improvement of maritime links between · pdf file · 2010-05-06improvement of...

The European Union’s Tacis TRACECA programme for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

TACIS 117107

IMPROVEMENT OF MARITIME LINKS BETWEEN TRACECA AND TENS CORRIDORS RoRo Terminal for Samsun Port, Turkey Feasibility Study Report April 2009

This project is funded by the European Union

A project executed by Royal Haskoning NEA Transport Research and Training Egis Bceom International

This Project is funded by the European Union

IMPROVEMENT OF MARITIME LINKS BETWEEN TRACECA AND TENS CORRIDORS

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1 Report cover page Project Title: Improvement of Maritime Links between TRACECA and TENs Corridors

Project Number: TACIS 117107

Client Contractor

Name: European Commission EuropeAid Cooperation Office

Consortium led by Royal Haskoning, The Netherlands

Address: Office: J-54 04/250 1049 Brussels

Barbarossastraat 35 Postbus 151 6500 AD Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Tel. Number: + 32 2 298 02 57 + 31 24 32 84 147 Fax number: + 32 2 296 62 17 + 31 24 36 09 634 Contact persons: Mrs. Barbara Bernardi

Programme Manager

Mr. Edwin Lock Team Leader

Signatures: Date of report: March 2009 Reporting period: 2008-2009

Authors of report: André Merrien (Egis Bceom International) Klaas Westerkamp (NEA) Gönül Ertürer (Golder Associates, for Egis Bceom International) Edwin Lock (Royal Haskoning)



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

BOT Build Operate Transfer

CD Chart Datum

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

DB Design and Build

DLH Railways, Ports and Airports Construction General Directorate (Ankara, Turkey)

DSI State Hydraulic Works Directorate (Ankara, Turkey)

DWT Dead Weight Tonnage

EC European Commission

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EU European Union

IAPH International Association for Ports and Harbors

IMO International Maritime Organization

IRR Internal Rate of Return

ISPS International Ship and Port Security Code (attached to the SOLAS convention)

LOA Length Over All (in meters)

METU Middle East Technical University, Turkey

NS National Secretariat

PIANC Permanent International Association for Navigation Congresses

SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea (IMO Convention)

TACIS Technical Assistance to CIS Countries (EC Programme)

TCDD Turkish State Railway Company

TEN Trans-European Network

TEU Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit

TL Turkish Lira (equivalent to YTL, standing for New Turkish Lira)

ToR Terms of Reference

TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia

USD United States Dollar



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References and Bibliography

[1] EU Technical Assistance to Transportation Infrastructure Needs Assessment for Turkey (TINA, Final Report, May 2007)

[2] Final Report for the Study on the Nationwide Port Development Master Plan in the Republic of Turkey (The Overseas Coastal Area Development Institute of Japan, August 2000)

[3] Port development, A handbook for planners in developing countries, Second Edition, New York 1985, UNCTAD

Currency Exchange Rates (as of 10 April 2009)

Exchange rate between the euro (€) and the Turkish Lira (TL): 1 € = 2.08 TL Exchange rate between the euro (€) and the US Dollar (USD): 1 € = 1.31 USD



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Table of Contents

1 Report cover page 2 2 Project synopsis 7 3 Introduction 8

3.1 Background 8 3.2 Scope of work 8 3.3 Port privatization and port master plan 8

4 Planning criteria 9 4.1 Tides, winds and waves 9 4.2 Location constraints 10 4.3 Design vehicle and vessel 10

5 Market study 11 5.1 General port statistics 11 5.2 Current ro-ro lines 11 5.3 Hinterland potential 12 5.4 Assessment of current ro-ro lines 14 5.5 Bottlenecks 15 5.6 Prospects 16 5.7 Conclusions 17

6 Terminal planning 19 6.1 Berth requirements 19 6.2 Yard requirements 20 6.3 Gate complex 20 6.4 Security systems 20 6.5 Terminal access roads 20 6.6 Development of project options 21

7 Cost estimates 24 7.1 Capital costs 24 7.2 Maintenance and operational costs 24

8 Financial analysis 25 8.1 Introduction 25 8.2 Basic assumptions 25 8.3 Capital investment 26 8.4 Running costs 27 8.5 Revenues 27 8.6 Financial results 28 8.7 Financial conclusions 32

9 Environmental issues 33 9.1 Introduction 33 9.2 The project 35 9.3 Description of the local environment 36 9.4 Environmental issues 39 9.5 Comparison of various project alternatives 40 9.6 Priority project impacts 41

10 Overall conclusions 43



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Annexes:

1. Market Study Report

2. Breakdowns of Cost Estimates (Option 1, Option 2 & Option 3)

3. Financial Tables

4. Minutes of the workshop held in Ankara on 26 February 2009

Maps and Drawings:

• Location Map 1

• Location Map 2

• Existing Situation

• Project Option 1 (3 drawings)





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2 Project synopsis

Project Title:


Project Number: TACIS 117107

Countries: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine

Project activities: Phase 0 (April – June 2007): Inception Phase 1A (June 2007 – April 2008): Preparation of the Market Study Phase 1B (June 2007 – April 2008): Preparation of the Action Plan Development of Port PPP Framework Phase 2 (May 2008 – April 2009): Preparation of the Feasibility Study for Samsun Port Ro-Ro Terminal, Turkey Preparation of the Pre-Feasibility Study for Filyos Greenfield Port Project, Turkey Implementation of Maritime Safety and Security Improvements Development of a Port Community Pilot Scheme Assessment of the PPP potential of port investment needs/projects in the region and selection of Bankable Projects Project starting date: 16 April 2007 Project duration: 24 months Project implemented by: Royal Haskoning (The Netherlands) and consortium partners:

NEA Transport Research and Training (The Netherlands) Egis Bceom International (France)



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3 Introduction

3.1 Background

As shown by the first attached location map, the Turkish port of Samsun is connected by sea to TENs Corridors 4, 7 and 8, and is located in the north of Turkey on the Black Sea. It has a turnover of about 2.5 million tons, owned and operated by TCDD, the Turkish State Railway Company. It is also the only port in north-eastern Turkey having a rail-ferry connection. When this project started, in 2007, Samsun rail-ferry terminal was in a very poor condition, no longer operational, and the Consortium was expected to perform a feasibility study on rehabilitation and modernization of that ferry terminal, focussed on commercial links between Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and other TRACECA countries to which there is no direct rail link from Turkey at present.

However, it turned out that TCDD had already launched rehabilitation works for Samsun rail-ferry terminal, together with the Russian UPM Company. The new ferry terminal will have a Russian gauge ramp and a land-based bogie exchange station. In March 2009 rehabilitation works were almost completed.

It was thus decided to remove this project component from the contract, and to replace it by a feasibility study on Samsun port ro-ro terminal. Until then, although Samsun port had no real ro-ro terminal, ro-ro traffic was doing well and growing fast, mainly based on the Samsun-Novorossiysk route (cf. first location map).

3.2 Scope of work

In April 2008 the Consortium proposed a scope of work to the EuropeAid Cooperation Office, who requested the ro-ro feasibility study to be performed accordingly, based on the following major tasks:

Establish planning criteria. Perform a market study. Develop terminal projects for Samsun port. Estimate project costs. Carry out a financial analysis. Perform an environmental scoping.

3.3 Port privatization and port master plan

In May 2008 the Consortium was informed that a tender had been launched for privatizing the port of Samsun, while in September 2008 it was announced that the Turkish Ceynak Group had won the tender – Ceynak was already involved in the port of Samsun, as grain



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terminal operator. However, since negotiations between Ceynak and the Turkish Government were on progress, the Consortium was not entitled to hold discussions with Ceynak about the Samsun ro-ro project. The main counterpart was still TCDD, together with DLH.

Nevertheless Ceynak was invited to participate to the workshop of 26 February 2009 in Ankara, dedicated to Samsun RoRo project (see attached minutes). TCDD also attended the workshop, as well as a ro-ro shipping company.

At the end of March 2009 negotiations were still on-going between Ceynak and the Government, meaning that TCDD was still the port owner and port operator.

In March 2009 the Consortium also got confirmation that Ceynak was launching a study for a Port Master Plan in Samsun, with the assistance of a British consultant. The ro-ro feasibility study will therefore be completed prior to the master plan, which is not the ideal sequencing for carrying out such studies. The Consortium now recommends that the Master Plan carefully assesses interactions between ro-ro traffic and container traffic, as both can address similar commodities (containers can also be carried on ro-ro, by the mean of road chassis).

Besides, regarding that Master Plan the Consultant wants to stress that from a nautical point of view, it would be a pity to keep considering that it will never be possible to develop port facilities in the current “green areas” that were transferred by TCDD to Samsun Municipality for leisure and recreational purposes (cf. second location plan). These green areas are located within the port breakwaters and thus benefit from a valuable protection against waves. In case of significant demand growth these areas would allow a large increase in port capacity.

4 Planning criteria

4.1 Tides, winds and waves

The astronomic tide range in the Black Sea is very limited, standing between 10 and 20 cm (however, strong winds and low atmospheric pressures can induce surges reaching 50 to 70 cm). For that reason no movable port ramp is required for a ro-ro terminal, whereas for a rail-ferry terminal even a limited tide range makes a ramp compulsory, as rail tracks must perfectly coincide between the vessel and the shore. However, in the areas where ramps of ro-ro ships will rest pavement must be resistant, if possible fitted with slightly protruding steel rails avoiding pavement wearing out.

Wind statistics collected at Samsun airport in 2008 reveal prevailing wind directions from SSW to NNW. The inner port of Samsun, and more particularly its main berth, thus benefits



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from a certain land protection against winds, which eases berthing and departing ship manoeuvres.

Regarding waves the existing breakwater system ensures a perfect protection to the inner port. Only a few problematic days per year were reported by the Harbour Master – by the way it seems that problems are actually due to wind gusts, rather than to wave disturbance.

4.2 Location constraints

As the current stage it is considered that green areas, marked as such on the second location map, should not be spoiled by any port facilities.

On the other hand, as the eastern pier will soon be dedicated to rail-ferry activities (berthing of rail-ferry vessels, marshalling and parking of rail-wagons) it is assumed that ro-ro would not have sufficient room to develop there. Besides, that area would not be very suitable with regard to road connections since the highway to/from Ankara connects to the north of the city.

The so-called “main berth”, where ro-ro activity currently takes place, is somehow obstructed by quayside sheds, as shown on the existing situation drawing. Dozens of trailers and semitrailers park in a mess in the vicinity of quay lines and warehouses, hampering other port operations.

Moving to the north close to Ceynak’s modern silo complex, there is a comfortable yard properly paved and close to the berths, which is most of the time occupied by empty road trailers staying there idle during weeks or even months. That area would be suitable for development of ro-ro or for container, or for a combined ro-ro & container terminal.

Moving more to the north the area is occupied by the Free Trade Zone, therefore not available for pure ro-ro activity.

4.3 Design vehicle and vessel

The design vehicle for the ro-ro feasibility study is the 38 ton semi-trailer, 18 m long and 2.5 m wide, being the largest road vehicle carried onboard ro-ro vessels in the Black Sea. Trailers are sometimes loaded without tractors, but this is not usual in Samsun. In Samsun there is also a significant amount of exported buses and cars manufactured in Turkey, in the vicinity of Istanbul.

The design vessel is the Ulusoy-1 type ro-ro vessel, being the largest ro-ro vessel calling in the region:

LOA: 146 m. Breadth: 22 m.



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Loaded draught: 5.5 m (requires 6.5 to 7 m water depth). Capacity: 95 semitrailers and 120 passengers. Stern quarter ramp.

It should be kept in mind that rail-ferry vessels operating on the Black Sea have larger technical characteristics, with LOA above 180 m and draughts over 7 m.

5 Market study

The following is a summary of the market study report on the prospects and constraints for a RoRo terminal in the port of Samsun. The full report can be found in annex.

5.1 General port statistics

The following tables show some statistics about the activities in the port of Samsun in the period 2004 - 2007.

Table 5.1: Cargo turnover Port of Samsun, in tonnes, 2004 & 2005

2004 2005 Loading Unloading Total Loading Unloading Total

General 122,552 74,632 197,184 97,069 73,088 170,157 Container 0 0 0 0 0 0 RoRo 295,296 263,703 558,999 381,747 268,127 649,874 Dry bulk 316,776 2,001,935 2,318,711 211,111 2,002,250 2,213,361 Other 0 37,340 37,340 0 33,816 33,816 Total 734,624 2,377,610 3,112,234 689,927 2,377,281 3,067,208 Table 5.2: Cargo turnover Port of Samsun, in tonnes, 2006 & 2007

2006 2007 Loading Unloading Total Loading Unloading Total

General 154,688 83,581 238,269 228,457 145,894 374,351 Container 0 0 0 0 0 0 RoRo 367,598 275,406 643,004 407,642 214,603 522,245 Dry bulk 1,729 1,145,060 1,146,789 0 688,703 688,703 Other 0 18,229 18,229 2,000 29,006 31,006 Total 524,015 1,522,276 2,046,291 638,099 1,078,206 1,716,305

The tables show that the overall cargo turnover in tonnes has decreased considerably from more than 3.1 million tonnes in 2004 to 1.7 million tonnes in 2007. During that period the turnover in general cargo almost doubled, RoRo decreased by about 7%, while dry bulk decreased from 2.3 million tonnes in 2004 to 688,703 tonnes in 2007. The main commodities causing this decrease were coal (-20%), iron ore (-26%), scrap (-22%) and wheat (-21%).

