ian christoplos - areu.org.af · may 2004 funding for this study was provided by the european...

May 2004

Funding for this studywas provided by the

European Commission (EC).

Ian Christoplos

Out of Step?Agricultural Policy

and Afghan Livelihoods

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Issues Paper Series

© 2004 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). All rights reserved. This issues paperwas prepared by an independent consultant with no previous involvement in the activities evaluated.The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of AREU.

Ian Christoplos is the head of the Department of Rural Development and Agroecology at theSwedish University of Agricultural Sciences and an Associate Researcher with the OverseasDevelopment Institute in London. His work focuses on issues related to risk, rural developmentand agricultural services. His interests focus on policy formation for poverty reduction andsupporting the role of local institutions in turbulent contexts. He has worked as a researcherand practitioner in both development cooperation and humanitarian assistance in Africa,Asia and Latin America. He is the co-editor, together with John Farrington, of the forthcomingOxford University Press book, Poverty, Vulnerability, and Agricultural Extension: PolicyReforms in an Era of Globalization.

About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research organisationthat conducts and facilitates action-oriented research and learning that informs and influencespolicy and practice. AREU also actively promotes a culture of research and learning bystrengthening analytical capacity in Afghanistan and by creating opportunities for analysis,thought and debate. Fundamental to AREU’s vision is that its work should improve Afghanlives. AREU was established by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has aboard of directors with representation from donors, UN and multilateral organisation agenciesand non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Current funding for AREU has been provided by the European Commission (EC), the UnitedNations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the governments of Sweden andSwitzerland.

About the Author

The author wishes to thank the many individuals who provided support in the course of thisstudy. The advice from the reference group who commented on the first draft of the proposaland the anonymous referees was most helpful in shaping the final document. From FAO,special thanks go to Antonio di Leonardo and his colleagues who provided assistance inBamyan and Kunduz. At AREU, particular thanks go to Alexia Coke and Asif Karimi, whosehelp and advice enabled me to quickly anchor my research in the current discussions inAfghanistan. The author also thanks Brandy Bauer from AREU for editing this publication.

Acknowledgements

Executive Summary ...................................................................................... 1

1. Introduction and Methods .......................................................................... 3

Points of Departure................................................................................... 3Methods ................................................................................................ 5

2. The Context of Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development.............................. 7

Beyond the tradition-crisis dichotomy............................................................. 7Afghan agricultural institutions..................................................................... 9Regional and international trends and markets.................................................. 10“New Public Management” and impediments to policy reform ............................... 12Operationa priorities and the policy process ..................................................... 15

3. What is Known About Livelihoods and Labour ................................................. 18

Agriculture and livelihoods in high and low potential areas ................................... 18Food security amid changing livelihood strategies .............................................. 22Relationship between agricultural production and food consumptiom....................... 23Off- and non-farm labour............................................................................ 27Migration ............................................................................................... 29

4. The Relevance of Agricultural Programming to Livelihoods ................................ 32

Impact assessment: fallen by the wayside?....................................................... 32Dealing with programming labels .................................................................. 34Narratives of vulnerability........................................................................... 36Risk...................................................................................................... 37Diversification ......................................................................................... 40Transaction costs and farmers’ priorities ......................................................... 42Patron-client relations and contract farming .................................................... 44

5. Broadening Livelihood Options.................................................................... 47

Technology transfer: historical narratives and current practice .............................. 47Seed distributions as a vehicle for technology transfer......................................... 48Accountability in technology transfer ............................................................. 49“More research and extension”: where does it lead? ........................................... 52Private sector alternatives to public sector service provision ................................. 57Redefining the role of the state .................................................................... 58Civil society in agricultural development: stimulating demand ............................... 60Shuras to the rescue?................................................................................. 60In search of farmers’ organisations ................................................................ 62

Table of Contents

6. Conclusions and Recommendations .............................................................. 64

Reframing the narratives amid uncertainty ...................................................... 64Principles and pragmatism .......................................................................... 65Recommandations .................................................................................... 67

References ................................................................................................. 71

Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................... 77

Publications from AREU ................................................................................. 78

Figures and Boxes

Figure 1. World cereal prices, 1960-2020 ......................................................... 22Figure 2. Daily wages of urban unskilled labour, 2002-2003 ................................... 28

Box 1. Example of a low potential area: Hazarajat ............................................. 19Box 2. Example of a high potential area: Kunduz ............................................... 20Box 3. The food aid debate in Afghanistan ....................................................... 25Box 4. Land tenure ................................................................................... 33Box 5. Vulnerability and seed programming ...................................................... 38Box 6. From humanitarian assistance to social protection: an agenda for agriculture? ... 41Box 7. The mantra of high value - low volume crops ........................................... 50Box 8. Agricultural recovery: Not according to plan? ........................................... 53Box 9. Veterinary services and ambivalence toward private service provision ............. 59

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) i

This issues paper reviews existing empiricalanalyses of agriculture’s relevance to rurallivelihoods and contrasts these with theprevailing concepts and approaches that guidethe Afghan government and internationalassistance community’s response to the“crisis” in Afghan agriculture. Findings stressthat the visions of the aid community are notcongruent with the perceptions and goals oflocal and national government. On the onehand, most aid programming implies thatdevelopment efforts can start from a blankslate due to the supposed collapse ofgovernance and livelihoods. On the otherhand, the visions of the governmentencourage ignoring ongoing local processesand international market trends, since thevisions of the past are assumed to still bevalid and viable. Neither encourages lookingat farmers’ own agricultural developmentefforts. Current agricultural rehabilitationand development efforts are supply-driven,and are poorly anchored in an understandingof what rural people themselves are strivingto achieve as they rehabilitate and developtheir own livelihoods.

In order to understand the current andpotential future relationships betweenagriculture and livelihoods, it is essential tolook at how well agricultural policies andprogramming are anchored in realistic,principled and pragmatic analyses of thesituation at large. It also is essential toexamine trends in both markets foragricultural products and markets for on- andoff-farm labour. Central to this is the needto place an understanding of agriculture’srole within a perspective of where agricultureis not the main component of livelihoods.The main component of livelihoods of ruralpeople is very different in high and lowpotential areas. In the former, challenges inretaining and regaining markets are the prime

concerns. In the latter, most people combinelimited and erratic agricultural productionwith other livelihood options. In both,smallholder subsistence-oriented farming isbut one aspect of how rural people survive.

In addition to examining agricultural policies,this paper focuses upon two cross-cuttingthemes. The first is how agriculturalrehabilitation efforts have shaped the currentinterface between aid interventions andfarmers’ own livelihood strategies. The secondtheme is that of poppy production. Just asaid expenditure has been primarily, andperhaps unduly, directed at seedprogramming, the priorities of the privatesector have very heavily focused on opiumproduction.

Recommendations*

The recommendations contained in this paperare intended as a framework for morepragmatic and principled approaches toincreasing the impact of agriculturaldevelopment efforts on Afghan livelihoods.These suggestions acknowledge the powerthat history and current social, political andeconomic relations have in steering localdevelopment processes and in preservingnational policy narratives. It is argued thatnarratives must be confronted if developmentplanning is to proceed in a manner that iscognisant of what can be done and whatshould be done in the current circumstances.

Build consensus on the goals and themeaning of a facilitating and regulatingstate in agricultural development

Current policy formation efforts combine(and conflate) the needs for establishingefficiency with enhancing equity in order toreverse the trends that have driven the

Executive Summary

* More detailed recommendations can be found in the conclusion section of this paper.

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) 1

Out of Step? Agricultural Policy and Afghan Livelihoods

conflict over the past decades. Internationalexperience has shown that efficiency andequity can be combined, but are not self-evident bedfellows. There is a need to movetoward more evidence-based policies thatcombine principled commitments to efficiencyand equity with pragmatic acknowledgementof trade-offs due to on-the-ground realitiesand the essential but limited impact that aidcan make on social, political and economicrelations.

Reassess and reinforce the accountabilityof the private sector and civil society inagricultural development

In order to better define the role of the state,notions and normative aims regarding theprivate sector and civil society must beanchored in an understanding of what thesesets of institutions really are. It is not enoughto label the private sector or civil society asthe solution. A frank assessment is neededof what agricultural services they provideand why they are providing (or failing toprovide) services to different groups offarmers. Disaggregation between high andlow potential areas and between wealthyand poor producers is a prerequisite topredicting where different strategies can beexpected to succeed and who is likely tobenefit.

Put the market on the agenda

Apart from woes about the supposedlyunassailable profitability of opium production,empirically grounded agro-economic and

market thinking has not gained centre stagein policies and programming. Even those whohave recognised the importance ofdiversification and market orientation haverun into difficulties in identifying where andhow to intervene. The challenges to gainingan overview of market forces in a countrywhere such a large proportion of the marketis illicit are admittedly enormous, but thedangers of continuing to leave these factorson the back burner are greater. The marketis not a panacea for equitable ruraldevelopment, but recognition of itsimportance would be an important step inrealigning programming with the prevailinglivelihood strategies of rural people and theeconomic realities they face when trying tosell their crops.

Deal with risk

In light of the legacy of conflict and naturaldisasters, Afghans will inevitably make theirdecisions about how to integrate agricultureinto their livelihoods primarily based on anassessment of risk. Fears of renewed conflictand natural hazards are at the core oftraders’, farmers’ and rural labourers’ choiceof livelihood options. The actions of the stateand the aid community already directly affectthe parameters for these risk assessments.The relevance and effectiveness of agricultureprogramming would therefore increaseenormously if risk was given far greaterprominence in policy formation. Instead ofbeing seen as a factor that scares donors,risk awareness should be used to highlightpriorities for protecting rural livelihoods.

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Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)2

Points of departure

This issues paper explores how well in tuneAfghan agricultural policies and programmesare to the ways that the people of ruralAfghanistan are themselves trying to surviveand rebuild their lives. It builds on theAfghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit’s(AREU) earlier issues paper AddressingLivelihoods in Afghanistan1 and also on theongoing livelihood monitoring studies of AREUand other organisations. The emphasis of thispaper is not on describing agriculturalsystems, but instead on reflecting on howour admittedly limited knowledge of thesesystems should better inform policy andpractice in (and beyond) the agriculturalsector. Livelihood analysis is applied in this

1. Introduction and Methods

paper as a tool to assess the relevance ofcurrent policies and programming with respectto the ways in which people in rural areasconstruct their livelihoods. A major goal oflivelihood analysis is to bring attention topeople’s vulnerabilities and the institutionalprocesses that frame their livelihoodstrategies, including the impact of governmentand the aid community’s programming andpolicies for the poor.

The point of departure of this study isagriculture and its links to livelihoods in abroad sense, including how agriculturalproduction (or lack thereof) impacts on labourmarkets, migration and local social, politicaland economic relations. Agriculturalproduction is not analysed as if it were an

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1 Pain, A. and Lautze, S. Addressing Livelihoods in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. September2002.



end in itself, but rather as one integratedcomponent in a wider set of livelihood options.This broad perspective is applied in order tounderstand both how agriculture affectslivelihoods and also how it does not. As oneobserver writes of recent history, “Most ruralAfghans, and certainly poor rural Afghans,did not meet their food needs primarily bytheir own cultivation, but by a variety ofstrategies, including the sale of livestock andlivestock products, casual labour, temporarymigration and remittances from relatives whohad permanently found refuge outside thecountry.”2 This study aims to provide a basisfor better connecting an understanding ofAfghan agriculture with these wider survivalstrategies. This paper highlights whereagriculture is proving to be but one componentwithin the more complex sets of strategiesthat households are engaging in to survive,to enhance their food security, and wherepossible, to prosper. It is important to stressthat terms such as “livelihoods” and “foodsecurity” are not always interpreted so widelywithin governmental and non-governmentalagricultural bureaucracies.

This paper also critically analyses howprevailing stories, or “narratives,” aboutsubsistence, technology transfer, the role ofthe state and the nature of civil societyinfluence assumptions about how agricultureand food production actually contribute tolivelihoods. It looks critically at the underlyingnarratives in current agricultural programmingand also the motivations in aid andgovernmental bureaucracies to buy intosimplified assumptions about farming. Specialattention is paid to how the rehabilitationassistance community, together with theAfghan bureaucracy, jump quickly into projectfixes that are poorly anchored in anunderstanding of the solutions that farmersthemselves are exploring.

There are two cross-cutting themesthroughout this paper. The first is the waysin which the architecture of agriculturalrehabilitation has shaped the current interfacebetween aid interventions and farmers’ ownlivelihood strategies. This paper does not aimto provide an in- depth analysis of agriculturalrehabilitation policy per se,3 but the prevailingexpenditure pattern in recent years has meantthat rehabilitation, and in particular the roleof seed programming, has had a profoundinfluence on almost all of the topics reviewedin the paper. The gap between grander visionsfor rural development and on-the-groundprogramming realities is to a large extentrelated to the narrow set of rehabilitationinterventions that actually receive funding.

The second cross-cutting theme is that ofpoppy production. Just as aid expenditurehas been primarily, and perhaps unduly,directed at seed programming, the prioritiesof the private sector have very heavily focusedon opium production. There are a variety ofareas where dynamism can be found in privatesector-financed agricultural development,but the overwhelming economic significanceof opium is undoubtedly the factor that moststrongly influences investment priorities, riskassessments, local socio-political relationsand labour markets. There are a number ofresearch initiatives now underway to betteranalyse this complex set of topics. It is hopedthat this paper may contribute to anunderstanding of the broad contextualframework in which these studies will needto be embedded.

The paper is organised in the following way:

• The next chapter provides an overviewof the policy formation process in Afghanagricultural development, and contraststhe key narratives of the internationalassistance community with the

2 Johnson, C. British Red Cross: Afghanistan Drought Response Case Study Notes for Seminar. 2003, 4.3 This narrower topic will be addressed in a forthcoming study, by the same author, as part of an Overseas Development

Institute research project entitled “The changing roles of agricultural rehabilitation: linking relief, development and supportto rural livelihoods.”

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perceptions of local and nationalgovernment.

• Chapter three places this policy analysiswithin the context of existing knowledgeabout the relationship betweenagriculture and livelihoods of ruralresidents.

• Chapter four examines how programmingrelates to livelihoods, particularly howissues of risk, diversification andtransaction costs have been addressed.

• Chapter five contextualises the factorsfor policy and programming by looking athow technology transfer efforts andservice provision have/have notbroadened livelihood options.

• Finally, the paper concludes withreflections on what a principled butpragmatic approach to bringing thesefactors together might entail. Therecommendations specifically addresshow policy choices must proceed in theface of uncertainty about the role of civilsociety, distrust of the private sector anddisagreement over the role of the state.

Methods

This issues paper brings together the findingsof interviews with governmental staff, localofficials, NGO representatives, UN staff,technical advisors and rural people. Theauthor collected data during two missions toAfghanistan, September 2-20 and November27-December 17, 2003, and visited Bamyan,Kunduz and Takhar Provinces. The study didnot allow for extensive direct empiricalobservation of rural conditions. The viewspresented here represent a synthesis of thefindings of available research and NGOstudies, and are juxtaposed with the “policynarratives” that clearly emerged in theinterviews that were conducted in the courseof the study. The methodology underlying

the study was to analyse how stories aboutagriculture and rural development, whichsteer the perceptions of the aid community,relate to the actual struggles of rural peopleto survive as described in available empiricalresearch.

A notable issue in assessing the validity ofthe data cited in this paper is the questionof how much the phenomena described inempirical studies represent recent adaptationto conflict and drought, and how much theyare anchored in a history of recurrent crisesand recovery. For example, some studiesreport a recent increase in indebtedness,particularly the custom of desperate farmers“pawning” (and subsequently losing controlof) their land. It is unclear whether this is anew phenomenon resulting from drought,changes in local power structures andpopulation pressures, or if it is a temporarycoping strategy that has appeared from timeto time in the past.

It should be stressed that there are majorgaps in available data on the link betweenagriculture and livelihoods. Even before theconflict of the past three decades, statisticson rural populations, economies and socialconditions were extremely scarce.4 Despiteconsiderable investment in data collectionfor project planning in recent years,information remains extremely patchy andthe majority of studies available have had avery limited geographical and topical focus.Information on nutritional status, in particular,is largely anecdotal or only valid for a limitedarea. The link between agricultural productionand food consumption can therefore largelyonly be speculated upon.5 Caution inextrapolating general observations fromanecdotal studies is particularly importantsince the effects of conflict, natural disasterand even development over the past three

4 Pain, A. and Goodhand, J. Afghanistan: Current Employment and Socio-Economic Situation and Prospects. InFocus Programmeon Crisis Response and Reconstruction, Working Paper No. 8. Geneva: International Labour Organisation. 2002.

5 This shortage of data may soon change as the comprehensive National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment structure is putinto place.



decades have been very diverse, episodicand localised.6 With respect to the nature ofthe state and societal structures, labels suchas “warlords,” “terrorists” and “chaos” havebeen used to gloss over vast differences inthe quality, depth and justness of the formsof governance that rural Afghans have enduredat the community level.

This study emphasises the narratives thatinfluence the production of data on Afghanrural development. Some studies are citedto highlight the prevailing pressures that havecreated the stories that guide currentprogramming decisions. The source criticismthat appears in this paper is not intended ascynical denigration, but is rather includedfor illustrating why it has proven so difficultto bridge that gap between programmepriorities and livelihood realities. The skewednature of incentives behind the productionof surveys and assessments in Afghanistaninfluences what questions are asked in these

studies and how data are interpreted. Whentrying to understand how rural peoplethemselves construct their livelihoods, aid(rather than farmers’ own efforts) is usuallygiven undue attention, since most surveysand assessments are intended as a basis forplanning increasing levels of aid disbursement.One frustrated consultant writes that “allreports read during the mission painted ableak picture of the country. The reportsfocused on the negative, and identified anaid-funded solution for every problemmentioned.”7 These weaknesses in assessmentand p lann ing have cont inued asimplementation has proceeded. Another studyacknowledged that the dearth of criticalreflection in agency reports had left it with“little material on which to draw to contributetheoretically or in terms of analytical methodto the debate on livelihoods under conditionsof political instability.”8 The situation todayis somewhat better, but still leaves much tobe desired.

6 Pain, A. Understanding and Monitoring Livelihoods Under Conditions of Chronic Conflict: Lessons from Afghanistan. OverseasDevelopment Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 187. London: ODI. 2002.

7 Hockley Associates. Afghanistan: A Report Following Participation in the 2002 Crop and Food Supply Assessment on Behalfof Chemonics, July 2002. Suffolk: Hockley Associates. 2002, 12.

8 Pain, 2002, op cit., 2.

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This chapter presents an overview of thepolicy formation process in Afghan agriculturaldevelopment. Key narratives of theinternational community regarding the “crisis”in agriculture and public sector reform aredescribed. These international narratives arecontrasted with the perceptions of local andnational government. The question of howAfghanistan’s agricultural production can beintegrated into regional and internationalmarkets is also stressed. This section alsoconsiders implications resulting from this mixof narratives and perceptions, particularlyhow the lack of consensus on programmeresponses and priorities has led to a growinggap between the policy debate and field-level programming realities.

Beyond the tradition-crisisdichotomy

Afghanistan’s agricultural economy isportrayed by many observers as a “traditional”or even “medieval” subsistence-based systemof isolated farmers using techniques thathave remained unchanged for centuries.Images such as these stem from theundercapitalised production systems andappearance of village life, rather than on anunderstanding of the historical processes thathave created the current system. For muchof the past century, Afghanistan has had astrong, market-oriented agricultural system.In the 1960s, it was one of the largestexporters of dried fruit (particularly raisins)and karakul lambskins in the world. Thisbrought significant wealth to the north ofthe country. Massive development aid wasinvested in irrigated agriculture in the south,resulting in major transformations inagricultural systems. Although far from allof these changes were positive for farmers

and rural livelihoods, they have produceda current agricultural context that hasmore to do with adaptation to episodicdevelopment interventions, recurrentdrought, periodic conflict and the regionalpolitico-economic situation than to“tradition.”

The programmatic structure of agriculturalrehabilitation and development efforts isnot congruent with the actual nature ofAfghan agriculture and processes ofrecovery in farming and livelihoods. Therapid expansion of agr iculturalrehabilitation assistance after the fall ofthe Taliban was not in response to a newcrisis caused by the conflict, which onlyhad an incremental and primarily indirectimpact on agriculture. The gradual erosionof formal institutions, infrastructure andmarket structures, and the ampleopportunities for predatory behaviour bylocal commanders have had more impactthan bombs and bullets. The “crisis” inagriculture was, and in some ways still is,caused by a combination of drought,chronically weak governance and disruptedmarkets. The “monotonous landscape ofinterventions”9 that makes up aid responsehas been only marginally related to thediversity of challenges faced by ruralpeople struggling to maintain theirlivelihoods as governments have come andgone. Thus, aid agendas have been largelyout of step with humanitarian anddevelopment needs in rural Afghanistan.

The central reason that the aid agenda isnot in line with the realities of agriculturalproduction and livelihoods is that a “crisisnarrative” shapes aid response. The historyof intermittent coping, recovery anddestruction of the past 25 years is glossed

2. The Context of Agricultural Rehabilitation andDevelopment

9 Pain, 2002, op cit., 11.



over by media images of systemic breakdown.Under the Taliban, before the beginning ofthe drought in the late 1990s, cerealproduction was recovering well and in 1995,livestock numbers were greater than theywere in the mid 1960s.10 The lessons of thesepast recovery processes are rarely alludedto, much less analysed, in current planningefforts. Similarly, the ingenuity of farmersin experimenting with new productionmethods and markets is ignored in the faceof efforts to raise funds and deliver suppliesto beneficiaries who are assumed to havenothing. Pressures for finding quick fixes toextremely complex problems stem from fearsthat narco-mafias, gaining sustenance fromrapidly increasing opium production, willundermine the grand post-2001nation-building project.

Currently, it is only possible toprovide a series of snapshotsof a transitional period wherethe government is strugglingto reassume the duties that theinternational community hasheld during recent years. It isunclear what the roles of thestate, civil society, the aidcommunity and the privatesector will be in driving futureagricultural rehabilitation anddevelopment. It is also unclearif and how the state will beable to take a stronger stanceon land grabbing, insecurity and other featuresof rural life in Afghanistan today. Much willdepend on how these different actors succeedin rebuilding the infrastructure of agriculturaland social services.

Another integral aspect of the context thatdelineates the interplay between policies,programmes, governance and agriculturaldevelopment is the role of the internationalcommunity. Afghanistan is not governed by

a UN transitional administration. Therecognised government has, however, verylittle resources of its own and the aidcommunity is still retaining a very tight gripon the purse strings. Considerable andlaudable effort has gone into fosteringgovernment ownership of budgeting and policyformation processes, but in many respectsAfghanistan functions under a quasi-transitional administration supported by theUN and the international community moregenerally. This rather hazy situation ischaracterised by uncertain accountabilitiesto the population, uncertain leadership ofagricultural development programming andinconsistent use of rewards and punishmentsto prod the policy process.

It should also be stressed that Afghanistan isan extremely diverse country with manydifferent microclimates and local historicallyrooted social, political and economicstructures. These exist independently, butat the same time have developed uniqueways of linking to national and internationalstructures. Despite the seeming isolation ofthe distant mountain valleys, and the uniquetrajectories they have followed, even themost remote regions have been profoundly

10 Italtrend. Pre-feasibility for Animal Health in Afghanistan. Report for the European Union. 2003.

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affected by the upheavals of recent and pastyears. One researcher writes of the isolatedPamirian Knot that:

“The observation that the effects ofinternational politics reach deep intothe peripheral valleys and plateauxof remote high mountain regions mightbe surprising for some, but confirmsthat the concept of security survivaloverrides the idea of these areas asrefugia.”11

Afghan agricultural institutions

A central aspect of the reconstruction andrehabilitation architecture in Afghanistan isthe pressure to identify, build, create orstrengthen “implementing partners,” that isto say, formal organisations that can receiveand utilise aid flows. This narrow focusdistracts from the need to take into accountthe wider formal and informal institutionsthat farmers rely upon to access capital,inputs, markets and knowledge in order tomaintain their production, profitability andlivelihoods. There is a tendency to miss theforest for the trees when efforts are madeto build, for example, a village seedproduction cooperative, without firstconsidering what the informal channels andrules are that have long governed howeffectively farmers have been able to accessthe seeds they desire.

The formal institutional infrastructure ofAfghan agriculture is extremely weak, and iscomprised of the following:

• Formal trading networks;• Finance;• Processing and storage;

• Market information;• Access to advice and inputs for new

technologies; and• Formal security of tenure.

These weak institutions preclude rapidrenewal of links to those international marketsthat demand agricultural productioncharacterised by predictability, standardisedquality, timeliness and bulk quantities.

