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For a Few Dollar$ More How al Qaeda moved into the diamond trade

A Report by Global Witness. April 2003.

Recommendations contained on pages 2 & 3

Table of Contents

Recommendations 2

Executive Summary 6

Introduction 8

Part One: Background to al Qaeda 10

Origins of al Qaeda 10

Command structures 11

Financing structures 13

Role of commodities in financing al Qaeda 13

Gold 15

Tanzanite 17

Part Two: Diamonds and Terrorism �

Precedents 20

Hizbullah and diamonds 20

Part Three: a l Qaeda and diamonds 28

Tanzania and Kenya 28

Sierra Leone and Liberia 39

Part Four: Global response to 9/11 63

Conclusion 72

Annexes 1 � 8 73

References 91

1 For a Few Dollars More

NorthAtlanticOcean

SouthAtlanticOcean

Indian Ocean

IndianOcean

ALGERIALIBYA

EGYPT

MAURITANIA

BURKINOFASO

LIBERIA

NIGER

NIGERIA

MALI

CÔTED’IVOIRE

DEM REPOF THE

CONGO

CHADSUDAN

EHIOPIA

TANZANIA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

LESOTHO

SOMALIA

KENYA

MADAGASCAR

ANGOLA

SOUTHAFRICA

NAMIBIA

BOTSWANA

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

MOZAMBIQUE

CAMEROON

EQUATORIALGUINEA

GABON

CONGOCABINDA

GHANASIERRALEONE

GUINEA

GUINEABISSAU

SENEGAL

WESTERNSAHARA

MOROCCO

GAMBIA

SWAZILAND

ERITREA

MALAWI

BURUNDIRWANDA

UGANDA

DJIBOUTI

Map of Africa showing countries that produce diamonds, and al Qaeda and Hizbullah diamond trading activity

‘I’m aware there is a connection.That connection is specific.They (al Qaeda) are moving diamonds as a commodity tolaunder their funds.’1

David Crane, Chief Prosecutor,Special Court United Nations, Sierra Leone.

9 February 2003.

‘The sinews of war are unlimited money.’Cicero

Key■ al Qaeda Hizbullah ◆ Diamonds ● Key players

For a Few Dollars More 2

Recommendations

The Kimberley ProcessCertification Scheme (KPCS):The credibility of the KPCS depends on

ensuring that all governments fully

implement the scheme. However crucial

elements of the KPCS are yet to be

implemented, and in some cases defined.

These include the lack of a monitoring

function, the current lack of agreement on

handling of statistical data and the issuing

of certificates.

The KPCS should:1. Establish a working group to proactively

investigate the role of diamonds in funding

terrorism and its impact on the KPCS;

2. Design and immediately implement a

credible and effective monitoring

mechanism;

3. Ensure that the recommendations listed

in Annex II of the KPCS be made

mandatory requirements for countries

with alluvial diamond production;

4. Ensure that KPCS members only trade in

rough diamonds with other participating

KPCS governments;

5. Ensure that the diamond industry

is properly audited by independent

third party auditors with adequate

government oversight;

6. End ongoing participant intransigence

on statistics by immediately establishing

and implementing a system to capture

data on the production, import and

export of diamonds;

7. Assist in establishing a credential system

for artisanal diamond miners, buyers

and traders.

8. Embark upon peer review mechanisms

with countries in the KPCS.

The international communityshould:1. Ensure that the International Convention

for the Suppression of Financing of

Terrorism of 1999 is ratified and

implemented by all member states;

2. Take action against known illicit

diamond traders;

3. Encourage Interpol and the World

Customs Union to proactively investigate

the use of diamonds by terrorists;

4. Include measures against illicit diamond

trading in national laws and regulations

particularly in relation to money

laundering and terrorist financing;

5. KPCS member governments should

monitor and ensure that diamond-trading

activities in national jurisdictions comply

with KPCS minimum standards and any

international agreements on money

laundering and terrorist financing;

6. Develop a greater understanding for the

potential of precious commodities to

finance terrorist activity.

Civilian intelligence, militaryintelligence and law enforcementagencies tracking the sources ofterrorist financing should:1. Recognise the use of diamonds as a source

of terrorist financing;

2. Carry out an immediate assessment of the

diamond trade to establish the full scope

of illicit trading structures.

3. Establish a mechanism for the full

coordination and exchange of

information on individuals and

companies involved in the illicit

diamond trade;


The diamond industry:The industry must take concerted action

against the extensive illicit trading networks

within all sectors of the diamond trade.

Failure to face up to this endemic problem

will result in the continued use of diamonds

by terrorists. There is cause for serious

concern about the diamond industry’s

proposed measures for voluntary self-

regulation, a requirement defined under

the KPCS. If the measures and subsequent

implementation prove to be inadequate

then further government regulation will

be required.

The diamond industry should:1. Immediately launch an investigation into

the extent of illicit trading activity and

develop measures to combat it. The

findings of the investigation and resultant

recommendations should be given to the

KPCS and to the UNSC Counter

Terrorism Committee;

2. Work with governments and civil society,

through the KPCS, to establish an

accreditation standard for third party

independent auditing and further work to

ensure its adoption by all sectors of the

industry;

3. Ensure the implementation of anti-money

laundering proposals as required by the

US Patriot Act. Similar action should be

taken by companies and sole traders

throughout the entire industry;

4. Engage with governments to develop

credential systems throughout the alluvial

diamond sector.

