[G.R. No. L-3339. March 26, 1908. ]

ROSA LLORENTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CEFERINO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.

Levering and Wood, for Appellant.

Hartigan and Rohde, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. ESTATES; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; NATURAL CHILDREN. — A natural child has not the right to represent his natural father or mother in the succession of the legitimate ascendants of the latter. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, February 13,

1903.)

D E C I S I O N

ARELLANO, C.J.  :

In consequence of the death of Martina Avalle, which occurred on the 6th day of June, 1902, her will was presented to the court for the probate, and was allowed on the 10th of July, 1902.

Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her marriage four legitimate children named Jacinta, Julio, Martin, and Francisco, all with the surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the will executed by her on the 31st of December, 1900, she instituted as her sole and general heirs her three first-named children, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late Francisco, named Soledad and Adela Llorente.

Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, on the 11th of August, 1901, leaving several legitimate children with the surname of Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a natural daughter named Rosa Llorente.

The said Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a party in the proceedings for the probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children of the said Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground that they were the sole and exclusive heirs of their mother, the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely can not be a party thereto.

The question that is set up is whether the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate daughter Jacinta Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess because of her death before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to her legitimate children; and this question is now before this court upon appeal.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu, before which it was first presented, decided the question, setting forth the following findings of fact and of law:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That the testatrix, Martina Avalle, having died after the enforcement of the Civil Code in the Philippines, the claimed rights of Rosa Llorente to her inheritance must determined in accordance with said code, in conformity with what has been held by this court in its decision of the 15th of April, 1904 (Llorente v. Rodriguez). 1

2. That according to article 134 of the Civil Code, an acknowledged natural child is entitled, among other things, to receive, in a proper case, the hereditary portion fixed in said code, and in section 8, chapter 2, title 3, of book 3, the same said portion is determined according to the circumstances.

3. That article 840 of said code states the portion of the inheritance pertaining to natural children in case the testator leaves legitimate children or descendants and natural children legally acknowledged; but neither this article nor any other determines what pertains to the natural children of a legitimate child; that is, while the law dwells on the question of legitimate descendants it makes no reference whatever to natural descendants, and dwells only on the relation between the father and the natural child and the legitimate children of the latter, as appears in articles 843.

4. That article 841 provides for cases in which the testator does not leave legitimate children or descendants, but provides nothing for cases in which a legitimate son leaves natural children; that is, illegitimate descendants of said testator.

5. That the Civil Code has granted to natural children many more rights than they were entitled to under former laws, but it has not given them the status of legitimate children, nor admitted them as members of the legitimate family of their natural parent.

6. That the rights of the one and the other class of children have been carefully fixed by the code, and great differences exist between such as are granted to each class. For instance, while article 114 grants to a legitimate child the right to demand support from his parents, from his ascendants, and even from his brothers, article 134 cited before only recognizes the right of the natural child to demand such support from the person who acknowledges him. A natural child has no other rights than those which are expressly recognized by the Civil Code, and among them the right to succeed the legitimate father of his natural parent does not appear.

7. That besides the above considerations which we might call negative, article 943 of the Civil Code positively denies to a natural or legitimized child the right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who have acknowledged said child, and in accordance with this article, Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, has no right whatever to inherit from the latter’s legitimate mother, Martina Avalle, the testatrix.

8. That commenting on this article, Manresa says on pages 104 and 105 of Volume VII of his work Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Between a natural child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged said child, the code denies all successory relation. They can not call themselves relatives, nor are they entitled to inherit."cralaw virtua1aw library

And further on:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged a natural child are the relatives in direct line, descendant, or ascendant, or in the collateral line. The legitimate family is entirely separated from the natural, and neither the members of the latter inherit from those of the former, nor the members of the former from those of the latter."cralaw virtua1aw library

This doctrine has been affirmed by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of the 13th of February, 1903, and in said decision it was held that a natural child whose deceased father was a legitimate son, has no right whatever in the inheritance of his grandfather, even if the latter died without legitimate descendants surviving him, which appears plainly evident, not only because article 943 of the Civil Code denies the natural child the right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother acknowledging the said child, included in which was the grandfather, nor because within the order of succession established for natural children and their descendants by article 939 to 944, the natural grandchild, whose father was legitimate, has no place; but more especially (considering the direct application of said doctrine to the case) because, as children inherit by right from their father, and grandchildren from their grandfather by representation according to articles 932 and 933, this right is only granted to the legitimate grandchildren and descendants when the head of the descending direct line is a legitimate child, in conformity with the secular doctrine admitted by our code as the basis of the order of succession which the same establishes and particularly sanctions by article 931, where it is assumed that the descendants called upon to succeed by such line shall be the issue of a lawful marriage. As a consequence of the law, the court below held that Rosa Llorente had no right whatever to the inheritance of the late Martina Avalle, and denied her all right to intervene in the proceedings regarding the estate of the said deceased.