Investments in repairing the physicalinfrastructure that was destroyed during theyears of conflict and decline have begun morerapidly than efforts to rebuild the institutionalinfrastructure. Though security problemshave delayed some construction in the south,progress has been made in other parts of thecountry. Some short-term gap filling ininstitutional support is underway, particularlyas related to seed access and some extension.More long-term thinking is starting to beapplied to micro-finance and restructuringthe commodity chains that show economicpotential. This, however, is still almostentirely in the planning stage. Most observersdoubt that institutional development willproceed rapidly.12

Pressures to channel aid flows are, by nature,biased by assumptions that revival ofagricultural production can only be achievedthrough re-establishment of formal institutionsfor input supply and credit. Aid agencies needrelatively formal institutional counterparts.Farmers, on the other hand, have lessstringent demands. Experience in Pakistanicotton farming, for example, has shown thatinformal structures can actually provide highquality agricultural services and even createeffective links to the formal sector.13 There

11 Kreutzmann, H. “Ethnic Minorities and Marginality in the Pamirian Knot: Survival of Wakhi and Kighiz in a Harsh Environmentand Global Contexts.” The Geographical Journal. September 2003. 169(3): 215-235.

12 Some major donors are more optimistic and see institutions as an area where rapid investment is possible. Referring tothe coming five years, a World Bank concept paper states, “Human capital investment and security investments may befront-loaded, while investment in infrastructure is likely to disburse far more in later years.” (World Bank. Costing thePublic Investment Needed for a Politically and Economically Sustainable Afghanistan, Concept Note. Washington, D.C.:World Bank. 2003.)

13 Smith, L.E.D., Stockbridge, M. and Lohano, H.R. “Facilitating the Provision of Farm Credit: The Role of InterlockingTransactions Between Traders and Zaminders in Crop Marketing Systems in Sindh.” World Development. 1999. 27(2): 404-418.



are some surprisingly strong informal Afghaninstitutions that have appeared in responseto the gap in formal capacity. The Hawalamoney exchange system provides anextraordinarily efficient and reliable structurefor financial transfers that reaches well intorural areas and greatly facilitates access tomigrant remittances.14 This system is believedto have originated to support trading alongthe Silk Route and became modernised inSouth Asia as a way to cope with therestrictions on financial transfers establishedin the India–Pakistan partition.15 It has grownparticularly strong in filling the gap createdby the collapse of formal banking systems inAfghanistan and Somalia, and even constitutesa strong competitor to formal bankingstructures in other countries, such asBangladesh. After being portrayed in theWestern press and by many politicians as ashady enterprise that finances terrorism afterSeptember 11, views on Hawala have begunto undergo a reassessment. It is nowincreasingly acknowledged to be a highlyefficient and essential structure for linkingthe Afghan rural economy to the internationalsystem by channelling vital remittances: “Itcan be argued that what Hawala is vilifiedfor (speed, trust, paperlessness, global reach,fluidity) are precisely the attributes thatmodern globalising investment banking aspiresto.”16

Informal trading networks have also provenvery resilient, building on experience overthe years of re-establishing business whenopportunities have arisen amid recurrentcrises and periods of recovery. The domesticmarket for dried fruit has remained strong,despite the collapse of export markets,17 andAfghanistan has retained its export market

for pistachios to India, even though productionhas shrunk due to destruction of some of thepistachio forests.

In much agricultural programming theweaknesses of formal institutions and policieshas led observers to assume that old structureshave collapsed. There is a tendency to setoff upon programming as if there was a blankslate for designing new policies, institutionsand processes. Plans make few referencesto experience from earlier periods of recoveryin the 1990s. The strength of manygovernmental institutions (though notnecessarily in agriculture) has caught plannersoff guard.18

Regional and international trendsand markets

Just as little attention has been paid toAfghanistan’s institutional infrastructure,there also has been little attention paid tolooking at regional and international marketsas key determinants of what might featureas a driving force for development.19

Afghanistan is not just a country that findsitself between relief and development. It isalso between the two CAPs. The UnitedNations’ Consolidated Appeals Processprovided food and agricultural support duringthe emergency years, and in some waysdisplaced pressures to see how markets affectfood security. The European Union’s CommonAgricultural Policy is the structure that, alongwith other northern subsidies, drasticallyinfluences opportunities to use agriculturalexport markets as an engine for developmentand poverty alleviation. A financially destitutestate, such as Afghanistan, must look very

14 Maimbo, S.M. The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in Afghanistan. World Bank WorkingPaper No. 13. Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2003.

15 De Goede, M. “Hawala Discourses and the War on Terrorist Finance, Environment and Planning.” Society and Space. 2003.21: 513-532.

16 Ibid, 517.17 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector 2003. Kabul:

FAO. 2003.18 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) and the World Bank. A Guide to Government in Afghanistan. Kabul: AREU

and the World Bank. 2004.19 One notable exception has been the attention given to international markets for opium.

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closely at whether it can achieve sufficientproductivity levels so as to compete oninternational markets when it has littlecapacity to provide support to its own farmers.Aid may remove some of the major barriersto trade, such as infrastructure and finance,but it cannot create a level playing field. Atbest, development cooperation may createa limited platform to advocate for more justinternational trade policies and to promotereform of domestic policy to ensure that itreflects market realities.

Internationally, analyses of food security areincreasingly focused on how households( r a t h e r t h a ncountries) accessfood. But it has beennoted that this frameof analysis is out ofsync with parallelpolicy formation processes that relate toaccessing international trading markets.International markets have massive impacton food security, both through devastatingcompetition and by providing cheap foodstuffsto net consumers. This reality is starting toinfluence food security analyses and policies. Food security concerns have had less impact,however, in informing trade policies andstrategies to promote export-led growththrough integration with internationalmarkets.20

Afghanistan’s National DevelopmentFramework (NDF) sees the nation’s future asrelying on export, market-led growth.21

Agricultural development trends in the regionand internationally are therefore of greatrelevance to decisions regarding howagriculture could be expected to bettersupport livelihoods in the future. Revivingproduction of wheat, seeds, raisins or cotton

is not just a matter of ensuring that irrigationsystems are rehabilitated and processingmachinery repaired. Marketing conditions,international prices and the subsidy regimesof potential competitors in the region are ofutmost relevance in the choice of investmentpriorities if livelihood support is to becomesustainable. Many actors within the aidcommunity are keeping their heads in thesand on these factors.

Within the limited sphere of interventionswhere marketing is being addressed, thereis a strong tendency to stress physicalobstacles to marketing in the form of poor

roads, storage andprocessing facilities.Analysis of marketopportun i t ies inn e i g h b o u r i n gcountries and urban

areas are only starting to be undertaken.This would seem to raise questions about thebasis upon which strategic priorities are beingmade for rehabilitation, given thegovernment’s market-led vision. For example,a stronger understanding of future potentialmarkets is indispensable to inform thosechoosing priorities for road construction toachieve maximum benefits for commercialagriculture.

Why has the government’s policy of market-led growth not led to greater emphasis onmarket analysis? The answer lies in acontinued “triumph of the project.” Duffieldet al. note that under the Taliban, despitegrand statements of commitment throughoutthe aid community to the Joint StrategicFramework for Afghanistan, both donors andNGOs remained locked into pre-existingroutines and procedures that kept them busywith picking out projects, rather than

20 Stevens, C., Devereux, S. and Kennan, J. International Trade, Livelihoods and Food Security in Developing Countries. IDSWorking Paper No. 215. Sussex: Institute for Development Studies. 2003.

21 More recently, the principles underlying the NDF were used to inform an action plan outlined in Securing Afghanistan’sFuture: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward, a publication of the Afghan government and internationalagencies. While the author of this paper does not specifically site this publication, he did meet with the chief architectsof Securing Afghanistan’s Future, and many of the ideas contained in that document are addressed herein.

Aid may remove some of the major barriersto trade, such as infrastructure and finance,but it cannot create a level playing field.



implementing policies.22 Theneed to have activities thatcan be related (howevertenuously) to pictures ofbillowing fields of wheat is stillgreater than the need to askif anyone is ready to buy theflour. Afghan policy documentsand budgeting structures mayresonate with the rhetoric ofthe new market-oriented aidarchitecture that is increasinglydominating the field ofdevelopment, but the on-the-ground programming realitiesin the agricultural sector retaina project-bound tunnel vision.

“New Public Management” andimpediments to policy reform

There is not only a disjunction between thegovernment’s market visions for agricultureand the project-bound nature of aid activities,but between the philosophy underpinningthe role of the state in documents such asthe NDF and the reality of visions within keyministries relating to agriculture. The NDFbegins by stating that “the people’saspirations must be represented and reflectedin an accountable government that deliversvalue on a daily basis.” The questions of whatshould be delivered and by whom are at thecentre of the debate on what kind of socialcontract the Afghan government intends toestablish with its people. The NDF goes onto specify that “we do not see governmentas the producer and manager of the economy,but as regulator and promoter of theentrepreneurial energies of the people. Thestate will enter into a direct managerial roleonly when social justice demands itspresence.” The policy formation process

essentially consists of a gradual bridging ofgaps in different interpretations of whatconstitutes a public good, i.e., where thestate could or should step in and where themarket and civil society can be expected totake the lead, requiring only facilitation andregulation from the state.

The goal of establishing a facilitating andregulating state is particularly important toanalyse in agriculture, where states areconventionally assumed to have a relativelyminor direct role in development and eventhe provision of basic services, as comparedto other sectors such as health or education,where state service provision remains thenorm. Agriculture would appear to be a sectorthat should slot in well with the goals of thegovernment and international community.An operational consensus has, however, yetto emerge regarding the role of the state inagricultural development.

Within the NDF, Afghanistan’s crisis has beentransformed into an opportunity for reform,as this New Public Management23 (NPM)inspired structure has been overlaid on the

22 Duffield, M., Gossman, P. and Leader, N. Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Researchand Evaluation Unit. 2002.

23 “New Public Management” is a term used to refer to the models for attempting to minimise the role of the state andincrease roles for the private sector and civil society. These models were implemented widely in Europe during the 1980s,and have since been increasingly promoted as part of structural adjustment programmes in the south and east. More recentlythese ideas have gained favour in design of international strategies for rebuilding failed or collapsed states.

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ruins of what was assumed to be a collapsedstate. The formal endorsement of the NPMapproach is widely perceived to be more aproduct of donor pressures than domesticcommitment. The continuing strength ofopposition to NPM in the government hasrevealed that the state was not as collapsedas many expected. A set of problems hasemerged in implementing the framework, asit has gradually been discovered that thestate and civil service have proven to besurprisingly vigorous and active in striving torebuild (rather than reform) their structuresof the past. There is intense pride in the civilservice24 that does not mesh well with theradical NPM paradigm. Agriculturalstakeholders expect and want the state “toprovide everything.”25 The belief that crisisinevitably creates opportunities for publicreform has been shown to have been builtmore on prevailingnarratives within theaid community thanon empirical realities.Afghan politicians andcivil servants have adifferent set ofprerogatives, basedon a different historyand culture than thatof their advisers, and a different set ofpolitical, economic and social pressures.

The advisers may also be directed atpromoting normative reconstruction models,at the expense of frank analyses of politicalprocesses in contexts of post- and chroniccrisis. Boin and ‘t Hart point out that thenarrative of crisis as an opportunity for reformis widespread in the north as well, but isprofoundly flawed as “the requirements ofcr is is management are inherentlyincompatible with the requisites for effective

reform.”26 Citizens’ expectations and otherfactors put pressures on political leaders (andin this case, the aid community as well) toshow quick results and provide visible publicservices. This is not in tune with NPM modelsthat suggest that the gap betweengovernment capacity and massive needs canbe used as a stimulus to shift to greaterreliance on the private sector and civil society.

When the current government assumed power,the vast majority of politicians and civilservants in agriculture took for granted thata large and well financed state-led agriculturaldevelopment effort was going to be put intoplace. That was all they had experienced inthe past and there was little understandingor awareness of the reform efforts that havebeen undertaken throughout the world overthe past two decades. There is a major gap

between the vision foragriculture and ruraldevelopment that isoutlined in the NDFa n d p r e v a i l i n gagricultural policy asperceived by most ofthose working withinthe M in i s t ry o fAg r i cu l tu re andAnimal Husbandry

(MAAH) and the NGOs providing agriculturalservices. Despite the endorsement of newpolicy concepts by key actors at the centrallevel, there is little sign that the new visionfor the state is either understood or acceptedat other levels. One donor assistance strategynotes that “Ownership within individual ATA[Afghanistan Transitional Authority] ministries[for the NDF] varies.”27 The government hasacknowledged this openly as well.28

Provincial and district officials retain theview that since agriculture is the “backbone”

24 AREU and the World Bank, op cit.25 Hemani, M. Agriculture and Rural Development Ministrie’s (sic) Level Strategy Development Workshop, 28 September – 2

October 2003, Kabul. Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. 2003.26 Boin, A., and ‘t Hart, P. “Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?” Public Administration Review. September

2003. 63(5): 544-553.27 Department for International Development (DFID). DFID Transitional Country Assistance Plan Afghanistan 2003-2004. Western

Asia Department, DFID. August 2003, 5.28 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). From Humanitarian Assistance to Social Protection. Paper prepared

for the Afghanistan Support Group Oslo Meetings. Kabul: MRRD. December 2002.

There is a major gap between the visionfor agriculture and rural development thatis outlined in the NDF and prevailingagricultural policy as perceived by most ofthose working within the Ministry ofAgriculture and Animal Husbandry (MAAH)and the NGOs providing agriculturalservices.



of the local economy, this therefore justifiesstate dominance in both financing andprovision of agricultural services and inplanning production priorities. There is asyet little public discussion of alternativevisions for the sector at provincial and districtlevels. A majority of those in provincial anddistrict political and civil service structuresinvolved in agriculture retain expectationsof a return to state-led development,requiring a large bureaucracy and publicservice provision. Even relations to civilsociety are assumed to require a strongleading role for the state. For example, plansare being put into place for a vast expansionof government advisers and subsidy structuresto guide a revival of agricultural cooperatives.

Agencies including the UN Food andAgriculture Organisation (FAO), the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB) and the UKDepartment for International Development(DFID) are investing in capacity building forthe MAAH in order to increase the awarenessof key staff of current international normsand practices within ministries of agricultureand the public sector. Most acknowledge thatthese efforts have as yet made limitedheadway. Even where NPM has been accepted,there is no consensus regarding what afacilitating and regulating state actuallyconsists of on the ground, and what could bedone to promote the growth of private andcivil society structures that the state shouldeventually facilitate and regulate. The blamedoes not necessarily lie with aid efforts perse, but rather with a high level of uncertaintywithin the system about what capacitiesshould be built. The implications of the NDFfor setting priorities have only just begun tobe absorbed at an overarching conceptuallevel. Genuine, widespread and sustainableownership may only be expected to emergeonce it is determined what these conceptsimply with regard to who does what inextension, cooperatives, veterinary services,etc.

Ambivalence toward NPM extends beyondthe government. Most NGOs, which are

currently the main operational actors inprovision of agricultural services, have yetto consider how to align the trajectories oftheir programmes with the NDF. Programmestend to reflect a de facto assumption thatall agricultural services are public goods, andthat the creation of a market for privateservices is a matter that will have to be dealtwith in the distant future (i.e., by someoneelse). Even the opportunity to access supportfor more private sector-oriented programmingfrom the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) has not stimulated amajor change in direction. The services thatthe NGOs provide are not dissimilar to thosethat the state actors would like to assume.The prospects of sustainability are notsignificantly better in their initiatives thanin government services, since their effortsare not anchored in local resource flows,either through the market or civil society.Most aid-financed agricultural programmesdo not provide an alternative vision for howagricultural services could be organised, butinstead are mere bypass structures in whichNGO staff provide the same services that thegovernment agencies expect and hope thatthey should be given responsibility for.

Within the government’s consultative groupand budgeting structure, the MAAH isresponsible for the natural resourcesmanagement sector, but not for livelihoodsand social protection, which is allotted tothe Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation andDevelopment (MRRD), with support from theWorld Food Programme (WFP) and others.While there are practical reasons for thisdivision, and it is uncertain whether the MAAHwould be able to effectively engage in yetanother set of policy reform initiatives, thisstructure has hindered efforts to see howagriculture contributes to the protection oflivelihoods. Neither the MAAH nor FAO havebeen actively engaged in discussions of thelarge social protection programmes that arejust starting. Opportunities have thus beenmissed for seeing how agriculturalprogramming could better contribute toreducing vulnerability.

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It would seem a paradox that agriculture isa sector that has been wary to accept theNPM vision proposed in the NDF, given thatagriculture is by nature an area where theprivate sector is inevitably the key drivingforce. There are several reasons for this:

• Agriculture has been seen as the primaryvehicle of state-led modernisation sincethe time of the massive U.S.-financedHelmand Valley Project in the 1960s.

• The background of many bureaucrats inboth the socialist system and exposureto the former U.S. agricultural systemhas underpinned a desire to revivecooperatives.29

• Aid structures that demand encapsulatedand quick impact projects cannot dealwith an unruly and unpredictable privatesector.

• There is a desire within the agriculturalbureaucracy to re-establish its legitimacythrough patronage and largesse.

Against the backdrop of these factors,government agricultural officials at districtand provincial levels observe NGOs distributingfree hand-outs and naturally wish to do thesame. They perceive NGOs to be the tenaciousremnants of a surrogate state that wascreated during the war. They see their roleas being one of taking back the responsibilitiesthat they once had and that NGOs havecurrently taken upon themselves. Supply-driven programming is assumed to be thenorm. Given the absence of alternativemodels, it would be surprising if they hadany different expectations.

Government officials are extremely frustratedthat the international donor community doesnot help them to develop their legitimacy ina similar manner as NGOs have done. This isgrounded in the perceived gap between donorrhetoric about strengthening the government

and funding priorities via NGOs. Local officialshave little understanding of how aid agenciesdetermine priorities and modalities andexperience a sense of powerlessness ininfluencing the agricultural programmingunder way in their jurisdictions. NGOs areseen to be totally unaccountable togovernment for the quality or impact of theiragricultural programmes, further fuellingenvy and anger.

Despite some progress in “convincing” high-level officials of the need for a lean state,there is no clear agenda for establishing theconcrete tasks of the public sector in eitherKabul or the rest of the country. The plansof agricultural departments at provincial anddistrict levels essentially consist of requestingfunding from Kabul for the provision of freeservices and waiting for a response. Theyrarely receive one. Discussing publicadministration more generally, it has beenobserved that “since December 2001,provincial and district staff essentially havebeen waiting to hear from Kabul.”30 Thereis some hope that the tables will be turnedbetween the state and NGOs when theNational Solidarity Programme (NSP) getsunder way. At the district level, there aresome optimistic hopes that NSP funds will beused for such services, including tractor-ploughing schemes and flour mills (i.e., areasthat the private sector would seem to beexpected to dominate within a vision of afacilitating and regulating state).

Operational priorities and thepolicy process

In lieu of a broad-based policy implementationprocess, programmes and projects (currentor hoped for) have become the proxy foractionable policies. The need to build thelegitimacy of the central government (and

29 U.S.-supported cooperative development, including 4-H clubs, was part of the social engineering strategy of the HelmandValley Project. (See Cullather, N. “Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State.” The Journal of American History.September 2002. 512-537.)

30 AREU and the World Bank, op cit., 4.



the weakness of the formal private sector)has meant that aid flows through the stateare increasing. There is a pragmaticacceptance that something needs to be doneto help get Afghanistan on its feet, and thatthe process of developing capacity in policyanalysis and implementation cannot be spedup sufficiently to use policy as a basis fortightly coordinating and prioritisingexpenditures. A significant element of supply-side programming is accepted as a necessaryevil.

One result of this is that competition oversupplies and over speed in expending them(and achieving “quick impacts”) has in someways taken precedence over coordinationand strategic direction. The “triumph of theproject” continues to prevail. One evaluationfrom 2002 goes so far as to state that “currentreconstruction practice — what agenciesactually do and how they do it — in practicebears more resemblance to regionalism andwarlordism than to a coherent and effectiveaid programme.”31 Coordination has improvedsince then, but is still rudimentary in manyrespects. Few would describe Afghanagricultural development efforts as a shiningexample of “good donorship.”

The reform narrative, as embodied in theNDF, has its roots in efforts around the worldto reduce the role and scale of statebureaucracies and create a lean state. Aparadox in Afghanistan is that, although thereis a need to scale down the visions and hopesof returning to organisational models fromthe 1960s and 1970s, there is presently littleagricultural bureaucracy to actually retrench.Instead there is a need to expand to meetthe challenges of a facilitating and regulatingstate. There is a contradiction between theretrenchment narrative and the actual make-up of the agricultural civil service. For

example, even if the state was to withdrawfrom direct service provision, the challengesit faces in shouldering the regulatory andfacilitatory tasks envisaged in the NDF areenormous. Key exports are currently inviolation of many countries’ phytosanitaryimport regulations. Border controls, inspectionof imported fertiliser and pesticides and theneed to monitor and regulate a transparentsystem for agricultural finance are all pressingneeds.

In addition, there is a growing portfolio ofprojects and programmes, ostensibly underthe leadership of the MAAH, that need to befacilitated and regulated. There is a veryreal disjuncture between aims of makingspace for the private sector and the need formassive investment in public goods and inpromoting the legitimacy of the state. Plansfor contracting out public services have notbeen anchored in a parallel agenda of ensuringstate capacity to act as a smart buyer ofthese services when they are publiclyfinanced.

The government has not yet ventured intothis process, either because it still harbourshopes that it will do it all itself, or becausedonors do not trust the government enoughto channel funds through its coffers.32 Thegrowing scale of programming bears with ita danger of creating further alienation of theagricultural bureaucracy from the aidbureaucracy if a more integrated modusoperandi is not established. The gap betweenrhetoric about ownership and the reality ofcontinued bypass structures is creatingdisillusionment. Donors, advisers and NGOstaff are openly frustrated about what areseen to be antiquated views within the civilservice, but there is a significant vacuum ofideas about how to bridge the divide.

31 Kampenaar, K., Silken, T. and Pain, A. DACAAR Mid-Term Review. June 2002.32 Considerable effort has been devoted to pressuring the aid community to work within the National Development Budget,

with coordination managed through a system of consultative groups. Without belittling the considerable successes of thisprocess at a macro level, it has yet to become a mechanism that addresses issues related to public/private roles andresponsibilities at an operational level.

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It is easy to blame implementing actors inthe government, FAO and NGOs for allowingprogramming to displace the policy debate,but thus far funding horizons have been veryshort, and therefore provide little space forpolicy development to move from talk toaction. A number of policy advisers arescattered throughout the ministry offices inKabul. At provincial and district levels,however, small delivery-oriented projectsare still far easier to fund than diffusecapacity-building initiatives. FAO’s structureof field-level offices would seem to providea relatively solid platform for a broadernormative commitment to coordinated policyreform. But these offices are starting to bedismantled as the emergency funding thatsustained them is reduced.

When funding is only available for one to twoyears, as is currently the norm, strategicthinking is unlikely to emerge. The phasingout of emergency funding has yet to bematched by an increase in developmentspending.33 Operational agencies are beingcriticised for being stuck in humanitarianmodalities, but funding structures have notbeen supportive of those actors who wish totake on a more strategic agenda. There issomewhat of a chicken or the egg situationwith regard to international NGOs and UNagencies building their own capacity for long-term thinking (to in turn build Afghan capacityfor the same). NGOs and UN agencies arecriticised for their failure to adapt to thenew situation, but as long as funding is souncertain, they have good cause not to riskinvesting their own resources in gearing up

for long-term strategic initiatives.Furthermore, it may be unethical to raiseexpectations among farmers, extension agentsand private actors by trying to establish moresustainable relations between agriculturalservice providers and their clients whensupport is in danger of being discontinued ina matter of months. Operational agenciesare in many respects acting in an ethicallycorrect manner in refusing to invest insustainable micro-finance, extension orresearch initiatives that may need to beclosed after a few months.

A further disjuncture in current agriculturalpolicies and programming is how best tocombine social and economic objectives. Theefficiency focus of the governmental roleenvisaged in the NDF is paired with socialobjectives that stress inclusion, equity andjustice. It is not self evident how the formerwill lead to the latter. The working assumptionappears to be that an effective, strong, butrealistically focused central government is aprecondition for pursuing objectives of equityand social justice. This is an assumption thatis common in NPM reform efforts: “…socialjustice is a star in the NPM firmament, setto shine more brightly as NPM tenets takeincreased hold.”34 It is worth noting, however,that the process by which efficiency in theagricultural bureaucracy is expected to impacton the well-being of vulnerable ruralhouseholds is not explicit. Reform may be apre-requisite for pro-poor and equitabledevelopment, but it is not a guarantee. Itwould seem irresponsible to wait for resurgentconflict as an indicator that social objectiveshave not been realised.

33 The major exception to this is the large USAID-funded RAMP program, though many observers express concerns that domesticpolitical pressures may result in this “development” programme being unduly directed at quick fixes.

34 Harrow, J. “New Public Management and Social Justice: Just Efficiency or Equity as Well?” In McLaughlin, K., Osborne,S.P. and Ferlie, E., eds. New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects. London & New York: Routledge.2002, 141.



In addition to understanding the context ofagricultural rehabilitation and developmentin Afghanistan, it is critical to discuss whatis known about Afghan livelihoods and labourbefore assessing the relevance of agriculturalprogramming. This chapter first examinesthe relationship between agriculture and theactual livelihoods of rural people in high andlow potential areas. It then looks at foodsecurity and food consumption in terms ofchanging livelihood strategies and levels ofagricultural production. Having demonstratedthat subsistence farming is but one aspectof how rural people survive, the chapter endswith a focus on non-farm labour and migrationas crucial livelihood strategies.

