ICAO / LACAC Regional Seminar ICAO / LACAC Regional Seminar Montevideo 7th & 8th July 2010Montevideo 7th & 8th July 2010

ICAO MRTD Standards & Security FeaturesSecurity Features

PresenterM l l C thb tMalcolm Cuthbertson

ISOMRTD Symposium

ICAO Headquarters, Montréal6 – 7 September 2006 1

International standardsInternational standardsInternational standardsInternational standards

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AgendaAgendaAgendaAgenda

Overview of ICAO StandardsOverview of ICAO StandardsSecurity features of MRTDsBalance between:

Document SecurityDocument SecurityIdentity fraud

ConclusionsConclusions

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Evolution of MRTDEvolution of MRTDEvolution of MRTDEvolution of MRTDAnnex 9 to the Chicago convention of 19441968 ICAO start work on MRTD standards1968 - ICAO start work on MRTD standards.1980 – First edition of Doc 9303Fi t MRP i d i 1981First MRP issued in 1981Standards evolved over nearly 3 decadesBalance between facilitation and securityCultural considerations:

TransliterationFlexibility in VIZ

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y

First introduction of ePassport 2004

VIZ – zone location optionsVIZ – zone location optionsVIZ zone location optionsVIZ zone location options

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MRTD - DriversMRTD - Drivers

ICAO requirement: MRP b A il 2010MRP by April 2010All non MRPs expire before 24th Nov 20152015

US Visa Waiver requirements:ePassports by Oct 2006

EU Requirements:U equ e e tsE-MRP (face) by 28th Aug 2006E-MRP to include finger by May of 2009

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E-MRP to include finger by May of 2009

ICAO 9303 – StatusICAO 9303 – Status

Structure of Document

Part 2 Part 3Part 1Visa ID cardsPassports

Volume 1 Volume 2 Volume 1 Volume 2

MRPw/oadd.

storage

MRP w/ expansion

of data storage

MRTD w/oadd.

storage

MRTD w/ expansion

of data storagestorage storage

capacity

6th edition 2006 3rd edition 2005 3rd edition tbr

storage storage capacity

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Part 1 – MRPsD l

Part 1 – MRPsD lData page layoutData page layout

VIZ

photo88mm

MRZ

125mm

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MRZ – OCR-BMRZ – OCR-BMRZ OCR BMRZ OCR B

document

country code

primary & secondarydocumenttype

primary & secondaryidentifiers (names) filler characters

passportnumber

nationality sex optional data check digitsnumber

date ofbirth

date of expiry

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Chapter 3. of Annex 9Chapter 3. of Annex 9Chapter 3. of Annex 9 Chapter 3. of Annex 9 Contracting States:

Shall not extend the validity of their MRTDsShall not extend the validity of their MRTDsShall issue a separate passport to each person, regardless of ageValidity. At least 5 years. Not more than 10 yrsShall begin issuing only MRPs no later than 1 April 2010April 2010Shall make provision for encoded data to be revealed to the holder of the documentNon MR passports issued after 24 Nov 2005 shall ensure that the expiration date falls before 24 Nov 2015. After 2015 all passports in

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circulation must be MRP

“One person one passport”A 9 Chi C i

“One person one passport”A 9 Chi C iAnnex 9 to Chicago ConventionAnnex 9 to Chicago Convention

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ePassportePassportePassportePassportChipArial

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ICAO BlueprintICAO BlueprintICAO BlueprintICAO Blueprint

Facial imageFacial imageFinger PrintIris

RF Chip (min 32K)p ( )LDSPKIPKI

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Planning for Introduction of P

Planning for Introduction of PePassportsePassports

Central or decentralised issuinggPersonalisation technology – location of chipEmbassy issue - repatriationEmergency issue - ETDsValidity of ePassports – 5 or 10 yearsImage capture - LiveSecond biometric - EUWaste levels – cost

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Level of security

MRP SummaryMRP SummaryMRP SummaryMRP Summary

169 out of 190 countries issuing169 out of 190 countries issuing MRPs21 countries still not issuing MRPs10 of these 21 countries have10 of these 21 countries have tenders or contracts in placeICAO requirement for all countriesICAO requirement for all countries to issue MRPs by 1st April 2010N MRP ft 2015

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No non MRPs after 2015

ePassport Summary2010

ePassport Summary201020102010

Over 70 countries issuingOver 70 countries issuing ePassports out of 191 73 illi P t i d h73 million ePassports issued each year out of a total of 120 millionNo ICAO requirement for countries to issue ePassportsp

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Security featuresSecurity featuresSecurity featuresSecurity features

Security must be multi layer and theSecurity must be multi-layer and the most important are the level 1 f tfeaturesThe security features need to protect the holder’s photographImportant not to obstruct the MRZImportant not to obstruct the MRZePassports & biometrics just another security feature

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another security feature

Data page – under pressureData page – under pressureData page under pressureData page under pressure

