ideology and international institutions - appendixassets.press.princeton.edu/releases/m30812.pdfthat...

Appendix

Contents Appendix ....................................................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................................................... 2

Figure 2-8: Ideal Point correlates .......................................................................................................... 2

Chapter 6 ................................................................................................................................................... 3

Logit analysis from Figure 6-6 ............................................................................................................... 3

Table belonging to figure 6-9: ............................................................................................................... 4

Chapter 7 ................................................................................................................................................... 5

...................................................................................................................................................................... 9

Democratic Peace and IGOs .................................................................................................................. 9

Structured and Interventionist IGOs ................................................................................................... 12

Network Analysis and IGOs ................................................................................................................. 15

Joining Militarized Disputes ................................................................................................................ 17

Non-Shared IGOs ................................................................................................................................. 20

Chapter 8 ................................................................................................................................................. 24

Replication from Chilton (non-imputed) ............................................................................................. 24

Replications Haftel and Thompson ......................................................................................................... 27

Chapter 9 ..................................................................................................................................................... 32

Appendix 9-A: Backlash Episodes............................................................................................................ 32

Appendix 9-B: Is a leader populist? ........................................................................................................ 43

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Chapter 2

Figure 2-8: Ideal Point correlates

(1) (2) (3)

m1 m2 m3

VARIABLES Idealpoint Idealpoint Idealpoint

left = L, 0.96*** 0.95** 0.98

(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)

right = L, 1.05*** 1.05** 1.05***

(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)

polity2 = L, 1.00 1.02*** 1.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

(max) defense = L, 1.20*** 1.41*** 1.07***

(0.03) (0.12) (0.03)

Chinn-Ito index = L, 1.05*** 1.10*** 1.02***

(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)

Constant 1.33*** 1.16*** 0.90***

(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)

Observations 5,221 1,550 3,671

R-squared 0.36 0.39 0.08

Number of ccode 154 122 154

seEform in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Chapter 6

Logit analysis from Figure 6-6

(1) (2) (3)

VARIABLES

L.idealpower -0.00*** -0.00***

(0.00) (0.00)

L.idealdist -0.01*** -0.01***

(0.00) (0.00)

L.polity2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

L.politydist -0.00 -0.00 -0.00**

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

L.defense 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

L.exportdependence 0.00** 0.00** 0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Observations 125,516 125,516 125,516

Note: (country and IGO fixed effects and time trends omitted)



Table belonging to figure 6-9: Linear regression with dyad fixed effects on weighted alliance portfolios.

(1) (2)

VARIABLES s_wt_atop s_wt_atop

L.Idealdist -0.03*** -0.03***

(0.00) (0.00)

L.mindem 0.02*** 0.02***

(0.00) (0.00)

L.demdiff -0.00***

(0.00)

L.maxcap -10.78***

(0.28)

L.capdiff 1.31***

(0.04)

L.ccdistance -0.00***

(0.00)

t 0.00*** 0.00***

(0.00) (0.00)

t2 -0.00*** -0.00***

(0.00) (0.00)

t3 -0.00*** -0.00***

(0.00) (0.00)

L.capratio -0.04***

(0.00)

Constant 0.70*** 0.88***

(0.00) (0.01)

Observations 579,714 464,684

R-squared 0.09 0.10

Number of dyadid 18,801 13,832



Chapter 7 Models including export dependence

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES conflict conflict conflict conflict

1L.majorpower 2.76*** 1.24*** 2.77*** -0.41

(0.12) (0.20) (0.27) (1.07)

L.shared 0.03*** -0.02*** 0.05*** -0.06***

(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

1L.majorpower#cL.shared -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.05*** -0.03***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)

1L.bordercont 2.90*** 4.32***

(0.14) (0.26)

1L.bordercont#cL.shared 0.00 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.03***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)

L.democracy -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.02**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

L.alliance -0.04 -0.07 0.13 -0.28

(0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.20)

L.capratb -0.04** -0.02 -0.04 -0.04

(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)

regionsim 0.73*** 0.81***

(0.12) (0.17)

L.IGOSinsystem -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00 0.01***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

L.peaceyears -0.05*** -0.00 -0.07*** -0.01

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

L.peaceyears2 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

L.peaceyears3 -0.00*** 0.00** -0.00*** -0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

exportdependence 1.99*** 1.68**

(0.44) (0.66)

L.idealdist 0.48*** 0.28***

(0.05) (0.08)

Constant -7.72*** -9.99***

(0.14) (0.30)

Observations 731,807 54,826 465,466 16,230

Number of dyadid 19,238 806 15,237 402



(1) (3) (4) (6)


1L.majorpower 2.93*** 1.37*** 2.56*** -0.26

(0.12) (0.20) (0.27) (1.07)

L.shared 0.04*** -0.00 0.05*** -0.03***

(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

1L.majorpower#cL.shared -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.03***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)

0bL.territorial 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

1L.territorial 1.90*** 0.81*** 2.45*** 0.17

(0.14) (0.15) (0.32) (0.34)

1L.territorial#cL.shared -0.01 0.00 -0.02** 0.01

(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

L.democracy -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.02**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

L.alliance 0.21** 0.03 0.41*** -0.29

(0.09) (0.11) (0.15) (0.20)

L.capratb -0.06** -0.02 -0.07 -0.04

(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)

regionsim 1.91*** 2.24***

(0.11) (0.17)

L.IGOSinsystem -0.01*** 0.00 -0.00** 0.01***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

L.peaceyears -0.05*** 0.00 -0.08*** -0.01

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

L.peaceyears2 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

L.peaceyears3 -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

exportdependence 2.45*** 1.80***

(0.47) (0.66)

L.idealdist 0.43*** 0.25***

(0.05) (0.08)

Constant -7.64*** -9.50***

(0.14) (0.27)

Observations 731,807 54,826 465,466 16,230

Number of dyadid 19,238 806 15,237 402

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



(1) (3) (4) (6)


1L.majorpower 2.83*** 1.27*** 2.56*** -0.70

(0.16) (0.27) (0.29) (1.03)

L.shared 0.04*** -0.02** 0.05*** -0.04***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)

1L.majorpower#cL.shared -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02*

(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

1L.bordercont 3.83*** 4.39***

(0.18) (0.27)

1L.bordercont#cL.shared -0.02*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.02**

