i-chen wang
DESCRIPTION
The Choice of Organizational Form: Vertical Financial Ownership versus Other Methods of Vertical Integration (Joe Mahoney, SMJ 1992). I-Chen Wang. Vertical Integration. Mkt. Intermediate forms of VC. VFO. Distinction between Concepts. Vertical Financial Ownership (VFO henceforth) - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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The Choice of Organizational Form: Vertical Financial Ownership versus
Other Methods of Vertical Integration (Joe Mahoney, SMJ 1992)
I-Chen Wang
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Distinction between Concepts
Vertical Financial Ownership (VFO henceforth)
Elimination of contractual or market exchanges + substitution of internal transfers within the boundaries of the firm
Vertical Contracting (VC henceforth)A variety of contractual relationship, e.g. resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, franchising, etc.
VFOMkt. Intermediate forms of VC
Vertical Integration
Vertical integration strategyIn the absence of agency theory and transaction costs, vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting are equivalent governance structures for achieving corporate objectives.
Research question: When market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become necessary, and when vertical financial ownership becomes the preferred governance structure
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To Overcome Market Failures
Market failures call for “institutions of capitalism”
Causes of market failures:OpportunismEnvironment uncertainty/complexity + bounded rationalityAsymmetric informationSmall numbers bargaining situation + asset specificity
Vertical integration Strategic considerations
Eliminate competition, e.g., oil refiner
Output and/or input price discrepanciesEliminate monopoly power from each production stage, minimizing risk of appropriation
Uncertain costs and pricesHolding asset specificity constant, VI increase with uncertainty (TCE); but, increase in uncertainty leads to less specialized assets (Harrigan)Output measurability, shirking
ADVANTAGES OF VFO
Transaction costs theory suggests the following:
Profit – eliminate preemptive claims on profits between separate firmsCoordination and Control – better control of opportunistic behavior due to authority relationships; disputes handled more effectivelyAudit and Resource Allocation – ability to audit whole firm; ability to control all resourcesMotivation – solidarity and clan-like emotionsCommunication – improved coding system
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The Disadvantages of VFO
Bureaucratic costs• Implementation costs• Loss of high-powered market incentives• High internal costs
Strategic costs• Loss of access to info. and tacit knowledge• Increasing sunk cost and/or chronic excess capacity• Over psychological commitment
Production costs• Cost disadvantages without minimum efficient scale• Capital drain• Capacity imbalance
----VFO is not sufficient to meet those considerations!
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To Integrate VFO, VC and TCs
Dimensions of transaction costsFrequency: occasional or recurrent transactionsUncertainty: demand and technologicalAsset specificity: human, physical and/or site firm-specific investments
Dimensions of agency costsNon-separability problems: asymmetry info. b/w output and effortTask programmability: knowledge of the transformation process
Proposition
Non-separability, programmability (agency theory Information asymmetry), specificity (TCE) are three factors to suggest the vertical ownership decision
Low task programmability
High task programmability
Low specificity
High specificity
Low specificity
High specificity
Low non-separability
Spot market Long-term contract
Spot market Joint venture
High non-separability
Relationship contract
Clan (hierarchy)
Inside contract
Hierarchy
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Contributions and Implications
Theoretical contributionsPropose a general theory of vertical integration strategyFill in the research gap by incorporating the vertical governance structure comparisonIntegrate the agency and transaction costs theory
Empirical implicationsEmpirical study on the three variables are warrantedWhether the dimensions of TCs specified here are “sufficient statistics” for predicting organization formWhether the efficiency orientation alone is adequate to predict organization form