadership Involvement and Accessibility

Morale suffers in squadrons where leaders are less engaged. In less effective squadrons,

Airmen observe things like “leadership by email” or a “unit disciplinarian” who only interacts

with Airmen when they’re in trouble. A familiar complaint was that squadron leaders are

“usually gone or too busy to focus on their people. This is also not inspiring for subordinates to

advance in the military.”

Airmen described the best squadrons as those where leaders put faces to names and get to

know their people and the job to be done. One Airman said, “A leader that can get ‘down and

dirty’ with their Airmen usually is well respected and has a team with high morale.” Effective

leaders at all levels get to know their Airmen.

This means regular face-to-face communication in

casual encounters, walking the floor or candid

conversations with individuals. This sentiment

was expressed frequently when Airmen

discussed what leaders could do better: “Get out

from behind desks and visit people!” Overall, Airmen admire leaders who, “spend more time

with the ‘line Airmen’ and [are] visible/interested in each Airman's work and contribution to the

mission.”

Improve Leaders’ Communication and Feedback

Airmen focused on the need for improvement in clear and timely communication and

feedback from leaders. Their comments touch on style, content and structure.

Direct, face-to-face interaction and

communication, where possible, was identified

by Airmen as the communication style of a

successful squadron and as the best tool for

actively managing expectations. Airmen

recognize that there are obstacles to clear

communication, but believe that excellent leaders

can overcome them. As was noted at one base,

“Our Commander, although in another building, still

does a great job of showing [his] face. This is how

relationships are built and communication flows easier.”

In terms of content, Airmen want clear information about standards and expectations,

including greater clarity around the requirements for promotions, evaluations and awards.

Supervisors should hold people to a set of standards and increase accountability for

Airmen who deviate from those standards. There should be constant and consistent

communication regarding how subordinates are doing in terms of meeting and exceeding

“Get out from behind desks and

visit people!”

“Our Commander, although in

another building, still does a

great job of showing [his] face.

This is how relationships are

built and communication flows

easier.”


expectations. “Leadership can be effective by asking

subordinates how they’re doing and being more

upfront about what they expect.”

Structurally, Airmen advocated for better

feedback mechanisms to ensure two-way

communication between leadership and

subordinates.

Mentor all Airmen (Including Rising Leaders)

Mentorship is understood to be a tool that deepens relationships, and Airmen want more of

it, whether done individually or in groups. They agree that the Air Force needs a better

means of intentionally mentoring Airmen throughout their careers. Mentoring was

recognized as important but currently ineffective,

especially during times of higher ops tempo,

when schedules may prevent more senior leaders

from participating.

Mentorship was also seen as critical for

developing good leaders and passing along best

practices. "Without mentorship, those who have

learned/developed poor decision-making skills will

only get worse."

Make Decision-Making Criteria More Transparent

Airmen indicated that they want more clarity and transparency from their squadron

leadership when it comes to communicating requirements for promotions and receiving

awards. It’s difficult for Airmen to connect their performance to mission objectives when

they aren’t clear about how they’re being graded. It’s even more difficult when Airmen

perceive favoritism is affecting personnel decisions. Some leaders combat this perception

by conducting mock scoring boards and deliberately providing feedback after forced

distribution panels.

Drive Mission Clarity and Focus

In every organization, leaders have the responsibility of communicating the mission and

keeping the group moving towards it. Airmen see shortcomings in how progress is

measured and in communication of the mission at the commander level.

Measure What Really Matters for Mission Success

“Are we working so hard on the right things? How do

we know?”

Airmen want desired mission outcomes to be

clear and verifiable. They are so overloaded by

“Leadership can be effective by

asking subordinates how they’re

doing and being more upfront

about what they expect.”

“Without mentorship, those who

learn/develop poor decision-

making skills will only get

worse."

“Are we working so hard on the

right things? How do we know?”


non-mission-essential duties and tasks that squadrons have difficulty focusing on the

things most critical for mission success. There is a commonly held perception that

squadrons are not measuring the things that have a tangible and direct effect on their

performance, but are instead prioritizing compliance and “box checking.” "We have to get

away from a compliance-based approach to an effects-based approach." They believe a change in

priorities is needed.

Help Airmen See How Their Role Fits In

“If we can get our Senior Airmen to understand how they tie into the mission and why their job is

important, then we will never lose a war."

Airmen and civilians look to their commanders for guidance and for a definition of mission

success. To these Airmen, actively-engaged and empowered commanders are a critical

driver of success. When this communication channel breaks down, so does squadron

performance. Unfortunately, many Airmen are not getting the information from their

commanders that they need; they do not understand the link between individual jobs and

the mission, and they do not understand how their squadron’s mission fits into the bigger

Air Force picture. To that end, Airmen ask for engagement “across our organization to help

define the organizational direction and its goals.”

2-Blow Up Barriers to Success

Airmen defined barriers to success as anything that prevents them from concentrating on

achieving their squadron’s mission. These barriers could be vaporized by better manning

policies, fewer additional and volunteer duties, trusting and empowering Squadron

Commanders to make decisions and learn from mistakes, and revising policies that are

detrimental to mission execution.

Align Workload & Manning

Generally, Airmen think that there is a shortage of workers and that the “do-more-with-

less” approach isn’t working. Airmen have suggested four ways to approach this problem:

increase manpower, change workload, reduce compliance requirements and allow

commanders to use the total force to fill manning requirements.

Provide More Manpower to Match Requirements

“Either increase manning or decrease mission.”

Airmen feel that mission requirements are too burdensome for existing manpower levels.

Manpower should be increased to more appropriately meet the workload, which includes

required additional duties and training. “At some point, HHQ will have to accept that we can’t

provide the same level of service with less people.”


As one Airman describes it, "The “good idea fairy”

visits often and gives us new mission/requirements. I

wish the Air Force would develop a companion

"manning fairy" to follow the good idea fairy around

and give manpower to each new requirement." For

Guard units, this could include changing some

drill-status billets to full-time positions.

Right-Size Workload to Match Manning Levels

Airmen want to end the “do-more-with-less” culture. If manning levels can’t be increased

with capable individuals, the workload needs to be decreased, and policies and processes

should be amended and updated. If the workload can’t be decreased, then leaders should

find ways to prioritize tasks and even, “do-less-with-less.” It is especially important for

squadrons to have the authority to prioritize between mission requirements and secondary

requirements when manning cannot support both simultaneously. As one Airman explains,

effective guidance is vital: “My leadership always emphasizes where my priorities should be. They

know I’ve got tons on my plate and help me by telling me what needs to be done first.”

Reduce Compliance Requirements

There is one category of work that Airmen feel

should be reduced across the board: compliance

requirements (mandates) from HHQ. Airmen

believe that these requirements (e.g., non-

mission-related, flavor-of-the-month, ancillary

awareness training, such as Human Trafficking)

are excessively burdensome to squadrons, especially given what many see as an imbalance

between ops tempo and manpower. The widely-shared opinion is that “leadership only sees

the end goal and not what suffers to meet it.”

Airmen also believe HHQ should reduce mandates levied on commanders. This includes

reports that squadrons must generate that are then rarely used, if at all. In fact, some

squadrons stopped providing a specific report to see if the HHQ staff would notice its

absence. In some cases, the staff never mentioned those missing reports, signifying that the

reports really were non-valued added requirements. Airmen think this happens when

AFI/staff requirements are not reviewed and updated for accuracy.

Allow Commanders to Use the Their Total Force to Meet Manning Requirements

Airmen believe that giving commanders more flexibility to manage their total force—

military, civilian, and contractor—will enable them to be creative about how they allocate

their personnel to meet mission objectives. This will lead to more adaptable squadrons and

possibly alleviate the need for certain requirements.

“The good idea fairy visits often

and gives us new

mission/requirements. I wish the

Air Force would develop a

companion "manning fairy…"

“Leadership only sees the end

goal and not what suffers

to meet it."


To reduce manpower barriers, Airmen felt that a thorough Air Force review of manpower –

numbers and composition – might be required. This should consider different missions and

needs.

Cut Additional Duties

Airmen feel that additional duties, such as administrative and volunteer tasks, take away

from their focus on the mission.

Reduce Non-Mission Related Tasks

“We are killing people with additional duties.”

Non-mission-related and administrative tasks are

hampering mission achievement in squadrons.

There are too many tasks and additional duties

assigned, and not enough people to complete them. “[I am] currently in a squadron with 75

additional duties despite only 25 members in the squadron. Massive amounts of additional duties

which have nothing to do with combat capability/core mission. These duties require more time than

the actual flying mission requirements.”

One Airman suggests some specific changes: “Take away jobs like computer fixes, Defense

Travel System (DTS), etc. and give them back to Functionals to free up time for people to do their

primary job.”

More generally, Airmen think that commanders should, “Review tasks and determine what

areas of lowest risk can be waived to allow for concentration of effort in areas of highest risk.” If

additional duties and tasks cannot be eliminated or reduced, they can at least be

prioritized.

Changes to the additional duty requirements should be made official. While Airmen

recognize that the CSAF has instructed squadrons to stop doing certain additional duties,

respondents are not confident that Air Force Instructions (AFIs) and other inspection

guidance will be modified in accordance with CSAF guidance, and that an unfavorable

mark on an inspection will have negative impacts on the Wing.

Increase Trust and Empowerment

Airmen want to see more decision-making authority pushed down the chain of command

to the leader closest to the work while simultaneously encouraging communication

between empowered Airmen and their leadership. This ensures that decision makers have

accurate and timely information about the state of play. This also demonstrates and builds

trust.

“We are killing people with

additional duties."


Empower Squadron Commanders

“[Let] commanders do what needs to be done. Give

them the authority to assume the risk and the

responsibility to do the mission." To achieve efficient

and effective mission execution at the unit level,

squadron leaders need to be able to make

operational decisions. When HHQ doesn’t

empower squadron leadership to do so, mission

execution suffers.

Airmen want commanders to have greater autonomy to make decisions on behalf of their

squadrons. This means greater control over resource management decisions (hiring, firing,

accountability, discipline, budget control, etc.), the ability to push back on unnecessary

tasking decisions, and more responsibility for training. It also means more back-and-forth

between commanders and headquarters.

Delegate Decisions to the Appropriate Level

Airmen think that the Air Force should push decision-making authority down to the level

best suited to make decisions, as opposed to setting universal standards from a position of

higher authority. Squadron Commanders can unburden themselves by, “formally

delegate[ing] decision authority to others on their leadership team, [which will] broaden the units’

ability to perform certain administrative functions, without requiring the commanders’ approval.”

Airmen felt that Squadron Commanders should empower their subordinates to take

ownership of their processes, thereby eliminating levels of review and expediting decision-

making. They should trust shop leads (first line

supervisors) to manage their people, hours, and

resources to get the job done. One Airman takes it

a step further, suggesting that there is a

leadership role for workers:

“My recommendation isn't for squadron leadership to

be more involved. But, for the squadron and unit to be

more involved in leadership. What I am suggesting is

empowerment. The ability of the worker to refine the

processes in their span of control with leadership guidance. This is the only way we can attack the

issues draining time from the already stressed minimal personnel we have to get the mission done.”

Let Squadrons Assess Their Own Manpower Requirements to Meet Ops Tempo

Airmen want squadrons to have more autonomy over their manpower requirements and a

simplified process for requesting additional manning. They see Squadron Commanders as

best able to ensure the specific/unique needs of a squadron are addressed. Airmen would

like to see HHQ acknowledge that some squadrons may have more immediate manpower

needs than others, and address those needs accordingly.

“[Let] commanders do what

needs to be done. Give them the

authority to assume the risk and

the responsibility to do the

mission."

“My recommendation isn't for

squadron leadership to be more

involved. But, for the squadron

and unit to be more involved in

leadership...."


Airmen see too many levels of coordination and are not clear of the expectations and duties

at each level. “People don't have a clear picture where responsibilities are; squadron, headquarters

or functional.”

Airmen noted that manpower is sometimes taken

from squadrons “out-of-hide” and used to fulfill

perceived requirements at Group and Wing

levels. The Air Force still considers those

positions “filled” for the purposes of headcounts,

but in truth there is one less body available.

Even the squadrons that are manned to their Unit Manning Document (UMD) levels report

difficulties due to the way the Air Force currently determines manning. Airmen gone on

deployments, under Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) review, “loaned” out to Groups or

Wings to fill billets or as augmentees, etc., are unable to participate in completing the core

mission, but still count against the levels allowed on the UMD.

Incentivize a “Culture of Innovation”

Airmen believe that innovation requires a culture of trust and empowerment, currently

lacking in the Air Force.

Many Airmen believe we are a “one-mistake” Air Force and that this culture inhibits the

ability to take risks due to fear of negative career repercussions. As a result, Airmen are

unable to unleash their innovative ideas. Airmen said that increased trust and

empowerment from leadership is key to removing this stigma.

Empowerment requires a lot of communication. Airmen want a squadron command

climate that encourages feedback up and down the chain of command. Down:

Commanders and supervisors provide transparency and the “why” of tasks—especially

when ops tempo is high. Up: Airmen and civilians share best practices and collaboratively

consider the best ways to accomplish tasks.

Let Airmen Learn from Non-Critical Mistakes

Many Airmen observe that the Air Force culture is risk-averse, and that people are afraid to

make mistakes. However, they feel that there is a need to allow for failure to enable

learning opportunities.

Airmen stated that leaders must lead this change, by allowing them to make and learn from

non-critical mistakes. Right now, leaders are afraid to let those below them make mistakes,

sometimes from fear of how it will impact the careers of those Airmen, and sometimes from

fear for how those mistakes could reflect on their leadership. Rewarding prudent risk-

taking and holding people accountable will allow Airmen to grow and learn from failure

(vice being punished).

“People don't have a clear picture

where responsibilities are;

squadron, headquarters or

functional."


Improve Processes and Policies

Airmen noted that Air Force processes and policies can themselves be formidable barriers

to mission success. Outdated policies and processes can be detrimental to mission outcome.

Budgeting policies cause squadrons to waste money on useless items. Old technology slows

down work. An unfair and opaque promotion and award system doesn’t advance the best

people and hurts morale. An evaluation system that doesn’t give enough emphasis to job

performance and mission success causes dissatisfaction and doesn’t help improve

performance.

Review Counterproductive Higher Headquarters Policies

Many Airmen are concerned that Higher Headquarters (HHQ) creates policies and

guidance without adequate understanding of the work being performed by, or the

capacities of, the squadrons. Overall, Airmen think that guidance and policies from HHQ

are disseminated with a lack of clarity or purpose, and not in a fashion that overwrites

previous guidance, but in a way that piles on top of existing guidance. In addition,

functional organizations issuing policy may do so with no awareness of the quantity or

content other functional organizations are issuing. This can create confusion and conflicting

messages for those Airmen asked to interpret and

execute these instructions, to the detriment of a

squadron’s performance. As one Airman put it,

“If you're going to keep adding on policies, make sure

that other policies are either being delegated, or

streamlined so that we aren't just getting more and

more work piled on top of an already heavy workload.”

The Airman’s suggestion is that the Air Force should conduct a review of policies and

processes at the MAJCOM and HAF to ensure that they are current, relevant to mission

success, coordinated across functional communities, and not driving unnecessary work.

Replace Antiquated Systems/Technology. Automate Where Possible.

Airmen want technology to make their jobs easier, not harder; to facilitate productivity, not

limit it. Airmen report that technology gets

updated, but the processes don’t, so they are not

getting the advantages of the new technology.

Digitized does not mean automated. Conversely,

when new processes/requirements get layered on

top of old technology, Airmen are left with

clunky “new” systems that cannot perform to the

new requirement.

“The Air Force is smaller than it's been in a long time,

but we have many holdover habits from our larger

days that no longer deliver results like they used to, or as intended by those who came before us."

“If you're going to keep adding

on policies, make sure that other

policies are either being

delegated, or streamlined..."

“The Air Force is smaller than it's

been in a long time, but we have

many holdover habits from our

larger days that no longer deliver

results like they used to, or as

intended by those who came

before us."


This was seen in the Air Force’s propensity to “digitize” things like paperwork, which does

not reduce the workload because Airmen are essentially doing the exact same thing on a

computer as on a piece of paper. In some cases, digitization increases the number of hands

involved in the process. There’s no change to how the Air Force collects and analyzes

information, and the process stays slow. The Air Force is upgrading systems at a cost, but

receiving no benefit (in terms of reduced workload and freed-up time) from the “upgrade.”

Improve the Promotion System and Award Processes

Airmen want to see improvements in how they are ranked against one another for

promotion to ensure a more fair and realistic system. The stratification system used for

promotion is widely seen as unfair and suboptimal. Airmen do not view the process as

transparent and many questioned whether it selected the best leaders. Same for the award

system: Airmen were skeptical that it was an objective system.

Many Airmen felt that an improved promotion process, along with more transparency,

would increase the desirability to join and remain in the Air Force.

Focus Evaluations on Job Performance

Airmen want leaders to rate them on their job performance and its relationship to mission

success. They don’t think the current evaluation

system is up to the task. As one Airmen

suggested, “If we really want to focus on mission,

remove volunteerism and education from the EPR

entirely. Save it for awards.”

The current evaluation process consumes an

enormous amount of time, lacks transparency

and provides little meaningful feedback to individuals and the organization. Numerous

Airmen and civilians remarked that many aspects of the evaluation process need to be

reviewed, including:

Bullet writing. Bullets are filler, not valuable feedback and a promotion might be

contingent on the quality of the bullets written, not the quality of the work.

The role of education and volunteer duties. Small unit forced-distribution

promotion recommendations are driven by secondary factors, not job performance.

Comparison groups. The Air Force should not compare those Airmen being rated

across AFSCs; rather, they should be rated within AFSCs.

3-Give Us Tools and Resources to Succeed

Every Airman needs the right tools to get the job done. Unfortunately, Airmen don’t think

they have either the human or technological resources to execute their missions

successfully. They want more well-qualified and well-trained co-workers, more

opportunities for hands-on technical training, and more state-of-the-art hardware and

software and the training necessary to use them.

“If we really want to focus on

mission, remove volunteerism

and education from the EPR

entirely. Save it for awards."


Ensure High-Quality People

Getting the right people into the right jobs doesn’t happen by accident. Leaders must select

well-qualified Airmen and allow them to focus on the mission with minimal distractions.

The Air Force, Airmen say, doesn’t just need warm bodies, it needs warm bodies with

appropriate skills.

Bring Back Embedded Squadron Support

Despite ongoing announcements regarding the return of the CSS, an overwhelming

majority of Airmen think that squadrons need additional support. A large number want to

see the CSS brought back to handle administrative and additional duties. One Airman

went to unusual lengths to get the necessary staff:

“I had to build my own Commander’s Support Staff

out of four Lt Cols” Airmen believe that increases

in manning to CSS staffs will reduce additional

duties, enabling Airmen to focus on their primary

duties. Airmen also expressed the desire for

squadron support in non-administrative jobs like communications and IT, as well as the

extension of the Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) program to non-special

forces (AFSOC) squadrons.

Pick the Most Qualified Person for a Position

Airmen perceive improper manning to be just as bad, or worse, than too little manning. As

one Airman explains, “Although manning may be limited, if the additional manpower is not

capable of performing the job, then it’s useless.” The

Air Force should pick qualified people and not

just make decisions based on required AFSC or

rank. Airmen want to ensure that squadrons put

the right person in the right job, thereby

improving performance and enabling unit

cohesion.

Better Leverage Civilians

Civilian Airmen play key roles in many

squadrons. Leaders are challenged with a different ruleset for managing this part of the

force. These challenges are reflected in Airmen’s view that civilian Airmen could be better

leveraged and managed to boost squadron performance and morale. Three common

themes surfaced:

Management. Airmen want Squadron Commanders to have more flexibility in

hiring, firing and overall performance management of civilian members.

Favoritism. Airmen are concerned about favoritism within the civilian hiring

process. Position descriptions for job vacancies are written in such a precise way

“I had to build my own

Commander’s Support Staff out

of four Lt Cols"

“Although manning may be

limited, if the additional

manpower is not capable of

performing the job, then it’s

useless."


that they appear to unfairly favor a specific candidate. This drives away outside

talent and reduces competition in favor of pre-selected candidates.

Slow Hiring Processes. Airmen also want to see the civilian hiring and removal

process sped up, as they believe it takes too long and the delays hurt squadron

productivity.

Enable Technical Mastery

Airmen want to do a good job. They feel they need more of the right kind of training and

more supportive processes in order to be as proficient as possible in their technical roles.

Improve Training Relevance, Frequency, Timing, and Methods

Airmen agree that there is too much irrelevant training. They want the Air Force to review

its training programs to evaluate which programs are most relevant, remove redundant

training, and consolidate training timelines to reduce the impact on daily operations.

Airmen do not want to approach training sessions with the mindset of, “How do I get

through this to get back to my job?” They want training that is focused on helping them build

the skills they need.

There is a widespread dislike of Computer Based Training (CBT). Airmen agree that CBT

modules are not effective at teaching the skills

required to execute their jobs. Airmen feel that

there are too many CBTs and that those CBTs add

little value; therefore, the Air Force should

change how they use CBTs as part of required

training. Airmen frequently noted that CBTs

were required at inappropriate times or for non-mission-essential requirements. Some

CBTs are required annually but may only need to be given as one-offs or occasional

refreshers. As one Airman said, “Get rid of [unnecessary] yearly CBTs like human relations, Law

of Armed Conflict, etc. It’s the same so it doesn’t need to be annual.” Many even recommended

cutting them altogether, saying, “If you don’t care enough to update them, why should I care to

take them?”

Put Budgets in Place to Provide Necessary Training

Airmen know that training costs money. They think that investment in training is necessary

to ensure everyone, uniformed and non-uniformed, gets the training they need. Currently,

not enough of the squadron’s budget is allocated for this purpose. Further, Airmen would

like squadrons to be responsible for allocating how much of their funding goes toward

training rather than those decisions being made at a higher level in the organization.

Implement More Hands-on, AFSC-Specialized Training

Airmen feel that they are not spending enough time honing the skills required for their

jobs. Specifically, they want more hands-on training. They believe that squadrons need to

“take training more seriously— you can’t learn everything from a book. Hands-on training is the

“[Regarding CBTs] If you don’t

care enough to update them, why

should I care to take them?”


best training.” Airmen think that the most important information is often delivered in the

least effective way. In that regard, many suggested, “making training more hands-on and

enjoyable, instead of [always training from Power Points.”

Create a Technical Career Path to Complement the Leadership Career Path

Many Airmen want technical career paths for non-leaders to complement the leadership

career path (i.e. fixing the up-or-out system). Not everyone wants a leadership role. As one

Airman explained, “Bring back Warrant Officers to the Air Force. Leave upper leadership to

officers; technical specialists should be Warrant Officers.”

Provide Sufficient and Reliable Resources

Airmen are asking for state-of-the-art hardware and software, the training to use it and a

better budgeting system to acquire it.

Upgrade and Modernize IT Infrastructure, Computers and Software

Airmen view technology as an efficiency enabler, but only when it’s functioning and up-to-

date. They feel that the Air Force is executing the mission with outdated and insufficient IT

tools and solutions. Other Airmen note that Air Force investments in more modernized

equipment and technology would amplify the benefit they would garner from face-to-face,

hands-on education.

Given the present fast-paced ops tempo throughout the force, many Airmen expressed a

need for better equipment to enable faster information exchanges, consistent data access,

and team connectivity. As one Airman said, “The majority of computers available in my duty

section are extremely outdated…substantial time could be recovered by not waiting minutes to open

a single document.”

Poor refresh rates and too much system downtime has an adverse effect on getting the job

done, which lowers overall job satisfaction. Guard and Reserve Airmen are especially

impacted by poorly scheduled system

maintenance. System downtime is often

scheduled on weekends, when those airmen are

working. As one Airman put it, “Without

computers working, no one is working.”

The key point is that IT platforms are often “half-baked” when they launch and are not

properly vetted. These systems promise better efficiency but when they arrive they actually

create more work, not less. There is a gaping chasm between what a new platform delivers

and what the end-user needs to perform at a high level.

Increase Budget Stability for Squadrons

Airmen feel that resourcing priorities aren’t where they ought to be and funds are not

consistently allocated with the frequency, timing or amount that matches squadrons’ needs.

“Without computers working, no

one is working.”


Some Airmen complain about how money gets apportioned throughout the fiscal year; e.g.,

if certain funds are released quarterly in equal amounts, this often does not match a

squadrons’ ops tempo which may be slow one quarter and high the next. And since

squadrons cannot keep excess money from year to year, there’s little incentive to generate

savings. Airmen want squadrons to get their budget for the year in one big chunk and be

trusted to spend it as they deem appropriate.

4-Strengthen the Team

Strong teams have a one-for-all-and-all-for-one spirit that helps them succeed in good times

and bad. Airmen feel that squadron camaraderie is not what it once was, having suffered

from the stresses and strains of the manpower shortages and the long hours. Airmen have

some ideas about how to foster cohesion and morale, and how the Air Force can better

demonstrate interest in the well-being of Airmen and their families and support networks.

Foster Cohesion and Morale

Airmen have a strong desire to feel connected to other team members. They want more

team building events, more ways to display squadron pride and more information about

squadron history.

Increase Team and Morale Building and Social Events

Airmen see squadron events as a positive way to do team-building and increase morale;

however, “the camaraderie is not what it used to be.” There is often little time to devote to these

events and squadrons have issues scheduling

them. As one Airman explains, “We work to get the

mission done, but there is no ‘work hard, play hard’

anymore. It used to be fun to go to award

ceremonies/luncheons/Christmas parties. But now fun

is associated with anything away from the military.

[The] force shrunk but workload didn’t.”

After-work events are problematic because of the number of hours people are working. At

the end of the day, Airmen feel they need to be with their families or just unwind. Many

say that they would like to see more events during duty hours, including group Physical

Training (PT) worked into the work day. Squadrons that are getting it right are setting

aside time for these events. As noted by one Airman, “About twice a year my squadron has a

burger burn or a squadron picnic or some sort of morale boosting event on a Friday afternoon. They

thank us for all of our hard work.”

Across the board, Airmen disliked the practice of “mandatory fun” (although some leaders

said that even mandatory events can be beneficial to promoting cohesion, teamwork and

camaraderie if done well). Airmen also noted that they would like the events to be planned

and driven at the unit level, not from the upper-echelons (Wing level).

“We work to get the mission

done, but there is no ‘work hard,

play hard’ anymore….”


Provide Outward Displays of Squadron/Unit Identity and Pride

Wearing squadron patches and unit ball caps are how Airmen show their pride in their

squadron, as well as easily distinguish which Airman belongs to which squadron. Airmen

at all bases overwhelmingly wanted to see a return to the tradition of unit patches, and

several expressed a desire to bring back unit ball caps.

Encourage Squadron Heritage Education

While not the case in all squadrons, many Airmen expressed a similar sentiment to this:

"Create a culture to begin with. The only reminder I have that I'm in the Air Force is my uniform."

They want deeper ties to their squadron roots.

To that end, Airmen want the Air Force to

encourage squadron heritage education. They

believe that learning about their squadron’s

history fosters a sense of pride and identity.

Many squadrons are already practicing this and

have “heritage rooms” or are setting aside time to do “lunch and learns” on squadron

heritage. But, Airmen want more of this practice and they want to see it done everywhere.

Foster Accountability in the Squadron

Many Airmen said that great squadrons are comprised of dedicated co-workers who are

passionate, supportive, resilient, and valued.

These are Airmen who feel accountable to help

each other succeed. But, some miss this sense of

accountability and team cohesion: “I feel like we’ve

lost sight of the fact that we are military. We are a

team. We’re all in it together and only as strong as our

weakest link. We need to feel accountable to and for

one another.”

Show Us You Care

Organizations may value their people, but people—especially people who are doing

stressful jobs with sub-par resources—won’t feel valued unless the organization makes a

point of showing it.

Create Open Lines of Communication

Airmen overwhelmingly desire an increase in communication across and within the ranks

of the squadron as an enabler of mission success. They want more communication up and

down the chain of command and across the shops in each squadron; i.e., less siloed and

more matrixed. Communication creates buy-in and a sense of cohesion and belonging. It

gives Airmen a sense of ownership in decisions, which boosts morale and helps people feel

needed. Encouraging idea sharing also leads to better ideas.

“Create a culture to begin with.

The only reminder I have that I'm

in the Air Force is my uniform.”

“I feel like we’ve lost sight of the

fact that we are military. We are a

team. We’re all in it together and

only as strong as our weakest

link. We need to feel accountable

to and for one another.”


Leaders Should Build in Downtime

Airmen believe that leaders successfully increase morale when they respect personal time.

As one Airman said, “Leaders have to block time for taking care of people.” Creating “white

space” means giving more time back to the Airmen and building in downtime as part of a

routine squadron schedule. Increasing the white space in high operational tempo

squadrons, and then respecting that time, allows Airmen to decompress. Sometimes

organizations need dedicated “time to catch up on 'behind the scenes work.' Not even a doctor's

office sees patients all day.”

Bolster Spouse, Family and Airmen Support Networks

Airmen’s morale increases when they have a reasonable balance between work and life,

and when their families and spouses feel connected to the squadron and have the support

they need to cope with the challenges of Air Force life.

Encourage Work-Life Balance

In periods of high ops tempo and/or high deployment tempo, burnout is an ongoing risk. A

high operational tempo impacts more than just the squadron members; it also significantly

impacts their families. Airmen note that high

operational tempo leads to longer work days,

which then leads to them being away from home

for longer stretches of time. “There is no work-life

balance; we need work-life integration,” says one

Airman. Another describes the impact, “We talk

about family, but it seems that I continue to work

longer hours and see less of my family.”

Leadership should set the tone for an increased focus on work-life balance. “[Leaders] often

arrive early and are usually the last ones to leave. Hearing that you need to spend more time with

family or 'recharging your batteries' doesn't mean much when it comes from someone who doesn't

usually get home until 11 pm.” Airmen want to see work-life balance encouraged – including

leaders practicing what they preach.

Creative scheduling can help with better work-life balance. Many squadrons are

investigating flexible scheduling as a way of optimizing Airmen’s time at home while also

meeting their mission obligations. Airmen want to see more creativity in the way

squadrons develop schedules for the work day/week, implementing flexible scheduling or

“core hours” to spread out the workload and prevent burn-out. They also want to see the

standard workweek changed “to match squadron requirements and ops tempo; e.g., don’t have

everyone work M-F if there’s not enough work to go around, but a need exists for weekend

availability.”

“We talk about family, but it

seems that I continue to work

longer hours and see less of

my family.”


Provide More Effective Family Support Programs

Airmen say they are more inclined to stay in the

Air Force knowing they have adequate family

support. “The Air Force is a retention service. We

spend time and money to train our people to do a job,

and need to retain them. Taking care of our people

starts with the individual and their families.”

Due to the demands on Airmen from high ops

tempo, deployments, and TDYs, family support

services such as the Child Development Center

(CDC) and other services for families of deployed Airmen are in high demand. Some base

facilities cannot meet current mission needs. For example, childcare development centers

(CDC) that are only open during regular working hours, when the reality is that many

Airmen are doing shift work outside of the core eight-to-five workday. Airmen also express

the desire for a re-invigorated Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) program to provide

more on-base activities and services.

Airmen and spouses alike cited the difficulty for otherwise working spouses to obtain jobs

when they PCS, both for jobs on base and in the local community. One factor cited was the

difficulty of transferring professional licenses and certifications between states.

Squadron Commanders Should Lead Family Support Efforts

In general, spouses expressed a desire for more communication from squadron leadership:

“Strong spouse groups and family support are essential and should be led at the Squadron

Commander level.” Effective and timely communication is especially important while loved

ones are deployed. The Key Spouse Program is intended to improve communication

between Squadron Commanders and spouses/families, but many feel it needs

improvement. Spouses would like to receive information regularly to know about events

happening on the base.

When these programs work, and families/spouses

feel connected to the squadron, it has a positive

impact on squadron morale. One Airman noted:

“[Citing a best practice] This is the first base I’ve been

where the Key Spouse and Booster Club work together.

They do things that could not be done separately.”

Spouses need to know how they can get involved

and where they can find information affecting

their families; e.g., deployment, schedules, and

TDY.

“…We spend time and money to

train our people to do a job, and

need to retain them. Taking care

of our people starts with the

individual and their families.”

“[Citing a best practice] This is

the first base I’ve been where the

Key Spouse and Booster Club

work together. They do things

that could not be done

separately.”


Revitalize the Key Spouse Program

Airmen would like the Key Spouse Program to function at a high level. At some squadrons,

the program works well. At others, it’s either not inclusive of all spouses or perceived as an

afterthought. Airmen want to see more consistency and excellence in how the Key Spouse

Program functions. Suggestions include:

Funding the Key Spouse position as a government or contracted employee.

Eliminating the program outright or significantly revising the program’s objectives

and role of the Key Spouse.

Rebranding the program to dispel the idea that the “key” spouse is part of the

squadron hierarchy which is preventing some spouses from participating;

Involving people who genuinely want to be there, participate, and help one another.

The program needs “Key Spouses who are

interested in meeting, knowing, and learning

about their squadron spouses.” The members

of this program “should be selected based on

their personalities, commitment, and desire to

help others. Seems that too often the spouses in

this role are placed there due to the activeness

and rank of their [member] spouses.”

Above all else, spouses reported a desire to see real accountability in the Key Spouse

Program, both for the Key Spouse and the Squadron Commander. They believe the

Key Spouse and commander need to be held accountable for the program’s

effectiveness, and commanders need to be directly involved.

Improve deployment preparation and support for families and support networks

Airmen and their spouses described how deployments (and the pre-deployment process)

can be incredibly disruptive to their spouses and families, and they’d like to make an

already difficult process less painful. Airmen’s wish-list includes:

Involve spouses. Many spouses want to be included in the deployment preparation

process.

Hurry it up. Airmen and families want to see a reduction in the time required to

administratively return a member (reintegration). They also want to see a reduction

in time spent in pre-deployment training so Airmen can be with their families

before they deploy.

Resources. Spouses and families want more information on resources they can use

during deployment and to receive this information pre-deployment.

Communication. They also want to see more communication from squadron

leadership during deployment, specifically from the commander or first sergeant, so

“Key Spouses… should be

selected based on their

personalities, commitment, and

desire to help others....”


they feel like they’re still a part of the squadron while their family member is

deployed.

Networking. Since Airmen often deploy alone, spouses can feel on their own.

Deployment is not a shared experience in most squadrons. Spouses would like to

have more networking opportunities to mitigate the loneliness they might

encounter during deployments. Key Spouses specifically should know who is

deployed/ being deployed to promote networking and support opportunities to

spouses and family members of deployed Airmen.

Include Spouses and Families in Squadron Events More Often

Spouses and families want more opportunities to participate in squadron activities and

events, but don’t want to be “voluntold” to do it. But, squadrons should be considerate

when scheduling, e.g., many spouses have their own careers or other daytime obligations

and want their schedules to be accommodated. Airmen want more family-friendly events,

and they’d like them to be welcoming to non-traditional families, too. Squadrons need to

find the right balance in the types of events so that both single Airmen and childless

spouses feel included.

There has been a lost sense of family support and morale when family programs were

downsized on bases. Spouses and families feel like they must go off base to do things, so

they want to bring back programs such as intramural sports and other family friendly

events.

Support and Involve Military Children

Airmen from all bases want to see more opportunities for children to get to know their

squadrons and to meet other kids. They want programs in place that make the realities of

military life, like deployments, easier on children. Airmen at one base thought that older

children could also be more involved in re-integration efforts.

The Kids Understanding Deployment Operations (KUDOS) program, a way for kids to

understand how deployments work, was considered a best practice. Some wanted to see

more partnerships between the Air Force and local schools to support the children of

deployed Airmen and to educate adults in those communities about the effect of

deployment on children.


ASSESSMENT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS Thinking Systemically The Air Force is not unique in the challenges it faces. Airmen reported problems –

including “risk aversion,” “additional duties that drain and distract,” and

“micromanagement”—that are military-wide, worldwide, not just across US Armed

Forces8. If these problems are common to military organizations, then to understand why

they occur, and what to do about them, we may have to zoom out, instead of drilling down.

Understanding these issues one-by-one, and trying to solve them one at a time, may not

work.

The Focus Area 1 (FA1) team worked to diagnose the underlying systemic issues affecting

squadron vitality. Airmen were outspoken about both problems and solutions affecting

squadron vitality. Yet sometimes both the problems and the solutions were in fact

symptoms of more macro-issues.

For example, the FA1 team found ample evidence that computer-based training (CBT)

wasted time, failed to train, and conveyed to Airmen that their time isn’t valued. This

problem is well known, and Air Force leadership launched an initiative to review CBTs a

year ago. That initiative is important (and widely applauded by Airmen) But there’s a

macro-issue here: Why was notoriously ineffective, wasteful, and demoralizing training of

any kind allowed to continue unchecked? And, what training are we missing? In other

words, how do we ensure our organizational OODA loop continually sharpens our

training?

Solutions such as the CBT review are extremely welcome, but deeper issues must be

addressed.

The Culture Challenge

Some participants offered diagnoses that were actually symptoms of systemic issues. For

example, when discussing challenges of squadron revitalization, Airmen frequently

explained the cause of a problem by saying, “It’s our culture!” In other words, “These beliefs

and behaviors happen a lot around here because they happen a lot around here.” Likewise, “It’s a

8 For example, see Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S.,

British, and Israeli Armies, Stanford University Press, 2011.


leadership problem!” was regularly pronounced as a diagnosis. Again, that diagnosis

suggests more about the systemic nature of the issue at hand than the specific treatment for

the problem.

This isn’t to deny that culture creation and maintenance is a leader’s job; it certainly is! In

fact, how to think about culture productively and how to affect it positively is a central

topic of this chapter. But cultures evolve over long periods of time. Cultural change

requires specific actions to address specific issues, the aggregate product of which

requires effort that must be constant for years to realize the desired change.

The “Just-Tell-‘em” Prescription

Project participants offered prescriptions, in addition to diagnoses. One common

prescription was, essentially, communicate something emphatically.

For example, the FA1 team heard, “Tell seniors to empower Squadron Commanders more.”