Rosa Llorente appealed from the said judgment.

It is set forth in the appellant’s brief on said appeal that the court below erred when deciding that Rosa Llorente, as the legally acknowledged natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, was not entitled to inherit from the late Martina Avalle, the mother of the said Jacinta Llorente.

Said allegation is based on section 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When a devise or a legacy is made to a child or other relation to the testator, and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving issue . . ., such issue shall take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done, if he had survived the testator, unless a different disposition is required by law."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the foregoing legal text the following is deduced: Jacinta Llorente was appointed as the devisee or legatee of Martina Avalle; Jacinta Llorente died before the said Martina Avalle. Therefore, her descendant, Rosa Llorente, shall be the devisee or legatee to whom Martina Avalle leaves what she intended to leave or bequeath to Jacinta Llorente.

But Jacinta Llorente had not been named by her mother, Martina Avalle, as the legatee of any determined kind of property; she is therefore neither a devisee nor a legatee, within the meaning of section 758, nor a legatee under the Civil Code, but a general heir like her other legitimate children, and, following the principles of the Civil Code, there is an essential difference between

instituting a legatee and instituting an heir, because the latter succeeds by general right and the former by special right. (Civil Code, art. 660.)

Assuming, however, that by section 758 it was the intent of the lawmaker to grant the right of representation in every hereditary succession to the issue of the heir or legatee instituted by an ascendant, there would still have to be decided to which class of issue the lawmaker referred, whether solely to the legitimate, or also to the illegitimate, or at least among the latter, to natural children, with regard to which the learned Justice Carson has submitted a dissenting opinion whereof the corollary seems to be that this is the question that has not yet been decided.

And taking it as a question already decided that the dispositive portion of section 758 grants to the illegitimate issue, or at least to the natural children, the right of representation, there still remains to be explained or construed the exception contained therein in the following words: "unless a different disposition is required by law." If the law in force in this country provides the contrary and denies to natural children the right to represent their mother in the succession of the latter’s mother, or her who would be called their natural grandmother, it is not then proper to invoke in favor of such children the right of representation established in a restrictive manner by said section of the law of procedure; that is, unless different disposition is required by the substantive law.

The decision of the supreme court of Spain, cited in the judgment appealed from, is decisive on this matter; according to the same a natural child has not the right to represent his natural father or mother in the succession to the legitimate ascendants of the latter.

From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who acknowledged him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them, it does not follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the succession to their legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and immediate in relation to the father or mother who acknowledged him, but it can not be indirect by representing them in the succession to their ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner, because he does not appear among the legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head.

If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from her, and in what she inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente would have participated, in conjunction with her legitimate children, from the day in which the succession became operative, because she would then appear by virtue of her own right to inherit from her mother the legal quota that pertained to her; but, not because she has said right, would she also be entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there is no legal provision establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing, and that she should have the right to inherit from her who would be called her natural grandmother, representing her natural mother, is quite another thing. The latter right is not recognized by the law in force.

Therefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with the costs of this instance against theAppellant. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson and Willard, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I dissent. I agree with the statement of the doctrine of the Spanish law, as set out in the majority opinion, denying to a natural child the right to inherit through its mother, and limiting the right of inheritance of a natural child from the mother to the estate of the mother.

I think, however, that the facts in this case bring it within the provisions of section 758 of the new Code of Civil Procedure, which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When a devise or a legacy is made to a child or other relation to the testator, and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving issue surviving the testator, such issue shall take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done if he had survived the testator unless a different disposition is required by law."cralaw virtua1aw library

In this case a devise was made by the grandmother of the plaintiff to the mother of the plaintiff, who died before the testatrix, leaving the plaintiff surviving the testatrix. Under the provisions of said section 758 the "issue" of plaintiff’s mother take the devise under the will, as the mother would have done if she had survived the testatrix.

The legitimate issue deny the right of the plaintiff, a natural child, to share in this estate, and it seems to me that the only

question before us in the meaning of the word "issue" as used in the above-cited section of the new Code of Civil Procedure.

The new Code of Civil Procedure having been written in English and substantially adopted from similar codes in the United States, it should be construed more especially in the light of American and English precedent and authority.

The word "issue" is a strictly technical term in English and American jurisprudence and has frequently been construed in the decisions of the courts last resort of the various States, where it has been held that in deeds, wills, and statutory provisions such as that under consideration, the word "issue" should be taken to mean "children," "heirs of the body," or "lineal descendants;" for the purposes of this opinion it is not necessary to examine the precise grounds upon which it has been given one or the other of these various significations, as in the case at bar it could only be taken to apply to the "children" of the plaintiff’s mother, and it unquestionable does apply to them.

