immigrant assimilation, canada 1971–2006: has the tide turned?
TRANSCRIPT
Immigrant Assimilation, Canada 1971–2006:Has the Tide Turned?
Michele Campolieti & Morley Gunderson &
Olga Timofeeva & Evguenia Tsiroulnitchenko
# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
Abstract Based on the micro files of the Canadian Census we document an increas-ing earnings penalty for cohorts of immigrants arriving after the late-1970s, especiallyfor the most recent cohort. We also find much quicker assimilation rates for thesecohorts, especially for the most recent cohort. Since the late-1970s, the increasingearnings penalty dominated their more rapid assimilation, so that immigrantsexhibited ever-deteriorating patterns of integration into the Canadian labour market.For the most recent cohort (2002–2006), this reversed itself, suggesting that the tidemay have turned. We find this for both men and women. Our findings are robustacross alternative regression specifications, as well as a sample that only considersfull-time and full-year workers.
Keywords Immigration .Assimilation .Earnings . Immigration policy.Census .Canada
Introduction
Being a nation with a large immigrant population, the issue of how immigrants fare inthe labour market is of immense importance for Canada. This is especially so giventhe importance of immigration in Canada’s labour force growth and the likely greater
J Labor ResDOI 10.1007/s12122-013-9167-z
M. CampolietiDepartment of Management (Scarborough Campus) and the Centre for Industrial Relations and HumanResources, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
M. Gunderson (*)Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, The Department of Economics and the Schoolof Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canadae-mail: [email protected]
O. Timofeeva : E. TsiroulnitchenkoUniversity of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
prominence in the near future when immigration could account for virtually all labourforce growth (Statistics Canada 2003, p.5).
If, within a reasonable period of time following entry, immigrant earnings donot become comparable to the earnings of Canadian-born workers with the samewage determining characteristics, then this can be perceived as a sign of dis-crimination. Such discrimination, whether it is perceived or real, will havenegative effects on the decision of these immigrants to remain in Canada andothers to come to Canada. This, in turn, will disadvantage Canada in the intenseinternational competition for skilled talent in the knowledge economy (Gera andSongsakul 2005). This is especially important since Canada needs a brain gain tooffset its brain drain to the U.S. Any reduced earnings of immigrants willadversely affect not only their economic well-being but also their emotionaland psychological well-being especially if they feel they have been lured intoCanada by an immigration policy that gives high points for education and skillsbut does not disclose that credentials may not be recognized (Bauder 2003; Grantand Nadin 2007). Since many new immigrants are also visible minorities, anydiscrimination against such groups also violates the letter and spirit of employ-ment equity initiatives since visible minorities are one of the four target groupsin those initiatives (the others being women, Aboriginal persons and persons witha disability).
If immigrants are not able to obtain jobs commensurate with their skills andcredentials this is also a loss of potential output for the Canadian economy.1
This is coming at a time when the large baby-boom population is entering theage of retirement when they will no longer be contributing to pay-as-you goexpenditures like public pensions and health care, but will be drawing on themfor a long period of time given increases in life expectancy. While there isgeneral recognition that expanded immigration will not provide a sufficient poolof new taxpayers to offset the increasing expenditures of an aging population(Guillimette and Robson 2006; Sweetman and Warman 2008), anything thatdeters immigrants from being effectively utilized in the labour market willexacerbate the issue.
Immigrants are often regarded as a potentially important pool to fill theimpending skill shortages associated with the retirement of the large baby-boompopulation. Obviously, if their skills are not utilized, this impedes their servingthat important role.
Poorer economic assimilation also increases the likelihood that immigrants mayend up in poverty,2 receiving transfer payments from such sources as social assis-tance, public housing and employment insurance. This in turn can foster backlashesagainst immigration, if immigrants become perceived as extracting from the social
1 Estimates of the loss of potential output to Canada from the lack of recognition of foreign credentials haveranged from $2.6 billion (Reitz 2001) to between $4.1 to $5.9 billion annually (Bloom and Grant 2001).2 Although overall poverty rates have been declining over time in Canada, the proportion of recentimmigrants (in Canada for 5 years or less) who fell below the Statistics Canada Low-Income cut-offincreased from 24.6 % in 1980 to 34.2 % in 1985, subsequently declining to 31.3 % in 1990 before rising toan astonishing 47 % in 1995, then falling to 35.8 % in 2000 and 36 % by 2005 (Picot et al. 2010, p. 14).
J Labor Res
safety net rather than contributing to it. Ultimately this can lead to social instability, ifimmigrants become part of the “have-nots” and excluded from society.
Unfortunately, these concerns may be coming to fruition, as the literature hasestablished a clear pattern of deteriorating earnings of immigrants into Canada,attributable to various factors.3 Immigrants are increasingly visible minorities, com-ing from non-English speaking, less-developed countries, giving rise to issues asso-ciated with discrimination, differences in language, literacy and numeracy, as well asproblems associated with the valuation of foreign credentials, education and labourmarket experience. Immigrants are also increasingly competing with Canadians,whose education has increased substantially, and immigrants are experiencing thedecline in the earnings of all new labour market entrants of which they are a part.Increasing labour market polarization implies that immigrants who cannot get high-end jobs may end up in low-paying jobs. Immigrants may also have been particularlyhard-hit by recent recessions, when Canada did not turn the immigration taps off asthey had in the past.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze that changing pattern of integration, usingCanadian Census data over a long time period, 1971–2006. To our knowledge, noother Canadian study utilizes such a long period, encompassing both the earlier 1971Census and the 2006 Census, to analyse the labour market integration of immigrants.4
We show how the entry penalty and the assimilation effect change over that period,and how the tide may have turned in the most recent census year with respect to thedeteriorating pattern of integration. We also show how these conclusions are robustacross alternative specifications and sample restrictions.
Data and Empirical Model
We use data from the public release files of Census of Canada for the years 1971,1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006 to estimate our earnings regressions. Thedata is restricted to persons 25 to 64 years of age,5 who worked a positive number ofweeks during the year prior to the census (for pay or in self-employment), and whoreported positive wages and salaries. Our annual earnings measure was as reported inthe Census and converted to real 2006 dollars; it includes self-employment income.
3 Studies that document the declining economic position of immigrants into Canada include Bloom andGunderson (1991), Baker and Benjamin (1994), Bloom et al. (1995), Grant (1999), Frenette and Morissette(2005), Hum and Simpson (2004a, b), Aydemir and Skuterud (2005), Picot and Sweetman (2005), Hiebert(2006), Reitz ( 2006, 2007a, b); Zietsma (2007), Ferrer and Craig Riddell (2008), Nadeau and Seckin(2010) and Beach et al. (2011).4 For example: Bloom and Gunderson (1991) are restricted to the 1971 and 1981 Census: Baker andBenjamin (1994) and Bloom et al. (1995) to the 1971, 1981 and 1986 Census: Aydemir and Skuterud(2005) to the 1981, 1986, 1996 and 2001 Census; and Picot and Piraino (2012) to the 1991, 1996, 2001 and2006 Census. Bonikowska et al. (2011) do use the 2006 Census but their analysis starts with the 1981Census, and it focuses on university educated immigrants and comparisons with the U.S. McDonald andWorswick (2010) also use the 2006 Census but their analysis starts with the 1991 Census and focuses ondifferent racial groups.5 As in Bonikowska et al. (2011) we excluded immigrants who arrived under the age of 25 in order not tocontaminate the results by differences in the composition of the age at migration across various cohorts, andbecause the labour market experience of youths may differ markedly from those who arrived as adults.