5.2 Current ro-ro lines

Table 5.3 shows some figures about the RoRo connections in the port of Samsun and some figures of other Black Sea ports in Turkey.



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Table 5.3: Transported road goods transport vehicles, in numbers, 2002-2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Samsun-Novorossiysk 18,095 19,846 31,201 39,220 38,961 31,423 23,523 Zonguldak-Ukraine 8,977 8,739 9,153 15,629 19,147 19,147 23,632 Rize-Poti 1,80 5,372 5,032 3,648 742 Trabzon-Sochi 3,641 1,609 3,512 3,403 6,574 10,150

The RoRo link with the Russian port of Novorossiysk was the only RoRo connection used in the period between 2002 and 2009 from Samsun. Compared to the other Turkish ports in the Black Sea region the figures show that Samsun was a relatively important RoRo port in that period.

During consultations with stakeholders the two RoRo operators active in Samsun informed the Consultant that in early 2008 they moved 2 of the 4 vessels active on the relation Samsun-Novorossiysk to Zonguldak, to be active in RoRo traffic to Ukraine. This was done because the lack of RoRo capacity in Russia. It explains the sharp decrease in RoRo activity in 2008.

Indications regarding RoRo traffic for 2009 are even lower, because of the impact of the economic crisis. For example, a RoRo line reported to have executed only 3 trips to Russia instead of the normal average of 13 trips per month in the month of January 2009.

5.3 Hinterland potential

The following map shows the natural hinterland of the port of Samsun, which includes the area around Hatay in the South East of Turkey where vegetables and fruits are grown for export to Ukraine and Russia via the port of Samsun.

Map 5.1: Hinterland port of Samsun



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On the basis of the forecasted trade between the hinterland of Samsun and Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine for the year 2020 an estimate of the market potential for RoRo activity in the port of Samsun was made.

Table 5.4 Total market potential RoRo Port of Samsun, 2020, tonnes BY BG GEO MD RO RUS UA Total Import 2020 2,672 104,384 5,476 827 153,636 271,832 219,785 758,613 Export 2020 wider hinterland 6,743 154,114 85,626 19,456 309,977 1,598,763 292,028 2,466,707 Total 2020 9,416 258,499 91,102 20,283 463,613 1,870,595 511,813 3,225,319

This potential has to be corrected for competition from other modes (road transport) and other ports.

The following table shows the results of a simple analysis of the costs of direct road transport versus the costs of RoRo. The table assumes road transport costs of EUR 1/km1, and RoRo costs of EUR 800 (based on the current tariffs for Novorossiysk)2.

Table 5.5 Costs of direct road transport versus RoRo Road

transport costs

Ferry costs

Road transport costs

Total costs

Ankara 422 Samsun 800 Constantza 222 Bucharest 1444 Ankara 1115 Bucharest 1115 Ankara 422 Samsun 800 Constantza 0 Constantza 1222 Ankara 1070 Constantza 1070 Ankara 422 Samsun 800 Odessa 474 Kiev 1696 Ankara 1952 Kiev 1952 Ankara 422 Samsun 800 Odessa 0 Odessa 1222 Ankara 1651 Odessa 1651

Though the analysis is very rough and does no take into account extra charges like to charge on transit permits and restrictions on the import of fuels, the analysis clearly shows that RoRo transport from Central Anatolia using the port of Samsun towards Romania doesn’t seems to be economically viable. It indicates that such a RoRo connection can only be sustainable in case of - for instance - problems with road transport permits, like a lack of transit permits for Bulgaria and loco permits for Romania. Also increasing tolls could influence the cost balance. Obviously the same result as for Romania goes for Bulgaria.

1 This price is more or less an average of the price of Turkish international road transport.

2 As stated earlier, the price of RoRo in the Black Sea is relatively high compared to prices for RoRo in Western Europe. More competition could lead to lower prices which might influence the results of the analysis, especially if the costs for direct road transport would go up due to extra charges like tolls.



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Furthermore, if we assume that 50% of the RoRo transport in relation to Ukraine will be dealt with in Zonguldak, 50% of traffic in relation to Georgia will be dealt with by other modes and/or ports, and 50% of traffic in relation to Belarus will go via other ports or by road, and the results are corrected for the competition from direct road transport (BG, RO, MD), the total market potential in 2020 adds up to 2,176,760 tonnes (129,362 units).

Table 5.6 Total market potential RoRo Port of Samsun, 2020, tonnes, units BY BG GEO MD RO RUS UA Total Import 2020 2,672 5,476 271,832 219,785 499,765 Export 2020 wider hinterland 6,743 85,626 1,598,763 292,028 1,983,159 Total 2020 9,416 91,102 1,870,595 511,813 2,482,925 50% UA via Zonguldak 50% GEO other 50% BY other 4,708 45,551 1,870,595 255,906 2,176,760 Units (16.8 ton average) 279 2,707 111,167 15,208 129,362

Results of the above table need to be handled with care because in the near future RoRo transport in the Black Sea will get more competition from container transport as more container facilities will be build in Black Sea ports.

5.4 Assessment of current ro-ro lines

Samsun – Novorossiysk (RUS)

Until April 2008 there were 4 RoRo vessels sailing between Samsun and Novorossiysk, exploited by Ulosoy and Cenk Group. However, 2 vessels were transferred to the port of Zonguldak, where they now sail between Zonguldak and two ports in Ukraine (Skadovsk and Yevpotaria). The reason for this is that the Russians reduced the RoRo capacity in Novorossiysk. They bought the terminal of Ulosoy and now they only offer one limited berth to Turkish RoRo vessels. Apparently the Russians want to transform Novorossiysk into a container port.

Turkish hauliers are now using Zonguldak to go to Ukraine and then to Russia, however it is estimated that 80% of transport now goes over land via Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and then to Russia.

As an alternative, the Russians are developing the port of Kavkaz where good facilities for RoRo seem to be planned that will be able to handle 5 vessels at the same time. However, this port can easier be reached from the Turkish port of Zonguldak in comparison with Samsun, because it is closer for cargo from the Istanbul and the Ankara region. Other sources indicate that the Port of Kavkaz is not a good alternative because vessels have to pass through a narrow channel to reach to Sea of Azov. Kavkaz also has problems with the draft (5 m).



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Other possible RoRo links

The other ports in the Black Sea seem not convenient for Samsun in terms of Ro-Ro activity. Generally Ukrainian ports don’t seem logical for a Ro-Ro connection with Samsun. Illichevsk already has a Ro-Ro linkage with Derince, and most of the vehicles choose Kapıkule Border Gate to go to Ukraine.

Odessa doesn’t have any Ro-Ro terminal, while Skadovsk port can be an alternative but it has to be improved. Sevastopol port is not sufficient for a Ro-Ro connection. The draft of the quays of Caucasus ports have to be developed. Sochi port is also not a good alternative, because the highway connection between Sochi and its hinterland is not good enough.

Only Poti port can be considered as a possibility for a Ro-Ro connection. Because there is a serious development in Georgia in terms of liberalization in bureaucracy, the handling capacity in Poti port is growing. However Poti doesn’t have a hinterland because of the problems between Russia and Georgia.

5.5 Bottlenecks

Relation Turkey - Russia

There are three types of problems with Russia that negatively influence RoRo traffic in relation to Samsun:

Lack of road transport permits. Russia is turning Novorossiysk into a container port, and apparently moving RoRo to

Kavkaz. Ban on container trucking with different licensed trailers. In a number of Black Sea

countries, like Russia and Turkey, it is forbidden to truck a trailer with a tractor that has a different license plate. For instance, a Turkish licensed trailer arriving unaccompanied in Russia from Samsun cannot be trucked by a Russian tractor to its destination in Russia. The same goes for a Russian trailer arriving in Samsun, which cannot be trucked by a Turkish tractor. Because of this, accompanied trailers need to be unloaded in the port of destination and the cargo has to be loaded on another trailer. This is a highly inefficient operation.

High price of RoRo services and low quality

According to the main stakeholders RoRo prices are relatively high because of a lack of competition. Furthermore, the quality of services at terminals and onboard vessels is low in terms of facilities for drivers and trucks.

Indications are that the current tariff for a return trip to Novorossiysk is around USD 1850 per unaccompanied trailer. A similar stretch in Western Europe would costs about 60% of this amount.



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The Samsun RoRo terminal

The RoRo Terminal in Samsun is not adequate at all. This is the reason why the Consultant has performed this feasibility study.

5.6 Prospects

Samsun - Russia

The future of RoRo services in Samsun seem to depend for a large part on the situation in the port of Novorossiysk and partly on the Turkish–Russian and Turkish–Bulgarian relation regarding transport permits. Given the Russian initiatives to transfer RoRo facilities to Kavkaz or other Russian ports, and especially their plans to ban RoRo from Novorossiysk the prospects seem vague, even if the problem of transport permits would be solved.

Furthermore, the current world crisis has a large impact on the current trade and the number of trips of vessels. In January 2009 apparently only 3 round trips were made compared to the average of 13 trips in a normal month.

Samsun - Romania

As the previous analysis shows, there might be a market potential for RoRo services to Romania. However, taken into account a price of EUR 1 per kilometre in international road transport, and an estimated ferry cost of EUR 800 for a RoRo line between Samsun and Constantza (single trip, trailer)3 it is clear that a RoRo service is not attractive unless the permit situation with Bulgaria would change drastically.

Samsun – Ukraine

As the previous analysis shows, there might be market potential for RoRo services to Ukraine. If the place of origin is for example Ankara and the destination would be Odessa, it would take EUR 422 (EUR 1/km) to Samsun, and a ferry trip of EUR 800 to Odessa. In total this would be EUR 1222. Given the distance between Ankara and Odessa by road of 1651 km and an estimated EUR 1 per kilometre, it is clear that in principle there is a market for RoRo from the Samsun hinterland to Ukraine.

The Ceynak Group

The future owner of the port, the Ceynak Group, intends to invest in an extensive upgrade of the port, and is focusing on the following activities:

Improve efficiency and facilities for handling and storage of dry bulk. Rail ferry (5-year contract for a Russian gauge rail ferry connection with Kavkaz)

connections with the port of Mersin. 3 The estimated EUR 800 is based on the price charged currently for Samsun-Novorossiysk. This price, as stated earlier is almost twice as high as a price in Western Europe for a similar service.



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Development of a container terminal. Improvement of RoRo facilities.

Through interviews with stakeholders (port users) the Consultant got the impression that many port users are welcoming the new management of the port, and expect a boost in activities from this change.

5.7 Conclusions

The main findings of the study were: The only RoRo line active in Samsun is the Samsun–Novorossiysk line. RoRo traffic in 2008 on this line in Samsun was 378,527 tonnes (23,523 units). Russia turns Novorossiysk into a container port, tries to reduce RoRo traffic there,

and apparently wants to develop Kavkaz as a RoRo port. Turkish stakeholders indicate that the draft of the channel to Kavkaz is not good for RoRo vessels.

As a result, in the beginning of 2008 the RoRo companies Ulusoy and Cenk moved 2 out of their 4 vessels to Zonguldak. These vessels now operate on the line Zonguldak–Ukraine.

The reduction of vessels has led to a drop in the number of trailers handled in 2008 to 23,523 (in 2007 31,423 units were handled).

The financial crisis also has an impact on RoRo in Samsun. In January 2009, instead of the usual 13 trips only 3 trips were made by RoRo vessels between Samsun and Novorossiysk.

An analysis of the current market potential for RoRo in Samsun, taking into account Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia and the Turkish hinterland of Samsun - Central and East Anatolia and South East Turkey - indicates a potential of about 879,000 tonnes or about 53,045 units for 2005.

The market potential for 2020 could grow to more than 2 millions tonnes and 129,000 trailers.

From a geographical standpoint Zonguldak seems more favourable for RoRo transport to Ukraine.

RoRo transport will get serious competition from container transport, given the fact that:

o Container facilities are being built on the Turkish Black Sea coast (Samsun, Filyos) and in Russian ports like Novorossiysk and in Ukrainian ports.

o RoRo facilities seem to decrease, especially in Russia. o RoRo is inefficient because of national legislation in Russia and Turkey that

forbids trucking of foreign trailers. o The lack of competition leads to relatively high prices for RoRo, almost twice

as much compared to RoRo prices in Western Europe. o Problems with road transport permits hinder the development of RoRo.



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Overall conclusion

Overall the conclusion is that Samsun has in principle a substantive market potential in RoRo transport. The most important factor however, is the willingness of Russia to build and operate RoRo terminals in its ports.

If facilities are available and legal bottlenecks are removed Samsun has the potential of handling more than 120,000 units per year in 2020. If one third or half of this potential would be taken over by container transport, this still leaves a potential of 60,000 to 80,000 trailers per year in 2020.

But because the RoRo facilities seem to disappear (especially in Russia) in the short run, and because the financial crisis has a deep impact on RoRo transport, the expectation is that during the coming years RoRo will stay at a modest level of around 15,000 to 25,000 units per year.



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6 Terminal planning

Tasks related to terminal planning cover all issues in connection with berthing, with ro-ro yard, gate complex, with security and access roads.