It must provide protection againstIt must provide protection against counterfeit and fraud, especially from desk-top publishingtop publishing

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Data page – Removed away from Data page – Removed away from covercover

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Page layout & picture outlinePage layout & picture outlinePage layout & picture outlinePage layout & picture outline

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LayersLayersLayersLayers

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ElementsElementsElementsElements

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ElementsElementsElementsElements

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ElementsElementsElementsElements

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E MRPE MRPE MRPE MRP

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Machine Assisted Document S i V ifi i

Machine Assisted Document S i V ifi iSecurity VerificationSecurity Verification

ICAO NTWG paper on subjectICAO NTWG paper on subjectA structure feature

hologram or DOVIDA substance featureA substance feature

Inks / fibres etcA data featureA data feature

Digital security - Steganography

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Structure FeatureStructure FeatureStructure FeatureStructure Feature

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Substance FeatureSubstance FeatureSubstance FeatureSubstance Feature

OVIOVIFibres

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VIZ – zone location optionsVIZ – zone location optionsVIZ zone location optionsVIZ zone location options

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Belgium PassportBelgium PassportBelgium PassportBelgium Passport

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ThreatThreatThreatThreatCriminals will always pick the weakest link:weakest link:

Document securityI i dIssuing proceduresFalse identity

Threat changes as technologies & procedures developp pThreat varies from country to country

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country

Balance between Document SecurityBalance between

Document SecurityDocument Security & Identity Theft

Document Security & Identity Theft

Doc ment fra d Identit theftDocument fraudFraudulent

lt ti

Identity theftFraudulently

i d TDalterationCounterfeit

acquired TDsIdentity theftLook alike

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All Component Parts must be All Component Parts must be Mutually SupportingMutually Supporting

C t f it

Legacy

IssuingSystem

Counterfeit

Legacy

Border BiometricsETDs

Control

FraudPKIIdentity theft

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Identity FraudIdentity FraudIdentity FraudIdentity FraudThreat

40,000,000 births go unrecorded p.a.Breeder documents. US birth certsLack of secure issuing proceduresInternal fraudPoor training of border control officersLinking of databases. Births & deathsLinking of databases. Births & deathsLack of readersHighly secure MRTDs

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Highly secure MRTDs

ICAO Doc 9303ICAO Doc 9303ICAO Doc 9303ICAO Doc 9303Informative appendix 1 to sect III

Security standards for MRTDsInformative appendix 2 to sect IIIpp

Machine assisted document verification

Informative appendix 3 to sect IIIThe prevention of fraud associatedThe prevention of fraud associated with the issuance processOriginated from a G8 paper

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Originated from a G8 paper

Internal FraudInternal FraudInternal FraudInternal Fraud

Secure & centralised issuingSecure & centralised issuing processLimit the number of officers who can grant authorityMake officers accountableNo one person can issue aNo one person can issue a passportA dit t il

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Audit trail

SummarySummarySummary Summary ePassport most secure ever

Not many readers deployedDoes not prove identity but seals IDNot many ePassports protected by PKI security

National identity managementEstablish “Evidence of Identity”Establish Evidence of IdentityConfirm citizenshipAssess entitlement

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Assess entitlement

Forgery Detections by Forgery CategoryUK B d C nt l 2007UK Border Control 2007

21%

19%

19%21% 19%

0.03%

1%

16%10%3%3%3%

2%

1%1%1%

1%

Impersonation (21%) Sub Photo Only (19%) Sub Bio Data Page (19%)

Counterfeit (16%) Fraudulently Obtained (10%) Stolen Blank (3%)Counterfeit (16%) Fraudulently Obtained (10%) Stolen Blank (3%)

Falsified UK Stamp (3%) Falsified UK Visa (3%) Falsified Other Stamp (2%)

Alt Details (1%) Falsified Other Visa (1%) Sub Page (1%)

Mutilated (1%) Pseudo Passport (<1%)

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Statistics 2007Statistics 2007Statistics 2007Statistics 2007ID Fraud.

Impersonations: 21%Fraudulently obtained 10%

Total 31%Document fraudDocument fraud

Counterfeit of document.16%Photo sub 19%Photo sub. 19%Counterfeit of bio data page. 19%

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Total: 54% Others 15%

Stats from Sept 2009Stats from Sept 2009Stats from Sept 2009Stats from Sept 2009

Remainder Imposters / Look alike

Imposters / Look alike48%

RemainderCounterfeit/fraudulent

alteration etc29%

Imposters / Look alike

Fraudulently obtained

Fraudulently obtained23%

RemainderCounterfeit/fraudulentalteration etc

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Shift to Identity FraudS i i S 2009

Shift to Identity FraudS i i S 2009Statistics Sept 2009Statistics Sept 2009

ID FraudID Fraud48% Imposters & Lookalikes23 % Fraudulently obtained

Total: 71%

Document fraud & otherTotal 29%%

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Threat constantly changingThreat constantly changingThreat constantly changingThreat constantly changing

counterfeit IssuingLegacy System

BorderControl

ETDsBiometrics

FraudPKIIdentity theft

Control Biometrics

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Biometrics in Issue Process as ll i D