J Labor Res
Our basic specification follows closely that of Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) andBloom et al. (1995). It involves estimating a Chiswick (1978) type of immigrantearnings equation, augmented to include the cohort-specific effects emphasized byBorjas (1985):
y ¼ αI þ δYSM Ið Þ þX
jΘ jCOH j Ið Þ þ
Xjλ j COH j Ið Þ � YSM Ið Þ� �þ Xβ þ u; ð1Þ
where y is the natural log of real annual earnings, I is a dummy variable that indicateswhether the individual is an immigrant, YSM denotes the years since migration forimmigrants and takes the value 0 for individuals born in Canada, COHj is a set ofdummy variables that indicate when the j-th cohort of immigrants arrived in Canada,X is a vector of individual characteristics (a quadratic in age, years of education,6
marital status, a dummy variable for those that live in Montreal or Toronto and yeardummies) and u is a residual term. We refer to this specification as the basespecification. We also consider some additional specifications that incrementallyinclude: 1) dummies for hours worked per week and number of weeks of work peryear; 2) industry dummies; 3) region of origin dummies7; and 4), dummies indicatingwhether English or French are spoken at home. We add these variables incrementallyto see how the estimates on our key variables of interest change as these additionalvariables enter the model specification.
We consider two samples when we estimate Eq. (1). First, we use a sample of allworkers, which would include part- and full-time workers, as well as those thatworked a full year and part of the year. Second, we use a sample that restricts theanalysis to full-time and full-year workers,8 as done in Aydemir and Skuterud (2005)to abstract from labour supply considerations. There can be a legitimate debate aboutwhich sample is more appropriate. For example, movement from part-time or part-year employment into full-time or full-year employment may be a mechanismwhereby immigrants assimilate into the labour market, in which case it is informativeto focus on all workers and not restrict the analysis to full-time or full-year workers.We will provide and discuss both sets of estimates.
The key parameters of interest in Eq. (1) are: α, which captures the immigrantentry effect; Θj, which reflects entry effects that vary by arrival cohorts; δ theimmigrant assimilation effect; and λj, the assimilation effects varying by cohort—thatis, the coefficient estimates on the interaction of the assimilation and cohort effect.We estimate Eq. (1) using a pooled sample of all seven census years. This sampleallows us to interpret Θj as the entry earnings of cohort j relative to the excludedreference cohort (i.e., the pre-1956 cohort). These entry cohort effects can reflectchanges in the composition of immigrants (perhaps induced by immigration policy)in terms of unobservable characteristics over-and-above changes in their observablewage-determining characteristics that are controlled for in the analysis. They can alsoreflect macro-economic conditions that have a different effect on Canadian-born
6 Years of education were based on the mid-points of the education categories in the Census.7 Countries of origin are aggregated to regions, to be comparable across the different Census years andinclude: Europe; Asia; Africa; Central and South America and the Caribbean; Australia, New Zealand andthe Pacific Islands; the United States; and Canada as the omitted reference group.8 Full-time workers are those who worked 30+ hours per week and full-year workers are those who worked49-52 weeks per year.
J Labor Res
persons than new immigrants upon arrival, as outlined subsequently in our results anddocumented in the literature. The λj indicates the rate at which each of the entrycohorts is assimilating into the labour market. The estimates of the Θj s and λj s arethe primary focus of our analysis, as we will compare the entry earnings effects andassimilation rates of the more recent cohorts with earlier cohorts.
The estimates from Eq. (1) can also be used to estimate the number of years it wouldtake for the earnings of an immigrant to catch up to a Canadian-born individual (Bloomet al. 1995). Knowledge of the years-to-equality is informative, because it is, in effect, asummary statistic that combines the entry effects by cohort and the assimilation effects bycohort. For example, if cohort entry effects are negative but the assimilation rates arepositive, the years of equality determines how long it takes for the positive assimilationeffect to offset the negative entry effect and how this changes across different cohorts ofimmigrants. If cohort entry effects are becoming more negative over time, for example,this may be acceptable as long as they are offset by more rapid assimilation, so that thetime-to-equality is not increasing or is even decreasing. The years-to-equality (YTE) iscalculated by solving equation (1) for the YSM when the expected earnings for immi-grants will equal the expected earnings of Canadian-born persons, which yields
YTE ¼ − αþΘ jð Þδþλ j
. While the YTE is a useful summary measure, it can be problematic.
For example, when controls for region of origin are included in Eq. (1), they reflect entryeffects, which means that the years to equality would vary across source regions.Including job characteristics in Eq. (1), such as industry or hours of work, also createssome problems in the interpretation of the YTE. Also, the YTEmaymask the differencesin the experiences of entry cohorts. For example, a cohort with a faster assimilation rateand large earnings penalty may have a similar YTE as a cohort without an earningspenalty that does not assimilate. Consequently, we compute and present the YTE for ourbase specification, which does not include controls for job characteristics or country oforigin, to provide some information about the time it takes for immigrants to catch up tonative born Canadians.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The mean values of the variables used in our basic specification are given in Appendix A,separately for immigrants and non-immigrants, and for males and females. In general, themean values are fairly close for immigrants and non-immigrants, for both males andfemales. Exceptions are that immigrants were slightly more likely to be married, to live ina major city (Toronto orMontreal), and to work in manufacturing (especially females) andless likely to work in public administration. Not surprisingly, immigrants were also lesslikely to speak English or French at home.
Estimates from Full Sample
We present the estimates for men in Table 1 using the full sample that contains allworkers. We consider five specifications. We begin with a base specification and expand
J Labor Res
it incrementally, including variables which control for job characteristics (i.e., hours andweeks of work, and industry), as well as region of origin and whether English orFrench is spoken at home. Including these additional variables progressively allows usto determine how the cohort entry and assimilation effects change as more controls forobservable characteristics are included in the specification. A similar approach wastaken in Aydemir and Skuterud (2005).We also focus most of the discussion on the mostrecent arrival cohort.
The estimates on the cohort entry effects in Table 1 from the base specificationindicate a general worsening in the entry earnings of men arriving in Canada after the1970s. This worsening is especially pronounced for the most recent arrival cohorts. Inparticular, men arriving in Canada during 2002–2006 were earning 103 log pointsless than the pre-1956 arrival cohort, while the 1996–2001 cohort that proceeded itearned about 33 log points less than the pre-1956 arrival cohort. As controls for jobcharacteristics (specifications 1 and 2) are included in the regressions the estimate ofthe entry earnings penalty for the 2002–2006 cohort is about −60 log points. Theaddition of controls for region of origin and language (specifications 3 and 4) to themodel reduces the estimate of the earnings penalty to −52 log points for the 2002–2006 cohort. We also observe a similar pattern in the other estimates of the cohorteffects, as we introduce the additional variables (i.e., the absolute value of thecoefficient is smaller as additional controls are included in the regression). The largenegative entry effect for the 1991–1995 cohort may reflect the pronounced recessionof the early 1990s when, for the first time, the immigration “tap” was not turned downduring the recession. Similarly, the large negative entry effect for the most recent2002–06 cohort may reflect the economic slowdown of the early 2000s as well as thedot.com IT bust that disproportionately affected the heavy concentration of immi-grants in IT related occupations (Hou 2010, p. 1).