The only question then is whether the word "issue," as used in the statute, includes "natural" as well as "legitimate" children. It must be admitted that the common-law doctrine limited the word "issue" in such cases to "legitimate" descendants of the ancestors, and that this rule has been generally, and perhaps universally, followed in those States wherein the common-law doctrine, denying heritable blood to illegitimate children or descendants has not been modified by statute. It is said in 2 Jarmen on Wills (2d Amer. edit., by J. C. Perkins, p. 34) to be an established rule that a gift to "children." "sons," daughters," or "issue" imports prima facie legitimate children or issue, excluding those who are illegitimate, agreeable to the rule qui ex damnato coitu nascuntur, inter liberos non computentur.

The Latin maxim furnishes us with the ground on which rests the common-law rule for the construction of the word. The bastard under the common law was not computed among the children. "We term them all by the name of bastards that be born out of lawful marriage." (1 Thos. Coke, 115) "A bastard is in law nullius filius, because he can not be heir to any." (Litt., § 188.) So if a bastard were possessed of personal estate, and he died intestate and without wife or children his estate belonged to the Crown; if of real estate it escheated. A bastard was supposed to have no relations except those arising from his own contract of marriage (his wife, children, and descendants). The status and rights of inheritance of bastards being thus fixed by law, the words "issue," "children," "descendants," and the like came to import only such "issue," "children," etc., as the law recognized as such, in other words, "legitimate" issue, children, or descendants; that is to say, issue or children born in lawful wedlock.

But it would appear that where the reason for giving these words such limited and restricted signification has disappeared, where the status of an illegitimate child has been changed or modified so as to cast upon such child the inheritance or a share of the inheritance of the intestate estate of one or both its parents, and where the law recognizes the existence of heritable blood, the legal import of these words must be taken to be changed or modified so as to defeat the manifest purpose and intent of such legislation.

In Virginia where the legislature adopted the most liberal rule in respect to an inheritance in case of bastardy that was consistent with the certain ascertainment of the parents, a bastard might inherit on the part of his mother in like manner as if he were her legitimate son, and he was made as to her, no longer quasi filius nullius, but her child, inheriting from and through her, transmitting to and through her. Accordingly we find that in Virginia, by relation to the mother, the word "children" in a will was relation to the mother, the word "children" in a will was held to include both legitimate and illegitimate children, all the children being comprehended in the same class. (Bennett Et. Al., v. Toler Et. Al., 15 Graft. Va., 588.)

In this case the English and American cases were learnedly and exhaustively reviewed, and the doctrine touching the effect of statutory modification of the common-law rule denying heritable blood to illegitimate "children," issue," or "descendants" was thoroughly and, as it seems to me, conclusively expounded.

In Gibson v. McNelly (11 Ohio, 131) the court adhered to the common-law doctrine, and held that a devise to "issue" meant prima facie legitimate issue; but while this ruling was followed thirty years afterwards by the same court in Hawkins Et. Al. v. Jones Et. Al. (19 Ohio, 22), abiding by the judicial rule of stare decisis, it clearly intimated its doubt as to its correctness; and the court in Flora v. Anderson (67 Fed., Rep., 182, 187; Circuit Court S. D., Ohio W. D.) , in commenting upon and "distinguishing" the leading cases in Ohio and Virginia, points to the fact that statutory modification of the common law as found in Virginia distinguished the Virginia case from the Ohio case.

I am convinced that the reasoning of the Virginia case leaves no room for doubt that to the extent that the law in a particular jurisdiction modifies the rigor of the common law, which treats illegitimate children as nullius filius, and without "heritable blood," to a like extent must the common-law definition of the words "issue,"" children," "descendants," and the like be modified so as to recognize the right of inheritance conferred upon such children. (Drain v. Violett, 2 Bush. Ky., 157; McGunnigle v. McKee, 77 Pa., 81; Miller’s Appeal, 52 Pa., 113.)

In the Philippine Islands, under the provisions of Spanish substantive law, the heritable blood of a natural child is expressly recognized, and its to inherit from its father when the father has recognized his paternity, and its right to inherent from its mother in all cases is secured by the express provisions of the code. Had the mother of the plaintiff survived the testatrix and then died intestate, the plaintiff would have received by operation of law a share of the inheritance equal to one-half the share which would have been inherited by any of the legitimate children. I think, therefore, that, under the provisions of section 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure, she is entitled to take a like portion under and by virtue of the will.

[G.R. No. L-66574. June 17, 1987.]

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, Petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, Et Al., v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI

JARDIN, Respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices, for Petitioners.

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J.:

Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa’s mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.chanrobles law library

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;

"b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;

"c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;

"e) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."cralaw virtua1aw library

Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.

Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti-Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.

Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.

On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3

After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads —

"WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Costs against the oppositors-appellees."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with the following:cralawnad

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/ "illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);

II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);

III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the petitioners’ grandchildren Santero;

IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct descendants and/or grand children;

V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and

VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.

The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in the estate of their grandmother (Simona Pamuti)" 5

Petitioners’ contention holds no water. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a).

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6

Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art, 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr. and Cortes, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. L-19996. April 30, 1965.]

WENCESLA CACHO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JOHN G. UDAN and RUSTICO G. UDAN, Oppositors-Appellants.

Gregorio Dolojan for Petitioner-Appellee.

Benjamin A. G. Vega and Abad Santos & Pablo for oppositors-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. SUCCESSION; INTESTATE HEIRS; COLLATERAL RELATIVES EXCLUDED BY CHILDREN OF INTESTATE. — Collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101 of the Civil Code, they do not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).

2. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATE RELATIVES OF MOTHER CANNOT SUCCEED HER ILLEGITIMATE CHILD. — The legitimate relatives of the mother can not succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.

3. ID; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF ACCEPTANCE OF INHERITANCE; OPPOSITION TO WILL COMPATIBLE WITH CLAIM OF INTESTATE HEIR. — The Civil Code (Art. 1507) presumes acceptance of an inheritance if the latter is not repudiated in due time, and that repudiation, to be valid, must appear in a public or authentic instrument, or petition to the court. The opposition by an intestate heir to the probate of an alleged will is perfectly compatible with the intention to exclude the proponent as testamentary co-heir, and to claim the entire inheritance as heir ab intestato.

4. WILLS; PROBATE; INQUIRY INTO TESTAMENTARY RIGHTS NOT PREMATURE IF PURPOSE IS TO EXCLUDE OPPOSITION. — Inquiry into the hereditary rights of the appellants is not premature, if the purpose is to determine whether their opposition should be excluded in order to simplify and accelerate the proceedings.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

Direct appeal, on questions of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales (Hon. Lucas Lacson, presiding), issued on 20 February 1962, in its Special Proceeding No. 2230, wherein the court disallowed the opposition of John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan to the probate of the alleged will of their sister Silvina Udan.

From the records it can be gleaned that on 13 December 1959 one Silvina G. Udan, single, and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming her son Francisco G. Udan and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike. Wencesla Cacho filed a petition to probate said Will in the Court of First Instance of Zambales on 14 January 1960 (RA. pp. 1-16). On 15 February 1960 Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate (RA. pp. 16-18). On 16 February 1960 Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., filed his Appearance and Urgent Motion for Postponement for and in behalf of his client Francisco G. Udan, the appointed heir in the Will (RA. pp. 18-22). On 9 June 1960 Francisco G. Udan, through counsel, filed his opposition to the probate of this Will (RA. pp. 33-35). On 15 September 1960 oppositor Rustico G. Udan, through counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his opposition, dated 13 February 1960, due to the appearance of Francisco G. Udan, the named heir in the Will and said opposition was ordered withdrawn (RA. pp. 55-56). After one witness, the Notary Public who made and notarized the Will, had testified in court, oppositor Francisco G. Udan died on 17 June 1961 in San Marcelino, Zambales, Philippines (RA. PP. 63-66).

After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law; that testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence (R.A. pp. 63-66; 67-71). On 20 January 1962 proponent-appellee, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss Oppositions filed by the Oppositors (RA. pp. 73-80), and on 20 February 1962 the Honorable Court of First Instance of Zambales issued an Order disallowing these two oppositions for lack of interest in the estate and directing the Fiscal to study the advisability of filing escheat proceedings (RA. pp. 97-99). On 26 and 30 March 1962 both oppositors filed their Motions for Reconsideration, through their respective counsels, and these motions were both denied by the lower court on 25 April 1962 (RA. pp. 99-122; 131-132). On 7 May 1962 oppositors filed their joint Notice of Appeal (RA. pp. 132 135).

The first issue tendered by appellants is whether the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan. We find that the court below correctly held that they were not, for at the time of

her death Silvina’s illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force at the time of the death of the testatrix:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased."cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles."cralaw virtua1aw library

These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).

That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not denied by the oppositors; and he is so acknowledged to be in the testament, where said Francisco is termed "son" by the testatrix. As the latter was admittedly single, the son must be necessarily illegitimate (presumptively natural under Article 277).

The trial court, therefore, committed no error in holding that John and Rustico Udan had no standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded by its terms from participating in the estate; and if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellants will be excluded by the illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law.

The death of Francisco two years after his mother’s demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law, not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother can not succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code.

"ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child."cralaw virtua1aw library

For the oppositors-appellants it is argued that while Francisco Udan did survive his mother, and acquired the rights to the succession from the moment of her death (Art. 777, Civ. Code), still he did not acquire the inheritance until he accepted it. This argument fails to take into account that the Code presumes acceptance of an inheritance if the latter is not repudiated in due time (Civ. Code, Art. 1057, p. 2), and that repudiation, to be valid must appear in a public or authentic instrument, or petition to the court. There is no document or pleading in the records showing repudiation of the inheritance by Francisco Udan. The latter’s own opposition (RA. p. 61) to the probate of the alleged will is perfectly compatible with the intention to exclude the proponent Cacho as testamentary co-heir, and to claim the entire inheritance as heir ab intestato.

Finally, it is urged that as probate is only concerned with the due execution of a testament, any ruling on the successional rights of oppositors-appellants is at present premature. Inquiry into the hereditary rights of the appellants is not premature, if the purpose is to determine whether their opposition should be excluded in order to simplify and accelerate the proceedings. If, as already shown, appellants can not gain any hereditary interest in the estate, whether the will is probated or not, their intervention would merely result in unnecessary complication.

It may not be amiss to note, however, that the hearing on the probate must still proceed to ascertain the rights of the proponent Cacho as testamentary heir.

WHEREFORE, the order under appeal is affirmed, without prejudice to further proceedings in the case, conformably to this opinion. Costs against appellants John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

[G.R. NO. 155733 - January 27, 2006]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-

MADARANG,Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half - and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado's life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio's and Felisa Delgado's union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter's intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado's intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father.16Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self -

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove

their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;

3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States - Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.

The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father's demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado's obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia's late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.

On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.28

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus 30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties' oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors' appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32

In a Petition for Review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors' failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.

x x x

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court's pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.

x x x

In this instance, private respondents' intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.

x x x

A review of the trial court's decision is needed.

x x x

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents' Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court's May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial court's decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDEREDdeclaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator's qualification and posting of the bond.

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

x x x

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;

x x x

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.39

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners' own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47

The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado's and Caridad Concepcion's Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51were her natural children.52

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?cralawlibrary

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that

succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are herbrothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa's estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent's entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;

(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63

Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma's right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.

The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma's second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor's report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado's obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor's parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor's claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter's death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.68

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70

Entitlement To Letters Of Administration

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia's June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado's full - or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado's grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia's estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado's estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 129163. April 22, 2003.]

VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE ARBOLARIO, EXALTACION ARBOLARIO, CARLOS ARBOLARIO, and Spouses ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ and CARLITO SALHAY, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO, RUTH COLINCO,

ORPHA COLINCO and GOLDELINA COLINCO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been legally ended is presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered into.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the February 28, 1995 Decision 2 and the March 5, 1997 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR No. 38583. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new one is accordingly entered —

"(a) in Civil Case No. 385, DISMISSING the complaint and [counter-claim];

"(b) in Civil Case No. 367, ORDERING the defendant spouses to vacate the premises occupied within Lot 323, Ilog Cadastre, registered under T.C.T. No. 140081 in favor of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco and Goldelina Colinco." 4

On the other hand, the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration. 5

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan had five (5) children, namely: (1) Agueda Colinco, (2) Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo Baloyo, Gaudencia Baloyo, and (5) Julian Baloyo. All of the above-named persons are now dead.

"The first child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and [respondent] Irene Colinco. Antonio Colinco predeceased his three daughters, herein [respondents], Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco.

"The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario. Their union was blessed with the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in 1985, died a spinster and without issue.

"Records disclose moreover that decedent Purificacion’s father, Juan Arbolario, consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca Malvas. From this cohabitation was born the [petitioners], viz, Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as "Arbolarios’). It is significant to note, at this juncture, that all the foregoing [petitioners] were born well before the year 1951.

"In 1946, it appears that the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire interest in Lot 323 to his sister, Agueda Baloyo Colinco, by virtue of a notarized document acknowledged before Notary Public Deogracias Riego.

"In 1951, a notarized declaration of heirship was executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half (1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half.

"And as far as Julian Baloyo — the fifth and last child was concerned, records could only show that he was married to a certain Margarita Palma; and that he died, presumably after 1951 without any issue.

"Purificacion Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion of the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or 1985.

"It was under the foregoing set of facts that [respondents] Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, executed a ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement’, dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves their proportionate or ideal shares in O.C.T. No. 16361, viz: Irene Colinco, to one-half (1/2); while the surviving daughters of her (Irene’s) late brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco, to share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining half (1/2). This forthwith brought about the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 16361, and the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-140018 in their names and conformably with the aforesaid distribution.

"On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed Civil Case No. 367 against Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito Salhay, seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot occupied by [respondent] spouses (’Salhays’ hereinafter) since 1970.