Agriculture and livelihoods in highand low potential areas

International findings are increasinglyindicating that the impact of changingpolicies, institutions and markets differsdramatically between high and low potentialagricultural areas. “Pro-poor growth”in i t iat ives and marketintegration generally havemuch more to offer farmers inareas that can directly takeadvantage of the opportunitiespresented.35 The hinterlandsoffer poorer prospects for manyof the strategies that havebeen promoted as ways to“escape” from poverty.Instead, realistic assessmentsusually point to the need toenhance coping strategies andways to promote inclusivedevelopment in the face ofd e c l i n i n g c o m m e r c i a linvestment and security.

The examples provided in Boxes 1 and 2illustrate the varying influences of marketaccess, labour markets, natural conditions,security and history in different parts of thecountry. Hazarajat and Kunduz are examplesfrom contrasting ends of the Afghan spectrumof rural development trends. The former isgrappling with isolation, depopulation andpoor market prospects. The latter is engagedin commercial production, but facesdifficulties in looking beyond pre-warproduction patterns to the market realitiesof today, and the implications of this forinvestment and rehabilitation priorities.

Hazarajat is not without potential, but whenviewed through the lens of experienceelsewhere in the world in development (orlack thereof) in isolated, mountainous areas,it appears unlikely that agriculture will providea sufficient “engine of growth” to reverselong-term trends toward economic decline.Agriculture is more likely to be one of anumber of coping strategies for a population

3. What is Known About Livelihoods and Labour

35 Ashley, C. and Maxwell, S. “Rethinking Rural Development.” Development Policy Review. 2001. 1119(4): 395-425.

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Box 1: Example of a low potential area: Hazarajat

Hazarajat is a poor and isolated mountainous region of central Afghanistan with relatively little arable land.Crops (primarily wheat) are mostly produced in narrow irrigated valleys, with some rain-fed crops beingplanted on surrounding hillsides when precipitation permits. The mountainous topography makes transportdifficult and puts Hazarajat’s agriculture at a disadvantage in accessing urban (Kabul) markets. Hazarajatis a chronic food deficit area. Livelihoods are heavily dependent on sales of livestock and migration to makeup for this deficit. Hazarajat is known for its out-migration, both to Kabul and internationally. Iran is thepreferred destination, since many Hazara are Shi’a and feel safer among people of their own religion. Someareas have had a pattern of seasonal migration, mostly to Kabul, during the winter months.36

The isolation of Hazarajat has by no means meant that farmers are hesitant about trying new technologies.Poppy cultivation is currently expanding “spectacularly,”37 even to areas where it has never been grownbefore. Potato production is also expanding rapidly. This year potatoes are a major commercial crop, usedin rotation with winter wheat. There is a readiness to invest in new machinery as well, as exemplified bysome farmers purchasing mechanical threshers after observing a project managed threshing pilot.38

Hazarajat’s small and isolated valleys display extraordinary diversity in terms of local socio-economic relationsand impact from conflict and drought. In some districts extreme “feudal”39 relations exist. In other districtsand valleys, sharecroppers have regained direct ownership of their land as former Kuchi landlords havefled.40 Many commanders are adapting to the coming of peace to the province by becoming landlords throughland grabbing and other abuse of their power.41 Current analyses emphasise the massive impact of thedrought on agriculture in Hazarajat, which devastated agricultural production. The uncertainties surroundingrain-fed agriculture in Hazarajat and skewed land ownership suggest that livestock is a more viable productionstrategy for the poor than crops. Some agency representatives acknowledge this. Subsidised veterinaryservices are, however, the only aid response under way. On a national level, some have called for “aggressivepost-drought programs to restore livestock bases.”42 However, there is a lack of surplus animals throughoutAfghanistan and with the extremely weak inspection and quarantine structures, imports from neighbouringcountries would be very risky.43

Hazarajat has attracted a considerable number of agencies over the years, but most have had relativelysmall programmes. One observer writes that, during the 1990s, “…at no stage has the volume of assistance,by any measure, been significant relative to the scale of the area economy.”44 Agricultural programmingremains primarily oriented to seed distribution. Oxfam and the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) areengaged in major long-term rural development programmes, both of which are struggling to refocus effortsaway from the past seed focus. They are both experiencing difficulty in renegotiating operational relationshipswith the shuras45 with which they work. FAO is starting to implement a large and ambitious DFID-financedprogramme focused on enhancing rural livelihoods through first developing shuras and other institutions toact as farmer organisations.

36 Johnson, C. Hazarajat Baseline Study – Interim Report. Kabul: UN Coordinator’s Office. 2000.37 Solidarités. Reinforcement of Food Security, in order to Stabilize Local Populations and to Favour the Return of Displaced

Persons and Refugees, Intermediate Report Period from April 1, 2002 – April 1, 2003. Kabul: Solidarités. 2003, 26.38 Solidarités, 2003, op cit.39 The term “feudal” is used to describe a diverse variety of unequal and exploitive social relations in studies of local land

tenure systems and political structures in rural areas.40 Alden Wily, L. Land Relations in Bamyan Province: Findings from a 15 Village Case Study. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and

Evaluation Unit. 2004.41 Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC). Speaking Out. Kabul: HRRAC. November 2003.42 Lautze, S., Stites, E., Nojumi, N. and Najimi, F. Qaht-e-Pool “A Cash Famine”: Food Insecurity in Afghanistan 1999-2002.

Medford, Massachusetts: Feinstein International Famine Center. 2002.43 Solidarités, 2003, op cit.44 Semple, M. Strategies for Support of Sustainable Rural Livelihoods for the Central Highlands of Afghanistan. Islamabad:

Pattan Development Organisation. 1998.45 Shura is the term used for an array of community councils that provide both traditional governance and an interface for

managing aid-financed rural development programmes.



Box 2: Example of a high potential area: Kunduz

Kunduz Province is located on the border of Tajikistan, west of the Hindu Kush. Agricultural land primarilyconsists of irrigated lowlands, rain-fed plains and low hills. Relatively abundant rainfall and higher landfertility make rain-fed production more reliable and important than in Hazarajat. The major crops are wheat,rice and cotton. The province produces a significant cereal surplus. Reliable statistics are not available, butwheat and rice appear to be primarily used for sales rather than for subsistence. Cotton was very importantin the past and was the motor for commercial and irrigation investment in the region. In many respectsKunduz’s cotton economy was a model for the state-led agricultural development policies of the last century.

Until a major land reclamation programme in the 1930s, much of Kunduz was a sparsely populated malarialswamp.46 With the start of development efforts, the population grew rapidly and the Spinzar Corporationbecame the primary motor of the cotton economy of Kunduz and neighbouring provinces. Started in 1936by a group of traders, Spinzar was purchased by the government in 1944.47 It still exists as a state-ownedenterprise. With the war, cotton production and related services rapidly collapsed. All sub-offices of theSpinzar Corporation outside of Kunduz town were destroyed. Cotton production began to be revived underthe Taliban, but at a very low level. Efforts to re-establish production have begun again. Much of the machineryowned by the Spinzar Corporation is still in working order or could be easily repaired,48 but operating costsare high due to the age of the machinery and the need to rely on generators for power. It is expected thatenergy may be imported from Tajikistan in the future.49

The memory of the frontline services provided by the Spinzar Corporation continues to underpin a steadfastgovernmental view and widespread farmer hope that development will consist of a restoration of theproduction system and services of the past. There is very little awareness of the ways that internationaltrends, especially subsidies, may affect the future viability of an Afghan cotton industry. European Unionsubsidies to Greece, for example, have averaged over 100 percent of farm value since 1997,50 and the U.S.provides over US$3 billion, or US$230 per acre, to its cotton farmers. Consideration has not been given tothe problems facing the cotton economy in Tajikistan either, where drastic de-mechanisation and de-capitalisation have been underway51 and where cotton production has had devastating environmentalconsequences.52 Neighbouring Uzbekistan is the world’s second largest cotton exporter, with Tajikistan andPakistan also major producers that would be expected to provide strong competition to Kunduz cottonproduction. The implications of these factors for expectations that the Spinzar Corporation can be returnedto viability appear not to be part of current discussions regarding the future of the cotton economy in Kunduz.

Paradoxically, it is partly the regional threats to Kunduz’s current wheat and rice production that have spurredhopes that cotton can again emerge as the engine of growth. Wheat and rice prices have sunk in the faceof imports from neighbouring countries with subsidisation policies. Some wheat and rice this year were noteven harvested, as farmers concluded that they could not compete with imports to the food deficit areasof the south and urban markets due to high labour and transport costs. Labourers used to come to the provincefrom Badakhshan to work in the wheat harvest, but expansion of poppy production there has reducedincentives to work in the wheat harvest and drastically increased wages.53

46 Barfield, T.J. “Weak Links on a Rusty Chain: Structural Weaknesses in Afghanistan’s Provincial Government Administration.”In Shahrani, M.N. and Canfield, R.L., eds. Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives. Berkeley,CA: University of California Press. 1984.

47 Central Asia Development Group (CADG). Spinzar Corporation: An Economic Analysis of the Spinzar Cotton Gin in KunduzProvince, Afghanistan. Singapore: CADG. 2002.

48 Ibid.49 Tensions could emerge if this energy is used to revive a cotton industry that would compete with Tajikistan’s own struggling

cotton industry. This could be a particularly sensitive issue if the Spinzar Corporation receives a US$2.5 million grant, asis currently being considered, since this could be perceived of as an unfair subsidy.

50 Townsend, T. Subsidies Beyond 2006. Washington, D.C.: International Cotton Advisory Committee. 2003.51 Pomfret, R. “State-Directed Diffusion of Technology: The Mechanization of Cotton Harvesting in Soviet Central Asia.” Journal

of Economic History. 2002. 62(1): 170-188.52 Spoor, M. “The Aral Sea Basin Crisis: Transition and Environment in Former Soviet Central Asia.” Development and Change.

July 1998. 29(3): 409-435.53 Maletta, H. Winters of Discontent: Seasonal changes in wages and food prices in Afghanistan, 2002-2003. Discussion Paper.

Kabul: Food and Agriculture Organisation/Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. 2003.

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that is heavily dependent on migration, wagelabour and government transfers. There isno international consensus about how toaddress the chronic poverty of places likeHazarajat. Some states have simply ignoredthe problem by adopting de facto triagepolicies. They have chosen to invest theirshrinking agricultural budgets in higherpotential areas where a financial return oninvestment is more likely and where it ishoped that the private sector will proveincreasingly willing to take over services asthe state retreats to facilitating and regulatingroles.54 This has not necessarily been seenas a non-pro-poor stance since, given thelimited economic prospects of hinterlands,the poor are assumed to be better off if theysimply leave.

The massive depopulation of these areas thatmany economists had predicted has, however,not occurred. The World Bank acknowledgesthat “one-quarter of the people in developingcountries — 1.3 billion in all — survive onfragile lands, areas that present significantconstraints for intensive agriculture…The sizeof this population is a signal that ourassumptions about the extent and speed ofout-migration have been flawed.”55 Referringto the Andes, Bebbington describes how,despite public policies effectively writing offisolated areas as “non-viable,” people arechoosing to remain by piecing togetherlivelihoods that rely on combinations ofmigration, subsistence agriculture and wagelabour.56 Though migration has certainlydrained these areas of human resources, ithas also offered transnational lifelines thatprovide the basis for new forms of livelihoods,as some family members send back

remittances while other relatives maintainthe family homestead.

Some livelihood strategies, such as narcoticsproduction, actually thrive on a combinationof access to transnational networks anddistance from public authorities, therebyproviding an attractive comparative advantagefor supposedly non-viable areas. The naturaltendencies to capitalise on these comparativeadvantages means that insecurity and conflictare common features in remote rural areas,as they feed both on the opportunities thatisolation provides and on the social exclusion,marginalisation and alienation (particularlyamong youth) that result from exclusion fromthe dynamism of more integrated areas.57

The disadvantages of withdrawing publicinvestment from these areas are thus startingto be acknowledged as being potentiallygreater than the losses that are incurred insupporting agricultural livelihoods that donot necessarily show a positive rate of returnon direct investments in research andextension.58

While the need to ensure a strong role forthe state will continue to be a key issue forHazarajat, the central question facing highpotential areas such as Kunduz is how to takeadvantage of market forces to attract themuch heralded benefits of globalisation.Hopes for a return to profitability incommercial wheat production in Kunduz arerooted in assumptions that the conflict wasthe problem that led to the disappearanceof markets. In fact, profitability may actuallyhave benefited from the isolation from worldprices, which have dropped precipitouslyduring the past three decades, as indicatedin Figure 1.

54 Christoplos, I. “Natural Disasters, Complex Emergencies and Public Services: Rejuxtaposing the Narratives after HurricaneMitch.” In Collins, P., ed. Applying Public Administration in Development: Guideposts to the Future. Chichester: John Wiley& Sons. 2000.

55 World Bank. Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World: Transforming Institutions, Growth, and Quality of Life, WorldDevelopment Report 2003. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 2003, 59.

56 Bebbington, A. “Capitals and capabilities: A framework for analysing peasant viability, rural livelihoods and poverty.” WorldDevelopment. 1999. 27(12): 2021-2044.

57 Bird, K., Hulme, D., Moore, K. and Shepherd, A. Chronic Poverty in Remote Rural Areas. CPRC Working Paper No. 13.Birmingham & Manchester: Chronic Poverty Research Centre. 2002.

58 Farrington, J., Christoplos, I. and Kidd, A. with M. Beckman. Extension, Poverty and Vulnerability: The Scope for PolicyReform - Final Report. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 155. London: ODI. 2002.



59 Sloane, P. “Food Security Strategy for Afghanistan (revised version).” Afghanistan Watching Brief (a joint UNDP-WB Project).Islamabad: United Nations Development Programme/World Bank. 5-6 June 2001; Khan, M.A. Afghanistan: Promotion ofAgricultural Rehabilitation and Development Programmes, Extension and Training. Islamabad: Food and AgricultureOrganisation. November 1996.

60 Gill, G.J., Farrington, J., Anderson, E., Luttrell, C., Conway, T., Saxena, N.C. and Slater, R. Food Security and the MillenniumDevelopment Goal on Food Security in Asia. Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 231. London: ODI.December 2003.

to food through investment in cerealproduction and food aid,59 to a broader viewexploring how an array of different livelihoodstrategies impact on food security. It isincreasingly accepted that, for the mostvulnerable sectors of the population, theproblem is not the availability of food, butrather the assets with which to purchasefood. Throughout the world, and particularlyin Asia, it is becoming apparent that “despitethe fact that food is produced in rural areas,food security in many countries is higher inurban areas where power to access ishigher.”60 In the past in Afghanistan, thefocus on production inputs and food aid mayhave been a reflection of the limited toolsof the aid community. Problems were definedby the available solutions. Some currentprogramming (particularly those in anemergency mode, focused on wheat seedsand food aid) retains past assumptions of adirect production-consumption link, but thismay relate more to opportunistic proposalwriting and pandering to donor expectationsthan to genuine convictions that production

Finally, though there is good justification fora two-pronged development strategy forplaces like Kunduz and Hazarajat, this doesnot mean that they should be seen as separateeconomic spheres. The fate of Hazarajatand Kunduz will be increasingly interrelated.The capacity of Hazarajat to benefit fromagricultural development will relate to accessto cheap wheat and rice from Kunduz andseasonal labour opportunities. Thecompetitiveness of Kunduz’s agriculture maydepend on access to cheap labour reserves,such as those from Hazarajat.

Food security amid changinglivelihood strategies

Levels of agricultural production in high andlow potential areas are also affecting currentthinking around food security and foodconsumption around the country. The conceptof food security in Afghanistan is going througha gradual shift from earlier assumptions thatfood security could and would be bestaddressed primarily through increased access

Figure 1. World Cereal Prices, 1960-2020

Source: Rosegrant (2001) in Ashley & Maxwell, 2001

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increase is a sufficient guarantee for foodsecurity.

The assumption that increased food securityis best achieved by production increase restson an underlying “yeoman farmer” narrativeabout Afghanistan being a country primarilymade up of subsistence farmers, i.e., peoplewho will eat more if they produce more. The“crisis narrative” depicts the livelihoods ofsubsistence farmers as having recently gonethrough a severe but temporary disruption.Among researchers, there is significantdisagreement about the extent to whichAfghan rural livelihoods have undergone atemporary or permanent shift fromsubsistence production to commercialproduction and diversified sources of income.The drought has almost certainly caused afar greater temporary reliance on access tocash (rather than subsistence production)due to the failure of food crops. The relianceon a cash economy has continued as farmersstruggle to repay debts to traders that wereincurred during the drought.61 In the searchfor cash income, household labour resourceshave increasingly been shifted to expandingopium production. This may further lockfamilies into the cash economy, as they mustpurchase more food while they devoteavailable labour resources to poppy.62 It isunclear, however, how much poppy productionhas actually diverted labour away from othercrops, as the spectacular increases in opiumproduction in recent years have occurredparallel to increased production of cerealsand other cash crops.

The process of shifting away from subsistenceproduction differs profoundly between highand low potential areas. In Kunduz, forexample, the shift away from subsistencehappened in the 1930s and 1940s, when

draining and irrigation investments pavedthe way for commoditisation. In low potentialareas, this process has been more gradual,influenced by increasing population pressuresand intermittent drought and conflict. It hasbeen a far less linear process.

There is little consensus about whether foodsecurity interventions in Afghanistan shouldeven strive to re-establish pre-drought/warsubsistence production patterns. Althoughsome63 stress that the drought was a highlyexceptional event that disrupted and causedlong-term damage to former subsistence-focused livelihood strategies, others64 drawattention to the major role that diversifiedlivelihood strategies, including migration andcommercial production, have historicallyplayed in the Afghan economy. Widespreadlandlessness also suggests that recovery willnot be rapid. Many landless and near landlessare resigned to the need to search for labouropportunities and do not expect a majorchange in their circumstances.65 Alternativelivelihood options have long been pursued inresponse to new opportunities, climaticvariability and conflict.

Relationship between agriculturalproduction and food consumption

Given the crisis narrative that has dominatedefforts over the past two years, there is asurprising dearth of information aboutwhether or not the massive swings in foodproduction have actually had a direct impacton consumption. Information about nutritionallevels is patchy. What data are availablehave, both during and after the drought,consistently shown surprisingly low levels ofacute malnutrition, paired with very highlevels of chronic and micronutrient

61 Lautze, et al., op cit.62 Mansfield, D. The Economic Superiority of Illicit Drug Production: Myth and Reality/ Opium Production in Afghanistan.

Paper prepared for the International Conference on the Role of Alternative Development in Drug Control and DevelopmentCooperation, Feldafeng/Munich, Germany. January 2002.

63 Lautze, et al., op cit.64 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.65 Alden Wily, op cit.



malnutrition. This suggests that copingstrategies have provided for the most basicsurvival needs under very high levels of stress.Repeated shocks create a situation of chronicvulnerability. Over 50 percent of childrenunder five are estimated to be chronicallymalnourished.66 Acute malnutrition appearsto be primarily a seasonal problem duringthe summer and is related to diarrhoealdiseases rather than food shortage. Low levelsof acute malnutrition have been interpretedas suggesting highly equitable distribution offood within the household. High rates ofmicronutrient malnutrition (and scurvy) pointto the importance of dietary habits, andpossibly food preservation and post-harvestpractices, rather than aggregate cerealproduction per se. There is very littleconsumption of fruits and vegetables duringthe winter months.

Despite the popular conception thatagricultural interventions (particularlyemergency programmes) should address foodsecurity, these findings on diet and nutritionhave had little impact upon programmingpriorities. “Hunger” is still used as ajustification for distribution of wheat seeds,and most fruit and vegetable productioninitiatives are primarily promoted for incomegeneration, rather than consumption. SomeNGOs are pursuing home gardening and otherprogrammes intended to impact on householdconsumption, there are very few post-harvestand food processing projects that couldaddress seasonal micronutrient deficiencies.

The vast majority of current operationalprogramming has been focused on increasingcereal production through the distribution ofimproved wheat seeds. Cereal productionhas indeed improved dramatically (even ifthe impact of seed programming incontributing to this increase is not self-evident). More and cheaper wheat does not,however, necessarily mean cheaper bread.

Surveys show that urban flour prices inFayzabad are the lowest in the country.Despite this, the price of bread is the highestin the country. This paradox can best beattributed to the effect of greater demandfor labour and levels of purchasing powergenerated by the opium industry on a non-tradable commodity such as bread.67 Thisshould not be taken to suggest thatsubsistence production of wheat is greatlyaffected by access to labour. In describingcurrent farming in Badakhshan, the provincewith the greatest increase in poppy productionduring 2003, Fitzherbert writes:

“Low grain prices do not seem to act aseither a disincentive not to grow wheatnor directly as an incentive to grow poppy.Badakhshan farmers are not, nor haveever been, commercial grain farmers, norare their circumstances or agriculturalconditions suitable to become so. Few,if any, farmers in Badakhshan are self-sufficient in wheat for their own domesticconsumption and the great majority aredependant on buying at least part of theirannual needs in the market. In thesecircumstances, generally low wheat pricessuit most people.

“Despite the high price of opium, mostfarmers, even those who are seriouslyinto cultivating poppy, also cultivatewheat on part of their land. Theproportion of wheat to poppy usuallyincreases or decreases with the relativesize of the land holding (the less land thegreater the proportion of poppy to wheat),but usually 50 percent or more of irrigatedland will be sown to wheat and othercrops. The instinct to protect domesticfood security as far as possible in anuncertain world is a very strong onethroughout Afghanistan, no less amongpoppy farmers than among others.”68

66 World Food Programme (WFP). Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – Afghanistan 10233.0, Projects for ExecutiveBoard Approval Agenda Item 6, Executive Board Regular Session, 5-7 February 2003, Rome. 2003.

67 Maletta, Winters of Discontent, op cit.68 Fitzherbert cited in Maletta, Winters of Discontent, op cit.

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It should be stressed that, due to the lack ofdata on rural malnutrition, the relationshipbetween cereal production and foodconsumption in isolated, marginal areas, suchas Hazarajat, can only be speculated upon.High levels of migration indicate that peopledo not remain at home when their own foodproduction fails, but empirical data on howpeople combine their different livelihood

options to secure food in areas such as theseare clearly insufficient to draw reliableconclusions.

Agriculture and labour markets:looking beyond the yeoman farmer

Improved support to food security is relianton ensuring that programming is more

Box 3: The food aid debate in Afghanistan

There is a lively debate underway regarding the relevance of continued food aid. Cereal production hasreached record levels and wheat prices have in some regions dropped.69 Several agencies have blamed foodaid for this fall in producer prices, and even claim that this has significantly contributed to the increase inopium production, as food production has become unprofitable.70 Others point out that at its peak, foodaid accounted for only 12 percent of demand.71 According to these observers, the price drop should insteadbe attributed to increased domestic production levels and imports of milled flour from neighbouring countries,some of which have been subsidised for domestic markets in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.72

The assumption that there is a direct trade-off in land use between opium and cereal production is disputedby the fact that cereal cropping area has increased parallel to increases in poppy production, since fewfarmers plant more than a small proportion of their land in poppies.73

Some areas of the country are still experiencing the effects of drought and warfare, with cereal deficits andhigh prices as a result. Apart from the urban areas, deficits are primarily in the south (most notably Kandahar,Uruzgan and Zabul) where the drought has continued and where transport of surpluses from the north arecostly and increasingly subject to security constraints.74 Throughout the country there are significantsegments of the population who apparently lack entitlements to food, through either direct production orother livelihood strategies. Since procurement, milling and transport constraints are the main reasons forhigh prices and lack of access to food in deficit areas, some ask whether imported food aid is an appropriateresponse, or if it is feasible to address the handling and entitlements issues instead.

WFP would reply that the answer to this last question is no. Despite its position as the strongest agency inAfghanistan in terms of logistical field capacity, it is nonetheless too weak to deal with the massive transactioncosts of local procurement and transport, given transport problems and the lack of large grain merchantsin the country. Furthermore, one WFP staff member has stated that “the [Afghan] private sector has almostno experience of contracted delivery.” If food procurement were to be managed on a market basis, localpurchase would favour regional purchase of grain from neighbouring countries where prices are lower,institutional and physical infrastructure stronger and quality higher. Few would not argue that there are,in principle, better ways than food aid to address Afghanistan’s food insecurity, but that there is no quickfix for addressing the paradox of food distributions after a record harvest in the short-term. For the longer-term, some donors, most notably the USAID-funded RAMP (Revitalizing Afghanistan’s Agricultural MarketsProgram), intend to invest heavily in processing and marketing. If this is successful, more appropriatemodalities can be expected to be available in the future.

69 Favre, R. Contributions to Food Aid Policy Development for Afghanistan: Wheat Balance by Region and Province July 2003.Kabul: Food and Agriculture Organisation. 2003.