While the entry earnings effects for the more recent arrival cohorts (i.e., those arrivingafter the early-1980s) have worsened relative to the earlier arrival cohorts, the assimi-lation effects of these cohorts have improved somewhat. For example, the interactionterm between the YSM variable and the 1996–2001 cohort suggests an assimilationeffect of about 2 log points in the base specification, while the interaction term for YSMand the 2002–2006 cohort is about 21 log points. This estimate suggests that theassimilation of the 2002–2006 cohort is much quicker than the earlier arrival cohorts.While the estimate of the assimilation effect for the 2002–2006 becomes smaller as thecontrols for job characteristics and region of origin and language are added to theregressions, it is still about 9 log points and is also considerably larger than the estimatesof the assimilation rates for the arrival cohorts that preceded it. By comparison, theestimates on the interaction terms for the YSM and 1991–1995 and 1996–2001 cohortsare about 0 to 2 log points in specifications 1 to 4.
We see similar patterns for women in Table 2. The entry earnings for the 2002–2006cohort are considerably lower than the earlier arrival cohorts, with the 2002–2006 cohortearning 86 log points less than the pre-1956 cohort in the base specification. As controlsfor the job characteristics are included (specifications 1 and 2) the earnings penaltylessens, with the 2002–2006 cohort earning about 39 log points less than the pre-1956cohort. However, this is considerably worse than the 1991–1995 and 1996–2001 co-horts, which earn about 17 and 11 log points, respectively, less than the pre-1956 cohortin the specifications with job characteristics. The addition of controls for region of origin
J Labor Res
Tab
le1
OLSestim
ates
formen,allworkers
Base
12
34
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Years
sincemigratio
n(YSM)
0.0142
0.0007
0.0083
0.0006
0.0081
0.00
060.0071
0.00
060.0057
0.00
06
Immigrant
−0.3845
0.0210
−0.2264
0.0190
−0.2149
0.01
89−0
.1953
0.01
97−0
.1315
0.01
97
COHORT19
56–60
0.3425
0.0327
0.1566
0.0296
0.1544
0.02
940.1187
0.02
950.1251
0.02
94
COHORT19
61–65
0.3042
0.0330
0.1652
0.0299
0.1653
0.02
970.1492
0.02
980.1644
0.02
97
COHORT19
66–70
0.2623
0.0255
0.1600
0.0231
0.1638
0.02
300.1706
0.02
300.1674
0.02
30
COHORT19
71–75
0.1563
0.0262
0.0371
0.0238
0.0363
0.02
360.0570
0.02
380.0575
0.02
37
COHORT19
76–80
0.0228
0.0260
−0.0362
0.0236
−0.0360
0.02
34−0
.0212
0.02
35−0
.0150
0.02
35
COHORT19
81–86
−0.117
10.0274
−0.1562
0.0248
−0.1510
0.02
46−0
.1417
0.02
48−0
.1236
0.02
47
COHORT19
87–90
−0.3565
0.0259
−0.2719
0.0234
−0.2638
0.02
33−0
.2069
0.02
34−0
.1906
0.02
33
COHORT19
91–95
−0.4140
0.0285
−0.3884
0.0258
−0.3791
0.02
57−0
.3653
0.02
58−0
.3351
0.02
58
COHORT19
96–200
1−0
.3259
0.0281
−0.1848
0.0254
−0.1798
0.02
53−0
.2046
0.02
57−0
.1639
0.02
57
COHORT20
02–200
6−1
.0271
0.0429
−0.6071
0.0388
−0.6003
0.03
86−0
.5224
0.03
86−0
.5209
0.03
86
COHORT19
56–60*
YSM
−0.0111
0.0011
−0.0050
0.0010
−0.0049
0.00
10−0
.0038
0.00
10−0
.0039
0.00
10
COHORT19
61–65*
YSM
−0.0102
0.0012
−0.0054
0.0011
−0.0052
0.00
11−0
.0045
0.00
11−0
.0049
0.00
11
COHORT19
66–70*
YSM
−0.0086
0.0009
−0.0050
0.0009
−0.0051
0.00
09−0
.0045
0.00
09−0
.0046
0.00
09
COHORT19
71–75*
YSM
−0.0069
0.0010
−0.0022
0.0009
−0.0021
0.00
09−0
.0007
0.00
09−0
.0009
0.00
09
COHORT19
76–80*
YSM
−0.0013
0.0011
0.0003
0.0010
0.0004
0.00
100.0027
0.00
100.0024
0.00
10
COHORT19
81–86*
YSM
0.0030
0.0014
0.0034
0.0013
0.0031
0.00
120.0055
0.00
130.0054
0.00
13
COHORT19
87–90*
YSM
0.0182
0.0015
0.0107
0.0014
0.0100
0.00
140.0117
0.00
140.0115
0.00
14
COHORT19
91–95*
YSM
0.0230
0.0022
0.0183
0.0019
0.0175
0.00
190.0220
0.00
190.0210
0.00
19
COHORT19
96–200
1*YSM
0.0222
0.0033
0.0011
0.0030
0.0004
0.00
300.0147
0.00
310.0110
0.00
31
COHORT20
02–200
6*YSM
0.2066
0.0131
0.0915
0.0119
0.0897
0.0118
0.0908
0.0118
0.0933
0.0118
J Labor Res
Tab
le1
(con
tinued)
Base
12
34
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Includ
escontrolsfor:
Hou
rsandweeks
ofwork
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Indu
stry
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Regionof
origin
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Speak
Eng.or
Frenchat
home
No
No
No
No
Yes
R2
0.0993
0.2616
0.2714
0.2723
0.2745
Sam
plesize
755055
755055
755055
755055
755055
Allspecifications
also
includecontrolsforeducation,age(aquadratic
specification),m
aritalstatusandadummyvariableindicatin
gwhetherthey
lived
inTo
rontoor
Montrealand
year
dummies,which
arenotpresentedin
thetable.The
dependentvariableislogof
realannualearnings.The
sampleisrestricted
tothoseaged
25to
64,and
does
notinclud
ethosewho
cameto
Canadaas
child
immigrants
J Labor Res
Tab
le2
OLSestim
ates
forwom
en,allworkers
Base
12
34
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Years
sincemigratio
n(YSM)
0.0134
0.0010
0.0088
0.0008
0.0087
0.00
080.0085
0.00
080.0076
0.00
08
Immigrant
−0.4171
0.0302
−0.2856
0.0248
−0.2780
0.02
46−0
.2715
0.02
54−0
.2340
0.02
55
COHORT19
56–60
0.3958
0.0466
0.1876
0.0383
0.1854
0.03
800.1829
0.03
810.1933
0.03
81
COHORT19
61–65
0.4132
0.0455
0.2052
0.0374
0.2076
