executive judiciary

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Brillantes vs COMELECGR No 163193

FACTS: Republic Act No. 8436 mandates the use by the COMELEC of Automated ElectionSystem for the national and local elections. By virtue of this law, the COMELEC promulgated aresolution for the implementation of this law. Under the said resolution the automation of electionwas divided into 3 phases namely: Phase 1, for the computerized registration of voters andvalidation of voters; Phase 2 is for the computerized voting and counting of votes; and Phase 3concerns the electronic transmission of results. Phase 1 was implemented while on the otherhand, due to certain controversies surrounding the implementation of Phase 1 the same was notimplemented.

This petition concerns Resolution No. 6712 issued by the COMELEC en banc promulgated by theCOMELEC barely two weeks before the May 2004 Synchronized residential and local electionsmandating the electronic transmission of the election results for the national elections. Theresolution in effect implements the Phase 3 of the automation though the COMELEC dubbed theelectronic transmission of results as an unofficial quick count.

The petitioners assail the above resolution because here is no provision under Rep. Act No. 8436which authorizes the COMELEC to engage in the biometrics/computerized system of validation of

voters (Phase I) and a system of electronic transmission of election results (Phase III). Evenassuming for the nonce that all the three (3) phases are duly authorized, they must complementeach other as they are not distinct and separate programs but mere stages of one whole scheme.Consequently, considering the failed implementation of Phases I and II, there is no basis at all forthe respondent COMELEC to still push through and pursue with Phase III. The petitioneressentially posits that the counting and consolidation of votes contemplated under Section 6 ofRep. Act No. 8436 refers to the official COMELEC count under the fully automated system andnot any kind of "unofficial" count via electronic transmission of advanced results as now providedunder the assailed resolution. On the other hand, petitioner-intervenors assail the constitutionalityof Resolution 6712 effectively preempts the sole and exclusive authority of Congress underArticle VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President.Further, as there has been no appropriation by Congress for the respondent COMELEC toconduct an "unofficial" electronic transmission of results of the May 10, 2004 elections, any

expenditure for the said purpose contravenes Article VI, Section 29 (par. 1) of the Constitution.

All of them likewise assail the legality of the resolution on the ground that it encroaches upon theauthority of NAMFREL, as the citizens accredited arm, to conduct the "unofficial" quick count asprovided under pertinent election laws. It also violates Section 52(i) of the Omnibus ElectionCode, relating to the requirement of notice to the political parties and candidates of the adoptionof technological and electronic devices during the elections.

COMELEC counters by saying that the Court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the assailedresolutions validity claiming that it was promulgated in the exercise of the respondentCOMELECs executive or administrative power as also because the issue involves a politicalquestion. It likewise challenges the standing of all the petitioners to file the present petition.COMELEC also denied the resolution aims to implement the Phase 3 of the election automation

system. They also argue that what is contemplated in the assailed resolution is not a canvass ofthe votes but merely consolidation and transmittal thereof. As such, it cannot be made the basisfor the proclamation of any winning candidate. Emphasizing that the project is "unofficial" innature, the COMELEC opines that it cannot, therefore, be considered as preempting or usurpingthe exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President.

ISSUE(S): (1) Whether the petitioners have standing to file the petition? (2) Whether the petitioninvolves a justiciable controversy? (3) Whether the respondent COMELEC committed graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the assailedresolution?

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HELD: (1) Yes. Since the implementation of the assailed resolution obviously involves theexpenditure of funds, the petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention, as taxpayers, possess therequisite standing to question its validity as they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegalexpenditure of money raised by taxation. In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there isa claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being deflected to anyimproper purpose, or where the petitioners seek to restrain the respondent from wasting publicfunds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Some of the petitioners arealso representatives of major political parties that have participated in the May 10, 2004 elections.Some represent the NAMFREL, which is the citizens arm authorized to conduct an "unofficial"quick count during the said elections. They have sufficient, direct and personal interest in themanner by which the respondent COMELEC would conduct the elections, including the countingand canvassing of the votes cast therein. Drilon and De Venecia are, respectively, President ofthe Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, the heads of Congress which isexclusively authorized by the Constitution to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President.They have the requisite standing to prevent the usurpation of the constitutional prerogative ofCongress.