70 Christian Aid. “Against the Grain.” Available at www.reliefweb.int. 15 September 2003; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty(RFE/RL) “Afghan Farmers Say Wheat Subsidies are Hurting Them.” RFE/RL Afghanistan Report 2/31. 28 August 2003.

71 Maletta, Winters of Discontent, op cit.72 Molla, D. Food Aid, Wheat Prices and Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan: Is there a Link? Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation

and Development/World Food Programme. 2003.73 Mansfield, 2002, op cit.74 FEWS Net. Afghanistan Monthly Food Security Bulletin, August 2003. Kabul: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

2003; 2.



75 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes/Government of Afghanistan (UNODC/GoA). Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003.Kabul: UNODC/GoA. 2003.

76 Mansfield, 2002, op cit.77 One example of this is the UNODC/GoA Opium Survey 2003, which refers to the population for which opium production has

a “direct role” in their livelihoods as only based on the number of farming households growing opium on their own land.This thereby ignores the impact of opium on migrant labourers and the indirect impacts on wages and prices created bythe opium economy. Also see Pain, 2002, op cit.

78 Ashley and Maxwell, op cit.79 Ellis, F. and Biggs, S. “Evolving Themes in Rural Development 1950s-2000s.” Development Policy Review. 2001. 19(4): 437-448.

cognisant of how labour markets interactwith the agricultural economy in rurallivelihoods. Some data collection efforts,such as the National Risk and VulnerabilityAssessment, are shifting their focus awayfrom cereal production, to better reflect theimportance of labour in livelihoods. AREU’slivelihoods monitoring project is also providinga more solid basis for understanding the waysthat Afghan livelihoods are (and are not)dependent on smallholder production.

Apart from links to the urbaneconomy, the major factor inrural labour markets is opium.As A fghan i s tan ’ s ma incommercial agricultural crop,opium is grown on just onepercent of arable land, or lessthan three percent of theirrigated land area.75 It is acrop that absorbs over eighttimes the labour input per unitof land as wheat.76 Thissuggests that the link betweenagriculture and livelihoods isnot a matter of how farmersdecide to use their land, butrather how rural people, landedand landless, use their labour. Nonetheless,there is still a tendency to focus on the farmas the unit for analysis of the rural economy,which distracts attention from how ruralhouseholds relate to the agricultural economybeyond the farm — if these rural dwellersare even farmers at all.77

Internationally, there is a growing shift inrural development thinking away from whathas been called the “yeoman farmer fallacy,”a belief that virtually all rural people strive(and should strive) to alleviate their poverty

through increased or more effectiveinvestment in their own household farms.Instead, there is a realisation that a growingmajority of the rural poor earn most of theirincome outside of the homestead farm, andthat in the coming years most of the pooresthalf of the rural population will be effectivelylandless.78 Ellis and Biggs write: “If a newparadigm of rural development is to emerge,it will be one in which agriculture takes itsplace along with a host of other actual and

potential rural and non-rural activities thatare important to the construction of viablerural livelihoods, without undue preferencegiven to farming as the unique solution torural poverty.”79 Agriculture may still be animportant engine of development, but thepoor will primarily benefit (if they benefitat all) through (a) non-farm jobs as profitsfrom agriculture are reinvested in otherbusinesses, (b) by working on large farms or(c) access to cheaper foodstuffs. Optimistsexpect that non-farm rural employment will

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create multiplier effects through “a chain ofincreased demand and incomes that cascadethrough the hands of poor people.”80 Othersare less sanguine, noting that thesealternatives to farming represent desperateefforts to survive that rarely provide escapesfrom poverty.81 Subsistence production willremain an important coping strategy,especially in isolated areas that are poorlyintegrated into international markets, butwill represent a shrinking relative proportionof household assets and investment.

Despite these realisations in the developmentfield, the yeoman farmer fallacy continuesto permeate much agricultural rehabilitationpolicy and programming.82 Food securityinterventions are particularly prone to animplicit reliance on this fallacy, as cerealproduction is (often falsely) assumed to havea direct impact on consumption amongvulnerable people. Conventional seeds andtool distributions, for example, implicitlyassume that agricultural rehabilitation fordisaster-affected rural populations issynonymous with helping small, own-accountfarmers to re-establish their family farms.Whilst these yeoman farmers are oftencertainly a major target group, they are notthe only — or necessarily the most vulnerable— group of rural people reliant on agriculturalproduction. A livelihoods approach toagricultural rehabilitation requirestranscending the yeoman farmer fallacy andaddressing the complexity of how rural people“hustle” to survive.

Off- and non-farm labour

One of the narratives that underpins theyeoman farmer fallacy in chronic conflict andpost-conflict contexts is the assumption that

80 World Bank, Sustainable Development, op cit.81 Bryceson, D. “Rural Africa at the crossroads: Livelihood practices and policies.” In Natural Resource Perspectives 52. London:

Overseas Development Institute. 2000.82 Christoplos, I., Longley, C. and Slaymaker, T. The Changing Roles of Agricultural Rehabilitation: Linking Relief, Development

and Support to Rural Livelihoods. Unpublished paper. 2004.83 Asian Development Bank. Natural Resources and Agriculture Sector Medium Term Development Framework Multi-Donor

Phase II Mission. April 2002.

conflict reverses “normal” developmenttrends by wreaking havoc on markets, andpushes people away from labour markets andback towards subsistence. There is no signof this in Afghanistan. Labour markets in thecities and in poppy production are ofincreasing importance. The conflict hasprobably resulted in an increased shift toreliance on wage labour as farmers struggleto obtain cash to pay off debts and regainaccess to land that has been mortgaged tocreditors. It has been estimated that 65percent of farming families depend heavilyon off-farm income.83

After the fall of the Taliban, many observersfeared that labour markets would be swampedby the massive return of refugees andinternally displaced persons (IDPs). Thesefears have proven unwarranted. The opiumand construction booms, as well as the revivalof cash crops and rapid expansion ofinfrastructure rehabilitation, have all providedemployment opportunities. In more isolatedareas the benefits have primarily occurredthrough opportunities for migrants, while inothers there has been a rapid inflation ofwages.

The opium economy is not the only reasonthat the demand for farm labour has remainedstrong. Agricultural mechanisation declinedduring the conflict due to destruction ofassets, shortage of capital and the high riskof capital investment due to theft. Anecdotalevidence indicates that investment in tractorsis now increasing rapidly. This may only bepartly due to improved security. Labourshortages and lack of oxen are other majorfactors.

During the height of the drought, the urbanservice sector provided a vital source of



income for those affected.84 Surveys shortlyafter the fall of the Taliban suggested thatlabour markets were weakening, and withthat purchasing power.85 More recently, it isclear that the picture is more positive, withstrong demand and rising wages in manyurban and peri-urban areas (Figure 2).86 Inthe past, migration to neighbouring countrieswas a much preferred option due to higherwages, but there are initial indications thatthe cities in Afghanistan are becoming a moreattractive option due to the lowertransportation costs and ability to returnhome more regularly.87 The popularconception of urban labour as being arelatively risky and perilous survival strategycan be disputed. Terms of trade betweenwages and wheat in Kabul have beenremarkably constant over the years,88

suggesting that, compared with Afghanistan’sother high-risk survival strategies, urban wagelabour is a relatively secure livelihood option,as evidenced in Figure 2.

There are great geographic and seasonalvariations in the interplay between agricultureand rural labour markets. In isolated areaswith very small land holdings, there is arelatively small market for labour. In moreaccessible areas, such as near Herat, labourmarkets have long been reported to bestrong89 and local officials have beenconcerned that IDP camps could actually actas a (subsidised) magnet for seasonal labourmigrants, providing free food and shelter andthereby distorting normal migrationpatterns.90 Near Kabul, there are manyreports of unmet demand for labour in peri-urban agriculture, particularly at harvesttime. The demand for semi-skilled labour forthe opium harvest is assumed to be thegreatest factor in rural labour markets, withreports of wages as high as US$15 per dayfor skilled harvesters. Wheat farmers inBadakhshan have complained of increasinglabour costs due to the expansion of poppyproduction.91 Farmers in Kunduz express

84 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.85 Lautze, et al., op cit.86 Maletta, H. Women at Work: Gender, wages and employment in rural Afghanistan 2002-2003. Discussion Paper. Kabul: Food

and Agriculture Organisation/Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry. 2003; Maletta, H. Wages of War, Wages of Peace:Food Prices and Unskilled Labour Pay in Afghanistan 1996-2002. Kabul: Afghanistan Food Security Monitoring Programme.2002.

87 Kerr-Wilson, A. and Pain, A. Three Villages in Alingar, Laghman: Understanding Rural Livelihoods. Kabul: AfghanistanResearch and Evaluation Unit. November 2003.

88 Maletta, 2002, op cit.89 Allen, M. Feasibility Studies on the Social and Economic Aspects of Agricultural Production. Kabul: Danish Committee for

Aid to Afghan Refugees. 1999.90 Christoplos, I. Evaluation Report: The Humanitarian Accountability Project’s Second Trial in Afghanistan, May-July 2002.

2002.91 Molla, op cit.

Source: Maletta, Winters of Discontent, 2003

Figure 2: Daily wages of urban unskilled labour, 2002-2003 (in US$ per day)

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92 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.93 Maletta, Women at Work, op cit.94 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.95 Kreutzmann, op cit.96 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.97 Pain and Goodhand, op cit. de Weijer, F. Pastoralist Vulnerability Study. Kabul: AFSU/VAM Unit of the World Food Programme.

2002.98 Ibid.

similar concerns. There are some anecdotalreports that it is becoming difficult to findsharecroppers in the main poppy growingareas, since the profits from daily wage labourare perceived to be more reliable. Veryremote areas with little demand for wagelabour have not experienced such inflationarypressures. In Hazarajat, for example, agenciesinvolved in contracting labour forinfrastructure rehabilitation report someinter-agency competition due to wagedifferentials, but no pressure on wages fromalternative agricultural wage labour.

Gender is also a central factor in labourmarkets, though not always in the ways thatare commonly assumed. Empirical researchis showing that there is great diversity inwomen’s access to income-generatingopportunities across different ethnic groups,wealth status and other variables.92 Womengain a large proportion of their income fromnon-agricultural activities, though very poorwomen depend to a large degree onagriculture.93 It is unclear whether womenwould benefit more from subsistenceproduction or from enhanced opportunitiesfor paid employment in processing. Somewomen, widows in particular, who own landbut lack the capacity for heavy agriculturaltasks, arrange to have sharecroppers farmtheir land while they seek alternativeemployment. Women are very much involvedin processing activities, such as cleaning andpreparing seed and fruit. Increased investmentin seed enterprises and food processing will(if successful) impact greatly on the demandfor these tasks. It is unclear if this will reduceemployment opportunities or give women agreater opportunity to engage in potentiallymore profitable or otherwise more valuedactivities. This would seem to be an importantissue to monitor in the future.

The potential of indirectly supporting thelivelihoods of the poor by helping wealthierfarmers to invest in expanding cash cropproduction and thereby create labouropportunities is an area that deserves furtherattention.94 The MAAH stresses the need forpromoting labour intensive productionmethods, but it is unclear which crops andproduction methods are expected to resultin more jobs, especially given the currentwage inflation. If labour opportunities withinthe wider commercialisation of agriculturewere to be promoted, a seemingly obviousstrategy would be to look at where incentivesmay lie for encouraging the reinvestment ofopium profits (by far the largest source ofwealth currently being accumulated in ruralAfghanistan) into other areas of agriculturalproduction, processing and other businesses.

Expanded agricultural production will leadto expanded trade, which in itself is a majorsource of employment. Especially in manyborder areas, porterage and petty trade —both often connected to smuggling — havelong provided important, though high risk,labour opportunities.95 The Kuchis inparticular have traditionally been involvedin trans-border trading and transport,96 aswell as domestic trade.97 Pastoralism hastraditionally been combined with other waysof benefiting from mobility, with transhumantlivestock production being only onecomponent of Kuchi livelihoods. The relativeimportance of pastoralism itself has variedconsiderably due to both crises andopportunities.98

Migration

Studies of Afghan political, social and culturalstructures inevitably stress the gulf betweenrural and urban areas, especially between



rural areas and Kabul. This “mud curtain” isgenerally described as being at the core ofvirtually all conflict over the past century.Without disputing the validity of thesetheories for illustrating the tensions in Afghansociety, analysis of livelihoods draws attentionto relations that bridge this dichotomy. Thechoice of the majority of returning refugeesto settle in urban areas indicates a responseto several factors:

• Push and pull of urbanisation;• Loss of assets that make rural livelihoods

unviable;• Preference for continued urban lifestyles

by returning refugees; and• Shortage of off-farm employment in

isolated rural areas that rules out agradual re-accumulation of assets throughrural livelihoods alone.

An overall understanding of labour marketsindicates that, both in terms of securinglivelihoods and stimulating economic growth,labour force mobility is in many respects ahighly positive factor. This runs counter tothe views and stated objective of many NGOsin “helping people to stay in their villages.”With the exception of pastoralism, migrationis seen by many agencies and someresearchers99 as a symptom of failedlivelihoods, not as a solution to inherentlyweak local subsistence and market economies.The assumption that migration is inevitablyand inherently bad underpins fixedprogramming that takes farming to be thenorm and consequently distorts programmepriorities.100

It is not clear how rural Afghans perceivetheir choice of whether or not to migrate.Some observers see the decision to migrate

99 Lautze, et al., op cit.100 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.

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as usually being an act of total desperation,which should not be portrayed as a choice.Others point to the clear preference of manyreturning refugees for urban resettlement asevidence that rural livelihoods are perceivedas being less desirable.101

It is very difficult to get an overview of theextent to which migrant remittances havesupported different rural livelihood strategies.Estimates of the scale and use of remittancesvary enormously. They are said to accountfor up to US$1 billion annually.102 There isno reliable data on the use of these assets,but they appear to be primarily used forsubsistence. Returning refugees are alsousually reported to use their savings forconsumption during their period of

reintegration and only rarely for directinvestment in production.

Even among those agencies and observerswho recognise the importance of migrationfor rural livelihoods, there are few plansdeveloped by which to support these efforts.There are some mentions of the need forskills training for migration,103 and othersuggestions of investment in post andte lecommunicat ions to fac i l i ta teremittance.104 Others have pointed out thatthe informal mechanisms, such as Hawala,actually support migration quite well, andthat encouraging formalisation in order toprevent uncontrolled international financialtransfers (as was done in Somalia) couldseverely damage this important livelihoodstrategy.105

101 Jamal, A., and Stigter, E. “Real-time evaluation of UNHCR’s response to the Afghanistan Emergency.” Bulletin 3. 31 May2002.

102 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.103 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.104 Semple, op cit.105 Maimbo, op cit.



The previous chapter highlighted thestrategies employed by rural Afghans increating their livelihoods. This chapter lookscloser at how programming relates tolivelihoods, particularly how issues of risk,diversification and transaction costs havebeen addressed. These factors are particularlyimportant to analyse in order to enhance theimpact of agricultural programming on thedecisions made by farmers and rural peoplein general.

Impact assessment: fallen by thewayside?

There is surprisingly little concerted effortto assess the impact of programminginterventions on the relationship betweenagriculture and livelihoods.106 This can bestbe attributed to pressures in the aid systemto demonstrate “efficiency” in movingresources to beneficiaries, rather than lookingat the outcome of these resource transfers.Agencies continue to do what they seethemselves as being good at, in most casesseed distribution. Other entry points intorural livelihood support are far hazier andare therefore seen as more difficult to fund,staff, organise and implement, even if theprospects for impact may be greater.Analytical rigour in assessing impact appearsto conflict with procedures for expeditiousimplementation of projects intended toachieve quick impacts. Infrastructure isconstructed and rehabilitated without lookingat by whom, how or even if the roads andcanals are subsequently used. Demonstrationfarms are established, without significant

4. The Relevance of Agricultural Programming to4. Livelihoods

efforts to ensure that farmers visit and learnfrom them, or to see if the technologies beingpromoted have actually been adopted.Thousands of revolving funds are created,with virtually no ex post evaluation of whetherthey have actually revolved. This failure tolearn encompasses seemingly obvious directimpacts on production and consumption, aswell as equally important indirect impactson labour markets. Some agencies arebeginning to recognise this gap107 and a fewdetailed surveys are being conducted of theimpact of aid,108 but pipeline pressures andthe general rut of just implementing projectsact as continuing disincentives to closeranalysis. Assessment of impact almostinevitably raises questions that demandprogramme modifications, which in turn maydelay disbursement and disrupt longestablished procedures.

A major reason for the lack of analysis of theimpact on livelihoods is the prevailing implicitassumption that production increase has adirect and positive impact on well-being.109

Internationally, studies of livelihoods haveshown that this is not necessarily true,particularly where local, entrenched powerstructures have traditionally found ways ofgaining control of surpluses. Entitlements,rather than production, govern relative well-being.110 Studies of opium production haveshown that many poppy producers are notobtaining signif icant profits ( i.e.,entitlements) from this ostensibly lucrativecrop,111 but there has been no similar analysisof the link between production andentitlements in other types of farming.

106 See Pain, 2002, op cit.107 Reddick, M. Evaluation of Oxfam Hazarajat Integrated Rural Development Programme, Final Report, July-August 2003.

2003; Solidarites, 2003, op cit.108 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). “Results of the Evaluation of the Autumn 2002 FAO Emergency

Agricultural Inputs Distribution Programme.” FAO Activities Update in Afghanistan No. 4. December 2002.109 Pain, 2002, op cit.110 Sen, A. Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred Knopf. 1999; Sen, A. Poverty and Famines. Delhi: Oxford University

Press. 1981.111 Mansfield, 2002, op cit.

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112 Alden Wily, op cit.113 See, for example, Reddick, op cit.114 Alden Wily, op cit.; Mansfield, 2002, op cit.115 Alden Wily, op cit.116 Suttie, J.M. Range, Grazing Management and Fodder on Pilot Areas in Laghman, Ghazni and Herat Provinces: Report of a

Consultancy Mission, April-May 1998. Peshawar: Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees. 1998.117 Alden Wily, op cit.118 Favre, R. Grazing Land Encroachment Joint Helicopter Mission to Dasht-e-Laili, 25-27 March 2003. Kabul: Food and Agriculture

Organisation. 2003.

In a period where rehabilitation is in focus,a key question related to impact on chosentarget groups is that of who controls theinfrastructure that is being rehabilitated,especially irrigation. An understanding of theimpact on downstream areas of increasedupstream irrigation off-take and use ofagrochemicals is essential to mitigatingpotential negative impacts, but the narrowproject/community focus of most aidinterventions discourages such analysis. Accessto irrigation water is in many cases dependenton ties to local political or military leaders.

There are also instances where national-levelpoliticians and commanders have gainedcontrol over such infrastructure. The capacityof aid agencies to investigate prevailing powerstructures is usually weak. Even if they areaware of how these structures affect accessto water resources, they may have littlecapacity to pressure for equitable distributionof benefits at the community level or to enterinto the multifarious realm of social andpolitical processes by which access toresources is negotiated.

Box 4: Land tenure

Landlessness is of course a critical factor in the link between agriculture and livelihoods, but is virtuallyinvisible in most plans and reports. One study of Bamyan estimates that over half of the rural populationare landless or near landless,112 but the implications of this factor are very rarely taken into account inthe many programmes in the area. An important starting point in assessing impact is to see how programmingdecisions are informed by issues related to land tenure, as this is one of the most important determinantsof who benefits from agricultural interventions and how. If the objective of seed distributions, for example,is to promote use of improved technology, it is essential to first determine who chooses the technologiesto be used on a given plot of land, be it the land owner, sharecropper or labourer. It is equally importantto take into account who will benefit from eventual increased production and who bears the risks if the newtechnology fails. Most agencies promoting technology transfer have not analysed these factors.113 In general,land owners make most decisions, retain most of the profits and bear part of the risk.114 There are someexceptions to these arrangements. Household vegetable production is not shared with the landlord and assuch is a form of programming that may even benefit the landless.

The long-term strengthening of agriculturally based livelihoods is reliant on a readiness to invest in long-term land husbandry, for which land tenure is a major determinant factor. Little analysis has been done inAfghanistan regarding how decisions are made, whether to invest in environmental protection and enhancesoil fertility among landlords, tenants or sharecroppers respectively. Agency staff rely heavily on their pre-existing beliefs about this issue, rather than on empirical analysis. Evidence suggests that tenants andsharecroppers move frequently,115 which would make it unlikely that they would be interested in productionsystems that protect or improve soils. Terracing, for example, has not proven popular and could only beexpected to be of interest among those who farm their own land.

Range management aspects of land tenure have particularly strong direct impact on both conflicts andenvironmental sustainability.116 Vast tracts of land in Afghanistan are sometimes used for extensive grazingand sometimes for rain-fed cropping when rains are sufficient.117 These lands are also often used forcollection of trees, shrubs and grasses for household fuel. Tensions are great between these different formsof resource use (and resource users). Environmental destruction due to ploughing appears to be rapidlyincreasing in some areas due to improved rains and efforts to gain control of these lands by demonstratingthat the land is under cultivation.118 Issues such as these cannot be addressed through short-term projects.



Dealing with programming labels

The difference between humanitarian anddevelopment programming in Afghanistan is,in the eyes of most of those working in theagriculture sector, a matter of donor fundingmodalities and priorities, rather than thenature of beneficiary needs or operationalcontexts. One NGO representative commentedon the frustrations of being offered long-term “development” funding in a southernprovince where insecurity made developmentapproaches impossible, while the same donorwas only willing to provide short-termemergency assistance to a very peacefulprovince in the north, since it was a lowerpriority. The difference between these twotypes of programmes is not necessarily relatedto the terms of payment upon which inputsare provided, either. Most observers believethat agricultural production will need toreceive a significant level of subsidies forthe foreseeable future if vulnerable farmersare to be able to survive and rebuild theirassets. The choice of whether or not to labelsuch subsidies as humanitarian has more todo with which label best ensures access tofunding windows, rather than with the natureof support given. Perhaps for this reason, theterm “emergency” is more commonly usedthan humanitarian to refer to programmesthat are funded withshort-term sources.

Some emergencyp r o g r a m m i n gtherefore consists ofprojects that theimplementing agencywould like to use for development purposes,but where short-term funding is used sinceit is the only resource available. Otheremergency programmes do not claim to havegrand, developmental objectives, but areinstead primarily intended just to “capturethe next harvest,” to use the FAO

119 There are also many emergency interventions that have significant indirect intended impacts on agriculture, most notablyinfrastructure and food aid.

terminology. The majority of these effortsthat are directly focused on agriculturalproduction119 consist of seed and fertiliserdistributions. This latter type of emergencyprogramming is a contentious topic for manyimplementing NGOs. Some common criticismsare:

• Emergency programming is seen to betoo big and too rushed, leading to lowagency expectations regarding impactand a feeling that “we have to do it, butreally would prefer to go back todevelopment activities.”

• It is now readily acknowledged that seedsare available and that emergencymodalities of heavily subsidiseddistributions may have unnecessarilydisrupted developmental modalitiesdesigned to gradually establish afinancially sustainable seed industry.

• Given time and quantity pressures,agencies have little capacity to ensurethat emergency agricultural programmingreally reaches the poor and vulnerable.Some openly acknowledge that their owntargeting “is a joke.”

• There are many examples of how intra-agency agreements regarding costrecovery, beneficiary selection or wagerates have been ignored when one agency

or another eitherfai led to act inaccordance withagreed procedures,when a donor placedundue pressure todistribute a certaincommodity (e.g.,

imported seed) or a new agency appearedin a district to conduct a “hit and run”distribution.

NGOs have many stories about the poor qualityof emergency programming among their“competitors” and some even engage in self-

Most observers believe that agriculturalproduction will need to receive a significantlevel of subsidies for the foreseeable futureif vulnerable farmers are to be able tosurvive and rebuild their assets.

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criticism. There is a general sense that therealpolitik of the aid system in the past fewyears has forced many into scaling up beyonda level in which quality could be assured.Confusing signals have been given tobeneficiaries about what services could besubsidised. There is a clear sense of reliefamong many agencies that were under suchpressure that emergency funds are nowbecoming scarce and that there is anopportunity to again return to developmentmodalities. Some agencies have noted thatchanges in the terms and modalities ofcooperation between emergency anddevelopment rules have required significantinvestment in communications with villages.These changes have not been seen by thebeneficiaries/clients of these services (oreven many agency staff) as being related tothe changing levels of livelihood stress thatthey have experienced.

Despite these critiques, a shift fromemergency to developmental modalities hasbeen constrained by organisational culture(in addition to funding modalities). Thechronic crises of the past quarter centuryhave resulted in the presence of a largenumber of agencies that are accustomed tohumanitarian modalities and with staff thattake “supply-side,” distribution-focusedprogramming for granted. There are verystrong feelings of solidarity with thecommunities in which they work. Thereplacement of humanitarian staff with moredevelopment-oriented personnel is resistedby many long-term expatriates who arededicated to the country. This legacy is beingchallenged by new interagency competition,in particular through tendering and sub-contracting procedures that create internalpressures for a change of the guard withinthose agencies hoping to continue to workin Afghanistan with post-emergencyprogramming.