0.03
710.2104
0.03
720.2163
0.03
72
COHORT19
66–70
0.3878
0.0363
0.1806
0.0298
0.1740
0.02
960.1820
0.02
970.1791
0.02
97
COHORT19
71–75
0.2872
0.0364
0.0867
0.0299
0.0836
0.02
960.0936
0.02
980.0954
0.02
98
COHORT19
76–80
0.1574
0.0365
0.0670
0.0300
0.0647
0.02
980.0714
0.02
990.0763
0.02
99
COHORT19
81–86
0.0570
0.0375
−0.0185
0.0309
−0.0163
0.03
06−0
.0132
0.03
07−0
.0026
0.03
07
COHORT19
87–90
−0.0667
0.0360
−0.0390
0.0296
−0.0348
0.02
93−0
.0158
0.02
94−0
.0072
0.02
94
COHORT19
91–95
−0.2508
0.0387
−0.1727
0.0318
−0.1666
0.03
15−0
.1762
0.03
16−0
.1563
0.03
16
COHORT19
96–200
1−0
.2880
0.0390
−0.115
70.0321
−0.113
50.03
18−0
.1308
0.03
22−0
.1079
0.03
22
COHORT20
02–200
6−0
.8605
0.0580
−0.3986
0.0477
−0.3916
0.04
73−0
.3685
0.04
73−0
.3747
0.04
73
COHORT19
56–60*
YSM
−0.0111
0.0016
−0.0052
0.0013
−0.0052
0.00
13−0
.0050
0.00
13−0
.0053
0.00
13
COHORT19
61–65*
YSM
−0.0122
0.0016
−0.0064
0.0014
−0.0064
0.00
13−0
.0064
0.00
13−0
.0065
0.00
13
COHORT19
66–70*
YSM
−0.0095
0.0013
−0.0031
0.0011
−0.0031
0.00
11−0
.0030
0.00
11−0
.0030
0.00
11
COHORT19
71–75*
YSM
−0.0063
0.0014
−0.0007
0.0011
−0.0008
0.00
11−0
.0005
0.00
11−0
.0006
0.00
11
COHORT19
76–80*
YSM
−0.0025
0.0014
−0.0008
0.0012
−0.0008
0.00
12−0
.0001
0.00
12−0
.0003
0.00
12
COHORT19
81–86*
YSM
0.0009
0.0018
0.0023
0.0015
0.0020
0.00
150.0026
0.00
150.0024
0.00
15
COHORT19
87–90*
YSM
0.0090
0.0019
0.0023
0.0016
0.0020
0.00
160.0026
0.00
160.0024
0.00
16
COHORT19
91–95*
YSM
0.0223
0.0027
0.0112
0.0022
0.0110
0.00
220.0136
0.00
220.0128
0.00
22
COHORT19
96–200
1*YSM
0.0322
0.0042
0.0066
0.0035
0.0073
0.00
340.0128
0.00
360.0108
0.00
36
COHORT20
02–200
6*YSM
0.1739
0.0172
0.0580
0.0142
0.0594
0.01
400.0605
0.01
400.0632
0.01
40
J Labor Res
Tab
le2
(con
tinued)
Base
12
34
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Includ
escontrolsfor:
Hou
rsandweeks
ofwork
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Regionof
origin
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Speak
Eng
.or
Frenchat
home
No
No
No
No
Yes
R2
0.07
350.37
350.38
460.38
470.38
55
Sam
plesize
6064
2960
6429
6064
2960
6429
6064
29
Allspecifications
also
includecontrolsforeducation,age(aquadratic
specification),m
aritalstatusandadummyvariableindicatin
gwhetherthey
lived
inTo
rontoor
Montrealand
year
dummies,which
areno
tpresentedin
thetable.The
dependentvariable
islogof
real
annual
earnings.T
hesampleisrestricted
tothoseaged
25to
64,anddo
esno
tinclude
thosewho
cameto
Canadaas
child
immigrants
J Labor Res
and language (specifications 3 and 4) to the model brings the estimate of the earningspenalty to −37 log points for the 2002–2006 cohort. While the entry earnings for womenin the 2002–2006 cohort are lower, their assimilation rates (like those for men) are muchhigher than the previous cohorts. In the base specification, the interaction term betweenthe YSM variable and the 2002–2006 cohort dummy has an estimate of 17 log points.As additional variables are added, this effect falls but is still about 6 log points in thespecifications we consider. Like the estimates for men, the estimate for the 2002–2006cohort is much larger than estimates for the 1991–1995 and 1996–2001 cohorts, whichtend to have estimates of assimilation rates of about 1 log point in specifications 1 to 4,as well as all the earlier cohorts.
Estimates from Full-time and Full-year Sample
As we noted earlier, we also consider a sample that only includes those that work full-time and a full-year. As before, we start with a base specification and expand it bycontrolling for industry, region of origin and whether English or French is spoken athome. We present the estimates for men in Table 3 and women in Table 4.
The estimates in Table 3 indicate that the estimates of the entry earnings andassimilation effects for men are generally smaller with the full-time and full-yearsample, but we see many of the patterns observed in the full sample. As in Table 1,there is a general worsening in the entry earnings of the more recent arrival cohortsrelative to the earlier arrival cohorts, especially the 2002–2006 cohort. The estimatesin Table 3 indicate that the 2002–2006 arrival cohort earnings were about 53 logpoints less than the pre-1956 cohort in the first two specifications we consider. Whenwe add the controls for region and language, the earnings penalty gets reduced toabout 44 log points. The assimilation rate of this cohort is also much quicker than theearlier cohorts, with an estimate of about 4 log points in the base specification andestimates that range between about 4 and 5 log points in the other specifications weconsider.
We observe similar patterns in the estimates for women in Table 4. The estimatesof the entry earnings effects with the full-time and full-year sample are generallysmaller, but the more recent arrival cohorts still do worse in terms of entry earningsrelative to the earlier arrival cohorts, especially the 2002–2006 cohort. Also, theestimates of the assimilation effects are generally smaller with the full-time and full-year sample. However, the assimilation rate for the 2002–2006 cohort is still muchhigher than the earlier cohorts, with estimates as large as 5 log points.