(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

L.IGONOMINATE 0.98*** 1.06*** 0.55** 1.40**

(0.16) (0.25) (0.26) (0.55)

L.democracy -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.03***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

L.alliance -0.07 -0.15 0.12 -0.32

(0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.20)

L.capratb -0.08 0.18** -0.14 0.17

(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12)

regionsim 0.65*** 0.76***

(0.14) (0.18)

L.IGOSinsystem -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 0.01***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

exportdependence 1.96*** 1.50**

(0.45) (0.67)

L.idealdist 0.45*** 0.29***

(0.06) (0.08)

Constant -9.03*** -10.07***

(0.21) (0.33)

Observations 574,734 35,938 400,735 15,876

Number of dyadid 13,753 624 12,224 389



Clustered Standard Errors

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

VARIABLES conflict conflict conflict conflict conflict conflict

1L.majorpower 2.57*** 2.56*** 2.77*** 2.47*** 2.42*** 2.40***

(0.13) (0.22) (0.12) (0.23) (0.17) (0.25)

L.shared 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06***

(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

1L.majorpower#cL.shared -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05***

(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)

1L.bordercont 2.33*** 4.02*** 3.26*** 4.03***

(0.14) (0.22) (0.17) (0.23)

1L.bordercont#cL.shared -0.00 -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.04***

(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)

exportdependence 1.00** 0.97** 1.04**

(0.46) (0.45) (0.47)

L.idealdist 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.45***

(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)

L.democracy -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

L.alliance 0.01 0.25* 0.29** 0.49*** -0.02 0.26*

(0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15)

L.capratb -0.05* -0.06 -0.10** -0.12 -0.09 -0.14

(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07) (0.14)

regionsim 0.44*** 0.57*** 1.35*** 1.67*** 0.38*** 0.54***

(0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.18) (0.13) (0.16)

L.IGOSinsystem -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

L.peaceyears -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.12***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

L.peaceyears2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

L.peaceyears3 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

1L.territorial 1.98*** 2.98***

(0.15) (0.30)

1L.territorial#cL.shared -0.01 -0.03***

(0.01) (0.01)

L.IGONOMINATE 0.81*** 0.30

(0.15) (0.22)

Constant -6.51*** -8.37*** -6.38*** -7.63*** -7.50*** -8.36***

(0.11) (0.23) (0.11) (0.21) (0.16) (0.25)

Observations 731,807 465,466 731,807 465,466 574,734 400,735



Replications

This section replicates four studies referenced in chapter 7. The first three studies emphasize the

hypothesis that the effect of joint IGO membership (and ideological similarity) is conditional on

a major power being in the dyad.1 In all studies, I also examined the interaction between IGO

membership and contiguity and found that shared IGO membership does not correlate with

conflict in contiguous dyads. However, the presentation focuses on the major power interaction.

The last study examines whether joint IGO membership influences joiners in conflicts. The

appendix also illustrates an alternative operationalization of the distributive thesis: that non-

shared IGO memberships correlate with dispute occurrence.

Democratic Peace and IGOs

Bruce Russett and Jon Pevehouse find that IGOs with more democratic membership reduce

conflict but overall number of shared IGO memberships does not. They argue that this is so

because the various mechanisms highlighted in the socialization and institutionalist literatures

work better when most members are democracies. They rely on a large literature, which shows

that democracies are better able to make credible commitments to international institutions and

more likely to settle disputes through institutions. Moreover, non-democratic states may get

socialized to resolve their disputes peacefully when they interact more with democracies.

The dependent variable is the occurrence of a fatal MID in the 1885-2000 period.

Democratic IGOs are those where the average member has a Polity score of 7 or higher. Column

1 replicates the base model from table 2. Joint IGO membership does not correlate with the

1 I use the COW definition of major power status.



initiation of a dispute but joint membership in democratic IGOs does. Column 2 adds the major

power interactions. We see that shared IGO memberships are significantly correlated with the

presence of disputes in dyads that include a major power. Figure 3 shows the substantive effect:

dyads including at least one major power but with very few shared IGO memberships are

especiallyconflict prone. However, once states have joined about 30 IGOs dyads including a

major power are about as peaceful as dyads without major powers.

Shared democratic IGOs is still significant and negative in column 2. One problem is that

this variable has an extremely skewed distribution: its mean is .7 but its maximum is 59 (with a

standard deviation of 3). Typically we take logarithmic transformations of such variables as

coefficients could be heavily influenced by those few dyads with very high shared democratic

IGO memberships. I do this for both shared democratic and all IGO memberships in columns 3-

5. The correlation for democratic IGOs does not survive such a transformation for the full period

but it does once we limit the analysis to the post 1945 period (column 5). It is only in this period

that IGOs systematically represent an attempt to create a liberal world order. So it could be that

shared democratic IGO membership captures the polarizing aspects of the liberal world order

and not just the pacifying effects of sharing many IGO memberships with democratic states. The

interaction between all IGO memberships and having a major power in the dyad is consistently

significant and negative.



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

VARIABLES Logarithmic Transformations

MajorPower 1.36*** 2.32*** 2.29*** 2.32*** 2.10***

(0.19) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.53)

NIGOs 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.95***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23)

1.MajorPower#c.NI

GOs

-0.05*** -0.58** -0.59** -1.47***

(0.01) (0.26) (0.26) (0.33)

DemocraticIGOs_6 -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.20 -0.18 -0.49***

(0.03) (0.02) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)

Ideal Point Distance 0.13

(0.10)

1.MajorPower#c.id

ealdistance

0.38**

(0.15)

SmlDemocracy -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.02

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)

SmlDependence -51.70*** -50.46*** -52.64*** -51.82*** -43.75*

(18.05) (17.85) (17.92) (17.91) (25.79)

Contiguity 1.63*** 1.56*** 1.56*** 1.58*** 2.19***

(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29)

logDistance -0.69*** -0.68*** -0.68*** -0.68*** -0.58***

(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)

CumulativeMIDs 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.09***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

lnDemIGOs -0.20 -0.18 -0.49***

(0.13) (0.13) (0.15)

Ally -0.09 0.02

(0.18) (0.22)

JointDemocracy -0.55* -0.08

(0.30) (0.36)

idealdist 0.13

(0.10)

fatal1spl -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.24***

(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)

fatal1sp1 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

fatal1sp2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Constant -0.96 -1.36 -1.31 -1.23 -2.53***

(0.84) (0.84) (0.84) (0.85) (0.98)

Observations 454,380 454,380 454,380 454,380 368,440

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Column 5 also adds the distance between two states ideal points from UN voting. As

predicted by the distributive theory, this correlation is only significant and positive for dyads that

include a major power. A separate analysis confirms that among contiguous states, a dissimilar

ideology does not significantly increase the probability of militarized conflict. Indeed, the



correlation has the opposite sign, suggesting that more ideologically similar contiguous dyads are

more likely to experience conflict. This could potentially be because more dissimilar states are

more likely to attract intervention. Or: more generally, because the dyadic analysis imperfectly

models multilateral MIDs where ideologically dissimilar non-contiguous states (including no

major power) are likely to find themselves on opposite sides of a disputes when none of the other

covariates point to a high likelihood of dispute). All of this remains speculative.