There are three general categories ofdevelopmental programming in theagricultural sector, all of which relate to the

creation and strengthening of agriculturalservices:

• Community development;• Technology transfer; and• Market promotion.

Most agricultural staff in Afghanistan havean agronomic background, with little capacityor inclination for analysing how agriculturalservices could be made sustainable throughthese three modalities. Some initiatives visiblyrun the danger of displacing or discouragingprivate sector investment. Food aid isfrequently criticised for competing with localmarkets, but there are also major threatsfrom heavily subsidised rehabilitation anddevelopment interventions as well. Seed andfertiliser distributions, veterinary services,very “soft” credits and other aid interventionsare potentially damaging to the creation ofa market for rural services. Similarly,promotion of agricultural markets suffersfrom weak capacity to understand and designcommercially viable interventions.Prioritisation of crops and marketing channelsare not well anchored in an understandingof what might best contribute to pro-poorgrowth.

The majority of technology transfer effortsare based on the verification, demonstrationand distribution of new seed varieties. Thestrongest justification for seed distributionis to improve what are perceived to begenetically degenerated seed stocks. It iswidely acknowledged (though perhaps not inall applications for funding) that there is no,and has been no, absolute lack of seeds.

Community development efforts might beexpected to provide a basis for integratinginitiatives to develop services, markets andnew technologies. Community development,using participatory and institutionaldevelopment methods, should be a way ofraising attention to how farmers perceivethe qualities and relevance of the varietiesthat are being released by researchinstitutions and/or distributed by NGOs. It



120 Reddick, op cit.121 Duffield, et al., op cit.122 Kampenaar, op cit., 5.123 Lautze, et al., op cit.; Kane, M. and Ehsan Aziz, R. Vulnerable Livelihood Systems in Afghanistan. FAO Study Part II, Herat

and Badahksan. June 2002.124 See, for example, Sloane, op cit.

should be a way for them to assess the marketqualities of new products and should providea platform for developing relations withservice providers. Performance in all of theseareas appears to be poor. Emergencymodalities have meant that “communitydevelopment” primarily refers to integratedprogramming through assembling astandardised and often multisectoralcollection of project components, rather thana forum for exploring where obstacles toimproved livelihoods may be overcome.Community planning processes are frequentlya matter of negotiating over the use ofinvestment budgets or revolving funds withaid agencies, rather than discussing how toenhance livelihood opportunities.

Despite the prevalence of short-term fundinghorizons, exit strategies for developmentprogramming are vague or non-existent. Thisconceptual gap is particularly alarming wherelocal micro-credit, revolving funds and otherstructures are being established that wouldseem to require a certain level of presenceover a significant period of time. Oxfam hasbeen one of the few agencies to take a self-critical stance on its failure to define how itwill leave.120 The UN hopes that transitionalprogramming will increasingly assume someconsistency of vision in defining the end stateof programming across the relief anddevelopment spheres. Some NGOrepresentatives privately express concernsabout the negative effects of bypass structuresand projectisation on efforts to work towardan appropriate end state. Evidence thus farseems to indicate that the bilateralisation ofaid flows121 and the competitive pressuresof the aid market constrain analysis atprovincial and district levels of howprogramming should, or could, contribute tomutual aims and with that, agreement onhand-over and exit strategies.

Narratives of vulnerability

“In practice, humanitarian responses toSCCPIs (situations of chronic conflict andpolitical instability) have been de-linkedfrom actual vulnerabilities and havelargely been driven by available donorresources, preva i l ing po l i t ica lconsiderations and the traditionalorganizing principles of humanitarianresponse agencies. Humanitarian agencieshave yet to reconcile the way they dobusiness with the necessary investmentsof time, the compromises of visibility andthe need for effective livelihoodprogramming that challenge violent ordeeply imbedded processes ofexploitation.”122

Particularly in a chronic/post-conflict milieu,the “vulnerability context” would seem tobe a self-evident cornerstone in howagricultural policies and programming relateto livelihoods. In Afghanistan, the vulnerabilitycontext is an ephemeral factor in agriculturalprogramming and in many cases is absentaltogether. The risks that a given vulnerableperson may face are rarely specified in manyproject documents. The causal assumptionsbehind how a given intervention is expectedto reduce the vulnerability of rural peopleor to mitigate the risks to which they areexposed are rarely explained. Insufficientattention is given to identifying what it isthat vulnerable people are vulnerable to.The risks encountered by a proposed set ofbeneficiaries, designated as vulnerablegroups, tend to be left vague. For example,although ample research emphasises thecentral role that indebtedness plays inincreasing vulnerability,123 some major foodsecurity documents fail to mention debt asa factor in assessing vulnerability.124

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There are reasons for this. When risks suchas chronic conflict, profound indebtednessor insecure land and resource tenure are leftvague, it becomes easier to imagine thatshort-term programming might succeed insolving the problem. Comprehensive risk andvulnerability analyseswould expose thedeep s t ruc tu ra ln a t u r e o f t h echallenges facing thelandless and destitutea n d t h e r e b ydemonstrate thelimits to modestproject interventions. This is not to implythat these interventions are not withoutsignificant benefit to beneficiaries, but ratherthat there is a lack of transparency aboutthe palliative nature of many projects.

In many documents, the term “vulnerability”is followed by the word “groups.” Thelabelling of vulnerable groups is a device tolink data on shortage of assets to selectionof target beneficiaries and choice of itemsto be distributed. The identification ofvulnerable groups thus tends todecontextualise poverty and reconstitute thepoor as beneficiaries rather than peoplestruggling to manage complex livelihoods.The identification of vulnerable groups is anecessary step in the process of planningdistributions, but it provides little basis foridentifying suitable livelihood support toaddress the risks faced by members of thesegroups.

The detachment of the focus on identifyingvulnerable groups from a deeper analysis ofthe nature of vulnerability itself has meantthat community development efforts havefailed to address the complexity of ruralpoverty. The fixed service packages thatdominate emergency and rehabilitationprogramming are an insufficient response to

the needs of many of the intendedbeneficiaries. The diverse topography of manyregions, with different microclimates, unevenmarket access and the varied impact of theconflict on specific villages, has meant thateven neighbouring villages may have very

different vulnerabilityp r o f i l e s 1 2 5 a n dtherefore requiredifferent packages.Standard categoriesof vulnerable groups,such as children orthe disabled, say littleabout what is either

possible or desired by these groups. Thetendency to classify all women as vulnerableglosses over the extraordinary diversity inwhat agricultural activities women areallowed to perform in even a small geographicarea.126

Risk

The conceptual gap between pressures todisburse aid to identified vulnerablebeneficiaries and the need to reduce risk inorder to obtain sustainable impact isparticularly notable with regard to agriculture,since farmer decision-making is alwaysdirectly related to perceptions of risk. Afarmer’s decisions whether or not to try anew seed variety, increase investment infertiliser, travel with one’s herds of sheepto a distant pasture or merely remain in anIDP camp are all directly related to how riskis perceived, and the options at hand withwhich that risk can be mitigated. The majorhazards that face rural people pursuingagriculturally based livelihoods include:

• Climatic variability;• Livestock disease and pest infestation

(especially locusts);• Recurrent conflict;• Uncertain resource tenure;

The identification of vulnerable groups isa necessary step in the process of planningdistributions, but it provides little basis foridentifying suitable livelihood support toaddress the risks faced by members ofthese groups.

125 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.; Alden Wily, op cit.126 Kerr-Wilson and Pain, op cit.



• Predatory institutions;• Unreliable public, private and civil society

provided services; and• Uncertainty, shortage of information and

weak understanding of regional andinternational market trends.

In the international discourse, it is frequentlyassumed that high levels of risk, from droughtor conflict, drives farmers back to subsistenceand other low-risk strategies. In Afghanistannothing could be further from the truth.Farmers in Afghanistan are not risk averse.

Perhaps driven by the desperation of massivedebts, they are plunging into opiumproduction, potatoes and other cash crops.Poppy production has spread from 18provinces in 1999 to 28 in 2003, including 31districts where it was never grown before.130

Uncertainties regarding wheat prices pushfarmers away from cereal production, as theystrive to obtain cash to pay off debtsaccumulated during the drought. Survivalstrategies are risky and market-led, for betteror for worse.

127 FAO, 2003, op cit.128 FAO sees this perception issue as cause for concern. In-kind reimbursement schemes, for example, are preferred to cash

reimbursements, as the latter give the impression of subsidised sales. It is unclear, however, how farmers perceive theintended messages and how these affect their expectations regarding the long-term role of the state and aid communityin providing subsidised inputs.

129 It is feared that farmers will return low quality seed to such banks, resulting in decline in seed quality. Existing, traditionalseed exchange systems are seen to be more effective.

130 UNODC/GoA, op cit.

Box 5: Vulnerability and seed programming

Critics of seed programming in Afghanistan complain that targeting “is a joke.” They question the commitment,the capacity and the conceptual frameworks that are needed in order to reach so-called vulnerable groups.Despite a major survey conducted by FAO, there is little information available about which households withina given community receive seeds, who actually benefits from eventual production increases and who is ableto actively participate in the different rotating funds that are said to be established with resources generatedby seed distributions.

Despite a variety of guidelines, there is clearly no consensus or joint understanding regarding if or howdifferent seed distribution modalities should or could be used to target specific beneficiaries in differentways. Despite formal agreement on “Guiding Principles Governing the Production, Distribution and Importof Seed and Planting Material of Field Crops in Afghanistan,”127 field staff are largely unaware of theseguidelines and develop modalities based on their own distribution targets, agency objectives and localinterpretations of FAO’s regulatory framework. Little or no effort is made to assess how beneficiariesthemselves interpret the array of seed banks, in-kind repayment, cash payment and soft credits that areused in these schemes.128 Villagers are visibly confused by vague plans for seed banks and in-kind repaymentschemes that will be commercialised and used for infrastructure investments. NGO staff are also visiblyconfused. FAO seed distribution guidelines specifically rule out the establishment of seed banks,129 butsome NGO schemes clearly seem to consist of seed bank-like mechanisms.

The guiding principles prohibit free distributions, but many suspect that the actual levels of repayment forseeds distributed is low. Some agencies present elaborate procedures for collecting seed back from farmersafter harvest. Others acknowledge that this rarely actually happens. It is not clear who (if anyone) is legallyresponsible for ensuring that loans are repaid.

The link between seed distributions and land ownership is central to any expectation that seed can supportvulnerable groups. It is unclear whether or not free seed enables sharecroppers to negotiate better agreementswith landlords. It is doubtful that it does, given that with cereal seed only accounts for 6-12 percent of inputcosts. Most informants question whether sharecroppers are able to negotiate better terms and assume thattheir benefits will only come from increased production due to higher quality seeds.

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131 Asian Development Bank, op cit.132 FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Agricultural Sector, op cit.

Progress is being made in some areas inbringing natural disaster risk into the policyarena. Given recent experience, drought isthe most glaring natural hazard in Afghanistan,but local flooding is also common, as aresand storms and other hazards. Earthquakesmay have a major indirect impact onagriculture, since they affect migrationpatterns. After the earthquake in Bam, Iran,a large number of Afghan refugees returnedfrom Iran.

The need to address predictable seasonalstress through social protection, rather thanhumanitarian mechanisms, has also beenrecognised. According to one UNrepresentative, “The government doesn’twant to focus on winter as an emergency

every year.” Suggestions have been put forththat meteorological information, snow surveysin particular, could help farmers predict howmuch irrigation water will be available,thereby reducing their risk by helping themto make informed decisions regarding varietiesand use of irrigation.131

There is, however, very little research doneon the effects of floods, frost and othernatural hazards on agriculture. One recentreview of horticultural research notes themajor impact of drought on research stationproduction, but treats this hazard as anobstacle for (rather than an important topicof) research.132 Even where informationabout levels of risk to agriculture is widelyavailable, such as the likelihood of major

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locust attacks, it has been very difficult tosecure resources for establishing a standingresponse capacity, resulting in the need tochase emergency funding at the last minutewhen significant damage is already inevitable.

It is particularly notable that in agency plansand in discussions with officials and agencystaff there is very little mention of conflictand insecurity as constituting major risks foragriculture. For example, when asked ifrecipients of seed aid could be allowed todelay or write off repayments, agriculturalofficers from some NGOs replied that thiswas possible only in the event of illness ornatural disaster. The dangers of theft oflivestock and machinery are also rarely raisedin discussions of development potentials.This tendency to downplay the risk of conflictmay reflect a combination of factors:

• The view that drought was the main causeof the rural emergency in recent years;

• A fear of reprisals if plans and reportingopenly describe who is responsible forviolence and human rights abuses;

• A concern that donors might withdrawsupport if the uncertainties around actualrisk were openly acknowledged, and thattransparency could make financingimpossible;

• A sense of powerlessness with regard tominimising risk, which leads to fatalismabout the potential effects of conflictand a feeling that too much reflectionwould merely paralyse recovery efforts;and

• A realisation that the dynamics drivinglocal, regional and international conflictare too complex to integrate into agencyprocedures and planning structures.

This last point deserves particular attention.The links between conflict and ruraldevelopment are complex and not as self-evident as might be expected. The link

between opium production and conflict isone example. It is undoubtedly true that thedrug economy fuels the conflict, but thechannels and inter-relations betweennarcotics and war are not linear. In 2003, forexample, narcotics production declined by49 percent in Helmand and 23 percent inKandahar, where conflict was increasing. Itincreased by 55 percent in the peacefulprovince of Badakhshan.133

The interplay between natural hazards andchronic conflict is a topic of notable relevancefor Afghanistan given the high levels of riskfrom both. In November 2003, a workshopon the challenge of addressing naturaldisasters amid complex political emergenciesdrew on experience from Afghanistan tohighlight ways in which agencies are dealingwith these combined sets of risks.134

Diversification

Diversification has traditionally been seen tobe one of the most effective risk reductionstrategies for farmers throughout the world.In some cases diversification has proveneffective in coping with chronic vulnerabilityby spreading risk. These strategies do notusually lead to escapes from poverty, butrather a reduced risk of falling into greaterdestitution. For others, often those who aresomewhat wealthier, diversification hasproven effective as a strategy for growth.This latter type of diversification has less todo with risk reduction and usually involvesengaging in uncertain or unproven strategiesthat may increase risk.

Diversification includes not only employinga variety of livelihood options within thehousehold through migration, wage labourand planting different crops, but alsodiversification within the community. Forexample, the success of Kuchis has been

133 UNODC/GoA, op cit.134 Johnson, 2003, op cit.

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related to the resilience of their communities.De Weijer writes:

“Those [Kuchis] with a more opportunisticand diversified economy are less likelyto be affected by shocks occurring totheir system. But even on a higher level,these individuals that own businesses oragricultural land are better placed toprovide labour opportunities to destituteKuchis in times of stress. Therefore, acommunity that has a high level ofintegration into businesses or agriculturewill have a higher community copingcapacity.”135

Diversification is being promoted in a numberof programmes in Afghanistan, primarily for

increased income. The potential of bettersupporting diversification specifically as away of reducing risk is a topic that wouldseem to deserve further analysis.

The primary diversification strategy by whichAfghan households have attempted to reducerisk is undoubtedly migration. When conflict,drought or other hazards affect their homes,the most effective means of mitigating theserisks is more often than not for all or part ofthe family to leave. Despite the squalor inwhich many refugees, IDPs and urban migrantslive, for them, migration works. During acutecrises, humanitarian assistance has protecteda modicum of dignity for refugees and someIDPs. Urban services are essential for

135 de Weijer, op cit., 9.136 Hultgren, M. Review of Social Safety Nets in the Context of Emergencies and Opportunities for FAO Intervention. 2003.137 Farrington, J., Slater, R. and Holmes, R. Synergies between Livelihood Protection and Promotion: The Agricultural Case.

London: Overseas Development Institute. 2003.138 Devereux, S. Social Protection for the Poor: Lessons from Recent International Experience. IDS Working Paper No. 142.

Sussex: Institute for Development Studies. 2002.139 Ibid.

Box 6: From humanitarian assistance to social protection: an agenda for agriculture?

A significant proportion of the Afghan population faces a structural deficit of assets by which to meet basiclivelihood needs. If the Afghan state is to re-shoulder the responsibility for the basic survival of its citizensthat the international community has borne over the past few decades, an institutionally sustainable safetynet is needed. If it fails to do so, its social contract with its citizens will be profoundly flawed.

Social protection can take on many forms, including employment programmes, pension schemes, insuranceand subsidies on agricultural inputs.136 Reducing risk through social protection and enhancing agriculturalinvestment are inter-dependent and present opportunities for synergy.137 At the same time, there is adanger that social protection may “crowd out” informal social insurance mechanisms,138 an issue thatshould be of particular concern in Afghanistan, where informal mechanisms have proven to be extraordinarilyresilient and where the eventual role and capacity of the central government is highly uncertain.

MRRD issued a policy paper in 2002 entitled “From Humanitarian Assistance to Social Protection.” The visionoutlined therein has significant implications for how the government and international community may tryto ensure security within rural livelihoods. Such a shift from humanitarian to more stable modalities involvesfirst a shift of responsibilities from the international community to the government. It will also demand ashift from providing support to loosely defined sets of beneficiaries, consisting of vulnerable groups anddisaster victims to the use of much more refined targeting tools — a major preoccupation in design of socialprotection mechanisms.139 While overall data collection regarding vulnerability is certainly improvingrapidly, the capacity of the government to manage transparent and non-politicised inter-community targetingat the field level remains limited.



improving the lives of those moving to thecities. It is uncertain, however, if there ismuch that the aid community can offer todirectly support migration’s impact on ruralhouseholds. In other countries, post officeshave been found to be an important part ofstrengthening migration’s role in rural socialprotection by providing a reliable way ofreceiving remittances,141 but in Afghanistanit is unlikely that formal remittance supportmechanisms will outperform the Hawalasystem. There may not be aid-financedsolutions that have much to offer tosignificantly enhance how rural peoplethemselves use migration for risk reduction.It may be enough to ensure that programmingis more cognisant of the central importancethat migration plays in livelihood strategiesand why and in so doing avoid inappropriateinvestments in yeoman farmer models thatAfghans realise hold little potential for safeand sustainable livelihoods.

Transaction costs and farmers’priorities

A combination of insecurity, uncertainty,weak formal institutions and destruction ofphysical infrastructure together result inAfghan farmers, traders and even aid agenciesexperiencing extraordinarily high transactioncosts. Indeed, it was largely the publicfrustration and anger over the unacceptablyhigh transaction costs imposed by localcommanders that caused the Taliban tocoalesce in 1994 and which helped sweepthem to power.142

Smith et al. summarise the transaction coststhat farmers and traders face as consistingof:

• Search costs: the costs of searching outsuppliers or buyers in a particular market(for inputs, outputs or credit).

For example, MRRD is currently planning how to best implement the National Emergency EmploymentProgramme (NEEP), a large-scale social fund that is a centre-piece in the proposed shift from humanitarianassistance to social protection. The primary obstacle to a smooth transition from current food for work,primarily managed by WFP, to NEEP lies in the vast differences in human and logistical resources availablefor these ostensibly similar modalities. WFP is undoubtedly the best equipped agency in Afghanistan in termsof ability to make things happen in the rural areas. The well intentioned desire to ensure that MRRD’s NEEPmanagement structures remain lean and sustainable has meant that they possess only a tiny fraction of theresources of WFP for designing, targeting, managing and monitoring NEEP activities in the field. There isreason to fear that the quality deficiencies already apparent in many food for work efforts are likely to befar more severe in NEEP. The expectation is that NEEP will address these capacity gaps through contractingprivate sector providers,140 but the capacity of the government to act as a smart buyer of such serviceshas been questioned. The appointment of external oversight agents should support but not absolve thegovernment of this responsibility.

While there is no doubt about the desirability of ensuring that social protection structures contribute toagricultural development, weaknesses remain in finding strategies to develop the institutional capacitiesthat would be required to bridge the two. Lack of capacity to assess viability has meant that income generationhas been largely left out of the first phase of the NSP. Discussion of agriculture’s role in social protection,and with that the possible transition of agricultural rehabilitation programming into social protectionsmodalities, has not occurred, since these issues have been the domain of MRRD and not MAAH.

140 MRRD, op cit.141 Farrington, J., Saxena, N.C., Barton, T. and Nayak, R. “Post Offices, Pensions and Computers: New Options for Combining

Growth and Social Protection in Weakly Integrated Areas.” Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Natural ResourcesPerspectives No. 87. June 2003.

142 Pain and Goodhand, op cit.

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• Screening costs: the costs of establishingthe reliability and trustworthiness ofpotential parties to a transaction —particularly the credit worthiness ofborrowers.

• Negotiation costs: the costs of bargainingwith trading partners, or officialsregulating trade.

• Measuring costs: the costs of measuringthe attributes — such as quality andquantity — of goods or services beingbought or exchanged.

• Transfer costs: including transport,processing, packaging and securing title.

• Monitoring costs: the costs of monitoringwhether the terms and conditions agreedare fulfilled.

• Enforcement costs: the costs of enforcingagreements, of seeking compensationwhen an agreement is broken or the costsincurred when a contract is broken.143

Farmers ultimately bear the brunt of thesecosts, either through higher prices, lowerquality of services they receive or by havingto adapt to a virtual absence of some services.Diminished trust due to the legacy of conflict,current insecurity or the capricious natureof aid flows discourages the emergence of asufficient array of service providers to offerfarmers choice. For this reason, market forcesare unlikely to create competitive pressuresto bring down these costs. Weak public sectorinstitutions and the remaining power of localcommanders make attempts to use legalmechanisms to hold service providers toaccount nearly impossible. Afghanistan’smountainous topography, low literacy levelsand lack of communications infrastructurehinder the flow of information that is essentialfor farmers to compare costs and monitorproduction prices. Interviews with farmersshow that they are furious over theinconsistent reliability of inputs that theyreceive from the private sector and NGOs.

In turn, the failure of the private sector toinvest in added value in commodity chainsstems from high transaction costs in doingso. It is important to stress that, with somenotable exceptions, there is usually someform of service available to meet farmers’demands. The problems usually relate totrust, quality, reliability and efficiency.

Input provision is perhaps the most glaringarea of concern for farmers. Fertilisers,pesticides, seeds and veterinary medicinesare widely available in markets. Farmers inisolated areas experience high costs intransporting inputs. Others are primarilyconcerned about the low quality of inputsand their inability to obtain redress whenthey perceive that the inputs they havepurchased were fake. Similar complaints areexpressed about poor quality seed providedby NGOs, particularly the “hit and run”distributions of the emergency phase. Farmerinterest in extension partly derives from aneed for help in choosing appropriate inputsfrom the market, and also a hope that thestate will reassume a role in providingstandardised and subsidised inputs. Thegovernment has presumably never beenstrongly accountable to farmers, but isconsidered the lesser of two evils. Provincialand district agricultural staff recognise theimportance of monitoring and regulatingprivate sector and NGO input provision, butthey have no capacity at all to perform suchtasks.

Finance and credit is a service with hightransaction costs, where aid programming istrying to replace what are perceived asexploitive and inefficient informal sectorservices. Since interest is formally prohibitedin Islam, informal credit is a sensitive topic.The quality of services provided informallyvaries greatly and is intertwined with widerpatron-client relationships. Interest may or

143 Smith, et al., op cit., 404.



may not be charged, with patrons reapingprofits through other aspects of theirrelationships with clients, such as paymentfor crops. Microfinance efforts are expandingrapidly, driven partly by the desire to providean alternative to traditional systems of creditwhereby farmers are locked into poppyproduction in order to access loans. Aidprogramming varies from extremely softcredits from NGOs at farm level (oftendisguised free distributions) to the recentlicensing of First MicroFinance Bank,supported by the Aga Khan Fund for EconomicDevelopment. In the long run, microfinancehas the potential to have significant impact.In the short run, rural Afghanistan is unlikelyto experience a microfinance revolution dueto the high costs of establishing institutionalinfrastructure in the countryside.

Successful service provision structures arecharacterised by integration. Wealthy farmersmay be able to scan the market and choosethe different services that they prefer, anddue to their buying power they may even beable to hold service providers to account.Poorer farmers lack the connections, timeand capital to attract and combine services.They therefore suffer from far higher relativetransaction costs. This is one reason why theyare particularly attracted to informalinterlocked systems of extension, finance,marketing and input provision, such as thatfrequently provided by traders for poppyproduction.

The majority of the aid community still takesa piecemeal approach to service provision,but there are notable exceptions. USAID andsome other agencies are starting to invest in“value chain” or “commodity chain”initiatives, bringing together producers,traders, processors and other service providersinvolved in the development of commercialproducts. By looking at the entire chain

related to a given commodity it is hoped thatbottlenecks that result in prohibitivetransaction costs can be identified andaddressed. One of the first hurdles that mustbe overcome in such an approach is to finda way of creating greater trust among thesedifferent actors. International experiencewith investing in commodity chains has shownconsiderable success in stimulating economicdevelopment, but in many cases has alsohighlighted the inability of poorer farmersto attain the rapidly rising standards ofquality, quantity and timeliness of productionthat commercial markets demand. The actorsin the commodity chain must trust that theirerstwhile colleagues will fulfil theircommitments and they often doubt thecapacity of poor farmers to do so.