"The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since 1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased the disputed portion of Lot No. 323 from the deceased lessor sometime in

[September] 1978.

"Meanwhile, or on May 9, 1988 — before Civil Case No. 367 was heard and tried on the merits — Voltaire M. Arbolario, Fe Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Ta-ala; Exaltacion Arbolario, Carlos Arbolario (’Arbolarios’, collectively) and spouses Carlito, Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (the same defendants in Civil Case No. 367), filed Civil Case No. 385 ‘[f]or Cancellation of Title with Damages’, against the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 367. The Arbolarios, joined by the Salhays, contend that the ‘Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement’ executed by the Colincos was defective and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the distribution of the aforesaid lot." 6

Ruling of the Trial Court

After a full-blown trial on the consolidated cases, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental (Branch 61) 7 rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [Arbolarios] and against the [Colincos] in Civil Case No. 385 —

1) Declaring that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement, dated May 8, 1987, executed by Irene, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco, as null and void and of no effect insofar as the share of Purificacion Arbolario in Lot No. 323 is concerned[;]

2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-140018 and issue a new one in the names of Voltaire Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Ta-ala, Carlos Arbolario, Fe Arbolario and Exaltacion Arbolario, 3/8 share or One thousand Six Hundred Forty Three Point Five (643.5) square meters, and the remaining 5/8 share or One Thousand Seventy Two Point Five (1,072.5) square meters in the names of Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco and Goldelina Corlinco or other heirs, if any[;]

3) Ordering the [Respondents] Irene, Ruth, Orpha and Goldelina, all surnamed Colinco, to pay jointly and severally to [Petitioners] Voltaire M. Arbolario, Et Al., the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages, Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees and the . . . sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as appearance fees; and

in Civil Case No. 367 —

1) Ordering the dismissal of [respondents’] complaint and the [petitioners’] counter-claim for lack of legal basis.

In both cases —

1) Ordering the Colincos to pay costs." 8

The trial court held that the Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her cousins and nieces. Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos could not inherit from her, because she had half-brothers and half-sisters. Their 1987 Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in bad faith, because they knew all along the existence of, and their relationship with, the Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand, had no document to prove their acquisition and possession of a portion of the disputed lot.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA rejected the contention of petitioners that "the cohabitation of their father with their natural mother, Francisca Malvas, was by virtue of a valid marriage." The appellate court observed that the Arbolarios had all been born before the death of Catalina Baloyo, as shown by the Deed of Declaration of Heirship, which she had executed in 1951. No evidence was ever presented showing that her conjugal union with Juan Arbolario had been judicially annulled or lawfully ended before that year. Because it was also in 1951 when Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, their union was presumably extramarital. Consequently, their children are illegitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, the daughter of Juan and Catalina.

Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late Purificacion Arbolario, petitioners cannot conveniently undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were treated as half brothers and half-sisters by the deceased.

On the other hand, there is no impediment for respondents to declare themselves as the sole and forced heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. Moreover, there is no clear and reliable evidence to support the allegation of the Salhays that they

purchased from the decedent, Purificacion Arbolario, the lot that they have been occupying since 1970.

Hence, this Petition. 9

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I

"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in considering the Arbolarios illegitimate children and not entitled to inherit from their half-sister Purificacion Arbolario.

II

"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in considering the purchase of the property by Rosela Rodriguez and subsequent acquisition by Petitioners Rosalita Rodriguez and Carlito Salhay improper.

III

"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious error in deciding that the court a quo had no right to distribute the said property." 10

In other words, petitioners are questioning the CA pronouncements on (1) the illegitimacy of their relationship with Purificacion; (2) the validity of the Salhays’ purchase of a portion of the disputed lot; and (3) the impropriety of the RTC Order partitioning that lot.

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Illegitimacy of Petitioners

Petitioners contend that their illegitimacy is a "far-fetched and scurrilous claim" that is not supported by the evidence on record. They maintain that the CA declared them illegitimate on the unproven allegation that Catalina Baloyo had signed the Declaration of Heirship in 1951. They aver that this 1951 Declaration does not contain her signature, and that she died in 1903:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Que Agueda Baloyo, Catalina Baloyo y Eduardo Baloyo murieron ab intestate en Ilog, Negros Occ.; la primera fallecio en 11 de Noviembre de 1940, la segunda murio el ano 1903 y el ultimo en 28 de Marzo de 1947 . . .." 11

We are not persuaded.

We begin our ruling with the general principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 12 However, where the trial court and the CA arrived at different factual findings, a review of the evidence on record may become necessary. 13

Petitioners, in effect, are asking us to evaluate the 1951 Declaration of Heirship, deduce that Catalina Baloyo had long been dead before it was ever executed, and conclude that the Arbolarios are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of Juan and Catalina’s only daughter, Purificacion. What we see, on the other hand, is a series of non sequiturs.