6.1 Berth requirements

On the short term, applying the projection of 20,000 semitrailers per annum and assuming an average load of 50 vehicles per trip, that is to say half of the design vessel capacity, 200 calls will be needed. As vessels belong to a very limited number of companies (2, at the moment) and can arrive in port with good regularity, a high occupation rate is acceptable, around 60%. With an average call duration of 1 day then 1 berth would be enough.

On the longer term, if traffic gets close to 60,000 semitrailers 2 berths will be sufficient, as call duration can be shorter than 1 day. The feasibility study will thus be based on 2 berths suitable for the design vessel.

Regarding berthing conditions the Consultant interviewed the Harbour Master and the Port Pilots, who are all of the opinion that berthing ro-ro vessels as it is done at the moment is appropriate, considering that 2 tug boats are available at the port, 2,500 HP each. It is therefore considered that no dolphin is required and that ro-ro vessels can continue berthing with bow anchors and stern ropes.

As already mentioned, water depths must be greater than 6.5 to 7 m, which is the case along the whole “main berth” and also along the whole “Tali Mendirek” berth (spot checks were made in June 2008 on purpose).

Ulusoy-1 berthed in Samsun (May 2008)



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6.2 Yard requirements

On the short term, with the target of 20,000 semitrailers per annum, if the average dwell time of semitrailers on yard is limited to 2 to 3 days (vehicles staying longer in Samsun should park outside the port, a few kilometres away) then 150 yard slots are adequate. On the longer term, if traffic gets close to 60,000 semitrailers per year, the above 150 yard slots will still match if dwell times are reduced, which could be achieved through improved port management: average dwell time should be 1 day for outbound vehicles, less than half a day for inbound. The ro-ro yard will therefore be designed for accommodating 150 semitrailers.

6.3 Gate complex

The gate complex is being designed to fulfil several needs:

Control of inbound and outbound vehicles. Buffer parking on each side of the gate, with a bigger capacity outside. Reception of truck-drivers. Office space for shipping agents, freight forwarders, customs and terminal operator.

Gate complexes proposed with the following project options meet these requirements.

6.4 Security systems

The port of Samsun is already ISPS compliant and its Security Plan takes into account ro-ro activities, including transportation of passengers. However, implementation of a dedicated ro-ro terminal will necessarily require an update of the Security Plan as well as installation of additional security equipment such as new fences, new gates, barriers and turnstiles, additional floodlighting, supplementary video-surveillance equipment and gate control equipment. The following cost estimates include appropriate provisions for such additional security equipment.

6.5 Terminal access roads

As shown on the following picture, Samsun has a good highway towards Ankara, starting some 200 m from the port northern gate:

Leaving Samsun, on the road to Ankara (2 x 2 lanes plus emergency lane)



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This highway is standing far below congestion and can thus accommodate a large increase of traffic.

However, port gates lack suitable adjacent parking areas, as already mentioned:

Main port gate, opening straight on the urban road network

6.6 Development of project options

On the basis of the above requirements, and considering the various location constraints, 2 berthing locations have been selected in Samsun inner port and 3 project options have been developed accordingly. They are illustrated by the attached project drawings.

6.6.1 Project option 1

Option 1 assumes that ro-ro vessels would continue berthing at the main berth, as currently, and that ro-ro traffic would carry on using the main port main gate. However, the gate would be improved and the project would offer a comfortable roundabout outside as well as a parking lot able to accommodate up to 30 semitrailers west of the gate. The new gate building would be accessible both from outside and inside the port. The problem with that gate is that it would require gaining space on the territory of the Samsun Municipality but, should this be really problematic, it could be done as a second development stage.

This project would also call for demolition of 2 quayside sheds, to enable construction of a large parking area for vehicles ready for boarding (an area able to accommodate 95 semitrailers, i.e. the design vessel capacity). In that area pavement would be fully upgraded. Besides, to compensate demolition of the 2 buildings, the project proposes to build a new silo complex, with a capacity of 20,000 tons.

The project also includes reconstruction of the quay capping beam on a length of 200 m and installation of new fenders and new bollards along that stretch.



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Flows of ro-ro vehicles would turn anti-clockwise, outbound vehicles reaching vessels after a turn close to the x-ray scanner. For inbound vehicles parking lots able to accommodate some 50 semitrailers would be arranged between the main berth and the main gate.

Lastly, the project includes some additional ro-ro handling equipment to enhance the existing limited capacity of tug-masters and chassis: 5 new tug-masters and 10 new chassis.

Existing tug-master in Samsun port


Option 2 differs from option1 in the location of the gate, as the second option proposes a pure ro-ro gate located at the southern end of the port, leaving the existing main gate as it is, for other commodities. All the rest is pretty similar to option 1.

Details of the ro-ro gate are shown on an attached drawing: no roundabout is proposed, unlike with option 1, but some cross-road reshaping is recommended in order to ease traffic connection with the city network, also to provide some parking area for outbound vehicles outside the port boundaries (the proposed scheme only offers a dozen of semitrailer slots, less than with option 1). A building would also be erected at the ro-ro gate, with access from both sides of the gate.


Option 3 differs significantly from both previous proposals, since it suggests moving ro-ro berths to the north – as already mentioned, water depths were checked in June 2008 and proved to be sufficient for ro-ro units. The main advantage there is the large free yard east of the grain silo complex, with better pavement than along the main berth.

It is suggested that ro-ro vessels would berth parallel to the long pier, as this would provide a very handy berth in the corner, after improvement of quay capping beams, fenders and



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bollards4. Berthing conditions for the second vessel would be less handy but still acceptable with the assistance of tug boats.

Samsun tug boats moored alongside the main berth

An alternative would consist in berthing ro-ro vessels perpendicularly to the long pier, but this would entail problems with regard to traffic flows between vessels and parking areas.

With option 3 it is recommended to move the existing x-ray scanner to the northern part of the port, and to set up a new weighbridge close to the ro-ro park.

The existing narrow gate should be demolished and a new gate built, on the same bases as with the previous options, including a gate building with access from both sides of the port boundary. As shown on the drawings the new gate should not be too close to the city roads in order to leave space for a parking area for ro-ro vehicles having to wait before proceeding through the gate.

Lastly, the Consultant likes to point out that this third option could ease development of a combined ro-ro/container terminal in Samsun, as the long pier could accommodate container feeder container vessels5. A container yard could even be developed on that pier, provided that the pier is made wider (that would require a shift of the Coast Guard vessels’ berth).

4 The Consultant wants to stress that, before moving to the next design stage, conditions of berthing bulkheads should be checked in-situ. During his assignment he asked TCDD and DLH to supply with information about Samsun quaywall structures, but the only info provided was that all structures were most probably of blockwall type, without any clear indication regarding foundation conditions. In the future it will notably be important to check whether any scouring has occurred at the toe of any berth.

5 Max. draught of 6.5 m, with capacity of about 500 TEU.



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7 Cost estimates

7.1 Capital costs

The attached cost breakdowns were elaborated on the basis of similar works carried out recently in the region. They cover civil works for berths, yards, gates, for connections to city roads as well as costs for procurement of equipment. They are given in euro, exclusive of any taxes, and are summarised in the following table:

Project Option 1 Project Option 2 Project Option 3

euro 7.1 million euro 6.4 million euro 2.9 million

Option 3 is approximately twice cheaper than the two others, because of two reasons:

Option 3 does not require any demolition of warehouses and therefore does not call for new silos.

Option 3 makes use of a yard which is already properly paved.

7.2 Maintenance and operational costs

As a first approach maintenance costs can be computed by applying a 7.5% ratio on capital costs.

As far as operational costs are concerned computations can be based on 3 gangs comprising each 5 tractor drivers, 5 stevedores and 5 people at the gate.

Some provision is also needed for consumables and power supply, approximately euro 5,000 per month, i.e. euro 60,000 per year.



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8 Financial analysis

8.1 Introduction

A financial analysis covering a 10-year period is provided in this chapter. The objective is to assess the financial feasibility of the required capital investments in the ro-ro terminal.

Capital Cost: Identification and quantification of the required capital investments, both for basic port infrastructure and handling equipment.

Operational Cost: Identification and quantification of the yearly operational costs, including maintenance, associated with the operations of the ro-ro terminal.

Revenues: Assessment of the potential future revenue streams over a 10-year period, associated with the operations of the ro-ro terminal

Results: Determination of the future cashflows and financial feasibility by means of the financial Internal Rate of Return (IRR).

It is to be noted that the results of the financial analysis should be handled with care. They simply give an indication of the financial feasibility.

8.2 Basic assumptions

The financial analysis for the period till 2020 is based on the assumption that the capital investments in the ro-ro terminal are to be recuperated by the operations of the ro-ro terminal.

In this report the new ro-ro terminal is assumed to operational by the 1st of January 2010.

Inflation has not been included in the calculations, as also the handling rates remain the same throughout the period from 2010 till 2020.

All prices and rates are in euro (€).

Depreciation (straight-line) is assumed at 25 years for infrastructure and 15 years for equipment parts.



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8.3 Capital investment

Option 1: Quay wall works € 200,000Demolition works € 778,500Pavement works € 1,771,500Gate complex works € 888,000Floodlighting works € 180,000

Security equipment € 250,000

Construction of new silos (cap. 20,000 tons) € 2,100,000Procurement of new handling equipment € 270,000Contingencies 10% € 643,800Total € 7,081,800

Option 2: Quay wall works € 200,000Demolition works € 694,900Pavement works € 1,413,500Gate complex works € 691,500Floodlighting works € 180,000Security equipment € 250,000Construction of new silos (cap. 20,000 tons) € 2,100,000Procurement of new handling equipment € 270,000Contingencies 10% € 579,990Total € 6,379,890

Option 3: Quay wall works € 270,000Demolition works € 48,750Pavement works € 813,000Gate complex works € 790,500Floodlighting works € 120,000Security equipment € 200,000Transfer of x-ray scanner € 150,000New weighbridge € 60,000Procurement of new handling equipment € 270,000Contingencies 10% € 272,225Total € 2,994,475



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8.4 Running costs

Operational costs: 3 gangs comprising each 5 tractor drivers, 5 stevedores and 5 people at the gate, totalling 45 persons. Average labour costs: € 500 per month (€ 270,000/year).

Maintenance costs: 7.5% over total capital investment.

Energy and utilities: lump sum of € 5,000 per month (€ 60,000/year).

Total running costs (in €):

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Operational costs 270,000 270,000 270,000 270,000 270,000 270,000 Maintenance Option 1 531,135 531,135 531,135 531,135 531,135 531,135 Option 2 478,492 478,492 478,492 478,492 478,492 478,492 Option 3 224,586 224,586 224,586 224,586 224,586 224,586 Energy & utilities 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 Total costs Option 1 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 Option 2 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 Option 3 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586

8.5 Revenues

The revenues of the Samsun ro-ro terminal depend on the future throughput of trailers and on handling rates.

As the future is uncertain, we have estimated the financial results for different scenarios, taking into account a variation of the yearly trailer throughput (low, high and medium scenarios) and the handling rate per trailer (€ 20, 25 and 30).

Trailer throughput: in the first year of operations (2010) starting with 25,000 units and gradually increasing to 60,000 (low), 80,000 (medium) and 120,000 (high) units in the year 2020.

The present handling rate for trailers is $ 25 per unit. However, as the ro-ro terminal increases its service level after the upgrading, it might be justified to increase the handling



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rates. Therefore, the calculations take into account handling rates varying between € 20 and € 30.

It should be noted that the handling rates should not be increased too much as this might deviate ro-ro flows via Samsun to other ports or to other transport modalities.

In the calculations, the potential revenues for storage of trailers on the ro-ro terminal are not included, as basically the terminal should not be used for long-time storage of trailers.

Forecast trailer throughput (in trailers):

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Scenario Low 25,000 32,000 39,000 46,000 53,000 60,000 Medium 25,000 36,000 47,000 58,000 69,000 80,000 High 25,000 44,000 63,000 82,000 101,000 120,000

Revenues (€):

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Handling rate: € 20 High 500,000 880,000 1,260,000 1,640,000 2,020,000 2,400,000 Medium 500,000 720,000 940,000 1,160,000 1,380,000 1,600,000 Low 500,000 640,000 780,000 920,000 1,060,000 1,200,000 Handling rate: € 25 High 625,000 1,100,000 1,575,000 2,050,000 2,525,000 3,000,000 Medium 625,000 900,000 1,175,000 1,450,000 1,725,000 2,000,000 Low 625,000 800,000 975,000 1,150,000 1,325,000 1,500,000 Handling rate: € 30 High 750,000 1,320,000 1,890,000 2,460,000 3,030,000 3,600,000 Medium 750,000 1,080,000 1,410,000 1,740,000 2,070,000 2,400,000 Low 750,000 960,000 1,170,000 1,380,000 1,590,000 1,800,000

8.6 Financial results

The principal indicator to assess whether the investments are to be financial feasible (profitable) is the financial internal rate of return (IRR), which should be above 10% for an investment to be considered cost-effective.

Results are summarized hereafter, whereas support details are supplied by the attached financial tables.