Figure 1: Fatal MIDs by Shared IGOs, based on Pevehouse and Russett

Structured and Interventionist IGOs

Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nord



strom argue that only some IGOs are likely to reduce militarized conflict.2 First, only

IGOs with institutionalist mechanisms for mediation, arbitration, and other means to coerce state

decisions are able to help states credibly reveal private information in crises. They distinguish

these interventionist organizations from structured and minimalist organizations, which do not

affect conflict. Interventionist organizations with security mandates are even more likely to be

effective. Second, IGOs are more effective as they are more homogenous in their membership as

these are better at maintaining the secrecy required for effective private information

transmission. IGO heterogeneity is measured using dyadic similarity in UN voting records. A

regression analysis on MIDs from 1950-1991 supports these hypotheses.

By contrast, the distributive perspective posits that the effect of IGO membership should

hold for all IGOs but only in dyads that contain a major power. The effects may well be more

pronounced in interventionist IGOs, as these are better at peacefully resolving disputes among its

members and are more likely used for collective coercive actions against non-members.

Table 2 replicates table two from the original study3 and adds an interaction between

major power in the dyad and shared IGOs. The results are consistent with the distributive theory.

Shared IGO memberships only reduce conflicts in dyads that contains at least one major power.

Moreover, the heterogeneity of IGO membership no longer correlates with conflict in the

regressions that include the interaction.

2 Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004. 3 The analyses are based on the original data and variables and have the same number of observations.

The coefficients are very close to the original but I could not get an exact match. Most notably, the coefficient on interventionist IGOs just misses the 5% significance mark in my re-analysis.



Table 2: Replication from Boehment, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, table 2

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

VARIABLES All IGOs Minimalist IGOs Interventionist IGOs Structured IGOs

IGOs 0.00 0.03*** 0.02 0.05*** -0.09* 0.02 0.01 0.08***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)

Major Power 1.60*** 3.00*** 1.59*** 2.17*** 1.58** 2.37** 1.60*** 3.49***

(0.22) (0.37) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.29) (0.22) (0.52)

Major Power#IGOs -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.32*** -0.15***

(0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)

Floor Member Contention 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.06 -0.00 0.03 0.01 0.07

(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)

Major Power Contention 0.22** 0.13 0.21** 0.17* 0.22** 0.14 0.22** 0.14

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)

Dif Floor MP Contention 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.05

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)

Diplomatic Missions, low 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Democracy, low -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03** -0.03** -0.05*** -0.04***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Interdependence, low -42.03* -28.17 -45.85** -29.58 -28.53 -21.81 -41.71* -30.05

(23.30) (17.58) (23.29) (18.61) (22.78) (16.38) (22.04) (19.08)

Capability ratio -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Allies -0.15 -0.15 -0.19 -0.19 -0.07 0.01 -0.15 -0.17

(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)

Contiguity 2.07*** 2.02*** 2.06*** 2.01*** 2.08*** 2.05*** 2.07*** 2.06***

(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)

Distance between capitals -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.46*** -0.46*** -0.51*** -0.49*** -0.47*** -0.45***

(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)

PeaceYears -1.66*** -1.66*** -1.66*** -1.65*** -1.67*** -1.66*** -1.66*** -1.67***

(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)

Spline 1 -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.16***

(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)

Spline 2 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Spline 3 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00** 0.00*

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Constant -0.84 -1.59** -0.88 -1.20 -0.43 -0.85 -0.87 -1.95**

(0.78) (0.75) (0.77) (0.73) (0.82) (0.80) (0.77) (0.81)

Observations 109,965 109,965 109,965 109,965 109,965 109,965 109,965 109,965

Robust errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 2 plots the estimated probability of a dispute onset by the number of joint

interventionist IGO memberships. Dyads that contain a major power and no shared

interventionist IGO are especially conflict prone. Once a dyad has about 5 shared interventionist



IGO memberships, there is no longer a statistically significant difference between dispute onset

in dyads that do and that do not contain a major power.

Figure 2: MID Onset by Shared Interventionist IGOs, from Boehmer, Gratzke, and Nordstrom

Network Analysis and IGOs

Emilie Hafner-Burton and Alex Montgomery examine how the way states are integrated

into the network of IGOs affects their propensity to engage in conflict.4 They build on insights

from social network theory to introduce three variables. First, the network of IGOs may consist

of different clusters. Membership in the same cluster may make conflict less likely. Second,

states that are in larger clusters may be more prone to conflict. Third, high disparities in network

4 Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006b.



prestige may affect conflict propensity, although the theory is unclear about the direction of this

effect. Columns (1) and (3) reproduce their main results: whereas shared IGO memberships are

not correlated with dispute initiation, two of the three network variables are.

Columns (2) and (4) introduce the major power interactions. As before, shared IGO

memberships are negatively correlated with dispute initiation only in dyads that include at least

one major power. The same holds for the cluster effect. The other two network variables do not

exhibit a significant correlation with conflict initiation.