And, “Tell Squadron Commanders that not everything’s a priority.” And, “Tell Squadron

Commanders to get out from behind their desks and get to know their people!”

The intent is spot on. But for system-wide change, the call for exhortation is another

symptom contributing to a diagnosis and not a solution in and of itself. Telling people

(even ordering people) will not be enough.

Every leader reading this has at least one time had the exasperated thought: “I couldn’t

have been any clearer! Why aren’t they getting it?” Well, it’s true that communicating the

right things and in the right way can drive change. But how those messages are actually

heard and acted on will depend on many other factors, too, which are discussed in the

following sections.

Solutions and Partial Solutions

Plenty of strategies were proposed, and many of them made sense – such as, “Give people

more time to do their jobs.” Or, “Give them better tools – especially information technology

tools.” Or, “Incentivize people better, if you want better behavior.”

Many of the suggestions were helpful, yet incomplete. For example, leadership training

that includes “how to assess and take risk” would probably help more leaders assess and take

risk. But, in a wing where mistake-avoidance is the default definition of “success,” training won’t

carry much impact.

Imbedded habits – “culture” – are rarely affected by a single solution. Therefore, a set of

organizational principles, diagnoses, and recommendations, taken together, are needed for

squadron revitalization.


Ten Leverage Points and The Fulcrum In interviews, surveys, focus groups, and 100-person group sessions, Airmen, including

senior leaders, spoke of broad issues and opportunities affecting squadron vitality. Poring

over those many inputs – and applying knowledge of the Air Force and organizational

behavior – the FA1 team observed 10 leverage points and a single fulcrum on which each

leverage point must rest. Together, they will help ensure maximum squadron vitality.

The Fulcrum: Clarity of Purpose

In life, work, or war, people receive their meaning from seeing how they fit into a higher

purpose. For that to happen, first, a higher purpose must exist; second, it must be known.

The Air Force has abundant higher purpose to offer its Airmen. Unfortunately, they don't

always know it.

Toward that point, Airmen said that “squadron mission” needs to be much clearer.

However, some countered that squadron mission was plenty clear: “We have lots of

measures,” one leader asserted.

But that misses the point; the complaints were about insufficient clarity of purpose; they

weren’t about an insufficient number of metrics. The ten “leverage points” cited in the

following sections (and listed below) all depend on this single fulcrum. It is the solid

foundation upon which to drive intentional culture change – and squadron vitality – and

achieve powerful results.

At issue here is the simplest, hardest, and most important question for leaders to ask…the

existential question, “Why do we, as a unit, exist?” It is usually dismissed out of hand by

those who haven’t pondered it; but intelligent action – especially for leaders – is impossible

without a clear answer. Put differently, the question is not, “What are we here to do?”


The real question is, “What are we here to achieve?” It’s about the few, important outcomes,

not the many, many tasks (which may or may not produce the outcomes).

At a unit level, the unit’s purpose is its “mission,” so it would be tempting to claim that

every unit leader already knows their unit’s mission, therefore they know their unit’s

purpose. However, the word “mission” falls a bit too easily from the lips of some leaders

who cannot say the overarching single outcome or few outcomes for which the unit was

stood up. In other words, they haven’t pinned down the point of their unit’s existence: its

purpose.

Clausewitz famously asserted that the talent of the strategist is to identify the decisive point and

to concentrate everything on it, removing forces from secondary fronts and ignoring lesser

objectives. However, if that “decisive point” – here, the point of a squadron’s existence – is

unclear, then it will be impossible for Airmen to distinguish “lesser objectives” from the

central one.

In these cases, with blurred or fragmented purpose, bureaucratic demands fill the

vacuum. Then, Mission Command9 – which depends on clear purpose – gives way to

Compliance Command: success defined by following all the rules in order to stay out of

trouble.

Mission Command, like many other concepts cited in this report, borrows from the

operational environment. In Mission Command, the commander’s intent “should convey

absolute clarity of purpose by focusing on the essentials and leaving out everything else.

The task should not be specified in too much detail.10” Mission Command wins wars in-

theater; but any organization, operational or not, becomes more innovative, agile, and

effective when its purpose – within thoughtful boundaries – drives analysis, decisions,

and action11.

One Airman nicely summarized the distinction between Compliance Command and

Mission Command when he suggested, “We have to get away from a compliance-based

approach to an effects-based approach.”

When Airmen’s concerns weren’t directly about clarity of purpose, often their concerns

were about the second-order effects of unclear or absent purpose. When a squadron’s few,

major outcomes – its purpose – aren’t clear, then it’s missing the overarching basis for what

9 For a quick, lucid description of Mission Command, see S. Bungay “The Road to Mission

Command: The Genesis of a Command Philosophy,” British Army Review, No. 137, Summer, 2005,

pp22 – 29. (To represent its opposite concept, we have coined the term Compliance Command.) 10 Ibid. 11 “Whole Goals” is one term for this approach to strategic direction. See Casey, W., Peck, W., Webb,

N. & Quast, P. “Are we driving strategic results or metric mania? Evaluating performance in the

public sector,” International Public Management Review V9(2), 2008, pp. 90-105.


tasks to take on or to decline, how to prioritize, and how to tailor all sorts of rules and

resources.

This sense of purpose-driven work extends not just to organizations (e.g., a unit’s mission),

but also to efforts at all levels – training classes, morale events, family support, etc. The

idea, “Begin with the end in mind” is a cliché for a reason: it is an important truth, one

which influenced many recommendations in this report.

Lessons from the Tooth to the Tail

Purpose-driven organizations and purpose-driven effort are commonplace in operational

and deployed environments. Military mission planning always begins with a clear

understanding of intent and purpose. When intended results are clear and matter, then

good things tend to happen: Airmen have little problem connecting to purpose and

sensing their membership in a valued team doing meaningful work – the prerequisites

for esprit de corps cited earlier in this report. Decisions get smarter, leaning toward “What

will accomplish our mission?” and leaning away from “Am I going to get dinged?” Problems

seen at home stations, such as “lack of empowerment,” “lack of trust,” “bureaucratic

solutions,” and “lack of transparency,” shrink or disappear in operational environments.

In operational environments, high ops tempo, which translates to long, stressful hours, is

accepted and often embraced. The higher purpose drives Airmen on, and feeds esprit de

corps. But in non-operational environments, Airmen resent long stressful hours, when the

higher cause isn’t evident. In effect, “We are working 12-hour days. . . why?”

In operational environments, social events aimed at increasing group cohesion aren’t all

that necessary – not to say that they aren’t welcome stress-relievers. But an operational

team, working toward the same clear, important purpose has quite a leg up in the morale

and cohesion department.

Why do operational environments bear these advantages? Is it just high stakes and

adrenaline? Probably not. Over the course of the project, many Airmen reported home

station leaders and squadrons that successfully created “vitality” – and clear, shared,

important purpose was an essential part of the success formula.

Consider this: any Airman – not just an operator – who overcomes great obstacles to serve a

noble purpose is the courageous Airman the Air Force requires. And on the other hand,

any person whose sole intent is to follow rules, even when they are out of context, becomes

just another “bureaucrat.”

Many of us would like to be up front, in the thick of it all, yet many of us wield keyboards

or wrenches, not control sticks or M-4s. But if we are connected to our clear and elevating

purpose, then we get to make a difference – and be part of something vital.


“Purpose” Before All Else

One month into his current tenure, General Goldfein asserted,

“Squadrons are the engines of innovation and esprit de corps. Squadrons possess

the greatest potential for operational agility. 12”

That’s true, and “clear purpose” will enable it all. Airmen linked to purpose will capably

surf the incoming sea of change in warfare and geopolitics. However, Airmen linked

solely to procedures and checklists will fare less well; they will be stuck with outdated

turn-by-turn directions in a fast-changing world.

Increased clarity of purpose will increase innovation, agility, and many other cultural

strengths. Institutional agility, for example, means the ability to tailor solutions, such as

organizational structure, manning mix and allocation, training, policies, process design,

and resources.

True empowerment, for example, becomes possible when purpose is sharply defined.

Then, authorities can be (and should be) tailored to align with purpose-linked

responsibilities.

Likewise, distinguishing today’s time-wasting micromanagement from life-saving

checklists becomes possible only with the understanding of purpose. When purpose isn’t

sharply clear, it’s hard to know when detailed guidance is central to success, or when it

wastes time and is a barrier to mission accomplishment.

Organizational learning becomes possible when intended outcomes are clear, because then

success and failure are clear – “success” cannot then be defined after the fact, thereby

thwarting a lesson to be learned. Thoughtful experimentation toward an important

purpose rises above blind rule-following.

It’s About Desired Outcomes

Purpose is the why behind what we do. If it’s unclear, we do the wrong things or do things

the wrong way. We focus on effort rather than outcomes. But when purpose is clear, so

can be the desired outcomes that reflect success. As General Goldfein recently said,

“[Secretary Wilson and I] told the [Inspector General]: ‘If you go out and inspect an

organization, and that commander has made a prudent reasonable decision to change

course, and that decision has actually increased the lethality and the readiness of that unit

to accomplish their mission, then we're not going to ding them. We're going to celebrate

it.13’”

12 From Gen Goldfein’s charge in FA1: http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/article/873161/csaf-

letter-to-airmen/ 13 From Gen Goldfein’s speech at the Air Force Association Air, Space and Cyber Conference in

National Harbor, Sept. 19, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p1LZNZYGwtw

http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/article/873161/csaf-letter-to-airmen/

http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/article/873161/csaf-letter-to-airmen/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p1LZNZYGwtw


When we understand the purpose of our effort then “agility,” “innovation,” and

“empowerment” aren’t just buzzwords, they are tools.

Ten Leverage Points

The following ten leverage points – principles and opportunities for systemic change –

require that Squadron Commanders and leaders above them answer the question, “Why

does this unit exist?” The next two sections discuss how to help leaders answer this

question, which will enable the systemic changes described in the eight sections after that.

In the end, the FA1 team’s observations and recommendations that follow are designed

to ensure every Airman, in every squadron, understands what to do and why, and has the

capabilities, support, and motivation to do it.

1. Organizational Role Clarity: Who’s Supporting Whom, and How

The Leverage Point

One critical way in which an organization must be organized is for its members to know who

among them is “supported” and who is “supporting”: who gets what versus who gives

what – and why. Ultimately, all organizations have both supported and supporting roles,

and often at the same time.

Organizational theorists call this simple arrangement a “value chain”: every organization-

within-an-organization understands and delivers its value for cumulative downstream

effects or capabilities. Though, for the Air Force, it might be better termed a Lethality

Chain, which is the phrase used in this report. This concept is different from the “chain of

command,” which is about the hierarchy of authority and responsibility established to

guide and enable successful mission execution. The chain of command is critical to

ensuring the Lethality Chain does, in fact, ultimately deliver the Air Force’s lethal

contributions to the Joint fight.

The Lethality Chain represents the value delivery that results from cross-organizational

coordination and handoffs. Think of it this way: each squadron is a link in the Air Force’s

Lethality Chain. Closest to the fight are operational units, such as bomber squadrons,

ICBM squadrons, and Cyber Mission Forces. The units immediately upstream from there –

for example maintenance squadrons or operations support squadrons – give operational

units the direct support they need to operate. These “direct support” squadrons (e.g.,

maintenance, munitions, operations support) provide support only to specific operational

squadrons. They don’t support everybody.

Other units provide more comprehensive support to all units, directly or indirectly. In

other words, these “comprehensive support” units (e.g., medical and dental,

communications, and contracting) support every organization in the Air Force.

When all those upstream units do their jobs, support is passed on, and operational units

can deliver the punch for Combatant Commands. Every Airman – whether in an


operational, direct support, or comprehensive support unit – is essential for Air Force

lethality. Without exquisite maintenance, the fighter will not get to the target; and without

precise intel, the enemy cannot be located; and without superb munitions technicians

maintaining and loading the ordnance, the weapons will not destroy the target. And

without comprehensive support from organizations such as contracting, medical, and security

forces, none – none – of the others can succeed. We wouldn’t have the equipment we need or

the safe and healthy men and women required to deliver Air Force capabilities to

Combatant Commands.

But there are three possible hitches to watch for . . .

First, each unit, including higher-up organizations (NAF Support, MAJCOM Support, Air

Staff, Functional Support, etc.), has to understand why it exists (as discussed earlier in the

Clarity of Purpose section). Each type of squadron must understand its respective role –

directly or indirectly contributing to the delivery of Air Force capabilities. The squadron’s

role should be clearly defined and articulated in its Mission Directive or Designed

Operational Capability (DOC) statement. Each higher-up organization must be clear about

its role in enabling an effective Lethality Chain – including giving clear strategic guidance

that makes its way to tactical execution, providing resources, and removing barriers to

ensure squadron success.

Second, and equally important, every unit needs to understand why each other exists. And, they

need to act like they understand. When the Lethality Chain is not understood or acted on, then

too many questions go unanswered, or answered badly: “Who can task whom with what?”

“When should I say ‘no’?” “Are we inspecting the right things for this unit?”

This understanding must include how roles can change depending on circumstances. For

example, sometimes an Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) organization

provides direct support to an operational organization. Other times it is the operational

organization. The diagram below reflects this, showing that a few such organizations

straddle comprehensive and direct support, or direct support and operations.

Third, units providing support and other units receiving it need to be in a feedback loop

– providing each other with the information that enables effective performance. That would

mean the unit providing support asks, “Did I give you the support that I’m here to provide?”

And, it would mean the unit receiving support asks, “Are my requirements clear?” and “Are

you getting what you need from me, so you can help me?” Sometimes that feedback loop

happens easily, especially when Airmen know each other and have a relationship. But

sometimes that’s impractical or unreliable, so other institutionalized means must be

adopted.

The diagram on the next page is one way of showing these organizational role

relationships.


Effective communication is the key to an effective lethality chain. This two-way

communication must be helped, not hindered, by the chain of command. Beyond effective

and efficient organization of effort, a clear and effective Lethality Chain affects Airmen’s

esprit de corps. Their connection to higher purpose requires not only that they understand

their squadron’s purpose, but also that they understand where their squadron’s purpose

fits into the Air Force’s bigger picture.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: Unclear organizational roles (purpose) and role relationships (e.g., providing

versus receiving support), especially in relation to what squadrons must deliver,

contributes to misalignment of responsibilities and authorities. This misalignment invites

inappropriate tasking, lack of empowerment, limited organizational learning and

innovation, and many Airmen not seeing the link between their work and a higher

purpose.

The challenge – and why role clarity and purpose are so critical – is this: The farther back

from the “pointy end of the spear” a unit resides, the easier it is for its members to lose

sight of why that unit exists; whom it supports and who it’s supported by, why, how, and

what success looks like. Often, the impact of their work is more delayed than those closer to

the fight. The childcare provider can’t see their contribution to lethality as easily as the

Airman who loads ordnance can. This places additional demands on leadership to help

people see how they serve a higher purpose. Without this link to a higher purpose,

Airmen can only see themselves through the lens of their technical specialty rather than

as a critical link in the chain that delivers lethality. And, the sense of meaning that is so

essential for high morale and esprit de corps is missing.

This challenge resides with higher level organizations, too. The farther up from a squadron

an organization exists, the more easily staffs forget who exists to help whom. (Senior leader

interviews reflect that most seniors, themselves, have not forgotten.) Most new action

officers learn only the process for staff communication and tasking. They are not trained on

the importance of enabling squadrons; they understandably can assume that lower

commands exist to do the bidding of higher ones. In other words, they understand their

place in the chain of command, but not the Lethality Chain. This limited perspective can

lead to data calls and other sometimes random or misdirected taskers that weaken the

Lethality Chain. Likewise: off-mission inspections, off-mission training, and appropriation

of squadrons’ Airmen for the administrative needs of Higher Headquarters.


Perhaps in response to this issue, General Goldfein recently said14,

“The org chart of the United States Air Force has the [Air Force] Secretary and me

at the bottom, Squadron Commanders at the top, and everybody else is in

between to make sure those Squadron Commanders have what they need to

succeed.”

Based on surveys and interviews, most Airmen share this view in principle. But the devil is

in the details.

For example, Airmen made many, many calls for greater empowerment, for pushing

decision-making further down the ranks – and especially for giving Squadron

Commanders the authority they need to succeed. However, ambiguity gets in the way.

Even when a Squadron Commander knows exactly why her squadron exists, and where

it fits in the Lethality Chain, does everybody else? What about the group and wing staffs,

and Higher Headquarters? Do they share the same opinion? What about the staffs of

various functional authorities and “supporting commands”? Based on the FA1 team’s

findings, it’s unlikely they all share the same opinions, and there’s currently no systemic

way to align them.

Meaningful “empowerment” requires the alignment of responsibility and authority. If so,

then for a Squadron Commander to be empowered, the squadron’s place and purpose in

the Lethality Chain must first be sharply defined and widely understood. In that context, it’s

possible to grant, tailor, and communicate authorities such as budgeting, personnel

allocation, and deciding how best to achieve mission success. Relevant training and

coaching can then be aimed not just at how to stay out of trouble, but also how a Squadron

Commander’s empowerment can be used for mission achievement. And squadron leaders

can more confidently look for ways to help their teams improve and innovate, once they

possess a clearer view of the outcomes they’re aiming for, and where they fit in the

Lethality Chain.

Time wasters – real and perceived – are also problematic when roles in the Air Force’s

Lethality Chain are unclear. When a squadron receives a task from an off-base command

(functional agency or a higher command), or receives an Air Force Instruction subject to

inspection – how seriously should they take it? Perhaps the assigned work is directly in line

with the squadron’s purpose and place in the Lethality Chain. And, perhaps not. But

without clear organizational role relationships, it’s hard for either party to know.

14 Excerpted from Gen Goldfein’s speech at the Air Force Association Air, Space and Cyber

Conference in National Harbor, Sept. 19, 2017. Available at:




Instead, each party in the assign/decline interaction will apply criteria such as “What’s

least risky?” And, “What’s easiest to do?” rather than “Will this contribute to the

squadron’s purpose?”

A task assigner, for instance, might decide that it’s least risky to “shotgun” a tasker (send it

to lots of people), rather than risk one person complaining that they didn’t get to weigh in

on something. Or, they may shotgun the tasker because they don’t have the time to

research who really ought to be tasked and in so doing, they save themselves an hour, and

cost others many hours. In either scenario, time is needlessly snatched away from

squadrons’ contribution to the Lethality Chain.

As taskers cascade down a chain of command – from MAJCOM to wing to group to

squadron, the taskers can sit in in-boxes for days before being passed down to the next

layer, which then does the same thing. A 30- or 60-day tasker can end up in a squadron’s

in-box with only days to respond.

When tasks are performed, feedback is often absent. One Squadron Commander

complained, “I got tasked to coordinate on an important AFI, and spent a lot of time trying

to improve the document, but many of the substantive inputs were rejected without

adjudication. Now we have to follow this instruction we view as flawed, and don’t know

why our improvements were rejected.”

If the organizations between the squadron and the Chief of Staff are there to help the

squadron succeed, then the tasker system is often a counter-example of that.

“Additional duties” were also an often-cited time waster, and they can arise from unclear

role relationships. Some additional duties are imposed on squadrons from external

organizations and others are self-imposed. For example, there are official “Additional

Duties,” such as each squadron’s “vehicle control officer” role (regardless of the number of

vehicles to be “controlled”), and then there are locally assigned “additional duties” – lower

case “a.”

In reality, the complaint that additional duties are “time wasters” rang true only some of

the time. The definition of “additional duties” differs from Airman to Airman, and may

include “things not in my job description,” “things that are obviously (or seemingly)

unimportant,” etc.

Said differently, the “additional duties” Airmen talked about fell into three categories.

1. It’s important and I know it. (I know how my work serves a larger purpose.)

2. It’s important and I don’t know it. (This work feels stupid and bureaucratic,

because no one has shown me how it serves a larger purpose.)

3. It’s not important and I know it. (This is stupid, bureaucratic work, and isn’t why I

joined the Air Force.)


Regarding #2, one Squadron Commander told us, “Some work just has to be done to run the

squadron. Part of my job is to get Airmen to see the connection.” Sounds about right. Skillful

leaders constantly help people make connections between the work at hand and the higher

purpose. When leaders fail to do that, the “time waster” isn’t just appearing to waste

time, it’s also undermining esprit de corps.

Regarding #3, that work needs to go away. It competes with the Air Force’s real work; and,

like #2, it saps the esprit de corps of our Airmen.

Clunky, badly designed processes also steal time. This is about doing things wrong versus

doing the wrong things. Unclear organizational roles and role relationships are key

contributors. Process improvement always hinges on knowing the point of the process,

who is (or ought) to be involved, and who the “customer” is. The clearer the Air Force’s

Lethality Chain is, the more Air Force-wide its process solutions can be, and therefore the

more dramatic their effect. A broad perspective permits a deep impact.

Otherwise, real improvements will tend to remain localized; and feeble or counter-

productive “improvements” will be saddled on everyone.

Case in point: removal of CSS positions was justified by “computerization” of processes.

But there are two varieties of that: “digitization,” which merely transfers bad processes and

forms to computers, and humans still have to do the same work. (That’s like buying a car,

and then having it pulled by a horse.) Or, “automation,” in which workflow is re-

conceptualized, and then computers help do the work rather than acting as mere file

cabinets.

Air Force Instructions (AFIs) are an important piece of the puzzle because they both

define and reflect assumed roles. The content and detail they include, how well they’re

written, and at whom they’re aimed will either help or hinder the role clarity required for

the Air Force to deliver its maximum lethal capabilities.

Since AFIs play a primary role in inspections – the prevailing yardstick for measuring

squadrons – the challenges and opportunities for aligning them to support each squadron’s

clear purpose are described in the next section on What We Measure. Our recommendations

below focus on the first steps in clarifying roles—steps that will pave the way for each of

the remaining topics in this report.

Recommendations

The first primary recommendation below is focused on “big picture” organizational role

clarity – clarifying, broadly, how the Air Force delivers it strategic value to Combatant

Commands. Clarifying the big picture will help provide the higher purpose that is a key

ingredient for esprit de corps and foundational for high performance. The second

recommendation is focused on the longer-term effort of developing and communicating

more precise organizational role clarity. The final recommendation acknowledges the


process redesign work that will likely increase as organizational roles and role relationships

become clearer. All of these recommendations will provide critical insights to help inform

decisions about possible changes to organizational structure, including squadron size and

manning mix.

1.1 Validate or modify the proposed Lethality Chain – including defining the terms that

could notionally describe organizational roles (e.g., operational units, direct support units,

comprehensive support units, etc.). Then clarify their relationship to one another and under

what conditions. The FA1 team recommends using easy-to-understand visuals, such as the

Lethality Chain diagram used earlier in this section. Once the diagram depicting

relationships is agreed upon among the Air Force’s senior-most leaders, such visual tools

should be used consistently by leaders at all levels to help educate, communicate, and

ultimately clarify organizational roles. (OPR: AF Role Clarity Implementation Team, see

recommendation 1.2).

1.1.1 In this effort, place extra emphasis on clarifying the role of Higher Headquarters

(HAF, MAJCOM, and NAF) in the Lethality Chain and finding ways for them to

better enable, rather than hinder, squadron success. This would require a review of

policies and processes at the MAJCOM and HAF levels to ensure they are current,

and that those requirements in place are contributing to mission execution, and not

driving unnecessary work or unreasonable response timeframes. A regular review of

these policies and requirements is warranted, especially as the purpose and role

relationships across the Air Force are clarified. This should also include

implementing a best practice policy being exercised by Air Force Global Strike

Command and the Air Force Personnel Center. Each of these organizations

maintains a rule whereby only a Commander can say “No” to a subordinate

Commander’s request. This ensures that a commander’s request is not turned down

by the first action officer or functional manager in the process. This policy works and

should be adopted Air Force-wide. (OPR: AF Role Clarity Implementation Team).

1.1.2 Update or create education and training content to (a) reflect the clarified

organizational roles and role relationships defined by senior leadership, and (b) help

Air Force members identify themselves first as an Airman (vice their technical

specialty). Minimally:

a. Update Developmental Education, leadership training, and HQ Staff

Training programs. Educate staff and commanders on the role relationships

as defined by AFI 38-101, Manpower and Organization, Paragraph 2.2

Standard Levels of Air Force Organization but also using any updated

terminology or visual(s) as described in recommendation 1.0 (OPR: AETC; OCRs:

AU, AF/A5/8, and SAF/FM).

b. Design an onboarding course for Enlisted, Officer, and Civilian Airmen in order

to help clarify roles and properly develop Airmen. (OPR: AETC; OCR: AU).


Because role clarity is paramount to success on purpose, it is important for

Airmen to understand where they fit into the Air Force from the very beginning

and to also have a sense of where their peers and others fit as well. The Air

Force does a great job accessing and enculturating Enlisted members. Enlisted

Airmen attend Airmanship 100 (immediately after BMT), Airmanship 200 (at

technical training), and Airmanship 300 (at FTAC). These three courses provide

a common professional development baseline which includes reinforcing their

role in the Air Force. Civilians and officers do not get this same baseline.

Civilians currently receive a 4.5 hour online New Employee Orientation course,

wherein the course delivery method deprives civilians the opportunity to

interact with and understand their uniformed peers or Air Force culture and

values. Officers, likewise, come from three separate commissioning sources, so

they receive training on roles, values, and institutional norms from the

perspectives of their own sub-cultures. After commissioning, there is no

common path for an officer prior to arriving at their first duty location. This

makes it difficult to instill a common baseline and sense of purpose within the

officer corps. The Air Force needs its officers to identify with being an Air Force

officer first. One of the key reasons the Air Force established the Air and Space

Basic Course (ASBC) was to eliminate the existing USAF culture that

encouraged officers to identify with their career field and commissioning

source instead of their service. A standard, centralized, in-residence

onboarding course is the most optimal solution and would address this issue—

especially for new officers and civilians. To keep costs down, the Air Force

could implement a course at the base level similar to Airmanship 300 (FTAC)

for the Enlisted force. The FTAC courseware could be expanded to include

officers and civilians with appropriate initial onboarding and developmental

content for each. Specific curriculum would be defined by AETC. The current

FTAC curriculum, former ASBC course content, and civilian orientation and

acculturation material should be used as a starting point. The course would be

a common baselining professional development experience, which includes

reinforcing culture, values, and roles in the Air Force’s Lethality Chain.

1.2 Establish a cross-functional, senior-level Implementation Team to determine how

best to more precisely clarify organizational roles (purpose) and role relationships

across the Air Force. (OPR: AF Role Clarity Implementation Team). This senior-level team

should be accountable to deliver a specific action plan at CORONA. Their plan should

be aimed at achieving this goal: Every Airman in every organization in the Air Force

knows the answers to these questions:

Why does my organization exist?

What are the critical outcomes we must deliver, and to whom, to help ensure the

Air Force can ultimately deliver its capabilities?


How will we know we’re delivering those outcomes, our mission, as effectively

as possible?

On what other Air Force organizations do we depend, and for what, to deliver

on our purpose (our mission)?

Minimally, this Implementation Team’s work should include these four things:

1. Determine the best process to help each Air Force organization identify and

articulate their critical, few mission outcomes. Each organization needs to know

the outcomes they exist to produce, and for whom: their place and purpose in the

Air Force’s Lethality Chain. These critical few (3 – 6) indicators should reflect

success in delivering on their purpose (mission). These should be measurable

outcomes, even if measured subjectively, such as with “customer” feedback. This

is not about the existing numerous indicators of effort or input.

For example, one squadron’s purpose might be to “provide fully mission

capable aircraft to an airlift squadron.” Despite the thousands of tasks any

squadron performs, and the many inputs they receive (such as manning or

training), they are all angled (or should be angled) toward maintaining successful

metrics on a small handful of mission outcomes.

Key considerations for this process:

Sequence matters. This effort should start with clarifying the vital few

mission outcomes for operational squadrons – the place the Air Force’s

ultimate capability leaves the door. Squadron outcomes – and accompanying

success measures – must be developed within the context of the Air Force’s

strategic goals – ensuring delivery of desired capabilities now and in the future.

These outcomes need to be directly defined in each squadron's DOC

statement. Once operational squadrons’ mission outcomes are clear, then

mission outcomes of direct support and comprehensive support squadrons

can be clarified – making sure that these mission outcomes indicate the value

delivered to the organizations they support in the Lethality Chain. In this

case, the “customer” might be inside the Air Force.

Then, mission outcomes for all other Air Force organizations can be

developed—including functional and other supporting organizations.

Finally, headquarters staffs should do the same, indicating their critical

outcomes that enable all of the above.

Each type of organization (e.g. maintenance, fighter, contracting, etc.) will

have similar mission outcomes. However, the goals, or optimal performance

range, for each will likely vary depending on the specific unit, and will be up

to each Squadron Commander and their superiors.


Inclusiveness and transparency will be important to this effort, which

should include representative leadership from each type of organization

(e.g., include a representative sampling of bomber Squadron Commanders

to help determine the mission outcomes for bomber squadrons).

Conduct proof-of-concept exercises with a few operational squadrons before

rolling out a “know your mission outcomes” process across the Air Force.

2. Recommend the best ways to ensure squadron leadership is empowered (and

required) to determine how they plan to achieve optimal performance for each of

their mission outcomes. Good leaders launch “initiatives” (or “priorities” or

“projects”) that improve their organization’s ability to deliver on its purpose.

These will each have a goal Airmen tend to call “the win,” which is the term

adopted here. Those efforts may last the commander’s entire tour, or may last

only weeks. In any event, the team’s “wins” should be clear, and well-connected

to better serving the squadron’s clear purpose – it’s mission outcomes. Also,

determine if they need education or tools to help them do this well.

3. Recommend ways to institutionalize feedback between interdependent

organizations. Establish feedback mechanisms to ensure that organizations

providing support are constantly adjusting, as needed, based on feedback from

the organizations receiving the support and that those receiving support are

providing clear requirements and other necessary information so that they can

be effectively supported. Consider how to institutionalize this two-way

information flow.

4. Recommend any additional adjustments to systemic behavioral drivers, beyond

those mentioned in this report (especially instructions, inspections, performance

reports, selection/promotion criteria, and training) to increase emphasis on these

well-defined outcomes and decrease emphasis on effort-based measures.

Specifically, once these outcomes are clearly defined, the unit’s Mission

Essential Tasks within the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), need to

be updated to help correctly represent the unit’s readiness.

Note regarding performance reports: The outcome measures described here

should be used in conjunction with performance rubrics to evaluate performance,

especially for leaders, and to determine promotions. This is further described in

these two leverage points: #5 Performance Reports Aimed at Performance

Improvement, and #6 Selection and Promotion Criteria.

1.3 Conduct process improvement events to identify and optimize procedures that are

burdensome and waste Airmen’s time (OPR: MPOs as Assigned; OCR: SAF/MG)

including, but not limited to, in and out processing (OPR: AFPC; OCR: AF/A1P),

issuing common access cards (consider Patrick AFB as potential benchmark) (OPR:

AFPC; OCRs: AF/A1P and SAF/MRM), drafting and routing awards. (OPR: SAF/MRM).


By emphasizing easy-to-measure performance over important-to-measure

performance, organizations can degrade culture and performance.

2. What We Measure: Important vs. Easy

The Leverage Point

Clarity of purpose is paramount, but it’s also elusive. Discovering the reason why finds its

root in Airmen’s frequent complaints that box-checking, compliance-oriented priorities

overshadowed work that would benefit their mission, tangibly and directly.

During conversations, an interviewer on the FA1

team tested a hypothesis with a Squadron

Commander asking, “Is the problem that we’re

measuring what’s easy to measure, instead of

what’s important to measure?” After a surprised

pause, the response was a resounding: “Yes. That’s

it. Exactly.”

Clarity of purpose is hard-won; it takes time and reflective thought, both of which are

precious commodities, especially when compliance-based action is usually easier to

identify, and therefore more pressing. This is compounded when inspections, from the

wing up to the MAJCOM, focus largely on compliance with specific items in AFIs instead

of strategic mission achievement. When what you are graded on is easy to measure, but not

the right thing to measure, it drives behavior that focuses more on the elimination of

mistakes than on accomplishment. This naturally encourages a culture of risk-aversion and

micromanagement.

In other words, it’s easier to generate a long list of to-do’s than a short list of to-achieve’s.

“Is the problem that we’re

measuring what’s easy to

measure, instead of what’s

important to measure?”


Recall that the original moonshot goal was: “Put a man on the moon and get him back

alive.” It sounds simple and obvious now – but must have taken much thinking before its

pronouncement at a podium.

Any successful leader will tell you that clear and simple strategic direction got that way

only after much hard work of thinking has been done. (And, vapid or muddled statements

of “commander’s intent” often testify to the ease of doing otherwise.)

But, a significant leverage point for any organization is to ask itself, “What’s really

important here?” and then measure that, and align its systems, particularly its human

systems, to those measurements.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: Risk aversion, mistrust, micromanagement, and many other hurdles to

squadron vitality stem largely from the Air Force’s tendency to measure (and act on) easy-

to-measure performance, which sometimes underemphasizes performance that’s

important, and sometimes overemphasizes performance that’s not important.

One center of gravity in the creation of these cultural weaknesses is our system of

inspections, and the documents – principally Air Force Instructions (AFIs) – that

inspections are anchored to.

Downstream From “Easy to Measure”

Overreliance on easy-to-measure indicators has affected much. Training considered to be

“check-the-box” has occurred, for example, because the point is only to check a box.

Performance records employ proxies for performance assessment, such as duty titles and

awards, instead of performance assessment. Some AFIs focus inspections on easy-to-

measure performance that is off-mission, thereby driving misdirected effort. This is at least

a partial cause of unwise risk aversion.

The first two items – training and performance reports – will be taken up, along with other

factors affecting squadron vitality, in later leverage points of this chapter. This leverage

point examines risk aversion, some consequences of risk aversion and the opportunity for a

behavioral shift through adjusting other key measurement tools, including AFIs and the

inspections they drive.

Worthy Risks and Foolish Risks

There are worthy risks, and there are foolish risks. Airmen complained15 that we are too

averse to the first kind. Those risks are “worthy” because, if taken, they could net a

squadron better outcomes or, minimally, a better-developed Airman or team. (Many can

15 In fairness, some Airmen couldn’t identify with this whole “risk aversion thing.” Sure, they’ve

heard about it, but these warriors, both uniformed and civilian, find ways to work around and

through the system to produce good results. These individuals are exceptional, but organizational

systems ought not rely too heavily on exceptions.


learn from the mistake of one, if that mistake is handled deftly.) These risks are “heads-I-

win/tails-I-win” propositions. Successful leaders don’t frame these as risks, but rather

“leadership development,” or “Airmen development.”

Time-wasting Metrics for Metrics-sake

There is a special set of metrics, metrics for the sake of metrics, that commanders described

that combined two inglorious attributes…they consume massive amounts of leadership

bandwidth, and provide little-to-no added value. Commonly, these metrics derive from

higher headquarters mandates on metrics that, at the unit level and often higher, have

minimal relevance to the unit’s effectiveness (at best) and even worse, are out of control of

the commanders. Metrics such as these consume significant time of members of the unit

and leaders across the base as they compile the data, then try to explain to each level of

command why the data looks the way it does, and how the unit or wing has no impact on

the data. The benchmarks numbers have no meaningful value, and if they are met or

missed, do not drive action or behavioral changes.

Commanders of support units commonly relay frustrations with the Air Force Common

Output Level of Service (AFCOLS), a conglomeration of trackers seen as non-value added,

in which inaccurate data is compiled that cannot be affected at the unit or wing level, and

often don’t even apply to the units. Yet on a recurring basis the Wing Commander’s

conference room is filled with Squadron Commanders and senior NCOs across the wing

trying to explain the data, which must be coordinated and forwarded to higher

headquarters, but produces no actionable information. The hundreds of man-hours spent

by senior leaders on metrics-for-metrics-sake is staggering, and in an era of high ops tempo

and demands on leaders’ time, these exercises in futility remove the commander from

leading their unit to mission success.

AFIs and Inspections

One reason some worthy risks might seem otherwise is our inspection system and the

Air Force Instructions (AFIs) they enforce. Some inspections target utterly vital aspects of

performance, such as mission accomplishment, or mission-related training; other

inspections target performance entirely tangential and distracting to the squadron’s

purpose such as records management.

One Airman classified inspections into three categories:

1. It matters for a very good reason, so it’s inspected.

2. It doesn’t matter, but we inspect it anyway because it’s in the AFI.

3. It matters greatly, but we don’t inspect it, so there’s no official record that it

happened or didn’t.

Here’s a good example of #2 and #3, and it concerns AFI 1-2. That’s Air Force’s instruction

on culture, and it spells out commanders’ responsibilities (execute the mission; lead people;


manage resources; and improve the unit). It’s a thoughtful and articulate piece on some

critical topics, but it’s nobody’s yes/no checklist.

One interviewee, a Squadron Commander, expressed frustration that he had used AFI 1-2

for guideposts in command leadership, which included some innovative efforts to develop

his people. His complaint was that his command has been given scant attention for that

development work, but that inspectors had recently dinged him for the AFI related to its

squadron sponsorship program. Not because the program was not run well, but because

after his unit representative was appointed via a commander-signed memo, there was not a

second signature by the commander acknowledging the appointment.

Obviously, this leader wasn’t risk averse – but he might be forgiven for slight gun-

shyness in the future. He had done something important-to-measure (but not measured),

and had been dinged for something easy to measure that was utterly unimportant. Here

was a commander attempting Mission Command, but being told, in effect, “No, we do

Compliance Command around here.” The example is one of measuring what’s easy to

measure (but unimportant), and not measuring what’s important, albeit hard to measure;

it’s also an example of how inspections and marking someone down for the wrong thing

can beget risk aversion. This is a much-studied topic in military literature. In the Air Force,

it is the origin of the so-called “One-Mistake Air Force.” That reputation for Airmen’s fear

of mistakes – and their career-affecting consequences – probably outweighs reality. But

mistakes and their negative consequences are better understood than successes and their

positive consequences.16

Off-mission AFIs and their accompanying inspections are a problem, and there is a waiver

system in place to address the problem. But unfortunately, three problems with the waiver

process can make it as vitality-sapping as the AFIs it’s meant to waive.

The authority to launch a waiver request can reside several levels higher than where

it is needed.