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Financial results for Option 1: medium traffic forecast – handling rate € 25

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Capital investments -7,081,800 Residual value 3,571,627 Costs 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 Revenues 625,000 900,000 1,175,000 1,450,000 1,725,000 2,000,000 Cashflow -7,317,935 38,865 313,865 588,865 863,865 4,710,492 IRR 2.13%


2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Capital investments -7,081,800 Residual value 3,571,627 Costs 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 Revenues 750,000 1,080,000 1,410,000 1,740,000 2,070,000 2,400,000 Cashflow -7,192,935 218,865 548,865 878,865 1,208,865 5,110,492 IRR 6.16%

Financial results for Option 1: high traffic forecast – handling rate € 30

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Capital investments -7,081,800 Residual value 3,571,627 Costs 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 861,135 Revenues 750,000 1,320,000 1,890,000 2,460,000 3,030,000 3,600,000 Cashflow -7,192,935 458,865 1,028,865 1,598,865 2,168,865 6,310,492 IRR 13.54%



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2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Capital investments 6,379,890 Residual value 3,197,275 Costs 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 Revenues 625,000 900,000 1,175,000 1,450,000 1,725,000 2,000,000 Cashflow -6,563,382 91,508 366,508 641,508 916,508 4,388,783 IRR 3.77%


2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Capital investments 6,379,890 Residual value 3,197,275 Costs 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 Revenues 750,000 1,080,000 1,410,000 1,740,000 2,070,000 2,400,000 Cashflow -6,438,382 271,508 601,508 931,508 1,261,508 4,788,783 IRR 8.10%

Financial results for Option 2: high traffic forecast – handling rate € 25

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Capital investments 6,379,890 Residual value 3,197,275 Costs 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 808,492 Revenues 625,000 1,100,000 1,575,000 2,050,000 2,525,000 3,000,000 Cashflow -6,563,382 291,508 766,508 1,241,508 1,716,508 5,388,783 IRR 10.98%



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Financial results for Option 3: low traffic forecast – handling rate € 20

2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Capital investments 2,994,475 Residual value 1,362,387 Costs 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 Revenues 500,000 640,000 780,000 920,000 1,060,000 1,200,000 Cashflow -3,049,061 85,414 225,414 365,414 505,414 2,007,801 IRR 5.53%


2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Capital investments 2,994,475 Residual value 1,362,387 Costs 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 Revenues 500,000 720,000 940,000 1,160,000 1,380,000 1,600,000 Cashflow -3,049,061 165,414 385,414 605,414 825,414 2,407,801 IRR 11.63%


2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Capital investments 2,994,475 Residual value 1,362,387 Costs 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 554,586 Revenues 625,000 900,000 1,175,000 1,450,000 1,725,000 2,000,000 Cashflow -2,924,061 345,414 620,414 895,414 1,170,414 2,807,801 IRR 19.58%



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8.7 Financial conclusions

For Option 1 to generate an acceptable IRR, the traffic in 2020 should amount to 120,000 trailers and a handling rate of € 30 per trailer should be applied. All other scenarios show an IRR below 10%6.

Option 2 might generate an acceptable IRR if traffic in 2020 comes close to 120,000 trailers and a handling rate of € 25 per trailer is applied. Under the low and medium traffic forecasts, the IRR will remain under the 10% threshold.

Option 3 gives an IRR standing above 10% for all scenarios, except when the low traffic forecast is applied in combination with a handling rate of € 20 per trailer.

The financial analysis gives the indication that Option 3 is financially the most feasible one, compared with Option 1 and Option 2. This is a result of the lower required capital investments and, consequently, lower maintenance costs.

6 As mentioned before, the level of 120,000 can hardly be reached as container segment is likely to catch part of the overall potential.



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9 Environmental issues

9.1 Introduction

Policy Framework

Samsun Port is one of the 6 TCDD ports, namely, Izmir, Mersin, Iskenderun, Derince, Bandirma and Samsun Ports which have been included in the privatization portfolio by the decision of the Privatization Higher Council in 2004.

The privatization strategy has been decided as transfer of operational rights, in which the ownership of the ports and the port assets and land will remain to be public property. TCDD will be further responsible for the post-privatization performance monitoring of the private sector performance of the port operations.

Shipping movements constitute a major component of Turkish economy, approximately 90% of the nation’s foreign trade being transported by sea. About 40% of the total cargo handled ports in Turkey is still handled at the TCDD ports.

It has been argued that Turkish ports have the potential to be the key drivers of national economic growth if the appropriate environment is facilitated by the policy-makers. New public policy measures suggested includes privatization of the TCDD ports so that they can be run with greater efficiency and accountability. Such an environment would foster the modernization of the ports and their growth through the infusion of private capital.

Situated on the Black Sea Coast of Turkey, Samsun Port is very important in the Black Sea region. Its traffic capacity is 1130 vessels/year and the handling capacity is 2 to 3 Million tons/year. Samsun Port has a connection with railway network through which it is linked with Mersin and Iskenderun ports on the south coast of Turkey.

The free trade zone near the port covers an area of 71,000 sqm, and has been operational since late 1998.

Regulatory Framework

Port capacity development and its environmental implications are regulated under various laws and by-laws listed below. Main legal framework that the marine transportation linkages are based on the MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships (73/78).

Law on Ports (No: 618) Environmental Law (No: 2872)



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Law on Aquatic Products (No: 1380) Coastal Law (No: 3621) Law Pertaining to Principles of Emergency Response and Compensation for Damages

in Pollution of Marine Environment by Oil and Other Harmful Substances (No: 4734) By-law on Reception and Control of Waste from Vessels By-law on Environmental Impact Assessment By-law on Environmental Inspection By-law on Air Quality Control By-law on Soil Contamination Control By-law on Bathing Water Quality By-law on Solid Waste Control By-law on Hazardous Waste Control By-law on Water Quality Control By-law on Waste Oil Control By-law on Evaluation and Assessment of Environmental Noise By-law on Dangerous Chemicals

As per the EU Directive on EIA, “inland waterways and ports for inland-waterway traffic which permit the passage of vessels of over 1 350 tonnes; trading ports, piers for loading and unloading connected to land and outside ports (excluding ferry piers) which can take vessels of over 1 350 tonnes” are listed in Annex-1 of the Directive as related with activities subject to an assessment in accordance with pertinent articles of the directive. These articles can be summarized to request the following:

The information to be provided by the developer should include the following:

o a description of the project comprising information on the site, design and size of the project,

o a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce and, if possible, remedy significant adverse effects,

o the data required to identify and assess the main effects which the project is likely to have on the environment,

o an outline of the main alternatives studied by the developer and an indication of the main reasons for his choice, taking into account the environmental effects,

o a non-technical summary of the information mentioned in the previous indents.

The EIA process should ensure that any request for development consent and any information gathered pursuant to Article 5 are made available to the public within a reasonable time in order to give the public concerned the opportunity to express an opinion before the development consent is granted.



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The results of consultations and the information gathered pursuant to Articles 5, 6 and 7 must be taken into consideration in the development consent procedure.

When a decision to grant or refuse development consent has been taken, the competent authority or authorities should inform the public thereof in accordance with the appropriate procedures and shall make available to the public the information related to the content of the decision and any conditions attached thereto, main reasons and considerations on which the decision is based, a description, where necessary, of the main measures to avoid, reduce and, if possible, offset the major adverse effects.

Turkish By-law on EIA (Date amended: 17.07.2008; Official Newsletter Issue: 26939) has been appropriated with EU Directive. Limits and processes are similar in both regulations. Thereby the Turkish EIA regulation requires an EIA Report for all ports, piers, wharfs planned to serve loading and unloading of vessels above 1,350 DWT. For the structures below this limit, a “pre-EIA” Report is required, which is less detailed in context and control measures.

Considering the increased vessel receiving capacity of the Samsun Port as a result of establishment of the ro-ro terminal, the project is anticipated to be categorised to call for an EIA Report. This should be verified in consultation with the Samsun Directorate of Environment and Foresry, under the pertinent ministry as the main authority in relation to guide and control environmental legislation in Turkey.

9.2 The project

The project comprises of establishing a ro-ro terminal within the port area. No physical enlargement is of concern, but evidently the handling capacity of the port is to increase along with the planned ro-ro traffic. Along with the construction of a new terminal, various port improvement activities are also recommended, thus requiring demolishment and removal of end-of-life buildings and equipment, reconstruction and moving of certain parts as appropriate toward better efficiency, depending on the selected project option.

Three project options are proposed for implementation of the Project, so far. The first and second alternatives involve removal and replacement of sheds currently used for grains storage. The condition of the paved areas is rather poor and requires removal and repaving, thereby it is included in all three options to different levels. It is also identified that a majority of the cranes and associated equipment should be removed from the port and replaced by new ones. The third alternative involves less removal and reconstruction, but involves transfer of the x-ray scanner, to a potentially less radiation safe spot on the port.



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9.3 Description of the local environment

The port of Samsun is the major for port the central part of Black Sea coast. The port serves export, import cargoes and transit traffic to Iran and also Ro-Ro lines between Turkey and Ukraine/Russia. It has an ideal location both for the trade with the countries having a coast on the Black Sea and for the potential cargoes which will arise due to Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR) Project. On the other hand, it is ideally located for the cargoes destined to the Middle East from the continental Europe through Rhine-Main-Danube canal and Black Sea.

9.3.1 Environmental site conditions

The port is located within the boundaries of the Samsun Greater Municipality. The port location has played a significant role in development of urban macroform since it was established. However, a rather unplanned urbanization took place for a long time, until the greater municipality performed extensive reconstruction works as of the start of 2000. A major part of the reconstruction was made in the environs of the port area, acquiring and transforming part of the port as park and leisure area. Currently, Dogu Park, to the south of the port is comprised of promenades, parks, cafes and restaurants, etc.

To the west of the port is the railway and the highway and the business zone beyond. A narrow road lies parallel to the highway along the port, primarily for vehicles entering and exiting the port. It is expected that there will be need to extend and improve the road, based on the increased port capacity to take place. To the north is the machinery park and maintenance center under DLH (State Presidency of Sea Ports and Airports), and marinas about 600 meters beyond that. The Free Zone adjacent to the port area has been serving since 1998. Turkish Grain Board is also located adjacent to the main entrance of the port, with its grain silos of 30,000 tonnes capacity.

Being located within the urban zone, there are no natural areas of importance. There are few urban and archaeological conservation sites in the district.

9.3.2 Environmental management practices

Currently, as the owner of the port, TCDD is responsible for environmental compliance related with the port activities, including on-site waste management, wastewater reception from ships, and emergency response issues.

According to the port regulations, it is compulsory to take actions against discharge of ballast, garbage and similar substances, oil and similar pollutants, and washing of tanks and bilges. TCDD has contracted management of all waste collected from ships and generated at the port, to Yakamoz company. Yakamoz is responsible for collection of wastewater from



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ships to the reception plant and operation of the plant, and for delivering the domestic (kitchen, office, etc.) waste to the municipal landfill. In relation with the hazardous waste, Yakamoz is responsible to deliver it to IZAYDAS, the single hazardous waste disposal and incineration plant in the country, located in Izmit. Samsun Greater Municipality has recently taken over its inspection duties to control pollutant discharges from ships.

The wastewater reception plant is an oily-water separator system at the capacity of 6,700 m3/year. Ballast and bilge from ships are received to this plant by Yakamoz.

It is observed that there are no hydrocarbon or chemical stains on the paves surfaces. However, given the lack of information, soil and groundwater inspections are essential before start of demolition and construction works of the Project. An environmental due diligence would determine the existing level of contamination from historical and current port operations, as well as provide information on presence of PCB containing oils in the port equipment, transformer; presence of asbestos containing materials and ozone depleting substances (mainly in cooling systems) and other hazardous materials.

It is understood that TCDD has certain emergency rules and procedures to cope with onsite spills and leakages. Furthermore, an Emergency Response Plan is underway to be approved by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.

According to the Samsun Port Regulations, carriage, loading and discharging of explosive, combustible, flammable and similar substances and other dangerous goods within the port are carried out in specially suitable vessels and containers in accordance with the provisions of (Regulations Regarding Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Merchant Ships), (Regulations Regarding Inspection of Gunpowder, Explosive Substances, Guns and Parts and Hunting Equipment ) and (Regulations Regarding Precautions to Be Taken in the Workshops Working with Combustible, Explosive, Dangerous and Harmful Substances) and by taking the necessary safety precautions.

Owner or agents of the ships carrying explosive, combustible, flammable and similar dangerous goods are responsible to notify the port administration about the type and quantity of the cargo on board. Ships carrying such goods can not anchor, berth to berths or wharves in other parts of the inner port or load or discharge these goods except bunker berth and bunker buoys in collateral breakwater.

Waste collection and disposal and noise control are regulated in detail within the scope of the Samsun Port Regulations.

In order to prevent dust generation, handling of dry bulk is performed in close sheds.



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9.3.3 Stakeholders

As discussed above, various organizations have various stakes in port development and its environmental implications. Main local stakeholders in relation to the Samsun Port are:

TCDD Samsun Port Administration, Regional Commandership of Coastal Security, State Authority for Railways, Ports and Sea Ports (DLH), Governorship of Samsun Province, Commandership of Garnison, Samsun Greater Municipality, Commandership of Gendarme, Regional Directorate of Marine Affairs, Regional Directorate of Highways, Province Directorate of Environment and Forestry, Free Trade Zone Directorate, Logistics and Transportation companies at the port, Waste Management Company.

TCDD is the owner of the port until operation rights will be transferred within the context of ongoing privatization process. TCDD will continue its presence as related with the rail ferry component.