(2) Yes. Petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention are questioning the legality of therespondent COMELECs administrative issuance will not preclude this Court from exercising its

power of judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent COMELEC in issuingResolution No. 6712. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify thelaw, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.27 When the grant of poweris qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualificationsor conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable the problem being one oflegality or validity, not its wisdom.28 In the present petition, the Court must pass upon thepetitioners contention that Resolution No. 6712 does not have adequate statutory orconstitutional basis.

(3) Yes. First. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation ofelection results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority ofCongress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. Second. The

assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that "no money shall bepaid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. By its very terms,the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election results projected under Resolution No.6712 is "unofficial" in character, meaning "not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged bythe government or government body. Any disbursement of public funds to implement this projectis contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the 2003 GeneralAppropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its funds appropriated for the AES for the"unofficial" quick count project may even be considered as a felony under Article 217 of theRevised Penal Code, as amended. The implementation of the assailed resolution would entail, indue course, the hiring of additional manpower, technical services and acquisition of equipment,including computers and software, among others. According to the COMELEC, it neededP55,000,000 to operationalize the project, including the encoding process. Hence, it wouldnecessarily involve the disbursement of public funds for which there must be the corresponding

appropriation. Third. It disregards existing laws which authorize solely the duly-accreditedcitizens arm to conduct the "unofficial" counting of votes. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166,as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, theaccredited citizens arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of theelection returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the national orthe local elections. No other entity is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposesof conducting an "unofficial" count. In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns,while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the aforementioned laws, are not intendedfor undertaking an "unofficial" count. The aforesaid COMELEC copies are archived and unsealedonly when needed by the respondent COMELEC to verify election results in connection with

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resolving election disputes that may be imminent. However, in contravention of the law, theassailed Resolution authorizes the so-called Reception Officers (RO), to open the second or thirdcopy intended for the respondent COMELEC as basis for the encoding and transmission ofadvanced "unofficial" precinct results. This not only violates the exclusive prerogative ofNAMFREL to conduct an "unofficial" count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopescontaining the election returns, as well as the returns themselves, by creating a gap in its chain ofcustody from the Board of Election Inspectors to the COMELEC. Fourth. Section 52(i) of theOmnibus Election Code does not cover the use of the latest technological and election devicesfor "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the authorizedrepresentatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by the use oradoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity ofthe use of such devices. Fifth. There is no constitutional and statutory basis for the respondentCOMELEC to undertake a separate and an "unofficial" tabulation of results, whether manually orelectronically. Indeed, by conducting such "unofficial" tabulation of the results of the election, theCOMELEC descends to the level of a private organization, spending public funds for the purpose.Besides, it is absurd for the COMELEC to conduct two kinds of electoral counts a slow but"official" count, and an alleged quicker but "unofficial" count, the results of each may substantiallydiffer.

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Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

GR 152154

FACTS: On 17 December 1991, the Republic of the Philippines, through the PresidentialCommission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan (Civil Case 0141. "Republic of thePhilippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos")pursuant to RA 13791 in relation to Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A; seeking the declarationof the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 millioninclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds werepreviously held by 5 account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks: (1)Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts; (2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus-

Avertina Foundation accounts; (3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts; (4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts; and (5) Maler Foundation accounts. In addition, the Republicsought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded theMarcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquiredproperty. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. On 18 October 1993,Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filedtheir answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the SupplementalAgreements dated 28 December 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGGChairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family.Subsequently, the Marcos children filed a motion dated 7 December 1995 for the approval of saidagreements and for the enforcement thereof. The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreementssought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned

by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified inone of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from theSwiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S.dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certainconditionalities are met x x x." The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed thedecision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting the Republic's request for legalassistance. Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated foundationsto be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of theparties entitled to restitution. Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion toapprove the General/Supplemental Agreements. Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the