Years-to-Equality Calculations
Overall, the estimates in Tables 1 to 4 indicate that the most recent arrival cohort ofimmigrants, 2002–2006, has a muchmore severe earnings entry penalty than the cohortsof immigrants that arrived before it. For example, the 2002–2006 cohort will trail itscomparison group more than the 1996–2001 cohort did at arrival. We observe this forboth men and women. However, the assimilation rate of the 2002–2006 cohort is alsomuch greater than that of the other arrival cohorts of immigrants. While these patternscan be determined from the estimates in the tables, it is difficult to assess whether the
J Labor Res
faster assimilation can offset the earnings penalty based on a comparison of theestimates. We utilize the time-to-equality measure as a summary statistic that combinesthe entry effects by cohort and the assimilation effects by cohort, giving a “bottom-line”
Table 3 OLS estimates for men, full-time and full- year sample
Base 2′ 3′ 4′
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Years since migration(YSM)
0.0045 0.0007 0.0043 0.0007 0.0038 0.0007 0.0024 0.0007
Immigrant −0.1115 0.0226 −0.1021 0.0224 −0.0948 0.0232 −0.0331 0.0232
COHORT 1956–60 0.0350 0.0329 0.0389 0.0327 0.0198 0.0327 0.0287 0.0326
COHORT 1961–65 0.0351 0.0337 0.0359 0.0334 0.0353 0.0335 0.0541 0.0334
COHORT 1966–70 0.0284 0.0269 0.0346 0.0267 0.0560 0.0268 0.0555 0.0267
COHORT 1971–75 −0.0828 0.0273 −0.0791 0.0271 −0.0445 0.0273 −0.0414 0.0272
COHORT 1976–80 −0.1183 0.0275 −0.1138 0.0273 −0.0915 0.0275 −0.0831 0.0274
COHORT 1981–86 −0.2126 0.0289 −0.2025 0.0286 −0.1787 0.0288 −0.1556 0.0287
COHORT 1987–90 −0.3122 0.0282 −0.3035 0.0279 −0.2335 0.0281 −0.2138 0.0280
COHORT 1991–95 −0.4318 0.0306 −0.4225 0.0304 −0.4053 0.0305 −0.3600 0.0304
COHORT 1996–2001 −0.2407 0.0306 −0.2409 0.0304 −0.2512 0.0307 −0.1966 0.0306
COHORT 2002–2006 −0.5299 0.0550 −0.5169 0.0546 −0.4364 0.0546 −0.4397 0.0544
COHORT 1956–60*YSM −0.0014 0.0011 −0.0015 0.0011 −0.0010 0.0011 −0.0012 0.0011
COHORT 1961–65*YSM −0.0015 0.0012 −0.0014 0.0012 −0.0011 0.0012 −0.0016 0.0012
COHORT 1966–70*YSM −0.0009 0.0010 −0.0011 0.0010 −0.0010 0.0010 −0.0011 0.0010
COHORT 1971–75*YSM 0.0016 0.0010 0.0014 0.0010 0.0024 0.0010 0.0021 0.0010
COHORT 1976–80*YSM 0.0019 0.0011 0.0017 0.0011 0.0040 0.0011 0.0037 0.0011
COHORT 1981–86*YSM 0.0039 0.0014 0.0032 0.0014 0.0051 0.0014 0.0051 0.0014
COHORT 1987–90*YSM 0.0099 0.0016 0.0091 0.0016 0.0105 0.0016 0.0104 0.0016
COHORT 1991–95*YSM 0.0172 0.0022 0.0161 0.0022 0.0210 0.0022 0.0193 0.0022
COHORT 1996–2001*YSM
−0.0009 0.0035 −0.0011 0.0035 0.0122 0.0036 0.0078 0.0036
COHORT 2002–2006*YSM
0.0423 0.0165 0.0391 0.0164 0.0415 0.0163 0.0478 0.0163
Includes controls for:
Industry No Yes Yes Yes
Region of origin No No Yes Yes
Speak Eng. Or French athome
No No No Yes
R2 0.0833 0.0980 0.0944 0.1048
Sample size 551640 551640 551640 551640
All specifications also include controls for education, age (a quadratic specification), marital status and adummy variable indicating whether they lived in Toronto or Montreal and year dummies, which are notpresented in the table. The dependent variable is log of real annual earnings. The sample is restricted tothose aged 25 to 64, and does not include those who came to Canada as child immigrants. This sample onlyincludes those that worked full-time (30 or more hours per week) and a full-year (49–52 weeks)
J Labor Res
indicator of how long it takes for different cohorts of immigrants to catch-up to theearnings of otherwise comparable domestic-born workers. This will allow us to deter-mine how the 2002–2006 cohort fares against the other cohorts of immigrants. As noted
Table 4 OLS estimates for women, full-time and full- year sample
Base 2′ 3′ 4′
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Coef.Est.
Std.Error
Years sincemigration(YSM)
0.0084 0.0010 0.0082 0.0010 0.0082 0.0010 0.0073 0.0010
Immigrant −0.2794 0.0321 −0.2691 0.0316 −0.2710 0.0324 −0.2413 0.0324
COHORT 1956–60 0.1480 0.0471 0.1481 0.0465 0.1547 0.0466 0.1673 0.0464
COHORT 1961–65 0.1218 0.0462 0.1292 0.0456 0.1455 0.0457 0.1579 0.0456
COHORT 1966–70 0.1054 0.0377 0.0990 0.0372 0.1231 0.0374 0.1257 0.0373
COHORT 1971–75 0.0266 0.0372 0.0253 0.0367 0.0520 0.0369 0.0604 0.0368
COHORT 1976–80 −0.0007 0.0380 0.0081 0.0375 0.0288 0.0377 0.0416 0.0376
COHORT 1981–86 −0.0774 0.0389 −0.0706 0.0383 −0.0551 0.0384 −0.0364 0.0383
COHORT 1987–90 −0.0652 0.0378 −0.0595 0.0372 −0.0174 0.0374 −0.0052 0.0373
COHORT 1991–95 −0.2191 0.0405 −0.2061 0.0400 −0.2157 0.0400 −0.1904 0.0400
COHORT 1996–2001 −0.1096 0.0412 −0.1000 0.0406 −0.1249 0.0408 −0.0949 0.0407
COHORT 2002–2006 −0.3282 0.0722 −0.3283 0.0711 −0.2899 0.0712 −0.2971 0.0710
COHORT 1956–60*YSM −0.0034 0.0015 −0.0034 0.0015 −0.0035 0.0015 −0.0038 0.0015
COHORT 1961–65*YSM −0.0036 0.0016 −0.0038 0.0016 −0.0040 0.0016 −0.0043 0.0016
COHORT 1966–70*YSM −0.0009 0.0013 −0.0008 0.0013 −0.0010 0.0013 −0.0013 0.0013
COHORT 1971–75*YSM 0.0005 0.0013 0.0004 0.0013 0.0006 0.0013 0.0003 0.0013
COHORT 1976–80*YSM 0.0012 0.0014 0.0008 0.0014 0.0016 0.0014 0.0012 0.0014
COHORT 1981–86*YSM 0.0036 0.0018 0.0033 0.0017 0.0037 0.0017 0.0032 0.0017
COHORT 1987–90*YSM 0.0035 0.0019 0.0033 0.0019 0.0037 0.0019 0.0035 0.0019
COHORT 1991–95*YSM 0.0124 0.0027 0.0117 0.0026 0.0157 0.0027 0.0149 0.0027
COHORT 1996–2001*YSM
0.0056 0.0042 0.0054 0.0042 0.0145 0.0043 0.0123 0.0043
COHORT 2002–2006*YSM
0.0391 0.0211 0.0145 0.0208 0.0446 0.0208 0.0489 0.0207
Includes controls for:
Industry No Yes Yes Yes
Region of origin No No Yes Yes
Speak Eng. or French athome
No No No Yes
R2 0.0809 0.1069 0.1073 0.1121
Sample size 348334 348334 348334 348334
All specifications also include controls for education, age (a quadratic specification), marital status and adummy variable indicating whether they lived in Toronto or Montreal and year dummies, which are notpresented in the table. The dependent variable is log of real annual earnings. The sample is restricted tothose aged 25 to 64, and does not include those who came to Canada as child immigrants. This sample onlyincludes those that worked full-time (30 or more hours per week) and a full-year (49-52 weeks)
J Labor Res
earlier, we use the estimates from the base specification to compute the YTE. Wecompute the YTE for the sample of all workers and the full-time and full-year sampleand present both sets of estimates (by gender) in Table 5.