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES disp_l1 disp_l1 disp_l1 disp_l1

1.majpower 1.94*** 2.79*** 2.64*** 2.83***

(0.15) (0.22) (0.27) (0.35)

IGOSame 0.01** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.03***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)

1.majpower#c.IGOSame -0.04*** -0.03***

(0.01) (0.01)

ClusSame -0.19** 0.18

(0.10) (0.13)

1.majpower#c.ClusSame -0.71***

(0.19)

CentDif -0.00*** -0.00

(0.00) (0.00)

1.majpower#c.CentDif -0.00

(0.00)

ClusSizeMax -0.00 0.01

(0.00) (0.01)

1.majpower#c.ClusSizeMax 0.01

(0.01)

smldmat -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

smldep -42.98*** -41.33*** -8.40 -35.06***

(12.25) (11.57) (7.36) (11.01)

lcaprat2 -0.20*** -0.22*** 0.05 -0.21***

(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)

allies -0.33** -0.34** -0.45*** -0.40***

(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)

hegdefb 7.66*** 9.51*** 3.67** 9.15***

(1.75) (1.84) (1.70) (1.82)

contigkb 1.77*** 1.72*** 2.34*** 1.67***



(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)

logdstab -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.26*** -0.47***

(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)

disp_spl0 -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62***

(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)

disp_spl1 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

disp_spl2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

disp_spl3 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Constant -0.96** -1.46*** -1.84*** -1.44***

(0.43) (0.44) (0.54) (0.50)

Observations 149,403 149,403 149,403 149,403


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Joining Militarized Disputes

Finally, I test the idea that the incentives for states to join disputes are linked to ideology

and institutionalized membership. I am not aware of a pre-existing study that develops this link. I

therefore start with a recent study that develops a baseline model that properly accounts for

geographic proximity to a conflict.5 The model starts with existing MIDs and pairs these with

potential joiner states (all states in the international system). The key hypothesis is that states that

are poorly integrated into IGOs (measured by their eigenvalue centrality) are more likely to

invite major power joiners than states that are well integrated. By contrast, if the target of a MID

is well integrated into the world’s IGOs, then major power joiners should be more likely.

Together, these hypotheses suggest that integration into the world’s IGOs reflects a state’s

willingness to institutionalize the status quo. Thus, initiating an MID is likely to be perceived by

major powers as a threat or attack on the status quo. However, an initiator that is poorly

5 Joyce and Braithwaite 2013. I use their preferred model: model 3 from the first regression table.



integrated is more likely to be seen as threatening the status quo, especially if it attacks a well-

integrated state.

Table 3: Replication from Joyce and Braitwaite

(1) (2) (3)

VARIABLES joined joined joined

Eigen Value Centrality Initiator 3.72***

(1.43)

1.majpower 1.71*** 0.25

(0.33) (0.62)

1.majpower#c.EVCent_i -7.36***

(2.13)

EV Centrality Target -8.57***

(1.62)

1.majpower#c.EVCent_t 6.90***

(2.32)

cinc_km_wgs84_itj 2.52*** 1.44*** 3.09***

(0.18) (0.28) (0.55)

contig_itj 2.14*** 1.84*** 1.87***

(0.10) (0.12) (0.32)

alliance_itj 1.15*** 1.15*** 1.35***

(0.11) (0.11) (0.29)

democ_itj 0.11 0.09 -0.06

(0.12) (0.12) (0.34)

autoc_itj -0.06 -0.18 0.22

(0.10) (0.12) (0.31)

majpower_i 0.79*** 1.25***

(0.12) (0.42)

majpower_t -0.25* -1.56

(0.15) (1.00)

idealdist_i -0.13

(0.27)

1.majpower#c.idealdist_i 0.68**

(0.30)

idealdist_t 0.14

(0.17)

1.majpower#c.idealdist_t -0.10

(0.22)

Constant -7.20*** -7.13*** -8.77***

(0.08) (0.22) (0.38)

Observations 211,730 204,433 64,501



Figure 3: Eigen Value Centrality and MID Onset

Table 3 confirms these insights. The first column gives the baseline model. In the second

column, the eigen value centrality of target and initiator state are added and interacted with the

major power status of potential joiners. I also added terms for whether the initiator and target are

major powers. Figure 5 shows the substantive effect: a major power intervention is much more

likely for initiator states with low centrality in the network of IGOs than for states with high

centrality. The opposite holds for target states.

The third column of table three shows that initiator states with very distinct global

ideologies from the potential joiner state are more likely to see a major power (but not other

states) join. There is no effect for ideology on the target states.

0

.00

5.0

1.0

15

Pr(

Jo

ined

)

0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3EVCent

No Major Power Major Power

Major Power Intervention by Eigen value Centrality Initiator



Non-Shared IGOs

Table 4, below, replaces the number of shared IGO membership with the proportions of shared

and non-shared memberships out of all IGOs. The latter are instances where one state belongs to

an IGO but the other does not. The reference category is the proportion of IGOs neither state is a

member of. Proportions test the distributive rationale more directly. What matters is not

necessarily the number of ties but how memberships are distributed over the universe of IGOs.

For simplicity, I only interact IGO variables with major power status and not also with

contiguity. The expectation of the distributive theory is that a large share of non-shared IGO

memberships with a major power would be associated with a larger propensity for conflict.



Table 4: Logit regressions with fixed and random dyad effects on the likelihood of militarized

conflict

1900-2010 1946-2010

VARIABLES RE FE RE FE

Major Power 0.77*** -0.43 -0.34 -3.25***

(0.24) (0.41) (0.42) (1.24)

Shared proportion IGOs 1.36* -2.63** 3.04** -4.89**

(0.74) (1.04) (1.30) (2.27)

Major Power#Shared Proportion IGO 0.31 2.06* -1.75 -2.54

(0.81) (1.16) (1.86) (3.40)

Non-shared proportion IGOs -1.02 -0.81 -4.79*** -5.19**

(0.72) (1.02) (1.25) (2.34)

Majorpower# Non-Shared Proportion 4.15*** 2.86*** 8.60*** 7.68***

(0.72) (0.97) (1.26) (2.33)

IGO Ideal Point difference 0.80*** 1.22*** 0.75** 1.56***

(0.17) (0.26) (0.31) (0.61)

Contiguity 3.54*** 3.69***

(0.14) (0.18)

UN Ideal Point distance 0.53*** 0.28***

(0.05) (0.08)

Shared Democracy -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03**

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Alliance 0.02 -0.29** 0.10 -0.35*

(0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.20)

Capability Ratio -0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.00**

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Shared Region 0.64*** 0.69***

(0.15) (0.18)

IGOSinsystem 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00*

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Peaceyears -0.04*** 0.01 -0.05*** -0.00

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Peaceyears2 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Peaceyears3 -0.00*** 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00**

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Constant -8.72*** -9.37***

(0.27) (0.38)

Observations 574,734 35,938 475,477 17,315

Number of dyadid 13,753 624 13,729 420

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



The results are consistent with this expectation. The correlation between the proportion of shared

IGOs and militarized conflict is inconsistent across model specifications. Yet, the proportion of

non-shared IGOs is consistently positively correlated with militarized conflict among dyads that

include at least one major power. The same finding holds if we examine only interventionist

IGOs. Moreover, it is robust to excluding the overall number of IGOs in the system from the

equation (which is the denominator). The figure below illustrates the substantive effects for both

non-shared IGOs (mean.22, SD .13) and interventionist IGOs (mean .34, SD .18). The proportion

of non-shared IGOs does not noticeably correlate with the likelihood of conflict in dyads that do

not include a major power but it is strongly correlated with increased conflict in dyads that do

include a major power. Even while including non-shared memberships, IGO ideal point distance

is also still positively correlated with increased conflict.



