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I. JUDICIARY

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25716 July 28, 1966

FERNANDO LOPEZ, petitioner,vs.

GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORALTRIBUNAL, respondents.

Vicente Francisco for petitioner.

Sycip and Salazar for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were the main

contenders for the Office of Vice-President of the Philippines in the generalelections held on November 9, 1965. By Resolution No. 2, approved on

December 17, 1965, the two Houses of Congress, in joint session

assembled as the board charged with the duty to canvass the votes then cast

for President and Vice President of the Philippines, proclaimed petitioner

Fernando Lopez elected to the latter office with 3,531,550 votes, or aplurality of 26,724 votes over his closest opponent, respondent Gerardo M.

Roxas, in whose favor 3,504,826 votes had been tallied, according to said

resolution. On January 5, 1966, respondent filed, with the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal, Election Protest No. 2, contesting the election of

petitioner herein as Vice-President of the Philippines, upon the ground thatit was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained the largest number of

votes for said office.

On February 22, 1966, petitioner Lopez instituted in the Supreme Court the

present original action, for prohibition with preliminary injunction, against

respondent Roxas, to prevent the Presidential Electoral Tribunal from

hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the groundthat Republic Act No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional,"

and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity."

Petitioner's contention is predicated upon the ground, that Congress may

not, by law, authorize an election contest for President and Vice-President,

the Constitution being silent thereon; that such contest tends to nullify the

constitutional authority of Congress to proclaim the candidates elected forPresident and Vice-President; that the recount of votes by the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal, as an incident of an election contest, is inconsistent with

the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the election returns for the

President and the Vice-President; that no amendment to the Constitution

providing for an election protest involving the office of President and Vice-President has been adopted, despite the constitutional amendment

governing election contests for Members of Congress; that the tenure of the

President and the Vice-President is fixed by the Constitution and cannot be

abridged by an Act of Congress, like Republic Act No. 1793; that said Act

has the effect of amending the Constitution, in that it permits the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal to review the congressional proclamation ofthe president-elect and the vice-president-elect; that the constitutional

convention had rejected the original plan to include in the Constitution a

provision authorizing election contest affecting the president-elect and the

vice-president-elect before an electoral commission; that the peopleunderstood the Constitution to authorize election contests only for

Members of Congress, not for President and Vice-President, and, in

interpreting the Constitution, the people's intent is paramount; that it is

illegal for Justices of the Supreme Court to sit as members of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal, since the decisions thereof are appealableto the Supreme Court on questions of law; that the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal is a court inferior to the Supreme Court; and that Congress cannot

by legislation appoint in effect the members of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal.

Pursuant to the Constitution, "the Judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. 1

This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely

some specified orlimitedjudicial power, but "the" judicial power under our

political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or "all" of said powerexcept, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency

such as the power to "judge all contests relating to the election, returns and

qualifications" of members of the Senate and those of the House o

Representatives which is vested by the fundamental law solely in th

Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.2

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputesinvolving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of

justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.3 The prope

exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such

enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies fo

violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hearand decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on

appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that "Congress shall have

the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various

courts," subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law. 4

Prior to the approval of Republic Act No. 1793, a defeated candidate forpresident or vice-president, who believe that he was the candidate whoobtained the largest number of votes for either office, despite th

proclamation by Congress of another candidate as the president-elect o

vice-president-elect, had no legal right to demand by election protest a

recount of the votes cast for the office concerned, to establish his right

thereto. As a consequence, controversies or disputes on this matter werenot justiciable.5

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:

There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal ..

which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the

election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and

the vice-president-elect of the Philippines.

has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contesjudicially the election of the President-elect or Vice-President-elect and to

demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved in the litigation

as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he6 is the one elected

president or vice-president, as the case may be,7 and that, as such, he is

entitled to assume the duties attached to said office. And by providingfurther, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the

Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court," said

legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional origina

jurisdiction of an exclusive character.8

Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has

merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a PresidentiaElectoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fac

that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts o

first instance,9

those of court of land registration,10

those of probate courts11 and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. 12 It is, also

comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of aprovincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited

number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of

courts of first instance. 13

In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipa

court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even

separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise of itsjurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinc

and separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land

registration or a probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic

relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a provincia

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capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited

than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which

are primary within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other

words, there is only one court, although it may perform the functions

pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristicsdifferent from those of the others.

Indeed, the Supreme Court, 14 the Court of Appeals 15 and courts of first

instance, 16 are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate

jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are booth trial courts and

appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one

Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance,clothed with authority to discharged said dual functions. A court of first

instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court of

land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although

with powers less broad than those of a court of first instance, hearing

ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior toitself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the

Supreme Court, since it is the same Courtalthough thefunctions peculiar to

said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in

the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic

Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power ofappointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes

the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme

Court. 17

Moreover, the power to be the "judge ... of ... contests relating to the

election, returns, and qualifications" of any public officer is essentiallyjudicial. As such under the very principle of separation of powers

invoked by petitioner herein it belongs exclusively to the judicial

department, except only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise.

This is precisely the reason why said organic law ordains that "the Senate

and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunalwhich shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,

and qualifications of their respective Members" (Article VI, Section 11, of

the Constitution). In other words, the purpose of this provision was to

exclude the power to decide such contests relating to Members of Congress

which by nature is judicial18 from the operation of the general grantof judicial power19 to "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may

be established by law.

Instead of indicating that Congress may not enact Republic Act No. 1793,

the aforementioned provision of the Constitution, establishing said

Electoral Tribunals for Members of Congress only, proves the exactopposite, namely: that the Constitution intended to vest Congress withdiscretion 20 to determine by law whether ornotthe election of a president-

elect or that of a vice-president-elect may be contested and, if Congress

should decide in the affirmative, which court of justice shall have

jurisdiction to hear the contest. It is, even, debatable whether such

jurisdiction may be conferred, by statute, to a board, commission ortribunal composed partly of Members of Congress and Members of the

Supreme Court because of its possible inconsistency with the constitutional

grant of the judicial power to "the Supreme Court and ... such inferior

courts as may be established by law," for said board, commission or

tribunal would be neither "the Supreme Court, 21 nor, certainly, "suchinferior courts as, may be established by law."

It follows, therefore, not only that Republic Act No. 1793 is not

inconsistent with the Constitution or with the principle of separation of

powers underlying the same, but, also, that it is in harmony with theaforementioned grant of "the judicial power" to said courts. Indeed, when

Claro M. Recto, Chairman of the Constitutional Convention, proposed thatthe original move therein to include in the fundamental law a provision

creating an Electoral Commission 22 to hear election contests against the

President-elect and the Vice-President-elect, be given up, he expressed the

view that the elimination of said provision would have the effect of leaving

in the hands of the legislative department the power to decide what entityor body would "look into the protests for the positions of President and

Vice-President." 23 Twenty-two (22) years later, or on May 3, 1957 then

Senator Recto reiterated this view, when, in the course of the debates on the

Bill which later became Republic Act No. 1793, he stated:

... Mr. President, as far as I can remember, the intention of the

constitutional convention was to leave this matter to ordinary

legislation.