The years-to-equality calculations for the sample that includes all workers areconsistent with the generalization that is common in the Canadian literature thatsuccessive cohorts of immigrants are having increasingly difficult times integratinginto the Canadian labour market. The expected time for male immigrants to have theirearnings catch up to the earnings of otherwise comparable Canadian-born workersincreased from 13.3 years for the 1956–1960 cohort to 31.3 years for the 1971–1975,fluctuating somewhat over subsequent cohorts. For the 1991–1995 and 1996–2001cohorts the years to equality is about 20 years or so. Importantly, the years to equalitydropped to 6.4 years for the most recent 2002–2006 cohort of males, suggesting thatthe tide may have turned. Caution should be used in this interpretation, however,since the rapid earnings growth for this most recent cohort may well taper off.
While the years to equality may be similar for some cohorts, it should be noted thatthere is some variability in how these cohorts fare in Canada. For example, the 1971–1975 and 1981–1986 have similar years to equality, about 30 years or so. However,the 1971–1975 entry cohort does not have an earnings penalty, unlike the1981–1986 entry cohort, but the 1971–1975 cohort’s experience worsens overtime. This pattern is also present for the other pre-1981 entry cohorts of men.In particular, the pre-1981 cohorts of male immigrants do not have entry earningspenalties, but they do not assimilate very well. In contrast, the post-1980 entrycohorts of male immigrants have entry earnings penalties, but they assimilate (albeit atdifferent rates). 9
For the full-time and full-year sample of men in the second column in Table 5, wesee similar patterns. That is, the rise in the expected time to catch up, although thattime peaks for the 1996–2001 cohort (at about 97.8 years) before falling to about13.7 years for the 2002–2006 cohort. However, these estimates also indicate that the2002–2006 cohort has a much lower time to equality than the cohorts that proceededit, which also suggests that this cohort assimilates at a much faster rate than earliercohorts of immigrants.
The patterns for women in the years to equality in Table 5 tend to be similar tothose for men. However, for women the increasing negative entry effects over timetend to be largely offset by increasing assimilation effects, so that the expected yearsto equality tends to be fairly constant at around 20 years for most of the post 1970cohorts based on the full sample. Importantly, the years to equality drops dramaticallyto only 6.8 years for the most recent 2002–2006 cohort, which is like the pattern weobserve for men. 10 With the full-time and full-year sample for women, we see largervalues in the years to equality for all cohorts. However, the patterns tend to be similarto the full sample. In particular, the 2002–2006 cohort still has a lower years toequality figure, compared to the other cohorts of immigrants.
9 We also observe a similar pattern in our results for women. The cohorts of immigrants arriving before themid-1980s do not have entry earnings penalties, but they do not assimilate very well. In contrast, the entrycohorts after the mid-1980s have entry earnings penalties, but they assimilate (at varied rates).10 We also estimated the equations excluding the Atlantic provinces since the coding of immigrants in the Atlantic
provinces changed over time. Our results are not affected by this exclusion.
J Labor Res
Comparing the results for the full sample, as well as the full-time and full-year samplefor both men and women, highlights that the basic pattern of our results is not sensitiveto whether the analysis is restricted to full-time and full-year workers as opposed to allworkers. This was also the case in Aydemir and Skuterud (2005, p. 647).
The analysis does not enable determination of the precise reasons for any possibleturning of the tide (shorter time-to-equality) for both male and female immigrants inthe most recent 2002–2006 cohort. It is possible that foreign credential recognition isbecoming less of a problem as foreign credentials are becoming more common andhence recognizable. Also, credential recognition initiatives and bridging programs
Table 5 Years to equality for base specification
All workers sample Full-time and full- year sample
Men
Entry cohort
1956–60 13.55 24.68
1961–65 20.08 25.47
1966–70 21.82 23.08
1971–75 31.26 31.85
1976–80 28.04 35.91
1981–86 29.16 38.58
1987–90 22.87 29.42
1991–95 21.47 25.04
1996–2001 19.52 97.83
2002–2006 6.39 13.71
Women
Entry cohort
1956–60 9.26 26.28
1961–65 3.25 32.83
1966–70 7.51 23.20
1971–75 18.30 28.40
1976–80 23.83 29.18
1981–86 25.18 29.73
1987–90 21.60 28.96
1991–95 18.71 23.97
1996–2001 15.46 27.79
2002–2006 6.82 12.79
Years-to-Equality computed as YTE ¼ − αþΘ jð Þδþλ j
, where α, the Θjs, δ and the λj s are obtained from estimates
of y=Xβ+αI+δYSM(I)+∑jΘjCOHj(I)+∑jλj[COHj(I)×YSM(I)]+u, for the base specification in Tables 1 to 4,where y is the log of real annual earnings (in 2006 dollars), X is a vector of human capital and othercontrols, I denotes Immigrants, YSM is years since migration, and COH is the immigrant entry cohort. Theaverage years to equality for each cohort are calculated by solving for the YSM when the earnings ofimmigrants equals the earnings of Canadian-born persons. The All Workers sample includes part-time andfull-time workers as well as those that worked a full-year and parts of the year. The Full-time and Full-yearsample is restricted to those that worked full-time (30 or more hours per week) and a full year (49 to52 weeks of work)
J Labor Res
may be having a positive effect. The same may apply to the increased emphasis on theeconomic class of immigrants and away from family reunification and humanitarianreasons, as well as an emphasis in the point system towards education and languageproficiency (Beach et al. 2011, p. 11–13). It is also possible that selective out-migration is artificially inflating the wage growth of the most recent cohort to theextent that low-earnings immigrants are more likely to leave the country (and hencethe data set). Picot and Piraino (2012) found that this was not an issue for earlierarrival cohorts, but their analysis did not include data after 1999, so it remains apossibility for explaining the results for the 2002–2006 cohort. It is also possible thatthis most recent cohort is investing more in human capital immediately on arrival(e.g., in bridging or language programs), leading to lower earnings in the initialinvestment period but more rapid subsequent wage growth. While these are plausiblereasons for a possible turning of the tide towards more rapid integration of immi-grants in the 2002–06 cohort, more research is necessary to establish the causallinkages. Unfortunately, the demise of the mandatory long-form for the Census meansthat census data can no longer be used to determine if this shorter time-to-equality is apermanent or temporary phenomenon.