Patron-client relations andcontract farming

Poor farmers throughout the world generallyrecognise that their best chance of accessingreliable services is to ally themselves withpatrons who either can provide servicesdirectly or who have the political, economicand social relations to arrange services fromothers. The cost of entering into theserelationships may be high and even exploitive,but a near destitute farmer usually looks firstat what is left for the family to survive on,rather than the cost.144 Various studies havepointed out that access to credit is highlydependent on ties to patrons.145 Even otherservices, such as ploughing,146 are easier toaccess where strong ties to a patron exist.There is a tendency within the aid communityto see sharecropping and other patron-clientrelationships as purely a source ofexploitation, as certainly it is. One studypoints out that “not a single landlord waspraised as being kind, generous or fair, andthe farmers do not expect them to be.”147

144 Scott, J.C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress. 1976.

145 Mansfield, 2001, op cit.; Alden Wily, op cit.146 Allen, op cit.147 Alden Wily, op cit., 67.

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The massive profits that are made throughthe interlocking of services related to opiumproduction are the most glaring example ofhow poor farmers become trapped in cyclesof increasing debt bondage and destitution.

While certainly often extractive, patron-client relationships are currently the mostviable way that many farmers seek to lower(or at least stabilise) their transaction costs.They are the lesser of evils that poor farmersface. In commercially integrated areas wherecompetition does exist for attracting clients,the interlocking of service provision has thepotential of bringing down transaction costs.It is in the interest ofthe patron, forexample, to ensurethat inputs are of highquality and thatfarmgate prices arehigh when profits ared i v i d e d w i t hsharecroppers. Landlords are in many waysmore accountable to their tenants for thequality of seed that they provide than aidagencies whose presence is dependent onshort-term contracts. The competitionbetween (and accountability of) landlordsmay even be growing as increasing wagesmake migrant labour a more attractivelivelihood strategy relative to sharecropping.The revolutionary reforms that wereintroduced during 1978-79 were intended tobreak patron-client ties and replace themwith more modern agricultural services. Theresult was catastrophic. Former institutionalties were disrupted, while new structuresfailed to fill the resulting gap. Given thelimited reach of current agriculturalrehabilitation and development programming,attempts to replace these relationships withgreater independence may not be feasibleor desirable now either. Dependence on anexploitive landlord has clear advantages over

dependence on an NGO with a six-monthcontract or a government with virtually nocapacity to cover its recurrent costs.Replacing an exploitive but functioning socialsystem with one that relies on institutionsnot yet created is a high-risk strategy, andit is rural Afghans that will bear such risks.

This does not necessarily imply that the statusquo should be accepted or reinforced.Opportunities may exist to at least partiallyshift the power balance. Internationally,contract farming is increasingly beingrecognised as a way of reducing risk anduncertainties by establishing a transparent

d iv i s ion o f r i skbetween the farmer,w h o a s s u m e sproduction risks, andthe investor, whoassumes marketingrisks and ensuresaccess to inputs.148

Fully commercial contract farming schemesare very rare in Afghanistan, with an initiativeto restart raisin exports managed by theCentral Asia Development Group being anotable exception.149

FAO has extensive experience in contractfarming in Afghanistan through seedproduction schemes, albeit with significantsubsidies. Learning from this experiencewould seem to hold promise as a channel forincremental reduction of transaction costsand promotion of a modestly more just andtransparent system of patron-client ties.Furthermore, a contract farming system wouldfit well with the commodity approachesmentioned above by providing a channel forprivate investment in extension and otherservices. This will be essential for ensuringthe quality, quantity and timeliness ofagricultural production that will be requiredif Afghanistan is to recapture a significant

148 Baumann, P. Equity and Efficiency in Contract Farming Schemes: The Experience of Agricultural Tree Crops. OverseasDevelopment Institute (ODI) Working Paper 139. London: ODI. 2000; Simmons, P. Overview of Smallholder Contract Farmingin Developing Countries. Food and Agriculture Organisation. 2003.

149 Central Asia Development Group (CADG). Central Asia Development Group: Afghanistan Overview. Singapore: CADG. 2003.

Replacing an exploitive but functioningsocial system with one that relies oninstitutions not yet created is a high-riskstrategy, and it is rural Afghans that willbear such risks.



share of former export markets. It would beimportant, however, to closely assess theprospects for gradually “weaning” anycontract farming system away from subsidisedand guaranteed procurement. FAO’sexperience has shown that such subsidies areeffective in establishing a contractingframework, but efforts have only recentlybegun in moving toward establishment of acommercially viable seed industry. It is notcertain that they will succeed.

It should be stressed that, although contractfarming may reduce transaction costs so thatsome small producers may be able to retaintheir involvement in a future seed industry,most of the very small and undercapitalisedproducers will not manage to compete. Asmentioned above regarding commodity chains,the development of trust and market-basedrelations will probably result in the exclusionof some of the most vulnerable producers.

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While the previous chapter looked specificallyat how risk, diversification and transactioncosts affect livelihoods programming, thischapter examines how technology transferefforts and service provision have (and havenot) contributed to broadening livelihoodoptions. If farmers are to gain more controlover the services that they receive, it isimportant to take into account the historicaltrajectories of the modernisation efforts ofthe Afghan state and how this has influencedthe identity of extension agents and localofficials. This is contrasted with the narrativesof international policy reform, whichemphasise the role of the private sector andcivil society. While these non-state actorsare indeed essential components of anyenhanced structure for technological changeand rural development, realism and greater

150 Cullather, op cit.

consistency of vision are imperative if projectmodels are to better relate to prevailinglivelihood choices.

Technology transfer: historicalnarratives and current practice

With the exception of the Taliban regime,modernisation, in the form of introductionof new technological innovations, has beena cornerstone of the legitimacy of the Afghancentral government since Nadir Shah assumedpower in Kabul in 1929.150 The transfer oftechnology to the hinterlands has been araison d’être for the bureaucracy and forother members of the educated elite whonow staff the aid organisations that provideagricultural services. They were educated

5. Broadening Livelihood Options

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with the intention of building a cadre toimplement the green revolution of highyielding varieties and heavy use of commercialseeds, pesticides and fertilisers. InAfghanistan, as in most of the world, themodernisation ethic is founded uponnarratives of the need to entice (oroccasionally even force) a tradition-bound,risk averse peasantry to adopt new, efficient,effective and profitable technologies.

As noted previously, the narrative of the risk-averse peasant in Afghanistan is false.Examples of dynamism in agriculturalinnovation over the past decade (i.e., in themidst of conflict and crisis) include awidespread shift to planting of winter wheat,massive adoption of new varieties, rapidincrease in potato production (which inrotation with wheatd e c r e a s e s t h eprevalence of disease)a n d t h e r a p i dexpansion of opiuminto new areas.Afghan farmers are themselves struggling toaccess new technologies. The key questionsabout this process relate to the terms bywhich they interact with sources of newinformation and access inputs.

This readiness to adopt new technologiesdespite a high degree of risk is not necessarilyrelated to a search for the most profitableproduction strategy. Desperation clearlydrives technological change among some ofthe most vulnerable farmers. Variousinternational studies have noted thatdiversification is often motivated by arealisation that former livelihood strategies(and technologies) can no longer guaranteesurvival.151 If a low yielding wheat varietymeans starvation, then the risk of trying anew, unproven variety becomes acceptable.The so-called “early adopters” that extensionis traditionally expected to seek out may in

151 Farrington, et al., op cit.; Bryceson, op cit.152 Remington, T., Walsh, S., Charles, E., Maroko, J. and Omanga, P. “Getting off the Seeds and Tools Treadmill with CRS Seed

Vouchers and Fairs.” Disasters. 2002. 26(4): 316-328.

Afghanistan actually be those who have littleleft to lose. It is culturally accepted thatwidows and destitute older women, forexample, are able to engage directly inagricultural activities since they have noother choice. They may be ready to try newtechnologies that more secure women wouldnot.

Seed distributions as a vehicle fortechnology transfer

The main arena in which technology transferefforts are underway in Afghanistan is throughthe ubiquitous seed distributions. In additionto providing a subsidy, virtually all seedprogramming has been intended to increaseaccess to improved seed and speed genetic

renewal. The successin this objective hasbeen exceptional. Insome areas, agencystaff proudly declarethat local varietieshave disappeared

entirely, a tendency that is disturbing forthose who see a value in retainingAfghanistan’s extraordinary and uniquegenetic diversity.

The success of seed distribution-driventechnology transfer does not automaticallyimply that seed has even been declared tobe the most appropriate response. Even wherefar broader needs have been identified insurveys and feasibility studies, seed is thebulk of what farmers get. This appears to bedue to the legacy of humanitarian and earlyrehabilitation programming, where seed wasperceived to be the only feasible form ofintervention. It also is a reaction to theinstitutional weaknesses that have madeother types of activities difficult to establish.It may also be the result of the inertia of the“seeds and tools treadmill,”152 as the aid

The so-called “early adopters” thatextension is traditionally expected to seekout in Afghanistan may actually be thosewho have little left to lose.

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community is used to seeing seed distributionssimply as what one does in response to arural agriculture-related emergency. Noneof the seed-related programmes reviewedwere justified based on objectives ofaddressing seed shortage per se, i.e., thedefault assumption that governs muchinternational agricultural rehabilitationprogramming.

Seed distributions are, to a large part,conceptualised as ways to push newtechnologies on ignorant farmers. Someagencies specifically target farmers whocommit to following instructions fromextension. This naturally filters out farmerswho do not have the resources with whichto follow extension advice or who do notbelieve extension advice to be relevant totheir conditions. Adaptive trials and learningmethods (such as farmer field schools) arerare. Agricultural officers from most agenciesinterviewed stress the primary importanceof changing the attitudes of villagers. It isthus the behaviour of the villagers, ratherthan the conditions in which they survive,that are seen to constrain livelihoods. Oneagency reports using a “yield gap” approach,i.e., looking for ways to ensure that farmerscan reduce the gap between on-farm and on-station results with a given variety. Suchapproaches have been largely discreditedinternationally for their failure to take intoaccount on-farm realities and for a failureto acknowledge that maximum yields maynot be optimally profitable for producerswho have little chance of replicating highlycontrolled environmental conditions. Manyhouseholds also pursue livelihood strategies

153 One evaluation observes, “However, there is a strong impression that the technical components of the agriculture sectortake priority over the social or participatory elements. Much of the extension programme is handled as an issue of technicaldelivery rather than as a process of developing farmers’ knowledge and motivation. The seed programme specifically targetswhat are called ‘progressive’ or ‘pioneer’ farmers. On-farm trials are described in the strategy as participatory technologydevelopment processes. However, they appear to only systematically record and report biological yield. There is very limiteddocumentation of the criteria that farmers might use to evaluate trials. Most of the on-farm trials focus either on newvariety introductions or classic agronomist management concerns (seed rates, fertility levels). No evidence of systematicanalysis of farmers’ practices or their management decisions was found. The extension programme bears all the signs ofbeing designed by extension workers to provide what they think farmers need to know.” (Kampenaar, et al., op cit.,17)

154 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). FAO National Livestock Census 2003, Interim Report. 2003.155 One frustrated consultant writes: “A tiny fenced ‘demonstration’ of grazing methods (a few square metres) subdivided into

three plots has been installed. This is totally unrealistic and makes the project look ridiculous. A similar travesty of ademonstration is at Saleb. It would, unfortunately, be difficult to remove them without losing face.” (Suttie, op cit., 11)

that stress other priorities than yieldmaximisation, such as sending their childrento school rather than applying more labourto agricultural production.153

One potential technology transfer focus thathas received surprisingly little notice hasbeen that of livestock production. Cropproduction has proven to be remarkablyresilient, suggesting that producers may needlittle extra support to ensure access to seedand rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure.The effects of the drought on livestock, onthe other hand, are likely to take longer toovercome,154 and the already very poorcondition of much grazing land suggests thata return to traditional extensive systems maynot be sustainable. Programming for livestockproduction (apart from veterinary services)has been erratic and at times consisted ofmere symbolic efforts.155

Accountability in technologytransfer

Local varietal trials and demonstrations arefew and far between in Afghanistan. Thisstems from the near collapse of nationalresearch capacity and a tendency to givehigher priority to input distribution ratherthan ensuring that seeds are appropriate forlocal conditions. Many proposals and planscall for widespread use of trials, tied toextension activities, but when compared tothe massive provision of inputs, there is littleevidence of matching activities on the groundto help farmers assess and learn about thenew varieties that they are receiving. The



concentration on input distribution hasdrained limited human resources from neededextension activities.165

156 Asian Development Bank, op cit.157 Allen, op cit.158 Tunwar, N.S. End of Assignment Report. Kabul: Food and Agriculture Organisation. 2003.159 Allen, op cit.160 Barrand, J. “Empowering Women, Fighting Poppy: Red Gold Rising.” The Crosslines Afghan Monitor. 15 July 2003. 1:10-

11.161 Allen, op cit.162 FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector, op cit.163 Ibid.164 DACAAR. Feasibility Study – Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Sector: Khwaja Omari IAD Project Area, March

2002. Peshawar: Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees. 2002.165 Solidarités, 2003, op cit.

The ethics of introducing new varieties inlieu of a considerable level of on-farm trialsand demonstrations deserves critical

Box 7: The mantra of high value – low volume crops

The massive logistical challenges of moving crops to market in Afghanistan and the low profitability of cerealshave inspired many to stress the need to focus on “high value–low volume” crops, an objective that is evenenshrined in the NDF. This interest has been spurred by the need to compete with incentives for opiumproduction as the pre-eminent high value-low volume crop. Success in developing such crops thus far hasbeen relatively limited. Interest in high value–low volume crops is nonetheless strong, particularly as theinvestment in improving the efficiency of existing irrigation systems will only yield a positive return if watercharges increase to the point that low value crops (especially wheat) are replaced by high value horticulturalproducts.156

Efforts have primarily focused on reviving existing horticultural production. Afghan pistachios have a largeand secure market in India, which has been maintained during the conflict, even though production hasshrunk due to destruction of trees and the effects of the drought. Traditional high value-low volume cropsthat were sold on the wider international market include raisins, dried apricots, dates, figs and almonds.Smaller niche crops include black cumin, melon seeds and liquorice root.157 Alongside its large-scale seedprogramme, FAO has arranged importation of hybrid silkworm eggs from a variety of countries in an effortto revive the traditional silk industry in western and northern Afghanistan.158 It has also been suggestedthat olive production could be revived, building on a formerly successful plantation.159 There is considerableunmet domestic demand for both olives (for medicine and cosmetics) and silk.

There are few entirely new crops being investigated or promoted as yet. One option that has been raisedis to take advantage of the relatively cold winters and warm summers to build an industry of custom seedproduction. This, of course, will probably await the establishment of a more solid seed industry to meetdomestic needs. Saffron is a new crop that is being introduced, primarily for women producers in Herat.160

It is not only high value-low volume, but also very labour intensive, thus particularly relevant as a competitorto poppy production. Another type of niche that has not been given much attention is the possibility ofproducing horticultural crops to meet off-season markets and thus attract higher prices. Planting underplastic tunnels could possibly be used to capture better profits,161 and has begun to be used in Balkh andLogar Provinces162 and in peri-urban farms near Kabul.

The search for high value-low volume crops can be seen as partly deriving from a desire to find a way tobypass the broad underlying problem of poor post-harvest and marketing infrastructure. Post-harvest handlingis currently the primary obstacle to re-establishing commercial horticultural production.163 One reviewstates, “Many farmers often find that they have greater problems after the harvest than before theharvest.”164 Afghanistan has little chance of regaining a significant share in many of its former marketsfor dried fruit and other products without a considerable improvement in quality. Improved post-harvesthandling and processing is essential.

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attention. These changes in farming systemslead to increased risk, especially whereblanket recommendations are being made inregions with diverse micro-climates. Farmersdo not know how or where seed has beentested. Surveys have shown that farmersappreciate the need for both high seed qualityand access to new varieties.166 They are alsoquite vocal in their anger when inappropriatevarieties have been distributed and whenagencies have demonstrated a lack ofcapacity/commitment to ensuring that theseeds distributed are appropriate for theirmicroclimate and soil conditions.

Several agencies interviewed, on the otherhand, while acknowledging some notablefailures of certain distributed varieties,maintain that the productivity of farmers’seed has degenerated to the extent thatvirtually anything would be an improvement.This is seen as particularly important inisolated valleys, where inbreeding is commonand access to commercial seed sources isrelatively limited. The extent to which seedhas actually degenerated could be disputed.Extensive FAO surveys have found that 54percent of wheat is being produced by seedsthat FAO has released in the past ten years.167

Some agencies have engaged in hit and runseed distributions, by arriving in an area andmaking free distributions and thenwithdrawing. This totally unaccountablebehaviour is underpinned by technologytransfer ethic. If the scientists areautomatically assumed to know best, follow-up and downward accountability to farmersare not required. Even in better programmes,the limited opportunity for farmers to observeand consider the appropriateness of thetechnologies that they receive before plantingraises attention to the limited accountabilityof those providing agricultural support. Mostimplementing agencies allocate virtually nofunds for investigating the extent to which

166 FAO, “Results of the Evaluation of the Autumn 2002 FAO Emergency Agricultural Inputs Distribution Programme,” op cit.167 By comparison, in Punjab, India, the annual seed replacement rate is 8-10 percent per annum, implying that Afghanistan

does not lag dramatically behind one of the most commercialised production systems in Asia.168 Martens, B., Mummert, U., Murrell, P. and Seabright, P. The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. 2002.

farmers are able to make informed decisionsabout the value of seeds they receive. Thisdoes not mean that failures go unnoticed.Disastrous results from wheat seed that provedtotally infertile and imported seed that provedunusable in Afghan conditions have been metwith outrage by farmers, local authoritiesand FAO. Less dramatic examples of failedaccountability, in the form of inappropriatevegetable seed and wheat seed that merelyyielded a poor harvest, are also common,but are more accepted by farmers as part ofthe risks of testing new varieties.

If the widespread seed programmes acrossAfghanistan are largely intended for inducedtechnology transfer, this would seem to implythat extension advice regarding fertiliserapplications, suitability for different soils,etc. would be more than a useful additionto distributions. Extension advice would seemto be a responsibility of those agenciesproviding seed, since new varieties oftenrequire changes in planting depth, wateringrequirements and fertiliser use. A failure toprovide extension can easily lead to failedharvests, failed transfer of technology andfailed livelihoods. A point of particular notewith regard to the accountability oftechnology transfer efforts is that a “normal”extension service needs to retain theconfidence of its clients if it is to achieve itstargets in the future. It cannot risk completelyalienating its clients by recommendinginappropriate inputs and then leaving. Aidagencies are by nature relatively free fromaccountability to those that they ostensiblyserve.168 Furthermore, the combination oftechnology transfer efforts with investmentin community infrastructure means thatfarmers feel themselves to be under pressureto keep quiet about their dissatisfaction withthe technology that has been transferred tothem to avoid antagonising their NGO patronsand endangering access to larger investments



in other sectors. The underlying accountabilityof the extension agent is weak in most currentaid-financed programming.

These criticisms relate to the modes oftechnology transfer, but not the broaderneed for development of a dynamic systemby which farmers can explore and access newtechnologies. Current technologies are notsufficient to sustain the population withdignity (even when complemented by otherlivelihood strategies). There are technologicalinterventions that could presumably go a longway to buttressing subsistence and helpingfarmers to take advantage of marketopportunities. The question is rather howtechnology transfer efforts can be promotedin an ethical manner that recognises farmers’rights to know what they are getting involvedin when presented with an improvedtechnology.

“More research and extension”:where does it lead?

Afghanistan is frequently said to need “moreresearch and extension.” In one livelihoodsstudy, villagers ranked various forms ofextension as their top three priorities fordevelopment interventions.169 Other reportsalso emphasise the need for expandedextension activities.170 These calls for moreextension notwithstanding, it is not alwaysclear what the ultimate aims of research andextension activities are meant to be or howthe different modalities on offer might serveto achieve these aims. Research and extensionare not objectives in and of themselves. Theirvalues can only be assessed in relation to theultimate aims to which they contribute. Thegoals of more research and extension arefrequently left vague in current programming,but seem to focus on combinations of thefollowing:

169 Semple, op cit.170 DACAAR, op cit.

• Increased food security through highercereal yields;

• Increased income through improvedquality, timeliness and quantitativeproduction of commercial crops;

• Decreased opium production, throughincreased awareness and efficiency ofalternative production options;

• Improvements in the licit nationaleconomy through increased tax revenuesderiving from agricultural exports and/ornational self-reliance; and

• Increased equity by supporting women,poor people and vulnerable groups toimprove their incomes and financialindependence.

Investment priorities need to be assessedagainst these different goals. Depending onthe choice of modalities, some of theseobjectives will be achieved, but not others.For this reason, it is important to avoidconflating these different aims, byacknowledging that there are trade-offs tobe made. The trade-offs in extension goalsare generally not transparent due to a failureto concede that the structures created havemajor recurrent cost implications. Forexample, the lean, efficient, market-ledtypes of NPM extension structures suggestedby the NDF may ultimately result in a systemthat facilitates national growth. They do not,however, lend themselves to promotion ofequity goals, as extension for isolatedproducers and women is highly staff intensiveand will in most cases yield greatest impacton household consumption, rather thanmarket integration. A concentration onwomen or the rural poor will achieveimportant social goals, but will probably notyield a positive direct return on investment.Plans and reports mix and conflate referencesto targeting the vulnerable with the need towork with “progressive” farmers that havethe land, labour and capital to invest in new

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technologies. Target groups are rarelyspecified, either regarding their needs orcapacities.

In the past, and to some extent even today,objectives were envisaged as being bestachieved by deciding what was to be doneand telling the extension agents to do it. Thepre-war extension system was highly verticaland had no channels for feedback from thefield to headquarters in Kabul. Staff werefrequently assigned non-advisory tasks, suchas the sale and/or distribution of inputs andimplementation of relief and development

171 Kampenaar, et al., op cit., 6.172 Future Harvest. “Science Consortium Established to Rebuild Afghanistan’s Agriculture.” Available at:

www.futureharvest.org/news/afghanistan.shtml. 2002. The lack of faith in the resilience of Afghan agriculture was notuniversal. Tunwar writes that, “Afghanistan can very quickly become self-sufficient in food again…We should not take toogloomy an approach to the speed at which the country will achieve food security.” (Tunwar, 2002, op cit.)

173 Asian Development Bank, op cit., 4.174 Favre, Contributions to Food Aid, op cit.; FEWS Net, op cit.175 FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector, op cit.176 Khan, op cit.

projects.176 Vertical structures are stillformally in place, with all extensionaccountability directed upwards to Kabul.Informally, it is likely that the staff of districtand provincial departments are in practiceoften attentive to local concerns andopportunities to access project funding. Thisis not officially encouraged.

Government extension staff are generallyperceived by outside observers as beingpassive. Extension agents themselvesfrequently acknowledge that they accomplishvery little due to lack of resources. Currently,

Box 8: Agricultural recovery: Not according to plan?

“The processes of policy formulation and the reconstruction agenda at all levels have largely been drivenby pictures or stories about Afghanistan that do not withstand close scrutiny, e.g., devastated societyand infrastructure. They deny the importance of regional diversity within Afghanistan, the dynamicnature of the war economy, household strategies and the persistence of the underlying elements ofconflict. At a pragmatic level the probable recovery of agricultural production this year to an estimated75 percent of national grain requirements challenges the assumptions of devastated rural infrastructure,collapse of markets, unavailability of seed, lack of access to farm power, etc. that have been made.While humanitarian interventions have made their contribution, much has also been achieved byhouseholds without aid support.”171

A typical headline from early 2002 reads “With Group’s [a scientific consortium] Help, Country Could SeeBulk of Food Needs Met within Five Years.”172 A major multi-donor mission in 2002 suggested that “Arealistic medium term target would be to return to 1992 levels of output within five years…”173 Headlinessuch as these reflect the prevalence of the crisis narrative that has dominated post-2001 agriculturaldevelopment thinking. In 2003, Afghanistan’s cereal production was estimated to be one of the largest everrecorded.174 Even other crops, such as potatoes and melons, have been extraordinarily successful.Afghanistan’s agriculture was not expected to recover as rapidly as it has, at least not without massiveexternal assistance. The importance placed on aid interventions ignored the extraordinary latent dynamismamong Afghanistan’s farmers (combined with favourable climatic conditions).

It is important to note that the resilience of Afghan farmers is something that had already been observedin the recent past (but apparently quickly forgotten). A strong recovery of agricultural production was madein the late 1990s under the Taliban, only to be cut short by the drought. Studies show that even the fruitand nut orchards that are popularly portrayed as having been steadily devastated by the years of conflictare actually relatively young, with 58 percent having been planted over the past ten years.175 The clearestconclusion of this experience is that our understanding of resilience is lacking. It is easier to predict lossesthan to understand how people pull together and reallocate their different assets to rebound in the wakeof a crisis.



virtually all project-financed extension isconducted by NGO staff. Extension includesa broad variety of activities. One agency hasstaff that apply agro-chemicals directly infarmers’ fields.177 Some extension effortshave surprisingly limited extension associatedwith them. In one long-term programmevisited, several impressive terraceddemonstration farms had been establishedat considerable cost. Very few arrangementshad been made, over the years, for farmersto visit and learn from these farms. Theadoption or diffusion of the technologiesextended are seldom monitored. Apart fromone major FAO survey,178 little investmenthas been made in assessing farmers’ reactionsto new proposed technologies and whetherthose technologies have proven relevant ornot.