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purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements. On 18 October 1996, theRepublic filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Mrs. Marcosfiled her opposition thereto which was later adopted by Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta andFerdinand, Jr. In its resolution dated 20 November 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied theRepublic's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground thatthe motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion forsummary judgment." Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on 26 May 1998 claiming she was not aparty to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of thefunds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. Meanwhile, on 10 August 1995,the Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for theimmediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted.On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated 10 December1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of thefunds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, the Marcoschildren moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in thePNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolutiondated 8 September 1998, granted the motion. After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trialorder and supplemental pre-trial order dated 28 October 1999 and 21 January 2000, respectively,the case was set for trial. After several resettings, the Republic, on 10 March 2000, filed anothermotion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million. Mrs. Marcos filed

her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by herMrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. On 24 March 2000, a hearing on the motion forsummary judgment was conducted. In a decision dated 19 September 2000, the Sandiganbayangranted the Republic's motion for summary judgment. Mrs. Marcos filed a motion forreconsideration dated 26 September 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed theirown motion for reconsideration dated 5 October 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated 4October 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc andFerdinand, Jr. In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its decision,thus denying the Republic's motion for summary judgment, holding that "the evidence offered forsummary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to theMarcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcosesof the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of thegovernment cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon, perforce,

must also have been without basis." The Sandiganbayan set the case for further proceedings.The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE(S): Whether the Swiss funds deposited in escrow at the PNB can be forfeited in favor ofthe Republic, on the basis, largely, of the Marcoses lawful income?

HELD: RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hencesubject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary andother lawful income of the public officer who owns it. The following facts must be established inorder that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the publicofficer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name orotherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., isgrossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. Herein, the spousesFerdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the present casewas never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of the Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegationsin paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E.Marcos as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, SenatePresident and President of the Republic of the Philippines from 1 December 1965 to 25 February1986. Likewise, the Marcoses admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petitionas to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of theInterim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrentlyMinister of Human Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986. Mrs. Marcos also admitted inparagraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which

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referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated27 May 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo.80 TheCertification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos hadaccumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total ofP2,288,750: (1) Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President: (a) 1966-1976, at P60,000/year, P660,000;(b) 1977-1984, at P100,000/year, P800,000; (c) 1985, at P110,000/year, P110,000; (2) Imelda R.Marcos, as Minister: June 1976-1985, at P75,000/year, P718,000. In addition to theiraccumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from Januaryto February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amountedto P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollarexchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the totalamount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43. The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using theofficial annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 aswell as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Centerfor Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The sum of $304,372.43 should beheld as the only known lawful income of the Marcoses since they did not file any Statement ofAssets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined.Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "anyother emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities". Likewise,

under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during histenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source." In fact, his managementof businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expresslyprohibited under the 1973 Constitution (See Article VII, Sec. 4(2), Article VII, Sec. 11. and ArticleIX, Sec. 7 thereof). Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairlyserve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.The Republic did not fail to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits.The elements which must concur for the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of RA 1379 toapply are: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired aconsiderable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount ismanifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawfulincome and the income from legitimately acquired property. It is undisputed that spousesFerdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly

extant. The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the publicofficer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned propertiesduring their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned bythem. There is proof of the existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it sufficesto comply with the second element. The third requirement is met if it can be shown that suchassets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer's salary and hisother lawful income. It is the proof of the third element that is crucial in determining whether aprima facie presumption has been established in this case. The Republic presented not only aschedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but alsoevidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under thenames of five different foundations. The Republic was able to establish the prima faciepresumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly andpatently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, the

Republic presented enough evidence to convince the Court that the Marcoses had dollar depositsamounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the fivefoundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of onlyUS$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government officials. Considering, therefore, that thetotal amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known lawful incomeof the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was dulyestablished. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount ofmoney and property acquired by the Marcoses, and their total government salaries. The Swissdeposits which were transferred to and are deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in

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the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002, plus interest,were forfeited in favor of the Republic.

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-Domingo vs Zamora

GR 142283

FACTS: On 5 March 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order 81entitled "Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Cultureand Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-BasedSports." Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales issued Memorandum01592 on 10 January 2000. Memorandum 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of theservice, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective 15 March2000. On 21 January 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum 01594 reassigning theBPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective 15 March2000. Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. were among the BPESS personnel affected byMemorandum 01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment, Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. filedthe petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order. During the

pendency of the case, Republic Act 9155, otherwise known as the "Governance of BasicEducation Act of 2001", was enacted on 11 August 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished theBPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sportscompetition to the PSC.

ISSUES(S):(1) Whether EO 81 and the DECS memoranda are valid? (2) Whether the abolitionof the BPESS results in employees cessation in office?