Samsun Greater Municipality is responsible for safe disposal of domestic waste collected from the port, and also for indicating adequate location for the disposal of construction and demolition debris. Besides, the municipality has also role in inspection of waste disposal from ships.

Directorate of Environment and Forestry is another significant environmental stakeholder, as it is responsible for the monitoring and control of compliance with the environmental laws and regulations. The directorate is the primary authority to decide on the EIA application, scoping and implementation stages.

In planning of port lay-out, utilities and investment needs, it is significant to consult with the logistics and transportation companies currently located at the port, as the main users of future port operations. It has been achieved to an extent during this pre-feasibility stage.



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9.4 Environmental issues

Establishment of a ro-ro terminal and associated changes in the port can be assessed under the components outlined in the table below.

STAGE Environmental Issues

Groundwater quality analysis Soil quality analysis Sea water and sediment quality analysis

Environmental Due Diligence

Clean‐up (if contamination is detected)

Dust emissions Ambient noise Demolishment debris disposal Hazardous waste disposal

Demolishment

Asbestos containing material management Traffic adjustment Dust generation Traffic based emissions of NOx and SOx Construction debris disposal Ambient noise

Reconstruction

Visual concerns Waste and hazardous waste disposal Stormwater drainage Integrity testing of tanks Testing and maintenance of utilities Efficiency check for the waste reception plant

Removal and installation of equipment

Removal of ODS containing equipment Waste reception and proper wastewater discharge Solid waste management system Emission control from heating system Inspection system: x‐ray scanner radiation safety Soil contamination due to accidental spills or leakages Contamination of sea water due to accidental spill from the port Pollution of sea water due to ballast discharge from sea vessels Oil spills in the marine environment Ambient noise

Operation

Emergency issues: spills, fires, earthquake, etc.



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It should be recalled that the project activities will be performed within the existing port boundaries, thereby the following environmental issues are outside the scope of assessment:

land-use (no extension of the port is possible; all land-use in the urban zone is defined),

terrestrial ecology (given that no sensitive areas or valued ecological components exist within the urban zone),

marine ecology (given that there will be no dredging).

Besides the nuisance level environmental impacts (i.e. dust and noise) on the communities, the development of the port will accomplish positive impacts in terms of provision of local construction jobs and permanent employment opportunities.

9.5 Comparison of various project alternatives

The Project involves 3 alternatives/options assessed in technical, financial and environmental terms. The environmental impacts to be mitigated during the operation stage are similar for all alternatives, except for the case of movement of the x-ray scanner in alternative/option 3 to a farther location on the port that could be less safe in terms of radiation impacts on the public.

Environmental Issues

Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3

Construction and Demolishment Debris

Highest Lower Lowest

Dust emissions


Traffic‐based emissions


Noise generation


Radiation Safety

No change No change Possibly higher



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9.6 Priority project impacts

Impact Issue Direct Impacts Mitigation Measures Environmental Noise Operation of pile drivers,

earth moving and excavation equipment, concrete mixers, cranes and the transportation of equipment, materials and people. Road traffic outside the ro‐ro terminal

Develop noise control plan: Switching off plant and equipment when it is not in use; Establish site working hours; Program works to minimise working outside normal working hours; Brief all workers on noise control measures; Use of temporary noise screens or partial enclosures around particularly noisy activities. Traffic arrangement: restriction on working hours for construction vehicles.

Air Quality Emission of fugitive dust caused by a combination of on‐site excavation and movement of earth materials, contact of construction machinery with bare soil, and exposure of bare soil and soil piles to wind. Exhaust from diesel engines of earth moving equipment, as well as from open burning of solid waste on‐site.

Water spraying during demolition and construction, dry bulk loading and unloading during operation. Regular air quality checks of the exhausts of construction vehicles. Control of the speeds of the vehicles. Traffic management plan.

Waste Non Hazardous Hazardous Waste

Excess fill materials from grading and excavation activities, scrap wood and metals, and small concrete spills. Office, kitchen, and dormitory wastes when these types of operations are part of construction project activities. Contaminated soils, which could potentially be encountered on‐site due to previous land use activities, or

Sorting of recyclables to be sold to retailers; collection and disposal of remaining waste by municipality. Recycling of domestic waste: plastics, glass, paper and cardboard; collection and disposal of remaining waste by Municipality. Collection by certified companies and safe disposal at IZAYDAS facility.



April 2009

42

small amounts of machinery maintenance materials, such as oily rags, used oil filters, and used oil, as well as spill clean‐up materials from oil and fuel spills.

Contaminated Land Due to known or unknown historical releases of hazardous materials or oil, or due to the presence of abandoned infrastructure formerly used to store or handle these materials, including underground storage tanks.

Secondary containment where hazardous chemicals are places, above‐ground or under‐ground storage tanks are located, temporary waste storage locations, vehicle fuelling locations. Use of spill kits. Transportation vehicles should be maintained regularly in order not to cause oil leaks.

Stormwater Drainage

Rainfall that can wash the port surface of the port area where oil or chemical spills can be transferred into the groundwater or the sea water along with the stormwater.

Stormwater drainage system; oil separators if necessary.



April 2009

43

10 Overall conclusions

The port of Samsun has a good location on the north-eastern coast of Turkey, connected by waterways to TENs corridors 4, 7 and 8 on the western shore of the Black Sea, not too far from Ankara metropolitan area and opposite Mersin on the Mediterranean, which could enable Samsun to play the role of a north point for a land-bridge across Anatolia, relieving traffic congestion in the Bosporus and Canakkale straits.

Samsun annual traffic varies between 2 and 3 million tons, mainly consisting of dry bulk, general cargo and ro-ro (between 25,000 and 35,000 trailers per annum). So far container traffic did not develop in Samsun, just a few boxes being transported by ro-ro on road chassis. Ro-ro shipping routes link Samsun to Russian ports on the northern shore of the Black Sea (cf. location map 1). Samsun has in principle a substantive market potential in ro-ro transport, which could reach 60,000 to 80,000 trailers per year on the medium term. However, doubts remain regarding willingness of Russia to carry on operating ro-ro terminals in its ports, whereas ro-ro facilities in the ports are inadequate, especially in Samsun. Container might soon become a serious competitor to ro-ro.

This feasibility study proposes 3 technical options for development of adequate ro-ro facilities in Samsun, based on a modest start level of 15,000 to 20,000 trailers per year because of the current worldwide economic crisis, yet able to meet in the future a larger demand of 60,000 to 80,000 trailers. The 2 options consisting in keeping ro-ro activities in the port area where they are currently based are rather expensive, reaching 6 to 7 million euro in capital cost, as they call for significant demolition and re-pavement works, whereas the option located in the north would be approximately twice cheaper, worth euro 3 million. Besides, as ro-ro revenues for the port would be the same, the northern option logically exhibits the best financial results in terms of internal rates of return. As far as environment is concerned the northern option should also be the preferred one, although expected impacts on the environment are pretty limited in all cases.

The port masterplan study which is currently being launched by the future port concessionaire should consider development of ro-ro in close relationship with that of container. First because they can both address similar commodities, second because they can share common areas on port yards. In principle container is more effective than ro-ro at sea as well as in ports, but container mode requires specific handling and storage facilities along the whole chain, from origin to destination, which are not sufficiently available in the Black Sea region for the time being.



April 2009

44

Development of ro-ro in Samsun would also require construction of refrigerated warehouses allowing to preserve fresh fruits and vegetables for export, as well as a large trailer park located a few kilometres away from the port.

Lastly, as shown by location map 2, the port of Samsun benefits from a large reserve of protected area in the southern part of its inner basin, leaving room for significant traffic growth. The Consortium is aware that part of this protected area is currently occupied by municipal “green areas” dedicated to leisure activities, yet he is of the opinion that in case of maritime growth demand an agreement should be found between the Port Authority and the Municipality, allowing to make use of these green areas for port development purposes, for instance by proposing compensatory leisure areas outside the port.

o0o

Annexes:

1. Market Study Report

2. Cost Estimates Breakdowns (Option 1, Option 2 & Option 3)

3. Financial Tables

4. Minutes of the workshop held in Ankara on 26 February 2009

Maps and Drawings:

• Location Map 1

• Location Map 2

• Existing Situation




Annex 1

Market Study Report

1

Market Research for a RoRo terminal

in the Port of Samsun, Turkey

Final report, March 2009

2

Contents

1 Introduction 3

2 Assessment of the current volumes in Samsun 4 2.1 Traffic volumes in Samsun, 2004-2007 4 2.2 Estimated volumes in 2008 Erreur ! Signet non défini.

3 Hinterland and market potential 6 3.1 Analysis of current situation 6 3.2 Estimated hinterland potential 2005 9 3.2 Market potential 2020 12

4 Assessment of current RoRo lines 14

5 Bottlenecks and prospects for RoRo transport 16 5.1 Bottlenecks 16 5.2 Prospects 17

5 Summary and Conclusions 18

3

1 Introduction

Within the TRACECA project “Improvement of Maritime Links between TRACECA and TENs” a

feasibility study was requested by the Turkish TRACECA representative concerning a

possible RoRo terminal in the port of Samsun.

In the current situation there is some RoRo traffic via the port of Samsun, but the facilities

are basic. If the port has the potential to attract more RoRo traffic, an investment in

upgrading of RoRo facilities could be economically viable.

In this report an attempt will be made to estimate the potential of Samsun as a RoRo port in

terms of volumes i.e. number of tonnes and number of trucks and trailers that in potential

could use the facilities of the port of Samsun.

The port of Samsun used to be a TCDD1 managed port. However, recently the port has been

sold to the Ceynak Group via a BOT2 construction.

1 TCDD is the national Turkish railway company, state owned.

2 Build – Operate - Transfer

4

2 Assessment of the current volumes in Samsun

2.1 Traffic volumes in Samsun, 2004-2007

General port statistics

The following tables give some statistics about the activities in the port of Samsun in the

period 2004 - 2007.


2004 2005

Loading Unloading Total Loading Unloading Total

General 122,552 74,632 197,184 97,069 73,088 170,157

Container 0 0 0 0 0 0

RoRo 295,296 263,703 558,999 381,747 268,127 649,874

Dry bulk 316,776 2,001,935 2,318,711 211,111 2,002,250 2,213,361

Other 0 37,340 37,340 0 33,816 33,816

Total 734,624 2,377,610 3,112,234 689,927 2,377,281 3,067,208


2006 2007

Loading Unloading Total Loading Unloading Total

General 154,688 83,581 238,269 228,457 145,894 374,351

Container 0 0 0 0 0 0

RoRo 367,598 275,406 643,004 407,642 214,603 522,245

Dry bulk 1,729 1,145,060 1,146,789 0 688,703 688,703

Other 0 18,229 18,229 2,000 29,006 31,006

Total 524,015 1,522,276 2,046,291 638,099 1,078,206 1,716,305

The tables show that the overall cargo turnover in tonnes has decreased considerably from

more than 3.1 million tonnes in 2004 to 1.7 million tonnes in 2007. During that period the

turnover in general cargo almost doubled, RoRo decreased by about 7%, while dry bulk

decreased from 2.3 million tonnes in 2004 to 688,703 tonnes in 2007. The main

commodities causing this decrease were coal (-20%), iron ore (-26%), scrap (-22%) and

wheat (-21%).

RoRo lines

Table 2.3 shows some figures about the RoRo connections in the port of Samsun and some

figures of other Black Sea ports in Turkey.

Table 2.3: Transported road goods transport vehicles, in numbers, 2002-2006

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Samsun-

Novorossiysk 18,095 19,846 31,201 39,220 38,961 31,423 23,523

Zonguldak-Ukraine 8,977 8,739 9,153 15,629 19,147

Rize-Poti 1,80 5,372 5,032 3,648 742

Trabzon-Sochi 3,641 1,609 3,512 3,403 6,574

The RoRo link with the Russia port of Novorossiysk was the only RoRo connection used in

the period between 2002 and 2009 from Samsun. Compared to the other Turkish ports in

5

the Black Sea region the figures show that Samsun was a relatively important RoRo port in

that period.

During the consultation with stakeholders the two RoRo operators active in Samsun

informed the consultant that in early 2008 they moved 2 of the 4 vessels active on the

relation Samsun- Novorossiysk to Zonguldak, to be active in RoRo traffic to Ukraine. This

explains the sharp decrease in RoRo activity in 2008.

Indications regarding RoRo traffic for 2009 are even lower, because of the impact of the

economic crisis. For example, a RoRo line reported to have executed only 3 trips to Russia

instead of the normal average of 13 trips per month in the month of January 2009.

Figure 2.4 shows a calculation of the average weight of the transported trailers/trucks via

RoRo in the port of Samsun.

Table 2.4: Average weight per trailer/truck Samsun - Novorossiysk

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Number of

trailers/trucks 18,529 17,812 18,095 19,846 31,201 39,220 38,961 31,423 23,523

Total weight 303,524 254,238 314,891 390,646 558,999 649,874 643,004 522,245 378,527

Weight per

trailer/truck 16.4 14.3 17.4 19.7 17.9 16.6 16.5 16.6 16.1

This calculation will be used to estimate the potential numbers of trailers/trucks on the

basis of forecast of transport flows in tonnes. The average weight of a unit in this period is

16.8 tonnes.

6

3 Hinterland and market potential

3.1 Analysis of current situation

The following map shows the potential markets for the Port of Samsun and the estimated

natural hinterland within Turkey.