Despite the vision of the NDF for a governmentthat stays out of direct service deliverywherever possible, privatisation of extensionservices has not been considered by thegovernment or NGOs. The option of using aidresources to contract private extensionadvisors179 has not been considered. As longas significant levels of donorfunding are available, there isa tendency for NGOs to simplyhire more extension agentst h e m s e l v e s , w i t h o u tconsideration of what kind ofagricultural knowledge andinformation system could orshould be developed. Extensionin Afghanistan is dominated bythe contracting of services byNGOs, but these NGOs are notkeen to p romote theemergence of a competitivesystem that provides fortransparency, monitoring, costcomparison and quality control.

177 Solidarités, 2003, op cit.178 FAO, “Results of the Evaluation of the Autumn 2002 FAO Emergency Agricultural Inputs Distribution Programme,” op cit.179 Many NGOs providing extension services could, however, be described as private businesses.180 See, for example, Neuchâtel Group. Common Framework on Financing Agricultural and Rural Extension. Available at:

www.neuchatelinitiative.net. 2002.

This is not to say that full-fledgedcommercialisation and privatisation ofextension services, as is underway in manycountries, is a viable alternative inAfghanistan. The vast majority of extensionwill, for the foreseeable future, need toremain publicly funded, and the emergenceof private service providers to compete forservice contracts will be a difficult processand may not happen at all in isolated areas.Nonetheless, this does not mean that thecurrent unaccountable, supply-side structuresare the only alternative. Publicly/aid-fundedand privately delivered structures have beenestablished rapidly in other chronically poor,post-conflict contexts (e.g., Albania). Thereis a wealth of experience with alternativemodels180 that has yet to be considered inAfghanistan.

Relationships between NGOs and thegovernmental extension service can be seenas falling into three categories:

• Integrated: usually where governmentstaff are fully involved in the work of theNGO, often to the extent that they are

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effectively “contracted in.”181 Experienceof application of NPM modalities inextension services has often shown that,although the initial objective has beento contract out services, the pre-existingpublic sector extension structure remainsin place (albeit with no operationalbudget) and a well-staffed private sectordoes not automatically appear to takeadvantage o f the commerc ia lopportunities being provided. Instead,NGOs very often obtain contracts toprovide extension services, which theyin turn implement by contracting inavailable government extension agentsin the field. This can even be observedon a limited scale in the more successfulNGO-government collaboration initiativesin Afghanistan, where the NGO inevitablypays incentives to participating publicsector extension staff. through supportto transport, field allowances, salaries,etc.

• A t t e m p t e dcollaboration, butfailure to achieveagreement: dueto differences inpriorities, envyover resources,and other reasons.

• Non-collaboration: no attempts made towork with government structures due tolow priority given by the NGO toinstitutional development, completeabsence of government extension staffin the area of operations or other reasons.

The financial sustainability of public extensionservices is not a topic for active discussion.The government realises that it has alreadylost its best staff to NGOs due to low salaries,but the only solution is seen to be more

181 Experience of application of NPM modalities in extension services has often shown that, although the initial objective hasbeen to contract out services, the pre-existing public sector extension structure remains in place (albeit with no operationalbudget) and a well-staffed private sector does not automatically appear to take advantage of the commercial opportunitiesbeing provided. Instead, NGOs very often obtain contracts to provide extension services, which they in turn implementby contracting in available government extension agents in the field. This can even be observed on a limited scale in themore successful NGO-government collaboration initiatives in Afghanistan, where the NGO inevitably pays incentives toparticipating public sector extension staff.

182 FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector, op cit.

money from Kabul to pay higher salaries andemploy more staff. NGO-run extensionmodalities are expensive and virtually noattention has been given to planning howsuch operations could continue when aidfinancing is reduced. Some reportsrecommend establishing innovative, butrelatively intensive/expensive, extensionmethods such as farmer field schools,182

without indicating how recurrent costs willbe financed.

Given the predominance of seed distributions,it is not surprising that extension is, to alarge extent, an activity that is piggybackedonto seed programmes. Some agencies seesubsidised seed distributions as a neededincentive to encourage farmers to followextension advice. Farmers are not expectedto pay for advice, but rather are expectedto have to be provided with incentives totake advice. The underlying patronising

assumption is thatextension is aboutraising awareness,rather than servingf a r m e r s . U n t i lextension servicesb e g i n s e e i n gthemselves as serving

farmers, client-oriented or demand drivenapproaches are unlikely to take root amongeither NGOs or the government.

Given the need for adaptation, monitoringand verification of the introduction of anynew technology, quality extension must havea strong link to research. For the most part,the research-extension linkage issue inAfghanistan has been an afterthought and inmany cases has been disregarded entirely.There are, however, some notable positiveexperiences. Through the work of the Future

Until extension services begin seeingthemselves as serving farmers, client-oriented or demand driven approaches areunlikely to take root among either NGOsor the government.



Harvest Consortium and FAO, Afghanistanwas a model for early investment in re-establishing a research infrastructure usingemergency funding. With the InternationalCentre for Agricultural Research in the DryAreas (ICARDA) as the main institutionalpartner, government research facilities wererapidly rehabilitated and a modest butessential structure was created for drawingattention to the need for verification trialsand other research related to the introductionof new varieties. These efforts were notsufficient to completely prevent the importand distribution of inappropriate seed, buthave been able to ensure that need forresearch and verification has not slippedentirely from the agenda.

The experience with inappropriate seedimports in recent years has shown thatAfghanistan clearly needs a capacity to screennew varieties, and it has an agency in placewith renowned expertise in developing suchscreening capacity (ICARDA), but after initialsupport to research, there has been asubsequent slump in funding for genuineresearch and verification activities. A lackof consensus among donors and thegovernment regarding the structure of afuture research and extension system, andpressures to obtain quick impact have meantthat ICARDA support has become increasinglyskewed toward demonstrations andestablishment of seed production units.ICARDA’s comparative advantage as a researchinstitution has been ignored in the search forimplementing partners. Another concern inthe “borrowing” of limited research capacitiesto support seed distribution is that it maydistract from the need to channel researchtoward crops with good economic potential.For example, even though smallholder cerealproduction is unlikely to prove competitivein the long term, 71 percent of research stationland is used for cereals, primarily wheat.183

183 Ibid.184 Byerlee and Alex, op cit.185 Christoplos, I. Common Framework for Supporting Pro-Poor Extension. Lindau: Neuchâtel Group, LBL. 2003. Available at:

www.neuchatelinitiative.net.

In sum, extension efforts are currently notsufficiently linked to efforts to understandthe livelihoods of either farmers or even ofthe future extension agents themselves.Internationally, development actors areincreasingly realising that there is no singlecorrect model for research and extension.Instead, there is a realisation that a two-pronged approach may be required to ensurethat potential high-growth options are pursuedin places that are integrated into marketsand low-risk, subsistence support is prioritisedin marginal areas. This dichotomy is valid forboth research184 and extension.185 A centralfinding of international reviews is that thepublic sector alone cannot finance, let alonedeliver, extension services to meet allrequirements. In many countries, extensionis being privatised in areas well-integratedinto markets. This may result in resourcesbeing shifted to more remote areas wherethe majority of rural poor live. In theseremote areas, some states have acknowledgedthat subsidies in the form of publicly financedextension and other support to agriculturalproduction are justified to prevent forms ofsocial misery and disruption, which ultimatelyhave higher financial and human costs thanthe cost of the services provided. The moreisolated areas, with very poor infrastructure(which is characteristic of a large proportionof Afghanistan), have little access tocommercial markets and also are “protected”from cheap imports due to the high costs oftransporting imported food to localconsumers. Services for isolated areas mayneed to accept an emphasis on subsistence,leaving the pro-poor growth agenda to areaswith greater prospects for market integration.Operationalising a two-pronged research andextension structure, such as this, relies on abroad vision for the role of the state inagricultural development that acknowledgesthe diversity of needs and resources availablein any given country. It also demands a

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pragmatic acceptance of the need to setpriorities on the use of limited resources,even if such priorities include cruel choices.

Private sector alternatives topublic sector service provision

Even in areas other than agriculturalextension, support for private sectordevelopment as an alternative to state serviceprovision is at an early stage. The NGOthinking that dominates agricultural activitiesclosely resembles the statist paradigm. Bothare supply-driven and lack a customerorientation. Neither includes accountabilitymechanisms or elements of competition. Fewevaluations, assessments and plans assessthe possible or actual impact of interventionson private sector development.186 In thepast, the nature of humanitarian assistancein many ways justified such an approach.Today, this conceptual gap stands in starkcontrast to the stated aims of the NDF.Dangers of NGO programming crowding outprivate service providers or of overly generoussupport to chosen implementing partnersupsetting the establishment of a level playingfield for commercial competition are generallyignored. Even where the private sector isgiven priority, the desire to demonstratequick impact encourages the provision oflarge and presumably very soft loans toentrepreneurs who have brought aid providersinto their networks.

Distrust regarding the private sector stemsfrom the perception that agriculture is thefoundation of rural livelihoods and from fear(in some ways well justified) of turning overresponsibility to private actors that are poorlyunderstood and therefore unpredictable. Thestrength of the private sector in contributingt o p o v e r t y a l l e v i a t i o n t h r o u g hcommercialisation and processing services

186 One notable exception is Kampenaar, et al., 2002.187 See Heierli, U. Poverty Alleviation as a Business: The Market Creation Approach to Development. Berne: Swiss Agency for

Development and Cooperation. 2000.188 FAO has a system of field offices, but these have been almost entirely maintained with emergency funding. Their existence

is now threatened due to the phasing out of emergency funding.

must come from seeing the poor as customersof businesses that endeavour to sell servicessuch as, for example, drip irrigation systems,post-harvest storage facilities or transport.187

There is little indication that either thegovernment or most NGOs have shifted theirviews of farmers away from beingbeneficiaries of agricultural services to beingpotential customers.

Through RAMP, support is being consideredfor food processing incubators in order tosupport fledgling enterprises. The largestengagement with the private sector is in seedproduction where, despite some setbacks tothe search for a viable market relationshipduring the emergency phase, renewed andserious attention is being paid to redefiningfarmers as customers rather thanbeneficiaries. Current thinking within FAOindicates that a commercially viable seedsystem will require far more attention tohow to actively market the product and arealisation that due to small margins betweenseed and grain prices, wheat seed is unlikelyto provide a commercially viable base for aseed enterprise. Higher value products, suchas vegetable seed, must be part of an eventualmarketing strategy. It should be stressed,however, that although FAO is discussingthese ideas together with their MAAHcounterparts at central levels, seedenterprises and NGOs continue to set seedproduction targets according to governmenttargets and donor promises of procurement,with little attention to whether or not farmerswant to buy the seeds produced. The resulthas been that only half of the seed producedby FAO’s implementing partners has beenresold to farmers. A paradigm shift is sorelyneeded, but FAO’s capacity of raising theawareness of its implementing partners tomarket realities is shrinking, as FAO’s owncapacity for field level engagement shrinks.188



Informal discussions reveal a tendency amongmany observers to assume that a marketorientation will inevitably lead the privatesector towards (rather than away from) opiumproduction, as it is the most profitablebusiness opportunity. The search foralternatives to the opium economy maydistract attention from dealing with thereality that the majority of financial flowsin agriculture are in one way or anotherlinked to the opium trade. This issue in privatesector development may therefore be one offinding ways to encourage diversification inthe reinvestment of opium profits into otherbusinesses, rather than framing private sectordevelopment as an either-or proposition.There are some indications that wealth doesencourage diversification out of poppies. InHelmand, Afghanistan’s province with thelargest production of opium, poppies areprimarily concentrated in those districts withsmall, scattered land holdings, with uncertainaccess to irrigation.189 Farmers that canafford better land have other investmentpriorities. Concerns about the countrydescending into a narco-mafia state are notanchored in an understanding of the politicaleconomy of how mafias choose investmentpriorities. As their risks increase (as theyhopefully will as the Afghan state becomesconsolidated), these mafias and the farmerswho supply them will most probably makeincremental shifts in their investmentportfolios into other businesses. A majorunanswered question is whether aid can beused to speed up this process and to influencetheir decisions on how to deal withincreasingly risky narcotics production.

In addition to those involved in the opiumeconomy, Pashtun traders are another groupthat has long played a major role inagr icultural marketing throughoutAfghanistan. Strengthening and formalisation

189 Mansfield, 2002, op cit.190 International Crisis Group (ICG). Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation. ICG Asia Report No. 62. Kabul/Brussels:

ICG. 5 August 2003.191 Ibid. ICG notes that Pashtun businessmen feel particularly insecure in Herat, where Ishmail Khan discriminates against the

Pashtun and exerts tight control over his trading monopoly.192 Kydd, J. and Dorward, A. “The New Washington Consensus on Poor Country Agriculture: Analysis, Prescription and Gaps: with

particular attention to globalisation and finance for seasonal inputs.” Development Policy Review. 2001; 19(4):467-478.

of the private sector is fundamentallydependent on how entrepreneurs such asthese judge the prevailing level of securityfor themselves and their investments. Dueto fears of retribution and uneven rule oflaw in the rural areas, Pashtun traderscurrently do not feel secure.190 They passon the costs of their insecurity in the formof higher transaction costs and a vacuum ofrural services in many isolated areas. As longas local and regional commanders191 canexercise their power at will to the benefitof their clans, families and associates, majorreinvestment by the large and wealthyPashtun trading diaspora is unlikely.

Redefining the role of the state

The NDF in general and agricultural policy inparticular do not specify what, where andhow the state should intervene in the provisionof public goods. The flip side of any NPMapproach is the importance of determiningwhere the market is unlikely to invest andhow to ensure that resources (not least therelatively generous supply of aid money) areavailable for these public goods. Kydd andDorward point out that the “WashingtonConsensus” that has led to the introductionof NPM policies throughout the world hasfailed to provide a coherent basis fordetermining how to prioritise investments inagricultural public goods.192

There are certain areas, particularly withregard to livestock, where there is nosubstitute for state intervention. Many typesof veterinary services have the potential ofbeing privatised (see Box 9), but the controlof epidemics, ensuring the quality ofmedicines and vaccines, quarantine, bordercontrols and phytosanitary standards are allpublic goods. The collapse of such serviceshas already been felt in Afghanistan. Imports

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of water buffalos from Pakistan for meathave brought cases of rinderpest.

There are also major issues related to theenvironment and natural resourcemanagement that may require stateintervention. One of these is addressingconflicts between use of range for crops orlivestock. Vast areas of land are used aspasture during most years, but may be

193 Barker, T.J., and Mehraban, A.B. The Development of Veterinary Services in Afghanistan 1986-2000. Working Paper No.1/2000. Islamabad: United Nations Development Programme. 2000.

194 Ibid.195 Italtrend, op cit.196 Ostrom, K. Self-Sustainability of Veterinary Field Units: Integrated Livestock Programme. Consultancy study for the Food

and Agriculture Organisation. 1997.197 Reddick, op cit.198 See International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship. Meeting Conclusions: International Meeting on Good Humanitarian

Donorship, 16-17 June, 2003, Stockholm. 2003.199 Italtrend, op cit.; Ostrom, op cit.200 Johnson, 2000, op cit.; Alden Wily, op cit.; Suttie, op cit.; Semple, op cit.: DACAAR, op cit.

ploughed for crop production when there issufficient rainfall. Differing interpretationsof grazing rights and land ownership for theserain-fed areas are common. Tensions betweenpastoral and settled groups have caused bothviolent reprisals and contributed to a zero-sum approach to natural resourcemanagement that has rapidly degraded theenvironment.200

Box 9: Veterinary services and ambivalence toward private service provision

Internationally, veterinary services have been a central battleground in the debate over the relevance andviability of NPM approaches to redefining the role of government in agricultural services. There has beenrelatively good success in establishing privately provided and fee-based veterinary services (particularly forlarge stock). Extension has been more difficult to privatise and commercialise. Livestock owners, however,have been found to be among the sectors of the population who are hardest hit by drought and conflict andtherefore in greatest need of subsidised assistance for recovery. Even well performing and relatively sustainablecommercial veterinary services have been hard hit by emergencies. In the past, Afghan veterinary serviceswere intended to be provided free by government staff. In practice, payment for medicines has always beencommon.193 Support to veterinary services during the period of conflict began with a political, rather thana humanitarian or livelihood agenda. Support was initially targeted to services for the donkeys of themujahiddin. Since then, a variety of agencies have supported veterinary services, primarily FAO and theDutch Committee for Afghanistan. Although piecemeal, by 1999 the various initiatives were said to amountto broader coverage than existed in 1979.194 Recently, funding has begun to shrink and with it the levelof coverage. At the same time the array of actors has expanded, with short-term assistance from NGOs,International Security Assistance Forces and other agencies.195 Legislation is unclear, and proposals for anew legal framework have been met with similar donor scepticism and debate over statist versus NPM models,as in other agricultural services.

In the past it was expected that commercialisation would ensure the viability of the myriad of veterinaryfield units.196 This has proven over-optimistic. It is important to analyse why these services, that farmersobviously value, have had such difficulty in establishing a higher degree of cost recovery. The staff of someagencies have steadfastly resisted plans to increase the independence of veterinary units.197 One of themain factors that complicates a process of commercialisation is that different agencies dabbling in theveterinary field have different policies regarding subsidies, salary levels and fees. “Good donorship” inpreventing such tendencies is a scarce commodity.198 Standardisation may be needed as a first step to levelthe playing field for more self-reliant veterinary services in the future. This, however, is not enough. In theopinion of farmers, agricultural officials and the aid community, control of the quality of service provision,in particular that of medicines and vaccines, is a precondition for developing trust between livestock ownersand private veterinarians.199 The capacity of the state to shoulder regulatory responsibilities must bedeveloped if the private sector is to flourish.



The MAAH recognises the seriousness of thisissue,201 but there is as yet no clear strategyto address it. Most recommended measuresfor improving l ivestock and rangemanagement (e.g., through rotational grazing,stall feeding methods, and a shift from annualcrops to trees) would require consensus andclarity on rights of access. Participatory andlocal watershed management approachesmay have a role to play in negotiating jointresource management,202 but given prevailinglevels of distrust, a measure of formalregulatory engagement will almost certainlybe needed as well.203 Experience inneighbouring countries could provide bothpositive and negative examples of how todeal with these complex issues.204

Civil society in agriculturaldevelopment: stimulating demand

Afghanistan has yet to move beyond supply-driven service provision where governmentand NGOs compete for access to donorresources. The central reason for this is thatfarmers, as yet, lack the power to demandbetter services. They feel that their situationis so fragile that acting as a cooperativebeneficiary is the most effective strategy toget something out of service providers. Theyhave little experience with accountableservice provision.

Until recently, approaches to stimulatingdemand-driven agricultural services oftenassumed that a free market could ensurethat farmers get what they want. If individualfarmers were given an opportunity to chooseand buy the services they need, then theissue of demand would be solved. Analysesof the powerlessness that accompanieschronic conflict and poverty have shown thatthe miracle of the marketplace rarely showsup at the doorstep of the poor. Furthermore,

201 Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (MAAH). Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Natural Resources ManagementSector Consultative Group. Kabul: MAAH. 6 May 2003.

202 Alden Wily, op cit.203 See, for example, DACAAR, op cit.204 Kreutzmann, op cit.

the transaction costs that are experiencedby individual farmers who can at best buy afew kilos of seed or a few sacks of fertiliserare too great to be overcome by the efficiencyincreases that may be found through moreeffective markets. Instead, there is a growingrealisation that demand needs to bestimulated by investing in civil society andfarmer organisations. Only through jointaction can farmers hope to overcome theirlack of power and take advantage ofefficiencies of scale in accessing services.

The aid community in Afghanistan has anambivalent approach to investments instimulating demand. Virtually no agencywould question the need for stimulatingdemand and there are some significantinvestments in strengthening the capacity oforganisations that claim to representcommunities and farmers. At the same time,the supply-driven nature of aid flows hasmeant that efforts to build capacity appearto be more focused on building capacities toabsorb aid, rather than to demand it.

Shuras to the rescue?

The shura is the lynchpin in the visions ofthe aid community (and to some extent thegovernment as well) for the institutionalinfrastructure that will support futureagricultural and rural development. It is seenas the basis for rebuilding what is popularlyassumed to be heavily depleted social capital.If shuras are to be employed as the solution,it is first important to critically analyse whatthe problems of social capital and community-level governance actually are, and whetheror not the shuras members are themselvesinterested in addressing these problems. Itis also important to consider whether theymight even be part of the problem.

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Current understanding of the narratives abouttraditional local organisations that guideparticipatory development efforts205 andhumanitarian and reconstruction efforts inthe midst of chronic conflict206 suggestcaution in assuming that organisations suchas shuras might be expected to share (or beinduced to share) the same objectives as theaid community. These various studies haveshown that the consensuses that are formedthrough participatory methods rarelyrepresent the concerns of the poor ormarginalised. Even otherwise laudatoryreviews of the role of the shuras acknowledgethat “what the agency expects the shura todo, in the function of a village developmentassociation, is something very different fromwhat the shura is used to do, what it is setup to do, and what the community expectsit to do.”207 Furthermore, many agencieshaphazardly load their programme documentswith a mix of managerial and socialengineering objectives. One evaluationcomments:

“The objectives for village organisations(VOs) … are too many and too diverse, asthey include narrow objectives relatingto programme activities and broadobjectives about empowerment …it isdifficult to know whether DACAAR seesVOs mainly as the interface between itselfand villages, or as new institutions tochallenge traditional sources of power,or as both.”208

Due to all of these factors, the sustainabilityof shura-based community development mustbe questioned. Despite concerted efforts at

205 See Cooke, B., and Kothari, U., Eds. Participation: The New Tyranny. London: Zed. 2001.206 Grünewald, F. ALNAP Global Study: The Case of Afghanistan. London: Overseas Development Institute. 2003; Harvey, P.

Rehabilitation in Complex Political Emergencies: Is Rebuilding Civil Society the Answer? IDS Working Paper 60. Sussex, UK:Institute of Development Studies. 1997; Keen, D. The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief inSouthwestern Sudan 1983-1989. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1994.

207 Harpviken, K.B., Suleman, M. and Taksdal, M. Strengthening the Self-Reliance of Returnee Communities: The Enjil CommunityDevelopment Programme, Herat Province, Afghanistan. Report from an Independent Mid-Term Review for Ockenden Venture.May 2001.

208 Kampenaar, op cit., 15-16.209 Reddick, op cit.210 Johnson, 2003, op cit., 6.211 Johnson, 2000, op cit., 7.212 Alden Wily, op cit.213 See Kanbur, R. Obnoxious Markets. Working Paper 2001-08. Ithaca, New York: Department of Applied Economics and

Management, Cornell University. July 2001.214 Pain and Lautze, op cit., 18.

empowerment, extending to over a decade,an evaluation of one major integrated ruraldevelopment programme notes with concernthat not a single shura has “graduated” fromprogramme support.209 Chris Johnson notesthat “it is unclear what civil society actuallymeans in the Afghan context.”210 In an earlierstudy she found that interviewees in Hazarajathad lost faith in their own institutions, “Yetalthough they wanted a new leadership,people also spoke of their lack of hope thatit would emerge from within the community.They pinned their hopes instead on the ideathat it might come from outside.”211 Shepoints out that a significant degree oflegitimacy remained at the “very local villagelevel,” but stressed the distrust toward peoplewith power and guns. Alden Wily hasuncovered similar findings.212

It is possible that some of the social capitalthat binds Afghan social relations would becharacterised by much of the aid communityas consisting of “unsocial capital,” i.e.,market relationships based on the opiumtrade and abuse of power.213 The interplayof social and unsocial capital frames manyof the livelihood choices that face ruralAfghans today. Pain and Lautze write that“contrary to popular thinking, states do notfail in times of chronic conflict and politicalinstability; rather they become convenientlydiffuse, rich in complicated networks thatextend from local strongmen/warlords to theboardrooms of international firms.”214 Bothsocial and unsocial capital form the glue thatholds these broader economic and politicalnetworks together.



At another level, recent research into therole of traditional institutions and socialcapital has recognised that, while theseinstitutions are the first (and most reliable)source of support for the destitute and thoseexperiencing livelihood shocks, they are alsomechanisms that reinforce structural poverty.Kothari and Hulme write:

“When poor people in Bangladesh faceproblems their first port of call for socialsupport are these local/informal networksand not ‘professional’ poverty reductionagencies. Having said this, there is a needto shift our focus in contemporarydevelopment policy from an uncriticalvalorisation of civil society in order torecognise that social capital is not alwaysand inevitably a positive asset, but onewhich can also keep poor people poor.”215

This should be especially true where civilsociety has as unfettered power as it does inAfghanistan. There is, however, littleacknowledgement of such ambivalence aboutthe power of civil society in Afghan ruraldevelopment programming. A typicalprogramme document states: “Participatorydecision-making can empower themarginalised and develop a community’scapacity to analyse its environment, identifyand address its problems, and takeresponsibility for development.”216 Despitedisturbing evidence and experience of theabuse of power by warlords, commandersand village elites, a certain myth ofegalitarianism in Afghan civil society stillremains.