HELD: (1) YES. Although the issue is already academic, by the subsequent enactment of RA9155, its significance constrains the Court to point out that Executive Order 292, otherwise knownas the Administrative Code of 1987, in Section 31 thereof, expressly grants the Presidentcontinuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. Since EO 81 is based on thePresidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, EO 81 is a valid exercise

of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants thePresident this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize hisoffice "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nervecenter of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President mustbe capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carryout his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of thePresident. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize theadministrative structure of the Office of the President. Domingo et al.s contention that the DECSis not part of the Office of the President is immaterial. Under EO 292, the DECS is indisputably aDepartment of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President,Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function oragency of the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the PSC is attached to theOffice of the President. Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the "functions,programs and activities of DECS related to sports development" to the PSC, making EO 81 avalid presidential issuance.

(2) NO. The Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and(3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the PresidentProper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the PresidentProper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit toanother. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to reorganizeoffices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President islimited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to

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Departments or Agencies, and vice versa. This distinction is crucial as it affects the security oftenure of employees. The abolition of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employeescessation in office, but in such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itselfceases to exist. On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in theemployees cessation in office because his office continues to exist although in anotherdepartment, agency or office. Herein, the BPESS employees who were not transferred to PSCwere at first temporarily, then later permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuringtheir continued employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that these employees "shall beretained by the Department."

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Javier vs ReyesGR No L-39451

FACTS: Before the Court is a certified case involving pure questions of law. The facts, as foundby the trial court, are as follows:

The following facts have been admitted by the parties: that petitioner Isidro M. Javier was

appointed Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan on November 7,1967 by the then Mayor VictorinoB. Aldaba, and approved by the Civil Service Commission on May 2, 1968; that petitioner took hisoath of office as such on November 8, 1967 and immediately assumed the position anddischarged his duties until January 13, 1968 when he was separated from office by respondentMunicipal Mayor Purificacion Reyes; that respondent recalled the said appointment of petitioneron January 3,1968 pursuant to which said appointment was returned by the Civil ServiceCommission returning his appointment on the basis of which the said commission reconsideredthe same and approved his appointment on May 2, 1968; that since May 2, 1968 to the present,respondent has not reinstated the petitioner notwithstanding a follow-up letter circular dated July9, 1968 of the Commission of Civil Service, directing the immediate reinstatement of petitioner;that one Bayani Bernardo was also appointed Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan on September4,1967, approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on September 17,1967; and that saidappointment of Bayani Bernardo by the then Mayor Jovencio Caluag was not referred to the

Police Commission for decision.

ISSUES(S): (1) When an appointment to the position of municipal chief of police was made by amunicipal mayor and said appointment was not approved by the municipal council and such lackof approval lasted for more than ninety (90) days from the issuance of the appointment, will Sec.8 of R.A. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966 apply? (2) When two appointments toone and the same position were both approved by the Civil Service Commission on the basis oftwo legal provisions, which one will prevail over the other?

HELD: The Court finds that preeminently, the question is: Between the petitioner's appointmentand that of Bayani Bernardo, which prevails?

It shall be recalled that the petitioner was appointed Chief of Police of Malolos, Bulacan, onNovember 7, 1967, by then Mayor Victorino Aldaba and the following day, took his oath of office.

He discharged the powers of the office until January 13, 1968 when the respondent, who hadmeanwhile succeeded as local chief executive, and in an apparent political maneuver, removedhim in favor of Bayani Bernardo.

On the other hand, Bernardo never assumed office or took his oath. It cannot be said, then, thathe had accepted his appointment. Such an appointment being ineffective, we hold that thepetitioner's appointment prevails.

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Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. The fact that Bernardo's appointmentwas confirmed by the Civil Service Commission does not complete it since confirmation orattestation by the Commission, although an essential part of the appointing process, servesmerely to assure the eligibility of the appointee.

Furthermore, Bernardo never contested the petitioner's right to office. He did, of course, intervenein the mandamus suit, but it was a belated effort to assert his alleged rights. It is not indicative ofan interested party. It was too little and too late.

Bernardo's argument that he had thought it "prudent" to await a clarification on the doubleappointments comes as a lame excuse. He should have challenged the petitioner's subsequentappointment, rather than allow events to take their course. The Court believes that he is guilty oflaches.

On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing as far as the petitioner is concerned. Therecords show that he was appointed on November 7, 1967, and the following day, November 8,1967, he took his oath of office and discharged the duties appurtenant thereto until January 13,1968, when the succeeding mayor, the herein respondent Purificacion Reyes, recalled hisappointment and appointed another. Thereupon, the petitioner went to the Civil ServiceCommission to ask for reinstatement. Finally, he brought suit for mandamus. These acts

amounted to acceptance and gave rise to a vested right to the office in his favor.