Figure Non-Shared IGOs and MID Onset



Chapter 8

Replication from Chilton (non-imputed)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

VARIABLES bit_sign_year

s bit_sign_year

s bit_sign_year

s bit_sign_year

s

Un Idealpoint difference -1.31*** -1.64*** -1.87***

(0.28) (0.39) (0.41)

US FDI outflows -0.47** -0.08 -0.78*** -0.66***

(0.21) (0.08) (0.28) (0.25)

c.idealdiff_t#c.usfdi_outflow_ln_t_1 0.12** 0.19** 0.18***

(0.06) (0.08) (0.07)

Military Aid 0.04 0.05** 0.06 0.04

(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)

Former Communist 1.63*** 2.47*** 1.17* 0.69

(0.46) (0.43) (0.63) (0.60)

US Exports 0.19* 0.16 0.18 0.15

(0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12)

Investment Risk -0.01

(0.10)

t 0.40 0.35 -0.26 0.36

(0.37) (0.38) (1.30) (0.37)

t2 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02

(0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.03)

t3 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

polity2 -0.02

(0.03)

Observations 3,284 3,425 1,853 2,653


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



(1) (2) (3)

VARIABLES bit_sign_years bit_sign_years bit_sign_years

Un Idealpoint difference -1.56*** -1.99*** -2.03***

(0.32) (0.49) (0.40)

Export dependence -9.76* -14.94** -12.25**

(5.12) (5.90) (5.44)

c.idealdiff_t#c.exportdependence 3.35** 5.26*** 4.24***

(1.48) (1.70) (1.56)

US FDI outflows -0.10 -0.25** -0.14

(0.10) (0.11) (0.10)

US Exports 0.15 0.14 0.14

(0.12) (0.15) (0.11)

Military Aid 0.03 0.07* 0.04

(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)

Former Communist 1.31** 0.60 0.57

(0.51) (0.80) (0.61)

Investment Risk -0.09

(0.12)

t 0.34 -0.64 0.33

(0.37) (1.36) (0.38)

t2 -0.02 0.06 -0.02

(0.03) (0.10) (0.03)

t3 0.00 -0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

polity2 -0.03

(0.03)

Observations 3,114 1,839 2,587


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



VARIABLES bit_sign_years

Un Idealpoint difference -1.37***

(0.36)

Export dependence -7.66

(5.42)

c.idealdiff_t#c.exportdependence 3.02*

(1.58)

BIT in place with other state 2.11***

(0.58)

Weighted proportion export partners with US BITs 7.07***

(2.29)

US FDI outflows -0.07

(0.09)

US Exports 0.08

(0.11)

Military Aid 0.01

(0.03)

Former Communist 1.26**

(0.59)

t 0.27

(0.31)

t2 -0.02

(0.02)

t3 0.00

(0.00)

Observations 3,111


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Replications Haftel and Thompson

Replication table 1. Cox models

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

VARIABL

ES

(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)

Dispute

Respondent

1.30*** 1.29*** 1.29***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)

Growth UN

Ideal Point

Gap

1.24*** 1.19** 1.24*** 1.36*** 1.24*** 1.20**

(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)

New EU

Member

1.81*** 2.48*** 1.81*** 2.31*** 1.78*** 1.58**

(0.33) (0.54) (0.33) (0.41) (0.33) (0.29)

Democratic

Transition

0.48 0.45 0.48 0.59 0.47 0.49

(0.36) (0.34) (0.36) (0.42) (0.36) (0.37)

Î”GDPCC

Gap

0.91 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.89

(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)

Î”FDI

Inflows

0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Common

Law

0.47*** 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.45***

(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)

Colonial

Ties

0.94 0.96 0.95 0.82 0.94 0.94

(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32)

Lagged

Renegotiate

d BITs

1.07*** 1.08*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 1.06***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

lag_disptota

l

0.98***

(0.01)

lag_partym

ove

1.22

(0.26)

lag_bitforce 1.01*



(0.00)

lagdisp3 1.29***

(0.08)

disp_3yearl

ag

1.18***

(0.03)

Observation

s

18,826 18,826 18,826 18,826 17,185 17,185

Robust seeform in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Replication Table 2 (logit and probit models)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12

(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)

Growth UN Ideal Point Gap 1.12*** 1.10*** 1.12*** 1.13*** 1.27*** 1.24***

(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09)

Dispute Respondent 1.11*** 1.11*** 1.11*** 1.31***

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)

New EU Member 1.21*** 1.38*** 1.21*** 1.34*** 1.66*** 2.24***

(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.30) (0.47)

Î”GDPCC Gap 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.90 0.93

(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10)

Democratic Transition 0.84 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.74 0.66

(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.55) (0.49)

Î”FDI Inflows 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)

Common Law 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.52*** 0.53***

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12)

Colonial Ties 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.89 0.86 0.87

(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.27) (0.27)

Lagged Renegotiated BITs 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.06*** 1.07***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)

counter 1.13*** 1.17*** 1.13*** 1.13*** 1.39*** 1.51***

(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.13)

counter2 1.00** 0.99*** 1.00** 1.00** 0.99*** 0.98***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

counter3 1.00** 1.00*** 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 1.00***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

lag_disptotal 0.99*** 0.99***

(0.00) (0.01)

lag_partymove 1.14

(0.09)

lag_bitforce 1.00*

(0.00)

Constant 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00*** 0.00***

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)