Biometrics in Issue Process as ll i Dwell as in Documentwell as in Document

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BiometricsBiometricsBiometricsBiometrics

Biometrics will help to solve IdentityBiometrics will help to solve Identity fraud, lookalikes & impostersBiometrics will not prove an identity but will seal an identityePassports just another security featurefeature

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Thank you for your attentionThank you for your attention

Malcolm CuthbertsonISOTel: +44 (0)1256 605047Email: malcolm.cuthbertson@uk.delarue.com

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1990sDi it l I iDigital Imaging

MRTD SymposiumICAO Headquarters, Montréal

6 – 7 September 2006 46

1980sE l I d i f MRP

1980sE l I d i f MRPEarly Introduction of MRPsEarly Introduction of MRPs

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Identity TheftIntegrity of the IssuingIntegrity of the Issuing

procedures

MRTD SymposiumICAO Headquarters, Montréal

6 – 7 September 2006 48

ePassport SummaryePassport SummaryePassport SummaryePassport Summary

2007 38 t i i i P t2007 - 38 countries were issuing ePassports

Volume 56 million p.a. out of total of 101 million

2008 - An additional 15 countries with an additional volume of 23 million ePassports being issued by the end of 2008

Total of 53 countries out of 189Total of 53 countries out of 189

Total Annual volume 79 million out of 101 million

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Shift from Fraudulent Alteration of Travel Doc to Identity Fraud

Shift from Fraudulent Alteration of Travel Doc to Identity FraudTravel Doc to Identity Fraud Travel Doc to Identity Fraud

Is this correct?Is this correct?Is it a global phenomenon?If so, when did it occur?Why did it occur?Why did it occur?What affect does it have?

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ICAO standardsICAO standardsICAO standardsICAO standards

ICAO DOCUMENT 9303 (P t 1 3)ICAO DOCUMENT 9303 (Parts 1-3), Family of MRTDs:

Part 1: Machine Readable Passports (MRPs)Part 2: Machine Readable Visas (MRVs)Part 3: Official Travel Documents (cards)

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Advances in Personalisation T h l i 1990

Advances in Personalisation T h l i 1990Technologies 1990sTechnologies 1990s

Improvement in digital printers:Incorporation of digital images

Moving data page away from coverg p g yIncorporating bank note featuresIntrod ction of laser engra ing &Introduction of laser engraving & polycarbonate data pagesInk jet printersMove to MRP – all bio data on one

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Move to MRP all bio data on one page

Centralised v DecentralisedC id i

Centralised v DecentralisedC id iConsiderationsConsiderations

Centralised DecentralisedGood security

Less expensive

Security issuesMovement of blanks

Less equipment

Poor customer

More difficult audit trailMonitoring staff

service

Embassy issueCost

equipment cost

Emergency issue

Possible political

staff costaccommodation costs

Good customer

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pconstraints

Good customer service

Advances in Document SecurityAdvances in Document SecurityAdvances in Document SecurityAdvances in Document Security1980s: Intro of MRP - Photo sub1990s:

Digital image replacing stuck-in photog g p g pMembrane laminatesDOVIDs / OVIDOVIDs / OVIMove of data page away from coverDigital securityDigital security

2000s: Biometrics & ePassports

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Document fraud in 1980sDocument fraud in 1980sDocument fraud in 1980sDocument fraud in 1980s

St ck in photosStuck in photosPhoto substitutionThick & insecure laminatesData pages on coverData pages on coverHand infilled / impact printersOnly seven countries issuing MRPs

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Identity Fraud- 2000sIdentity Fraud- 2000sInternal fraudLost & stolen – look alikeLost & stolen look alikeBreeder documentsR lRenewalsETDsLegacy books. 10 yrs to 5yr validityPoliticalPolitical

Break up of USSR F il d St t

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Failed States

Identity Theft in 1980sIdentity Theft in 1980sIdentity Theft in 1980sIdentity Theft in 1980s

Few national data basesFew national data basesBirths & deaths not linked

The day of the JackalInsecure breeder documentsInsecure breeder documentsEase of assuming an identity

Threat differed from region to regionThreat differed from region to region

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Recent Improvements in Issue P d

Recent Improvements in Issue P dProceduresProcedures

Increased use of data bases:Increased use of data bases:Linking births & deathsLinking of government data bases

Legal issues / data protectionLegal issues / data protectionSocial footprint - InterviewsU f bi t i t tUse of biometrics to prevent multiple applications

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Automation of biometric checks

Historical BackgroundHistorical BackgroundHistorical BackgroundHistorical Background

1980s1980sStuck in photosDevelopment of MRPs

1990sDigital imaging of photoImproved data basingImproved data basing

2000sP t

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ePassports

Data Feature - Digital SecurityData Feature - Digital SecurityData Feature Digital SecurityData Feature Digital Security

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