The respondent Mayor, or her successor in office, as well as the respondent, the Municipality ofMalolos, Bulacan, are ORDERED to REINSTATE the petitioner to office of Chief of Police,Malolos, Bulacan, or its equivalent, or to any position equivalent in rank and pay, subject to therequirements of age and fitness, and to PAY him back salaries equivalent to five (5) years withoutqualification or deduction.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SANLAKAS VS. Executive Secretary

GR No. 159085

FACTS:

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men ofthe AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders haveseized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFPand declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of thePresident, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and theofficers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both theProclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessationof the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NGMANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VIIof the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, andthat there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. ExecutiveSecretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the reportrequirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a reportto Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that thepresidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congresshas not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. PresidentMacapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there wasusurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)

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Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens thedoor to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUES(S): (1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 areconstitutional? (2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bringsuit?

HELD: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 areconstitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. ThePresident in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executivepowers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armedforces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court mayexamine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constitutinggrave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported theirassertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of thereport is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts orthat military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation ofthe legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state ofrebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief

Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on thePresident by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powerscontemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, sinceany person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishableunder the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the casesuch that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental actthat is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "suchpersonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficultconstitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJSOfficers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.

Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. Itsustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent thepowers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his officeconfers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sumulong Torres vs Gonzales

152 SCRA 272

FACTS: Original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres,presently confined at National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.

Sometime before 1979, petitioner was convicted by the CFI of Manila of the crime of estafa (2

counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from 11 years, 10 months and22 daysto 38 years, 9 months and one day. The convictions were affirmed by the CA, the maximumsentence would expire on November 2, 2000.

On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of thePhilippines on condition that petitioned would not again violated any of the penal laws.

On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to the President the cancellation ofthe conditional pardon. The evidence before the board showed that on March 22 1982 June 24

1982, petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, which cases were then pending

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before the RTC of Rizal (Quezon City). It also showed that on June 26 1985, he had beenconvicted by the RTC of the crime of sedition. The said conviction was then pending appealbefore the Appellate Court. There also letter report from the NBI that a long list of charges hadbeen brought against the petitioner for the last 20 years.

ISSUES(s): Whether or not conviction of crime by final judgment of a court is necessary beforethe petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of hisconditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence?

HELD: The Grant and Determination of breach of condition of pardon is purely executive acts andit is no subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec. 64 (1) of the Revised Administrative Code.

Violation of conditional pardon prior conviction by final judgment of subsequent crime necessarybefore parolee or convict may suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-People vs Patriarca

GR No 135457

FACTS: That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening in theMunicipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping oneanother, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence andbrought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfullyand feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault andshoot ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused hisdeath to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court atSorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 2773 convicting him of murder andsentencing him to reclusion perpetua. He was also charged with Murder for the killing of oneRudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.

2665 and 2672, respectively.

Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No.347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All OtherPersons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other CrimesCommitted in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating aNational Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National AmnestyBoard.

HELD: The court acquitted the appellant. His application for amnesty was approved and one ofthe acts listed in the resolution of the Nat'l Amnesty Commission is the killing of the victim in thiscase. The approval was pursuant to Proc. No 347 granting amnesty to all persons who shallapply who have committed crimes on or before June 1 1995 in pursuit of their political beliefs.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded and provedby the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty byProclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c thecourts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty isgranted to classes of person or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generallybefore or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardonlooks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he hasbeen convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not work the restoration ofthe rights to hold public office or right of suffrage unless such rights be expressly restored by the

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terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnityimposed upon him by the sentence (Art 36).

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.

ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, andHON. EMILIA T.BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management.G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2003, En Banc (Austria-Martinez, J.)The method of absentee voting has been said to be separable anddistinct from theregular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner ofvoting from thatpreviously known, and an exception to the customary and usualmanner of voting. The rightof absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is

purely statutory; absenteevoting was unknown to, and not recognized at, the common law.Romulo B. Macalintal a member of the Philippine Bar, sought thedeclaration of certainprovisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Actof 2003) asunconstitutional. Claiming that he has actual and material legalinterest in the subject matter of thiscase in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used andappropriated, petitioner filedthe instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing theregistration of voters whoare immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by theirmere act of executing an affidavitexpressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate theresidency requirement in Section 1of Article V of the Constitution?2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law empowering theCOMELEC to proclaim thewinning candidates for national offices and party list representativesincluding the President andthe Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4,Article VII of theConstitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed aswinners by Congress?