Map 3.1 Potential markets and hinterland Port of Samsun

At first glance the potential (bilateral) markets for the Port of Samsun seem to be Romania,

Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia, while the natural hinterland within Turkey seems to

be the region Central and East Anatolia. Also some stakeholders indicated that the port of

Samsun plays a role in the export of fruits and vegetables from the region around the city of

Hatay to Russia.

Regarding the potential markets it has to be stated that, depending on the quality of

hinterland connections to for instance the Port of Mersin but also towards countries like

Iran, the Port of Samsun has potential for transit cargo between the countries in the north

and countries to the south and east of Turkey.

The following map shows some more detail of the Turkish hinterland of the Port of Samsun.

It must be said that improvement of the hinterland connections could easily expand the

natural hinterland of the port especially to the east and to the south.

7

Map 3.2 Detailed Turkish hinterland Port of Samsun

Stakeholders indicate that the actual domestic hinterland of Samsun expands more to the

East than the map suggests. In the following analysis this will be checked.

The following table shows the import flows between the described Turkish hinterland of

Samsun and the potential international markets: Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova,

Romania, Russia and Ukraine for 20053.

3 The figures are derived from the EU project ‘WorldNet” that is currently being carried out by NEA. In

this project the base year for statistics is 2005.

8

Table 3.1 Import flows from BY, BG, GEO, MD, RO, RUS and UA to the natural hinterland of

Samsun, 2005, in tonnes

The import of coal has the largest share with 21% of total imports, followed by crude

petroleum with 14%, and non-fuel derivates with 12%. This import comes mainly from

Russia.

The following table shows the export flows from the natural Turkish hinterland of Samsun to

the potential international markets: Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia

and Ukraine for 2005.

Export is dominated by fresh and frozen vegetables and fruits with a share of 18%, followed

by other manufactured articles with 13% and leather textiles and clothing with 12%.

9

Table 3.2 Export flows from the natural hinterland of Samsun to international markets,

2005, in tonnes!

3.2 Estimated hinterland potential 2005

Total estimated potential

To estimate the potential for RoRo in the current situation it is needed to eliminate from the

import and export figures cargo that seems not suitable for RoRo (coal, waste, iron ores

etc).

For the import relation Samsun – Russia this leaves 273,000 tonnes. In reality about

268,000 was recorded for RoRo at the Port of Samsun, which seems to match with the

elimination of non-suitable cargo and the estimation of the hinterland and markets.

If the elimination of cargo not suitable for RoRo is also carried out for the other countries

this leaves as potential for Bulgaria some 94,000 tonnes, for Romania 73,000 and for

Ukraine 196,000 tonnes (see table 3.3).

To estimate the potential for RoRo in export it is needed to also eliminate from the export

figures cargo that seems not suitable for RoRo (coal, waste, iron ores etc). For the relation

Samsun – Russia this leaves 62,000 tonnes. In reality about 382,000 was recorded for RoRo

at the Port of Samsun, which seems to indicate that the Turkish hinterland of Samsun for

exports is much wider than indicated in map 2.2. This has been confirmed by stakeholders

who stated that especially the South East region around Hatay also belongs to the potential

hinterland, mainly because of the vegetables and fruits exported from there to Russia.

Therefore the analysis has been carried out agin for exports using the hinterland as

presented in map 3.3.

10

Map 3.3 Extended Turkish hinterland export Port of Samsun

When the hinterland is extended to the South and East the potential RoRo flows are up to

133,000 tonnes, which is still a factor 2.9 less that the real figure for 2005 indicates.

Apparently the hinterland of Samsun for export flows is even wider. In the tables below the

export figures are corrected with this factor 2.9.

To calculate the potential of other relations than Samsun - Russia, in this case for the

countries Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia, the same elimination

of not-suitable cargo has been done. The outcome then was multiplied by a factor 2.9 to

take into account the wider hinterland of Samsun than shown on map 3.3.

Table 3.3 summarises the results of the analysis in terms of potential tonnage to be

transport between the Port of Samsun and the countries mentioned on the basis of 2005

figures.

Table 3.3 Total market potential RoRo, Port of Samsun, 2005, tonnes

BY BG GEO MD RO RUS UA Total

Import 2005 912 94,066 6,921 1,188 73,782 273,366 196,067 646,302

Export

(wider

hinterland) 2,349 170,198 98,426 16,713 203,554 387,861 130,781 1,009,882

Total 3,261 264,264 105,347 17,901 277,336 661,227 326,848 1,656,184

The analysis seems to indicate that the Port of Samsun has potential to act as a RoRo

destination for countries like Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. This potential is

about a factor 2.5 higher then the realised volume in 2005.

11

Market potential corrected for direct road transport

The results of the analysis of RoRo potential for Samsun have to be corrected for the

possible use of other modes of transport. For the mentioned destinations RoRo has to

compete with direct road transport, and the outcome of that is dependent on the costs of

using RoRo versus the costs of direct road transport. Other factors that influence decisions

are bilateral trip permits for road haulage and tolls to be paid4. During interviews with

stakeholders most of these stakeholders indicate that for destinations in Romania and

Bulgaria RoRo is not a good alternative.

The following table shows the results of a simple analysis of the costs of direct road

transport versus the costs of RoRo. The table assumes road transport costs of EUR 1/km5,

and RoRo costs of EUR 800 (based on the current tariffs for Novorossiysk)6.

Table 3.4 Costs of direct road transport versus RoRo

Road

transport

costs

Ferry

costs

Road

transport

costs

Total

costs

Ankara 422 Samsun 800 Constantza 222 Bucharest 1444

Ankara 1115 Bucharest 1115

Ankara 422 Samsun 800 Constantza 0 Constantza 1222

Ankara 1070 Constantza 1070

Ankara 422 Samsun 800 Odessa 474 Kiev 1696

Ankara 1952 Kiev 1952

Ankara 422 Samsun 800 Odessa 0 Odessa 1222

Ankara 1651 Odessa 1651

Though the analysis is very rough and does no take into account extra charges like to

charge on transit permits and restrictions on the import of fuels, the analysis clearly shows

that RoRo transport from Central Anatolia using the port of Samsun doesn’t seems to be

economically viable. It indicates that such a RoRo connection can only be sustainable in

case of for instance problems with road transport permits, like a lack of transit permits for

Bulgaria and loco permits for Romania. Also increasing tolls could influence the cost

balance. Obviously the same result as for Romania goes for Bulgaria.

The analysis also shows that in principle Ukraine could be an interesting destination for

RoRo transport from Central and East Anatolia via Samsun. Also there could be a small

market for Georgia and Belarus.

If we assume that 50% of the RoRo transport in relation to Ukraine will be dealt with in

Zonguldak, 50% of traffic in relation to Georgia will be dealt with by other modes and/or

ports, and 50% of traffic in relation to Belarus will go via other ports or by road, the total

market potential adds up to 878,955 tonnes.

4 Sometimes a combination of tolls and permits exist. Bulgaria started charging extra money for transit

permits in 2008. At first the charge was EUR 86 for a single trip, later the charge was reduced to EUR 43 per single trip.

5 This price is more or less an average of the price of Turkish international road transport

6 As stated earlier, the price of RoRo in the Black Sea is relatively high compared to prices for RoRo in Western Europe. More competition could lead to lower prices which might influence the results of the analysis, especially if the costs for direct road transport would go up due to extra charges like tolls.

12

Table 3.5 Market potential RoRo corrected for direct road transport, Port of Samsun, 2005,

tonnes


Import 2005 912 6,921 273,366 196,067 477,266

Export (wider hinterland) 2,349 98,426 387,861 130,781 619,417

Total potential 3,261 105,347 661,227 326,848 1,096,683

50% UA via Zonguldak

50% GEO other

50% BY other 1,630 52,674 661,227 163,424 878,955

Table 3.6 summarises the realisation in 2005 and the market potential.

Table 3.6 Summary market potential RoRo, Port of Samsun, 2005, tonnes & units

Realisation 2005 Potential 2005

Tonnes 649,874 878,955

Units 39,220 53,045

3.2 Market potential 2020

The same analysis as for 2005 was done using forecasted volumes7 per product category for

the year 2020. The following table shows the results.

Table 3.7 Total market potential RoRo Port of Samsun, 2020, tonnes


Import

2020 2,672 104,384 5,476 827 153,636 271,832 219,785 758,613

Export

2020 wider

hinterland 6,743 154,114 85,626 19,456 309,977 1,598,763 292,028 2,466,707

Total 2020 9,416 258,499 91,102 20,283 463,613 1,870,595 511,813 3,225,319

7 Forecast results taken from the project “Improvements of Maritime Links between TRACECA and TENs”

and the NEA project “Worldnet”.

13

If we again assume that 50% of the RoRo transport in relation to Ukraine will be dealt with

in Zonguldak, 50% of traffic in relation to Georgia will be dealt with by other modes and/or

ports, and 50% of traffic in relation to Belarus will go via other ports or by road, and the

results are corrected for the competition from direct road transport (BG, RO, MD), the total

market potential in 2020 adds up to 2,176,760 tonnes (129,362 units).

Table 3.8 Total market potential RoRo Port of Samsun, 2020, tonnes, units


Import 2020 2,672 5,476 271,832 219,785 499,765

Export 2020 wider

hinterland 6,743 85,626 1,598,763 292,028 1,983,159

Total 2020 9,416 91,102 1,870,595 511,813 2,482,925

50% UA via Zonguldak

50% GEO other

50% BY other 4,708 45,551 1,870,595 255,906 2,176,760

Units (16.8 ton average) 279 2,707 111,167 15,208 129,362

The results of table 3.8 need to be handled with care because in the near future RoRo

transport in the Black Sea will get more competition from container transport as more

container facilities will be build in Black Sea ports.

14

4 Assessment of current RoRo lines

General

Currently, automotive and construction goods are mostly carried by RoRo from Samsun to

Novorossiysk. There is a reduction in food carriages in last years. Hatay (a city in

Mediterranean region) is the hinterland of Samsun in terms of fruit and vegetables. The

goods are loaded to semi-trailers and carried by RoRo vessels. Although the demand in

Russia for food is very high, the amount of the carriages of those goods has been reducing

because of the lack of RoRo services and semi-trailers. The construction goods will continue

to have priority for Ro-Ro carriages, especially for the construction investments in

Kazakhstan.

Samsun – Novorossiysk (RUS)

Until April 2008 there were 4 RoRo vessels sailing between Samsun and Novorossiysk,

exploited by Ulosoy and Genk Group. However, 2 vessels were transferred to the port of

Zonguldak, where they now sail between Zonguldak and two ports in UA (Skadovsk and

Yevpotaria).

The reason for this is that the Russians reduced the capacity in Novorossiysk. They bought

the terminal of Ulosoy and now they only offer one limited berth to Turkish RoRo vessels.

The reason is that the Russian want to transform Novorossiysk into a container port, and

they don’t want RoRo traffic there.

Turkish hauliers are now using Zonguldak to go to Ukraine and then to Russia, however it is

estimated that 80% of transport now goes over land via Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and

then to Russia.

As an alternative, the Russians apparently are developing the port of Kavkaz where good

facilities for RoRo seem to be planned to be build that will be able to handle 5 vessels at the

same time. However, this port can easier be reached from the Turkish port of Zonguldak in

comparison with Samsun, because it is closer for cargo from the Istanbul and the Ankara

region.

Other sources indicate that the Port of Kavkaz is not a good alternative because vessels

have to pass through a narrow channel to reach to Sea of Azov. Kavkaz also has problems

with the draft (5m).

Now there are only 4 navigations in a week between Samsun and Novorossiysk. According

to stakeholders there is not another convenient port in Russia for a RoRo connection with

Samsun.

The latest information shows that also due to the financial crisis RoRo transport to Samsun

has more or less collapsed, and that there were not more than 3 trips in the month of

January.

Samsun – Geoport (RUS)

There was another port in Russia called Geoport, which belonged to the Ministry of Natural

Resources of Russia. There had been 12 navigations in a week between Samsun and

Geoport until April 2007. However it has been closed by the government.

Other possible RoRo links

The other ports in the Black Sea are not convenient for Samsun in terms of Ro-Ro

navigation. Generally the Ukrainian Ports doesn’t seem efficient for a Ro-Ro connection with

Samsun. If we consider Illichevsk there is already a Ro-Ro linkage between Derince and

Illichevsk and the most of the vehicles chooses Kapıkule Border Gate to go to Ukraine.

Therefore a Ro-Ro connection between Samsun and Illichevsk would be risky and because

the distance is too much it would be also costly. Furthermore if we consider Odessa there is

not a Ro-Ro Terminal in this port. Maybe the Skadovsk Port can be an alternative but it has

15

to be improved. The Sevastopol port is not sufficient for a Ro-Ro connection. The draft of

the quays of Caucasus port has to be developed. Sochi port is also not a good alternative,

because the highway connection between Sochi and it’s hinterland is not good enough. The

Ro-Ro traffic should always be oriented to the East so Ukrainian ports don’t seem attractive

for Samsun. If the vehicles will experience difficulties to pass the Kapıkule Border Gate in

the future, a port in Crimean region can be a potential for Ro-Ro navigations from Samsun.

Currently, only Poti port can be considered as an alternative for a Ro-Ro connection.