Observations 19,587 19,587 19,587 19,587 19,587 19,587


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Replication Table 3

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

m13 m14 m15 m16 m17 m18

VARIABLES analysis

time when

record ends

rene

goti

ate

analysis

time when

record ends

reneg_nopt

a +

bit_termina

te

analysis

time when

record ends

analysis

time when

record ends

Dispute

Respondent

1.28*** 1.11

***

1.28*** 1.11*** 1.31*** 1.28***

(0.06) (0.0

2)

(0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08)

Growth UN Ideal

Point Gap

1.24*** 1.12

***

1.25*** 1.12*** 1.21** 1.22**

(0.09) (0.0

3)

(0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09)

New EU Member 1.64*** 1.17

**

2.36*** 1.37*** 2.07*** 1.63**

(0.29) (0.0

8)

(0.41) (0.09) (0.41) (0.34)

Î”GDPCC Gap 0.90 0.96 0.90 0.96 0.90 0.89

(0.09) (0.0

4)

(0.10) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09)

Democratic

Transition

0.68 0.92 0.42 0.80 0.47 0.60

(0.42) (0.2

0)

(0.32) (0.21) (0.36) (0.46)

Î”FDI Inflows 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00

(0.01) (0.0

0)

(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)

Common Law 0.53*** 0.80

***

0.43*** 0.75*** 0.46*** 0.43***

(0.12) (0.0

6)

(0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12)

Colonial Ties 0.99 0.96 1.58* 1.13 0.90 1.09

(0.31) (0.1

0)

(0.41) (0.10) (0.31) (0.40)

lag of max of

cumulative

renegotiated BITs

1.07*** 1.02

***

1.06*** 1.02***

(0.01) (0.0

0)

(0.01) (0.00)

counter 1.13

***

1.14***

(0.0

4)

(0.04)



counter2 1.00

***

0.99***

(0.0

0)

(0.00)

counter3 1.00

**

1.00**

(0.0

0)

(0.00)

analysis time

when record ends

. . . .

(.) (.) (.) (.)

reneg_nopta +

bit_terminate

.

(.)

Lagged

Renegotiated

BITs

1.07*** 1.06***

(0.01) (0.01)

lag of max weight

distance

0.40

(0.32)

Constant 0.03

***

0.03***

(0.0

1)

(0.01)

Observations 18,783 19,5

87

18,776 19,587 18,826 8,263


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



Chapter 9

Appendix 9-A: Backlash Episodes

Zimbabwe vs the South African Development Community

2011. In 2007, white Zimbabwean farmers brought a case to the SADC Tribunal regarding the Zimbabwean government’s land redistribution program. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the farmers because the program targeted white farmers specifically. President Mugabe denounced the judgment, calling it “nonsense” (Nathan, 2013) (Alter, Gathii, & Helfer, 2016). The court ruled against the government again in 2009 for not complying (Alter et al., 2016). The Mugabe administration refused to appear before the Tribunal anymore and to be bound by its rulings. Mugabe refused to appoint judges to the Tribunal. In 2011, the SADC announced a moratorium on new cases pending review of the Tribunal Protocol, rendering the court ineffective. Other amendments to the treaty have allowed withdrawals and severely limited the court’s functioning (Cowell, 2013) (de Wet, 2013).

Trinidad and Tobago exit IACtHR ;

11 Caribbean states leave the Privy Council

May 1998. In 1994, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council heard a case on the use of the death penalty in the Caribbean (Soley & Steininger, 2018). Shortly afterwards, the IACtHR made decisions limiting the possible applications of the death penalty (Soley & Steininger, 2018). This was the reason cited when Trinidad and Tobago denounced the American Convention effective May 1999. Some have argued that this was significant in weakening the authority of the court and human rights issues in the region (Concepcion, 2000). After this case, in 2001, eleven Caribbean countries decided to replace the British Privy Council with a new Caribbean Court of Justice (Helfer, 2002).

Venezuela exits IACtHR 2008 – exit in 2012. Chavez regime threatens and follows through on withdrawal from the IACtHR. Denunciation of the American Convention effective September 2013. Chavez described the court as antithetical to the Bolivarian revolution. (Soley & Steininger, 2018) (Ginsburg, 2013) Chavez has also called the court a US puppet amidst this threats to withdraw (Couso, Huneeus, & Sieder, 2010).



Peru exits IACtHR (and later returns)

July 1999. Threaten to withdraw by President Fujimori and Congress (Ginsburg, 2013). Fujimori argued that the court violated Peru’s sovereignty (Faiola, 1999). Soley & Steininger do not call it true backlash because it was short-lived and driven by the executive (Soley & Steininger, 2018). Resistance to the court was largely driven by domestic politics rather than a specific issue (Soley & Steininger, 2018). Peru returned to the jurisdiction of the court after a brief withdrawal.

Dominican Republic conflict with IACtHR

November 2014. A 2014 ruling regarding the status of Haitians in the DR triggered discontent among the public, related to anti-immigrant attitudes. High-ranking officials began to criticize the court for interfering in the granting of citizenship. The minister of foreign affairs threatened to denounce it, but so far has not taken this action (Soley & Steininger, 2018).

Bolivia (Evo Morales) opposes IACtHR

June 2012. President Morales suggested reforming or eliminating the IACtHR (Ginsburg, 2013). Morales has also suggested, along with Chavez, creating or expanding an alternate human rights tribunal in the region (Couso et al., 2010).

Rwanda withdraws from ACtHPR

The controversial judgment occurred in 2017, finding that Rwanda violated the right to free speech for restricting the rights of a political figure associated with the promotion of genocide and terrorism. This elicited explicit resistance from the Rwandan government. The government announced its decision to withdraw in March 2016, claiming that the court was dominated by those associated with the genocide in 1994. Daly & Wiebusch find that this is a case of backlash, because of the implied overall lack of legitimacy of the court and the opening of an opportunity for others to follow suit (Daly & Wiebusch, 2018).

US opposes renewal of WTO AB appointments

The US had opposed judges in 2011 and 2016 but those were individual cases with specific rationales. The Trump Administration has started blocking any reappointments, which potentially ends the AB system altogether in 2019 (Shaffer, Elsig, & Pollack, 2017).