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3. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committeecreated in Section 25of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, andapprove the ImplementingRules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall

promulgate without violating theindependence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of theConstitution?HELD:Petition partially granted.A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration ofvoters who areimmigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mereact of executing an affidavitexpressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate theresidency requirement in Section 1

of Article V of the Constitution?Section 5(d) provides:RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW

U.S.T. Law Review, Volume XLVIII, January December 2004

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified fromvoting under this Act:d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such inthe host country, unlesshe/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for thepurpose by the Commissiondeclaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent

residence in the Philippines not laterthan three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under thisAct. Such affidavit shall alsostate that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.Failure to return shall be causefor the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent residentfrom the National Registry ofAbsentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote inabsentia.Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because itviolates Section 1, Article V of

the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a residentin the Philippines for at leastone year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least sixmonths immediately precedingan election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court ofAppeals to support hisclaim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holderimmigrant to the United States is

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deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in thePhilippines.Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitutiondoes not allow provisionalregistration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be

qualified to vote in a politicalexercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent therequirement of theConstitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereonwhich in effect amends oralters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroadto vote. He claims that theright of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date ofthe election, does not possessthe qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of theConstitution.

The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is givento the phrase, qualifiedcitizens of the Philippines abroad as it appears in R.A. No. 9189, towit:SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the prime duty of the State toprovide a system of honestand orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy andsanctity of the ballot. Towardsthis end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified citizens ofthe Philippines abroad in theexercise of this fundamental right.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act:a) Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizensof the Philippines abroad,exercise their right to vote;f) Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines whois qualified to registerand vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who isabroad on the day of elections.SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are nototherwise disqualifiedby law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may

vote for president, vicepresident,senators and party-list representatives.in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which read:SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines nototherwise disqualified bylaw, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall haveresided in the Philippines for at least

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one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least sixmonths immediatelyRECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAWU.S.T. Law Review, Volume XLVIII, January December 2004

preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantiverequirement shall be imposed onthe exercise of suffrage.SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecyand sanctity of the ballotas well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides thatsuffrage may be exercised by(1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law,(3) at least eighteen years ofage, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and inthe place where they proposeto vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No.9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant orpermanent resident who isrecognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes anaffidavit declaring that he/sheshall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippinesnot later than three years fromapproval of his/her registration under said Act.Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of anaffidavit to qualify the

Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote.He focuses solely on Section1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity toSection 5(d) of R.A. No.9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering Congressto provide a system forabsentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeedgive the impression thatit contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipinoimmigrants and permanent residents

overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned the Philippines tolive permanently in their hostcountries and therefore, a provision in the law enfranchising those whodo not possess the residencyrequirement of the Constitution by the mere act of executing anaffidavit expressing their intent toreturn to the Philippines within a given period, risks a declaration ofunconstitutionality. However,

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the risk is more apparent than real.As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualifiedFilipinos, it behooves theCourt to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both theConstitution and R.A. No. 9189.

It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitutionshould be construed as a whole.In Chiongbian vs. De Leon, the Court held that a constitutionalprovision should function to the fullextent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but inconjunction with all other provisionsof that great document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory incharacter unless, either byexpress statement or by necessary implication, a different intention ismanifest. The intent of theConstitution may be drawn primarily from the language of the

document itself. Should it beambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers throughtheir debates in theconstitutional convention.R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the firstparagraph of Section 2,Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system forvoting by qualified Filipinosabroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for theparameters of the exercise oflegislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of

restrictions, Congress ispresumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI(The Legislative Department)of the Constitution.RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW


To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell firston the significance ofabsentee voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively new. It isviewed thus:The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely

separable and distinct from theregular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner ofvoting from that previouslyknown, and an exception to the customary and usual manner of voting.The right of absentee anddisabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory;absentee voting was unknownto, and not recognized at, the common law.