First, a review of the 1951 Declaration reveals that the year of Catalina’s death was intercalated. The first two numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are legible; but the third digit has been written over to make it look like a "0." Further, the paragraph quoted by petitioners should show a chronological progression in the heirs’ years of death: Agueda died in 1940 and Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if Catalina had indeed died in 1903, why then was her name written after Agueda’s and not before it? Moreover, the document, being in Spanish, requires an official translation. We cannot readily accept the English translation proffered by petitioners, since respondents did not agree to its correctness. Besides, it consisted of only a paragraph of the whole document.

Second, there is no solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolario’s marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly because Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born. It does not follow that just because his first wife has died, a man is already conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact.

Third, clear and substantial evidence is required to support the claim of petitioners that they were preterited from the 1951 Declaration of Heirship. The RTC Decision merely declared that they were half-brothers and half-sisters of Purificacion, while respondents were her cousins and nieces (collateral relatives). It made no pronouncement as to whether they were her legitimate or illegitimate siblings. We quote the appellate court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . . Therefore, in the absence of any fact that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and Catalina Baloyo had been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios] was extra-marital. And consequently, . . . Voltaire Arbolario, Et Al., are illegitimate children of Juan Albolario.

"There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy in this jurisdiction (Article 261, New Civil Code); and whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after the dissolution of a prior marriage or the separation of the spouses must introduce such evidence to prove his or her allegation (Ibid.; Sec. 4, Rule 131, New Rules on Evidence). It is the . . . Arbolarios, claiming to be born under a validly contracted subsequent marriage, who must show proof of their legitimacy. But this, they have miserably failed to do." 14

Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established. 15 It stands to reason that children born within wedlock are legitimate. 16 Petitioners, however, failed to prove the fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas; hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy in their favor.

As it is, we have to follow the settled rule that the CA’s factual findings cannot be set aside, because they are supported by the evidence on record. 17 As held by the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage to Juan is presumed to have continued. Even where there is actual severance of the filial companionship between spouses, their marriage subsists, and either spouse’s cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed to be between "husband and wife." 18

Second Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Evidence of Purchase

Petitioners contend that the CA committed a serious error when it disregarded the testimony that the Salhays had purchased the portion of the lot they had been occupying since 1970. This issue, according to them, was not even raised by respondents in the latter’s appeal to the CA.

We disagree. Although the sale was not expressly assigned as an error in their Brief, respondents (as petitioners in the CA) still assailed the existence of the sale when they argued thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As to the spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita R. Salhay, they could not present any written contract to support their claim to having purchased a portion of Lot 323 where their house stands. Rosalita R. Salhay on the witness stand testified under oath that she has no contract of sale in her favor because it was her mother, Rosela Rodriguez who had purchased the land, but she was not able to produce any evidence of such sale in favor of her mother. She declared that she has never paid land taxes for the land." 19

Hence, they prayed for the reversal of the appealed RTC Decision in toto. The CA, on the other hand, categorically ruled that "no clear and reliable evidence had been introduced to prove such bare [allegation]" that a portion of the disputed lot had ever been purchased by the Salhays. Besides, no favorable supporting evidence was cited by petitioners in their Memorandum. Thus, we find no reason to overturn the CA’s factual finding on this point.

Third Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Partition

Petitioners also contend that the Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds when it ruled that since respondents did not raise the issue of partition on appeal, the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot. The CA held, however, that the partition of the property had not been contemplated by the parties, because respondents merely sought recovery of possession of the parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition respondents had entered into.

We agree with the appellate court. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and a right to enjoy the allotted estate without supervision or interference. 20

Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to establish that they were legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion. Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of ownership and possession. 21

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 126707. February 25, 1999.]

BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUITA M. MACATANGAY, MA. OLIVIA M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, RUBEN M. ADRIANO, HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, JOSELITO M. ADRIANO, ROGELIO M. ADRIANO, WILFREDO M.

ADRIANO, VICTOR M. ADRIANO, CORAZON A. ONGOCO, JASMIN A. MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO,Petitioners, v. JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 17, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41283, which reversed the decision, dated June 10, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 59705.

The facts of the case are, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She left five (5) parcels of land situated in Orambo, Pasig City.

At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs, viz: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her niece who is the only daughter of Rosa de la Merced-Platon (a sister who died in 1943); and (3) the legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another sister of Evarista who died in 1965), namely: Herminio, Ruben, Joselito, Rogelio, Wilfredo, Victor and Constantino, all surnamed Adriano, Corazon Adriano-Ongoco and Jasmin Adriano-Mendoza.