It is a lengthy and cumbersome process, imposing a workload on top of the as-yet

unwaived AFI.

The waiver process must start all over again when a new leader takes command of a

unit for which the waiver was granted.

So, the waiver process doesn’t do much to address the risk aversion issue (or, high ops

tempo driven by off-mission distractions). Clearly, the waiver system could use some

revision to better serve its intended purpose.

16 Again, these phenomena are not unique to Air Force. For example, “Micromanagement, risk-

aversion, and the zero-defects mentality” in Army are discussed in this award-winning essay: Maj.

D. A. Ghikas, US Army “Taking Ownership of Mission Command.” Military Review, November-

October 2013.


The AFI problems are made worse by what some report as a perverse incentive to expand

AFIs with content that will help justify new or additional positions.

Issues of trust, arising from risk aversion, were a frequent topic among Airmen. For this

discussion, it’s worth teasing apart two kinds of “trust”: (1) trusting others’ motivations, as

in whether someone’s intent is benign; and (2) trusting others’ competence, as in whether

someone is up to a particular task.

The first variety, trusting others’ motivations, was often expressed along the lines of, “Your

opaque criteria (hiring / promotions / placement) cause me not to trust you.” The second

variety, trusting competence, could be summarized as, “Why can’t you trust me to handle

this work/decision myself?”

In the first case, risk aversion may be driving the lack of transparency regarding decision-

making criteria. Is it risky to make decision criteria explicit? Lack of transparency

contributes to mistrust and, in some cases, perceptions of favoritism. Solutions will need to

consider both how to ensure that the best information is available to decision makers and

transparency regarding those decisions, if we’re to affect both performance and morale.

Airmen commonly viewed micromanagement as arising from mistrust. Perhaps. One can

certainly feel mistrusted, if being micromanaged. But a much stronger contributor to

micromanagement is a boss’ aversion to risk. Lt. Col. Mark Schmidt recently wrote, “Risk

aversion was the first reason I would micromanage. As a risk-averse micromanager, I

tried to eliminate all risk through excessive scrutiny and oversight.”17 Lt Col. Schmidt’s

view is widely shared, in both the popular and academic military literature, and that

appeared to be the case in this study as well.

Micromanagement can result from aversion to the

possible risk of reprisals for subordinates’ mistakes. When

non-failure is treated as “success,” career-minded

leaders might reasonably find micromanagement

attractive.

For some leaders, an even safer alternative is to do the

work themselves, instead of delegating the work to a less

skilled subordinate. When that happens, Air Force then has two people not doing their

jobs.

In either case, micromanagement or “just do it yourself,” there is a risk with a long fuse:

the non-development of Airmen, including leaders. The earlier chapter describing

squadron vitality called for purposeful leaders who achieve success today and enable

17 Lt. Col. Mark Schmidt, “Confessions of a Recovering Micromanager,” Wingspread, Joint Base San

Antonio-Randolph. Page 2, May 27, 2016. (Recommended)

“Risk aversion was the first

reason I would

micromanage.”


success in the future. If so, then risk aversion is causing some leaders to address only half

the job: today’s success.

Airmen often reported lack of “empowerment” (i.e., pushing authorities down to align

them with responsibilities), and linked that absence to lack of trust. But some Airmen had a

different take on it: leaders don’t always use the authorities they have. People are either

asking permission when they don’t need to, or they are complying when they can and

should say “no.” One senior leader commented:

Most people don’t exercise the authorities that they have. Most people – a

great example is that of the core mission career field manager. He can

waive someone from any training that he wants to, but he doesn’t. You can

ask the career field manager to waive this or that, but we have not taught

our people how to take risk or [be] rewarded for it.18

The Persistence of Fear

“Risk aversion” is far easier to create than to be rid of. Fear has a way of lingering in

cultures; to remove it, you can’t just punish people less often.

Most people have seen fear creation first hand. For example, most of us have been in a

meeting, when a boss has chewed out a subordinate for a stupid comment. That single

reprimand, then, suppresses everyone’s comments, stupid or otherwise. And word gets

around, and fear persists. Even if the boss stops the public lashings.

Fear lingers and becomes part of the culture; then it’s hard to weed out.

As a result, the Air Force will need to take steps to counter risk aversion, including acting

on the imperative to reward productive mistakes, a more concrete and actionable version

of “encourage risk-taking.”

Guidelines for Using AFIs (and Their Ilk)

Attempting to direct a large, technical and military force through written guidance is tricky.

There are many ways to get it wrong, and to produce worse results than if you had done

nothing. This is a known problem. For example, a recent (and incisive) review of the Air

Force’s and Navy’s nuclear enterprise repeatedly expressed grave concern for a “pattern of

devaluing personal and leadership responsibility and accountability in favor of

processes and procedures that reduce leadership risk at the expense of mission risk19.

Input from Airmen suggests these four guidelines:

1) Put Expectations in Their Place. Some guidance should guide, not control. That means

putting the right content in the right place. AFIs certainly have a central role, but so do

18 Miriam Matthews & John A. Ausink. “Revitalizing Air Force Squadrons: Perceptions of Senior

Leaders at Major Commands” RAND PR-3185-1-AF, September 2017. 19 Larry Welsh & John Harvey. “Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear

Enterprise” June, 2014.


Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), and other guidance documents. Too much is

being dumped into AFIs.

Some have argued that we need to simply reduce the volume of AFIs. The fact is there is a

legitimate need to standardize across the Air Force so that Airmen do not have to learn a

new way every time they move to a new base. At the same time, we can give Airmen

flexibility by not mandating these Air Force best practices. So, when we decide there’s a

new expectation to place on our leaders, then we ought to ask ourselves, “Is it something to

“inspect,” or is it something to “evaluate” – or is it actually wise guidance – suggestions

that might bear improvisation, based on creativity, intelligence, and context?”

Consider that some valued performance is not remotely IG-inspectable. That places the

performance squarely in the neglected “important-to-measure” / “hard-to-measure”

quadrant. For example, the excellent items cited in “Commanders Conduct” (AFI1-2) or the

“Purposeful Leaders” attributes (see report’s earlier chapter, “Squadron Vitality: Key

Attributes”) deserve to be expected, but not IG-inspected. Such performance requires

observation over time, in context, by someone who can make informed judgements. In

other words, it might belong in a well-designed performance report – which is described in

a different section of this report.

2) Decide: “Mission” or “Compliance.” Some documents really do need to prescribe every

single detail of what to do; these checklists are necessary, and compliance with them

warrants step-by-step inspection. “Compliance” is exactly what we’re looking for in some

documents and their subsequent inspections.

However, sometimes Air Force wants leaders to exercise judgement – not checklists –

toward defined outcomes within a few constraints and restraints. That’s when our AFIs (or

other guiding documents) should encourage Mission Command. The best leaders crave

this. One told an interviewer, “Give me the destination and the map, then let me drive.

Don’t tell me how to operate the car!”

3) Remember Who’s Helping Whom. What if AFI writers had to compete based on the

ease of understanding their instructions?

Then, good AFI writers would . . .

Write clearly, with intention to help, and from a supporting role.

Build in feedback loops in the same persistent way customer-focused web sites

survey “how are we doing?”

Follow the existing AFI on how to write AFIs.

Not require a research project to follow their AFIs: prior AFIs, referenced AFIs, or

any other “digging.”

Put only AFI material in AFIs, and other material in other documents.


4) Make the unknown known. Maybe the worst AFI problem is the unknown unknown:

as several commanders reported. When asked what AFIs described their responsibilities, a

common phrase included in their response was: “as far as I know.” The Air Force has such

a maze of AFIs etc. that Squadron Commanders don’t fully understand all of their

requirements. Perhaps a better way of describing it is there are so many AFIs across so

many areas that the daunting task of sifting through the myriad guidance documents to

determine if it pertains to a leader, and if it prescribes how to lead their squadron, is an

insurmountable quest.

The proliferation of guidance documents…ranging from doctrine, to AFIs, to MAJCOM

instructions or supplements, to local operating instructions…has created a chaotic racket

of voices telling a commander not only what to do, but how to do it. Seeking to ensure

compliance with every guidance document can become an all-consuming task, and yet

most leaders will admit they still expect that – somewhere out there – a document exists

that directs an action that they can/will be dinged for non-compliance. Yet if motivated

leaders don’t know about those guiding documents, are they really doing much good? The

desire to control may have actually reduced control.

Recommendations

2.1 Restructure the way we use, write, and update Air Force Instructions (AFIs), Air

Force Manuals, Technical Orders, and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).

This recommendation supplements the SECAF’s 11 Aug 2017 directive on publications

reduction. A thorough review and reduction of the growing number of prescriptive,

compliance-based AFIs will help to combat the culture of risk aversion,

micromanagement, and perceived lack of trust. It will empower commanders to make

more decisions at their level while leading their squadrons. (OPR: SAF/AA; OCRs:

SAF/MG, SAF/IG, and SAF/MRM).

2.1.1 Review all existing AFIs to place content in the appropriate documents. Ensure

that AFIs are used only to direct "what we need to do" and not “how we do it.”

Shift details for the “how” from AFI’s to documents that are not inspected and

that can be updated more easily to reflect lessons learned and best practices

(e.g., TTPs). This will give Air Force the ability to adjust more rapidly as we

learn – enabling the agility described in strategic guiding documents. (OPR:

SAF/MG; OCR: SAF/AA).

The current AFI process allows for the use of non-directive publications, but the

process is not being followed. We should encourage the use of non-directive

publications that are not inspectable under AFIs and that could also be used to

capture manpower requirements. To do this, the following should be

implemented:


a. Allow the use of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for all functional areas.

Add language into AFI 33-360 Table 4.2 line 2 to expand the use of TTPs to all

areas. (OPR: SAF/AA; OCR: SAF/MG)

b. Encourage the use of nondirective publications (IAW AFI 33-360) like Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) documents to outline best practices and

guidelines for performing tasks (AFI 33-360, paragraph 4.1.2 Nondirective

Publications). These publications are informational and suggest guidance that

you can modify to fit the circumstances. Complying with publications in this

category is expected, but not mandatory, and Air Force personnel use these

publications as reference aids or “how-to” guides. (OPR: SAF/AA; OCR:

SAF/MG)

2.1.2 Develop training process (OPR: SAF/MG) and then codify training policy (OPR:

SAF/AA) to train Functional Managers and Air Staff on existing guidance for

writing new publications (AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management) to

ensure AFIs are not overly prescriptive and have been coordinated with

subordinate units. All new/changed AFIs should be reviewed by SAF/MG to

ensure this direction is followed and feedback is provided to functional

managers. (OPR: SAF/MG; OCR: SAF/AA).

2.1.3 Develop a mechanism (OPR: SAF/MG) whereby AFIs can be updated based on

feedback. Provide open comment periods prior to each AFI’s bi-annual revision,

to solicit feedback from affected parties and to be used as the basis for any

changes. Adjudications and rationale should be made available to submitters

and others within 60 days of the bi-annual review on a common website or

another easily accessible system. Codify the new policy in AFI 33-360. (OPR:

SAF/AA).

2.1.4 Direct MAJCOMs and Wings to incorporate parent AFIs and HHQ supplements

into any new supplement they approve. The few hours to do that on the front

end would save many man-hours thereafter. (OPR: SAF/AA; OCR: SAF/MG).

2.1.5 Make it easier to use and understand AFI’s and other instructions. Specifically,

provide links to higher-level guidance or other referenced material in all new

AFIs and other publications and provide an improved search function for AF

ePubs. Again, the few hours to do that on the front end would save many man-

hours thereafter. (OPR: SAF/MG; OCR: SAF/AA).

2.1.6 Develop a list of the responsibilities common to all Squadron Commanders as

directed in current AFIs, and revalidate this list annually. This would remove

some of the guesswork and significantly reduce the amount of time spent at the

squadron level to identify specific responsibilities. (OPR: SAF/IG).

2.2 Change the tiers in the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) to push waiver authorities

down to the appropriate level. Expanding the waiver tiers will give commanders the


ability to place decision making at the appropriate level and will increase trust and

empowerment across the board. (OPR: SAF/IG).

2.2.1 Amend AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management Table 1.1 Tier Waiver

Authorities. The new tiers are as follows: Tier 0 = External to Air Force (DoD or

above); Tier 1 = Internal to MAJCOMs; Tier 2 = Internal to Wings. Tiers 1 and 2

can designate to any level below their tier, as appropriate (OPR: SAF/IG).

2.2.2 Develop a System of Record to store all approved waivers and make it visible to

all commanders. The system can be used to eliminate requirements that are no

longer valid and eliminate the need to resubmit waivers after a Change of

Command. Incoming Commanders will be able to accept and keep in place

approved waivers. The lack of a system to store waivers critically degrades the

ability for field-level commanders to document risk acceptance and for

Functional Area Managers (FAMs) to track these decisions in order to enable

data-driven decisions in policy OT&E. A system of record will provide visibility

to Air Staff and MAJCOM functionals on all approved waivers which they can

use to determine Air Force trend analysis, identify items being waived, and stay

abreast of issues in the field. (OPR: SAF/IG; OCRs: AF/A5/8 and SAF/FM).


3. Leadership Development That Develops Leaders

Leverage Point

It’s common in organizations to hear that leadership is vitally important. But in many of

those same organizations, it’s also common to see a say-do gap relative to the internal

systems that might produce, motivate, and enable great leaders.

As an organization sharpens its clarity of purpose, that say-do gap becomes more visible.

Fortunately, when an organization knows exactly what it’s trying to achieve, that also

highlights the kinds of leaders it needs to succeed. Organizations looking to close the

leadership say-do gap might cast an eye toward factors such as these:

Leadership Competence. Have we created a system to instill level-appropriate

leadership knowledge, skills, and abilities throughout leaders’ careers? Is that

system multi-pronged, employing a full arsenal of development opportunities and

tools? Does our system have feedback loops, so we can see what’s working and

what isn’t, never forgetting that the point isn’t simply to increase effort, such as

classes, but it’s to increase demonstrated leadership competence on the job?

Motivation and Selection. Are we promoting people up the leadership hierarchy

because of their demonstrated leadership capability? Have they shown that they can

achieve the right results through a team, while also developing and caring for those

people? (Or are we assuming that people who are technically proficient are also able

to lead? Or, that “leaders” will learn to lead, once they’re put in a position to do so?)

Bureaucratic Burdens. Have we removed as many barriers as possible, to enable

leaders to spend time with their people leading and mentoring? Have we empowered

them to lead, with clear authorities aligned to clear responsibilities?

The first factor, “Leadership Competence” is the topic of this leverage point of the

Assessment and Recommendations Chapter. The second factor, “Motivation and

Selection,” is discussed in “Performance Reports Aimed at Performance Improvement” and

“Selection & Promotion Criteria.” The third factor, “Bureaucratic Burdens,” is addressed

throughout, especially in “The Fulcrum: Clarity of Purpose,” “Organizational Role Clarity:

Who’s Supporting Whom, and How,” and “What We Measure: Important vs. Easy.”

Leadership Development: Five Factors to Consider

Organizational Commitment

Leadership is a skillset, one that takes effort and expense—over time—to acquire. It sounds

obvious, but isn’t. For example, in leadership training and education, it’s cheap and easy

to “cover” leadership topics, but it is expensive and time-consuming to imbed skilled

knowledge.


There really is a price – time, money, attention – attached to consistently producing

purposeful leaders, like those described earlier in the chapter, “Squadron Vitality: Key

Attributes.” If leadership development becomes a priority, then by definition, it means

other things won’t get bought or accomplished, in order to produce more effective

leaders, more consistently.

Valuing Leadership Skills

Success with leadership development means elevating the value often placed on certain

kinds of skills. “People skills,” for example. That’s because, when people lead people,

people skills are really important. Training in “people skills” can be a bit marginalized,

especially in technical environments. But those soft skills can be hard. An example of that

is performance feedback – seeking it, giving it, and receiving it. Organizations such as Intel

Corporation rightly pride themselves on a culture of candor, because respectful straight

talk makes improvement happen faster; it makes large, complex organizations – like Intel,

and hopefully the Air Force – much nimbler.

People skills are eminently learnable, if the teaching is done well, but they aren’t something

everyone admits needs to be learned.

Also, the “management” end of the leadership skills continuum is worth learning, however

boring that sounds. For example, many Airmen interviewed would love it if their leaders

knew how to run productive meetings – a boring management skill.

Peer Leadership

Another high-leverage skillset is basic project management: how to organize and lead a

team to produce a unique output or outcome within constraints of time, cost, and quality,

and not burn out the team in the process. Some people get Ph.D.’s in project management,

but every leader should know the basics – and there are definitely basics to know. Projects

can come in all sizes and – apart from creating critical squadron “wins” – they create a

highly scalable vehicle for peers to lead peers, and for incrementally larger leadership

experiences – something interviewees said was needed, because the “official” stair steps to

leadership can be too steep.

Risk management is another set of handy management techniques. So are collaborative

problem solving and decision making.

None of these people skills or management skills are skills that we would want our rising

leaders to learn the hard way, or to fail to learn at all. But such skills development needs

to be deliberately cultivated.

Experiential Learning: Practice Under Pressure

Skills that are either complicated or emotionally demanding should be practiced.

Leadership skills are often both, and ordinary classroom instruction can leave students


with the perception of mastery, without the reality of it. For example, no polite

PowerPoint brief will really enable someone to give or receive candid performance

feedback, which can be a nuanced and sweaty-palmed experience – especially depending

on with whom one is doing it. Only repeated practice with feedback, in pressurized,

realistic situations – “practice under pressure” – will confer readiness to perform in real life.

Plenty other leadership skills fall in this category, such as collaboration with people who

aren’t like you, and emotional intelligence (which is a bundle of skillsets, including

empathy and self-awareness – all teachable, but no hand wave). Even the skill of strategic

planning benefits hugely from practice under pressure. This is another case in which lessons

from the operational side should be applied throughout the Air Force. We will fight (and

lead) like we train.

Rigorous Evaluation

Of the various scholarly reviews20 summarizing best practices in leader development, all of

them include some form of rigorous evaluation. There are many and varied ways to develop

leaders, such as classes, 360-degree feedback, coaching, and mentoring. But the research

suggests that such effort should be subject to the question, “Did it produce the desired

effects?” This question, foundational in operational environments, is likewise important

when developing leaders.

One deservedly popular framework for thinking about that question is Kirkpatrick’s

evaluation model21 for evaluating education and training. This model suggests four levels

at which it’s possible to answer the question, “Did the training (or education) work?” The

four levels of training evaluation move from easy-to-measure to important-to-measure:

1. Reaction: asking participants their reaction to the experience.

2. Learning: determining whether learning objectives were achieved.

3. Behavior: observing the participant’s new knowledge and skills applied on the job.

4. Results: observing any intended outcomes from the desired behavior.

The organizations most effective at developing their leaders devour high quality

feedback, and don’t settle for #1 above.

Multi-Prong Approach

It’s easy to think of “leadership development” only as coursework, and that’s certainly part

of it. But leadership development for an organization should take multiple forms, because

each one confers different advantages.

20 E.g., S.L Leskiw and P. Singh, “Leadership development: learning from best practices,” Leadership

and Organization Development Journal, Vol. 28, No. 5, pp. 444 – 464 – one example among many. 21 Dating back to 1959, the most recent authoritative reference on this model is Kirkpatrick, J. &

Kirkpatrick W.K., Kirkpatrick’s Four Levels of Training Evaluation, 2016, ATD Press, Alexandria, VA.


And, even coursework can and should take different forms – though all of it should

include actual practice – “hands-on instruction,” as Airmen call it. So, “briefings” don’t

count.

Another form of leader development is 360-degree feedback; it’s powerful, if properly

administered. Typically, with 360-degree feedback, no matter how self-aware a person is,

they will learn at least one important thing about themselves that they can use as leaders.

“Action learning,” means putting leaders onto a project that will produce something

important for their organization, but that will also develop them further as leaders. Action

learning is not theoretical. Application is immediate, and lessons are long lasting. It is about

learning and practicing real skills on real problems – developing and articulating clear

goals, for example. The project needs to be designed and facilitated to ensure that both the

organization and the individuals benefit.

Mentoring and coaching are also rightly popular avenues of leadership development.

“Mentoring” tends to be long term and career-oriented, between a senior person and a

more junior person. They tend to be informal. There are ways organizations can facilitate

mentoring, such as direct training in how to seek and use a mentor, and how to mentor. But

direct, formal mentorship programs have a spotty record. Coaching is shorter term and

more behavior- or performance-focused. How to coach is a skill every leader should possess,

and coaching can be between boss and subordinate, or coaches can be hired from the

outside – many good leadership coaches are available.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: We’re not building leaders as effectively as possible because leadership

development throughout leaders’ careers (a) occurs too infrequently, (b) is not

consistently well-timed with their leadership role changes, and (c) omits many skills that

are central to leadership.

Airmen rightly revere technical mastery. Airpower depends on it. However, technical

mastery does not confer leadership mastery; they are both essential, but they both take

effort to achieve. Airmen were clear on this point: Squadrons need great leaders who are

engaged – and current efforts to develop such leadership has room for improvement.

That’s not to say that great leaders don’t exist in the Air Force. They very much do. But

these leaders have risen above the system, as much as having been buoyed by it. There are

plenty of technical masters who perhaps should be advising other technicians, but in no

way leading them; leadership is its own skillset.

Other services seem to have devoted more deliberate effort to pre-command leadership

development. For example, initial command training for Navy spans three weeks; for

Army, it’s four weeks; and for Air Force, it’s one week.


In the leadership courses that do exist, much of it isn’t about leadership. That’s doesn’t

mean it isn’t necessary. For example, leaders need instruction from JAGs, Public Affairs

Officers, and Personnel Officers. But, much of that instruction is about procedures and

how to stay out of trouble, which are worthy topics, but not the topic under consideration

here.

Bottom line: putting a bunch of leaders in a room and then briefing them – or even teaching

them – does not make it “leadership development.” And Air Force needs more leadership

development.

Leadership development should be aimed at two

successful leadership outcomes: the unit achieves

its purpose, and the team grows more capable.

Avoidance of low priority “bad marks” is in a

distant third place. We are back to Mission

Command vs. Compliance Command.

On-the-job leadership learning is hit-or-miss, too.

The development of subordinates’ ability to lead people is not a consistently measured /

rewarded component of leaders’ career advancement, diminishing the emphasis on

leadership throughout our system and leaders’ careers. For some leaders, the very act of

getting their subordinates promoted is considered “leadership development,” not the

rightful consequence of a leader having been developed.

In certain career fields, such as operational ones that require great time investment to

hone technical skills, steps from one leadership position to another may be too steep

without incremental increases in leadership experience along the way. Our nurturing of

leadership skills may need to be more deliberate and more gradated to yield a higher

percentage of great leaders. (These are technical specialists being groomed to lead in the

field.)

In existing leadership training throughout Air Force, there’s insufficient time and practice

accorded to “people skills” such as giving, receiving, and seeking corrective feedback and

executing effective team building activities. Other people skills are equally important. For

example, knowing how and when to seek input on a decision vs. when to just decide and

move on. Knowing how to communicate clear direction. How and why to seek mentorship

– how and why to mentor. How to delegate, and how to follow up (and why). Thinking

skills can and should also be taught. For example, risk assessment – not just operational

risk assessment – can and should be taught, including how to perform a hotwash on non-

operational “failure.” The list goes on.

Leadership development should

be aimed at two successful

leadership outcomes: the unit

achieves its purpose, and the

team grows more capable.


Team-building Events, Good, So-So, and Lousy

Here’s an interesting side note about one important (and teachable) “people skill”: how to

arrange team-building events. This was a hot topic with Airmen, and so is worthy of

special mention here. Some Airmen said they wanted more team-building events, but

some said they wanted fewer; some said the Air Force should pay for the expenses, but

some didn’t seem to care about expenses. “Forced fun,” was a term used often, but not

always disparagingly. Amid these contradictory responses, a pattern emerged:

The best events or venues make it easy for strangers – even introverts – to get to know

each other. Sports for example – intramural or informal – provide lots of shared

opportunities for people to comment or joke about things with people they don’t yet

know. Optional physical training at work was a frequent, positive example. One

commander told of the success he had had with an optional basketball game, beginning

1500 every Friday. Four people showed up the first day, but over weeks it grew to a

happy, team-ful mob. Someone else told how a pool table in a breakroom gave people a

reason to get to know each other over an enjoyable activity.

And, the events don’t have to be sporty: the large (100-person), choreographed

brainstorm events run by the FA1 team at every visited base was often cited as,

“Something our commanders should do.” Well-designed collaboration sessions create

cohesion and deliver useful ideas and products.

The over-arching idea is that an event is arranged whereby strangers have something in common

to talk about, besides the weather, and those interesting things keep changing. That keeps

conversation going and, pretty soon, relationships are established or strengthened, and cohesion

is built.

The so-so events are good mostly for extroverts, and must be done repeatedly for

people to get to know each other. “Burger burns” are in this category. They’re better

connection-forming opportunities for extroverts than introverts. Though, they’re a great

way to stay connected.

Lousy team-building efforts actually devitalize. For example, a party at “the general’s”

house, without clever planning, can become just a commander’s call with hors

d’oeuvres. An extrovert who knows the social rules fares okay there. Otherwise,

participants cluster in small circles – maybe only with their spouses – and mentally

weigh how soon they can escape.

Perhaps there’s a fourth category: “Free fun.” For example, a teams’ day watching a

professional baseball game is an example of “free fun,” but it isn’t an example of team-

building – especially when Airmen disperse, beer in hand, into the stands with small

groups of friends. Whatever other benefits that free fun might confer, team-building

isn’t one of them.


Recommendations

Many of the recommendations that follow concern training and education. Two

overarching recommendations apply to all of them:

(1) Stand up a robust, ongoing evaluation feedback system for each, composed of

appropriate direct and indirect assessment tools (i.e, testing, rubric based

exercises, graduate surveys, supervisor surveys, etc.) to determine on-the-job impact

of the coursework. Many Air Force classes already do this. It should be the

standard.

(2) Almost any thinking or communication skill requires practice under pressure

(tough, realistic scenarios, with feedback) to turn “knowledge” into “skilled

knowledge.” That is harder to do and takes more classroom time than just lecture

and discussion, but it’s how classroom lessons become lifelong lessons. It is the

only way to imbed skilled knowledge that will show up later, when it’s needed.

Some MAJCOMs, such as AFGSC and PACAF, have created their own courses with

excellent reputations; those existing classes will be a goldmine for anyone assembling the

courses recommended below.

3.1 Airmen spoke of a desire for improved squadron leadership training. While there is

service-level, central training for Wing and Group Commanders, there is no common

course for Squadron Commanders. The FA1 Team recommends the Air Force

develops a centralized, in-residence Squadron Commander leadership course and

requires that all Squadron Commander selects attend. The purpose of the Squadron

Commander course is to provide a standard baseline of leadership knowledge and

skills for participants that is conducive to building culture, teamwork, and value at the

unit level – the content should be heavily weighted to the “art of leadership” with only

some curriculum on “hard” or technical skills. The Revitalizing Squadrons team

initially presented this recommendation at CORONA in February 2017. Air University

was tasked with creating the course and has been working on implementation. Air

University is planning to conduct first course in 2018. Below are key elements to this

recommendation. (OPR: AETC; OCRs: AU, AF/A5/8 and SAF/FM).

3.1.1 Develop the core curriculum. A MAJCOM capstone course may be used to

supplement the core curriculum and AETC should provide Instructional

Systems Design expertise to assist with MAJCOM content development and

revalidation. Courses should be delivered via an appropriate combination of in-

residence and prerequisite work. In-residence content should focus on

experiential learning that supports synthesis of knowledge and employment of

skills. It should also include mentoring opportunities with perspectives from


multiple leadership levels. Participation in the course should require a

leadership self-assessment. (OPR: AETC; OCRs: AU, AF/A5/8 and SAF/FM).

While “hard skills” are important they have less impact on improving

organizational outcomes or improving performance. However, “soft skills”

(interpersonal, social, etc.), while harder to teach and learn, have significant

impact on improving both organizational outcomes and performance – thus

contributing to increased Air Force lethality. The FA1 team recommends the

following key content to specifically address the trends found during the

Revitalizing Squadrons data collection. Most of the content focuses on the “art

of leadership” with the inclusion of some important “hard skills.”

Importance of organizational role clarity

Elements of Squadron Vitality

Developing, communicating, executing an aligned strategy

Building and empowering teams

Developing Airmen and Leaders (to include mentoring) (AF/A1 Block

on: Manning; Assignments; Evaluations; Development for Officer,

Enlisted and Civilian)

Creating an environment of appropriate risk taking

Importance of unit heritage and esprit de corps

Responsibility for Airmen and family support

Measuring mission success

Giving and receiving feedback

Emotional intelligence

Self-awareness with Leadership Assessment

Teaching Commanders skills on how to conduct leadership transition.

Communication: how to delegate communication (and then follow up).

Critical Thinking

Project management basics

Budgeting, from a squadron’s perspective (such as training on best practices)

The in-residence portion should also include mentoring opportunities and

perspectives from:

Senior leaders

First Sergeants (First Sergeant school at Gunter)

Superintendents (SNCOA)

Senior Commanders (Gp/CC or higher)

Junior Commanders (recently graduated or sitting Sq/CC) mentor for the

course

Judge Advocate General (JAG school at Maxwell, SOLO)


3.1.2 Develop on-line resources, references, and guides for Squadron Commanders,

similar to how the Profession of Arms Center of Excellence (PACE) provides

resources on its website. Update command-related publications, e.g., AF 1-2,

AFI 36-2924, and AU-2). (OPR: AETC; OCRs: AU, and Publication Owners).

3.2 Develop and implement a centralized, in-residence Squadron Superintendent course

with core curriculum. (OPR: AETC; OCRs: AU and SAF/FM)).

3.2.1 Develop a core curriculum, with key content and prerequisites that mirror the

Squadron Commander Course. (OPR: AETC; OCR: AU).

3.2.2 If curriculum will be supplemented by a MAJCOM-specific capstone course,

AETC should provide Instructional Systems Design expertise to assist with

content development. (OPR: AETC; OCRs: AU, MAJCOMs, and SAF/FM).

Airmen expressed a desire for improved squadron leadership training. Airmen

also said there was a lack of communication between leadership and the line. To

address this, the FA1 team recommends developing a standardized Squadron

Superintendent course with core curriculum similar to the Squadron

Commander Course currently in development.

While a centralized in-residence course that leverages experiential learning

opportunities with the new Squadron Commanders Course would be preferred,

another delivery option could be a hybrid of on-line portions with in-person

portions conducted as the base level. While not optimal, AETC could develop

the course, and the in-person portion could be delivered by instructors at each

base. AETC would be responsible for working with MAJCOMs to provide

qualified train-the-trainers for base-level instructors. It is important for

instructors to be qualified on teaching the content at the base level. While subject

matter experts can provide experiential anecdotes, they are not necessarily the

best instructors. Individuals selected to instruct the course must be qualified on

teaching the content.

3.3 Develop and implement a standardized Flight Leadership course curriculum for

MAJCOMs and/or Wings to tailor for delivery to Flight Commanders and Flight

Chiefs (or their equivalents). (OPR: AETC; OCRs: AU, MAJCOMs, AF/A5/8, and

SAF/FM).

Airmen expressed concerns about a lack of development for mid-tier level leaders.

Squadrons are the core of our Air Force, and this mid-tier is an important bridge

between higher leadership and Airmen working the core mission of the unit. Flight

Commanders and Flight Chiefs are essential to building culture and connecting Airmen

to meaningful work. To provide Flight Leaders with the proper knowledge and skills,

the Air Force should develop a Flight Leadership curriculum designed to be tailored for

and delivered by MAJCOMs and/or Wings. Leadership courses are currently conducted


at various units across the Air Force to help Flight Commanders and Flight Chiefs

understand their duties before starting in the position. These courses would benefit

from a core curriculum with options to tailor into a course or seminar designed for local

delivery. To build a common culture, we want to develop a common set of knowledge

and skills to help develop leaders.

3.3.1 Develop core content for the course and individual units can tailor as needed.

(OPR: AETC; OCR: AU).

Content should be focused on bridging the front-line supervisor course and

Squadron Commander or Squadron Superintendent courses. Content themes

include strategic planning and aligning with higher strategy, critical thinking,

crisis management, giving/receiving feedback, appropriate risk taking, and

various hard skills, such as the how-tos of performance reports, technical

aspects of the personnel management system, budget, and managing resources.

Air University currently conducts a Flight Leadership course designed for those

in Force Support Squadron flight command and flight chief positions. While

there are technical aspects of this course focused specifically on Force Support

functions, there are also topics on general flight leadership, financial

management, ethical leadership, and force development. Other units across the

Air Force also conduct locally-designed Flight Leadership courses; most are for

Flight Commanders. 19th Air Force conducts a Flight Commander course which

also could be leveraged to start building core content.

3.3.2 Develop on-line resources, references, and guides for Flight leaders, similar to

how PACE provides resources on its website. (OPR: AETC; OCR: AU).

3.3.3 Courses could be implemented via a combination of distance learning and in-

person classes/seminars delivered by instructors at each base. Base-level

instructors should be properly trained by competent trainers, and fully qualified

to teach the course. (OPR: AETC; OCRs: AU, MAJCOMs, AF/A5/8, and SAF/FM).

Organizations cannot solely depend on subject matter experts to teach the

course. Subject matter experts are not necessarily the right people to conduct

training. While a subject matter expert may understand how to do something,

they might not be able to teach someone else.

3.4 AF/A1D, working in concert with the Force Development Commander, should

implement an enterprise-wide 360-degree assessment program that provides

developmental feedback at key junctures in Airmen’s careers. The feedback should be

used for individual development only (not to be used for performance evaluations or

Development Team boards). The data from 360-degree assessments could be used in

aggregate to provide a high-level view of leadership across the Air Force and identify


trends among specific groups, but the use of outside of developmental purposes should

be limited and guarantee anonymity. AF/A1D could also work with Air Mobility

Command to piggyback on their current efforts to pilot a 360-degree Assessment and

Individual Development program, called Airpower 360. The Office of Personnel

Management (OPM) has a requirement for all Senior Executive Service Civilians across

the federal service to have a 360-degree assessment every three years. OPM has their

own feedback tool which could be reviewed for compatibility with the Air Force. (OPR:

AF/A1D; OCRs: AETC, AF/A5/8 and SAF/FM).

There are several crucial aspects to a successful 360-degree feedback program:

Individuals receiving developmental feedback should not receive raw data or

information directly from participants providing the feedback. Participants

providing survey input should be given anonymity from the feedback they give.

Feedback results should be reviewed and interpreted by expert coaches. A face-

to-face discussion between an expert coach and the individual is the ideal

method of receiving the results of a 360-degree feedback.

Another option is to provide individuals with a report of the results that have

been developed and reviewed by coaching experts.

Follow-up coaching on individual developmental plans and goals is essential.

In much of the private sector, 360-degree assessments have become popular as

developmental and even personnel evaluation tools. Airmen in the field expressed

positive opinions on 360-degree feedback and assessments. 360-degree feedback can be

effective for providing Airmen with actionable input about their performance and

interpersonal relationships. They can be a constructive contribution to organizations

when implemented carefully and with an appropriate method. When implemented

soundly and used as developmental tool, a 360-degree assessment program could

provide individuals an opportunity to receive developmental self-awareness input from

supervisors, subordinates, and peers. While some Airmen, mostly senior leaders,

receive a 360-degree leadership assessment at some point in their careers, most Airmen

do not. There is no enterprise-wide formal mechanism to provide 360-degree

feedback.22

The Air Force previously, through a Senior Leader Development contract, purchased

licenses to use the Leadership Mirror Assessment Tool, but did not fund the coaching

22 The Navy and Marine Corps have 360-degree feedback programs for select populations (e.g.,

senior leaders, commanders, etc.). The Army has the most robust program of all the Services, called

the Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback Program (MSAF). The Army uses it as a development,

self-improvement, and self-awareness tool. It is not used for performance evaluation. MSAF is open

to all members and mandatory for Army Officers O-1 to O-6, NCOs, and civilians.


and interpretation aspects of the tool, thus rendering it ineffective. The General’s group

(DPG), also has a 360-degree feedback in the Senior Leadership Career Management

System, but it is not as robust as many of the other 360-degree assessments available

and does not come with recommended coaching.

The Army requires certain populations to complete a 360-degree feedback assessment

every three years. The FA1 team recommends using key career events or junctures to

trigger a 360-degree feedback rather than instituting a time requirement. Key junctures

to use as triggering events are below.

Key Career Junctures for 360-Degree Feedback

Officer Airmen Enlisted Airmen Civilian Airmen

Flight Commander (prerequisite

for Flight Leadership course) Flight Chief (perquisite for Flight

Leadership course) Flight Chief (perquisite for Flight

Leadership course)

Squadron Director of Operations

(upon selection)

Squadron Superintendent

(perquisite for Squadron

Superintendent course)

Squadron Commander/Director or

Equivalent (prerequisite for

Squadron Commander course)

Squadron Command (prerequisite

for Squadron Commander course

& after first year in command) Group Chief In conjunction with any PME

Group Command (perquisite for

Group Commander course) Wing Command Chief

Wing Command or Vice Wing

Command (perquisite for Wing

Commander course)

Airman Leadership School (peer

and supervisor input only)

Prerequisite for each level of

Development Education NCO and SNCO Academy

3.5 Review PME course content and reinforce what we want from Airmen and leaders.

(OPR: AETC; OCR: AU).

Airmen expressed a desire for improved leadership development and more focus on

“soft skills” such as interpersonal communication. This is symptomatic of a disconnect

between what we say we want from Airmen and leaders and what we develop and

reinforce. To help address this, the FA1 team recommends supplementing course

content at different PME courses to help develop these attributes in our Airmen.

Course content should consider:

Squadron Vitality Attributes

Strategic Thinking: Appropriate risk taking; change and improvement management;

understanding how you fit into the higher Air Force purpose

Self-Awareness: Airmanship; giving/receiving feedback; soft skills (interpersonal

communications); self-reflection; emotional intelligence


Self-directed leadership/followership: critical thinking; self-development; self-

directed learning

Practical, hands-on for mentoring and giving/receiving feedback

Related to professional military education, the FA1 team observed a general perception

among Civilian Airmen that those who attend Developmental Education (DE): 1)

Cannot return to their pre-DE duty station; 2) Are not deliberately vectored to a

specified post-DE assignment; and 3) Must find and apply for a post-DE job.