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Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economicconditions devised toaccommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties makeit impracticable for them toattend their polling places on the day of election, and the privilege of

absentee voting may flow fromconstitutional provisions or be conferred by statutes, existing in somejurisdictions, which provide invarying terms for the casting and reception of ballots by soldiers andsailors or other qualified votersabsent on election day from the district or precinct of their residence.Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, oran absolute right. Whenthe legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operatewith equality among all the classto which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may be limited in

their application to particulartypes of elections. The statutes should be construed in the light of anyconstitutional provisionsaffecting registration and elections, and with due regard to their textsprior to amendment and topredecessor statutes and the decisions thereunder; they should alsobe construed in the light of thecircumstances under which they were enacted; and so as to carry outthe objects thereof, if this canbe done without doing violence to their provisions and mandates.Further, in passing on statutes

regulating absentee voting, the court should look to the whole andevery part of the election laws,the intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption,and try to give effect to everyportion thereof.Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a personcannot be at the same time,both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws andthe countlesspronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absenteeremains attached to his residence

in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous withdomicile.For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile aredictated by the peculiar criteriaof political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,what has clearly andunequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposesis used synonymously with

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domicile.Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itselfis not the enabling orenfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not onlyproof of the intention of the

immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency inthe Philippines, but moresignificantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in factabandoned his domicile oforigin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavitunder Section 5(d) violates theRECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW


Constitution that proscribes provisional registration or a promise by avoter to perform a conditionto be qualified to vote in a political exercise.The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that greencard holders aredisqualified to run for any elective office finds no application to thepresent case because the Caasicase did not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rightsof Filipinos who areimmigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.Contrary to petitioners claim that Section 5(d) circumvents theConstitution, Congress enactedthe law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting incompliance with the constitutional

mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide asystem of absentee voting thatnecessarily presupposes that the qualified citizen of the Philippinesabroad is not physicallypresent in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 arecomponents of the system ofoverseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualifiedFilipino abroad who executedthe affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines.He is presumed not to havelost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having

become an immigrant orpermanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply anabandonment of his intentionto return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under thelaw, he must be given theopportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicilein the Philippines byexecuting the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.

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Petitioners speculative apprehension that the implementation ofSection 5(d) would affect thecredibility of the elections is insignificant as what is important is toensure that all those who possessthe qualifications to vote on the date of the election are given the

opportunity and permitted tofreely do so. The COMELEC and the Department of Foreign Affairs haveenough resources andtalents to ensure the integrity and credibility of any election conductedpursuant to R.A. No. 9189.In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Courtdoes not find Section5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the sameAct in contravention ofSection 4, Article VII of the Constitution?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee votermay vote for president,vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. 18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of theproclamation of a winningcandidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by theresults thereof. Notwithstandingthe foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order theproclamation of winning candidates

despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in aparticular country or countries, ifthe holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible byevents, factors and circumstancespeculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors andcircumstances are beyond thecontrol or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW


Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189empowering the

COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as itaffects the canvass ofvotes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutionalbecause it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 ofArticle VII of theConstitution:SEC. 4 . . .

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The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, dulycertified by the board ofcanvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to theCongress, directed to the President ofthe Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of

the Senate shall, not laterthan thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificatesin the presence of the Senateand the House of Representatives in joint public session, and theCongress, upon determination ofthe authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided bylaw, canvass the votes.The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimedelected, but in case two ormore shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of themshall forthwith be chosen by the

vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,voting separately.The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of thecertificates.which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaimthe winning candidatesfor president and vice-president.Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is fartoo sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of thewinning candidates for the

presidency and the vice-presidency.Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4,Article VII of theConstitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded theauthority given to Congress by theConstitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions ofpresident and vice-president.In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, thechairman of the Special Boardof Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other

means of transmission equallysafe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements ofVotes to the Commission, . . .clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitutionwhich provides that thereturns of every election for President and Vice-President shall becertified by the board ofcanvassers to Congress.