Summary and Policy Discussion
We examine the earnings of immigrants using data from 1971 to 2006 from the publicrelease files of the Census. We find that, for both male and female immigrants, thereis a general pattern of deteriorating entry earnings (i.e., an earnings penalty) for themore recent arrival cohorts relative to earlier arrival cohorts. However, we also findthat the more recent arrival cohorts tend to assimilate more quickly than the earliercohorts of immigrants. Moreover, we find that while the most recent arrival cohort inour data, i.e., the 2002–2006 cohort, has the largest entry earnings penalty it also hasthe fastest assimilation rate of all the cohorts of immigrants in our data. While the sizeof these effects varies somewhat across the various specifications and the twosamples we consider, the general pattern is robust. When we compute a bottom lineindicator, the years to equality (the time it takes for the earnings of immigrants tocatch up to the earnings of comparable Canadian born persons), we find that the fasterassimilation rates dominate the negative earnings penalty, so that the years-to-equalityfigure improved dramatically for the most recent 2002–06 cohort for both men andwomen, relative to cohorts of immigrants arriving after the mid-1970s. Unfortunately,the demise of the mandatory long-form for the Census means that census data can nolonger be used to determine if this quicker assimilation for the 2002–2006 arrivalcohort is a permanent or a temporary phenomenon.
Our empirical results and the results from the literature have a number of implicationsfor policy initiatives in this area.11 The fact that immigrant earnings are lowereddramatically by their lower returns to education compared to otherwise comparable
11 The policy implications are generally similar to those in Beach et al. (2011). Their analysis is basedlargely on simulations of the impact of alternative policy initiatives on immigrant entry earnings in thecalendar year after their arrival. Their simulations are based on estimates from the existing literatureincluding their own earlier work such as Beach et al. (2008).
J Labor Res
Canadian-born persons, highlights the importance of credential recognition. But it is notsimply a matter that foreign credentials are not properly recognized. This undoubtedlycontributes to the earnings gap, but it is also the case that there likely are real differencesin the quality of the education and its “fit” with labour market requirements in Canada.This was highlighted in the literature indicating that countries where credentials are mostdiscounted tend to be ones where literacy and numeracy test scores are lowest (Sweetman2004) and that the cognitive skills of immigrants based on test scores for literacy,numeracy and problem solving are lower than those of observationally equivalentCanadian-born persons with much of this likely reflecting differences in languageproficiency (Bonikowska et al. 2007; Finnie and Meng 2002). It is also highlighted inour evidence of the increasing importance of unobservable factors for more recentcohorts of immigrants coming from countries where these less tangible factors are likelyto be more prominent and to matter in the knowledge economy.
In the 1980s, Canada moved from a system where points were given for compe-tencies in specific occupations to a more “general human capital model” where pointswere given more for general competencies and education. The rationale was thatmore general generic skills were increasingly important for flexibility and adaptabil-ity in the knowledge-based economy where careers could be changing rapidly. Thisrequires, however, that such general competencies and credentials would be recog-nized, that language issues would not be an impediment and that labour marketswould be buoyant so that jobs would be available. Because these conditions have notbeen prominent, the move to the general human capital model in Canada has beenstrongly criticized (e.g., Australian Joint Standing Committee on Migration 2006;Birrell et al. 2006; and Hawthorne 2007a, b, 2008).
This also highlights that the current emphasis on general education in the admis-sion criteria may need to be more fine-tuned to reflect differences in the quality ofeducation and cognitive skills, as well as skill shortages and occupations that aremore in demand. Facilitating immigrants obtaining a Canadian credential may alsohelp not only because of the high value of the Canadian credential that immigrantsreceive, but also because it serves an important signal to verify the quality of theirforeign education. International students who obtain a degree in Canada are apotential pool of such applicants. Such “onshore” applicants are increasingly soughtafter, for example, in Australian immigration policy (Hawthorne 2008, p. 27).
Since language facility appears to be an important factor in immigrant success,and understandably so in the knowledge economy and the service economy withpersonal and team interactions, more emphasis could also be put on this factorin admissions criteria. Language proficiency and testing could be required as isthe case in Australia and New Zealand, with apparent success (Hawthorne 2007a, 2008;Walker 2007).
In varying degrees Australia and New Zealand abandoned the general humancapital model in the mid 1990s and emphasised other specific criteria that are oftenabsent in the Canadian system: an emphasis on specific skills that are in high demandand short supply; a genuine job offer in an occupation in demand; language fluencyand testing; pre-immigration assessment of qualifications; mandatory credential as-sessment; an emphasis on credentials that are already recognized; and an emphasison former international students who have credentials recently completed in thehost country.
J Labor Res
Much of the evidence from our study and the literature suggests that more attentionshould be paid to such policy initiatives as part of evidence-based policy making.This is necessary to reverse the substantial increase in the time it takes for immigrantsto achieve the same earnings of otherwise comparable Canadian-born workers.Otherwise there is a danger that the pride of being a nation of immigrants will turnto discontent on the part of both immigrants and domestic-born Canadians.
Appendix A
Table 6 Means, by gender and immigration status
Men Women
Non-immigrants Immigrants Non-immigrants Immigrants
Log of real annual earnings 10.550 10.482 10.024 9.938
Years since migration (YSM) – 17.766 – 17.493
Immigrant 1.000 – 1.000
COHORT 1956–60 – 0.083 – 0.071
COHORT 1961–65 – 0.057 – 0.058
COHORT 1966–70 – 0.124 – 0.121
COHORT 1971–75 – 0.116 – 0.124
COHORT 1976–80 – 0.093 – 0.101
COHORT 1981–86 – 0.100 – 0.115
COHORT 1987–90 – 0.073 – 0.080
COHORT 1991–95 – 0.088 – 0.103
COHORT 1996–2001 – 0.074 – 0.076
COHORT 2002–2006 – 0.026 – 0.027
COHORT 1956–60*YSM – 2.208 – 1.957
COHORT 1961–65*YSM – 1.330 – 1.383
COHORT 1966–70*YSM – 2.479 – 2.558
COHORT 1971–75*YSM – 2.167 – 2.369
COHORT 1976–80*YSM – 1.502 – 1.737
COHORT 1981–86*YSM – 1.328 – 1.563
COHORT 1987–90*YSM – 0.667 – 0.764
COHORT 1991–95*YSM – 0.766 – 0.921
COHORT 1996–2001*YSM – 0.380 – 0.409
COHORT 2002–2006*YSM – 0.068 – 0.070
Control variables
Years of education 13.483 13.443 13.888 13.335
Age 40.558 44.288 40.431 43.541
Married 0.658 0.819 0.602 0.728
Live in Toronto or Montreal 0.168 0.407 0.224 0.500
J Labor Res
References