Exacerbating a rather negative view of Civilian DE was the past broad requirement to

sign mobility agreements acknowledging and accepting the possibly of moving to a

new duty station after completing a program. However, under the AY18 Civilian

Developmental Education process, mobility agreements are only required for a handful

of Developmental Education (DE) programs. Civilian career field teams determined

there are suitable positions that broaden an individual's experience and utilize the

developmental education without requiring geographic mobility.

Under the current Civilian DE process, outplacement is a deliberate process by the

functional community, and Civilian Airmen are typically not required to apply for a

post-DE position. In some cases, such as a Civilian who wants to compete for a higher-

grade position, a post-DE job may require applying through a competitive process in

accordance with Federal employee merit promotion policies and laws.

The memorandum announcing the AY18 Civilian Development Education application

process mentions post-DE outplacement for those selected to attend. However, it is not

clear on exactly how DE graduates are outplaced. Documents, such as the Personnel

Service Delivery Memorandum used to announce these programs, should be explicit in

describing the outplacement process. In addition, there should be a concerted strategic

communications effort to ensure eligible Civilians are aware of the outplacement

processes for these programs. If the outplacement process is not clearly articulated to

members, it may create a disincentive to participate in these important leadership

development opportunities.


4. Communication: A Capability and a Responsibility

Leverage Point

“Communication” might be one of the more ironic words in our language – it can mean so

many different things. But we know that an organization’s leaders must do it well to

align people to the organization’s goals.

Communication experts offer guidelines for effective organizational communication, a few

of which are these:

1) Communication should be anchored to purpose. It’s remarkable how often

communication planning begins with “What do we want to say?” instead of “What do

we want to achieve?” The latter is better; always start with purpose.

2) Communication should be tailored to the audience. Generally, the golden rule does

not apply – you cannot judge other people based on how you would receive a message.

The brief that worked well with O-9s and O-10s might need to be re-worked – not

merely handed off – before it has the desired impact on junior officers, for example.

The above two rules will help any communicator, but the next is for leaders:

3) If a communication is delegated, then it should be treated as a delegated task. Too

often, when a senior leader assigns more junior leaders the task of communicating a

message, that’s the one kind of assignment on which he does not follow up. Savvier senior

leaders will ask subordinates’ subordinates, “What do you think of that new policy we

just released?” Passing along messages (and translating them, per rule #2) is a

leadership accountability, and should be treated as such.

In addition to tailoring for audience, communicators must also consider the emotional

nature of the message. A topic with low emotional impact (“Please park on the north end

during construction.”) can be delivered via lean methods (e.g., email, voice mail, or text).

However, a topic with potentially high emotional content (e.g., workforce reductions,

unexpected schedule changes, etc.) is best delivered with rich methods (e.g. face-to-face or

video conference).

So, there are things to know about being an effective communicator. Fortunately, a formal

degree in the topic is not required for most roles. But, roles that include supervising people

require core capabilities in this area.

Unfortunately, capability is necessary but not sufficient for predictable, effective

communications. Like so many other things, effective communication at all levels requires

reinforcement and accountability, too, if it is to be done well consistently. Aligning the

organizational systems that provide reinforcement and accountability for this capability

helps prevent a say-do gap.

This means organizational systems for evaluating and rewarding performance must be

designed to include consideration of this important capability. This also means supervisors


must follow up to be sure that those they lead are doing it well. Follow-up helps ensure

that the message intended was the message actually received. Think of it this way: There is

no category of delegation that does not require follow-up, and that includes

communication.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: Effective communications, as a core capability for leaders, has not been well

established in the Air Force. It is not comprehensively taught in courses designed to develop

leaders and is not overtly emphasized in performance evaluations or decisions relating to

promotions and selection. Said simply, the message that communication really matters

has not been received.

The FA1 team heard about communication challenges in many forms – from Airmen’s

desire for more frequent and effective communications within their squadron and the chain

of command to their need for clearer, more targeted and relevant communications from

outside their squadrons (e.g. via functional channels).

The team also heard about communication disconnects – leaders thinking they had been

clear in their messages but the receivers having heard something else – or nothing at all.

For example, senior leaders believing they’ve communicated messages of empowerment to

squadron leaders, but squadron leaders still saying they aren’t empowered. Or, Air Force

sending directives to change policies, such as the direction to discontinue non-critical

additional duties, and several at the squadron level reporting no change or that they didn’t

even know about the policy change.

Maybe the biggest challenge is to address the clear need for more candid communications.

Candor would include, for instance, messages that explain the “why” behind decisions.

Candor would include the ability to confront and take positive action with poor

performers. And candor would also include the ability to notice and communicate when

things are going well – to use communication as positive reinforcement that tells someone

not just “good job,” but the more information-rich “this is ‘right,” and you did it!” It also

contributes to squadron vitality, by making Airmen feel they’re doing valued work. These

are all “behavioral skills,” but they are also

emotional ones. Even the gutsiest warrior can get

sweaty palms in difficult conversations.

The challenge requires shining a brighter

spotlight on communications as both as a core

leadership capability and responsibility.

The challenge requires shining a

brighter spotlight on

communications as both as a core

leadership capability and

responsibility.


Recommendations

4.1 Include communications best practices in every leadership course. (OPR: AETC;

OCRs: AU and MAJCOMs).

As with the development of most critical skills, this should include concepts and the

opportunity to practice the concepts. (This is also included in recommendations for the

Leverage Point, “Leadership Development That Develops Leaders.”)

Also, this should include teaching leaders when and how to lean on communications

experts for help – especially for topics with high strategic impact.

4.2 Include communications capabilities as a consideration in leadership performance

evaluations, mentoring efforts, and promotion and selection decisions. (OPR:

AF/A1PP; OCR: SAF/MRM). (This is also included in the Leverage Points discussing

performance evaluations and criteria for selection and promotion decisions).

Place heavy emphasis on things done right as a means of reinforcing what the Air Force is

looking for. Here are a few examples of best practices cited during field visits and

where they’ve been observed:

a. “A commander would communicate with employees by sending "What I'm

Thinking" emails. This kept his employees at all levels informed, and through

the use of humor, boosted morale.”

b. At one intel squadron, “years ago, the CC used to put on ‘the green light’ every

Friday and end the work week with all the members in the heritage room. No

pressure to participate or do anything, just talk, spend time together, and not

talk work. Once a year, we had a SQ ‘birthday’ celebration where we reviewed

the history.”

c. “Team Chat! Less cumbersome than Outlook but better than group texting.

Look up the Slack app/desktop client.” (Industry)

d. “Recognition on birthdays, important events, accomplishments through the use

of WhatsApp in a fighter squadron.”

e. “An ISR squadron meets once per month. Each shop presents projects and

leadership prioritizes work.”

f. “Squadron CC constantly spoke about how proud he was of the things we did.

He always illustrated what effect the little things we did had on the base.”


5. Performance Reports Aimed at Performance Improvement

Leverage Point

With an organization’s mission outcomes clear (as described in Leverage Point 2, “Role

Clarity”), ideally its members then operate in their individual roles toward achieving

their respective pieces of that mission. One systemic driver to help people do that is the

performance evaluation system.

In an ideal world, people would receive useful feedback and feedforward (how to get better

in the future) on their performance routinely and frequently. But even in that ideal world,

the occasional, formal performance evaluation would help, if done well. In the real world

we occupy, formal performance evaluation needs to be done really well; most are not.

The point of performance evaluation systems is to direct and improve performance –

toward successful mission outcomes. When these systems work well, they have effectively

considered three elements: (1) the tool, i.e., form or template, (2) the process, and (3) the

people – their skills and motivation.

The Tool

Good performance evaluation tools are “valid” and “reliable.” That is:

A performance evaluation tool is “valid” if it describes performance that matters to

mission success. Other parts of this report have discussed the problem of measuring what’s

easy to measure (also known as performance proxies or box checkers) instead of

measuring what really matters or what we value. This is an age-old problem and it

challenges the designers of performance evaluations as much as everyone else. Addressing

what’s important to measure helps to clear the “validity” hurdle, but leaves one more to

clear: the hurdle of “reliability.”

An evaluation is “reliable” if it describes the performance so very clearly that different

observers would pretty much agree on that performer’s scores – excellent, good, fair, etc. –

on each dimension of performance. Even the performer, himself, would give those same

scores. That’s how clear it should be.

None of that is to say bosses shouldn’t have leeway to objectively describe problems or

accomplishments, or to provide their own assessment about the ratee’s potential. Indeed,

they must, and the tool should provide for that vital – sometimes pivotal – input; but that’s

not the hard part of constructing an effective performance evaluation tool. Valid and

reliable? That’s the hard part.

Two Completely Different Approaches to Attempt “Reliable” Evaluation

Let’s assume that we know the kinds of performance that we’d like in officers and Enlisted

Airmen. Much of this report has been about exactly that – performance that matters; plus,

much is already known, including studies about effective leadership. So, then reliability –


requiring clear expression of expectations –becomes the “big rock.” There are two ways

people attempt clarity, and those two techniques are exactly opposite.

The first way is to attempt to describe a dimension of performance we’d like to see. Let’s

say, just for example, that we wanted to see “integrity” as an evaluated performance factor.

One way to handle that is simply to put the word “integrity” on the form, and hope

everybody means the same thing by the term. Maybe we’d add sentence or two of

elaboration, and then we’d bolt on a numerical scale.

This relies on a deductive approach: we would be hoping that Airmen and their bosses will

deduce the same specific Airman rating on “integrity” from the generality of “integrity.”

As you might guess, this is a low-reliability method that affords lots of opportunities to

game the system It routinely results in inflated ratings and often generates ill will rather

than meaningful feedback.

The opposite approach is to offer examples and counter-examples of the performance we

are looking for (the “inductive approach.”). It turns out that the best way to convey an

abstract concept is the very same way you convey to a child what is (and isn’t) a bird, and

it’s why college professors want you to compare and contrast things. Differences and

similarities between examples are how people learn concepts.

In higher education, this tool is used – sometimes well – to spell out expectations for

students and then to grade how well students performed against those expectations. It is

called a “performance rubric.” Done right, it is the clearest way to spell out what “right”

looks like – before and after performance takes place. Performance rubrics offer the very

best way to achieve both reliability and validity.

Why aren’t performance rubrics used by every organization? Well, many do, by one name

or another23. The Marine Corps has a good one with an admirable performance

rubric…based on what the Marine’s value. One obstacle is that performance rubrics are

hard to construct well24. Actually nailing down discrete, concrete, and relevant examples of

each level of each performance factor takes real work. It takes iterative work with different

groups of subject matter experts; it is a project! There is a correct, effective methodology to

construct performance rubrics, and that isn’t the topic of this report. The point is: there’s

stuff to know, and an action officer in a cubicle can’t type one up in a couple of days.

23 “Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales” is also common term. 24 One of the cop-outs of low quality rubrics is to distinguish different levels of excellence with

“Always does X,” “Sometimes does X,” and “Seldom does X.” Unfortunately, that little shortcut

undermines reliability. The descriptors have to be objectively different behaviors; not subjective

degrees of the same thing.


But is it worth the work? It depends on the size of the organization. It’s a cost-per-person,

bang-for-buck decision. So, does it make sense for the Air Force? Yes, easily. To have

everyone know what right looks like? Yes, it’s very much worth the work.

Process

A great performance rubric is one piece of the puzzle. There are two other pieces.

Process: if the point is to direct and boost performance, then the process must encourage

conversation between the two players: rater and ratee. Face-to-face is best, most other rich

(VTC, phone call) methods are a distant second and anything via text (email, note) should

be completely avoided. A leadership best practice is for the rater to get the ratee talking,

reflectively, about their own performance – what went well, what could have been better,

what needs work. The rater weighs in at the end, with 51% of the votes.

A good performance rubric makes this conversation far easier than starting with “how’s it

going’?” Each party should have filled in their own copy of the ratee’s evaluation,

independently. In the conversation, the rater is free to change his or her rating. But the going-

in assumption is that the rater’s copy is the official one.

In large organizations, IT can help streamline records management – not the topic here. But

be wary of “solutions” that help raters and ratees dodge this important conversation.

That’s not a “solution”; it’s IT-enabled avoidance of a basic leadership responsibility.

The “official” performance rubric can be used unofficially, quarterly or even semi-annually

to provoke the how-am-I-doing conversation. Or, it can happen without the tool – just so it

actually happens quarterly or semi-annually, and isn’t just reported as happening.

Players

Respectful and candid discussions about performance are not easy for most of us. They

require time to think, and time to meet on an important but non-pressing topic; they

require nuanced communication skills; and they require motivation to make these

sometimes-difficult conversations a priority.

Elsewhere in this chapter, the issues of making

more time for on-mission work and building

skills (with practice!) such as to seek, give, and

receive criticism and reinforcement are

addressed. But what about the motivation?

One can build into performance evaluations how

well leaders develop other people, including

other leaders. A good performance evaluation

system, in a way, supports itself. Squadron

Vitality, as described early in this report, calls for more “purposeful leaders” whose

accomplishments exist both in the present and in the future. Purposeful leaders concern

One can build into performance

evaluations how well leaders

develop other people, including

other leaders. A good

performance evaluation system,

in a way, supports itself.


themselves with success on today’s mission outcomes, but they also concern themselves

about tomorrow’s mission success, and building the teams and individuals to deliver it.

In other words, although micromanagement or do-it-yourself management might

accomplish the first purpose – today’s success – it would undermine tomorrow’s success.

And, leaders’ performance evaluations (and careers) should reflect both kinds of success.

In that case, even the most cynical “realist” would have a hard time overlooking the

opportunities to help subordinates strengthen their performance through the performance

evaluation system.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: According to Air Force policy, the primary purpose of performance reports is

to communicate performance expectations for ratees, and to provide performance

feedback on past performance and forward-facing direction for improvement. In other

words, performance reports should help leaders improve their team’s ability to deliver

mission outcomes. Secondarily, performance reports should help provide a basis for

promotion decisions.

Airmen say that our system does very little of either. Instead, the current performance

reporting system breeds cynicism, while providing almost nothing to improve

performance.

Airmen describe performance reports as check-the-box exercises that provide little actual

information about past performance and no information about desired future performance.

It is hugely time-consuming– without much to offer in return. It is both inefficient and

ineffective. Enlisted Performance Reports (EPRs) come closer to the mark – some desired

performance is actually described; however, rater inflation is creeping into that system

and deserves to be stopped. Officer Performance reports (OPRs) and their associated

system of execution are much worse.

In all of DoD, the Air Force’s OPRs are the only

performance evaluations that do not require

some kind of objective comparative assessment

on performance. Of course, candid written

comments are expected. But in many cases the

rater does not write the majority of the

evaluation. Rather, the ratee provides “inputs”

that highlight all the best things that occurred

during the rating period. Those commanders

who do provide objective, written critical

performance feedback do so in a system that

encourages otherwise. One commander explained, “If I give critical feedback – and write it

down on the performance record – then the person I’m trying to help get better is now at a

“If I give critical feedback – and

write it down on the performance

record – then the person I’m

trying to help get better is now at

a disadvantage competing

against all the people who didn’t

get honest, written feedback.”


disadvantage competing against all the people who didn’t get honest, written feedback.”

Ratings that are not essentially “outstanding” or “great” are career-killers. Nuanced and

helpful corrective feedback is impossible via this system.

This arrangement has led to seriously inflated ratings – not because individuals lack

integrity, but because the system does. Over the years, this has led to a strange scheme of

opaque rules about how to leave comments on an OPR – how to say wonderful things

about everybody, but sometimes convey nuanced messages, too.

This is the “secret language of bullets [points],” the line item comments in performance

reports, which must conform to elaborate, shifting, and silly rules. For example, “If you

leave room for more than two spaces at the end of the line, then you need to re-write the

line. You have left too much space.”

An important element of this bullet system is communication of “stratification,” a line in

which the rater can rank the ratee relative to others. It is information often used by

promotion boards. This all gets gamed, of course, and it takes insider knowledge to play

the game. As one officer remarked, “True ‘mentorship’ is when someone calls you aside

and tells you how [the game] really works around here.”

In the end, only a small percentage of Airmen receive these stratifications. The top 10%

receive real stratifications that provide feedback on their performance, although these “Top

Performers” do not really need the feedback. The next 10% receive creative stratification

that is as likely to confuse (“Hey, I must be doing really well, I got a strat!”) than it is to

inform. And, the bottom 80% are told “Great job” and left to guess about their performance

until they encounter a promotion board.

Unfortunately for promotion boards, it’s currently difficult to determine which raters are

more zealous gamesmen than others, so differences in raters’ rating inflation is difficult

to take into account when making promotion decisions.

This supposed feedback process is not just a one-per-year affair. It’s also intended to

include face-to-face, mid-cycle feedback discussions. Many Airmen report that this doesn’t

happen.

Unfortunately, many Airmen don’t know how the game is played, but they do know

there’s a transparency problem; that contributes to the perception of favoritism and hurts

morale; it is de-vitalizing. More important, the Air Force misses the opportunity to

provide meaningful feedback that can drive improved performance.

But those who do know the game must accept it as “just how it is.” It has become an

accepted failure of Air Force’s workforce management system.

Culture of Candor vs. Culture of Perfection

If the Air Force is looking for a Culture of Candor, then it’s performance reporting system

is not the path to it. Instead, the current system perpetuates the existing Culture of


Perfection: where everyone is outstanding and “success” equals mistake avoidance. Says

one squadron commander: “Our collective failure to lead boldly and teach others do the

same has led us towards the end of our runway. Airmen are watching. Young military

leaders vicariously learn the easiest path to promotion is through conservative decisions,

and a single mistake may cost a career.” 25

And, when mistakes are made, or standards aren’t quite met, then we avoid talking

about it. Our current performance reporting system neither enables nor rewards difficult

conversations, and lessons learned, and growth over time – and especially, putting it in

writing. This leads to shallow mentoring where we talk about how to write the best

promotion recommendations and what the best career paths are instead of how to make

ourselves better and looking for insights on solving hard problems.

Those good leaders who do take the time and risk to really develop Airmen are neither

aided by the performance reporting system, nor rewarded for their efforts. A Culture of

Candor requires not just enabling candid performance conversations, but also making it a

part of every leaders own performance evaluation.

Today, Airmen are told, “Great job!” – even when that’s not true. Conforming to this

unwritten system is the realistic thing to do. However, this fundamentally goes against our

core value of “Integrity First,” and has costs beyond missed opportunities to develop

Airmen. Whenever military systems misalign “the realistic thing to do” and “the honest

thing to do,” we put our values and culture at risk26.

One solution to this problem is not to “Just tell people to use OPRs the right way!” Just-tell-

‘em solutions rarely suffice. The system will need fundamental re-design.

Recommendations

5.1 Redesign the Officer Performance Evaluation System. (OPR: AF/A1H; OCRs: AF/A1P

and SAF/MRM).

The following recommended changes to the Officer Evaluation System (OES) will instill

the transparency and appropriate level of objectivity needed in our appraisal system.

They will also help develop more trust and clearer expectations with our Airmen when

it comes to what the Air Force values. By clearly articulating what we value, and then

tying it to the success of the unit and its mission outcomes, Airmen will better

understand their connection to not only the squadron, but to the highest levels of the

Air Force.

25 Lt. Col. Nelson Rouleau, “Lead Ridiculously: Time to Go Long on Fourth Down.” LinkedIn Pulse,

LinkedIn, www.linkedin.com/pulse/lead-ridiculously-time-go-long-fourth-down-nelson-rouleau. 7

Sept. 2017 26L. Wong, & S.J. Gerras, “Lying to ourselves: dishonesty in the Army profession,” U.S. Army War

College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2015.


The OES in the 70s and 80s included useful measures of performance. It also included a

quota system that was later abandoned, due to the inability to fairly rate all members in

units with high populations of outstanding performers. After removal of the quota

system, the measures of performance ratings experienced so much inflation over time

that they became useless, both as an evaluation of performance and as a meaningful

feedback mechanism. In the late 80s, the Air Force abandoned the performance ratings

altogether, due to the problem of rater inflation.

The availability of new technology and use of web-based systems means that we can

now implement reasonable controls for rater inflation and reinstitute performance

measures. Rater inflation can be controlled through a detailed performance rubric and

rater accountability. What Air Force values and the new appraisal system will need to

be incorporated in all the appropriate methods of Airmen development starting with

the commissioning sources and continuing through appropriate DE.

Based on the Air Force’s need to overhaul the OES, AF/A1 recently reviewed the OES to

determine how we measure what we value in the Air Force and how to reduce

inflation. They also considered how raters could provide more objective feedback on a

ratee’s performance. This initiative preceded FA1’s. However, this recommendation

contributes important elements to that effort.

5.1.1 Replace stratifications with an overall score/ranking (comparative assessment)

for all members by the rater and senior rater (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AF/A1H).

The comparative assessment is another critical part of objective appraisal

system. It will eliminate unregulated stratification (e. g. #1/20 X) while helping

discourage behaviors like careerism. The comparative assessment is a form of

stratification or ranking for all Airmen, not just the top 20 or 30 percent.

Airmen rated by the rater are compared to all members of the same rank and

not just against those in their unit. This approach will emphasize becoming the

best one can be, instead of competing with members on their team/unit. It places

the focus on doing the best you can (as a team, also) to accomplish the mission

and take care/develop our people. These changes make a more transparent and

clear appraisal system.

5.1.2 To control for rating inflation, incorporate rater accountability measures (e.g.,

rater batting average) for raters and senior raters. Utilize a lifetime/career

average for each rater/additional rater. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AF/A1H).

Rater inflation and accountability will be controlled through the implementation

of a mathematically-derived rater average that will allow comparison of the

ratee’s score against the rater’s lifetime average for all ratings in the same grade.

This leaves the rater free to fairly rate all members, even those in units with high


populations of outstanding performers, while eliminating any benefit of

inflating ratings.

The importance of incorporating rater accountability cannot be emphasized

enough as the Air Force is already starting to see inflation in the current enlisted

system, which is only 3 years old. Currently Army, Navy and Marine Corps use

some type of rater accountability system to help control rater inflation, enabling

promotion boards to better identify the right leaders for promotion. The Marine

Corps even goes as far to measure a performance factor on the actual report

reflecting how well a rater controls inflation. The importance of the rater

controlling inflation and providing an honest assessment of a Marine’s

performance is heavily emphasized in their performance report regulation.

5.1.3 Develop performance rubrics, each with performance factors. Include attributes

derived from “Purposeful Leadership27” (establishing clarity of purpose,

appropriate risk taking, team building, and development of subordinates).

Demonstrate the meaning of each performance factor – rather than attempting to

wordsmith a definition – by providing concrete contrasting examples of each

factor, making clear delineations between levels of performance, and thereby

making it difficult to inflate ratings. Rubric example shown in narrative below.

(OPR: AF/A1H; OCR: AF/A1P).

Establishing a performance rubric using clearly articulated performance factors

with both positive and negative examples will help raters judge members

objectively on their performance and provide the constructive feedback Airmen

need. It will also teach Airmen what is expected, and to self-assess against those

expectations.

To construct a performance rubric will require several rounds of validation and

cross-validation with subject matter experts, which certainly hasn’t been done

for this example. The chart below is only intended to illustrate the method.

27 See Squadron Vitality Attributes section of this report.


Performance Factor: Meeting Management SAMPLE RUBRIC

Needs Improvement Acceptable Excellent

His/her meetings begin

and/or end more than five

minutes late.

Nothing, either written or

spoken, conveys the

intended purpose of

his/her meetings.

Next actions, decisions,

and personal

accountabilities arising

from her meetings – if any

– are commonly not

articulated.

Participants can find

themselves sitting through

much of his/her meetings,

listening to information

and discussions of no

relevance to themselves.

His/her meetings begin

and end within five

minutes “on time,” unless

otherwise agreed to by

attendees.

The purpose of his/her

meetings is announced at

beginning of meetings or

in writing prior to the

meetings.

Tangents that arise in

meetings are

acknowledged as tangents

and may be pursued if

immediately relevant to

most of the meeting

participants.

Ground rules (e.g., no side

conversations) are

articulated but not

enforced.

Meetings begin and end

on time, unless otherwise

agreed to by meeting

attendees.

Tangents that arise in

meetings are either

handled in a few minutes

or are scheduled to be

discussed at another time.

Attendees of meetings

he/she has led leave

meetings able to articulate

what decisions have been

made and knowing what is

expected of them,

personally.

Ground rules (e.g., no side

conversations) are

articulated and enforced.

Uses visual aids such as flip

charts or white boards to

illustrate points and keep

the group focused.

Note that these are behavioral examples that sketch an outline; they are not

exhaustive, and they do not attempt to wordsmith a definition of the

performance factor, “meeting management.” They are simply observable,

objective examples that map out three levels of performance, for a single

performance factor.

The performance rubrics recommended here would describe leadership factors

as previously discussed (i.e., derived from “Purposeful Leadership,” in the

Squadron Vitality Attributes section of this report). Each performance factor

should include three or more levels of performance, for example “Needs

Improvement,” “Acceptable,” and “Excellent.” Each level of performance could

contain both positive and negative examples of behavior desired or not desired,

respectively. These examples need to be specific enough to identify where an

individual ranks, but broad enough to be used across all officer career fields. For

each performance factor, a Likert scale is used for the rater to appropriately rate

the performance for the rating period. Combining scores from each performance

factor produces an aggregate score for overall performance during the period.


The overall score, coupled with the rater’s comments, can then help the rater

appropriately assess and mark the ratee on the comparative assessment.

By clearly defining the desired behavior, it makes it more difficult for a rater to

inflate or firewall the markings under each level of performance based on if an

officer did not exhibit those traits. Using a performance rubric coupled with

rater accountability will provide an objective measure of performance that does

not currently exist in today’s officer performance reports.

5.1.4 Eliminate use of bullets and change to a narrative format to reduce non-value-

added work/time on nuanced semantics and format. The narrative section

should describe objective accomplishments (without superlatives), and provide

a Commander’s assessment of performance and potential for increased

responsibilities: actual words, in English, without code. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR:

AF/A1H).

Eliminating bullets and using a clear narrative will place more focus on content,

while de-emphasizing formatting and the imperative to “fill white space.” This

will help with the administrative burden and reduce time wasted on

performance report processing, which often includes a back-and-forth exchange

on such matters between executive officers. This will give back time to members

to focus on the mission and on developing their Airmen. The narrative should

be an overall assessment, using objective examples, of the individual’s

performance based on everything the rater marked on the performance rubric

and the officer’s future potential to serve in higher grades as a leader.

5.1.5 Develop feedback forms with new performance rubric and require ratees to

provide self-assessments as a part of the new performance reporting process

(OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AF/A1H).

Improving feedback is critical in better developing our officers. When the new

performance rubric is developed for the performance reports, it also needs to be

incorporated in our feedback forms. This makes it clear from the beginning of

rating period, when the rater sets expectations and goals, through the mid-term

feedback and finally with the performance report, that expectations and

feedback are clear for the ratee. By having the ratee fill out a self-assessment,

then comparing it to what the rater provides/thinks, we create a better process

with more meaningful/constructive feedback and development opportunity for

the ratee by the rater. This will also help alleviate the current practice of a

member drafting and filling out their entire report, only to have the rater make

minor changes and/or concentrating on the bottom lines of the report (this is

compounded by raters not having enough time). This structure will also help


the culture of “great job” feedback and empty (job suggestion, PRF review)

mentoring.

5.1.6 Remove Developmental Education recommendation on the OPR. Use the

existing stand-alone DE recommendation forms and process (OPR: AF/A1PP;

OCR: AF/A1H).

As the Air Force removed the select designation for which officers will attend

Developmental Education (DE) in residence, there is no need for that

recommendation on the new officer appraisals. Currently all officers are

expected to complete DE either through correspondence or residence, and the

method is masked on the promotion boards. This, in theory, eliminates the need

for a recommendation that everyone will complete if they want to be promoted.

We also want to place the right emphasis on performance (all categories) and

not on the wrong proxy measures or easy to measure factors for promotion. The

existing, stand-alone DE recommendation forms and process already

accomplishes this recommendation.

5.1.7 Use static closeout dates for officer reports, similar to enlisted static closeout

dates. Officer close out dates should be deconflicted with enlisted closeout

dates. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AF/A1H).

5.2 Revise Enlisted Performance Evaluation System. (OPR: AF/A1H; OCRs: AF/A1P and

SAF/MRM).

As in the new officer evaluation system, the AF1 Team recommends moving towards

using a performance rubric (as explained in the officer section) designed on what the

AF values, using profile management for rater accountability, providing a comparative

assessment for enlisted members and using a narrative format. Combined, this will

provide a more objective and transparent performance appraisal system. There are only

minor differences such as when and where the new system should be incorporated in

enlisted development.

What the AF values and the new appraisal system will both need to be incorporated in

all the appropriate methods of Airmen development. Focusing on real performance

provides constructive and meaningful feedback for development and helps us build a

larger pool of leaders to help reinvigorate squadrons.

These changes would update the Enlisted Evaluation System to parallel those recommended

above, concerning the Officer Evaluation System.

5.2.1 Eliminate stratifications and instead incorporate an overall score/ranking

(comparative assessment) for all members by the rater and senior rater (with a

concur/non-concur from the additional rater). (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AF/A1H).


5.2.2 To control for rating inflation, incorporate rater accountability measures (e.g.,

rater batting average) for raters and senior raters. Utilize a lifetime/career

average for each rater/additional rater. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AF/A1H).

5.2.3 Employ performance rubrics to reflect the performance we value. Demonstrate

the meaning of each performance factor by providing concrete contrasting

examples of each factor, making clear delineations between levels of

performance, and thereby making it difficult to inflate ratings. (OPR: AF/A1H;

OCR: AF/A1P).

5.2.4 Eliminate use of bullets and change to a narrative format to reduce non-value-

added work/time on semantics and format. Narrative should describe only

objective accomplishments (sans superlatives). (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AF/A1H).

5.2.5 Develop feedback forms with new performance rubric and require ratees to

provide self-assessments as a part of the new performance reporting process.

(OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AF/A1H).

5.2.6 Remove community relations and education reporting in EPRs. (OPR: AF/A1PP;

OCR: AF/A1H).

By removing the education block, on the senior non-commissioned enlisted AF

Form 911, and reference on community relations and education on both enlisted

performance evaluations (AF Form 910 and 911), the Air Force can better

emphasize duty performance and diminish the perception that education or

community relations are more important or are over-valued in the current

enlisted evaluation system. Education and community involvement are likely

used as a proxy/default standardized measurement when people unfamiliar

with Airmen’s duties are comparing records. Increases in education and

leadership in the community should be properly weighted and demonstrated in

improved duty performance. This will be appropriately measured in the

performance rubric in both the leadership and mission effectiveness

performance categories.

5.3 Consider employing information technology systems to manage new Performance

Evaluation System. (OPR: AF/A1H; OCRs: AF/A1P, AF/A1X, AFPOA, AFPC, ARPC,

AF/A5/8, SAF/FM, and SAF/MRM).

A good web-based system could reduce the burden of administering a new

performance evaluation, as recommended here. The system would be the backbone for

both filling out and processing evaluations – giving back many hours to leaders at all

levels. It would also enable and automate rater accountability profiles for all raters in

the Air Force.


This is not a new idea. The Army recently moved to a web based system to establish a

more effective performance appraisal system. Their system incorporates scoring for

rater accountability, and it provides the ability for soldiers to fill out the performance

reports online, which has helped streamline their administrative process.

A well-designed web-based system would enable flexibility. For example, it would

provide the ability to tweak performance factors – what they are, how they’re worded,

or how they’re weighted. It would make possible quick adaptation, lessons learned; and

it would enable tailoring if needed, in response to the needs of different populations

and different environments.

With the right technology, the Air Force’s human performance system could be as agile

and adaptive as we want our Airmen to be.


6. Selection and Promotion Criteria

Leverage Point

If you are running an organization, it’s helpful to be clear about when and why you would

promote someone, or place them in one job versus another. All that requires clarity about

what’s “promotable performance,” which may encompass more than “good performance.”

It also requires understanding the organization’s purpose, needs, and the nature of the

work.

The advantages of that clarity are multiple, but among them is that people aiming to

advance their careers can then align their interests with those of the organization.

Otherwise, for those people, career advancement can become a goal unto itself.

Absent all that clarity, it’s easy for selection and promotion criteria to default to the

dangerous “easy-to-measure” syndrome – a cautionary theme of this report. There’s a term

for easy-to-measure predictors of success that don’t actually predict success. That term is

“proxy,” meaning it’s merely a stand-in, and not the genuine item. People use proxies

when they have fallen victim to the streetlight effect . . .

The Streetlight Effect

There is a very old joke, retold in

this Mutt and Jeff cartoon, about

the drunk, on his hands and

knees under a streetlight, looking

for a dropped quarter. He’s

looking there because that’s the

easiest, best-lit place to look, not

because he dropped it there.

In Mutt’s defense, at least he knows he’s looking in the wrong place; the worst cases of the

“Streetlight Effect” is when people don’t know they’re looking in the wrong place, or

that their proxies are proxies.

For example, imagine a company that promotes salespeople to sales management positions,

based strictly on their sales. Sales are easy to measure, of course, they’re right under the

streetlight. But they reflect little on a candidate’s leadership skills, or even aptitude. You

would want a sales manager to be good enough at sales, but that’s a poor (though easy)

indicator of leadership abilities. It’s a “proxy.”

The attraction to simplicity and convenience is strong and understandable; but as Einstein

rightly asserted, “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.”

Two Other Ways to Oversimplify Promotion Criteria

One other way to oversimplify promotion criteria is to provide too few promotion

channels. Let’s use the illustrative company, mentioned above. Imagine that they routinely


evaluated their employees, scanning for leadership talent. Now imagine that they found a

research scientist who was just brimming with leadership potential. So they told her:

“Congratulations! You’re the next sales manager!”

Now, that research scientist might do wonderfully as a sales manager. It would be

interesting to watch. But, the corporate policy that elevates “leadership,” while ignoring the

kind of work being led is simplistic. That policy would reflect an insufficient number of

categories for promotion. It’s likely that salespeople should be led by good leaders with a

decent knowledge of sales, and research scientists ought to be led by good leaders with a

decent knowledge of research science.

There is a second kind of oversimplification, and it is the reverse mistake: overvaluing the

specialty, while undervaluing leadership. That’s the leaning of many technical

organizations, where technical excellence is rightly revered. However, leadership is also a

skillset – and not necessarily one possessed by every brilliant technician.

If that logic holds, then we should avoid:

The unskilled leader – who is a skilled technician.

We should welcome:

The skilled leader who is competent, but perhaps is not expert, in the work to be led.

We should continue to value:

The skilled leader who is also a skilled technician.

Embracing the skilled leaders with competent technical skills will require replacing proxies

with better predictors, and ensuring that there are sufficient categories of expertise into

which people can be promoted.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: Air Force’s overreliance on “proxy” designations and technical skill, results in

sub-optimal leader selection.

First, proxies such as “Below the Promotion Zone,” awards, in-residence Developmental

Education, Distinguished Graduate pushes some Airmen into leadership positions for which

they are unprepared, while also overlooking – or even ostracizing – late bloomers.

Second, having too few competitive categories means missed opportunities to better

develop leaders in different Air Force disciplines

Airmen delivered a strong message: put people in jobs who can do the jobs – based on

merit, not extraneous factors. That’s not just an issue of “fairness”; it’s about where we

need to be in the future.


As the nature of war becomes more multi-dimensional, more and more Airmen will be

fighting alongside members of other services, and armed services from around the world.

If we are failing to make merit-based promotions, then it will show up in side-by-side

comparisons in these highly Joint environments. There will be no kidding ourselves.

This Squadron Vitality study did not undertake to compare Airmen with other servicemen

in Joint environments. But it would be an interesting inquiry. In an informal conversation,

one non-Air Force general officer with ample Joint Staff experience opined that Air

Force officers might be getting promoted earlier than other services do. Another general

officer with NATO experience independently reported the same.

So, Airmen’s goal of merit-based promotions is a reasonable one. But as now employed,

our promotion criteria impose significant hurdles.

Hurdle: Proxy Criteria

Too many of our promotion criteria are stand-ins for real predictors of success: “proxies.”

Promotion Zones

One cause of the problem may be our emphasis on promoting officers designated

“Below the Promotion Zone,” which means that they are performing better than one

would expect, statistically, for their time in service. So, in Air Force, is BPZ a descriptor, or

an anointment? According to Airmen, there is a halo effect that comes with a BPZ

designation – it’s assumed that, if you were ahead of the pack at one point, you probably

always will be. As demonstrated by the high school classmate voted most likely to succeed,

not all successful people keep succeeding.

How heavily do we rely on the BPZ proxy? A lot, apparently. One 2010 study28 offers a

clue: Nearly 100% of line officers in the Air Force selected for brigadier general are

below-the-zone. In the Marine Corps, none were

promoted below-the-zone, in the Navy 55% were

never promoted below-the-zone and finally the

Army, with early promotion possible at all field

grade ranks, 65% were never promoted below-

the-zone.

We need ways to on-ramp those late bloomers

and ways to off-ramp the people we thought were so full of potential, but weren’t.

Awards

Another proxy performance indicator is awards. As discussed in the prior section,

promotion boards are tasked with figuring out which performers are worthy of promotion,

28 Lt. Col Travis Rex, “Speed Trap: The USAF 24-Year Pole to General Officer,” United States Army

War College Strategy Research Project, Page 9, April 1, 2015.

We need ways to on-ramp late

bloomers and ways to off-ramp

the people we thought were so

full of potential, but weren’t.


and the board must do so with performance reports that say most Airmen are doing a great

job, and describe performance with superlatives and secret code. One differentiator is

awards. Either the ratee did or didn’t win an award, and award-winning is an objective

fact. Citing that someone won a particular award is often used as justification for a

stratification.

So far, so good. But the award system has three problems.

1. As a genuine indicator of performance, awards deserve a much smaller role. If the

Air Force’s performance reporting systems allowed for richer and more accurate

descriptions of performance – without clobbering careers in the process – then

knowing an Airman’s awards could be helpful. In the absence of descriptive

candor, however, this minor indicator has been given the spotlight.