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Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power thatconstitutionally belongsto it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power ofCongress to canvass the votes forpresident and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for

the said positions. Theprovisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the landshould be read as part of TheOverseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing ofthe votes and the proclamationof the winning candidates for president and vice-president for theentire nation must remain in thehands of Congress.RECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW


C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1,Article IX-A of theConstitution?Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate ArticleIX-A (CommonProvisions) of the Constitution, to wit:Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall beindependent, are the Civil ServiceCommission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission onAudit.The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 andportions of Section 17.1 are

unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this questionraised by petitioner.However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role ofCongress through the JointCongressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis--vis the independenceof the COMELEC, as aconstitutional body.R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A JointCongressional OversightCommittee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate

Committee onConstitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven(7) other Senators designatedby the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee onSuffrage and ElectoralReforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House ofRepresentatives designated by the Speaker

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of the House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7)members to be designated by eachHouse of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and theremaining three (3) from theminority.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power tomonitor and evaluate theimplementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approvethe Implementing Rules andRegulations promulgated by the CommissionSEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. TheCommission shall issue thenecessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisionsof this Act within sixty (60)days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules andRegulations shall be submitted to

the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of thisAct for prior approval.By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered theCOMELEC to issuethe necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement theprovisions of this Act within sixtydays from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of law follows theusual procedure in draftingrules and regulations to implement a law the legislature grants anadministrative agency theauthority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has

enacted, in recognition of theadministrative expertise of that agency in its particular field ofoperation. Once a law is enacted andapproved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished andcomplete. The legislative functionmay spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that bodydeems it proper to review,amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, reviseand amend the IRR of theCOMELEC.By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and

revise the IRR for TheOverseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond thescope of its constitutionalRECENT JURISPRUDENCE - POLITICAL LAW


authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate ofindependence of the COMELEC.

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Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdrawfrom its usual reticence indeclaring a provision of law unconstitutional.The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for beingUNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section17.1, to wit: subject to theapproval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only uponreview and approval ofthe Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit:The Implementing Rulesand Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint CongressionalOversight Committee created byvirtue of this Act for prior approval; and

d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit:It shall review, revise,amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulationspromulgated by the Commission ofthe same law;for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitutionmandating the independenceof constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD withrespect only to theauthority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for

the Senators and party-listrepresentatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes andproclaim the winning candidates forPresident and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress underSection 4, Article VII of theConstitution.The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions ofsaid law continues to bein full force and effect.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN.PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

Facts:

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At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporaryrestraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estradacommanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine National Police(the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings andcarnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibilitypatrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief

of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of theInterior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance withthe presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulatedLetter of Instruction 02/2000 (the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols,called Task Force Tulungan,would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership ofthe Police Chief of Metro Manila.

Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in aMemorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In theMemorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manilathrough a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The Presidentfurther stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the Presidentdirected the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment andutilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merelytemporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have

improved.

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City),Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and theNAIA and Domestic Airport.

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant petition to annulLOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional,arguing that:

I

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THECONSTITUTION, IN THAT:

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLYREMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT ISIN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIANFUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF

THE CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORMTHE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLYMAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to upholdthe rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of theMarines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

Issue: WON the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has legal standing to petition for the annulment of theLOI and to assail the constitutionality of the declaration of deployment of the Philippine Marines

Ruling: NO

Rationale:

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule oflaw and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support ofits locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general aninterest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards, the IBP hasfailed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose

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which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law professionand to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of theMarines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed thepetition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To besure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue.

Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has notshown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.

Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as aresult of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has beenarrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBPprojects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippinedemocratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumedinjury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy therequirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as aconsequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of thedeployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely nostanding to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof,satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.

(Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to takecognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest isinvolved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitionerwhere the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people Thus, when theissues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of

procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issueswhich deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasingtempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in thepetition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves theCourt to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.)

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Tanada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade

Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein

respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through

the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products.

Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associatedwith exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as

reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market

espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and

impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino Firstpolicy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO

agreement.

Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts thegenerally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and

adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all

nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally acceptedprinciples of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws.

Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty

is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as

absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when

Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right

under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a validexercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable

is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement

is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this bethe political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of

economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading

and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is

isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed,through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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Laurel vs GarciaFACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives andagents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at

306 Roppongi; 5-chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the

Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9

May 1956. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanesegovernment for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the

Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War

II.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the

Philippine government.

2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have the authority, andjurisdiction to sell the Roppongi property.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public

service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement

and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both thePhilippinegovernment and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is ofpublicdominion and is outside the commerce of man. And the property continues to be part of

the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is aformal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such ( Ignacio

vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil 335).

It is not for the President to convey valuable real proeprty of the governent on his or her

own sole will. Any such conveyances must be authorized and approved by a law enacted

by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is granted.

executive judiciary

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