Kenya pushes for reform of East African Court of Justice

2006. The Court rejected Kenya’s proposed candidates for the East African Legislative Assembly. The Kenyan government viewed this as a violation of sovereignty and taking sides with their political opponents. The government tried several methods of



backlash, mostly notably threatening to remove the court’s two Kenyan judges. These attempts were blocked, but instead the EAC Treaty was amended (outside of the accepted institutional processes) to change the structure and function of the court (Alter et al., 2016; Caserta & Cebulak, 2018a).

UK promotes Brighton Declaration and threatens to withdraw from ECtHR

In 2014, the UK administration planned to exit the ECHR unless they were given the right to veto any decisions made in the court, citing a lack of national sovereignty and the expanding role of the court into new issue areas (Watt & Bowcott, 2014). They hoped to see the court become an advisory body without any binding authority (UK Conservative Party, 2014). Britain has been a critic of the court since around 2012, after the Court overruled domestic decisions on polarized issues. The Brighton Declaration, adopted in 2012, seeks to limit the court’s authority over national courts and narrow the criteria for selecting cases (“Down to the wire: Human rights and Europe,” 2012; Madsen, 2016). Pulling out of ECtHR is also a part of Theresa May’s 2020 campaign (Hope, 2016).

Russia restricts authority of ECtHR

After the 2004 reforms in Protocol No. 11 to reduce the court’s backlog of cases and continuing investigation into human rights in the country, Russia began to oppose the court and has threatened to withdraw several times. (Hillebrecht, 2014; Madsen, 2016).

In 2015, Russia’s Constitutional Court, backed by the legislature, redefined the country’s relationship with the ECtHR, reinforcing previous patterns of noncompliance with and nonenforcement of ECtHR rulings (Mälksoo, 2016). The Constitutional Court ruling limits the ability of the ECtHR to rule in certain areas where the ECtHR rulings conflict with the Russian constitution (Mälksoo, 2016). This limits the authority of the court over the Russian state.

Venezuela exits the Andean Community/ATJ

In 2006, Chavez decided to withdraw from the Andean Community, favoring instead alternatives less exposed to US interests (Alter & Helfer, 2017). The withdrawal was catalyzed by Peru and Colombia’s free trade agreements with the United States (Alter & Helfer, 2017). This meant that the AC came to a standstill because of the conflicting politics of the remaining



members (Alter & Helfer, 2017; Caserta & Cebulak, 2018a).

Ecuador threatens to leave AC/ATJ, but does not follow through

The court’s first cases focused on reforms by Ecuador’s president Correa since 2007. After the court ruled against Correa, Ecuador threatened to leave, but the rest of its pushback has remained within the rules of the system (Caserta & Cebulak, 2018a). Meanwhile, Ecuador has failed to comply with free trade rules, and was expected to leave the agreement facing cases challenging its policies, but did not and has pursued legal approaches instead (Alter & Helfer, 2017).

Central American countries oppose the CACJ

In 2005, the court ruled on a dispute involving the separation of powers of the Nicaraguan presidency, overruling the Nicaraguan Supreme Court. Since then, several Central American countries have moved away from the court and tried to limit its resources and jurisdictions (Caserta, 2017; Caserta & Cebulak, 2018b).

In 2015, Costa Rica withdrew from the Central

American Integration System (SICA), which includes the CACJ, because the institution was unable to work with Costa Rica’s decisions regarding an influx of Cuban migrants (“Analysts call Costa Rica’s withdrawal from SICA ‘deadly blow’ for organization,” 2015). Belize, Guatemala, and Nicaragua would not cooperate in the solution that Costa Rica advocated, and this withdrawal significantly hindered the organization’s functioning in the region (“Costa Rica’s leaving SICA said complicating situation in region,” 2015). The country rejoined about six months later (“Costa Rica politics,” 2016).

Meanwhile, since it ratified the treaty in 2008,

Guatemala has refused to appoint judges to the court, hindering its participation (Caserta, 2017).

Venezuela withdraws from ICSID, threatens to terminate BITs, and exits BIT with the Netherlands

2012. Venezuela withdraws from ICSID after Chavez announces intent to leave imperialist international organizations (de Córdoba, 2011; Ginsburg, 2013; Kaushal, 2009; Langford & Behn, 2016). The government has spread false press releases regarding the unfairness of the court (Ginsburg, 2013). For more on the court’s legal reaction to the denunciation see (Bastin & Lee, 2015). The denunciation did not have a large effect on existing disputes, since those that were pending are proceeding (de Córdoba, 2011; Peinhardt & Wellhausen,



2016). Venezuela also began to discuss withdrawal from other BITs, and in 2008 terminated an important BIT with the Netherlands (Kaushal, 2009; Peinhardt & Wellhausen, 2016).

The Gambia challenges the Court of the Economic Community of West African States

2009. Two of the first suits in the court were against Gambia. The government ignored them and acted against the rulings. In response, the Gambia proposed amendments to weaken the court. The other West African governments rejected Gambia’s challenge, making this what Alter and coauthors call a “failed backlash.” (Alter et al., 2016)

Bolivia denounces ICSID and renegotiates BITs

Bolivia denounced ICSID Convention in May 2007 after many cases being filed against it (Ginsburg, 2013; Langford & Behn, 2016). Morales blamed the ICSID for favoring MNCs over the governments of Latin America (Wick, 2011). Although some were worried that this move would destabilize the ICSID, it has not appeared to have that effect yet (Waibel, Kaushal, Chung, & Balchin, 2010). Bolivia then began to renegotiate all of its BITs after 2009 (Peinhardt & Wellhausen, 2016; Waibel et al., 2010). Bolivia has withdrawn from two BITs (United States and Italy) and threatened to renegotiate or withdraw from 22 more (“ICSID backlash will see limited impact,” 2014; Kaushal, 2009).

Ecuador withdraws from ICSID and renegotiates BITs

2009-2010. Ecuador denounced ICSID (Ginsburg, 2013; Hutchinson, 2013). In 2008, under President Correa, Ecuador adopted a new constitution that forbade entering in the future into forums of international arbitration, except where these institutions contain only Latin American parties (Wick, 2011). At the same time, Ecuador terminated 26 BITs (Ahmed, 2017; Kaushal, 2009; Langford & Behn, 2016; Peinhardt & Wellhausen, 2016), including the US-Ecuador BIT (Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc., 2018a). The rest are in the process of being terminated (“ICSID backlash will see limited impact,” 2014).