2. As a natural consequence of their inflated value, demand for awards has grown –

and now the Air Force simply has too many, and the number is growing.

3. The process by which awards applications are handled is clunky, inefficient, and

slow. As the number of awards has grown, so has the number of submissions, and

so has the amount of administrative time – by squadrons that have no time to

waste.

Development Education and Distinguished Graduate Designation as Proxies

Two other commonly used proxies are Developmental Education (DE) and the

Distinguished Graduate (DG) designation. Both are highly valued as indicators of

performance. This is not bad, in itself; however, these accomplishments are given more

weight than they deserve in determining future potential. The Air Force has started to

address this issue and recently Gen Goldfein directed changes to the DE designation

process and removed the “select” status. With the change, officers are no longer designated

years in advance, but rather will be selected annually, based on demonstrated performance.

This effectively removes the DE “select” status as a proxy and, for some officers, keeps an

important motivator in place. We have also seen efforts to mask the method of DE

completion on Officer Selection Briefs used by promotion boards. This, however, is a half

measure, as the information is still available in the promotion record.

Additionally, there is an over-importance placed on earning a DG designation from DE,

and other programs. For example, DG from Squadron Officer School or Airman’s

Leadership School is used as an early indicator of future leadership potential. Like DE

“select,” these designations can produce a halo effect that overvalues specific

accomplishments in determining future assignments and progression.

The good news is that addressing these accomplishments and giving them their due, but

not overly so, is relatively straightforward. We do not have to eliminate the notation of

the accomplishment; rather we just need to put it in context, and provide more complete


performance information by establishing a comparative assessment that allows leaders

to properly value all performance, not just specific, easy-to-measure indicators.

This bias toward over-weighing easy-to-measure proxies may be dangerous, and is worth

avoiding. At the base of a squadron, Airmen are valued for applied technical skills. Someone

who is merely an average technician, but a superior leader, may well end up without the

required proxies and will be unlikely to screen for command. Yet, some of these Airmen

may simply have been late bloomers – people we’d be foolish not to select, now.

Insufficient Promotion Categories

We compete and promote most of our officers in a single promotion category (“Line of Air

Force”) and we promote the “Best Qualified” individuals regardless of the actual need in

specific Air Force Specialty Codes at the next higher grade.

As in the example offered above (the scientist turned sales manager), this doesn’t always

serve us well. In fact, historically, this has caused substantial imbalances in the sustainment

of needed officers across career fields. This also results in a reduced number of leaders to

pick from to command squadrons in these specialties and may negatively impact the

quality of leadership in these areas.

Although the Air Force’s strength rests largely on the smart combination of different kinds of

expertise, we have harnessed ourselves to a system that fails to recognize and advance

leadership capabilities within an area of expertise. Additionally, by promoting in one major

“Line of the Air Force” category we are missing the opportunity to value and incentivize

specific skills and attributes these different categories would benefit from. For example, for

an acquisition officer, leading a program or advanced program management, certification is

more important than serving in a deployed location. We already use this approach with

medical and legal officers for this exact reason—we value different attributes in these career

field.

What’s the counter-argument? Perhaps the idea that Air Force has foundational values that

are important to all officers, so why bother? That’s not denied here. But how we serve those

values necessarily changes from one career field to another. Allowing leaders from within a

field to lead others within that field is no compromise; it only strengthens how we serve Air

Force’s values.

Recommendations

6.1 CSAF provide a memo to all Developmental Team’s (DT) squadron command

selection processes with his direction on the importance of leadership skills when

selecting future Squadron Commanders. (OPR: HAF/CX; OCR: AFPC).

This memo would provide what we value or specific factors that each future Squadron

Commander should have or demonstrated this in their careers. The DT would use this

memo as a guiding directive during the squadron command board selection process for


each type of their functional areas. This would allow for picking the best leaders based

on both technical and leadership skill. This would help balance the impact of proxy

accomplishments until the comparative assessment system is in place.

(Recommendations made in the prior section of this chapter, Performance Reports Aimed

at Performance Improvement, will take a while to implement, but should then remove the

need for that memo from CSAF, and will go a long way to nudge aside performance

proxies, in favor of actual performance evaluation.)

6.2 Consider replacing “Promotion Zone” categories with flexible promotion board

eligibility dates and transition to a Promotion Board Order of Merit to determine line

number sequencing rather than date-of-rank seniority. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCRs:

AF/A1H, SAF/MRM, and SAF/GC).

Currently Air Force’s Talent Management Innovation Cell is researching a method of

using a promotion board Order of Merit List (OML) to determine line number

sequencing for promotions instead of date of rank seniority. The FA1 team supports

consideration of such a method as it may mitigate some major cultural perceptions

pertaining to advancement within the Air Force. OML helps minimize the potential halo

effect of early success for members who do not keep performing to the same level,

allowing for better on-ramping of individuals developed or demonstrating greater

potential later in their careers. It minimizes using BPZ promotion as a proxy variable

(key identifier) for sustained performance. Compared to the other three services the Air

Force values BPZ much more (as described above).

Additionally, eliminating the Promotion Zone terminology from performance reports

and promotion recommendations could mitigate the negative stigma of the APZ

designation and fairly judge these officers based on performance. The removal of the

APZ designation is consistent with the previous SECAF direction for promotion boards

to give no weight to promotion category. Continuation policies would not be affected

by the elimination of the APZ terminology.

6.3 Re-Baseline Air Force Awards and decrease the time it takes to process them. (OPR:

SAF/MRM).

6.3.1 Review and reduce special interest and functional awards that are listed in the

AFI 36-28xx series. (OPR: SAF/MR).

6.3.2 Conduct a process improvement event on the Awards process. Deconflict

annual award processing dates with new static close out dates for both enlisted

and the new proposed officer evaluation. (OPR: SAF/MR).

As discussed previously, awards proliferated over time because our

performance reports used them as proxies to help justify stratifications. Since

there is a lack of objectivity and clear indicators of success on performance


reports for both officers and enlisted, awards were used as justifications for

stratifications and by promotion boards to discern performance between career

fields. This drove many leaders to place more emphasis on these awards. This

added administrative burden to squadrons, because squadron leadership value

and want to help promote their people. Adopting a comparative assessment in

our performance reviews would reduce the need to employ awards as a proxy,

and would instead restore awards to their original purpose: recognition.

Reducing the administrative burden of processing awards gives time back to

members in the squadron enabling them to focus on the core mission – a key to

revitalizing their squadrons.

6.4 Explore expansion of the Line of the Air Force officer promotion category to multiple

categories and promote to “best qualified” within each expanded promotion category

to achieve a better mix of talent across Air Force Specialty Codes, by matching

inventory more closely with readiness requirements. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCRs: AF/A1H,

AFPC, SAF/MRM, and SAF/GC).

Consider expanding promotion categories to:

Rated Operations: 10X, 11X, 12X, 13A, 13B, 13C, 13D, 13L, 18X

Non-Rated Operations: 13N, 13M, 13S, 14X, 15X, 17X

Logistics: 21A, 21M, 21R

Support: 31P, 32E, 35P, 38P, 71S

Acquisition: 61X, 62X, 63X, 64X, 65X

By moving to expanded promotion categories, the Air Force will be able to more closely

promote to requirements, with each career field tailoring its approach to best benefit Air

Force, overall. For example, the rated career field may value technical experience over a

longer time period compared to the support career field. Optimizing development for

each career field grows the officers into more capable leaders for squadron command

and beyond. Ultimately, this recommended approach will produce more officers

available to meet all requirements across the board, which will improve the officer

manning situation at the squadron-level.

In addition, the benefits of expanded officer promotion categories include: targeted

evaluation of performance, valuing nuanced capabilities, targeted development of

capabilities valued within categories, and ultimately selecting leaders within categories

based on the specific criteria valued within that category. Potentially ties into

developing better joint leaders.

This move would clearly give greater flexibility to each career field to manage and

develop their officers to meet their specific developmental requirements. This helps

ensure only the best officers in each career field are promoted and more are available

for command selection.


7. Airmen’s Development That Does Its Job

Leverage Point

An organization that’s clear on its purpose can align all of its performance drivers to that

purpose. One of those drivers is training and education or, more broadly, its

“development system29.” That system can operate in a continuous cycle of determining

where exactly knowledge and skills need to be conveyed, how they should be conveyed,

and how well the effort is working. The entire cycle is outcome-oriented, continuous, and

self-correcting. It is not “set and forget,” nor “assume and forget.”

Such a system should have good answers to questions such as these:

Where is “development” the answer, or even part of it?

Are we mistaking lack of desired performance for lack of desired skill? As previously

mentioned, it’s often assumed that the prescription for non-performance or bad

performance is either to tell or to teach Airmen the right thing to do. For example, if some

Airmen are charging their phones using Air Force computers, it must mean they don’t

know better. Right? Well, maybe. Or, perhaps the solution is more complex – such as

training plus motivation (penalties) plus easily available alternatives for phone charging. In

some cases, though, skill deficits may be the issue.

Is the purpose of the development clear?

What do we want to enable people to do and think, exactly? Like organizational “purpose”

questions discussed earlier in this report, this purpose question is often dismissed as too

obvious to bother with, or too hard. But like military operations, clear objectives enable

better and more useful execution.

One thing to get right is the level of knowledge needed, from simple remembering of facts, up

to direct application of the knowledge, and further up to creative problem solving with it.

Then those instructional objectives need to be stated as such, which is no easy task to do

well.

All of that takes skilled instructional design/assessment professionals, which is the next

point.

Are we treating instructional design and assessment like the professional discipline that it is?

Purdue University, Pennsylvania State University, Virginia Tech and many other

universities offer doctorates in instructional design. And, if that’s so, there’s apparently lots

to know on the subject. So, to what degree is our training and education system informed

by people who are both studied and experienced in this discipline?

29 Here, the terms “development,” “education,” and “training” will be used interchangeably, as will

“knowledge,” “skills,” “abilities,” and “competence.” Instructional professionals can be sticklers for

the nuanced differences in those terms, but those differences do not serve the purposes of this report.


And, just as important, if an organization has such people, are they resourced and

authorized to make the difference that they can make?

A related question is: Can our trainers train? A classic mistake is to assume that a good

performer (in any given job) will therefore be a good instructor in that, too. That’s

mistaken. Simply ask yourself, if you were a first-day skier, as you lean down the mountain

for the first time, who would you rather have at your side, the world’s best skier, or the

world’s best ski instructor?

How well does the training work?

Good training doesn’t get launched and let go; it gets launched, monitored, and adjusted.

The system must bake in continuous evaluation and adjustment, or else many, many

man-hours and opportunities will be wasted. It’s that simple.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: Our Airmen development system has been . . . unsystematic. We have

multiple systems, but they are not driven by a clear unifying purpose, and they are

tolerant of badly timed, ineffective, or irrelevant, or altogether absent training. What’s

needed: A firm hand, better resourced and authorized development efforts, and with a

clear eye on outcomes at every level.

Training, good and bad

Airmen were not shy on the topic of training. They wanted less of one thing and more of

another. First, they wanted less Computer-Based Training (CBT). That’s not news to

anyone in the Air Force. As mentioned earlier, the Air Force launched, tracked and

enforced widespread CBT courses that were notoriously awful for the end-user, and were

of limited, if any, value. The Secretary of the Air Force directed a review of all CBTs to

weed them out. Airmen’s complaints about CBT were reminiscent of that old joke about the

cynical Soviet factory worker: He said, “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.”

Likewise, Airmen reported getting “trained” by hitting the return key enough to

“complete” the course. They claimed that such CBT wastes time, but it also obviously

squanders morale. It wouldn’t be half as bad, if it only wasted time.

Second, what Airmen want more of is what they call “hands-on” training. In large part,

what they are basically saying is, “Help me learn the actual skill. Help me learn to do it.

Don’t just brief me.” There is a morale side to this, too. In effect, “Please treat my job

skills like they are important, and treat me like my time is valued.”

What did bad CBTs teach the FA1 team?

Mind-numbing CBT was a popular topic among Airmen, even after they were told that the

problem was being addressed. Unless we plan to play whack-a-mole with bad training, the

CBT problem, itself, is useful instruction: the FA1 team found itself asking, how could it

have gone on so long? What is to prevent other training of questionable relevance, quality,


timing, frequency, and appropriateness of delivery? The answer seemed to be that there

was a lack of both mission-focus and vigorous oversight. Current systemic reviews occur

periodically via different stove-piped processes. Crudely designed and questionable usage

of CBTs was symptomatic rather than the root cause of a poor approach to Airmen’s

development. Why did it take a memo from the Secretary of the Air Force to initiate a

review of ancillary and computer-based training? There should already be an institutional

process of checks and balances in place to remove training that is no longer relevant and to

prevent unneeded and poorly designed ones from being fielded.

What the FA1 team found however was that

while there are systems and processes in place,

the types of training Airmen voiced strong

opinions against were the same ones that are

developed, approved, and fielded via

organizational stove-pipes. The stove-piped

nature of the requirements and development

processes contributed to an environment where

various organizations were fielding training

without a common picture of the enterprise-wide

impact to Airmen and Squadrons. The FA1 team

came to call this “The Checkbook Problem.”

In addition, a working assumption derived from anecdotal information, was that

instructional design experts are available in the process to ensure proper objectives and

delivery methods in the development of training. However, resource constraints often

override the recommendations leading to less than ideal approaches being fielded.

How lightly should “mandated training” be taken?

Even if training is mandated by Congress or by DoD, there is usually a good intent behind

it. So, why shouldn’t the Air Force do it well, rather than just do it so it can be checked off?

It’s not just leaders whose development needs to be mission-focused. It’s all Airmen. Let’s

also align Airmen’s training with the capabilities we need – a continually adjusting process.

In any bureaucracy, training can become a “feed the bureaucracy” exercise. Let’s not

have the Air Force be that bureaucracy. Instead, let’s let the Air Force’s training feed the

mission.

How to make on-the job training more effective

The Air Force uses a lot of on-the-job training (OJT). That’s good – most people have

learned some of their most valuable work-related (and other) lessons from co-workers. It’s

worth observing, however, that relying on OJT makes four assumptions:

1. A subject matter expert (SME) exists on site,

2. The SME has time to train,

The Checkbook Problem

As with AFIs, taskers, and many

other demands for squadron time,

these courses are essentially checks

written by different parties out of

the squadrons’ checkbooks.

It’s check-writing in which:

No one coordinates, and

No one balances, and

No one pays for overdrafts,

except the squadrons themselves.


3. The SME knows how to perform OJT, and

4. Performing OJT successfully is part of the SME’s evaluated job function.

Assumptions #1 (proper manning), #2 (reducing off-mission work), and #4 (performance

reports) are taken up elsewhere in this chapter. Regarding #3, consider that many more

technical experts – whether on a leadership track or not – could benefit from Air Force’s

existing training on how to perform OJT than currently use it. This training can be a

“force multiplier” significantly contributing to the Service’s lethality.

Recommendations

7.1 Create a Review Council to examine all ancillary training, Expeditionary Skills

Training, and additional duty training requirements and course development before

content is fielded to the force. The Council will serve as a “gatekeeper” for all new and

existing non-primary duty training requirements. (OPR: AETC).

One of the FA1 Focus Groups conducted a case study on the ancillary training

requirements approval process. A key assumption during this case study was that there

is a disconnect between what the Air Force officially identifies as “ancillary training”

and what Airmen identify as “ancillary training.” Ancillary training includes total force

awareness training, which is required of all Airmen on an annual basis; selected force

training, which is targeted to specific members such as commanders and supervisors;

event-driven training, which is triggered by events such as a new duty assignment; and

Expeditionary Skills Training (EST).

Currently the Air Force Education and Training Course Announcements website lists

118 different ancillary training courses. At the bare minimum, all Airmen are required

to take 5 total force awareness training courses annually: Green Dot; Cyber Awareness;

Human Trafficking; Religious Freedom, and Force Protection. Other courses are

required depending on duty position and events (such as moving to a new base). While

there is a set of prescribed ancillary training courses, most Airmen identify ancillary

training as any general training that does not directly relate to their primary duty. In

addition to officially recognized ancillary training, most Airmen define would identify

any training associated with additional duties as ancillary training.

This case study examined ancillary training (total force awareness; selected force, and

event driven), EST, and training associated with additional duties. Ancillary training

(except for EST) requirements are worked through AF/A1D and the Air Force Learning

Council (AFLC). EST requirements are managed through AF/A3 and the Expeditionary

Skills Senior Review Group (ESSRG). AF/A1 is the gatekeeper for additional duties

(with AF/A1M as the OPR) which includes assessing associated training requirements;

however functional owners of the additional duties also have responsibility for

developing the training.


7.1.1 The Force Development Commander should conduct a business process review

to develop an implementation plan for the Review Council. The Council should

meet as frequently as needed to manage training requirements and ensure

content remains current and relevant. (OPR: AETC).

While AFI 36-2201 indicates the Force Management and Development Council

(FMDC) is the overarching authority for both the AFLC and ESSRG, subject

matter experts from the field said the FMDC no longer performs this function

(the FMDC has not met in the past 3 years). Training requirements are vetted and

courses are developed in separate stovepipes for each type of training. Courses

are approved and fielded in these different stovepipes without any overarching

authority having visibility to the holistic impact or return on investment for the

greater enterprise.

As with AFIs, taskers, and many other demands for squadron time, these

courses are essentially checks written by different parties out of the

squadrons’ checkbook – check-writing that no one coordinates, from a

checkbook that no one balances, and with overdrafts that no one pays for,

except the squadrons themselves.

While the Air Force conducted ad hoc measures to reduce the training burden

on Squadrons, this does not address the systemic issues that led to the situation

of too much non-value-added training being levied upon Airmen and

Squadrons.

7.1.2 The Council’s initial focus should be to review the impact of non-primary duty

training on squadrons and phase out training, where appropriate. The initial

review should consider: quality of training, validity of learning objectives,

appropriate delivery method to support content and objectives, and the impact

on Airmen and Squadrons. (OPR: AETC).

7.1.3 The Council should periodically revalidate training courses and requirements,

and the effectiveness of all current training, to ensure it remains relevant and

achieves its intended purpose. (OPR: AETC).

7.1.4 Instructional design experts and requirement sponsors should be heavily

involved at key junctures throughout the review process. (OPR: AETC).

Crucial to a review council is a partnership between the strategists who own the

resources and the instructional system design experts. The key personnel on the

council who understand from a high level what the Air Force needs, may not

have the expertise on learning objectives and course design. The review council

needs to ensure instructional system design experts are intimately a part of the

requirements, development, fielding, and on-going evaluation processes. Their


expertise in identifying sound objectives and ensuring valid delivery methods

cannot be over-emphasized. The Air Force cannot put itself in a situation, again,

where it takes a declaration from the Service Secretary to initiate corrective

action for poorly fielded training.

The Air Force possesses instructional design expertise, so why does suboptimal

training continue? While resource constraints will continue to be a factor,

instructional design specialists need to have an official say in the approval and

fielding process, and course correction. While simple advice from an expert is

always welcome, it must come with a matter of authority. The approval,

fielding, and revalidation process should have a codified means to document

the official recommendation from the instructional design expert. If a

requirement is to move forward (or continue), counter to a recommendation

from an instructional design expert, then there must be justification.

7.2 Provide unit training managers the capability to simultaneously update multiple

training records in the Air Force Advanced Distributed Learning Service (ADLS) in

support of large group training events. (OPR: AF/A1D; OCRs: AETC, AF/A5/8 and

SAF/FM).

During field visits, FA1 team heard overwhelmingly that there were too many CBT

requirements levied upon Airmen. According to AFI 36-2201, while ADLS CBTs are the

preferred method for completing total force ancillary training, Commanders have the

option to have these training requirements completed off-line in other venues such as a

Commander’s Call. After members have been certified as receiving the training, the

unit training manager (UTM) or appropriate authority must update the training status

in ADLS.

ADLS does not have the ability to import data to update multiple records at once. If

Airmen receive mass training at a Commander’s Call, the UTM must manually select

every, single record in ADLS to update. Some Air Force Reserve units scan individual’s

Common Access Cards to identify Airmen attending training and are able to upload the

data to ARCNet (Air Reserve Component Network). Providing a capability to import

data files, such as comma delimited .csv files, to ADLS would provide Commanders a

more practical option for delivering total force awareness training to Airmen that

would not overly burden the UTM.

7.3 Reduce or Replace Awareness CBTs with computer pop-up messages or other

alternative delivery systems (e.g. via smartphones) to satisfy the requirements for

Cyber Awareness, Human Trafficking, Religious Freedom, and Force Protection

annual training. (OPR: AF/A1D; OCRs: AETC, AF/A5/8 and SAF/FM).

Currently all Officer, Enlisted, and Civilian Airmen are required to complete total force

awareness training annually. This training includes: Cyber Awareness (60 minute CBT);


Human Trafficking (60 minute CBT); Religious Freedom (20 minute CBT), and Force

Protection (30 minute CBT). The overall objective for this type of training is for

Airmen to gain a general awareness of the topics. This is at the very low end of the

spectrum for learning objectives; participants are required only to have simple

knowledge of the topic vice being able to apply the information learned.

Since only general awareness of the topics is required, the FA1 team recommends using

a series of pop-up messages on computers that can be cycled throughout the year. This

could be particularly useful in replacing or at least significantly supplementing the four

total force awareness CBTs. The pop-ups serve to provide Airmen general awareness.

Information and learning that cannot be accomplished via this method can remain in a

CBT or other appropriate training method; the pop-ups would reduce the requirement

to complete a CBT. According to subject matter experts in our working groups, this is

an acceptable method to achieve general awareness, and the Army had previously

already instituted a similar method for some training.

7.4 Conduct a review of all Air Force training tracking systems to reduce redundancies

and invest in an information technology (IT) ecosystem to support the Air Force

training, education, and development enterprise. This first review phase should focus

on consolidating all tracking systems for Air Force training requirements into a single,

integrated system followed by further developments to support the Airmen learning

enterprise. (OPR: AETC; OCRs: AF/A5/8 and SAF/FM).

Airmen want the resources and tools to allow them to succeed. Airmen also want tools

that are not time wasters. Currently, there are multiple different information systems

that are used to track training. Some are functionally specific, others are MAJCOM or

HHQ specific. One of the FA1 Working Groups conducted a case study on the different

information systems used to track training at a typical base. At one base, the training

managers are required to use a multitude of different information systems to track

training (GO81, Air Force Training Record, Training Business Area, Graduate Training

Integration Management Systems, Patriot Excalibur, Learning Management System,

and Advanced Distributed Learning Service)

Having several different systems that do not connect to each other or share information

is inefficient and not the most effective manner to track training. Airmen’s time and

resources are wasted through duplicating information, learning to use the different

systems, and maintaining the various platforms. The FA1 team recommends further

study into the different duplicative training tracking information systems being used

across the Air Force. The study should include determining the requirements being

tracked and the capabilities of each system. Although there may be MAJCOM-specific

and functional-specific requirements and capabilities associated with individual

systems, a single platform that meets the requirements of all would decrease the

amount of time Airmen spend on tracking training. The study should determine the


feasibility of consolidating disparate training tracking information systems with the

ultimate goal of fully consolidating into a single platform.

The Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved the creation

of the Force Development Commander to execute policy and assign responsibility for

force development policy under a single commander. The Force Development

Commander will be responsible for providing the capability to track learning and force

development to provide commanders with the status of Airmen. The Force

Development Commander is best postured to conduct a review of training tracking

systems to reduce redundancies and invest solutions that benefit the Air Force training,

education, and development enterprise.

This could be the first phase of phased approach to developing an Air Force Integrated

Training, Education, and Development Information Technology Ecosystem. The

ultimate outcome of this review process will be the creation of an integrated training,

education, and development information technology ecosystem, comprised of these

critical features:

Consolidates Airmen Learning Record into one place for tracking currency,

certification, and capabilities

Built-in conduit for users and supervisors to provide feedback on training content,

objectives, and usefulness

Provides a backbone for teaching, learning, cataloging, and assessing to enable

content management, faculty resource management, planning, and design

Accessible from multiple information technology platforms including non-military

and mobile/tablet hardware

Connects to and shares with the Air Force personnel information technology system

of record

Employs an artificial intelligence (or like) capability to assess an individual’s record

of learning and experiential history to determine developmental gaps and tailor

development; can recommend training, educational, and development courses of

actions to fill gaps and achieve developmental goals

Automates information sharing with readiness assessment platforms

Enables electronic tracking, routing, and approval of training, education,

certification, and related waivers

Assesses an individual’s learning record and experiences to identify potential credit

qualification for personnel development units, competencies, or certifications


8. People and Resources: Enough in the Right Places

Leverage Point

Some of the Leverage Points and their implications discussed so far in this report are

somewhat invisible – not easy to perceive every day. The topics of people and resources

(e.g., money, equipment, and materials), however, are quite different. When people or

resources are lacking, or misallocated, the negative impact is easy to see and is felt every

day – starting with decreased morale, but eventually ending with less-than-desirable

outcomes.

All of the clarity, education, and reinforcement in the world won’t be enough to ensure

organizations can achieve their strategic goals. Success requires enough of the right

resources and in the right places. And, of course, the clearer organizations are about their

purpose and roles, the easier it becomes to tailor resources for targeted needs – ensuring

each unit has what it needs.

And, as with all Leverage Points discussed in this report, this one requires occasional

adjustment to meet changing needs. This implies robust feedback loops and the systemic

mechanisms that would allow for agility.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: Manning problems – including both under-manning and misallocation of

manning – plus under-resourcing, is endangering squadrons’ long-term ability to deliver

on their respective missions.

People

The topic of manning, in one form or another, was by far the most frequently discussed

concern among Airmen. The manning issue fell into two categories.

First, manning levels: Airmen often perceive that manning is substantially inadequate to

the needs of current missions and ops tempo.

But secondly, many Airmen also said ineffective allocation of the people we have today causes

some of the pain. This includes mismatches with capabilities and roles, and the inability to

effectively leverage personnel either due to existing policies or lack of knowledge about

what’s possible.

Twenty-six years of sustained combat and decisions regarding acquisition of future systems

resulted in cuts in squadron support at the same time we were increasing demands on

squadrons. These challenges, combined with continuing operational demands, require us to

address some manning issues head on.

These challenges are most evident now because:


Squadrons require basic support (e.g., CSSs and First Sergeants), but the Air Force

degraded that support over time. While those decisions made sense given the

pressures of that time, restoring Air Force readiness will require giving back to

Airmen the time and mental bandwidth to deliver mission outcomes and tend to

the things that build and sustain esprit de corps. Most squadrons are still missing

these support people – even squadrons who formally have the billets.

Foundational squadron authorizations and personnel are lacking. What the Unit

Manning Documents (UMD) say squadrons are authorized and funded for, based

on the required workload when last validated, does not actually match the

numbers and skill levels of personnel that it takes to meet mission requirements in

today’s operating environment.

There are no standards for manning Wing and Group staffs. Today, each builds

their core staff and augments their staffs using squadron personnel.

The Air Force has not adequately tailored manning decisions according to

mission types and size of squadrons (of course, clearer purpose and roles will help).

Some Airmen say that existing biases get in the way of thoughtful and creative

employment of the current force. That is, the temptation exists for military

supervisors to take shortcuts or do what they understand best – such as hire a

retired military person rather than considering a civilian whose background may

be difficult to correlate. As one commander said, “Military leaders don’t always

know how to assess and interpret non-military experience.” The temptation might

also be to hire someone they already

know to avoid the risks they perceive

exist otherwise. Of course, this leads to

perceptions of favoritism. More

prevalent, though, is that many leaders

are lacking the knowledge (and

reinforcement + accountability)

required to more effectively employ the entire force. This seems to be especially

apparent regarding the employment of civilians, but many Guardsmen and

Reservists would say it’s true for them, too. The first hurdle seems to be

overcoming the lack of awareness and knowledge about what’s possible – the real

rules vice the perceived rules – for hiring, firing, and effectively managing non-

active duty personnel.

There are existing laws and policies making it difficult to get caught up on

manning shortfalls. For instance, a series of laws that restricts employment of

different components of the DoD workforce constrains the permeability of utilizing

a diverse military, civilian, contractor, Guard, and Reserve workforce in any given

squadron. The FA1 team does not attempt to solve this issue here.

Many leaders are lacking the

knowledge (and reinforcement +

accountability) required to more

effectively employ the entire force.


Resources

As with allocation of people, resource allocation seems sub-optimized in some cases. While

Airmen discussed funding (and the timing of funding) for many things, information

technology (IT) was one of the hottest topics. Current equipment and resources are at

uneven levels – both for today’s missions and for tomorrow’s. Productivity and morale are

negatively affected because IT equipment isn’t available or is so outdated and problem-ridden, the

time required to use it robs Airmen of valuable time needed to do their mission-critical work. So, a

resource problem is exacerbating the manpower problem. When Airmen own better

technology in their homes than the Air Force provides them at their duty stations, it does

little to reinforce the belief – necessary for squadron vitality – that their work is

important.

It gets worse: employing comm/cyber professionals who could solve problems faster and

prevent future problems is nearly impossible for many squadrons. Airmen apply a “fix-

it-yourself” mentality, but this is hardly where the Air Force should be, especially when

these systems directly affect mission success and are increasingly vulnerable to cyber

threats.

Squadron Morale, Cohesion, and Identity

Two other opportunities reside at the intersection of people and resources, and they both

promise high impact on the esprit de corps element of squadron vitality. The first one is

morale- and cohesion-building activities. Resources aren’t always set aside for such

activities, but should be. While many other issues and opportunities discussed in this

report strongly affect esprit de corps, this frontal approach to morale and cohesion

warrants strong consideration. Considerations for how to design and conduct those

morale-building events appear earlier, in the leverage point, “Leadership Development

That Develops Leaders.”

The second opportunity concerns Airmen knowing that they are part of valued team,

which is an essential element of esprit de corps. Many organizations have tangible ways to

convey that a person is part of a particular team. In the military, such means not only

convey outward identity but they also support personal pride and unit cohesion. The

recommendations below address the need for squadrons to have additional funds to

support such events.

Recommendations

8.1 Continue to reconstitute the Commander's Support Staff (CSS). (OPR: AF/A1X; OCRs:

AF/A1M, SAF/MR, AF/A5/8, and SAF/FM).

CSSs existed 10-15 years ago, but the manning was sold to pay for a series of virtual

work transformations taking processes across the personnel support portfolio and

putting them on-line, web-based, with individual Airmen handling the interactions

(similar to on-line banking) – the work, however, was mostly digitized, instead of


automated – meaning that an essentially paper-based system was little-changed, except

put onto computers – and the workload was then shifted from the disbanded CSS to

individual Airmen. So, un-automated processes that had been manned by people expert

in those processes were handed over to Airmen, via computer, to do for themselves.

The Air Force never realized the expected efficiencies from the transition to the vMPF –

at least not to the degree expected. This, coupled with decreased manpower and

increased workload on squadrons over the same period, drove Air Force leadership to

later reverse this decision. The Air Force is reconstituting the CSS in order to handle a

wide variety of support work requirements, thus freeing up technicians to focus on the

Squadron’s core mission. The CSAF already agreed with this assessment /

Recommendation and funded the reconstitution of CSSs.

8.1.1 Strategically communicate the changes once the Air Force fills the positions.

(OPR: AF/A1X; OCR: AF/A1M).

8.1.2 Include the Unit Safety Program Manager’s responsibilities in the next iteration

of the CSS Manpower Standard. (OPR: AF/A1M).

We reviewed all of the workload associated with the new CSS Manpower

Standard, and the only “additional duty” missed was the Safety Program

Manager. Any increases to the Manpower equation would be negligible. The

FA1 team recommends, for completeness, including the Safety Program

requirement in the update to the CSS Manpower Standard (2 years).

8.2 Rebrand Commander’s Support Staff as Unit Support Team (UST) and physically

locate these Teams (when possible) outside of the command suite. (OPR: AF/A1X).

Airmen in many units view the CSS as a function that is dedicated to supporting the

Squadron Commander, rather than the entire unit. Changing the name will help clarify

the CSS/UST’s role. Where possible the UST should be located outside of the command

section to further improve access for squadron Airmen.

8.3 Fully resource Squadron First Sergeant authorizations. Fund the remaining positions

and strategically communicate the changes once the positions have been filled. (OPR:

AF/A1M; OCRs: AF/A5/8, SAF/MR, and SAF/FM).

Airmen consistently gave us feedback that they consider having a First Sergeant and a

Squadron Superintendent foundational support for what makes a Squadron a

Squadron. Thus, every Squadron needs a First Sergeant if it has an Enlisted population

of any significant size. The CSAF already agreed with this assessment /

recommendation and approved the ability for Major Commands to convert existing

billets to fund First Sergeants where they do not already exist. The Air Force is

accomplishing this, but implementation is lagging as only 20 of the ~160 positions have

been converted. We need to resource the remaining 140 billets to accelerate this effort.


8.4 Develop a new Squadron Superintendent Manpower Standard and Fund new

authorizations as required. (OPR: AF/A1M; OCRs: AFMAA, AF/A5/8, SAF/MR and

SAF/FM).

8.4.1 Expand Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force functional authority to include

squadron superintendents in addition to existing group superintendent

responsibility. (OPR: AF/A1M; OCR: CMSAF).

Currently, about a third of Squadrons have a funded Superintendent position

(these were usually in Functional Squadrons, where the Functional community

leadership made the decision in the past to fully fund these positions in all of

their Squadrons). About a third of Squadrons do not have a funded position, but

for years have taken the senior Enlisted Airman in the Squadron out of their

current position and given them the duties of Squadron Superintendent. Finally,

about a third of Squadrons do not have a Superintendent at all, or it’s an

“additional duty” for the senior Enlisted Airman in the Squadron. Convert

billets of all those currently serving in a squadron superintendent capacity.

Fund new squadron superintendent authorizations earned in above threshold

squadrons without a current/acting superintendent.

8.5 Move away from completely centralized cyber management and return some of this

capability along with the required permissions back to the base-level and let

functional managers at Communications Squadrons decide how to best deploy the

capability. (OPR: SAF/A6).

8.5.1 Determine manpower requirements for unit-level cyber personnel (Air Force

Specialty Code 3D). Incorporate into appropriate Air Force Manpower

Determinant. (OPR: AF/A1M; OCRs: SAF/MR and SAF/A6).

The final piece of Squadron support that is missing, that Airmen said there

exists a substantial need for, is Information Technology (IT) troubleshooting

technicians embedded at the local-level, in the Squadron where it makes sense,

for both timely responsiveness and mission prioritization. This would support

the strategic goal of pushing authorities to the lowest levels.

The Air Force centralized IT permissions to minimize risk, and may have

succeeded in doing so; but it has been at the cost of mission effectiveness. It

would be easy for the pendulum to swing back and forth between centralizing

and decentralizing IT services. But the dilemma is unnecessary. There are best

practices to apply in such situations – practices that allow for effective

standardization across Air Force and effective, tailored local support.

Briefly, it is both possible and desirable to preserve “unity of command” in a

seemingly paradoxical way with IT specialists (or other matrixed personnel):


hold them accountable at the squadron- or wing-level for what work is done (i.e.,

let the local leader directs work as needed); and hold IT personnel accountable

for how the work gets done at a centralized level (i.e., let senior experts set and

maintain standards, such as for cyber security). 30

8.6 Create Manpower Standards for both the Wing and Group staffs. Properly resource

with standard staff positions to alleviate manning shortages imposed on Squadrons

when Wings and Groups pull these Airmen up without backfills. (OPR: AF/A1M;

OCRs: AFMAA and SAF/MR).

Currently no standard exists for what Manning should be allocated for support staffs at

the Group and Wing levels, other than some basic requirements that exist on the

Manning Documents (UMD). Thus, individual Commanders make that decision and

reach into Squadrons for Personnel to meet their requirements. Some of these positions,

the requirements that a majority of Groups and Wings are using, need codification and

funding into official positions. Others are at Commanders’ discretion and the diversity

and size of support functions varies widely. We don’t want to eliminate all of these

opportunities, as many of them are good for professional development, but we need to

eliminate the Manning shortage impact on Squadrons when Wings and Groups pull

these Airmen without backfills.

8.7 Incorporate periodic reviews of Wing and Group Support Staff Manning levels into

Command Transition Instruction (and advocate returning “taxed” Personnel to

Squadrons to support their success, when positions are deemed not mission critical).

(OPR: SAF/IG).

“Out of Hide” Manning occurs when Groups and/or Wings determine that workload

requirements exist, but no valid Authorizations exist for those requirements on Staff

Unit Manning Documents (UMD). Thus, Groups and/or Wings “tax” Squadrons to fill

positions, often for an entire year or longer, with members working on Staff, but staying

on the UMDs of the originating Squadrons. Because of this, the Air Force Personnel

Center (AFPC) views these positions in the Squadrons as filled. Thus, Squadrons have

effectively lost those individuals to accomplish Squadron workload without backfills, as

well as retaining the associated deployment commitments. Add requirement in

command transition AFI for commanders to review and approve these “taxed”

positions.

30For a quick summary, see W. Casey (chapter), “What are the keys to getting cross-functional work

done?” in Business driven information technology: answers to 100 critical questions for every manager by

David Laube (ed.) and Ray Zammuto (ed.), Stanford Business Books (2003). Or, see the white paper,

W. Casey, W. Peck, et al. “Multiplying the power of experts: a systemic approach,” 2010

https://goo.gl/3MVcsJ

https://goo.gl/3MVcsJ


8.8 Initiate Air Force-level review of Augmentee Details to validate requirements and

establish how to use those personnel most effectively. (OPR: SAF/MR). One indicator

of the need to validate augmentee details is reflected in the use of First-term Airmen for

details upon arriving at their first duty station. During field visits, the FA1 team were

told of anecdotes about Airmen being used for base details in conjunction or

immediately subsequent to completing the First Term Airmen’s Center (FTAC). While

using Airmen for details during FTAC is strictly prohibited by Air Force Instruction, it

continues to occur. The team heard reports of Airmen being held for a period of time

after completing FTAC to be used for base details, such as cleaning and lawn care.