In search of farmers’ organisations

A central question regarding the role of shurasin supporting agricultural development is thequestion of whether they can be considered

215 Kothari, U. and Hulme, D. Narratives, Stories and Tales: Understanding Poverty Dynamics Through Life Histories. Manchester:Institute for Development Policy and Management. 2003; 13.

216 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). The Development of Sustainable Agricultural Livelihoodsin the Eastern Hazarajat. Project Document GCP/AFG/029/UK. 2003; 13.

217 See, for example, FAO, Afghanistan: Survey of the Horticultural Sector, op cit.

to be, or can be transformed into, farmers’organisations. Some agencies approach thisissue as inherently unproblematic, relatingto the shuras as if they were by nature capableof representing farmers and engaging in avariety of activities related to marketing,technology transfer, etc. Others invest inbuilding the capacity of shuras to act asfarmer organisations. Some reports see therole of shuras as being unrelated to agricultureand bemoan the complete absence of farmerorganisations capable of engaging in marketingand other commercial functions.217

At the centre of this issue is the potential ofdeveloping the shuras into genuine producerorganisations, with accountability to members(rather than to the community as a whole)and an ability to manage economictransactions in a competitive marketeconomy. This is doubtful within current aidmodalities. There are two reasons for this.First, prospects for sustainability are poor aslong as aid projects operate as the mainbuyer of the produce (as is the case in muchseed production). Many project plans arevague about how the supporting agency willeventually withdraw and either be replacedby market relations with commercial tradersand processors, or by a higher-level farmerorganisational structure that can assumeresponsibility for marketing and other tasks.There are some efforts to work withintermediate levels (e.g., the creation of“cluster shuras”), but there is generally littleindication that these organisations aremotivated by a genuine desire to engage incooperative economic activities. Furthermore,mechanisms to ensure financial accountabilityto members have not been developed. Thisshould come as no surprise. The shuras areultimately not economically orientedmembership organisations, but rather politicalbodies.

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218 Italtrend, op cit.219 Asian Development Bank, op cit.220 See Pain, A. Livelihoods Under Stress in Faryab Province, Northern Afghanistan, Opportunities for Support. A report to

Save the Children US, Pakistan/Afghanistan Field Office. 2001.

The second problem in treating shuras as ifthey were farmer organisations is thetendency to combine community developmentefforts, having primarily social developmentaims, with the organisation of producers,that must be led by commercial and marketprerogatives focusing on the interests ofindividual households. Agriculturaldevelopment efforts that are channelledthrough shuras may be effective in dealingwith some public goods, such as locust control,but are unlikely to develop into the type ofstructures that would be necessary to addressprivate goods.

The alternative is naturally to pass over theshuras in efforts to strengthen farmerorganisation. There are some efforts in thearea that are said to be quite successful,e.g., FAO support to dairy collection in Mazar-i-Sharif.218 Other structures are beingestablished with the primary aim of linkingto groups of farmers for the provision ofmicro-finance services, for example by CFAin Kunduz, where demobilised formercombatants are being organised accordingly.As mentioned earlier, the government hopesto channel such interests into rebuildingcooperative structures. There is widespreaddistrust by donors (and perhaps by farmersas well) that such cooperatives will be moreaccountable to the government than to theirmembers. Intentions to use these cooperativesas channels for subsidised services (as waspast practice) suggest that these fears arewarranted.

It is especially unclear how issues thatcombine the management of access to publicand private goods, such as irrigation, can beaddressed in an effective manner. One multi-donor mission recommended that river basins

and sub-basins be used as the main unit forplanning and management.219 But it remainsto be seen if such a watershed approach isviable and appropriate given the powerstructures that frequently dominate suchareas. Weakly or inequitably led watershedmanagement structures could instead fanexisting upstream-downstream animosities.There is widespread faith that traditional(mirab) water management institutions canaddress potential conflicts in current irrigationsystem renovation, but there is littleknowledge about how the years of conflicthave impacted upon these traditionalarrangements. It is relatively easy forcommanders to ignore downstream users.220

The lack of agency capacity to monitor theseissues gives cause for concern.

Despite these dangers of investment in less-than-civil society, there is no viablealternative other than working with localinstitutions. If an appropriate relationship tocivil society is to emerge, it will only appearonce agencies start shifting some of theirpower to their community partners. Amongthe NGOs there is little explicit discussion ofthe need on their part to be accountable tolocal civil society. Anchored in a technologytransfer mode, they generally perceivethemselves to be, ipso facto, doing good.Efforts are underway to strengthen financialaccountability, but sustainable impact mayonly be achieved if a more transparentdistinction is made between the differenttasks of c iv i l soc iety as farmerorganisations/cooperatives providing servicesfor members, implementing partners forinvestments in public goods (especiallyinfrastructure) and as bearers of civicresponsibility in the political sphere.



Reframing the narratives amiduncertainty

The Afghan rural development agenda centreson how to proceed in the face of uncertaintyabout the role of civil society, distrust of theprivate sector and disagreement over therole of the state. Afghans are ambivalentabout how to move forward. They are evenlydivided over whether it is better to channelresources through the government, in orderto strengthen its legitimacy and capacity, orwhether continued dominance by NGOs andthe UN is preferred, given distrust of thecommitment of politicians and civil servantsto public welfare and stability.221 The aidcommunity has also demonstratedconsiderable ambivalence. Its efforts to liveup to declarations about putting thegovernment in the driver’s seat have beenhighly erratic. At the frontline of agriculturaldevelopment efforts, the aid community isstill in charge.

There is substantial justification for suchambivalence by both the public and the aidcommunity. Afghanistan could, with somedegree of optimism, be described as a countryin transition from a state of chronic conflict(due to war) to a state of chronic violenceand insecurity.222 It is undergoing a shiftfrom experiencing human rights abusesdirectly related to war, to a context ofcontinued widespread abuses of rights relatedto access to land, water and markets,stemming from the power that has beenaccumulated by individuals with guns. Thecessation of most open armed conflict hastherefore not necessarily led to changedcircumstances for most rural Afghans.

221 HRRAC, op cit.222 Pain and Goodhand (2002) have suggested that Afghanistan may move in a similar direction as post-war Guatemala, which

experienced an increase in rural violence after the formal cessation of hostilities.223 Based on Johnson, C. and Start, D. Rights, Claims and Capture: Understanding the Politics of Pro-Poor Policy. Overseas

Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 145. London: ODI. 2001.

The degree to which rural people are ableto construct viable livelihoods withinprevailing structures will partly relate to howwell agricultural policies and programmingare anchored in realistic, principled andpragmatic analyses of the situation at large.In Afghanistan, as anywhere, policies toensure that rural development effortsalleviate poverty or suffering are reliant onthree factors:

• Ability of agents (governmental, NGO orprivate sector) to administer theirprogrammes effectively;

• Ability to ensure that targetedbeneficiaries are reached; and

• Ability to challenge societal vestedinterests that seek to re-appropriate thebenefits that accrue to the intendedbeneficiaries.223

Some progress is being made in the first twoareas. Questions remain about the choiceand effectiveness of strategies to addressthe third. Many agencies possess a strongbody of tacit knowledge about what mightbe a principled and pragmatic approach forachieving these aims. What they too oftenlack is a framework of intervention thatsupports and insists upon applying thisknowledge in programme design andimplementation. The “triumph of the project”too often overrules common sense.

Given the legacy of weak governance at alllevels, this is not just a short-term transitionalset of problems. Institutional ambivalenceand aid-dominated programming must beseen as part and parcel of the relationshipsand structures that will frame rural livelihoodstrategies for the foreseeable future. The“weak state” question is not just an abstract

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

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issue of debate for political scientists. Conflictand uncertainty are part of how a farmerdecides to plant or not to plant a given crop,whether a land owner decides it is worthinvesting in maintaining soil fertility, whethera trader tries to enter into new and potentiallymore profitable markets and whetherprospective returning migrants and refugeessee agriculture as something they want tobuild their survival upon. These factors alsoframe the decision-making of donors whomust choose whether or not it is worthinvesting in highly flawed governmentalagricultural organisations, when the reformagenda is far from anchored at central levelsand has yet to even be broached outside ofKabul.

Principles and pragmatism

Despite all this, the extraordinary growth inagricultural production over the past twoyears indicates that something is going wellin rural Afghanistan. The scattered butdisturbing signs that this growth has resultedin limited improvement in livelihoods amongthe majority of rural people gives cause forgrave concern. We simply do not know muchabout what is happening withregard to the third conditionfor transforming pro-poorprojects into pro-poor ruraldevelopment. Fears ofwidespread and gross abuse ofpower in local processesrelated to farming suggest aneed to design and monitoragricultural interventions inrelation to rights and protectionagendas. The question is how.

First, it is important toacknowledge that we do notknow which factors enable poorpeople in Afghanistan to

224 Solidarités. UNAMA Survey: Agriculture. Kabul: Solidarités. 2001, 10.225 Alden Wily, op cit.226 Conway, T., Moser, C., Norton, A. and Farrington, J. “Rights and Livelihoods Approaches: Exploring Policy Dimensions.”

Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Natural Resource Perspectives 78. March 2002.

benefit from production growth and whichdo not. There is no clear picture, at microlevel, of what might create an enablingenvironment for the poor and landless tothrive and what might encourage furtherextortion and land grabbing. Some observersfear that “rich valleys generate politicalambitions.”224 Others have found that richvalleys have been able to bribe localcommanders, and thus avoid the ravages ofconflict.225 Participatory platforms may bea way to resolve conflicts over resourcetenure. They may, on the other hand, merelyinflame existing tensions between pastoralistsand settled farmers and between landownersand tenants as communities are pressured toarrive at a consensus on developmentpriorities in order to access aid flows. Arights-based approach may help us learn moreabout who has power and how they are usingit, but it may not provide much guidance onwhat should be done about it. A more luciddefinition of rights may be useful in clarifyinggovernmental responsibilities, but may saylittle about how to mobilise the neededhuman and financial capacity to live up tothose responsibilities.226 Furthermore, arights-based approach may be of little use in

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searching for a middle ground between thegrand assumptions about the roles andresponsibilities of the state that most of theAfghan bureaucracy would like to pursue,and the narrow NPM vision of the NDF.

The underlying paradox of rural developmentefforts is that, on the one hand, the crisisnarrative of the aid community suggests thatdevelopment efforts can start from a blankslate. On the other hand, the statist visionsof the government also encourage turning ablind eye to ongoing local processes andinternational market trends, since the visionsof the past are assumed to still be valid andviable. Both remain rooted in a convictionthat development interventions can createthe missing social capital that will bindtogether rural development processes. Neitherencourages looking at what is actually goingon in Afghan villages and the markets andnetworks in which villages are entwined.

The challenge of getting local perspectivesonto the agenda will only be met on asignificant and sustainable scale if ruralpeople, especially farmers, organisethemselves and develop their own politicalcapacity for joint action. This requires bothinstitutional savvy and skills in financialmanagement. The emergence of some formof farmer organisations would seemimperative. The community developmentefforts of most NGOs assume that they canfill a supposed void through sitting withshuras. The cooperative promotion effortsof MAAH assume that Afghanistan can merelypick up where it left off in the 1970s. Bothapproaches directly aim at organising thepoor. Neither looks critically at the moreimportant issue of the local level incentivesthat poor people have to organise and sustaintheir organisations.227 Both approaches giveinsufficient attention to how rural people —farmers, labourers and traders — have beengetting on with their lives all along. Neither

227 See Joshi, A. and Moore, M. The mobilising potential of anti-poverty programmes. IDS Discussion Paper No. 374. Sussex:Institute for Development Studies. 2000.

the interventions of the NGOs nor thegovernment are being mobilised withadequate capacity in either political oreconomic skills to catch up with therehabilitation agenda that rural peoplethemselves have been pursuing all theseyears. Farmer voice and empowerment willonly start to emerge if programmes are basedon empirical understanding of the political,economic and institutional underpinnings oftheir ongoing livelihood strategies. Thecollective experience of interventions in thesector during the past few decades couldprovide a basis for developing such anunderstanding. The various efforts to establishrevolving funds and other processes basedon the introduction of subsidised agriculturalinputs could provide valuable informationregarding if and how these types of aid canreally contribute to the emergence ofsustainable and equitable institutions.Analyses may also reveal whetherprogramming actually causes more damageby reinforcing impressions that the aidcommunity and the state intend to continuetheir provision of scattered and occasionallargesse. This requires a strong commitmentto learning, and a process of critical reflectionon the narratives upon which these types ofprogrammes rely.

There is also a need to acknowledge thelimited scope that governmental and aid-financed services have in enhancingagriculture’s impact on livelihoods. There isa need to acknowledge the power of localstakeholders to lead development where theymay. In some types of programming, such aspromotion of alternatives to opium productionand efforts to influence gender roles, a degreeof realism has taken hold. In others, theunbridled optimism of international narrativesabout “seamless transitions” between warand development clearly still hold sway. Thefollowing recommendations are intended asa framework for more pragmatic and

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principled approaches to increasing the impactof agricultural development efforts on Afghanlivelihoods. These suggestions acknowledgethe power that history and current social,political and economic relations have insteering local development processes and inpreserving national policy narratives. Theserecommendations also propose how thesenarratives must be confronted if developmentplanning is to proceed in a manner that iscognisant of what can be done and whatshould be done in the current circumstances.

The central conundrum regarding the “light”NPM model and the older visions for a strongstate is that Afghanistan cannot afford either.In financial terms, the country cannot affordthe level of investment that would be requiredto create a strong public sector bureaucracyand to intervene to protect and provideservices to promote the production ofcommodities such as cotton in Kunduz tocompete with neighbouring countries. Theextremely weak tax base and the lack ofdynamism in the public sector mean that theresources are simply not there to establisha strong state in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, in socio-political terms,the Afghan state cannot afford the de factolaissez faire approach to rural developmentthat inevitably accompanies a light state. Itcannot afford to allow its potentialagricultural recovery to fade due to unfaircompetition from imports. It cannot affordto let the opium economy continue todominate commercial development. And itcannot afford to forfeit state legitimacy byfailing to provide services and establish visiblestructures that counterbalance the power ofthe commanders in rural areas. Failure toaddress these challenges is likely to lead tothe return of the centrifugal tendencies thathave torn the country apart so many timesin the past. Civil society and the privatesector could (and should) fill some of theagricultural service provision breach, buttheir capacity and willingness to shoulder agreater burden is contingent on the stability

that can only be achieved through a strongerstate in rural areas.

The solution for this conundrum is of coursegenerally assumed to be aid. The internationalcommunity is expected to ensure that thesegaps can be filled, while waiting for thegovernment’s own financial and humanresources to get up to speed. But will aconsistency of funding and politicalcommitment be maintained over the nextfew crucial years? This paper echoes thecritique of unfulfilled promises andinconsistent rhetoric from the donorcommunity about what the Afghan state willand won’t be helped to do. Still, it may bepragmatically more appropriate to designapproaches that are cognisant of thefickleness that the aid community hasrepeatedly shown in financing post-conflictrehabilitation and reconstruction throughoutthe world, and the short memory that hasbeen demonstrated time after time inAfghanistan in particular. There is a need foradvocacy and also for a degree of jadedrealism. The following recommendations arepresented in such a spirit.

Recommendations

Learn about and build consensus on thegoals and the meaning of a facilitatingand regulating state in agriculturaldevelopment

Current policy formation efforts combine(and conflate) the needs for establishingefficiency through NPM approaches withenhancing equity in order to reverse thetrends that have driven the conflict over thepast decades. International experience hasshown that efficiency and equity can becombined, but are not self-evidentbedfellows. There is a need to move towardmore evidence-based policies that combineprincipled commitments to efficiency andequity with pragmatic acknowledgement oftrade-offs due to on-the-ground realities andthe essential but limited impact that aid can



make on social, political and economicrelations.

• Better coordination is both a prerequisiteand a product of intra-agency learning.Sharing of knowledge is the mostappropriate basis for ensuring greateragreement regarding what outside supportfarmers need and who the mostappropriate actor is to provide thissupport.

• Improved programming relies on frankanalyses of (a) the ability of differentservice providers to reach different targetgroups, (b) the cost efficiency andeffectiveness of different methods, and(c) the potential sustainability of differentinstitutional service structures.

• These analyses will probably point towardthe need for a two-pronged approach torural development (research andextension in particular), with growth andprivatisation leading efforts in highpotential and accessible areas, such asKunduz Province, and a concern for basicfood security and social protection inweakly integrated areas, for example,Hazarajat.

• There is a need to concretise theobjectives of the National DevelopmentFramework by more specifically definingwhat support farmers should expect toreceive, and by prioritising the use ofpublic/aid resources to ensure that thegoals of promoting both growth and equityare addressed in a more transparentmanner.

• Given the extreme levels of ruraldestitution and vulnerability, thisconsensus can provide a basis for seeinghow enhanced social protectionprogramming can ensure both basicsurvival and the provision of resourceflows that rural people can invest inproduction.

Reassess and reinforce the accountabilityof the private sector and civil society inagricultural development

In order to better define the role of the state,notions and normative aims regarding theprivate sector and civil society must beanchored in an understanding of what thesesets of institutions really are. It is not enoughto label the private sector or civil society asthe solution. A frank assessment is neededof what agricultural services they provideand why they are providing (or failing toprovide) services to different groups offarmers. Disaggregation between high andlow potential areas and between wealthyand poor producers is a prerequisite topredicting where different strategies can beexpected to succeed and who is likely tobenefit.

• There is a need for clear and independentevaluation of current efforts to delegateresponsibilities to shuras, cooperativesand other civil society institutions, andto assess the impact of efforts totransform these institutions intoegalitarian and/or commercially orientedorganisations.

• Investments in building civil society’scapacities for channelling aid resourcesto agricultural development need to becoupled with more specific attention toif and how these institutions can be mademore accountable to their communities.

• Civil society should be supported tostrengthen the capacity of farmers tomake demands, instead of just trainingshuras to manage the receipt of aidresources. This objective has beenaddressed in some sectors, but is stillweak in agriculture.

• Initial efforts to encourage the privatesector to provide agricultural services areencouraging, but are still dwarfed by thecontinued tendency of aid agencies toundercut the market for private service

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providers, or are distorted by tendenciesto favour a few chosen entrepreneurswith massive subsidies. This needs to beaddressed through tighter coordination,in particular through good donorship.

• The greatest concern of farmers is theneed to ensure that private input suppliersare held accountable for the services thatthey provide, including those sellingfertilisers and pesticides and thoseproviding veterinary medicines andvaccines. Priority should be given toenhancing the capacity of the state tocarry out its regulatory responsibilities.Investment in this area would illustratethat public sector reform is not just anagenda to dismantle the state, butactually results in visible improvementsin service provision.

• Critical consideration must be given tothe need to apply “protection” conceptsto assessing the likely intra- and inter-community impact of agriculturalinterventions, particularly irrigation. Thisshould be done based on an understandingof how Afghan farmers, communityleaders and commanders have dealt withconflict and tried to manipulate theoutcomes to benefit their own livelihoodstrategies.

Put the market on the agenda

Apart from woes about the supposedlyunassailable profitability of opium production,empirically grounded agro-economic andmarket thinking has not gained centre stagein policies and programming. Even those whohave recognised the importance ofdiversification and market orientation haverun into difficulties in identifying where andhow to intervene. The challenges to gainingan overview of market forces in a countrywhere such a large proportion of the marketis illicit are admittedly enormous, but thedangers of continuing to leave these factorson the back burner are greater. The market

is not a panacea for equitable ruraldevelopment, but recognition of itsimportance would be an important step inrealigning programming with the prevailinglivelihood strategies of rural people and theeconomic realities they face when trying tosell their crops.

• Efforts to promote export agriculturemust be more cognisant of regional andinternational markets if they are to avoidleading farmers into unprofitable andunsustainable endeavours.

• Special attention should be paid to usingcapacity building to introduce alternativeperspectives on what is possible anddesirable in commercial development, aswould guidelines to promote a do-no-harm-to-the-market frame of analysis inagricultural service provision.

• If market development initiatives are tobe pro-poor, then priorities for aidinvestments must take into account theways in which new market prospects maybest stimulate the creation of off-farm,non-farm and large-farm employmentopportunities.

• After recent successes in increasingproduction, attention should shift to thelinks between farm production and marketdemand. The most important of thesefactors is storage and processing.

Deal with risk

In light of the legacy of conflict and naturaldisasters, Afghans will inevitably make theirdecisions about how to integrate agricultureinto their livelihoods primarily based on anassessment of risk. Fears of renewed conflictand natural hazards are at the core oftraders’, farmers’ and rural labourers’ choiceof livelihood options. The actions of the stateand the aid community already directly affectthe parameters for these risk assessments.The relevance and effectiveness of agricultureprogramming would therefore increase



enormously if risk was given far greaterprominence in policy formation. Instead ofbeing seen as a factor that scares donors,risk awareness should be used to highlightpriorities for protecting rural livelihoods.

• While it is important not to exaggeratethe effectiveness of traditional or informalr isk reduction inst itut ions andmechanisms, planning should nonethelessrecognise that they are the first line ofdefence in dealing with natural hazardsand conflict, and that formal institutionsfor risk management (insurance, civilprotection, governmental land useplanning structures, etc.) will not emergein the near future.

• Traditional mechanisms cannot, however,provide much protection against marketuncertainty. In order to mitigate theserisks, it is important to increase awarenessamong aid agency and government staffof regional and international markettrends.

• A priority for helping farmers manage riskshould be providing information onmarkets and weather. Market informationservices and meteorological information,including snow surveys, would helpfarmers predict what might be a profitablecrop and how much irrigation water maybe available.

• Diversification within and beyondtraditional livelihoods through migration,commercialisation and other strategieshas long been the most effective set ofrisk reduction strategies employed byrural Afghans. Aid may have little directrole to play in enhancing these strategies,but livelihood-focused programming mustbe anchored in an awareness of theirimportance.

• Efforts to combat the opium economy arecentred on increasing the risks for poppyproduction relative to other livelihoodoptions. This specific aspect of riskenhancement deserves greaterprominence.

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Issues Paper Series


ADB Asian Development Bank

AKDN Aga Khan Development Network

AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

CADG Central Asian Development Group

DACAAR Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees

DFID Department for International Development (UK)

FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation

FEWS Famine Early Warning System

GoA Government of Afghanistan

ICARDA International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas

ICG International Crisis Group

IDP Internally displaced person

ISAF International Security Assistance Forces

MAAH Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry

MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

NDF National Development Framework

NEEP National Emergency Employment Programme

NGO Non-governmental organisation

NPM New Public Management

NRVA National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment

ODI Overseas Development Institute

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WFP World Food Programme

WTO World Trade Organisation

Abbreviations and Acronyms



July 2002 The Public Health System in Afghanistan, by Ronald Waldman and HomairaHanif

August 2002 Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan, by Nicholas Stockton

September 2002 Addressing Livelihoods in Afghanistan, by Adam Pain and Sue Lautze

December 2002 Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return to Afghanistan,by David Turton and Peter Marsden

March 2003 Land Rights in Crisis: Addressing Tenure Insecurity in Afghanistan, by Liz AldenWily

August 2002, 2003 The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance, 1st and 2nd editions

September 2003 One Hundred Households in Kabul: A Study of Winter Vulnerability, by JoGrace

September 2003 Land and the Constitution, by Liz Alden Wily

October 2003 Three Villages in Alingar, Laghman: Understanding Rural Livelihoods, by AliceKerr-Wilson and Adam Pain

November 2003 Afghan Elections: The Great Gamble

December 2003 Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan, by Rama Mani

February 2004 Land Relations in Bamyan Province: Findings from a 15 Village Case Study,by Liz Alden Wily

February 2004 Some Notes on the Livelihoods of the Urban Poor in Kabul, Afghanistan, byPamela Hunte

March 2004 A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, by AREU and the World Bank

March 2004 Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Assessment and Recommendationsfor Action, by AREU and the World Bank

March 2004 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2003: A Stakeholder-GeneratedMethodology, by Andrew Pinney

April 2004 Gender Roles in Agriculture: Case Studies of Five Villages in NorthernAfghanistan, by Jo Grace

April 2004 Understanding Village Institutions: Case Studies on Water Management fromFaryab and Saripul, by Adam Pain

April 2004 Wheat Seed and Agriculture Programming in Afghanistan: Its Potential toImpact on Livelihoods, by Alexia Coke

All AREU publications can be downloaded as soft copies from its web site. Hard copies are availableby contacting the AREU office in Kabul:

Publications from AREU

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation UnitCharahi Ansari (opposite the Insaf Hotel and Popolano’s Restaurant),

Shahr-e-Naw, Kabul, Afghanistan

Mobile: +93 (0)70 276 637; E-mail: [email protected]

Web site : www.areu.org.af

Issues Paper Series


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