Australian Joint Standing Committee on Migration (2006) Negotiating the Maze: Review of arrangementsfor overseas skills recognition, upgrading and licensing. Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra
Aydemir A, Skuterud M (2005) Explaining the deteriorating entry earnings of Canada’s immigrant cohorts:1966–2000. Can J Econ 38:641–672
Baker M, Benjamin D (1994) The performance of immigrants in the Canadian labor market. J Labor Econ12:369–405
Bauder H (2003) Brain abuses, or the devaluation of immigrant labour in Canada. Antipode 35:700–717
Table 6 (continued)
Men Women
Non-immigrants Immigrants Non-immigrants Immigrants
Weeks of work
1–13 0.019 0.026 0.039 0.046
14–26 0.049 0.049 0.071 0.076
27–39 0.054 0.055 0.064 0.067
40–48 0.124 0.153 0.135 0.167
49–52 0.753 0.717 0.691 0.643
Weekly hours of work
1–19 0.024 0.025 0.098 0.088
20–29 0.026 0.024 0.117 0.099
30–34 0.030 0.027 0.085 0.069
35–39 0.128 0.125 0.260 0.218
40–44 0.463 0.501 0.311 0.400
45–49 0.095 0.093 0.048 0.047
50+ 0.235 0.204 0.082 0.081
Industry:
Manufacturing 0.206 0.278 0.087 0.173
Primary (agric. forestry,fishing, mining)
0.062 0.026 0.023 0.015
Construction 0.088 0.086 0.016 0.011
Transportation & communication 0.123 0.088 0.055 0.037
Trade 0.155 0.138 0.151 0.146
Finance & real estate 0.044 0.051 0.083 0.087
Service 0.220 0.284 0.501 0.486
Public administration 0.097 0.047 0.081 0.042
Language proficiency:
Speak English at home 0.713 0.528 0.725 0.548
Speak French at home 0.279 0.047 0.267 0.041
Number of observations 631,837 123,168 512,934 93,495
J Labor Res
Beach C, Green A, Worswick C (2008) Impacts of the point system and immigration policy leverson the skill characteristics of Canadian immigration. In: Immgration: Trends, consequences andprospects for the United States. Research in Labor Economics, 27. Elsevier JAI Press,Amsterdam
Beach C, Green A,Worswick C (2011) Toward Improving Canada’s skilled immigration policy: An evaluationapproach. C.D. Howe Institute, Policy Study, Toronto, p 45
Birrell B, Hawthorn L, Richardson S (2006) Evaluation of the general skilled migration categories.Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra
Bloom M, Grant M (2001) Brain gain: The economic benefits of recognizing learning and learningcredentials in Canada. Conference Board of Canada, Ottawa
BloomDE, GundersonM (1991) An analysis of the earnings of Canadian immigrants. In: Abowd J, Freeman R(eds) Immigration, trade and the labor market. University of Chicago Press for the N.B.E.R, Chicago, pp321–367
Bloom DE, Grenier G, Gunderson M (1995) The changing labour market position of Canadian immigrants.Can J Econ 28:987–1005
Bonikowska A, Green D, Riddell C (2007) Cognitive skills and immigrant earnings. UBC Working PaperBonikowska A, Hou F, Picot G (2011) A Canada – US comparison of labour market outcomes among
highly educated immigrants. Can Public Policy 37:25–48Borjas G (1985) Assimilation, changes in cohort quality, and the earnings of immigrants. J Labor Econ
3:463–489Canada S (2003) 2001 census: Analysis series, the changing profile of Canada’s labour force. No.
96F0030XIE20011009. Statistics Canada, OttawaChiswick B (1978) The effect of Americanization on the earnings of foreign-born men. J Polit Econ
86:897–921Ferrer A, Craig Riddell W (2008) Education, credentials and immigrant earnings. Can J Econ 41:186–216Finnie R, Meng R (2002) Minorities, cognitive skills, and the earnings of Canadians. Can Public Policy
28:257–274Frenette M, Morissette R (2005) Will they ever converge? earnings of immigrant and Canadian-born
workers over the last two decades. Int Migr Rev 39(1):228–257Gera S, Songsakul T (2005) How is Canada faring in the competition for internationally mobile skilled
workers? Skills Research Initiative Working Paper 2005 D-06. Industry Canada, OttawaGrant M (1999) Evidence of new immigrant assimilation in Canada. Can J Econ 34:930–955Grant PR, Nadin S (2007) The credentialing problems of foreign trained personnel from Asia and
Africa intending to make their home in Canada: a social psychological perspective. Migr Integr8:141–162
Guillimette Y, Robson W (2006) No elixer of youth: Immigration cannot keep Canada young. Backgrounder96. C.D. Howe Institute, Toronto
Hawthorne L (2007a) Labour market outcomes for migrant professionals: Canada and Australia compared.Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Ottawa
Hawthorne L (2007b) Foreign credential recognition and assessment: an introduction. Canadian Issues(Spring) 3–13
Hawthorne L (2008) The impact of economic selection policy on labour market outcomes for degreequalified migrants in Canada and Australia. IRPP Choices 14:1–49
Hiebert D (2006) Beyond the polemics: the economic outcomes of Canadian immigration. Vanvouver:Centre for Excellence, Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis
Hou F (2010) Entry earnings of Canada’s immigrants over the past century: The role of changingcharacteristics and returns to skills. CLSRN Working Paper 63
Hum D, Simpson W (2004a) Economic integration of immigrants to Canada: a short survey. Can J UrbanRes 13:46–61
Hum D, Simpson W (2004b) Reinterpreting the performance of immigrant wages from panel data. EmpirEcon 29:129–147
McDonald T, Worswick C (2010) Visible minority status, immigrant status, gender and earnings in Canada:A cohort analysis. In: McDonald T, Ruddick E, Sweetman A, Worswick C (eds) Canadian immigra-tion: Economic evidence for a dynamic policy environment. McGill Queens University Press,Montreal and Kingston, pp 111–146
Nadeau S, Seckin A (2010) The immigrant wage gap in Canada: Quebec and the Rest of Canada. Can PublicPolicy 36:265–285
Picot G, Piraino P (2012) Immigrant earnings growth: selection bias or real progress. Analytical StudiesBranch Research Paper Series 2012340e. Statistics Canada, Ottawa
J Labor Res
Picot G, Sweetman A (2005) The deteriorating economic welfare of immigrants and possible causes:Update 2005. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, Business and Labour Market Analysis Division, catalogue no.11F0019MIE – No. 262
Picot G, Yugian L, Hou F (2010) Immigrant low-income rates: the role of market income and governmenttransfers. Perspect Labour Income 22:13–27
Reitz J (2001) Immigrant skill utilization in the Canadian labour market: implications of human capitalresearch. J Int Migr Integr 2:347–378
Reitz J (2006) Recent trends in the integration of immigrants in the Canadian labour market. HumanResources and Social Development Canada, Ottawa
Reitz J (2007a) Immigrant employment success in Canada, part 1: individual and contextual causes. J Int MigrIntegr 8:11–36
Reitz J (2007b) Immigrant employment success in Canada, part 1I: understanding the decline. J Int MigrIntegr 8:37–62
Sweetman A (2004) Immigration source country school quality and canadian labour market outcomes.Analytical Studies Research Paper Series. 11F0019MIE – No. 234. Statistics Canada, Ottawa
Sweetman A, Warman C (2008) Integration, impact and responsibility: An economic perspective on Canadianimmigration policy. In: Biles J, Burstein M, Firderes J (eds) Immigration and integration in Canada in thetwenty-first century. McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal and Kingston, pp 19–44
Walker J (2007) International approaches to credential assessment. Canadian Issues (Spring) 21–25Zietsma D (2007) The Canadian immigrant labour market in 2006: First Results from Canada’s
J Labor Res