This can be particularly taxing for overseas bases where a First-term Airman leaves

after only 12-24 months. For a short-tour assignment, if a First-term Airman does not

get to her unit until after a month of arriving due to FTAC and conducting details, then

the Squadron would only get the Airman for 10 months at most (when taking into

consideration mid-tour leave). The FA1 team received input about the difficulty of

training and getting return on investment from first-term Airmen on short-tour

assignments.

If there are valid requirements for augmentee details, then they should be properly

reflected in manning calculations and allocations.

8.9 Revise current training for Commanders and civilian supervisors on "how to manage

civilians." (OPR: AF/A1C; OCRs: AFPC and AETC). Training should occur on the

following subjects:

Management reassignment options and rules

Current options and processes for civilian removals

Civilian hiring processes

Civilian performance management (establish templates at AFPC for how to do a

civilian performance plan)

We already have this training as part of the Civilian Supervisors Course, but most

Commanders are not aware of the flexible options for utilizing their Civilians, the

streamlined authority option for firing new Civilians, or the rules for firing career

Civilians. Civilian career development education at the Squadron Commander’s course

will help the military to better understand what a good civilian career looks like,

compared to a good military career, so there is less unintended bias in civilian

utilization.

8.10 Reform how we post job listings to USAjobs to reduce favoritism in civilian hiring.

Mandate the use of standardized Position Descriptions (PDs) when positions can be

found in the Standardized Core Position Description (SCPD) library. When using a

non-standard PD, justification must be sent to the hiring official’s supervisor for


approval, followed by an AFPC review, before posting the position on USAjobs. (OPR:

AF/A1C; OCR: AFPC).

To combat favoritism in civilian hiring, we should mandate the use of standard PDs. If

not a standard PD, then a supervisor must approve, with AFPC review, the position

requirements to prevent requirements that may unnecessarily limit the number of

applicants.

8.11 Air Force should financially support more team-building and morale

events/activities. Done correctly, these efforts will improve unit cohesion and esprit

de corps. (OPR: AF/A1S).

8.11.1 Air Force Services Activity should develop and provide a menu of Squadron

team building event and activity capabilities supported by both appropriated

and non-appropriated funds that Squadron Commanders can use for

enhancing morale and unit cohesion. (OPR: AF/A1S).

Current Air Force policy provides Installation Commanders with the authority

to determine how best to utilize MWR non-appropriated funds designated as

Organizational/Unit Morale Funds. A Field Data Call indicated variance exists

in the way installations distribute these types of funds. At some Bases, all funds

are distributed to units proportionately, based on population. At some bases,

funds are distributed to units proportionately after an amount is first taken off

the top to support Wing or Group level events and activities. And, at other

bases, all of these types of funds are withheld and utilized only at the Wing

level for events and activities for which the entire base population is able to

participate. Each of these methods disburse the non-appropriated funds for the

benefit of Air Force personnel, but the AF1 Team’s Field Visits determined the

best option for revitalizing Air Force Squadrons is to ensure these funds always

reach the Squadron level. To address this, the Air Force is providing additional

non-appropriated fund support in addition to organizational/unit funds,

specifically for unit cohesion, team building events and capabilities to help

revitalize squadrons.

8.11.2 Improve funding for Force Support Squadron morale-boosting capabilities in

Air Force budgets – Program Objective Memoranda (POM) and Personnel

Policy Guidance – to include funds for running base-level intramural sports

programs. (OPRs: AF/A1S; OCRs: AF/A5/8, IMSC, AFSVA, and SAF/FM).

Air Force MWR appropriated fund program portfolios are underfunded in the

POM with gaps funded via Year-of-Execution and/or End-of-Year process, or

not funded at all. Due to this instability, MWR appropriated fund programs are

fragile when relying on Year-of-Execution and End-of-Year funding. When

End-of-Year money is received it is usually spent on capitalization purchases


(equipment, etc., quickly purchasable at End-of-Year), rather than improving

the programs. Program improvements require budget stability through

strategic planning and POM support.

8.11.3 Ensure 1 additional full-time equivalent assigned to Force Support Squadrons

(FSS) Fitness Center Staffs as a Unit Cohesion Facilitator at each base for the

purpose of full-time management of Unit Cohesion Funds and additional

support for base-level intramural sports. (OPR: AF/A1M; OCRs: AF/A1S,

AF/A5/8, and SAF/FM).

Programmed and budgeted line items, such as fitness equipment, are

adequately funded. What we found during the Field Visits, however, is that

appropriated funds are under-funded for running Intramural Sports programs

(for example, hiring referees, or the accoutrement needed to host a marathon or

10K race, etc.). In addition, running the Intramural Sports program is usually a

part-time duty for a Fitness Center Staff member. To be effective, this needs to

be a full-time position. Finally, to ensure the best utilization of enhanced

Squadron funding for morale-boosting capabilities (8.11.2), Unit Cohesion

Facilitators will be responsible for improving Squadron Commander awareness

of, and facilitate execution of, these capabilities.

8.11.4 Add a new category to the Air Force's “Recharge 4 Resiliency” (R4R) program

to cover team-building and morale events/activities and fund it in the POM

using appropriated funds. Communicate any new program options to

squadron leaders. (OPR: AF/A1S; OCRs: AF/A5/8, and SAF/FM).

OSD initially launched and funded the R4R appropriated fund program for

several years. More recently, the Air Force assumed funding responsibility, but

was not successful in gaining approval in the POM for R4R long-term funding.

The Air Force R4R annual unfunded gaps are also currently funded via the

End-of-Year process. The entire portfolio, including the new unit cohesion

category, requires annual budgeting and funding approval to

programmatically enhance programs via budget stability/strategic planning.

8.11.5 The Air Force Services Activity should centrally fund the enterprise-wide non-

appropriated fund menu of activities portion of the Squadron team building

event and activity capabilities. Annual non-appropriated funding of $5 per

person will be supported for Squadron cohesion team building events and

activities. (OPR: AF/A1S; OCRs: IMSC, AFSVA, AF/A5/8, and SAF/FM).

8.12 For unit/team identity authorize unit patches on the utility uniform. The FA1 team

recommends using Velcro on the uniform to provide flexibility as Airmen change units

(also reduces cost from sewing on patches) (OPR: AF/A1PA).


In the course of our review, we included a line of inquiry designed to determine ways

to increase unit/squadron cohesion, camaraderie, teamwork, and morale in an effort to

help revitalize AF squadrons. The FA1 team found that an individual sense of

belonging is a key element to unit cohesion, camaraderie and teamwork. Including an

element of unit identity on duty uniforms provides a clear benefit in this regard and

also provides Airmen a way to distinguish themselves from other units. This

recommendation directly targets positive reinforcement of Squadron culture and

building Esprit de Corp.

8.13 Review current portfolio of IT systems to prioritize system upgrades and deliver “IT

systems that work." (OPR: SAF/A6).

8.13.1 Review current portfolio of IT systems to prioritize upgrades that automate

previously digitized processes (e.g., performance reviews). (OPR: SAF/A6).

8.13.2 Establish Air Force standard for IT hardware refresh rates and leverage

economies of scale for all new purchases. (OPR: SAF/A6).


9. Flexibility in Talent Utilization and Retention

Leverage Point

Every successful organization strives to retain its talented performers – especially those

who are hardest to find or whose development takes tremendous time and investment. The

Air Force is one of those organizations. This is a challenge that’s getting more difficult to

manage given the competition among military and non-military organizations for great

talent.

Air Force priorities include: Restoring readiness . . . to win any fight, any time; driving

innovation . . . to secure our future; and developing exceptional leaders . . . to lead the world’s

most powerful teams. We can’t accomplish any of these priorities without fully leveraging the

talent of our Airmen – developing them effectively, utilizing them in the right place and the

right time, and finding ways to retain those who prove to be the best fit for our service.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: We’re losing some needed technical expertise and experience due to an

inflexible approach to career advancement, talent utilization and retention.

The Air Force defines Talent as the collective set of knowledge, skills, abilities, experience,

and potential that individuals or groups can provide to meet an organization’s goals or

objectives.

The Air Force defines Talent Management as an integrated set of human capital

management processes designed to ensure mission objectives are met by optimizing the

productivity, value, and potential of an organization’s greatest asset – its people.

Though not always referred to by this term, issues related to talent management were a

common theme in field visits with Airmen. Two topics stand out:

1. Airmen believe the Air Force needs to utilize their skillsets better. When the Air

Force doesn’t properly leverage the skills Airmen are able to bring to the fight,

there’s a negative cascading effect: Airmen become dissatisfied with Air Force

service and some leave the force. As a result, squadron readiness suffers and so

does Air Force lethality.

2. Airmen also expressed a desire for a technical career path to complement the

leadership career path. They called this a “dual-track” system. This would afford

those not aspiring to take on a leadership role an opportunity to be recognized and

promoted for their increasing technical capabilities.

Talent utilization – the right Airman, in the right place, at the right time – has been

addressed in more depth in the leverage point, “People and Resources: Enough and in the

Right Places.” For instance, by expanding Officer Promotion categories, the Air Force will


be able to more closely promote to requirements – better matching inventory with Air Force

readiness requirements. Ultimately, this will generate more officers available to meet all

work-load requirements across the force, and improve officer manning at the squadron-

level. In addition to the significant benefits outlined already in the Selection and Promotion

Criteria Leverage Point, better talent utilization creates greater job satisfaction, increased

morale and stronger teams.

Regarding a dual-track system, the FA1 team did not find compelling evidence that this is

required. The team explored multiple options for a technical track, including Warrant

Officers and Limited Duty Officers and determined no requirement to create a dual track

for all technical specialties31. The Air Force needs SNCOs and FGOs to transition to more

leadership focused roles (with technical expertise). The Air Force designed career pyramids

to ensure there were a sufficient number of CGOs to build the required FGO leaders after

accounting for retention and promotion. In general, the current system produces enough

CGOs, however there are a few limited exceptions where FGO requirements as technical

experts has grown beyond the ability to grow them from CGOs to FGOs – for example, the

17X career field (Cyber). The only short-term option in these limited cases is a Lateral Entry

program until rebalanced requirements create sustainability over the long-term.

The other area where we have an out of balance personnel pyramid is with pilots, where

we need more technical experts at the CGO level, than we would otherwise require to build

sufficient FGO and above leaders. Based on our review, the Air Force would benefit from

more pilots at the CGO level. One possible solution would be to keep a larger number of

pilots flying as Captains, without promotion to Major. Long term, the Air Force needs to

sustain the required pilot CGO/FGO mix closer to 60/40.32

Ultimately, the Air Force already is a more technical service than the others, so the

inclusion of an additional technical core within it is not required. What does makes sense is

smartly retaining the technical talent the Air Force already develops and employs.

The following recommendations leverage enhanced programs and policies to improve

speed, agility, transparency, and inclusiveness in empowering Airmen and decision makers

to best manage Air Force talent and create Airman readiness and retention.

31 The Air Force had Warrant Officers in its past, but eliminated them to create the SMSgt and CMSgt

ranks as the pinnacle of technical expertise within the Enlisted Corps. 32 The FA1 Team, working with subject matter experts, developed a recommendation and associated

protocols for an enduring program to transition 20-25% of Rated Captains at the 10-year point into a

CGO aviation technical track, which we passed on to the Aircrew Crises Task Force, but do not

include in this report because it does not affect all or most squadrons.


Recommendations

9.1 Improve information and transparency on existing beyond High Year Tenure

Enlisted retention programs. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AFPC).

9.1.1 At 6 months prior to High Year Tenure (HYT) separation/retirement date, allow

Unit Commanders to offer Enlisted Airmen the opportunity to volunteer for 1-

to 3-year enlistment extensions (based on Air Force sustainment models). (OPR:

AF/A1PP; OCRs: AFPC and Squadron Commanders).

9.1.2 Track sustainment numbers for all AFSCs and Grades via a transparent and

accessible “sustainment matrix.” The extension program will be “first come, first

served” until reaching the sustainment number. Airmen may continue to

compete for promotion during extension and may receive more than one

extension. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AFPC).

9.1.3 Offer a volunteer incentive option to keep Airmen at their current base during

the length of extension. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCRs: AFPC and Squadron Commanders).

9.1.4 Rename the HYT Extension program as the Experience Retention Incentive

program. (OPR: AF/A1PP; OCR: AFPC).

9.2 Rebrand the Selective Continuation program as the Experience Retention Incentive

program and offer it to all O-3s and O-4s not selected for promotion in career fields

(or AFSCs) below sustainment levels. (OPR: AF/A1P; OCRs: AFPC and SAF/GC).

Currently, Airmen culturally view “Selectively Continued” Officers as non-valued

added to the organization. They are no longer seen as upwardly mobile, and in an “Up

or Out” system, Airmen view them as a drain on the system. Airmen view these

Officers as just “hanging on” and no one is willing to develop these individuals further

due to limited developmental opportunities. Thus, if we are going to encourage and

fully utilize a group of continued Officers for technical expertise, we need to rebrand

them and treat them as respected and valued members of the organization for the role

they continue to play.

The current need, at any degree of scale, is for additional Rated Pilots at the O3 level.

9.3 Research using computer-based optimization algorithms to help assignment officers

make smarter and more complex assignment designations. The software should

include rulesets that enable Airmen to express preferences for staying in place while

accounting for the needs of the Air Force (i.e., more than the standard 3 or 4 years on

station). (OPR: AFPC; OCR: AF/A1H).

Using advanced algorithm-driven programs to help manage the assignment system

provides greater flexibility to match requirements for the Air Force and desires of the

member together. With computer optimization, appropriate business rules could be


established (time on station limits) to prevent undesired behaviors. With up to 48 % of

enlisted and officers moving in June and July during the summer assignment cycle, the

number and complexity of options or too great for assignment officers to effectively

achieve the optimum results for thousands of Airmen (functional assignment officers

match officers in batches and are not able to look across all career fields at one time).

Even with a better software program to do the bulk of the assignment matching,

assignment officers would still need to verify the matches and handle special

assignment situations on case by case basis. Currently planned is an assignment

matching test for rated officers which will compare the normal assignment matching

process against a new software program’s results. These results could help inform the

efficiency and effectiveness of using optimized assignment software compared to the

current manual matching by assignment officers.

With a more capable system other assignment options may be available. A member

may want a choice to stay in a location longer for family stability, i.e. spouse’s career or

children’s needs. The intent is to give members the choice to stay or move at their

current duty location based on their desires and the needs of the Air Force. Currently a

member designated to move can only list their choices for another location but cannot

stay longer in place. More and more spouses now hold advanced degrees and are

working in professional careers that are not easily transportable to new locations.

Members want more predictability and stability with where and when they move. Even

if we are only able to increase matching for a small percentage of the force to either stay

in place longer or a preferred assignment, while meeting AF requirements, then we

succeeded in retaining more talent.

9.4 Support ongoing OSD efforts to transform the Officer workforce from an "Up or

Out" promotion system to a "Perform to Stay" utilization system. (OPR: SAF/LL; OCR:

AFPC).

The military “Up or Out” system has very strict promotion and utilization rules, which

are very inflexible in terms of talent management, thus negatively affecting retention.

Moving to a “perform to stay” model would provide additional flexibility in both the

utilization and retention of Officers above that provided by the previous

recommendations. The OSD policy community is advocating for this change which may

be helpful to retain expertise based on Air Force needs.


10. Modernizing Family and Spouse Support

Leverage Point

When someone’s support network becomes more resilient, so do they.

Intel analysts get a little worried when their “social network analysis” of bad guys reveals

that the bad guys’ social network has gotten bigger, stronger, and more resilient. In like

fashion, the rest of us should get excited when good guys, like our servicemen and women,

experience the same thing. Spouses and families33 are a key part of that network.

Leaders of any successful organization understand that, for themselves and the other

individuals in their organizations, home and work are inextricably linked. Positive and

negative effects from the working environment can be felt at home and vice versa.

Successful organizations pay attention to this linkage and work hard to create the work-life

balance and support to keep this linkage a positive one. With this attention comes high

morale, effective performance, and desired retention.

Military organizations have an even bigger responsibility, though. The nature of military

service imposes additional stresses on family life. Many military roles will require life-

threatening work and lengthy deployments away from home. And almost every military

role requires significant sacrifices due to frequent moves and the high ops tempo required

by most functions – even those that don’t routinely deploy. Commanders have a special

responsibility to support families.

Today’s Challenge

Summary: The programs and methods used by the Air Force to support spouses and

families need to be refreshed and don’t always reflect the needs of today’s Airmen and

the critical network that supports them. Without an effort to clarify the current purpose of

our programs and methods, the Air Force’s warfighting effectiveness and ability to retain

talented Airmen is at risk.

Air Force families deal with frequent changes and multiple sources of stress. General

Goldfein recently spoke about the importance of support for Airmen and their families as a

critical component of ensuring a ready and lethal Air Force. They “move all around the

globe…they get dropped into new neighborhoods, jobs, circle of friends. They balance

personal passions with long hours of separation, family demands, and hardships. They

learn to expect the unexpected.”34 When Airmen’s families are okay, then those Airmen can

33 For simplicity, the terms “family” or “families” are intended to include all individuals considered

part of an individual’s support network 34 Staff Sgt. Rusty Frank,” Goldfein talks taking care of Airmen at Treasure our Troops,” US Air

Force website, available at: http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1355207/csaf-talks-

taking-care-of-airmen-at-treasure-our-troops/

http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1355207/csaf-talks-taking-care-of-airmen-at-treasure-our-troops/

http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1355207/csaf-talks-taking-care-of-airmen-at-treasure-our-troops/


focus on their tasks at hand. The challenge today is finding the best ways to connect with

and support our Airmen’s spouses and families.

Families Have Changed

Many Airmen described the fact that families today are different than those in existence

when most family and spouse support programs and concepts were developed. As one

Airmen said, “This isn’t the 1950’s anymore.

Most families have two working parents – if

there are even two parents still living

together.” There are far more variations on

families requiring new ways of support. The

Air Force must reassess the real needs of

Airmen’s families today – including those of

the close support networks needed by single

Airmen and others in unique circumstances.

Communicating with Families

One major hurdle in today’s environment is squadron leadership’s difficulty in reliably

communicating with families. Some Airmen said they were reluctant to have their families

contacted or involved in squadron life. Spouse and family rosters are often incomplete as

many Airmen haven’t given permission for their unit’s Key Spouse to contact their families.

Some spouses said Airmen are disinclined to involve the family in unit events or functions

in order to keep their work and family life separate. Other spouses do not want their

contact information given to the unit or to be contacted by a Key Spouse—preferring to

maintain some distance between their member spouse’s job and their personal lives. But

there are many spouses and families who want to be a part of a broader support network.

They understand that building relationships within the squadron family broadens their

support network and lets them know that they are not alone.

Creating the Motivation for Connection

Addressing the issues identified in other sections of this report, especially those aimed at

clarifying the purpose and meaning of every unit, may help create the motivation for

Airmen to want their families to have a stronger connection to the Air Force. As each

Airman feels increasing pride in their work and the teams to which they belong, they’ll

be proud to share both with their families.

Creating Work-Life Balance

One of the causes for disengagement is an out-of-whack work-life balance, heavily tilted in

favor of work, leaving precious little room for quality family time and identities apart from

one’s career. If Airmen are putting in long hours at work, then they can hardly be blamed

for wanting to preserve their precious family time. For some Airmen, home feels like a

refuge and they don’t want to mix their work life with their home life.

The Air Force must reassess the real

needs of Airmen’s families today –

including those of the close support

networks needed by single Airmen

and others in unique circumstances.


Clarifying the Role of Squadron Leadership

The role relationships between squadron leadership and families are not clear. While most

squadron leaders understand their responsibility to enable and foster effective support

networks for their Airmen, they don’t always know how best to do it. While families are

sometimes asked to provide support to the squadron, first and foremost they must know

they are supported by the squadron. Squadron leaders’ role in this area seems to be clearer

during deployments. And families seem to be more comfortable being contacted by the

squadron leadership during deployments because the intent is clear—the squadron is

supporting the family. Contact from leadership ensures they are getting needed support

and lets the family know their service and sacrifice is valued.

Regardless of deployments, spouses report that they relish communication that keeps them

“in the loop” on things like long- and short-term schedules, and anything that can help

them manage expectations and plan more effectively.

The Key Spouse Program

The Key Spouse program was designed to use a spouse volunteer (selected by the unit

commander) to serve as a liaison between the command and its family members. The Key

Spouse can be an effective communication vehicle, the point of contact that helps families

learn where to go for base resources and other assistance. But the clarity and quality of the

program varies wildly across Air Force Squadrons. Opinions about the program were

varied and generally fell into these six categories:

1. It’s great! “Our Key Spouse is excellent and our Squadron Commander is involved.

(The program is running as intended. We feel engaged by the squadron and

connected to the leadership).”

2. It’s okay. “We have a Key Spouse, but our commander isn’t engaged (i.e. our Key

Spouse is excellent, but the commander does not make/have the time to engage

us).”

3. It’s not good. “It’s just a clique for women with children (i.e. our Key Spouse

Program has morphed into an unofficial ‘club’ and is not inclusive).”

4. It’s not good. “We have a Key Spouse but they are not involved (i.e. Our Key

Spouse isn’t engaged with their role and we feel ignored).”

5. It’s bad. “We don’t even have a Key Spouse (i.e. our Commander has not appointed

a Key Spouse. They do not consider families a priority).”

6. “What is the Key Spouse Program? It’s not advertised, so how can we be involved if

we don’t know it exists?”

This program is an important connector between the squadron and its network of spouses

and families, but not all Squadron Commanders are giving it the attention it requires. Some

are completely uninvolved, while others appoint a Key Spouse and then “let it run on auto-

pilot.” The most effective Squadron Commanders are actively engaged and use the Key


Spouse as an effective communication conduit, regularly checking on the health of the

program and ensuring the success of this important support network.

Clarity of Purpose Required

There are inconsistent views on the purpose of the Key Spouse program. As with so many

other things mentioned in this report, until purpose is clear, effectiveness of the program

will be uneven.

Some Airmen and their spouses complain that the Key Spouse program is being used as a

de facto “social club.” While having a family and spouse-centric social organization may fill

an existing need within squadrons, that is not the intent of the program, and using it in this

way creates the wrong atmosphere and may alienate otherwise interested spouses from

connecting with the squadron.

Because there is such a disparity in the program’s effectiveness across squadrons, the intent

and purpose of the program is not made clear to Airmen or their families. Is it an

informational program? Is it a deployment support program? Is it a social program? Is it a

counseling program? Is it none of those things? Is it all those things? The lack of clarity

surrounding the program’s objectives has led to inconsistent and ineffective efforts across

the Air Force.

The bottom line: While clear guidance exists in the Commander's Key Spouse Program

Desktop Guide, Key Spouse program intent and goals remain unclear to leaders and

Airmen. Program application and performance varies drastically from squadron to

squadron. As a result, this program is not serving families the way it was intended.

Key Spouses

Key Spouses are officially appointed volunteers, many of whom feel under resourced and

supported relative to what’s been asked of them. This issue is most acute in larger

squadrons with large numbers of deployed members. In some cases, commanders will

appoint more than one Key Spouse to share the workload, but that doesn’t always happen.

Engaged squadron leaders, including first sergeants, can help determine the right mix of

resources and can ensure strong support for the Key Spouse(s). Working together, they can

ensure an effective program that meets the needs of their squadron.

A Tangled Network of Benefits and Support Programs

As research and field visits revealed, there are many family support programs available,

but Airmen and families aren’t always aware that they exist, let alone know how to

navigate those resources. How are Airmen and families supposed to make decisions that

impact their families when they don’t know all the resources available to them? They don’t

know what they don’t know.

There are a multitude of websites that explain the dozens of programs and benefits

available to Airmen and their families, but none are truly a one-stop-shop. Quality and

content of official Air Force websites vary by Base, Wing, Group, etc. A quick search of


Airman and Family Readiness Center websites shows that some bases have streamlined

and easy to navigate sites with the end user in mind, while others clearly slapped together

a few links as an afterthought. Internet-savvy spouses and families who are used to

obtaining information via their phones in mere seconds are frustrated by these barriers.

Moving from one base to another, often several times during the span of a career, is a

disruptive experience for any family. Spouses enjoy having program continuity between

bases. But simply having programs is not enough, the ability to access information about

those family programs is paramount to ensuring smooth transitions between bases.

Childcare Resources

High ops tempo and longer than normal workdays require Airmen to lean on childcare

resources like the on-base Childcare Development Centers (CDC) to meet their needs.

CDCs are a popular resource, and some bases are at or above capacity, either due to space

constraints imposed by outdated buildings, or staffing constraints where not enough

childcare providers are available, leaving parents to find alternative arrangements. Many

A&FRCs provide information on alternative childcare services, but that information isn’t

necessarily provided or easily accessible at every installation. Childcare issues become

especially challenging when parents are working longer than normal hours in high ops

tempo squadrons.

Childcare programs are highly valued by Airmen, however, the Air Force’s ability to meet

that demand is often constrained due to budgetary or personnel issues, therefore reducing

a popular resource. Airmen are left with the impression that the Air Force may not

recognize the importance of helping Airmen have or find childcare that’s reliable and

convenient.

Communicating About Deployment & Staying Connected During Deployment

Spouses and families of deployed Airmen want to stay connected to the Squadron before

and during deployments. In the Air Force, deploying is not always a team activity, and

there’s no “we’re in this thing together” mindset. Deployment is already an isolating

experience, and so it can be even more so when that experience is not shared.

Recommendations

10.1 Clarify and Modernize the Key Spouse program. (OPR: AF/A1S).

10.1.1 Create a working group to clarify the intent and scope of the program, one that

is more inclusive of families and other support networks. Consider best

practices from Army and Navy Family Readiness Groups and Ombudsmen

programs and the Marine Corps Family Readiness Program. (OPR: AF/A1S).

The Air Force designed the Key Spouse program after the Navy’s Ombudsman

Program, with the intention of increasing unit readiness by having an

informational conduit between unit leadership and families, and as an


information repository for relevant installation and community resources. The

Air Force must clearly communicate the program’s intent and goals. The Field

Visits indicated that Airmen and spouses desire the program to be more

inclusive and basically a family support program (family being defined

however the individual Airman needs the support (more inclusive than just

spouse, or spouse and children)).

10.1.2 Rename the Key Spouse program and the “Key Spouse” position (consider

"Family Support program" and "Family Support Liaison (FSL).") (OPR:

AF/A1S).

The term “Key Spouse” has some negative connotations and cultural baggage.

As part of a military organization, it implies a sense of hierarchy that should

not exist as a part of a volunteer construct. Airmen perceive the Key Spouse as

the Commander’s (or senior) Spouse and Airmen’s Spouses perceive a degree

of authority in this position that does not exist. Nevertheless, spouses (and

Airmen) perceive that there may be negative workplace repercussions for the

member for not following the “lead” of the Key Spouse or that their

participation may otherwise affect the active duty member. They perceive this

to a degree that they would rather not participate in the program than risk any

negative repercussions. This inhibits participation and effective delivery of

support.

10.1.3 Market the Family Support program and make it part of the onboarding

checklist so new members are aware it exists and actively look for it.

Conversely, the Family Support program should reach out to new members

upon joining squadrons. A best practice is for the program to make

postcards/materials with information to pass out/send to spouses and families

as well as share and connect on social media. (OPR: AF/A1S).

Any rebranding of the Key Spouse program must flow from an Air Force

decision on what effects the program seeks to achieve, and then any new name

and marketing campaign flows from that. Needed is a more inclusive

definition of this program beyond spouses and the FSL needs to be framed as

more of a liaison role versus a leadership role.

10.2 Provide initial training to Squadron Commanders on their responsibility for family

support along with familiarization with the renamed Key Spouse Program. (OPR:

AETC; OCRs: AU and AF/A1S).

If it is true that Purposeful Leadership is a key element of squadron vitality, and that

bolstering Airmen and Family Resilience is one of the key attributes we’re aiming for,

we must provide improved initial training to all squadron leaders upon assumption of

their responsibilities, similar to existing initial training performed by Equal


Opportunity, Legal, Comptroller, etc. Upon implementation of 10.4, initial training

could be delivered at the base-level through Airmen & Family Readiness Centers.

10.3 Enhance and standardize training for Key Spouses. (OPR: A1S).

During a recent Key Spouse Review and Revision Facebook Town Hall meeting,

hosted by Ms. Goldfein and Ms. Wright, and facilitated by A1S, many participants

(most of whom were Key Spouses) suggested making revisions to the current Key

Spouse training program. Improvements include virtual webinars, evening training

sessions (to ease the burden on working spouses), modified training for Guard and

Reserve units, and new course topics on things like social media etiquette, OPSEC,

sponsorship, etc. Revisions to the training program are expected by Spring 2018.If

recommendation 1 (above) is adopted, then this training will inevitably need to be

adjusted to fit the intent and scope of a revised program.

10.4 Advocate for Air Force-level Manning increase of one Full Time Equivalent (FTE)

plus-up to Force Support Squadron (FSS) Airmen and Family Readiness Centers

(A&FRC) at each base for full-time management of the Base-level Family Support

program. Fund ~84 positions. (OPR: AF/A1M; OCRs: AF/A1S, AF/A5/8, SAF/FM, and

AFPC).

Currently, Air Force Instruction requires each squadron to appoint a volunteer Key

Spouse. Per Policy Guidance, this individual should not be the Commander’s Spouse,

who instead usually functions as the Key Spouse Mentor. Squadron Key Spouses must

receive initial training and annual refresher training. The A&FRC is responsible for

providing this training at Base-level, both an initial training course and periodic

refresher courses. In addition to providing this training, one of the A&FRC’s

Community Relations Consultants, who is usually the Base Program Manager for a

portfolio of other programs, is also the Installation Program Manager for the Key

Spouse program. This responsibility is typically part-time work for a GS-12 employee.

During field visits and through follow-on contacts to Force Support Squadron

Commanders, the FA1 team saw a wide disparity in the management of this program.

It often came down to the bandwidth of the Program Manager in relation to the other

programs in their portfolio, the expertise of that individual in dealing with the wide

array of available Airman and Family Resilience and Support programs, and the

degree to which that individual showed initiative and cared about the success of the

program. When these issues were positive and aligned, the Base program was vibrant

and successful, and often Squadron Key Spouse programs were successful. Whenever

they were not aligned, the Base program was often an afterthought, and Squadron

programs suffered. When individuals did not commit to the effort it showed in the

results. This program demands full-time attention for the best chance of success. The

U.S. Army embeds a Family Support Program Manager (FTE) at the Installation


Support-level (the Family Readiness Group (FRG)). Recommend, rather than one per

Wing, we support and fund one full-time position at each Main Operating Base.

10.5 Encourage more and better communication between Squadrons and families. (OPR:

AF/A1S; OCRs: Squadron Commanders).

During field visits, squadron leaders reported the challenges with connecting to

families because it was difficult to get contact information for spouses. During the

Key Spouse Review and Revision Facebook Town Hall meeting, hosted by Ms.

Goldfein and Ms. Wright, and facilitated by A1S, spouses said that the major issue for

them (many were Key Spouses) was getting access to and interaction with squadron

leadership and getting contact information from squadron leadership (Recall Rosters,

Inbound Rosters, etc.).

It appears that what we have is a major breakdown in effective communication

between squadron leadership and Key Spouses in terms of needs and expectations

from both sides of the equation. The follow recommendations should address and

mitigate this breakdown.

10.5.1 Create a link on every Base website homepage to contact information for

Installation Family Support Program Facilitator in the Airman and Family

Readiness Center (A&FRC) and ensure that Point of Contact (POC) has an

updated list of every Squadron’s Family Support Facilitator and their contact

information (OPR: AF/A1S; OCRs: FSS/CCs).

10.5.2 Incorporate training on Airman and Family Resilience communication issues

in Squadron Commanders Course (OPR: AETC; OCRs: AF/A1S and AU).

10.6 Advocate for Military Construction funding for Childcare Development Centers at

bases where demand exceeds capacity. (OPR: AF/A1S; OCRs: IMSC, AFSVA, AF/A5/8,

and SAF/FM).

Improving child care capacity and availability is the goal. Airmen described child care

availability is a high priority. Currently, physical structures limit child care capacity

on DoD installations. Often, CDCs are the oldest building on many bases. Due to the

DoD’s very limited funds for MILCON over the last 15-20 years, the Air Force needs

new CDCs on Bases that have demand beyond current capacity.

Short of new facilities, another issue that drives capacity down is employee turnover.

These are often low Grade and low pay positions, with high levels of stress and

responsibility, and turnover for child caregivers is high. When employees leave, the

ratios at the CDCs temporarily drop, classroom space shrinks, and childcare slots

shrink. The background check process for new hires is necessarily extensive, and is a

lengthy process, increasing the temporary gap in capacity. Increasing retention,


shortening turn-over time, and widening the hiring pool are all worthy efforts to

diminish the fluctuations on capacity.

In addition to capacity, childcare availability was also an issue as some members

desire child care during night hours during 24/7 operations. Studies of the limited

Army and Navy CDCs that are 24/7 operations show that Airmen underutilize the

1800-0600 shift and the costs associated with keeping CDCs open for 24 hours would

negatively affect the ability to provide quality child care at capacity for the primarily

used 0600-1800 standard operating hours.


CONCLUSION Squadron vitality drives Air Force lethality. That is why this project was launched. The

Focus Area 1 team began its thinking by asking and answering: “What attributes comprise

squadron vitality?” And, of course, “What gets in the way?”

The team found issues hampering squadron vitality, and they found that those issues are

nothing new. Risk aversion, under-manning, micromanagement, and so on degrade

militaries across the globe – and have done so for years. So, what advantage did this effort

aim to offer that’s different than the many books, studies, and reports that address the

same or similar issues?

The Focus Area 1 team employed several approaches that may offer advantages.

First, the assessment and recommendations aimed at systemic solutions. So, for example,

this study did not simply observe that authority needs to be pushed down, and then call for

people to do so. That’s the fruitless “just-tell-‘em” solution; or worse, it is simply

admiring the problem. Nor does this analysis lean on point-to-point solutions: the ones in

which a tactical problem is identified, and then a tactical solution proposed.

Instead, this effort attempted to discern organizational practices and their systemic

drivers. For example, why is there a pattern of smart and reasonable people not pushing

authority down? Or, why is non-candid feedback on OPRs the norm among otherwise

honest and candid people? Or, why is there a pattern of ineffective computer-based

training? Understanding these patterns is more helpful than developing one-time, one-off

solutions. Out of that analysis came recommended systemic solutions.

Second, this effort recognizes that it is our own bureaucracy – and culture – that we must

employ to change our own bureaucracy and culture. We must leverage our existing tools

to upgrade our toolset if we are to achieve long-term cultural change. For example, our

performance reports must truly reflect the performance we value – such as achieving

mission outcomes and building strong, competent teams and Airmen. And that desired

performance must be reflected in what we train, and whom we promote. All of our

institutional influencers must point in the same, correct direction. Our organization must

exhibit as much integrity as we expect from our people.

Third, this analysis aims to operate from fundamental principles. The Fulcrum (clarity of

purpose) and its ten Leverage Points all offer concepts that illuminate problems and that

lead to solutions. One example is the idea that we should be measuring what’s important to

measure, instead of simply what’s easy to measure. That may seem obvious – sound principles

usually do – but it explains much about where we’ve been, and where we need to go.


The Focus Area 1 team developed those principles to assist their thinking, and it worked.

But there is perhaps someone else who can also exploit those principles: you. If you are

associated with the Air Force, you may see other opportunities to use these principles. You

may, for example, see opportunities where a better understanding of purpose (the Fulcrum)

would serve us well, or where clear organizational roles would make us more effective, and

so on. In short, the Focus Area 1 team anticipates that the principles articulated here will

lead to an improved Air Force, even in ways that aren’t reflected in this report’s

recommendations.

A final advantage of this report may be that it’s based on input from many, many

Airmen, and much of it was person-to-person. That methodology helped obtain solid data;

but equally important, it has already begun the grassroots involvement necessary for

genuine cultural change.

This study provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges Airmen feel they face in

their squadrons, and it provides a foundation for squadron revitalization. It is the first step

in a larger effort. Digging deeper into these issues will require action coupled with

iterative evaluation and assessment to determine what’s working, what’s not, and what’s

next. By leveraging the vitality attributes as a framework, and the fundamental

principles expressed in this report, Squadrons – operational and supporting – will remain

the heartbeat driving Air Force lethality.

The project is summarized on the following page.

A-1 of 54 IMPROVING AIR FORCE SQUADRONS Recommendations for Vitality

APPENDICES Methodology

Summaries from each data source

Meta-Data Summary

Email Survey Summary

Large Group Sessions Summary

Evening Events Summary

Senior Leaders Interviews Summary

Peer-to-Peer Interviews and Focus Groups Summary

Crowdsourcing


Methodology Introduction

This section discusses the methodology and process used for General Goldfein’s Focus

Area 1, Revitalizing Squadrons to support restoring Air Force readiness. It provides an

overview of the project approach, introduces the FA1 team members and their roles, and

then describes the three project phases in more detail.

This project was designed to hear Airmen’s voices about the challenges and opportunities

related to revitalizing squadrons across the Air Force. To do this, the FA1 team started by

reviewing the over-arching results (meta-data) available from the Air Force’s many data-

gathering surveys and other sources. With this context, the FA1 team was able to develop a

targeted online survey, the results of which shaped the interview questions and forums for

extensive field visits across 10 MAJCOMs and 25 bases. These field visits also included

opportunities for spouses and families to share their perspectives.

Since not every Airman could be reached with field visits, a web-based crowdsourcing tool

was also established to invite insights from any and all members and their families. With

the unfiltered inputs from Airmen across the Air Force, the FA1 team and selected subject

matter experts (SME) worked collaboratively to determine the areas requiring greatest

focus for analysis and solution development.

The Project Team

The project team for this review included an Air Force Core Team, an Extended Team,

MAJCOM POCs, an Interview Team, and a variety of SMEs and advisors.

The Core Team was tasked with overseeing the review full-time, and was led by Brig Gen

S.L. Davis as the Focus Area 1 Champion. The Deputy, Col Kim Brooks (AF/A4), was the

Project Manager. The Core Team also included CMSgt Rob Stamper (designated from the

Command Chief List), and Lt Cols George Buch (AF/A3), John Cappella-Zielinski (AF/A1)

and Michael Harris (AF/A2) as Action Officers (AOs).