Such was, also, the impression of Dr. Jose M. Aruego, another prominent

Member of the Convention, who says 24 that

Election protests for the Presidency and the Vice-Presidendency

were left to be judged in a manner and by a body decided by theNational Assembly. (Emphasis ours.)

No less than one of the main counsel for petitioner herein, himself, anothe

delegate to the Constitutional Convention, evidently shared this view as

late as September 30, 1965, for the introduction to his 1965 edition of "the

Revised Election Code" states that "he will always be remembered for ..

his famous bill creating the Presidential Electoral Tribunal ...". Indeed as amember of the Senate, on January 3, 1950, he Introduced Senate Bill No. 1

seeking to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal "to try, hear and decide

protests contesting the election of the President and the Vice-President of

the Philippines", which shall be composed of three Justices of the SupremeCourt, including the Chief Justice, and four Senators and four Members of

the House of Representatives.

Then, again, the records of the Convention show, that in voting eventually

to eliminate, from the draft of the Constitution, the provision establishing a

Presidential Electoral Commission, the delegates were influenced by th

fact that there was no similar provision in the Federal Constitution of theUnited States. Having followed the pattern thereof, it must be assumed

therefore, in the absence of any indicium to the contrary,25 that th

Convention had adhered, also, to the interpretation given to this feature of

said Federal Constitution, as may be deduced from the fact that, by an act

of Congress of the United States, approved on January 29, 1877, anElectoral Commission was created to hear and decide certain issue

concerning the election of the President of said nation held in 1876. It is,

also worthy of notice that pursuant to said Act, nothing therein "shall be

held to impair or affect any right now existing under the Constitution and

laws to question, by proceedings in the judicial courts of the United Statesthe right or title of the person who shall be declared elected, or who shall

claim to be President or Vice-President of the United States, if any such

right exists". 26 Thus the absence of a provision in said Federal Constitution

governing protests against the election of the President and the Vice

President had been construed to be without prejudice to the right of the

defeated candidate to file a protest before the courts of justice of the UnitedStates, if the laws thereof permitted it. In other words, the Federal Congres

was deemed clothed with authority to determine, by ordinary legislation

whether or not protests against the election of said officers may properly be

entertained by the judicial department.

Needless to say, the power of congress to declare who, among thecandidates for President and/or Vice-President, has obtained the larges

number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent

with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by

Republic Act No. 1793. Congress merely acts as a national board o

canvassers, charged with the ministerialand executive duty 27 to make saiddeclaration, on the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial

and city boards of canvassers. 28 Upon the other hand, the Presidentia

Electoral Tribunal has the judicialpower to determine whether or not said

duly certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with

or reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, ifnot, to recount the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto, pass upon the

validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and

in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has power to do.

It is, likewise, patent that the aforementioned authority of the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal to determine whether or not the protestant has a betterright than the President and/or the Vice-President declared elected by

Congress would not abridge the constitutional tenure. If the evidenc

introduced in the election protest shows that the person really elected

president or vice-president is the protestant, not the person declared elected

by Congress, then the latter had legally no constitutional tenurewhatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no abridgement thereof.1wph1.t

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It is similarly obvious that, in imposing upon the Supreme Court the

additional duty of performing the functions of a Presidential Electoral

Tribunal, Congress has not, through Republic Act No. 1793, encroached

upon the appointing power of the Executive. The imposition of new duties

constitutes, neither the creation of an office, nor the appointment of anofficer. 29

In view of a resolution of this Court dated July 8, 1966, upholding the

validity of Republic Act No. 1793, upon the ground that it merely vests

additional jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, petitioner has filed a motion

dated July 13, 1966, praying this Court "to clarify whether or not" this

"election contest should as a consequence ... be docketed with, and therecords thereof transferred, to this Supreme Court, and all pleadings, papers

and processes relative thereto should thence forth be filed with it". The

motion is, evidently, based upon the premise that the Supreme Court is

different and distinct from the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which is

erroneous, as well as contrary to the ruling made in said resolution.

Wherefore, the petition herein is hereby dismissed and the writs thereinprayed for denied accordingly. The aforesaid motion is, moreover, denied.

With costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OFTEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANIALCALA, petitioners,vs.BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, PhilippineConstabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971

ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL.CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971

LUZVIMINDA DAVID, petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine

Constabulary, COL. N. C. CAMELLO, in his capacity as Chief ofStaff, Philippine Constabulary and HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILEin his capacity as Secretary, Department of National defense,respondents.

G.R. No. L-33982 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OFNEMESIO E. PRUDENTE FELICIDAD G. PRUDENTE, petitioners,

vs.

GENERAL MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34004 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEASCORPUSIN BEHALF OF GERARDO TOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS"GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR RETURN OF DOCUMENTSILLEGALLY SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE LARA, in his capacity asChairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine BaAssociation, petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34013 December 11, 1971

REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief of the PhilippineConstabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34039 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEASCORPUSIN BEHALF OF SGT. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO ANDHIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO. CARLOS CRABAGO, in his capacity as President of the ConferenceDelegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA),petitioner,

vs.

BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, PhilippineConstabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34265 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OFANTOLIN ORETA, JR. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., petitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA and COL. PROSPERO OLIVASrespondents.

G.R. No. L-34339 December 11, 1971

GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVARpetitioner,

vs.

GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, PhilippineConstabulary, et al., respondents.

Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioners Teodosio Lansang, et al.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Rogelio V. Arienda.

E. Voltaire Garcia II for petitioner Luzvimindo David.

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Verzola, Africa and Atencio, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Wigberto E.Taada, Fortunato de Leon, R. G. Suntay and Juan T. David for

petitioner Felicidad G. Prudente.

Ruben L. Roxas for petitioner Reynaldo Rimando.

Nuez, Acob, Del Rosario and Ramos for petitioner Carlos Rabago,etc.

E. Voltaire Garcia II and M. P. Vivo for petitioner Gary Olivar, etc., etal.

Jose W. Diokno and Juanito R. Remulla for petitioner Antolin Oreta,Jr.

Domingo E. de Lara for and in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and AssistantSolicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the LiberalParty of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at PlazaMiranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the generalelections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenadeswere thrown, one after the other, at the platform where saidcandidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8)persons were killed and many more injured, including practically allof the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustainedextensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been fatalhad it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.