Because there is a serious development in Georgia in terms of liberalization in bureaucracy,

handling capacity in Poti port is growing. However Poti doesn’t have a hinterland because of

the problems between Russia and Georgia.

Possibly the line Constantza and Samsun could be viable. In the past there has been a rail

ferry service between Samsun and Constantza.

Port of Karasu – Sakarya

Apparently at the moment a new port is constructed at Karasu, located west of Zonguldak /

Eregli and close to Istanbul. If the draft problem of this port would be solved, stakeholders

see potential for this port for RoRo services.

16

5 Bottlenecks and prospects for RoRo transport

5.1 Bottlenecks

Relation Turkey - Russia

There are three types of problems with Russia that negatively influences RoRo traffic in

relation to Samsun:

• Lack of road transport permits

There are limitations for transport permits for Turkish vehicles. The Russian government

gives only a limited amount of transport permits to the Turkish government. Also, the total

number of permits is given in 4 tranches. Sometimes when the permits are distributed alet,

vehicles wait for the permits at the parking lots in Samsun and vessels cannot leave without

these vehicles so sailing schedules are not kept.

• Russia is turning Novorossiysk into a container port, and apparently moving RoRo to

Kavkaz

As mentioned before, some stakeholders indicate that Russia is replacing RoRo terminals to

the port of Kavkaz, and offers only limited space for RoRo in Novorossiysk. The reason is

that the Russian want to transform Novorossiysk into a container port, and they don’t want

RoRo traffic there.

As an alternative, the Russians seemingly are developing the port of Kavkaz where good

facilities for RoRo will be build that will be able to handle 5 vessels at the same time.

However, this port can easier be reached from the Turkish port of Zonguldak in comparison

with Samsun, because it is closer for cargo from the Istanbul and the Ankara region.

However, some stakeholders indicate that the draft of the channel to the \Sea of Azov is to

small for RoRo vessels.

• Ban on container trucking with different licensed trailers

In a number of Black Sea countries, like Russia and Turkey, it is forbidden to truck a

container with a tractor that has a different license plate. For instance, a Turkish licensed

trailer arriving unaccompanied in Russia from Samsun cannot be trucked by a Russian

tractor to its destination in Russia. The same goes for a Russian trailer arriving in Samsun,

which cannot be trucked by a Turkish tractor.

Because of this, accompanied trailers need to be unloaded and the cargo has to be loaded

on another trailer. This is a highly inefficient operation.

High price of RoRo services and low quality

According to the main stakeholders RoRo prices are relatively high because of a lack of

competition. Furthermore, the quality of services at terminals and onboard vessels is low in

terms of facilities for drivers and trucks.

Indications are that the current tariff for a return trip to Novorossiysk is around USD 1850

per unaccompanied trailer. A similar stretch in Western Europe would costs about 60% of

this amount.

The Samsun RoRo terminal

The RoRo Terminal in Samsun is not sufficient. First of all there must be two different gates

in Samsun Ro-Ro Terminal, one for unloading process of import goods and another for

customs operations for export goods. The current situation causes waste of too much time

in Samsun Ro-Ro Terminal.

17

Bottlenecks according to Ceynak, new management of Samsun

There are some bottlenecks for the development of Ro-Ro in Samsun. The first one is the

current problem with Russia. Secondly the Ro-Ro companies in Samsun are not open to

cooperation. Thirdly the space is not enough to establish a new and efficient infrastructure.

For instance the size of the parking area is too much and dispersed. Also the two Ro-Ro

companies Ulusoy and Cenk Group occupy a large field. May be this field has to be used as a

Ro-Ro + Container Terminal.

5.2 Prospects

Samsun - Russia

The future of RoRo services in Samsun seem to depend for a large part on the situation in

the port of Novorossiysk and partly on the Turkish – Russian and Turkish – Bulgarian

relation regarding transport permits. Given the Russian initiatives to transfer RoRo facilities

to Kavkaz or other Russian ports, and especially their plans to ban RoRo from Novorossiysk

the prospects seem vague, even if the problem of transport permits would be solved.

Furthermore, the current crisis has a large impact on the current trade and the number of

trips of vessels. In January apparently only 3 trips were made compared to the average of

13 in a normal month.

Samsun - Romania

As the analysis in chapter 3 shows, there might be market potential for RoRo services to

Romania.

However, taken into account a price of EUR 1 per kilometre in international road transport,

and an estimated ferry cost of EUR 800 for a RoRo line between Samsun and Constantza

(single trip, trailer)8 it is clear that a RoRo service is not attractive unless the permit

situation with Bulgaria would change drastically.

Samsun – Ukraine

As the analysis in chapter 3 shows, there might be market potential for RoRo services to

Ukraine.

If the place of origin is for example Ankara and the destination would be Odessa, it would

take EUR 422 (EUR 1/km) to Samsun, and a ferry trip of EUR 800 to Odessa. In total this

would be EUR 1222. Given the distance between Ankara and Odessa by road of 1651 km

and an estimated EUR 1 per kilometre, it is clear that in principle there is a market for RoRo

from the Samsun hinterland to Ukraine.

The Ceynak Group

The new owner of the port, the Ceynak Group, intends to invest in an extensive upgrade of

the port, and is focusing on the following activities:

• Improve efficiency and facilities for handling and storage of dry bulk

• Rail ferry (5 year contract for a Russian gauge rail ferry connection with Kavkaz)

connections with the port of Mersin

• Development of a container terminal

• Improvement of RoRo facilities

Through interviews with stakeholders (port users) the consultant got the impression that

many port users are welcoming the new management of the port, and expect a boost in

activities from this change.

8 The estimated EUR 800 is base don the price charged currently for Samsun – Novorossiysk. This price,

as stated earlier is almost twice as high as a price in Western Europe for a similar service.

18

5 Summary and Conclusions

The main findings of the study were:

• The only RoRo line active in Samsun is the Samsun – Novorossiysk line.

• RoRo traffic in 2008 on this line in Samsun was 378,527 tonnes (23,523 units).

• Russia turns Novorossiysk into a container port, tries to reduce RoRo traffic there, and

apparently wants to develop Kavkaz as a RoRo port. Turkish stakeholders indicate that

the draft of the channel to Kavkaz is not good for RoRo vessels

• As a result, in the beginning of 2008 the RoRo companies Ulusoy and Cenk moved 2 out

of their 4 vessels to Zonguldak. These vessels now operate on the line Zonguldak –

Ukraine.

• The reduction of vessels has led to a drop in the number of trailers handled in 2008 to

23,523 (in 2007 31,423 units were handled)

• The financial crisis also has an impact on RoRo in Samsun. In January 2009, instead of

the usual 13 trips only 3 trips were made by RoRo vessels between Samsun and

Novorossiysk.

• An analysis of the current market potential for RoRo in Samsun, taking into account

Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia and the Turkish

hinterland of Samsun - Central and East Anatolia and South East Turkey - indicates a

potential of about 879,000 tonnes or about 53,045 units for 2005.

• The market potential for 2020 could grow to more than 2 millions tonnes and 129,000

trailers.

• Zonguldak seems geographical speaking more favourable for RoRo transport to Ukraine.

• RoRo transport will get serious competition from container transport. Given the fact that:

o Container facilities are being built on the Turkish Black Sea coast (Samsun,

Filyos) and in Russian ports like Novorossiysk and in Ukrainian ports.

o RoRo facilities seem to decrease, especially in Russia.

o RoRo is inefficient because of national legislation in Russia and Turkey that

forbids trucking of foreign trailers.

o The lack of competition leads to relatively high prices for RoRo, almost twice

as much compared to RoRo prices in Western Europe.

o Problems with road transport permits hinder the development of RoRo.

Overall conclusion

Overall the conclusion is that Samsun has in principle a substantive market potential in

RoRo transport. The most important factor however, is the willingness of Russia to build and

operate RoRo terminals in its ports.

If facilities are available and legal bottlenecks are removed Samsun has the potential of

handling more than 129,000 units per year in 2020. If one third or half of this potential

would be taken over by container transport, this still leaves a potential of 65,000 to 86,000

trailers per year in 2020.

But because the RoRo facilities seem to disappear (especially in Russia) in the short run,

and because the financial crisis has a deep impact on RoRo transport, the expectation is

that during the coming years RoRo will stay at a modest level of around 15,000 to 25,000

units per year.

Annex 2

Breakdowns of Cost Estimates (for options 1, 2 & 3)

Quantity Unit Rate Amount Sub-Total

Quay wall works

Repair works on capping beam 200 lm 700 140 000Bollards & fenders works 200 lm 300 60 000

200 000Demolition works

Demolition of warehouses 7 500 m2 25 187 500Demolition of pavement on quay apron 30 600 m2 15 459 000Demolition of buildings at port gate

Shipping agents' building 2 300 m2 40 92 000Gate buildings & fences 1 ls 40 000 40 000

778 500Pavement works

Pavement on quay apron 30 700 m2 40 1 228 000Pavement in the gate area 13 600 m2 35 476 000Pavement near weighbridge 4 500 m2 15 67 500

1 771 500

Gate complex worksMain building 480 m2 1 000 480 000Control booths 1 ls 120 000 120 000Fencing 320 lm 900 288 000

888 000

Floodlighting works 60 000 m2 3 180 000 180 000

Security equipment 1 ls 250 000 250 000 250 000

Construction of new silos (cap. 20,000 tons) 1 ls 2 100 000 2 100 000 2 100 000

Procurement of new handling equipmentTug masters 5 piece 30 000 150 000Chassis 10 piece 12 000 120 000

270 000

Contingencies 10% 643 800

7 081 800

Samsun RoRo Terminal - Option 1

(all prices in euro, exclusive of any taxes)

Total

18 March 2009


Quay wall works

Repair works on capping beam 200 lm 700 140 000Bollards & fenders works 200 lm 300 60 000


Demolition of warehouses 7 500 m2 25 187 500Demolition of pavement on quay apron 30 600 m2 15 459 000Demolition at port gate

Fences 320 lm 150 48 000Gates 2 piece 200 400

694 900Pavement works

Pavement on quay apron 30 700 m2 40 1 228 000Pavement in the gate area 5 900 m2 20 118 000Pavement near weighbridge 4 500 m2 15 67 500

1 413 500

Gate complex worksMain building 450 m2 1 000 450 000Control booths 1 ls 120 000 120 000Fencing 135 m 900 121 500

691 500



Construction of new silos (cap. 20,000 tons) 1 ls 2 100 000 2 100 000 2 100 000


270 000


6 379 890

Samsun RoRo Terminal - Option 218 March 2009


Total


Quay wall works

Repair works on capping beam 300 m 600 180 000Bollards & fenders works 300 m 300 90 000


Northern gate 1 ls 15 000 15 000Fences 225 m 150 33 750

48 750

Pavement works

Pavement between quay & gate 29 000 m2 15 435 000Pavement outside the gate 10 800 m2 35 378 000

813 000

Gate complex worksMain building 450 m2 1 000 450 000Control booths 1 ls 120 000 120 000Fencing 245 m 900 220 500

790 500



Transfer of x-ray scanner 1 ls 150 000 150 000 150 000

New weighbridge 1 ls 60 000 60 000 60 000


270 000


2 994 475


18 March 2009


Total

Annex 3

Financial Tables

Total Depreciation Depreciation/year

(in years) (in €)

Quay wall works 200 000 25 8 000 Demolition works 778 500 25 31 140 Pavement works 1 771 500 25 70 860 Gate complex works 888 000 25 35 520 Floodlighting works 180 000 15 12 000 Security equipment 250 000 15 16 667 Construction of new silos (cap. 20,000 tons) 2 100 000 25 84 000 Procurement of new handling equipment 270 000 15 18 000 Contingencies 10% 643 800 15 42 920

Total 7 081 800

Rest value in 2020

Quay wall works 200 000 88 000 112 000 Demolition works 778 500 342 540 435 960 Pavement works 1 771 500 779 460 992 040 Gate complex works 888 000 390 720 497 280 Floodlighting works 180 000 132 000 48 000 Security equipment 250 000 183 333 66 667 Construction of new silos (cap. 20,000 tons) 2 100 000 924 000 1 176 000 Procurement of new handling equipment 270 000 198 000 72 000 Contingencies 10% 643 800 472 120 171 680

7 081 800 3 571 627


Total Depreciation Depreciation/year(in years) (in €)

Quay wall works 200 000 25 8 000 Demolition works 694 900 25 27 796 Pavement works 1 413 500 25 56 540 Gate complex works 691 500 25 27 660 Floodlighting works 180 000 15 12 000 Security equipment 250 000 15 16 667 Construction of new silos (cap. 20,000 tons) 2 100 000 25 84 000 Procurement of new handling equipment 270 000 15 18 000 Contingencies 10% 579 990 15 38 666

Total 6 379 890

Rest value in 2020

Quay wall works 200 000 88 000 112 000 Demolition works 694 900 305 756 389 144 Pavement works 1 413 500 621 940 791 560 Gate complex works 691 500 304 260 387 240 Floodlighting works 180 000 132 000 48 000 Security equipment 250 000 183 333 66 667 Construction of new silos (cap. 20,000 tons) 2 100 000 924 000 1 176 000 Procurement of new handling equipment 270 000 198 000 72 000 Contingencies 10% 579 990 425 326 154 664

6 379 890 3 197 275


Total Depreciation Depreciation/year(in years) (in €)