In addition, Executive Leadership Group (ELG), Booz, Allen, Hamilton (BAH), and RAND

Corporation (RAND) augmented the Air Force Core Team’s expertise and capacity.

The Extended Team was selected for their organizational perspectives and comprised HAF

AO’s from AF/A5/8, AF/A9, AF/A10, AF/RE, AF/SG, SAF/A6, SAF/MGM, and SAF/PA.

Major Command Points of Contact (POCs) were the focal points for Major Command

participation in the effort with members represented from: ACC, AETC, AFGSC, AFMC,

AFRC, AFSOC, AFSPC, AMC, ANGB, PACAF, and USAFE.

The Interview Team consisted of 45 Airmen, NCOs, SNCOs, CGOs, FGOs, and civilians

selected from the Major Commands to conduct interviews and facilitate focus groups

during the field visits. These Airmen were organized into two alternating interview teams

(Blue Team and Silver Team). Each field visit also included Air Force Core Team members

and experts from ELG, RAND, and BAH.

Air Force Subject Matter Experts and Advisors augmented the teams’ expertise throughout

the project. They included representatives from: AETC, AF/A1CP, AF/A1DI, AF/A1DL,

AF/A1H, AF/A1MR, AF/A1PFO, AF/A1PP, AF/A1X, AF/A4, AF/A4C, AF/MDA9, AF/TFC,

AFPC, AMHS, AU, AWC, CSAF/SSG, DISL, Eaker Center, IMSC, PACE, SAF/AA, SAF/IG,

and SAF/MM.


The following chart provides a high-level view of the FA1 team:


Project Phases: Data Gathering and Analysis, Solution Development, and

Implementation

This project has three phases, the first two of which are complete:

Phase I, Data Gathering and Analysis: This phase included gathering and analyzing data from

online surveys, peer-to-peer and senior leader interviews, focus groups – large and small,

and crowdsourced data.

Phase II, Solution Development: This phase employed cross-organizational working groups

that formed hypotheses about the systemic causes of key issues and developed solutions to

address them.

Phase III, Implementation: Still to be completed, this phase will include support for assisting

in the execution and tracking of approved recommendations.

Phase I: Data Gathering and Analysis

The FA1 team gathered an extensive amount of data to come up with the key focus areas

and recommendations articulated in this report. Quick wins were also identified and

communicated to senior leadership throughout this effort. These were opportunities

believed to be able to provide initial positive results within one year. In all, data was

gathered through seven means: 1) Review of historical meta-data; 2) An Air Force online

survey; 3) Peer-to-peer interviews, 4) Senior leader interviews, 5) Small focus groups, 6)

Large, collaborative focus groups, and 7) Crowdsourced Airmen inputs. A description of

each method follows.

Meta-data: The FA1 team first conducted extensive analysis of historical meta-data. This

included analyzing surveys and other relevant metrics and information.

Surveys Other Metrics/Information

Air Force Exit Surveys AMJAMS Data

Air Force Retention Surveys Classified Readiness Data

Squadron DEOCS Surveys Demographics

Unit Climate Assessments

Unit Effectiveness Inspections (UEIs)

Operations Metrics

Personnel Accessions Data

Personnel Retention Data

Quality Force Indicators

Sustainment Metrics


The team used these surveys and metrics to determine the initial list of issues that further

review should focus on. The meta-data identified 27 areas for analysis, 18 of which the team

decided to further explore. These focus areas were categorized according to the

Commander’s Inspection Program typology:

Executing the Mission,

Improving the Unit,

Leading People, and

Managing Resources.

Online Air Force Survey: Next, the FA1 team launched an Air Force online survey designed

to further explore the 18 focus areas identified in the meta-data analysis. The team sent the

survey to 79,300 Total Force Airmen. There were 14,652 respondents and the survey had an

18.48% response rate. The survey included both military and civilian participants and

encompassed Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard personnel. It was sent proportionately to

Total Force Ranks and Grades, and was weighted to ensure all current and former

commanders received it. The survey results narrowed the team’s focus to the following

topics:

Squadron Culture,

Manning,

Resources,

Core Mission Focus,

Squadron Leadership Effectiveness, Team Preparation and Support,

Favoritism,

Higher Headquarters Support and Communication,

High Operations Tempo at Home Stations, and

Big Opportunities (Top priorities for change).

Interviews: The FA1 team then generated specific interview questions for each of the

categories listed above and conducted field visits. The teams tailored the questions to

audiences at Base-level, including Airmen, NCOs, SNCOs, CGOs, FGOs, Civilians,

Squadron Commanders, Squadron Superintendents, First Sergeants, Group Commanders,

and Wing Commanders. They also tailored questions to Major Command, Numbered Air

Force, and Center Headquarters, including Senior Leaders, A-Staff Directors, Division

Chiefs, Branch Chiefs and Graduated Squadron Commanders, and Staff CMSgts.


Interview teams comprised Total Force Airmen from the Air Staff and all Major

Commands, including Reserve and Guard personnel, plus consultants from ELG, RAND,

and BAH. In all, 45 interviewers plus the project core team interviewed 3,886 participants at

25 bases.


The bases visited included:

ACC (JB Langley-Eustis)

AETC (JB San Antonio: Fort Sam Houston, Lackland AFB, Randolph AFB, Sheppard AFB)

AFCENT (Shaw AFB, Al Udeid AB)

AFDW (JB Andrews)

AFGSC (Barksdale AFB, F.E. Warren AFB)

AFMC (Wright Patterson AFB, Tinker AFB)

AFRC (Warner Robbins AFB, Fort Worth ARB,)

AFSOC (Hurlburt Field)

AFSPC (Peterson AFB, Buckley AFB, Schriever AFB)

AMC (Scott AFB, Travis AFB)

ANGB (JB Andrews, Cheyenne ANGB, Greely ANGB, Portland ANGB)

PACAF (JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Osan AB)

USAFA (USAF Academy)

USAFE (Ramstein AB, RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall)


The following chart illustrates a typical week-long data-gathering schedule:

The traveling team gathered inputs through interviews and focus groups:

Peer-to-peer interviews: Interview teams conducted peer-to-peer interviews at all Major

Command Headquarters, at Numbered Air Force and Center Headquarters when co-

located on a Major Command Headquarters Base, and at a sampling of Air Force Bases,

with operational Bases nominated by each Major Command. Peer-to-peer interviews

involved one-on-one discussions where the interviewer’s rank matched that of the

interviewee (so, they truly were “peer-to-peer”). The Core Team and an additional select

group of Airmen of all ranks, both enlisted and civilian, conducted these discussions.

Senior Leader interviews: In addition to peer-to-peer interviews, researchers from RAND

assisted with interview protocol and conducted semi-structured interviews with Senior

Leaders at MAJCOM, NAF, Center, and Air National Guard headquarters. RAND

interviewed 82 senior leaders in total: 66 military from the 0-6 to 0-9 level, and 16 civilians.

Small Focus Group Sessions: Members of the traveling team conducted small group sessions

with Airmen of all ranks, both enlisted and civilian. Small focus group sessions were

conducted in a “one to many” interview session format in which groups of four to six

Airmen of similar rank answered questions that fell within their experience and rank level.

Large, Collaborative Focus Groups: ELG designed and facilitated 12 large focus group sessions

at 12 bases, including: Andrews AFB, Sheppard AFB, Randolph AFB, Hurlburt Field,

Oregon ANG, Tinker AFB, Wright-Patterson AFB, Buckley AFB, Peterson AFB, Hickam

AFB, Langley AFB, and Barksdale AFB. Members ranged in age and experience levels, from

Airmen to Colonels, from civilians to active duty, and from reservists to guardsmen. These

events were structured to ensure anonymous inputs using silent brainstorming techniques

and then collaborative solution development within small, diverse teams. Participants were

selected to ensure a good representation of the force below senior leadership levels.


ELG and BAH also conducted evening focus group sessions predominantly designed to

address spouse and family issues and how these could help to revitalize squadrons.

Crowdsourced Airmen Inputs: Since field visits couldn’t reach every Airman, the FA1 team

established a macro-level Air Force web-based ideation and crowdsourcing tool (milSuite).

This provided an avenue for Total Force Airmen across the Air Force to participate in

generating ideas and solutions relevant to revitalizing Air Force squadrons. The

crowdsourcing platform facilitated the solicitation of ideas, feedback, and solutions on

specified challenges and topic areas.35

Phase II: Solution Development

From the meta-data analysis, online survey, field visits, and crowdsourcing tool, the FA1

team generated a list of key issues to focus on, then hypothesized systemic causes, and

identified recommendations for this final report. To do this, the team assembled several

diverse working groups to address key issues such as:

Airman and Family Resilience,

Airmen Development,

Leadership Effectiveness,

Morale and Esprit de Corps,

Manning and Squadron Structure,

Performance Management,

Inspections/Measurement, and

Roles, Responsibilities, and Goals.

The working groups included SMEs and advisors, representative Airmen from the

interview teams, and other personnel who had assisted with data gathering and interviews.

Phase III: Implementation

The team took the findings and observations, along with the recommendations from the

working groups, and developed the final set of recommendations represented in this

report. The Implementation Phase begins in earnest when the CSAF approves specific

recommendations for implementation. Some members of the core team will remain in place

to assist with implementation and progress tracking.

35 The Revitalizing the Squadron milSuite crowdsourcing site:

https://www.milsuite.mil/revitalize



Summaries from Each Data Source Meta-data Analysis Summary

Introduction

This report discusses the results of the original meta-data analysis conducted by the Core

Team. The team summarized and analyzed the following surveys: Air Force Exit surveys,

Air Force Retention surveys, Squadron Defense Equal Opportunity Climate (DEOCS)

surveys, and Unit Climate Assessments. The team also summarized and analyzed the

following related metrics and information: Automated Military Justice Analysis and

Management System (AMJAMS) data, Classified Readiness data, Air Force Demographics,

Inspector General (IG) Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) results, Operations metrics,

Personnel Accessions data, Personnel Retention data, Quality Force Indicators, and

Sustainment metrics. The team synthesized quantitative and qualitative findings to reveal

significant focus areas validated across the surveys and metrics. The team discerned areas

of follow-on action concentration based on the meta-data analysis, and vetted them for

implementation of further exploration tools (Surveys and Field Visit Interviews) most

appropriate for further focus area exploration and solution acquisition. Categorization of

the meta-data followed the Commander’s Inspection Program typology: Executing the

Mission, Improving the Unit, Leading People, and Managing Resources. In addition, the

team compiled Benchmarks and Best Practices from the data. Finally, to reveal priorities, the

team mined the data for “Top Suggestions” in support of Squadron revitalization. This

executive summary highlights the main topics the team observed at a rate of approximately

25% or greater across the meta-data sources. The main themes within each topic (in bold)

reflect up to the top five issue areas by percentage, rank ordered.

Executing the Mission:

Bad organizational processes limiting

organizational effectiveness

Intentional violations (Tied)

Leadership involvement insufficient

(Tied)

Training guidance inadequate (Tied)

The data suggested further efforts should focus on: greater focus on the core mission;

higher headquarters guidance, communication, and support; training support; and

unnecessary barriers to success.

“Better train and equip Airmen at

Technical Training to increase

their capabilities.”


Improving the Unit:

Lack of help-seeking behaviors is limiting

organizational effectiveness (Tied)

Unreasonable ancillary training and

additional duties (Tied)

Poor diversity management is limiting

organizational effectiveness

Biased awards practices and not enough recognition

The data suggested further efforts should focus on: Disseminating Best Practices;

implementing innovative policies and practices; right-sizing the number of squadrons;

squadron organizational structure changes; and squadron size changes.

Leading People:

Leadership involvement insufficient

Barriers to reporting discrimination and

harassment

Dissatisfied with discrimination and

harassment resolution

Leadership favoritism in personal

relationships

Leadership guidance inadequate

The data suggested further efforts should focus on: Airmen development; discrimination

and harassment; favoritism; leadership decision making and judgement; leadership

guidance and communication; leadership involvement; squadron leadership team

preparation and support; and squadron guidance and communication.

Managing Resources:

Deployments increasing duty hours,

stress, and workload at home-station

Squadron guidance inadequate

Manning inadequate

Resources inadequate

Time inadequate

The data suggested further efforts should focus on: high deployment and ops tempo;

manning support; resource (funding) support; and squadron guidance and communication.

“Balance Manpower with

mission requirements; do less

with less (mission and quality of

life are suffering).”

“Overhaul civilian hiring and

firing processes; make them more

efficient, flexible, transparent,

and fair.”

“Reduce ancillary training and

currency requirements.”


Benchmarks and Best Practices:

From the meta-data analysis, the team also identified Benchmarks and Best Practices and

assessed them for their squadron revitalization potential.


Top Suggestions:

From the meta-data analysis, the team also mined the data for “Top Suggestions” in

support of squadron revitalization. The “Top Suggestions” observed, rank ordered by

percentage, include:

Increase manning to fill at required levels

Better train and equip Airmen at Technical Training to increase their capabilities

Balance manpower with mission requirements

Assess manpower before implementing new programs

Overhaul civilian hiring and firing processes

Thoroughly vet changes before implementing new programs

Protect benefits from reductions and improve base services availability and quality

Increase pay to match inflation and increase Basic Allowance for Housing to match reality

Address pay and benefits gap between Active Duty/Guard/Reserve

Improve budget and funds allocation rules, processes, and guidance

Reduce number of Computer Based Trainings to allow for more hands-on AFSC-

specific training

Reduce taskings and requirements to match reduced manpower

Reduce ancillary training and currency requirements

Overhaul the Physical Fitness Assessment

More performance focus in the evaluations system


Major Issue Areas:

From the meta-data analysis, the team identified 27 major issue areas for further

exploration. The team deemed 18 of the identified issue areas as significant and eventually

designated those issues as needing further fidelity and examination via an Air Force

survey.


Online Survey Summary

Introduction

This report discusses the results of the Air Force Survey, and associated analysis, conducted

by the Core Team. The team launched a targeted Air Force on-line survey designed to

further explore the significant focus areas identified during the meta-data analysis. The

team based the survey questions on the 18 most significant focus areas derived from the

meta-data analysis. The team sent the survey to 79,300 Total Force Airmen: Military and

Civilian; Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard; sent proportionately to demographics of Total

Force Ranks and Grades; weighted population to ensure all current and former

Commanders received. A total of 14,652 respondents completed all or some of questions,

for an 18.48% response rate. This executive summary highlights the main topics the team

observed from the survey responses. The main themes within each topic (in bold) reflect

the top three issue areas by percentage, rank ordered.

All respondents answered the first six questions, which primarily focused on squadron

culture.

What makes a Squadron great?

Mission focus

Good leadership

Team cohesion

Respondents indicated a clear vision with common goals and objectives, leaders who are

passionate about the mission and compassionate about their Airmen, and a sense of

camaraderie, belonging, and togetherness makes a squadron great.

What is the best thing about your squadron?

Team cohesion

Dedicated co-workers

Commitment to the mission

Respondents indicated Airmen want to work as a team, as a family, and have a sense of

belonging, a strong sense of squadron identity, and a sense of connection. Airmen want

teammates that are passionate, supportive, resilient, and valued. Finally, Airmen want a

clear mission with a deep sense of job satisfaction.

“Team cohesion, camaraderie,

and morale are the keys to what

makes a Squadron great.”

“Passionate, supportive, resilient,

and valued co-workers.”


What is the one thing your squadron can do better?

Better leaders

Better communication

Better use of time

Respondents indicated: leaders (Commanders as

well as NCOs) need to be more caring; lead by

example, minimize micromanaging, and push

authorities to the lowest levels. Airmen want more information sharing (Airmen to

Commanders, Commanders to Airmen, and higher level Commanders to Squadron

Commanders) and accountability. Airmen also want a shift in focus onto continuity

(documentation for turn-over, longer tenure in positions, and military-to-civilian

conversions), to deploy as a unit, support for spouses/families and work-life balance,

accountability for under-performing, mentorship, and reconstitution of the Commander’s

Support Staff (CSS).

What is the one thing you would change about squadrons with the widest / most

significant positive impact?

Trust leadership

Mission focus

Manning

Respondents indicated: empower Commanders

to lead by giving them the necessary authorities;

Higher Headquarters’ micromanagement limits field leaders’ effectiveness; focus on

effectiveness over efficiency; right-size squadrons (200-350 personnel) to consolidate

resources with a manageable span-of-control; and fill personnel to requirements.

What Best Practice would you identify for

dissemination?

Leadership

Training

Mission focus

Respondents indicated: build squadron relationships via Commander approachability and

visibility; develop mentorship tools to mentor junior Airmen and Officers; training should

be via small interactive sessions or entertaining briefings in large groups; reducing

administrative burdens and reconstituting the CSS positively impacts how much time the

squadron can spend on building relationships; deploy as a squadron.

“Core mission focus is the key,

enabled by good

communication.”

“Reduce bureaucracy and

prioritize limited time and

resources.”

“We need to do a better job of

selecting, preparing,

empowering, mentoring, and

supporting leaders.”


What barriers hinder your squadron’s ability to achieve mission success?

Leadership

Manning

Additional Duties

Respondents suggested: eliminate Groups;

Squadron Commanders should come from the

Functional area of that squadron’s mission; the

Air Force needs better leadership selection from

NCOs to Commanders.; reduce bureaucratic layers and processes, and legacy Air Force

Instructions (AFI); information technology systems need stability and effectiveness; reduce

additional duties; establish a timely and stable budget execution cycle; Airmen want better

communication.

The responses to the first six questions clearly indicated that squadron culture is a

significant driver of both squadron success and failure. Team cohesion, camaraderie, and

morale are the keys to what makes a squadron great. Communication is either a force

multiplier or a major barrier to success. Squadron leadership is a center of gravity –

selecting, preparing, empowering, mentoring, and supporting squadron leaders at all

levels. Mission focus is a key. Reducing bureaucracy (both organizational and process) and

prioritization of limited time and resources are all important. Improving Manning is also

about reducing non-core mission responsibilities and/or realigning organizational

structures based on current Manning/resource realities – not just adding more people

(other than the CSS).

“Reduce non-core mission

responsibilities and prioritize

work based on current Manning

and resource realities.”


Major Issue Areas:

For the remaining questions, the survey asked respondents to pick their 5 most significant

from 18 focus areas derived from the meta-data analysis: Please choose five (5) of the following

issue areas as most significant, that if addressed, would provide the biggest return on investment for

the effort to revitalize squadrons and ensure their success.

The survey then asked respondents to provide comments on the five focus areas chosen.

The survey also offered the opportunity for respondents to answer questions from

additional focus areas. The analysis of those comments allowed the FA1 team to rank order

the most significant issues that Airmen in the Field wanted revitalized for squadron

success.

Of the 18 focus areas on the Air Force survey, one, squadron Culture, came out of the

responses to the first six questions. Eight other focus areas were in the top five of at least

one demographic category from the survey respondents (listed in weighted order of

significance):

Manning

Resources

Core mission focus

Squadron leadership team preparation and support

Squadron leadership effectiveness

Higher Headquarters support and communication

High Operations tempo at home-station

Favoritism


Focus areas of Air Force-wide significance include: Manning support solutions; resource

(funding/equipment) support solutions; greater focus on the core mission; implementing

better policies, procedures, and practices; squadron leadership team preparation and

support; and squadron leadership decision making, judgement, and involvement.

Additional focus areas of significance include: Favoritism (AMN, NCO, CIV); Higher

Headquarters support and communication (SQ/CC; FGO; HHQ Staff); high Operations

tempo at home-station (GO, CGO); impact of deployments on home-station (GO); and

Training support (CIV).

The team found a remarkable consistency of major themes across MAJCOMs and Bases,

with few focus area outliers: Training support (AFRC, ANG, JB Andrews, JB Pearl Harbor-

Hickam, Travis AFB); deployment impacts on home-station (ACC; AFCENT; USAFE; Shaw

AFB); high Operations tempo at home-station (JB Langley-Eustis, RAF Lakenheath); and

Favoritism (Tinker AFB).

Squadron leadership team preparation and support concerns leadership at all levels.

Squadron leadership decision making, judgement, and involvement concerns General

Officers, Enlisted, and Civilians. Favoritism is an issue of concern among Junior Enlisted

and Civilians. Higher Headquarters support and guidance concerns Commanders and

Field Grade Officers. Home-station Operations tempo concerns General Officers and

Company Grade Officers. The impact of deployments on home-station concerns General

Officers as well. Finally, training support is an issue of concern among Civilians.


The analysis of the survey results thus identified nine major issue areas for further

exploration and examination. Assessment teams generated interview questions from these

nine focus areas for further exploration during the Field visit interview portion of the data

gathering effort of the project.


Large Group Sessions Summary

Introduction

In support of General Goldfein’s Focus Area 1, Revitalizing Squadrons, Executive

Leadership Group (ELG) conducted 12 large focus group sessions at 12 bases over the

course of 3 months.36 The purpose of these sessions was to gather ideas from a large

population and diverse demographic in a structured setting. Participants ranged in age and

experience levels, from Airmen to Colonels, from civilians to active duty, and from

reservists to guardsmen. Altogether, 983 total participants provided roughly 13,000 inputs

on key topics. Group innovation techniques were employed that encouraged individual,

anonymous brainstorming, as well as “wisdom of the crowd” sorting and weighting of

ideas.

This overview describes ELG’s findings from these large group events, including a

quantitative analysis of common themes across the bases, a sampling of the top-voted best

ideas and quick wins, several key recommendations, and a brief analysis of the top issue

areas participants viewed as most important to the revitalization effort.37

Approach

The ELG team tailored each session to focus on seven areas which were determined by

previous surveys across the Air Force and represent many of the same topics that were

explored in one-on-one interviews and small focus groups.38 ELG also added an “other”

category for ideas not easily binned by the seven categories.

The Eight Focus Areas: Squadron Culture; Manning; Resources; Core Mission Focus;

Squadron Leadership Team Preparation and Support; Squadron Leadership Effectiveness;

High Operations Tempo at Home Station; and Other. Each focus area was further divided

into two questions:39

Question 1: What’s one thing that gets done right here (at your base or squadron) or

elsewhere that the rest of the Air Force could learn from?

Question 2: If you were given a magic wand and could change only one thing related to

this focus area to help revitalize squadrons, what would it be?

36 The 12 bases visited were Andrews AFB, Sheppard AFB, Randolph AFB, Hurlburt Field, Oregon

ANG, Tinker AFB, Wright-Patterson AFB, Buckley AFB, Peterson AFB, Hickam AFB, Langley AFB,

and Barksdale AFB. 37 Executive Leadership Group, Revitalizing the Squadron, Summary Report: Large Group Sessions,

August 25, 2017. All page numbers cited are from this report. 38 For summaries of the findings from interviews and small focus groups, see Appendix Peer-to-Peer

and Focus Group Interviews Summary. 39 Two bases (Oregon ANG and Buckley AFB) had fewer participants and were only asked to

respond to the second question described above – the “magic wand” question.


THE “ULTIMATE MAGIC WAND” QUESTION: Finally, ELG added an “Ultimate Magic

Wand” question at four of the 12 bases, because time allowed. Participants were asked, “If

you had a magic wand and could change only one thing –anything—to help revitalize

squadrons, what would it be?”40

Process for Large Group Sessions:41 At each base, all participants were asked to provide

their answer to Questions 1 and 2 for the focus areas by posting one sticky note to a wall

chart representing each question for each focus area. The group was then organized into 16

small teams consisting of 4 to 8 people. Each team organized its sticky notes into similar

groupings of ideas. Teams summarized the ideas in each grouping and then determined a

descriptive heading. These headings are the basis for the analysis in this report. Then, teams

voted on the headings they thought were the best ideas (i.e., highest impact for squadrons)

as well as the ideas they thought made the best candidates for quick wins (i.e., could be

implemented and deliver positive results within one year). Teams then developed

recommendations, which a representative from each team briefed to the larger group.

Most Common Themes Across All Bases and Focus Areas

40 The four bases where the “Ultimate Magic Wand” question was asked are: Oregon ANG, Hickam

AFB, Langley AFB, and Barksdale AFB. 41 For a detailed description of the process, see pp. 2-3.

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Promotions based on job accomplishment, not manufactured…

Allow down days to decompress

Promote and listen to feedback - institute an open-door policy

Bring back CSS's and secretaries

Clearly communicate the squadron core mission

Remove Irrelevant Training from Training Requirements (CBTs…

Mentoring for mission success

More professional development training/formal educational opportunities

Reward and Recognize Airmen for High Performance

Rightsize workload to match manning (no "do more with less")

Delegate decisions to the right level

Get out from behind the desk and get to know your people

Frequent squadron morale events (during and after the duty day)

Pick the most qualified person for a position (merit-based, not rank or…

Open lines of communication and exchange of ideas at all levels

Top 15 Most Common Themes Across All Bases and Focus Areas


ELG then identified the top 15 most common themes across all bases, calculated by the

number of times each theme appeared (as a descriptive heading) at each base under each

focus area.42 The chart below provides an overview of these top themes:

Top Themes by Focus Area

ELG also looked at the top themes in each topic/focus area, ranked by the number of bases

at which each theme appeared. This provides a sense of which themes are most prevalent

across ALL bases. For this summary, we present the top three themes, in order of

frequency.43

Squadron Culture: 1) Allow squadrons to

express and celebrate unit identity; 2) Frequent

squadron morale events (during and after the

duty day); and 3) Open lines of communication

and exchange of ideas at all levels. Participants

desire more camaraderie and cohesion: “In my squadron, different shops are separated by

buildings. Every day I see people I've never met before. How am I supposed to have

camaraderie with these people if I've never met them?” Another participant stated, “Create

a culture to begin with. The only reminder I have that I'm in the AF is my uniform.”

Manning: 1) Right-size workload to match manning; 2) Bring back CSS's; and 3) Focus on

skills and training for the current job. One person

suggested, “Conduct a manpower study related

to current taskings, then use to re-evaluate task

load and manning hours to accommodate

(currently they don’t match).” Another

participant noted that “Selecting the right people

for the job [is important]. No office should be a

dumping ground for bad/broken airmen.”

Resources: 1) Upgrade and modernize computers and software; 2) Units fund frequent and

relevant training for personnel; and 3) End "use or lose" and bad end-of-year spending

practices. Focus group members emphasized the need for better IT support and equipment:

“I'd rather give up training resources and gain better IT support, better servers, more IT

personnel, printers that actually work, etc. Without computers working, no one is

working.”

Core Mission Focus: 1) Remove irrelevant training from training requirements; 2) Clearly

communicate the core mission; and 3) Delegate decisions to the right level. One person

opined, “The good idea fairy visits often and gives us new mission/requirements. I wish the

42 Pp. 4-6. 43 Pp. 6-9 detail the top 5 themes by focus area with additional notable quotes.

“Create a culture to begin with.

The only reminder I have that I'm

in the AF is my uniform.”

“Selecting the right people for the

job [is important]. No office

should be a dumping ground for

bad/broken airmen.”


AF would develop a companion ‘manning fairy’

to follow the good idea fairy around and give

man power to each new requirement.”

Squadron Leadership Preparation and Support:

1) More professional development and formal

educational opportunities; 2) Change how we vet

leaders; and 3) Pick the most qualified person for

a position (merit-based, not rank or time in grade). One person suggested, “Provide

training for squadron mid-level leadership,

especially for officers; it may have been a long

time since they received training…” Another

participant observed, “In addition to picking [a]

Squadron Commander who checks boxes, there

should be a common-sense test, i.e., is he or she a

bro, or robot that cares more about making rank

than their people?”

Squadron Leadership Effectiveness: 1) Get out from behind the desk and get to know your

people; 2) Conduct frequent squadron morale events; and 3) Open lines of communication

and exchange of ideas at all levels. Participants observed, “A leader that can get "down and

dirty" with their crew usually is well respected and has a team with high morale.” And,

“Our Commander, although in another building, still does a great job of showing face. This

is how relationships are built and communication flows easier.”

High Ops Tempo at Home Station: 1) Right-size workload to match manning; 2) Empower

squadrons to assess manpower requirements to meet ops tempo; and 3) Develop creative

alternative schedules to accommodate missions and personnel. Participants emphasized the

strain of high ops tempo: “We are all like boxers.

When the fight gets serious in the first 5 rounds

we are all at the top of our game, by the 12th

round we are smoked. Best ops tempo has been

hard and fast but for 120 days or less.” Another

participant noted, “Allow squadron to set their

own priorities and stop higher leadership

influence to drop everything to accommodate.”

“…I wish the AF would develop

a companion ‘manning fairy’ to

follow the good idea fairy around

and give man power to each new

requirement.”

“In addition to picking [a]

Squadron Commander who

checks boxes, there should be a

common-sense test...”

“Allow squadron to set their own

priorities and stop higher

leadership influence to drop

everything to accommodate.”


Other: 1) Provide effective family support programs; 2) Improve connection between

spouses/families and unit; and 3) Revamp fitness requirements. One participant stated that

the AF should “Bring back the old family culture.

Everyone is so focused on the mission, we forget

to check up on each other” Another said, “Make

the AF something to be excited about instead of a

prison sentence. Let there be a light at the end of

the tunnel.”

Best Ideas and Quick Wins

Teams at each base voted on which descriptive headings they thought were the best idea

and best candidate for a quick win. We present the top 5 below.44

Top 5 Best Ideas

(based on total # 1st place votes)

Top 5 Quick Wins

(based on total # 1st place votes)

1. Reduce additional duty workload on

personnel/focus on primary duties

2. Open lines of communication and

exchange of ideas at all levels

3. Pick the most qualified person for a

position (merit-based, not rank or time in

grade)

4. (Leaders) Get out from behind the desk

and get to know your people

5. Accountable and empowered squadron

leaders

1. Reduce additional duty workload on

personnel/focus on primary duties

2. Frequent squadron morale events (during

and after the duty day)

3. More professional development

training/formal educational opportunities

4. Remove irrelevant training from training

requirements (CBTs included)/consolidate

training

5. (Leaders) Get out from behind the desk

and get to know your people

Top Recommendations for Implementation

Each team then developed recommendations for implementing either the best idea or quick

win. Below are the top 3 most common recommendations (best idea and quick win

combined) and some featured implementation ideas. Where possible, we have included

comments citing specific best practices (what gets done right) and where.45

Recommendation 1: Reduce additional duty workload on personnel/focus on primary

duties

44 Pg. 10. 45 See pp. 11-15 for the full description of recommendations and additional supporting quotes.

“Bring back the old family

culture. Everyone is so focused

on the mission, we forget to

check up on each other”


Give squadrons the authority to prioritize between mission requirements and secondary

requirements when manning cannot support both simultaneously. Do this by removing the

Wing-level metric-driven pressures from Commanders.

Recommendation 2: Conduct frequent squadron morale events (during and after the

duty day)

This includes scheduling time during the duty day for fun/morale activities e.g., “Aloha”

days, a full duty day doing fun activities everyone can take part in like going to the beach,

BBQs/picnics, hikes, and sports. Empower Squadron Commanders to hold these events

during slow days and empower the flights to schedule the events and take ownership.

Ensure full participation with the squadron—military, civilian, and contractor alike.

Recommendation 3: More professional development training/formal educational

opportunities

Empower and train leaders earlier in their career, exposing future leaders to challenges and

enabling the Air Force to better weed out non-leaders. Implement this through job-shadow

programs (increasing exposure to decision-making), realistic and scenario-based training,

and a formalized mentorship program.

“Shift actual duties from work sections to people who perform them, e.g.,

supply person takes care of all supply issues.”

“We are once a year going through programs with functional leads to see

what can be cut from training/work centers to streamline our processes

(36IS JBLE).”

“Because my unit works shift work, we have one day a month where both

shifts come in on duty and do PT together (and other things as well). We

then finish the day with a beer or another beverage to relax (Langley AFB,

36 IS).”

“Aloha Friday – Every Friday the Guard is allowed to wear ‘Aloha’ attire.

Our active counterparts practiced once so far. Total Force Integration (TFI)

partnership building.”


Develop leaders through increased shadowing opportunities. This will give squadrons

ready staff for one-deep positions, expose airmen and civilians to upper management

duties and responsibilities, and increase understanding of higher expectations. Implement

this by: assessing the current promotees; allowing “shadows” to attend relevant training;

establishing a curriculum/checklist for guided progress; frequent check-ins between

shadowed to ensure proficiency; and giving additional duty credit in official files.

“Ultimate Magic Wand” Question

The “Ultimate Magic Wand” Question was asked at four bases where extra time was

available. The question was, “if you had a magic wand and could change only one thing—

anything—to help revitalize squadrons, what would it be?” The chart below provides an

overview of their answers.46

46 Pp. 16-20 list all the Ultimate Magic Wand answers with notable quotes.

“As with CGO development, provide new or newly-selected SNCOs a

variety of leadership experiences to prep them for unit-level challenges

(JBPHH).”

“Provide more leadership training to first-time commanders. Possibly

institute a Squadron Commander ‘internship’ program.”

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Manning allocation

Bring back specific manning positions

Training frequency, effectiveness, and methods

Airmen development

Team building activities

Improve evaluation systems

Increase manning

Leadership training & development

Compensation

Evaluate/develop effective schedules

Creative down days/time

Change org structure and processes

Assess PT/fitness training

Change promotion system/process

Reduce CBTs

Top 15 Responses to Ultimate Magic Wand Question


The top three most frequent responses to this question include:

Manning allocation: Participants largely

focused on how squadrons hired, fired, paid,

and apportioned their existing staffs. This meant

increasing commander and supervisor

authorities and control, balancing between full-

time and part-time staffs, and augmenting with

Guard, Reserve, Civilian, and Contractors when

necessary: “Give the section supervisors the

ability to choose how many people they think they really need to be successful in their

AFSC. Per the workload. One size does not fit all. Keep the Airmen from being burned out

with adequate manpower.”

Bringing back specific manning positions: Generally, this meant bringing back

Commander’s Support Staff (CSS) and Warrant Officers (WO).

Training frequency, effectiveness, and methods: Increasing relevant hands-on training

(including in Professional Military Education

(PME), and changing the frequency for when

certain training is required. One participant

stated: “Reduce redundancies in training.

Example: we do information protection annually,

then require the same training when people in-process, and equipment custodians take

additional training that is 90% the same as what they receive annually.”

Conclusion (Critical Questions)

This report concludes by highlighting the broad themes that emerged across all bases and

were often captured in more than one focus area. These themes invite critical questions that

must be answered as part of the collective Core Team solution development effort. ELG’s

hypotheses about the causes of the challenges we heard about are reflected in the critical

questions below.47 The themes and examples of critical questions include:

Mission and purpose: Are desired mission outcomes clear and verifiable (measurable)?

How can we help Airmen understand their squadron’s purpose and the goals the squadron

must achieve to support a successful Air Force in the future?

Leadership readiness, development, and effectiveness: What should we be measuring to

ensure we select and retain the very best leaders? How can we better equip them with the

right skills to lead their people? What criteria should drive the empowerment of Squadron

47 Pp. 23-24.

“Reduce redundancies in

training….”

“Give the section supervisors the

ability to choose how many people

they think they really need to be

successful in their AFSC…One

size does not fit all...”


Commanders to ensure they have decision making authorities that are commensurate with

their accountabilities and the calculated risks we expect them to take?

Performance evaluations systems: Are we measuring and promoting based on the real

skills and attributes we want our Airmen to have or do we lean too heavily on things that

are easier to measure? Do existing evaluation systems provide adequate feedback for

continued improvement?

Manning: Do we have adequate support staff in place to enable squadrons to focus on their

mission? Do we have the right people in the right jobs (and, if not, why)? Which squadrons

don’t have enough total manning given their mission requirements (and are some in

greater need than others)?

Additional duties: Exactly which non-mission related and administrative tasks are creating

unnecessary barriers to mission achievement at the squadron level? Which ones are

inappropriately being tasked? Where are organizational roles and authorities (including

tasking authorities) unclear or misaligned?

Training and education: Is training and education for leaders and technicians delivering

the right content? Using the right delivery method? Offered at the right time and with the

right frequency? How are we measuring the effectiveness of current training?


Evening Events Summary

Introduction

From March 13th to June 8th, Executive Leadership Group (ELG) conducted seven focus

group evening sessions on spouse and family issues, and how these could be better

addressed to help revitalize squadrons. In total, we received 733 substantive responses

from 157 participants. This report summarizes of the overarching themes from these events,

ELG’s initial thoughts and “Quick Wins”, and answers to the “Ultimate Magic Wand”

Question, where participants at three bases were asked, “If you had a magic wand and

could change only one thing—anything—to help revitalize squadrons, what would it be?”

Overarching Themes48

The chart below highlights the top 9 themes that arose during the seven focus groups.

There was also a cross-cutting theme (General Awareness of Benefits) that became apparent

during each of these evening sessions. The themes are described below.

Deployment: Preparation and Support

Across all bases, we saw support for greater time between deployments. This included

comments advocating for more volunteers for deployments AND a more equitable

distribution of deployments (i.e., making sure everyone deploys). Spouses noted that they

want to be included in and better informed about the deployment prep process: “Integrate

spouses during the deployment cycle – take us seriously. We need information. We’re key

48 Executive Leadership Group, Revitalizing the Squadron: Summary Report on Family and Spouse Issues.

All page numbers cited are from this report. Pp. 1-4.

Figure 1 The top spouse and family-related themes across the evening events.

10

12

13

21

24

35

43

69

99

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Jobs & Volunteering

Health (mental + physical)

Time Management

Childcare

Key Spouse Program

Communication

Supporting & Involving Children

Events & Activities

Deployment

Top Themes (Frequency)


players.”49 Spouses also requested more information on resources they can use during

deployment, and more networking opportunities to mitigate the loneliness when their

family member deploys. Finally, members felt that reintegration when a member returns

from deployment requires too much administrative time.

Events & Activities: Involving the Spouses

Spouses and families want more opportunities to participate in squadron activities and

events, but don’t want to be “voluntold” to do it. In addition, many spouses have their own

careers or other daytime obligations and feel that squadrons should be more aware of the

impact on spouses and their time. Some want to see a change in the “culture of alcohol” at

these events, others want to go back to the good old days where everyone can connect over

beer. Finally, spouses mentioned the importance of finding the right balance of events that

include both single Airmen and childless spouses (in addition to families).