Kenya opposes ICC Kenya has begun to oppose the ICC after the investigations into the violence emerging after its 2007-2008 presidential election. The government attacked the court until the charges brought against President Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto in 2012 were dropped in 2014 and 2016, respectively (Helfer & Showalter, 2017). The government rallied domestic and international support, delayed court proceedings, and



silencing witnesses, as well as attacking the ICC as part of a campaign strategy in 2013 (Mueller, 2014). They also lobbied the UNSC for a deferral or termination of the prosecutions, and made motions to withdraw from the ICC both in 2010 and after the election in 2013 (Helfer & Showalter, 2017). Kenya also encouraged other African countries to withdraw, with Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe agreeing and Ivory Coast, Gambia, Mali, and Botswana opposing (Helfer & Showalter, 2017).

(“It’s show time: Kenya and the international court,” 2013)

South Africa withdraws from BITs seen as hindering the national agenda

In 2012, South Africa began to withdraw from BITs with Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, arguing that these arrangements were hindering the national agenda (Green, 2012; Peinhardt & Wellhausen, 2016). However, the country may turn toward renegotiation instead of continuing to withdraw from these agreements (Peinhardt & Wellhausen, 2016).

Indonesia plans to withdraw from or renegotiate all BITs

In 2016, two years after announcing a plan to terminate or renegotiate all BITs, Indonesia had withdrawn from 9, with plans to withdraw from 11 more by 2018 (Peinhardt & Wellhausen, 2016). Bland and Donnan argue that this decision fits into a broader global backlash against ISDS in investment treaties (Bland & Donnan, 2014).

South Africa plans to leave ICC

In 2016, South Africa announced plans to withdraw from the International Criminal Court, following in the footsteps of Burundi (Chan & Simons, 2016). South Africa has been opposing the court since it accused the country of noncompliance in 2015, and also supports the idea that the court is an institution of colonialism over Africans (Chan & Simons, 2016). However, there is doubt as to whether South Africa will actually withdraw, given its record of supporting the ICC under President Mandela and the potential damage to the country’s reputation (Corder, 2016; “The battle against impunity goes on,” 2015).

Burundi plans to leave ICC In October 2016, Burundi became the first country to announce its intent to withdraw from the ICC after the court announced intentions to investigate political violence in the country (Chan & Simons, 2016; Sengupta, 2016).



Gambia plans to leave ICC In October 2016, Gambia announced plans to pull out of the ICC, calling it the “International Caucasian Court” and referencing the ICC’s apparent focus on convicting Africans (Corder, 2016; Sengupta, 2016). These concerns are similar to South Africa’s and Burundi’s.

Philippines plans to leave ICC

In November 2016, President Duterte of the Philippines announced his plans to withdraw from the ICC facing criticism for his policies of killing suspected drug dealers (Rauhala, 2016). In March 2018, he issued a statement withdrawing ratification of the Rome Statue (Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc., 2018b).

India terminates/lets expire 58 BITs

In April 2017, India allowed as many as 58 of its BITs to expire or be terminated, insisting that they be renegotiated with a new draft model BIT that would require arbitration to occur in domestic Indian courts (Sen, 2017). The US has been engaging in talks with India in 2017 over a BIT, but they have not come to an agreement yet (Basu, 2017). This decision is a response to several cases brought against the country (Ahmed, 2017).

Poland announces plan to terminate BITs

In March 2016, Poland announced that it planned to terminate all BITs, following several cases against it (“Poland Wants to Terminate Bilateral Investment Treaties,” 2016). However, it has quickly reversed some of these statements, and it is not clear whether they intend to take any resulting action (Mondaq Business Briefing, 2016).

Ecuador attempts to curtail the Inter-American Commission and replace the IACtHR

In 2012, Correa wanted to remove the IACH jurisdiction on free speech cases (among others) asserting undue US influence. Was supported by Bolivia and Venezuela.

In 2016, President Correa criticized the IACHR and suggested replacing this institution with another human rights body, citing the colonialist influence of the US on the existing institution (“Correa calls for new Inter-American Human Rights System,” 2016) See also 2012 effort.

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Appendix 9-B: Is a leader populist?

State Government/Leader

Populist Sources

Zimbabwe

Robert Mugabe Yes (Moyo 2015; Melber 2015)

Trinidad and Tobago

Banday No

Venezuela

Chavez Yes (Hawkins 2009; Ellner 2003)

Peru Fujimori Contested – personalist vs populist

Neopopulist/neoliberal populist

Yes

(Weyland 2001)

(Ellner

2003; Weyland 1999)

(Roberts 1995; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Pappas 2012; Roberts 2006; Houle and Kenny 2018)

Dominican Republic

Medina No (Ribando 2005; Seelke 2014)

Bolivia Morales Yes (Panizza and Miorelli 2009; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013; Weyland 2013; Roberts 2007; Hawkins 2009)

Rwanda Kagame No (Baker 2017)

Kenya Kenyatta Mixed (Kagwanja 2009)

United Kingdom

Cameron No

(Webb and Bale 2014; Gruber and Bale 2014; Abedi and Lundberg 2009)



Yes (Alexandre

-Collier 2016)

Russia Putin Yes Yes, post-2012 No

(Gurganus 2017; Clément 2015; Mersol 2017)

(Hadiz and

Chryssogelos 2017)

(Taussig

and Netesova 2017; Lassila 2018; Oliker 2017; Hawkins 2009)

Ecuador Correa Yes (Torre and Lemos 2016; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Torre 2013)

Costa Rica

Solís No (Wollerton 2017)

Guatemala

(several) No (Seligson 2007)

Panama Martinelli No (Nyenhuis 2014)

Gambia Jammeh Yes (Saine 2000; Ihonvbere and Mbaku 2003)

Kenya Kenyatta No (Kagwanja 2009)

Indonesia

Widodo Yes (Mietzner 2015; Hadiz and Chryssogelos 2017; Pratikno and Lay 2011)

South Africa

Zuma Yes Populist rhetoric

but little economic action

(Resnick 2010; Glaser 2009; Southall 2009)



(Guha 2013)

Burundi Nkurunziza No (Tobolka 2014)

Philippines

Duterte Yes (Curato 2017; Casiple 2016)

India Modi Yes (Chakravartty and Roy 2015; Jaffrelot 2013)

Poland Duda Yes (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016; Sadurski 2018; Martinelli 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016)

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