Quay wall works 270 000 25 10 800 Demolition works 48 750 25 1 950 Pavement works 813 000 25 32 520 Gate complex works 790 500 25 31 620 Floodlighting works 120 000 15 8 000 Security equipment 200 000 15 13 333 Transfer of x-ray scanner 150 000 15 10 000 New weighbridge 60 000 15 4 000 Procurement of new handling equipment 270 000 15 18 000 Contingencies 10% 272 225 15 18 148

Total 2 994 475

Quay wall works 270 000 118 800 151 200 Demolition works 48 750 21 450 27 300 Pavement works 813 000 357 720 455 280 Gate complex works 790 500 347 820 442 680 Floodlighting works 120 000 88 000 32 000 Security equipment 200 000 146 667 53 333 Transfer of x-ray scanner 150 000 110 000 40 000 New weighbridge 60 000 44 000 16 000 Procurement of new handling equipment 270 000 198 000 72 000 Contingencies 10% 272 225 199 632 72 593

Total 2 994 475 1 362 387


INCOME

Year 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020Traffic forecastTrailers High Units 25 000 44 000 63 000 82 000 101 000 120 000

Medium 25 000 36 000 47 000 58 000 69 000 80 000Low 25 000 32 000 39 000 46 000 53 000 60 000

Income 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Handling rate per unit 20 20 20 20 20 20

High € 500 000 880 000 1 260 000 1 640 000 2 020 000 2 400 000Medium € 500 000 720 000 940 000 1 160 000 1 380 000 1 600 000Low € 500 000 640 000 780 000 920 000 1 060 000 1 200 000


High € 625 000 1 100 000 1 575 000 2 050 000 2 525 000 3 000 000Medium € 625 000 900 000 1 175 000 1 450 000 1 725 000 2 000 000Low € 625 000 800 000 975 000 1 150 000 1 325 000 1 500 000


High € 750 000 1 320 000 1 890 000 2 460 000 3 030 000 3 600 000Medium € 750 000 1 080 000 1 410 000 1 740 000 2 070 000 2 400 000Low € 750 000 960 000 1 170 000 1 380 000 1 590 000 1 800 000

COSTS

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Operational costs 270 000 270 000 270 000 270 000 270 000 270 000 270 000 270 000 270 000 270 000 270 000

Maintenance costs 7,5% over Capital Investments

Option 1 531 135 531 135 531 135 531 135 531 135 531 135 531 135 531 135 531 135 531 135 531 135Option 2 478 492 478 492 478 492 478 492 478 492 478 492 478 492 478 492 478 492 478 492 478 492Option 3 224 586 224 586 224 586 224 586 224 586 224 586 224 586 224 586 224 586 224 586 224 586

Energy & utilities 60 000 60 000 60 000 60 000 60 000 60 000 60 000 60 000 60 000 60 000 60 000

Total costs

Option 1 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135Option 2 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492Option 3 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586

FINANCIAL RESULTS

Option 1 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Capital investments -7 081 800Residual value 3 571 627

Costs 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135

Revenues - Medium/€25 625 000 762 500 900 000 1 037 500 1 175 000 1 312 500 1 450 000 1 587 500 1 725 000 1 862 500 2 000 000

Cashflow -7 317 935 -98 635 38 865 176 365 313 865 451 365 588 865 726 365 863 865 1 001 365 4 710 492

IRR 2,13%

Option 1 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020


Costs 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135

Revenues - Medium/€30 750 000 915 000 1 080 000 1 245 000 1 410 000 1 575 000 1 740 000 1 905 000 2 070 000 2 235 000 2 400 000

Cashflow -7 192 935 53 865 218 865 383 865 548 865 713 865 878 865 1 043 865 1 208 865 1 373 865 5 110 492

IRR 6,16%

Option 1 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020


Costs 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135 861 135

Revenues - High/€30 625 000 1 035 000 1 320 000 1 605 000 1 890 000 2 175 000 2 460 000 2 745 000 3 030 000 3 315 000 3 600 000

Cashflow -7 317 935 173 865 458 865 743 865 1 028 865 1 313 865 1 598 865 1 883 865 2 168 865 2 453 865 6 310 492

IRR 13,26%

Option 2 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Capital investments 6 379 890Residual value 3 197 275

Costs 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492

Revenues - Medium/€25 625 000 762 500 900 000 1 037 500 1 175 000 1 312 500 1 450 000 1 587 500 1 725 000 1 862 500 2 000 000

Cashflow -6 563 382 -45 992 91 508 229 008 366 508 504 008 641 508 779 008 916 508 1 054 008 4 388 783

IRR 3,77%

Option 2 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020


Costs 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492

Revenues - High/€25 625 000 862 500 1 100 000 1 337 500 1 575 000 1 812 500 2 050 000 2 287 500 2 525 000 2 762 500 3 000 000

Cashflow -6 563 382 54 008 291 508 529 008 766 508 1 004 008 1 241 508 1 479 008 1 716 508 1 954 008 5 388 783

IRR 10,98%

Option 2 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020


Costs 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492 808 492

Revenues - Medium/€30 750 000 915 000 1 080 000 1 245 000 1 410 000 1 575 000 1 740 000 1 905 000 2 070 000 2 235 000 2 400 000

Cashflow -6 438 382 106 508 271 508 436 508 601 508 766 508 931 508 1 096 508 1 261 508 1 426 508 4 788 783

IRR 8,10%

Option 3 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020


Costs 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586

Revenues - Medium/€20 500 000 610 000 720 000 830 000 940 000 1 050 000 1 160 000 1 270 000 1 380 000 1 490 000 1 600 000

Cashflow -3 049 061 55 414 165 414 275 414 385 414 495 414 605 414 715 414 825 414 935 414 2 407 801

IRR 11,63%

Option 3 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020


Costs 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586

Revenues - Medium/€25 625 000 762 500 900 000 1 037 500 1 175 000 1 312 500 1 450 000 1 587 500 1 725 000 1 862 500 2 000 000

Cashflow -2 924 061 207 914 345 414 482 914 620 414 757 914 895 414 1 032 914 1 170 414 1 307 914 2 807 801

IRR 19,58%

Option 3 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020


Costs 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586 554 586

Revenues - Low/€20 500 000 570 000 640 000 710 000 780 000 850 000 920 000 990 000 1 060 000 1 130 000 1 200 000

Cashflow -3 049 061 15 414 85 414 155 414 225 414 295 414 365 414 435 414 505 414 575 414 2 007 801

IRR 5,53%

Annex 4

Minutes of the Workshop of 26 February 2009 in Ankara

Minutes of Meeting/Workshop

ID 0902-T-A-01-AM-EL Country Turkey Port/City Ankara Date 26 February 2009 Time 10:00 through 13:00 Authority/Company Ministry of Transport and Communications Participants The list of participants is attached to the minutes. Team members Mrs. Gönül Ertürer, Environmental Engineer

Mr. Edwin Lock, Project Team Leader Mr. André Merrien, Maritime Engineer

Remarks Mr. Klaas Westerkamp, Transport Economist, and Mr. Ewout van der Reijden, Maritime Engineer, could not take part to the meeting because their flight from Amsterdam had been cancelled, following the aircraft accident that happened near Amsterdam airport on 25 February.

A. General

The meeting/workshop was aimed at: - Enabling team members explain their preliminary findings and proposals

regarding the Port of Samsun RoRo Terminal Feasibility Study. To that end 4 PPT presentations were used:

o A Market Study & Traffic Forecast presentation. o A Terminal Planning presentation. o A presentation on Environmental Issues. o A presentation on Basis for Financial Analysis.

- Allowing team members receive comments and recommendations from

the participants, before completing the Feasibility Study, due by the end of March 2009.

Representatives of the current port owner/operator (TCDD) as well as of the future one (Ceynak) were present, which contributed to the success of the workshop. Presence of a shipping operator also helped a lot. Main topics discussed are summarized in the following text.

B. Discussions on the Market Study

Regarding past ro-ro traffic in Samsun, TCDD representatives are of the opinion that figures presented by the Consultant are standing below reality. At the end of the meeting they handed over a data sheet containing their past traffic figures, notably records for year 2008. The Consultant shall adjust his study with due consideration to the above data.

Ceynak does not seem to be against development of ro-ro in Samsun, but seems to believe more in container. They operate a container terminal in Mersin, and think that a land-bridge is feasible between Mersin and Samsun, for seaborne traffic from/to the Suez canal and Port Said. With that regard Ceynak believes that a block-train service should be launched between Mersin and Samsun. The Consultant was informed that the rail-ferry terminal in Samsun will soon be operational. The ramp is already completed, whereas construction of the boogie exchange station is about to start.

C. Discussions on Terminal Planning Ceynak confirmed that they are planning development of container traffic along the eastern pier, where water depths are above 12 m (close to the rail-ferry terminal), and also informed that they would like to develop container activities east of their existing grain silos – therefore they do not really like the proposed alternative 3 for ro-ro. Ceynak is currently launching a port-wide master plan, with the assistance of a British consultant. TCDD agrees with the principle of berthing ro-ro vessels with bow anchors only (without any dolphins). However, Mr. Tozar doubts that this is feasible with the proposed alternative 3 (TCDD will ask port pilots’ opinion about that, and will report to the Consultant). Ceynak does not like alternative 2 very much, because they may prefer to erect new buildings at the southern end of the port, where alternative 2 proposes a new gate. The Consultant is advised to consider construction of a reefer warehouse for storage of fruits and vegetables to be exported by ro-ro (and possibly containers, in the future). The Consultant was also advised to consider construction of a trailer park outside of the port, a few kilometers away from it.

D. Discussions on Environmental Issues Focusing on the scope of environmental concerns and studies, participants contributed in filling of some of the information gaps pointed during the presentation. One aspect was the currently unused above-ground storage tank that was formerly used for fuel storage. The tank is not in use since long. Although the port buildings are old, it was stated by the participants that no asbestos containing materials existed at the port. Considering that ACMs can be a concern during disposal of demolition debris, it is suggested by the team that an asbestos survey should be carried out. Upon the discussion on the need for an EIA, the participants stated that the port was exempt from the EIA regulation, given its construction before 1992, which exempts all projects before the date. However, it is a question of matter whether the ro-ro terminal was marked on the site layout plans before that date. If the ro-ro terminal was not planned before, an EIA has to be conducted definitely. However, it was perceived that environmental concerns did receive as much attention as the environmental liabilities required. It was emphasized by the project team that, regardless of the Turkish EIA legislation, a prospective loan from the EU or Equator Principles banks would definitely ask for a detailed environmental impact assessment. The presentation also raised a discussion on the stakeholders of the project and their roles. This led to a deeper discussion on the role of Ceynak, whose representatives were present at the meeting. It was stated that Ceynak was involved in a project meeting at a very late stage of the project, despite its position as the future operator of the port. It was understood in a recent site visit that Ceynak had assigned a consulting group for a feasibility study and marketing assessment for the port, and that Ceynak was not informed at all about the Project. The discussion went on in a way that a commitment was made by the Ministry of Transportation to reflect the findings and recommendations of the project at the stage of transfer of the port fully to Ceynak. However, it is still a vague issue, as Ceynak is continuing with their own plans, regardless of the findings of the Project. Environmental issues were scoped for the stages of demolition, construction and operation. It was confirmed that the Metropolitan Municipality is responsible for designating a suitable location for the disposal of demolition debris particularly from old pavement to be removed as well as quayside sheds to be demolished.

E. Discussions on Finance

The Consultant stated that after the rehabilitation of the ro-ro terminal, handling tariffs can be increased as the service level will be higher.

Besides, to ease his analysis, the Consultant asked TCDD to supply the yearly amount of paid parking days of trailers on the terminal (for the years 2002 – 2008).

o0o Attachments: List of Participants PPT Presentations: Market Study & Traffic Forecast Terminal Planning Environmental Issues Basis for Financial Analysis

Stakeholders Workshop Feasibility Study Samsun Ro-Ro Terminal Ankara, Turkey, 26 February 2009 List of participants Institution Participant name - position

TRACECA Turkey Barış TOZAR - TRACECA National Secretary

TRACECA Turkey Seçil ÖZYANIK - TRACECA Expert

Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs Fikret GAGLAR - Engineer

Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs Osman Fatih GİRAZ - Expert General Directorate of Road Transport Hakan ÖZDEMİR – Acting Operating Manager

General Directorate of Road Transport Bülent SÜLOĞLU - Expert

TCDD Hakan ERDOGAN - Chief of the Section

TCDD Ergun BAYAR - Chief of the Section

TCDD Levent PİRCİ - Engineer

RODER Ali GÜLKANAT

DLH – Port & Airport Construction Simter OZDEN

CEYNAK Nevzat ÖZKENEL

CEYNAK Atilla ÖZKUŞAKSIZ

SAMSUN Port Çağlayan AKSU - Deputy General Director

SAMSUN Port Soner SÖNMEZ

SAMSUN Port Hakan KURT

Maps and Drawings

Location map 1

Location map 2

Existing situation

Project option 1 (3 drawings)



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Location map 1

2

North

Rail-Ferry Terminal (under rehabilitation)

Green Area

Green Area

Cargo Berth

Main Berth

Samsun

Inner Harbour

Free Trade Zone

Yacht Club

Location map 2

Published April 2009

This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication is the sole responsibility of

Royal Haskoning, NEA, Egis Bceom International and other project partners, and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.

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