Supporting and Involving Children

Across bases, participants wanted to see more opportunities for children to get to know the

squadrons and other kids. The KUDOS program was recommended by Tinker participants

as a way for kids to understand how deployments work. Sheppard participants thought

older children could also be more involved in re-integration efforts. And, Barksdale

participants wanted to see more partnership between the Air Force and local schools to

support the children of deployed members.

Communication: More Involved Squadron Leaders

At all bases, spouses want to see more communication from squadron leadership during

deployment, specifically the commander or first sergeant. Several participants mentioned

that a commander at Sheppard AFB is using a group texting app (like GroupMe) to

communicate in real time, and this was viewed as a positive step.

Key Spouse Program

The Key Spouse Program is supposed to help improve communication between Squadron

Commanders and spouses/families – but many feel it’s not working. Spouses want to see

more consistency in how the Key Spouse Program functions. The participants at Buckley

AFB and Barksdale AFB suggested funding the Key Spouse position as a government or

contracted employee. Other participants suggested eliminating it outright or significantly

revising the program’s objectives and role of the Key Spouse. Above all else, spouses wish

to see accountability for the program’s effectiveness, both for the Key Spouse and the

Squadron Commander.

Childcare: The CDCs and Other Family Support Programs

Members and spouses want the base Childcare Development Centers (CDCs) open on

weekends and late nights. Participants at Hurlburt noted that a free childcare program had

been eliminated recently, which has impacted morale by sending a message that the Air

49 Pg. 9, Sheppard AFB.


Force doesn’t value those programs. Spouses at Barksdale AFB favored bringing back the

Give Parents a Break (GPAB) program, which has recently been suspended. They enjoyed

having periodic free childcare available for eligible families, but were concerned that the

program’s restrictive access (i.e., referral only) may hinder greater participation.

More Time: High Ops Tempo Issues

Some spouses noted that the impact of Airmen’s busy work schedules could be mitigated

with better scheduling transparency, which would afford spouses the ability to modify

family schedules accordingly. Spouses felt similarly about deployments and planning:

when families can look six months out and have a good idea of what to expect, they can

plan. Participants also advocated for block leave schedules, which would further enable

planning. Across all bases, participants wanted more time at home during slow periods.

Several participants suggested altered training schedules where members could set aside

time during the work day for training, rather than bringing it home with them.

Health: Mental and Physical Concerns

Participants discussed USSOCOM’s Preservation of the Force and Family Program

(POTFF), which provides mental health programs and other services to members and their

families to help reintegrate them upon return from deployment. Hurlburt participants

suggested that POTFF be implemented across all AF-squadrons and expanded to other

services. Participants at Barksdale AFB were concerned that mental health issues were so

stigmatized that members and their families feared seeking help. They want to see more

mental health programs available or, if already available, then better advertised.

Jobs and Volunteer Opportunities for Spouses

Spouses feel the system for getting hired on base is “rigged” and jobs only go to insiders.

Some spouses felt they weren’t given enough opportunity to grow their own careers

because of Airmen work schedules and deployments. Others wanted the Air Force to

recognize that spouse careers are as important as an Airmen’s. They felt the tempo of

deployments and TDYs “does not successfully foster an environment in which the non-

military spouse can successfully build their own work place relationships and create a

sense of dependability.”50 Many non-working spouses desired more volunteer

opportunities within the squadron: “Ask for spouse/family volunteers. Give us a chance to

be a volunteer force. Many spouses would be willing and have skills.”51

Cross-Cutting Theme: General Awareness of Benefits

ELG observed in each session that many spouses were hearing about several of the Air

Force’s programs and benefits for the first time. Participants at most bases noted that many

families/spouses may not be aware of all the benefits and programs available to them –

there is an information deficit. The Airman and Family Readiness Centers (located at ALL

Air Force Bases) are a source of information, however, many don’t know how to use them

50 Pg. 4. 51 Pg. 9, Sheppard AFB.


or know they exist. Barksdale participants indicated that Air Force and squadron websites

ought to be updated with more information.

Initial Thoughts and “Quick Wins”52

The Air Force is an armed service, not a social service, so why should it worry about

spouses and families? We think it’s because warriors who are not confident that their

families are taken care of will have a much harder time in the fight. Listening to spouses,

the overarching messages we heard from them were:

Keep me in the know and manage my expectations. No unnecessary surprises,

please.

Help me connect with others, and know that I’m not alone.

Show me that I’m respected and valued. Take me and my time seriously.

Below, we consider more specific themes that emerged and have identified areas with

“quick win” potential.

Activities for Spouses/Families

Members want more opportunities for their spouses and families to see what they do and

be a part of the squadron culture. Our suggestions for addressing this include:

Institute “demo days” during times of slower ops tempo, where spouses and

families (if able) can stop by the jobsite and see what members do.

Keep the working spouse in mind. Many spouses have day jobs and don’t want to

spend leave to come to a mandatory squadron event. A balance of events during

working and non-working hours is important.

Communicating About Deployment & Staying Connected During Deployment

Spouses and families of deployed Airmen want to stay connected to the squadron during

their deployments. Deployment is already an isolating experience, it can be even more so

when that experience is not shared. Quick wins might include:

Increased communication and engagement from the home squadron leadership. This

could include semi-frequent letters to the families of deployed airmen, keeping

them up to date on how the home squadron is doing.

Increased communication from the deployed Airman’s leadership. This could include

semi-frequent letters to the families of deployed airmen, keeping them up to date on

how the deployed squadron is doing.

Integrating the spouses and families into deployment preparation. This could

consist of briefing, networking opportunities, Commander Q&A, etc.

52 Pp. 5-7.


On-Base Childcare/Support

High Ops Tempo and long workdays require Airmen to work outside of the normal

Childcare Development Center (CDC) operating hours. This can cause further problems

when schedules aren’t known or shared in advance, and especially poses a problem for

single-parent Airmen or dual-military marriages when one spouse is deployed. The

following may help mitigate this issue:

Consistent or predictable squadron schedules. If members can plan for their

childcare, they can make alternative arrangements.

If the squadron has an active spouse club (and many do not), this can be a resource

for last-minute or unplanned childcare needs.

There are likely on- and off-base childcare options that are not being explored. It

may be worthwhile to keep an information repository for members should the need

arise.

Key Spouse Program and Spouse Clubs53

The Key Spouse Program received mixed reviews at every base. There are two main

criticisms with the program: 1) Because the Air Force does not officially have “spouse

clubs” (like the Navy and Army do), the program has unofficially expanded in scope and

Key Spouses are acting like de facto spouse club leaders. These ad hoc clubs can fill a void

(camaraderie and sense of belonging to a group), but the lack of structure can lead to

needless drama. 2) Squadron Commanders are not paying enough attention to the

program. Some are ignoring it entirely, while others “set it and forget it.” The good ones

take it seriously and use the Key Spouses as communicators. The following are suggestions

for bolstering the effectiveness of the program:

Include Key Spouse “training” as part of the PME curricula for Officers prior to

Squadron Command and for First Sergeants.

Institute a Family Readiness Group (FRG) to mirror the Navy and Army programs.

These are largely successful spouse/family clubs, and there already exist detailed

instructions on how to establish such groups.

With permission from the Airmen, include fiancées and partners in these

programs/groups. If members are single, consider including other family members

in informational updates and activities.

Frequent and sustained communication from the Commander and First Sergeant to

the spouses. This should be on at least a monthly basis via in-person information

meetings or email updates. This keeps squadron spouses “in the know” on activities

53 We believe there are some quick wins that can be achieved here. However, we believe this

program needs a “reset,” and in the full report we offer some suggestions for a process to update the

program.


and schedules, and provides them an opportunity to ask questions. In-person

meetings with the Commander should be held during non-duty hours to allow ALL

a chance to participate.

To truly modernize and revitalize the Key Spouse program requires a deeper dive. The Air Force should

consider establishing working sessions with key constituents to determine the appropriate

path forward for the program (or any proposed alternatives). The purpose of these sessions

would be to define the problems with the program, determine the root causes behind

program discrepancies across the Air Force, establish new goals for the program, and

determine how to achieve those goals. Key constituents will include a cross-section of

spouses from the Air Force.

“Ultimate Magic Wand” Responses54

At three bases, participants were asked, “If you had a magic wand and could change only

one thing—anything—to help revitalize squadrons, what would it be?” Their answers are

summarized below.55

Langley AFB: “Give time back to the airmen” by conducting career field analyses, increasing

the civilian workforce manning, and “reloading AFSC skill levels.” This will allow airmen

more time for PT, family, and relaxation/mental health breaks, leading to “healthier

squadrons with happier home lives.”

F.E. Warren AFB: Participants had three recommendations: 1) Increased communication

between squadrons and spouses/families (one idea was to build an AF Spouse Portal, like

the AF portal for dependents); 2) Create a sense of family/camaraderie between spouses;

and 3) Increase funding (for programs).

Barksdale AFB: The two most predominant themes were: 1) Mental health: de-stigmatizing

mental health concerns; and 2) Creating a sense of community among the spouses,

including more spouse volunteer opportunities and inclusion in AF events.

54 Pp. 21-22. 55 The three bases where the Ultimate Magic Wand question was asked were: Barksdale AFB, F.E.

Warren AFB, and Langley AFB.


Perceptions of Senior Leaders at Major Commands56

Introduction

This report discusses the results of RAND-conducted interviews with senior leaders at

Major Command (MAJCOM), NAF, Center, and Air National Guard headquarters. RAND

interviewed 82 senior leaders for this report: 66 military personnel from the 0-6 to 0-9 level,

and 16 civilians. Interview questions covered the following categories:57 squadron culture;

manning; resources; core mission focus; squadron leadership team preparation, support,

and effectiveness; high ops tempo at home station; higher headquarters support and

communications. To reveal priorities, interviewees were also given the opportunity to

express the one thing they’d most like to see changed overall in support of squadron

revitalization. This executive summary highlights the main topics in the order the questions

were asked and some of the solutions suggested by interviewees. The main themes within

each topic (in bold) reflect the perceptions of those interviewed, highlighting comments

made by the greatest number of interviewees.

Squadron Culture: Promoting cohesion, teamwork, morale, and squadron identity

Leadership involvement is critical to promoting squadron culture. The majority of

interviewees across the commands discussed this idea, stressing that the commander sets

the tone for the squadron. One senior leader stated, “When you talk about mission

accomplishment and teamwork, I think the commander has to set the priorities for his unit”

(AFMC).58

Social interactions (structured and unstructured) are important. Interviewees referenced

organized social events (morale duty events, community service, picnics, luncheons, and

physical training), and unstructured interactions (drinking beer together after work) as

important to promoting morale and cohesiveness.

Manning: Squadron structure, total force leveraging, additional/ancillary duties

Undermanning is a problem. A major theme in the interviews was the endemic

undermanning of the squadrons. Interviewees discussed the impacts of undermanning,

including more errors and inefficiencies from lack of trained personnel (particularly on

administrative tasks), less work/life balance, and greater pressure on airmen to perform

ancillary duties, taking them away from their mission focus.59

56 Miriam Matthews and John A. Ausink, Revitalizing Air Force Squadrons: Perceptions of Senior Leaders

at Major Commands, RAND Corporation, September 2017. All page numbers cited throughout this

Executive Summary are from this report. 57 Pg. 12 58 Pg. 15 59 Pg. 36


Squadrons need more support staff. When discussing structural changes, most

interviewees commented on the need for more administrative and support staff.

Interviewees noted that the lack of support staff meant that Airmen must take on

responsibilities they aren’t trained to do, leading to errors and inefficiency. Some supported

bringing back the Command Support Staff (CSS): “Creating a CSS and manning them with

the right skillset—that can eliminate pain points for our squadrons.” (AFMC)60

Squadrons can better leverage the force, particularly civilians. In the five commands that

were asked about force leveraging, a majority of interviewees perceived that squadrons

could do a better job leveraging the total force.

Some thought squadrons could better leverage

civilians: “I absolutely think civilians bring so

much to the fight. We lose a lot of continuity as

our Airmen move, so the civilians being more

constant works. They’re going to be your SMEs [subject matter experts].” (ANG)61

Ancillary (non-core) duties take away from the core mission. Several interviewees were

concerned about ancillary requirements that increasingly take away from the core mission.

These include additional training requirements, the officially designated additional duties

of the Air Force, and other pop up administrative tasks.62

Resources: Granting Squadron Commanders more control over resources

Interviewees cited four primary benefits to granting commanders control of resources.

First, funds would go where they are needed (particularly to lower levels). Most

interviewees thought this was the greatest benefit

to allowing commanders more control of

resources. Second, greater control allows

commanders to respond quickly to opportunities

or issues as they arise. Third, resourcing control

empowers commanders, and fourth, it would

promote better understanding of resourcing.63

One interviewee stated, “The benefits are giving

the Squadron Commander a sense of control and the ability to take actions that will

enhance their squadron and build some esprit [de corps].” (USAFE)64. Another said, “They

[commanders] can take advantage of emerging opportunities. They can have resources

60 Pg. 18 61 Pg. 52 62 Pg. 21 63 Pg. 23 64 Pg.54

“[With more control over

resources] They can take

advantage of emerging

opportunities . . . to go move

[and innovate].”

“I absolutely think civilians bring

so much to the fight…”


available to go move [and innovate], but only if they can have that latitude. Today,

commanders…have to go up their chain and ask.” (AFSPC)65

But, lower levels might not have the big picture or budgeting skills. Limitations cited

included lack of budgetary knowledge or lower levels not having the broader strategic

picture. This was chalked up to lack of experience or training earlier in a commanders’

career. An interviewee noted: “They don’t really get into understanding how do you

request your money, program for your money, until they get to a point where they are

sitting as a commander. And they don’t have a clue.” (AMC).66

Core Mission Focus: Ensuring mission focus, squadron success, delegation to

lowest levels

Maintaining mission focus requires defining the core mission (in terms everyone can

understand) and prioritizing critical vs. non-critical tasks. Many interviewees mentioned

these two themes when asked how to ensure that squadrons focus on their core mission.

One senior leader said, “Everyone assigned to a squadron…ought to be able to tell you

what their mission [is] and how they fit into it…that requires squadron leadership to be

able to do that…knowing what the mission is—is a big deal.” (ANG)67 Another interviewee

mentioned that a successful squadron is one where everyone understands and

accomplishes the mission: “Squadron success looks like mission success. The more you are

connected to the mission, the better you are.” (USAFE)68

Interviewees emphasized three themes when asked how to perpetuate a culture of

placing authorities at the lowest level: First, reward and support those who take

calculated risk; second, train commanders to make more informed decisions about taking

risk, and third, don’t punish those who make non-critical mistakes. Many of the discussions

focused on empowering and trusting commanders and allowing for mistakes: “We need to

empower and trust…don’t be a micro-manager…and give them responsibility. And you

should expect a few mistakes but no one has the time to make decisions for 500 people.”

(AFSOC)69

Squadron Leadership Team Preparation, Support, and Effectiveness: Selection of

leaders, training/education, and leadership effectiveness

Perceptions of the selection process were mixed. Interviewees felt the Development

Teams for selecting squadron leaders work well, commanders provide good feedback, and

there is use of both objective and subjective information. Concerns included insufficient 360

65 Pg. 23 66 Pg. 54 67 Pg. 56 68 Pg. 56 69 Pg. 25


evaluations: “We need more 360 feedback…we need to expand that down to the field grade

officer level, where we are looking at someone more holistically than what they look like on

the record.” (ACC)70 Insufficient job preparation prior to assuming command was also a

concern: “We need leadership requirements early on in a person’s career, and specific

assessments in how they did.”71

Provide commanders with more opportunities to lead earlier in their careers. One senior

leader stated, “The best Squadron Commanders had been in an organization where they

were given the ability to be in charge of a deployment or project or establishing a new

mission area…it’s about giving them more leadership opportunities at the lowest level

possible.” (USAFE)72 Exposure to a variety of posts was also cited as important (e.g., joint,

staff, or outside of one’s functional group.)73

Allow experience to learn from failure. This was a key theme throughout the interviews.

As one senior leader said, “Lead people and [let them] stub their own toes [and] work

through their mistakes.” (AFSOC)74 A corollary to this theme was the perception that a

“little mistake affects one’s career more than a big success.” 75 While interviewees had

different perspectives regarding the truth of this statement, many were concerned that

leaders don’t want to put themselves out there because they might make a mistake.

High Operations Tempo at Home Station: Rate of actions and missions, work/life

balance

Inadequate manning contributes to a higher ops tempo for mid-level leaders

(CGO’s/NCO’s). Interviewees who were asked about the high ops tempo of mid-level

leaders cited a lack of manning and

TDY/deployments as major reasons for this.

“…two things are happening. We don’t have the

right manning at the bases. We have very thin

officer manning at most bases. When the

Squadron Commander takes leave, the first

lieutenant takes over the squadron of 400

people…we’re developing a crisis management

leader, not a true leader.”76

70 Pg. 29 71 Pg. 29 72 Pg. 58 73 Pg. 60 74 Pg. 34 75 Pg. 60 76 Pg. 66

“…two things are happening. We

don’t have the right manning…

[and]

…we’re developing a crisis

management leader, not a true

leader.”


Adequate manning is key to maintaining work/life balance. Most interviewees further

emphasized the importance of ensuring adequate resourcing and manning to reduce the

burden on Airmen: “If you’re manned appropriately, you don’t have to work 12 hours a

day and six days a week.”77 Interviewees also said that Airmen model commander behavior

(in terms of time spent at work), and that commanders need to acknowledge that Airmen

are expected to work long hours.

Higher Headquarters Support and Communication: How it helps or hinders

squadrons

Headquarters helps squadrons with resource support and by removing bureaucratic

obstacles. One interviewee at headquarters noted, “Our job is to remove impediments or

consolidate them, or where they cannot be removed, make it easier to meet those

requirements that get you over the impediment.” (AFMC) 78

But, most interviewees discussed headquarters hindrances. Interviewees cited

headquarter difficulties in communicating with squadrons, with one person stating, “we

did not get timely information from the higher headquarters” (AETC). 79 Other issues

include headquarters sending down requirements without resources: “I think we hinder

them by creating calls that take them away from the mission. Those calls help me because I

have to answer to the four star, but that airman took six hours to prepare the task for

me…anything that takes an airman away from the mission isn’t good.” (USAFE)80 Tensions

between functional authorities and MAJCOMs were also a theme: “There is confusion

when the functional chains are tasking directly outside of the commander chain, the true

chain of command.” AFSPC81

New ideas are needed to streamline headquarters tasking. Interviewees discussed the

potential use of functional gatekeepers, allowing inspection prioritization by Squadron

Commanders, and instituting higher headquarters compliance to help streamline tasking

from headquarters and prevent overtasking. However, none of the proposed solutions

fostered widespread agreement expect inspection prioritization, which was generally

viewed positively.

If You Could Only Change One Thing . . .

Interviewees were asked: “If you had a magic wand and could change one thing to

revitalize the squadrons, what would it be? The top three answers, which the majority of

interviewees suggested, are listed below.

77 Pg. 63 78 Pg. 39 79 Pg. 40 80 Pg. 68 81 Pg. 40


Adequately resource and man the squadrons: These are the actions that most interviewees

thought would contribute to revitalizing the squadrons. One senior leader stated, “In my

opinion, you have to man the squadrons to accomplish the mission….We have

undermanned our squadrons for many years and paid the costs for that. I think if you fixed

manning and had it at 95%, morale would improve, and mission accomplishments would

be off the charts.” (USAFE). 82

Empower commanders: Or, let squadron leadership lead by giving them the tools and

allowing them to ask for help. As one interviewee succinctly stated, “Let them lead. Let

them take risks. Let them fail as long as they learn from the failure. Changing that culture

would go a long way…”83

Re-establish and resource the CSS: Along with fixing the undermanning problem in

general, interviewees also suggested bringing back the CSS and adding dedicated support

staff.

82 Pg. 75 83 Pg. 76

Senior Leader Interviews

The top nine themes from the Magic Wand question

Provide adequate resourcing and manning to squadrons

Empower commanders to lead and manage

Bring back and resource the CSS

Promote esprit de corps with squadrons

Change squadron structure

Reduce additional duties/ancillary training

Ensure a clear understanding of the mission

Deploy as squadrons

Reduce Air Force Instruction (AFI) compliance statements

Tied

Tied


Peer to Peer and Focus Group Interviews Summary

Introduction

This summary discusses the results of the Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) analysis of the peer

to peer and focus group interview data. A total of 1,418 interview sessions took place

between 2 February and 4 August 2017 at 10 MAJCOMs with volunteers of all ranks at the

officer, enlisted and civilian levels. In the 837 Peer to Peer Interview Sessions, interviewers

asked interviewees of the same rank questions in a one-to-one format. The 581 Focus Group

Interviews were conducted in a one-to-many format in which groups of up to ten Airmen

of similar rank answered questions at their own ability. Interview questions spanned the

following topic areas: Culture, Manning, Resources, Mission Focus, Squadron Leadership

Preparation/ Effectiveness, High Operations Tempo, Higher Headquarters Support,

Favoritism, Airmen’s Time, Talent, Compliance, Feedback, and Trust. In addition to the

listed topic areas, participants were asked to answer one question that fell within an

additional topic area called “Big Opportunities which would enable the interviewee to

prioritize one key piece of his/ her feedback. This executive summary highlights the top

mentioned themes across the entire population from AFDW-USAFE.

Improve Leadership Involvement/ Accessibility

Airmen across peer to peer and focus group interviews want involved and accessible

leadership who want to get to know them, mentor them, and provide individualized

attention and guidance. The data suggests that the commander sets the tone for the

organization and is the key person to drive the attitude of the unit. Prevalent sub-themes

found across both groups include scheduled and unscheduled face-to-face interaction,

mentorship and an open-door policy. Many talked about the desire to have a “real” open

door policy where they can meet in individual or small group discussions to provide and

receive feedback and to participate in mentorship. Airmen at all levels want to know their

leadership cares and they believe this comes from the leaders’ efforts to get to know them,

their goals, and interests. Overall, there are many ways leaders can motivate and get to

know their squadron, but the leaders need to make a deliberate effort to be more involved

and available.

Need More Manpower, Too Many Additional

Duties and Taskers

Feedback stressing the need for more manpower

and relief from additional duties were heavily

intertwined and speak to an imbalance between

what is being asked of squadrons and their

Airmen and the resources available to complete

those directives. Taken together, these are by far

“Massive amounts of additional

duties which have nothing to do

with combat capability/core

mission. These duties require

more time than the actual flying

mission requirements.”


the strongest and most consistent themes across all locations and interview types.

Responses overwhelmingly showed that interviewees feel that that there are too many

taskers assigned to the squadron and not enough people to complete them. These

additional duties divert attention away from Airmen’s mission objectives. Additionally, the

shortage of manning requires Airmen to consistently work excessively long hours,

negatively impacting work/life balance or family life. In most instances, the interviewee

was nonspecific in what areas the additional manpower was needed or which additional

duties were problematic. The interviews that do identify specific additional duties tend to

highlight general administrative tasks and the desire to bring the CSS back.

Others conveyed more specific frustration that they are nowhere near their allotted UMD

levels and that they don’t necessarily need manpower above and beyond that; they just

need what the current documents say they should have to get the job done. Even the

squadrons that are manned to their UMD levels report difficulties due to the way their

current manning is determined. Airmen gone on deployments, under MEB review, etc., are

unable to participate in completing the home mission, but still count against the levels

allowed in the UMD. Exacerbating this is the difficulty in maintaining continuity of these

positions with contract backfills due to lengthy hiring and clearance processes.

Interviews suggest that the lack of manpower combined with requirements (both mission

and additional) are stressing the squadrons and their members to their limits and that at

some point the “do less with more” mentality must change. In summary, these extra taskers

are not only creating issues at work due to the lack of manpower, but the negative effects

encroach on members’ personal lives which, in turn, affects their overall morale, esprit de

corps, and feelings of good will towards the AF.

Squadron Commander Need More Empowerment from HHQ

Among peer to peer and focus group interviewees, the idea of empowering Squadron

Commanders was a strong theme and is heavily tied to both risk aversion as well the

general empowerment of Airmen by pushing decision-making down to the lowest levels

possible. General empowerment was identified as a key component in building morale,

creativity, and innovation. Respondents cited two key areas in which they’d like to see

more Squadron Commander Empowerment from Headquarters. First, they want to have

greater autonomy regarding resource management and personnel decisions such as hiring,

firing, accountability/punishment, etc. Another strong empowerment theme centered

around tasking and training, more specifically the ability to say no to a given request from

above and decide what training their people do or do not need. This can be tied back to the

overwhelming feedback that there are far too many. Overall, many responses spoke of

empowerment in terms of the desire for more decision-making opportunities overall –

chances to learn from mistakes and develop through experience. The feedback received in

the peer to peer sessions correlates to the feedback from focus groups. Overall, respondents


agree on the fact that Squadron Commanders need more empowerment and trust in

making decisions on the ground.

Improve Leadership Development

A need to Improve Leadership Development proved to be a prominent theme across all

interview data from both groups. Sub-themes across these groups include

Leadership/Training/Development across all

levels, communication, and mentorship. As a

whole, the respondents expressed a need for the

Air Force to focus on developing leadership soft

skills such as effective communication, providing

feedback related to strengths and development

areas, and time management. Airmen have said

that leaders are often unprepared to take on the

leadership positions and that by promoting Officers quickly, we tend to place less

experienced leaders who lack the maturity to make decisions. Focus Groups shared a

similar sentiment stating that officers, enlisted and civilian do not receive much leadership

training early. Leadership development should be structured and occurring throughout all

Airmen’s growth and development in the Air Force. Current leaders need to not only

identify their rising leaders early on, but they also need to invest time and effort into them

through mentoring, training and professional development. If rising leaders have the right

mentors as they grow and develop in their careers, they gain hands-on experience across all

aspects of the organization and effortlessly transform into effective future leaders. Leaders

should be trained and well versed on setting clear expectations, ensuring the work-life

balance of their people, and allowing for mistakes/ providing mentorship in these

situations. Both groups expressed that Airmen are often put in position of leadership

without the right knowledge or experience to be good leaders.

Improve Training

How and when the squadrons are trained not only affects the individual’s time and

workload, but it also affects the mission. Key feedback provided in both the focus group

and peer to peer sessions surrounded training frequency, methods, audience, and the

tracking of these trainings. Many respondents felt that training is very important and that if

additional duties were decreased, more focus could be put on training. It was strongly

recommended that the number of trainings required should be reviewed as well as what

frequency certain trainings are required and for which groups. In addition to the training

frequency being reviewed, the methods and relevance of training should also be reviewed.

It was recommended that instead of self-driven or computer based trainings (CBTs), SMEs

should provide insight and facilitate trainings. The trainings that are required and

administered should be what is needed to succeed and carry out the mission as opposed to

“A duty title doesn’t denote that

you are a leader. Have to

recognize people’s strengths and

put them in the right job based

on that.”


an overreaction to isolated issues. Airmen are not opposed to training, but they want to

know that the trainings are related to their roles/ job specific and a beneficial use of their

time worth their time since it is taking them away from their daily responsibilities and

focus on the mission.

Team/ Morale Building Social Events

Overwhelmingly, the sentiment surrounding squadron events is that they are a positive

thing for team-building and morale, however the camaraderie is not what it used to be. The

problem is often there is little time to devote to these events. Events at the end of the day

are problematic because the number of hours’ people are working, they feel they need to go

be with their families or just unwind. Many mentioned they would like to see more events

during duty hours such as group PT. However, events during duty hours can present

problems. Some career fields have reported not being able to fully participate in events due

to the requirements of their job, such as seeing patients, and would prefer to be able to get

more involved in things like wingman days. Across the board, ‘mandatory fun’ was looked

down upon and although many said that even mandatory fun events can be beneficial to

promoting cohesion, teamwork, and camaraderie.

Culture too Risk-Averse/ Need to Allow for Failure for Learning Opportunities

A prominent theme within the focus group interviews was being a part of a culture that

was extremely risk-averse – not only at the

leadership level, but across all ranks. Many

acknowledged that failures are not celebrated or

rewarded and that, as a whole, they are

“governed by fear.” Currently, several Squadron

Commanders fear that they will be fired for

making a “bad” decision. Building risk-taking into the process of leadership development

is crucial to developing successful leaders for the future. Allowing for young officers and

enlisted to make mistakes and work through issues assists in shaping better leaders.

Commanders are not able to learn if they are not allowed to make mistakes. For example, if

a mistake ends someone’s career, other commanders are less open to taking risks – instead,

supporting them even if their decision is not going “correctly”, will teach them how to

recover from failure. Removing the “one-mistake” Air Force stigma and fear of negative

career repercussions will otherwise promote innovative leaders and a supportive culture.

Celebrating risk and holding those accountable will bring forth the ability to grow and

learn from it versus being punished encourages bold leadership.

Big Opportunities

In addition to the topic areas, participants are asked to answer one question that falls

within an additional topic area called “Big Opportunities.” Participants were asked “If you

“The AF is not good at risk

management, the AF is good at

risk avoidance.”


had a magic wand and could change only one thing to revitalize squadrons, what would it

be?” The purpose of this question is to present the interviewee with an opportunity to

prioritize one key piece of his/ her feedback. Below is a table of the top mentioned themes

found in the responses.

When participants were asked if they could change one thing, we heard many of the same

top themes as the responses in other questions. Overall, respondents want their Squadron

Commanders to be empowered, more manpower to help with the workload that is only

increased by too many additional duties and taskers and improved training. However, we

also heard a more specific request to bring back the CSS as well as varied topics which fit

into broad categories for Finance, Personnel, and Org Structure. More detail and analysis

on these specific topics can be found in the final BAH report.


Crowdsourcing Summary

Introduction

The FA1 Team created and implemented a web-based, crowdsourcing idea site, providing

Airmen another avenue to give input to and participate in generating ideas and solutions

for Revitalizing Air Force Squadrons. The site is an idea-development community that

resides on milSuite, a collection of online tools and applications used to deliver

collaborative methods to Department of Defense Communities. The idea platform was used

to solicit ideas, feedback, and solutions on specified topics, which were presented to users

in the form of challenges. Any user with an Air Force Common Access Card could submit

ideas.

The FA1 Team presented four different rounds of challenges, each consisting of five topics.

Each set of five challenges ran for about a month and included an idea open forum, which

provided users a means to submit relevant ideas not captured in the other challenges. For

each round of challenges, users were asked to submit ideas, provide comment on other

ideas, and vote for the best ideas. At the close of each challenge round, top ideas were

identified by scoring votes from users. Those top ideas were selected for review by the FA1

Team.

Users from a wide variety of backgrounds and ranks, from Senior Airman to Lieutenant

Colonel and Civilians, weighed in and gave the FA1 Team actionable feedback. Over the

course of five months (May to October 2017) the website received over 180,000 views with

Airmen submitting 966 ideas and placing over 29,000 votes to help identify top ideas.

The FA1 Team then conducted a review of ideas during the analysis and solution

development phase of this effort. Many of the ideas from the milSuite site were similar to

inputs the FA1 Team had received from the field. These were incorporated into the

recommended solutions developed in working groups with subject matter experts. Several

ideas were also taken up by the FA1 Team for immediate action. Two such ideas, from the

challenge topic of Squadron Identity and Heritage, were submitted by the FA1 Team to the

Air Force Uniform Board. The FA1 Team

recommended the Board consider unit patches

and switching from the Airmen Battle Uniform

(ABU) to the OEF Camouflage Pattern (OCP)

Uniform.




Summary of the Challenge Topics

Unit Identity and Heritage

Improving the Idea Site

Family Support

Core Mission Focus

HHQ Support to Squadrons

Centralized/Decentralized Squadron

Support

Job-Specific Training

Honest, Objective Feedback

Leadership Involvement

Work-Life Balance

Squadron-to-Spouse Communication

Higher Performing Teams

Improving Professional Military

Education

Performance Evaluations

Improving Processes

Mentorship

Idea Open Forum

Summary of the Top-Voted Ideas

CHALLENGES – ROUND 1

Challenge Topic Top-Voted Ideas

Unit Identity and

Heritage

- Adopt the OCP Uniform

- Squadron Patches on ABU

- Eliminate the Fitness Assessment Cell

Improving the Idea

Site

- Remove Names [from idea postings]

- Get the Word Out [about this site]

- Navigation [provide links back to main page]

Family Support

- Embedded Support [unit Chaplain, Family Consultants]

- Rebuild Base Communities

- Reinvigorate the MWR Program(s)

Core Mission Focus

- Root Cause: The AF Form 1206 and Awards [reduce weight ofvolunteering and development]

- Eliminate All SNCO Awards Programs

- Remove Self-Improvement/Community Involvement (Whole AirmanConcept) Section from EPRs

Idea Open Forum

- Beards. The men want them.

- Two Career Paths. [Managers and Technical Experts]

- Instant WAPS Score Results




HHQ Support to

Squadrons

- The Reason [HHQ Staff Taskings]

- Eliminate Extra Paperwork to Submit Awards/OPR/EPR

- Organize, Train, and Equip with as Few Intermediaries as Possible

Centralized/

Decentralized

Squadron Support

- Resource Advisor Duties [Need an Expert Should Not Be Done as an

Additional Duty]

- Decentralize a Portion of Civilian Hiring Process from AFPC Back to the

Base Civilian Personnel Office

- Orderly Rooms – CSF [Put Supporting Functions in a Commander

Support Flight]

Job-specific Training

- Eliminate Green Dot

- Commercial Best Practices Implementation

- Create a How-To Video Site for Maintenance Units or Similar Career

Fields

Honest, Objective

Feedback

- ACA – Eliminate the “Understands the Importance of” Fields from the

Form

- Create a 360 Degree Feedback System

- Leadership Reverse Feedback

Idea Open Forum

- Create a Warrant Officer Corps

- Bring Back THRMIS [Total Human Resources Management Information

System] or Open It’s Equivalent to Everyone in the Air Force

- Increase Awareness of This Forum



Leadership

Involvement

- Reduce Time Spent on EPRs/Decorations/Awards

- Categorized Enlisted Performance Report “No More Bullets”

- Stop Doing More with Less

Work-Life Balance

- Dissolve the Whole Airman Concept

- US Air Force Paternity Leave [Increase Days]

- Reduce Focus on Non-mission/Non-essential Business Practices

Squadron-to-Spouse

Communication

- Closed/Restricted Facebook Groups

- Return Onus of Communication to Member

Higher Performing

Teams

- Restore Trust/Leadership to the Middle Tier (E-5/E-6)

- Bring Back Warrant Officers

- Give Squadrons Civilian Hiring Authority

Idea Open Forum

- Modernize the Assignment System

- Close the Gap in the Pay Charts

- Standardize Air Force EPR/OPR Bullet Format and Abbreviation Lists




Improving

Professional

Military

Education

- Double Length of Computer-based Training Expiration at a Certain

Rank/Age/TIS

- Have "Air Command and Staff College" actually teach "Command" and "Staff"

functions or just delete it entirely and send people to JPME

- Integrate Real Experience/Scenarios/Problem Solving into PME

Performance

Evaluations

- Cut the Bullets

- Don’t Start Writing Until the Performance Period Ends

- Eliminate Bullets / Implement Narratives

Improving

Processes

- Move the Airman Powered by Innovation (API) site to milSuite and Allow

Voting

- Reduce Quarterly and Annual Awards

- vPC Decoration Improvements

Mentorship

- Improve Career Progression Pathing for Airmen (How to Get from AB to

CMSgt)

- Implement SOCOM’s Peer Mentorship Program Across the Air Force

- Shadow Program

Idea Open Forum

- Return Fitness Assessments to 12-Month Cycles (Remove 6-Month

Requirements)

- Scrap Ancillary Training to Bare-Bones and Increase Time Between Courses

- Overhaul the Fitness Assessment Standards










Participants Submitting Top-Voted Ideas

MSgt Scott Bledsoe, 22nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

Lt Col Chris Buckley, 412th Operations Support Squadron

TSgt David Bunn, 18th Civil Engineering Squadron

Jennifer Butcher, PACAF/A1

MSgt Brook Carter, 303rd Intelligence Squadron, Detachment 1

TSgt Joel Cassel, 33rd Maintenance Squadron

MSgt Clane (Joey) Shirley, 592nd Special Operations Maintenance Squadron

CMSgt Jermaine Evans, Alaskan Command

TSgt Timothy Ferber, 673rd Security Forces Squadron

Maj Joseph Ferrante, 512th Rescue Squadron

TSgt Anthony Harmon, 343rd Training Squadron

TSgt Rashid Harris, 723rd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

SSgt Andrew Harrison, Air Combat Command, Detachment 4

Capt Jason Henderson, 7th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

MSgt James Hilton, AFSOC

SrA Orion Hogan, 353rd Special Operations Support Squadron

CMSgt Matthew Jurek, 691st Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Group

Capt James Kawecki, 746th Test Squadron

TSgt Joshua Kerns, AMC/A3

SSgt Jeffrey Landers, 673rd Communications Squadron

Lt Col Chris Lovett, 426th Air Base Squadron

Capt Mick Madden, 563rd Rescue Group

Lt Col Robert Mammenga, AF/A10

Lt Col Caleb Martiny, 3rd Operations Support Squadron

SMSgt Ryan McCauley, 612th Air Communications Operations Squadron

TSgt Matt McCleary, 30th Reconnaissance Squadron

Lt Col Joseph Meister, 184th Cyberspace Operations Group

MSgt Ruth Presto, 726th Air Control Squadron

Maj Gary Priest, 116th Communications Squadron

TSgt Jason Rockwood, 614th Combat Training Squadron

SrA Thomas Robinson, Air Force Personnel Center

TSgt Matthew Shaffer, 59th Training Group

Michelle Spickler, 15th Operations Support Squadron

Capt Brian Stewart, 460th Operations Support Squadron

MSgt Wesley Surber, 359th Medical Operations Squadron

MSgt Corey Terceira, 354th Fighter Wing

TSgt Ryan Vogel, 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron

MSgt Carl Wesley, 355th Equipment Maintenance Squadron

MSgt Aaron Yost, 966th Airborne Air Control Squadron