On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippinesannounced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21,1971, reading as follows:

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluatedinformation, it is definitely established thatlawless elements in the country, which aremoved by common or similar ideologicalconviction, design and goal and enjoying theactive moral and material support of a foreignpower and being guided and directed by a welltrained, determined and ruthless group of menand taking advantage of our constitutionalliberties to promote and attain their ends, haveentered into a conspiracy and have in factjoined and banded their forces together for theavowed purpose of actually staging,undertaking and waging an armed insurrectionand rebellion in order to forcibly seize politicalpower in this country, overthrow the duly

constituted government, and supplant ourexisting political social, economic and legalorder with an entirely new one whose form ofgovernment, whose system of laws, whoseconception of God and religion, whose notion ofindividual rights and family relations, and whosepolitical, social and economic precepts arebased on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachingsand beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting inconcert through front organizations that areseemingly innocent and harmless, havecontinuously and systematically strengthened

and broadened their memberships throughsustained and careful recruiting and enlistmenof new adherents from among our peasantrylaborers, professionals, intellectuals, studentsand mass media personnel, and through suchsustained and careful recruitment andenlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almosevery segment of our society in their ceaselessdetermination to erode and weaken the politicalsocial, economic and moral foundations of ouexisting government and to influence many

peasant, labor, professional, intellectualstudent and mass media organizations tocommit acts of violence and depredationsagainst our duly constituted authorities, againsthe members of our law enforcement agenciesand worst of all, against the peaceful membersof our society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements havecreated a state of lawlessness and disordeaffecting public safety and the security of theState, the latest manifestation of which habeen the dastardly attack on the Liberal Partyrally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which hasresulted in the death and serious injury oscores of persons;

WHEREAS, public safety requires thaimmediate and effective action be taken in ordeto maintain peace and order, secure the safetyof the people and preserve the authority of theState;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND EMARCOS, President of the Philippines, byvirtue of the powers vested upon me by ArticleVII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of theConstitution, do hereby suspend the privilege othe writ of habeas corpus, for the personpresently detained, as well as others who maybe hereafter similarly detained for the crimes oinsurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes

and offenses committed by them in furtheranceor on the occasion thereof, or incident theretoor in connection therewith.

Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in theabove-entitled cases, by the following persons, who, having beenarrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon theauthority of said proclamation, assail its validity, as well as that oftheir detention, namely:

1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANALCALA, the petitioners in Case No. L-33964 filed on August 241971 who, on August 22, 1971, between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., were"invited" by agents of the Philippine Constabulary which is undethe command of respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia to go

and did go to the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, aCamp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation, and thereafterdetained;

2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 filed, also, on August 24, 1971 who was picked up in hisresidence, at No. 55 Road, 3, Urduja Village, Quezon City, bymembers of the Metrocom and then detained;

3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 or onAugust 28, 1971 the same was amended to include VICENTEILAO and JUAN CARANDANG, as petitioners therein, althoughapart from stating that these additional petitioners are temporarily

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residing with the original petitioner, Rogelio V. Arienda, theamended petition alleged nothing whatsoever as regards thecircumstances under which said Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandangare said to be illegally deprived of their liberty;

4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 filed onAugust 25, 1971 who was similarly arrested in his residence, atNo. 131-B Kamias Road, Quezon City, and detained by theConstabulary;

5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 on August 27, 1971 upon the ground that her father, Dr.NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, had, on August 22, 1971, at about 8p.m., been apprehended by Constabulary agents in his house, at St.Ignatius Village, Quezon City, and then detained at the CampCrame stockade, Quezon City;

6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed on August 30,1971 to intervene as one of the petitioners in Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, he having been arrested by membersof the Constabulary on August 22, 1971, between 6:30 and 7:30p.m., in his residence, at 86 Don Manuel Street, Sta. Mesa Heights,Quezon City, and brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where heis detained and restrained of liberty;

7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one

of the petitioners in said three (3) cases, upon the ground that, onAugust 23, 1971, at about 8 a.m., he was, likewise, apprehended atSta. Rosa, Laguna, by members of the Philippine Constabulary andbrought, first to the Constabulary headquarters at Canlubang,Laguna, and, then, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he isdetained and restrained of liberty;

8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one ofthe petitioners in the same three (3) cases, he having been arrestedin his residence, at 318 Lakandula St., Angeles City, on August 22,1971, between 6 and 7 p.m., and taken to the PC offices at Sto.Domingo, Angeles City, then to Camp Olivas, San Fernando,Pampanga, and eventually to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where heis restrained and deprived of liberty;

9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old secondyear college students of St. Louis University, Baguio City, on whosebehalf, Domingo E. de Lara in his capacity as Chairman,Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association filedon September 3, 1971, the petition in Case No. L-34004, upon theground that said Gerardo Tomas had, on August 23, 1971, at about6 a.m., been arrested by Constabulary agents, while on his way toschool in the City of Baguio, then brought to the Constabularypremises therein at Camp Holmes, and, thereafter, taken, on August24, 1971, to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, and thence, on August 25,1971, to the Constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame, QuezonCity, where he is detained;

10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 filedon September 7, 1971 a 19-year old student of the U.P. Collegein Baguio city who, while allegedly on his way home, at Lukban

Road, Baguio, on August 23, 1971, at about 1 a.m., was joined bythree (3) men who brought him to the Burnham Park, thence, toCamp Olivas at San Fernando, Pampanga, and, thereafter, to CampCrame, Quezon City, where he is detained;

11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs.BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO, on whose behalf Carlos C. Rabago as President of the Conference Delegates Association of thePhilippines (CONDA) filed the petition in Case No. L-34039 onSeptember 14, 1971 against Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia, allegingthat, on August 27, 1971, at about 3 p.m., Mrs. De Castro wasarrested, while at Liamzon Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal, byagents of the Constabulary, and taken to the PC headquarters at

Camp Crame, where, later, that same afternoon, her husband wasbrought, also, by PC agents and both are detained;

12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L34265 on October 26, 1971 against said Gen. Garcia, as Chieof the Constabulary, and Col. Prospero Olivas, Chief of the CentraIntelligence Service (CIS), Philippine Constabulary, alleging thatupon invitation from said CIS, he went, on October 20, 1971, toCamp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to see Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief ofStaff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who referred petitioneto Col. Laroya of the CIS; that the latter, in turn, referred him to CISInvestigator Atty. Berlin Castillo and another CIS against, whosename is unknown to the petitioner; and that, after being interrogatedby the two (2), petitioner was detained illegally; and

13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34339 filed onNovember 10, 1971 who was apprehended, by agents of theConstabulary, in the evening of November 8, 1941, in Quezon Cityand then detained at Camp Crame, in the same City.

Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents wereforthwith required to answer the petitions therein, which they didThe return and answer in L-33964 which was, mutatis mutandisreproduced substantially or by reference in the other cases, excepL-34265 alleges, inter alia, that the petitioners had beenapprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had

"participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "theircontinued detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilegeof the writ ofhabeas corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of thePresident of the Philippines;" that there is "a state of insurrection orrebellion" in this country, and that "public safety and the security ofthe State required the suspension of the privilege of the writ ohabeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the Philippines inProclamation No. 889; that in making said declaration, the"President of the Philippines acted on relevant facts gathered thruthe coordinated efforts of the various intelligence agents of ougovernment but (of) which the Chief Executive could not at themoment give a full account and disclosure without risking revelationof highly classified state secrets vital to its safely and security"; thathe determination thus made by the President is "final andconclusive upon the court and upon all other persons" and"partake(s) of the nature of political question(s) which cannot be thesubject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87

and Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882; that petitioners "areunder detention pending investigation and evaluation of culpabilitieson the reasonable belief" that they "have committed, and are stilcommitting, individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged inarmed struggle, insurgency and other subversive activities for theoverthrow of the Government; that petitioners cannot raise, in theseproceedings for habeas corpus, "the question of their guilt oinnocence"; that the "Chief of Constabulary had petitioners takeninto custody on the basis of the existence of evidence sufficient toafford a reasonable ground to believe that petitioners come withinthe coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ ofhabeascorpus has been suspended"; that the "continuing detention of thepetitioners as an urgent bona fide precautionary and preventivemeasure demanded by the necessities of public safety, publicwelfare and public interest"; that the President of the Philippines has"undertaken concrete and abundant steps to insure that the

constitutional rights and privileges of the petitioners as well as of theother persons in current confinement pursuant to Proclamation 889remain unimpaired and unhampered"; and that "opportunities ooccasions for abuses by peace officers in the implementation of theproclamation have been greatly minimized, if not completelcurtailed, by various safeguards contained in directives issued byproper authority."

These safeguards are set forth in:

1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defensedated August 21, 1971, directing, inter alia, in connection with thearrest or detention of suspects pursuant to Proclamation No. 889

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that, except when caught in flagrante delicto, no arrest shall bemade without warrant authorized in writing by the Secretary ofNational Defense; that such authority shall not be granted unless,"on the basis of records and other evidences," it appearssatisfactorily, in accordance with Rule 113, section 6(b), of the Rulesof Court, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of the actsmentioned in the proclamation; that, if such person will be chargedwith a crime subject to an afflictive penalty under the Anti-Subversion Act, the authorization for his arrest shall not be issuedunless supported by signed intelligence reports citing at least onereliable witness to the same overt act; that no unnecessary or

unreasonable force shall be used in effecting arrests; and thatarrested persons shall not be subject to greater restraint than isnecessary for their detention;

2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August23, 27, and 30, 1971, to all units of his command, stating that theprivilege of the writ is suspended for no other persons than thosespecified in the proclamation; that the same does not involvematerial law; that precautionary measures should be taken toforestall violence that may be precipitated by improper behavior ofmilitary personnel; that authority to cause arrest under theproclamation will be exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS,and "officers occupying position in the provinces down to provincialcommanders"; that there shall be no indiscriminate or mass arrests;that arrested persons shall not be harmed and shall be accorded fairand humane treatment; and that members of the detainee's

immediate family shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;

3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, datedSeptember 2, 1971, directing the Chief of the Constabulary toestablish appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups toprevent and/or check any abuses in connection with the suspensionof the privilege of the writ; and

4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating aPresidential Administrative Assistance Committee to hearcomplaints regarding abuses committed in connection with theimplementation of Proclamation No. 889.

Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitionersVicente Ilao and Juan Carandang had been released from custody

on August 31, 1971, "after it had been found that the evidenceagainst them was insufficient."

In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents thereintraversed some allegations of fact and conclusions of law made inthe petition therein and averred that Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitionertherein, had been and is detained "on the basis of a reasonableground to believe that he has committed overt acts in furtherance ofrebellion or insurrection against the government" and, accordingly,"comes within the class of persons as to whom the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpus has been suspended by Proclamation No.889, as amended," the validity of which is not contested by him.

On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A,amending Proclamation No. 889, so as to read as follows:

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluatedinformation, it is definitely established thatlawless elements in the country, which aremoved by common or similar ideologicalconviction, design and goal and enjoying theactive moral and material support of a foreignpower and being guided and directed by a well-trained, determined and ruthless group of menand taking advantage of our constitutionalliberties to promote and attain their ends, haveentered into a conspiracy and have in factjoined and banded their forces together for theavowed purpose of [actually] staging,

undertaking, [and] wagging and are actuallyengagedin an armed insurrection and rebellionin order to forcibly seize political power in thiscountry, overthrow the duly constitutedgovernment, and supplant our existing politicalsocial, economic and legal order with an entirelynew one whose form of government, whosesystem of laws, whose conception of God andreligion, whose notion of individual rights andfamily relations, and whose political, social andeconomic precepts are based on the Marxist

Leninist-Maoist teaching and beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting inconcert through front organizations that areseemingly innocent and harmless, havecontinuously and systematically strengthenedand broadened their memberships throughsustained and careful recruiting and enlistmenof new adherents from among our peasantlylaborers, professionals, intellectuals, studentsand mass media personnel, and through suchsustained and careful recruitment andenlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almosevery segment of our society in their ceaselessdetermination to erode and weaken the politicalsocial, economic and moral foundations of ou

existing government and influence manypeasant, labor, professional, intellectualstudent and mass media organizations tocommit acts of violence and depredationsagainst our duly constituted authorities, againsthe members of our law enforcement agenciesand worst of all, against the peaceful membersof our society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by theiacts of rebellion and insurrection, have createda state of lawlessness and disorder affectingpublic safety and security of the State, the latesmanifestation of which has been the dastardlyattack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila onAugust 21, 1971, which has resulted in the

death and serious injury of scores of persons;

WHEREAS, public safety requires thaimmediate and effective action be taken in ordeto maintain peace and order, secure the safetyof the people and preserve the authority of theState;

NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND EMARCOS, President of the Philippines, byvirtue of the powers vested upon me by ArticleVII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of theConstitution, do hereby suspend the privilege othe writ of habeas corpus for the personspresently detained, as well as all others whomay be hereafter similarly detained for the

crimes of insurrection or rebellion [,] and [allother [crimes and offenses] overt actscommitted by them in furtherance [or on theoccasion] thereof[,]. [or incident thereto, or inconnection therewith.] 1

On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 andL-33982 were jointly heard and then the parties therein were allowedto file memoranda, which were submitted from September 3 toSeptember 9, 1971.

Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889was further amended by Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the

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suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in thefollowing provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the Philippine,namely:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Batanes 15. Negros Occ.2. Ilocos Norte 16. NegrosOr.3. Ilocos Sur 17. Cebu

4. Abra 18. Bohol5. Abra 19. Capiz6. Pangasinan 20. Aklan7. Batangas 21. Antique8. Catanduanes 22. Iloilo9. Masbate 23. Leyte10. Romblon 24. Leyte delSur11. Marinduque 25.Northern Samar 12. Or. Mindoro 26. EasternSamar13. Occ. Mindoro 27.Western Samar 14. Palawan.