Almost a year later or on March 19, 1988, to be precise, Francisco (Evarista’s brother) died. He was survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their three legitimate children, namely, Luisito E. dela Merced, Blanquita M. Macatangay and Ma. Olivia M. Paredes.

On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, Evarista M. dela Merced, referring to (1) the abovenamed heirs of Francisco; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan and (3) the nine [9] legitimate children of Eugenia, executed an extrajudicial settlement, entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. dela Merced" adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso.

On July 26 ,1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. Dela Merced with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order", alleging that he was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully aware of his relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private respondent Joselito prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.

On August 3, 1990, the trial court issued the temporary restraining order prayed for by private respondent Joselito, enjoining the

sale of any of the real properties of the deceased Evarista.

After trial, however, or on June 10, 1992, to be definite, the trial court dismissed the petition, lifted the temporary restraining order earlier issued, and cancelled the notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the real properties of the deceased Evarista.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The factual setting of the instant motion after considering the circumstances of the entire case and the other evidentiary facts and documents presented by the herein parties points only to one issue which goes into the very skeleton of the controversy, to wit: "Whether or not the plaintiff may participate in the intestate estate of the late Evarista M. Dela Merced in his capacity as representative of his alleged father, Francisco Dela Merced, brother of the deceased, whose succession is under consideration.

x x x

It is to be noted that Francisco Dela Merced, alleged father of the herein plaintiff, is a legitimate child, not an illegitimate. Plaintiff, on the other hand, is admittedly an illegitimate child of the late Francisco Dela Merced. Hence, as such, he cannot represent his alleged father in the succession of the latter in the intestate estate of the late Evarista Dela Merced, because of the barrier in Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.’

The application of Art. 992 cannot be ignored in the instant case, it is clearly worded in such a way that there can be no room for any doubts and ambiguities. This provision of the law imposes a barrier between the illegitimate and the legitimate family. . ." (Rollo, p. 87-88)

Not satisfied with the dismissal of his petition, the private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In its Decision of October 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court of origin and ordered the petitioners to execute an amendatory agreement which shall form part of the original settlement, so as to include private respondent Joselito as a co-heir to the estate of Francisco, which estate includes one-third (1/3) pro indiviso of the latter’s inheritance from the deceased Evarista.

The relevant and dispositive part of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

It is a basic principle embodied in Article 777, New Civil Code that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent, so that Francisco dela Merced inherited 1/3 of his sister’s estate at the moment of the latter’s death. Said 1/3 of Evarista’s estate formed part of Francisco’s estate which was subsequently transmitted upon his death on March 23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among whom is appellant as his illegitimate child. Appellant became entitled to his share in Francisco’s estate from the time of the latter’s death in 1987. The extrajudicial settlement therefore is void insofar as it deprives plaintiff-appellant of his share in the estate of Francisco M. dela Merced. As a consequence, the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens is not in order because the property is directly affected. Appellant has the right to demand a partition of his father’s estate which includes 1/3 of the property inherited from Evarista dela Merced.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to execute an amendatory agreement/settlement to include herein plaintiff-appellant Joselito dela Merced as co-heir to the estate of Francisco dela Merced which includes 1/3 of the estate subject of the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Evarista M. dela Merced dated April 20, 1989. The amendatory agreement/settlement shall form part of the original Extrajudicial Settlement. With costs against defendants-appellees.

SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 41)

In the Petition under consideration, petitioners insist that being an illegitimate child, private respondent Joselito is barred from inheriting from Evarista because of the provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code, which lays down an impassable barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families.

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would

inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter’s share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista.

As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article 777 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco’s) share in the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in the latter’s share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista.

Petitioners argue that if Joselito desires to assert successional rights to the intestate estate of his father, the proper forum should be in the settlement of his own father’s intestate estate, as this Court held in the case of Gutierrez v. Macandog (150 SCRA 422 [1987])

Petitioners’ reliance on the case of Gutierrez v. Macandog (supra) is misplaced. The said case involved a claim for support filed by one Elpedia Gutierrez against the estate of the decedent, Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., when she was not even an heir to the estate in question, at the time, and the decedent had no obligation whatsoever to give her support. Thus, this Court ruled that Elpedia should have asked for support pendente lite before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in which court her husband (one of the legal heirs of the decedent) had instituted a case for legal separation against her on the ground of an attempt against his life. When Mauricio (her husband) died, she should have commenced an action for the settlement of the estate of her husband, in which case she could receive whatever allowance the intestate court would grant her.

The present case, however, relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir to the share of his late father in the estate of the decedent Evarista, ownership of which had been transmitted to his father upon the death of Evarista. There is no legal obstacle for private respondent Joselito, admittedly the son of the late Francisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir to his father’s estate, which estate includes a one-third (1/3) undivided share in the estate of Evarista.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the Appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.