B. SUB-PROVINCES:

1. Guimaras 3. Siquior2. Biliran

C. CITIES:

1. Laog 10. Bacolod2. Dagupan 11. Bago3. San Carlos 12. Canlaon4. Batangas 13. La Carlota5. Lipa 14. Bais6. Puerto Princesa 15.Dumaguete7. San Carlos (Negros 16.

IloiloOcc.) 17. Roxas8. Cadiz 18. Tagbilaran9. Silay 19. Lapu-lapu

20. Cebu 24. Tacloban21. Mandaue 25. Ormoc22. Danao 26. Calbayog23. Toledo

On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No.889-C, restoring the privilege of the writ in the following provincesand cities:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Surigao del Norte 8.Agusan del Sur2. Surigao del Sur 9.Misamis Or.3. Davao del Norte 10.Misamis Occ.4. Davao del Sur 11.Zamboanga del Norte5. Davao Oriental 12.Basilan6. Bukidnon 13. Pagadian7. Agusan del Norte

B. CITIES:

1. Surigao 8. Tangub2. Davao 9. Dapitan3. Butuan 10. Dipolog4. Cagayan 11Zamboanga5. Gingoong 12. Basilan6. Ozamiz 13. Pagadian7. Oroquieta

On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was furtherlifted by Proclamation No. 889-D, in the following places:

A. PROVINCES:

1. Cagayan 5. Camarines2. Cavite 6. Albay3. Mountain Province 7Sorsogon4. Kalinga-Apayao

B. CITIES:

1. Cavite City 3. TreceMartires2. Tagaytay 4. Legaspi

As a consequences, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is stisuspended in the following eighteen (18) provinces, two (2) subprovinces and eighteen (18) cities, to wit:

A. PROVINCE:

1. Bataan 10. NorthCotabato2. Benguet 11. Nueva Ecija3. Bulacan 13. Pampanga4. Camarines Sur 14Quezon

5. Ifugao 15. Riza6. Isabela 16. SouthCotabato7. Laguna 17. Tarlac8. Lanao del Norte 18Zambales9. Lanao del Norte

B. SUB-PROVINCES:

1. Aurora 2. Quirino

C. CITIES:

1. Angeles 10. Manila2. Baguio 11. Maraw3. Cabanatuan 12. Naga4. Caloocan 13. Olongapo5. Cotabato 14. Palayan6. General Santos 15Pasay7. Iligan 16. Quezon8 Iriga 17. San Jose9 Lucena 18. San Pablo

The first major question that the Court had to consider was whetherit would adhere to the view taken in Barcelon v. Baker, 2 andreiterated in Montenegro v. Castaeda, 3 pursuant to which, "the

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authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiringsuspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs tothe President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon thecourts and upon all other persons." Indeed, had said question beendecided in the affirmative the main issue in all of these cases,exceptL-34339, would have been settled, and, since the other issues wererelatively of minor importance, said cases could have been readilydisposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a majority of the Members ofthe Court had, however, reached, although tentatively, a consensusto the contrary, and decided that the Court had authority to and

should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by theConstitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; but beforeproceeding to do so, the Court deemed it necessary to hear theparties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken,none of them having previously expressed their views thereof.Accordingly, on October 5, 1971, the Court issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating in part that

... a majority of the Court having tentativelyarrived at a consensus that it may inquire inorder to satisfy itself of the existence of thefactual bases for the issuance of PresidentialProclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspendingthe privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus for allpersons detained or to be detained for thecrimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout

the Philippines, which area has lately beenreduced to some eighteen provinces, twosubprovinces and eighteen cities with the partiallifting of the suspension of the privilege effectedby Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and 889-D) and thus determine theconstitutional sufficiency of such bases in thelight of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1,par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of thePhilippine Constitution; and considering that themembers of the Court are not agreed on theprecise scope and nature of the inquiry to bemade in the premises, even as all of them areagreed that the Presidential findings are entitledto great respect, the Court RESOLVED thatthese cases be set for rehearing on October 8,1971 at 9:30 A.M.

xxx xxx xxx

On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, onceagain, but, this time jointly with cases Nos. L-34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties were then granted a period to filememoranda, in amplification of their respective oral arguments,which memoranda were submitted from October 12 to October 21,1971.

Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, onSeptember 1 and October 8, 1971, their willingness to impart to theCourt classified information relevant to these cases, subject toappropriate security measures, the Court met at closed doors, onOctober 28 and 29, 1971, and, in the presence of three (3) attorneys

for the petitioners, chosen by the latter, namely, Senator Jose W.Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty. Leopoldo Africa, aswell as of the Solicitor General and two (2) members of his staff,was briefed, by Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the ArmedForces of the Philippines, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Deputy Chief of Staff,Gen. Felizardo Tanabe, Col. Tagumpay Nanadiego, JudgeAdvocate General, JAGS (GSC), and other ranking officers of saidArmed Forces, on said classified information, most of which wascontained in reports and other documents already attached to therecords. During the proceedings, the members of the Court, and,occassionally, counsel for the petitioners, propounded pertinentquestions to said officers of the Armed Forces. Both parties werethen granted a period of time within which to submit their respectiveobservations, which were filed on November 3, 1971, and

complemented by some documents attached to the records onNovember 6, 1971, and a summary, submitted on November 151971, of the aforesaid classified information.

In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivarhad been filed and the parties therein were heard in oral argumenon November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively.

On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations motions stating that on November 13, 1971, the following petitioners

were:

(a) released from custody:

(1) Teodosio Lansang -- G.R. No. L-33964(2) Bayani Alcala -- " " L-33964(3) Rogelio Arienda -- " " L-33965(4) Nemesio Prudente -- " " L-33982(5) Gerardo Tomas -- " " L-34004(6) Reynaldo Rimando -- " " L-34013(7) Filomeno M. de Castro -- " " L-34039(8) Barcelisa de Castro -- " " L-34039(9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. -- " " L-34264.

(b) charged, together with other persons named in the crimina

complaint filed therefor, with a violation of Republic Act No. 1700(Anti-Subversion Act), in the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City:

(1) Angelo de los Reyes -- G.R. No. L-22982(2) Teresito Sison -- " " L-33982 *

(c) accused, together with many others named in the criminacomplaint filed therefor, of a violation of section 4 of Republic AcNo. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the Court of First Instance ofRizal:

(1) Rodolfo del Rosario -- G.R. No. L-33969 *(2) Luzvimindo David -- " " L-33973(3) Victor Felipe -- " " L-33982 *

and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, asamended, and praying that the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-33964, L33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-34039 be dismissedwithout prejudice to the resolution of the remaining cases. Copy othe criminal complaint filed, as above stated, with the Court of FirsInstance of Rizal and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-1623of said court which was appended to said manifestations-motionsof the respondent as Annex 2 thereof shows that Gary Olivar, thepetitioner in L-34339, is one of the defendants in said case.

Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, LuzvimindoDavid, petitioner in L-33973, in his comment dated November 231971, urged the Court to rule on the merits of the petitions in all othese cases, particularly on the constitutionality of PresidentiaProclamation No. 889, as amended, upon the ground that he is stildetained and that the main issue is one of public interest involving

as it does the civil liberties of the people. Angelo de los Reyes, oneof the petitioners in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Nemesio EPrudente and Gerardo Tomas, for whose respective benefit thepetitions in L-33982 and L-34004 have been filed, maintained thathe issue in these cases is not moot, not even for the detainees whohave been released, for, as long as the privilege of the writ remainssuspended, they are in danger of being arrested and detained againwithout just cause or valid reason. In his reply, dated and filed onNovember 29, 1971, the Solicitor General insisted that the release othe above-named petitioners rendered their respective petitionsmoot and academic.

I

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Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question theformal validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege of thewrit ofhabeas corpus. In this connection, it should be noted that, asoriginally formulated, Proclamation No. 889 was contested upon theground that it did not comply with the pertinent constitutionalprovisions, namely, paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of ourConstitution, reading:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shallnot be suspended except in cases of invasion,insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safetyrequires it, in any way of which events the samemay be suspended wherever during such periodthe necessity for such suspension shall exist.

and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument,which provides that:

The President shall be commander-in-chief ofall armed forces of the Philippines, andwhenever it becomes necessary, he may callout such armed forces to prevent or suppresslawless violence, invasion, insurrection, orrebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, orrebellion, or imminent danger thereof when thepublic safety requires it, he may suspend the

privileges of the writ ofhabeas corpus, or placethe Philippines or any part thereof under martiallaw.

Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of "imminent danger"of invasion, insurrection or rebellion which is one of the groundsstated in said paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of theConstitution, but not mentioned in paragraph (14), section 1 of its Billof Rights petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 didnot declare the existence ofactual"invasion insurrection or rebellionor imminent danger thereof," and that, consequently, saidProclamation was invalid. This contention was predicated upon thefact that, although the first "whereas" in Proclamation No. 889 statedthat "lawless elements" had "entered into a conspiracyand have infact joinedand banded their forces together for the avowed purpose

of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrectionand rebellion," the actuality so alleged refers to the existence, notofan uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion orinsurrection, but of the conspiracyand the intentto rise in arms.

Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has beenrendered moot and academic by Proclamation No. 889-A, issuednine (9) days after the promulgation of the original proclamation, oron August 30, 1971. Indeed, said Proclamation No. 889-A amended,inter alia, the first "whereas" of the original proclamation bypostulating the said lawless elements "have entered into aconspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces togetherfor the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and areactually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in order toforcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the dulyconstituted government, and supplant our existing political, social,

economic and legal order with an entirely new one ...." Moreover,the third "whereas" in the original proclamation was, likewise,amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by theiracts of rebellion and insurrection," have created a state oflawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security ofthe State. In other words, apart from adverting to the existence ofactual conspiracyand of the intentto rise in arms to overthrow thegovernment, Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawlesselements "are actually engaged in an armed insurrection andrebellion" to accomplish their purpose.

It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor ofthe original proclamation and particularly, the circumstances underwhich it had been issued, clearly suggest the intent to aver that

there was and is, actually, a state of rebellion in the Philippinesalthough the language of said proclamation was hardly a felicitousone, it having in effect, stressed the actuality of the intentto rise inarms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself. Thepleadings, the oral arguments and the memoranda of respondentsherein have consistently and abundantly emphasized to justifythe suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus theacts of violence and subversion committed prior to August 21, 1971by the lawless elements above referred to, and the conditionsobtaining at the time of the issuance of the original proclamation. Inshort, We hold that Proclamation No. 889-A has superseded the

original proclamation and that the flaws attributed thereto are purelyformal in nature.

II

Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, asamended. Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of theConstitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid exercise ofthe authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) theremust be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or pursuant toparagraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminendanger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspensionof the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under considerationdeclares that there has been and there is actually a state of rebellionandthat 4 "public safety requires that immediate and effective action betaken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of thepeople and preserve the authority of the State."

Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondentsmaintain that they are, upon the authority of Barcelon v. Baker5andMontenegro v. Castaeda. 6Upon the other hand, petitioners pressthe negative view and urge a reexamination of the position taken insaid two (2) cases, as well as a reversal thereof.

The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two(2) factors, namely: (a) it relied heavily upon Martin v. Mottinvolving the U.S. President's power to callout the militia, which he being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces may beexercised to suppress or prevent any lawless violence, even withouinvasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and

is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend theprivilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter doesindividual liberty; and (b) the privilege had been suspended by theAmerican Governor-General, whose act, as representative of theSovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly beequated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with thefreedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, andfrom whom all government authority emanates. The pertinent rulingin the Montenegro case was based mainly upon the Barcelon caseand hence, cannot have more weight than the same. Moreover, inthe Barcelon case, the Court held that it could go into the question"Did the Governor-General" acting under the authority vested inhim by the Congress of the United States, to suspend the privilegeof the writ of habeas corpus under certain conditions "act inconformance with such authority?" In other words, it diddeterminewhether or not the Chief Executive had acted in accordance withlaw. Similarly, in the Montenegro case, the Court held that petitioner

therein had "failed to overcome the presumption of correctnesswhich the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive ...." In short, theCourt consideredthe question whether or not there really was arerebellion, as stated in the proclamation therein contested.

Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit noclear on the point under consideration. Although some casespurport to deny the judicial power to "review" the findings made inthe proclamations assailed in said cases, the tenor of the opinionstherein given, considered as a whole, strongly suggests the court'sconviction that the conditions essential for the validity of saidproclamations or orders were, in fact, present therein, just as theopposite view taken in other cases 9had a backdrop permeated o

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characterized by the belief that said conditions were absent. Hence,the dictum of Chief Justice Taney to the effect that "(e)very casemust depend on its own circumstances." 10One of the important, ifnot dominant, factors, in connection therewith, was intimated inSterling v. Constantin, 11 in which the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that:

.... When there is a substantial showing that theexertion of state power has overridden privaterights secured by that Constitution, the subjectis necessarily one for judicial inquiry in anappropriate proceeding directed against theindividuals charged with the transgression. Tosuch a case the Federal judicial power extends(Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court hasall the authority appropriate to itsexercise. .... 12

In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority ofthe Court" had "tentativelyarrived at a consensus that it may inquirein order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for theissuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... andthus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in thelight of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII,sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon furtherdeliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in theconviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of

said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiencythereof.

Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neitherabsolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution,both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, islimited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishesa general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, itpostulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress itsimportance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeascorpus shall notbe suspended ...." It is only by way ofexception thatit permits the suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion,insurrection, or rebellion" or, under Art VII of the Constitution,"imminent danger thereof" "when the public safety requires it, inany of which events the same may be suspended wherever duringsuch period the necessity for such suspension shall exist." 13 For

from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege ofthe writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only bythe prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence,but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may beexercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting orconditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines andthe limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like thelimitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law uponthe legislative department, adherence thereto and compliancetherewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts ofjustice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereonwould be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution couldnot have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mindthat our political system is essentially democratic and republican in

character and that the suspension of the privilege affects the mostfundamental element of that system, namely, individual freedom.Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as demands,the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discussand dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views, thepolicies and the practices of the government and the party in powerthat he deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth,regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not.The untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right which,under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest order is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successfuloperation and wholesome growth and development.

Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by ouBasic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereofbut consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of thesocial order established by the Constitution and the context of theRule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used todestroy that social order, by means of force and violence, indefiance of the Rule of Law such as by rising publicly and takingarms against the government to overthrow the same, therebycommitting the crime of rebellion there emerges a circumstancethat may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementionedguarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of the writ o

habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must beforewarned against mistaking mere dissent no matter howemphatic or intemperate it may be for dissidence amounting torebellion or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has beenfairly established or cannot reasonably be denied to uphold thefinding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upona power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land anddepriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, withoutviolating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law theCourt is called upon to epitomize.

As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege othe writ: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the

aforementioned suspension. The President declared in ProclamationNo. 889, as amended, that both conditions are present.

As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence 14attests abundantlyto the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manilafrom the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally aincitement to sedition or rebellion, as the immediate objective. Uponthe establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, themovement seemed to have waned notably; but, the outbreak oWorld War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the devastation andhavoc, and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant withthe military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequenliberation, brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of theCommunist threat, with such vigor as to be able to organize andoperate in Central Luzon an army called HUKBALAHAP, duringthe occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan

(HMP) after liberation which clashed several times with the armedforces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino toissue Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspendingthe privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus, the validity of which wasupheld in Montenegro v. Castaeda. 15 Days before thepromulgation of said Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines wereapprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of thecrime of rebellion, they served their respective sentences. 16

The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar aspeace and order were concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Rep. ActNo. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, wasapproved, upon the ground stated in the very preamble of saidstatute that.

... the Communist Party of the Philippinesalthough purportedly a political party, is in facan organized conspiracy to overthrow theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also bydeceit, subversion and other illegal means, fothe purpose of establishing in the Philippines atotalitarian regime subject to alien dominationand control;

... the continued existence and activities of theCommunist Party of the Philippines constitutes

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a clear, present and grave danger to thesecurity of the Philippines; 17and

... in the face of the organized, systematic andpersistent subversion, national in scope butinternational in direction, posed by theCommunist Party of the Philippines and itsactivities, there is urgent need for speciallegislation to cope with this continuing menaceto the freedom and security of the country....

In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, onSeptember 4, 1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitionersherein

The years following 1963 saw the successiveemergence in the country of several massorganizations, notably the LapiangManggagawa (now the Socialist Party of thePhilippines) among the workers; the MalayangSamahan ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA)among the peasantry; the KabataangMakabayan (KM) among the youth/students;and the Movement for the Advancement ofNationalism (MAN) among the

intellectuals/professionals. The PKP hasexerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence andutilize these organizations in promoting itsradical brand of nationalism. 18

Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been splitinto two (2) groups, one of which composed mainly of youngradicals, constituting the Maoist faction reorganized theCommunist Party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established aNew People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept ofthe "Protracted People's War" or "War of National Liberation." Its"Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution" states, inter alia:

The Communist Party of the Philippines isdetermined to implement its general programme

for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipinocommunists are ready to sacrifice their lives forthe worthy cause of achieving the new type ofdemocracy, of building a new Philippines that isgenuinely and completely independent,democratic, united, just and prosperous ...

xxx xxx xxx

The central task of any revolutionary movementis to seize political power. The CommunistParty of the Philippines assumes this task at atime that both the international and nationalsituations are favorable of asking the road ofarmed

revolution ...

19

In the year 1969, the NPA had according to the records of theDepartment of National Defense conducted raids, resorted tokidnappings and taken part in other violent incidents numbering over230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243losses. In 1970, its records of violent incidents was about the same,but the NPA casualties more than doubled.

At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists,whether they belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction,believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainmentof their main and ultimate objective, and act in accordance with such

belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at agiven time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New People'sArmy, other, of course, that the arm forces of the Republic andantagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se proof of theexistence of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishmenwas announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Suchannouncement is in the nature of a public challenge to the dulyconstituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of warsufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerencyeven before the actual commencement of hostilities.

We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeablegroup of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow thegovernment and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellionagainst the Government of the Philippines.

In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People'sArmy proper is too small, compared with the size of the armedforces of the Government, that the Communist rebellion oinsurrection cannot so endanger public safety as to require thesuspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thisargument does not negate, however, the existence of a rebellionwhich, from the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not bewidespread or attain the magnitude of a civil war. This is apparenfrom the very provision of the Revised Penal Code defining thecrime of rebellion, 20which may be limited in its scope to "any partof the Philippines, and, also, from paragraph (14) of section 1

Article III of the Constitution, authorizing the suspension of theprivilege of the writ "wherever" in case of rebellion "thenecessity for such suspension shall exist." In fact, the case oBarcelon v. Baker referred to a proclamation suspending theprivilege in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas only. The case ofIn re Boyle 21involved a valid proclamation suspending the privilegein a smaller area a country of the state of Idaho.

The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the secondcondition essential to the validity of the suspension of the privilege namely, that the suspension be required by public safety. Beforedelving, however, into the factual bases of the presidential findingsthereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's function inpassing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended.

Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power tosuspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specifiedconditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powersunderlying our system of government, the Executive is supremewithin his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under theConstitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand withthe system of checks and balances, under which the Executive issupreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only ifandwhen he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, andthe authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vestedin the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turnconstitutionally supreme.

In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merelyto check not to supplant 22 the Executive, or to ascertainmerely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his

jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determinethe wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court todetermine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from beingidentical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil ocriminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferiocourts, in which cases the appellate court has allof the powers othe court of origin.

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system ochecks and balances, the judicial authority to review decisions oadministrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regardsfindings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English law, thereviewing court determines onlywhether there is some evidentiarybasis for the contested administrative findings; no quantitative

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examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. Theadministrative findings can be interfered with only if there is noevidence whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is,accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. Thisview has been adopted by some American courts. It has, likewise,been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases, inboth jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence" rule,which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla" or"relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequateto support a conclusion," 23even if other minds equally reasonablemight conceivably opine otherwise.

Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review ofadministrative determinations involving the exercise of quasi-judicialfunctions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence. It doesnot and cannot be applied, in i ts aforesaid form, in testing the validityof an act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension ofthe privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule,neither body takes evidence in the sense in which the term isused in judicial proceedings before enacting a legislation orsuspending the writ. Referring to the test of the validity of a statute,the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr.Justice Roberts, expressed, in the leading case of Nebbia v. NewYork, 24the view that:

... If the laws passed are seen to have areasonable relation to a proper legislativepurpose, and are neither arbitrary nordiscriminatory, the requirements of due processare satisfied, and judicial determination to thateffect renders a court functus officio ... With thewisdom of the policy adopted, with theadequacy or practically of the law enacted toforward it, the courts are both incompetentandunauthorizedto deal ...

Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General

... that judicial inquiry into the basis of thequestioned proclamation can go no furtherthanto satisfy the Court not that the President'sdecision is correct and that public safety was

endanger by the rebellion and justified thesuspension of the writ, but that in suspendingthe writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.

No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection ofsuch test. Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate branches of theGovernment, under our constitutional system, seems to demand thatthe test of the validity of acts of Congress and of those of theExecutive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence,counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the properstandard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.

Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889, as amended?Petitioners submit a negative answer upon the ground: (a) that thereis no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of

the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were thecourts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) thatthe President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in thePhilippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety tosuch extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writofhabeas corpus.

As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious,so much so that counsel for several petitioners herein have admittedit.

With respect to the normal operation of government, includingcourts, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilegesuffice it to say that, if the conditions were such that courts of justiceno longer functioned, a suspension of the privilege would have beenunnecessary, there being no courts to issue the writ of habeascorpus. Indeed, petitioners' reference to the normal operation ocourts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the contested act othe Executive stems, perhaps, from the fact that this circumstancewas adverted to in some American cases to justify the invalidationtherein decreed of said act of the Executive. Said cases involvedhowever, the conviction by militarycourts of members of the civilian

population charged with common crimes. It was manifestly, illegafor military courts to assume jurisdiction over civilians so chargedwhen civil courts were functioning normally.

Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident afteAugust 21, 1971, does not necessarily bear out petitioners' viewWhat is more, it may have been due precisely to the suspension othe privilege. To be sure, one of its logical effects is to compel thoseconnected with the insurrection or rebellion to go into hiding. In fact,most of them could not be located by the authorities, after Augus21, 1971.

The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded asincredible, upon the theory that, according to Professor EgbaAhman of Cornell University, "guerrilla use of terror ... is sociologicaand psychologically selective," and that the indiscriminate resort to

terrorism is bound to boomerang, for it tends to alienate the people'ssymphaty and to deprive the dissidents of much needed masssupport. The fact, however, is that the violence used is somedemonstrations held in Manila in 1970 and 1971 tended to terrorizethe bulk of its inhabitants. It would have been highly imprudenttherefore, for the Executive to discard the possibility of a resort toterrorism, on a much bigger scale, under the July-August Plan.

We will now address our attention to petitioners' theory to the effecthat the New People's Army of the Communist Party of thePhilippines is too small to pose a danger to public safety of suchmagnitude as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ ohabeas corpus. The flaw in petitioners' stand becomes apparenwhen we consider that it assumes that the Armed Forces of thePhilippines have no other task than to fight the New People's Armyand that the latter is the only threat and a minor one to our

security. Such assumption is manifestly erroneous.

The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, theExecutive had information and reports subsequently confirmed, inmany respects, by the abovementioned Report of the Senate AdHoc Committee of Seven 25 to the effect that the CommunisParty of the Philippines does not merely adhere to Lenin's idea of aswift armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh'sterrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperativelocal official; that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there werefourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater ManilaArea in 1970; that the Constitutional Convention Hall was bombedon June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza Miranda incident, theNAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary, wasbombed; that this was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila

City Hall, the COMELEC building, the Congress Building and theMERALCO substation at Cubao, Quezon City; and that therespective residences of Senator Jose J. Roy and CongressmanEduardo Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were theMERALCO main office premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and theDoctor's Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building, in Caloocan City.

Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that as per saidinformation and reports the reorganized Communist Party of thePhilippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept of protractedpeople's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of thegovernment, of the political, economic and intellectual leadershipand of the people themselves; that conformably to such concept, the

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Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive andintensive program of subversion by the establishment of frontorganizations in urban centers, the organization of armed citypartisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor unions, andfarmer and professional groups; that the CPP has managed toinfiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations;that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in makingCommunist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youthorganizations; that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) massorganizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among whichare the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the

Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement ofNationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan(SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisang Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the KM hadtwo hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout thePhilippines, of which seventy-three (73) were in the Greater ManilaArea, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central Luzon,forty-two (42) in the Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao andSulu; that in 1970, the Party had recorded two hundred fifty-eight(258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) endedin violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500)injured; that most of these actions were organized, coordinated orled by the aforementioned front organizations; that the violentdemonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but well-trainedgroup of armed agitators; that the number of demonstrationsheretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970; andthat twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and

resulted in the death of fifteen (15) persons and the injury of manymore.

Subsequent events as reported have also proven thatpetitioners' counsel have underestimated the threat to public safetyposed by the New People's Army. Indeed, it appears that, since

August 21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon six (6) encounters andstaged one (1) raid, in consequence of which seven (7) soldiers losttheir lives and two (2)others were wounded, whereas the insurgentssuffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armedgroup of NPA, trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked thevery command port of TF LAWIN in Isabela, destroying two (2)helicopters and one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier; that theNPA had in Central Luzon a total of four (4) encounters, with two (2)killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the Government, one (1)BSDU killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at

Botolan, Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an unidentifieddissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of the dissident groupwere killed; that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in thebarrio of San Pedro. Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC andthe NPA, in which a PC and two (2) KM members were killed; thatthe current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces havebeen rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA,for, in mid-1971, a KM group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza,contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in their settlement in Magsaysay,Misamis Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and brochuresof Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teach-ins in the reservation;that Esparagoza an operation of the PC in said reservation; and thatthere are now two (2) NPA cadres in Mindanao.

It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its frontorganizations are, according to intelligence findings, definitely

capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally availablematerials; that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention Hallwas a "clay-more" mine, a powerful explosive device used by theU.S. Army, believed to have been one of many pilfered from theSubic Naval Base a few days before; that the President hadreceived intelligence information to the effect that there was a July-August Plan involving a wave of assassinations, kidnappings,terrorism and mass destruction of property and that an extraordinaryoccurence would signal the beginning of said event; that the ratherserious condition of peace and order in Mindanao, particularly inCotabato and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forcessufficient to cope with the situation; that a sizeable part of our armedforces discharge other functions; and that the expansion of the CPPactivities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country,

particularly Manila and its suburbs, the Cagayan Valley, IfugaoZambales, Laguna, Quezon and Bicol Region, required that the restof our armed forces be spread thin over a wide area.

Considering that the President was in possession of the above data except those related to events that happened after August 211971 when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court isnot prepared to hold that the Executive had acted arbitrarily ogravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that publicsafety and national security required the suspension of the privilegeof the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously withviolent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance andcooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and thebombing or water mains and conduits, as well as electric powerplants and installations a possibility which, no matter how remotehe was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under ob