The banking sector should:1. Ensure that financing of the diamond

trade be dependent upon proof of

independent third party auditing;

2. Increase vigilance on transactions linked

to diamond trading;

3. Adhere to the Wolfsberg Principles on

money laundering.

The UN should:1. Immediately make the KPCS an

internationally legally binding agreement,

using a UNSC resolution under Chapter

VII of the UN charter;

2. Immediately place an embargo on

unofficial diamonds from the DRC;

3. Ensure that countries are not allowed to

join the KPCS until a credible monitoring

mechanism has been established;

4. Ensure all member states fully comply

with UNSC 1373.

The Chairman of the MonitoringGroup established pursuant toUNSC resolutions 1363 (2001) and1390 (2002) should:1. Establish a task force to examine the role of

precious commodities in terrorist financing;

2. Undertake a detailed diagnostic of the

illicit diamond trade;

3. Actively encourage the full participation

of governments in the KPCS;

4. Actively encourage the establishment of a

monitoring mechanism for the KPCS.

The UN Policy Working Group onthe United Nations and Terrorismshould:1. Undertake specific work on the link

between commodities and terrorist

financing;

2. Examine the current effectiveness of the

KPCS to restrict terrorist financing

through the diamond trade.


Acronyms

ADF Allied Democratic Forces AFRC Armed Forces Ruling CouncilAMAL Afwaj al Muqawamah al

LubnaniyyahAPG Asia Pacific GroupATU Anti-Terrorism UnitAU African UnionAUC Autodefensas Unidas de

ColombiaBGI Binladin Group InternationalCAR Central African RepublicCFR Council on Foreign Relations, USCIA Central Intelligence AgencyDIA Defence Intelligence Agency, USDRC Democratic Republic of

the CongoECOMOG Military Observer Group

of the Economic Community of West African States

EU European UnionEUC End User CertificateFATF Financial Action Task ForceFBI Federal Bureau of InvestigationFSAP Financial Sector Assessment

ProgramFSU Former Soviet UnionGAO General Accounting Office, USGIR SA Grupo de Representaciones

InternationalesHRD High Diamond CouncilHUMINT Human intelligenceIIRO International Islamic Relief

Organisation IMF International Monetary FundISI Inter Services Intelligence JA Jewellers of AmericaKGB Committee for State SecurityKPCS Kimberley Process

Certification SchemeLURD Liberians United for

Reconciliation and DemocracyMAK Maktab al Khidmat Lil Mujahidin

al-ArabNCIS National Criminal Intelligence

ServiceNDC National Diamond CompanyNGO Non Governmental OrganisationNIF National Islamic FrontNPFL National Patriotic Front of LiberiaNPP National Patriotic PartyNPRC National Provincial Ruling CouncilNSA National Security Agency USNSC National Security Council OAS Organization of American States

OECD Organisation of Economic Community and Development

PLO Palestinian Liberation OrganisationRCD-Goma Le Rassemblement Congolais pour

la Démocratie RPA Rwandan Patriotic ArmyRUF Revolutionary United FrontSADR Sahrawi Arab Democratic RepublicSIGINT Signals IntelligenceSSS Special Security Service, LiberiaTFRG Terrorism Financial Review GroupTPB Terrorism Prevention BranchUAE United Arab EmiratesUMFF Ugandan Mujahidin Freedom FightersUN United NationsUNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra LeoneUNGA United Nations General AssemblyUNITA National Union for the Total

Independence of AngolaUNSC United Nations Security CouncilUS United StatesUSAID United States Agency for

International DevelopmentWDC World Diamond CouncilWFDB World Federation of Diamond Bourses

Osama bin Laden T-shirt, FreetownSierra Leone March 2002


Key PlayersAbdullah Ahmed Abdullahaka Abu Mohamed al-MasriSaad al Sharif, Saleh and AbuMarium. Egyptian nationalpossibly of Saudi origin.Indicted by a US court for1998 African embassybombings. He played anactive role in the murders ofUS servicemen in

Mogadishu. He trained soldiers in the use ofexplosives at the Jihad Wal camp in Khost,Afghanistan. He sits on al Qaeda’s consultationcouncil as well as the religious/fatwa committee.

Abu Ubadia al-Banshiri – real name Ali al Rashidi.aka Mr Jalal and Abdel Habib.Former military commander of al Qaeda andpossible founder member and was sent by Usamabin Laden to recruit for al Qaeda in East Africa in1994. He died in a ferry disaster in Kenya in 1996.He ran a diamond smuggling operation and wasowner of Tanzanian mining concern,Taheer Ltd.

Wadih El HageOsama bin Laden’s personalsecretary. Born in Sidon,Lebanon, 1960. El Hage hasbeen indicted on multiplecounts of perjury pertainingto his relationship with alQaeda. In 1993 el Hage wasin Sudan where he met withBin Laden and became his

personal secretary. In 1994, he moved to Kenyasetting up Tanzanite King, a gemstone mining andtrading company. He was key in the al Qaedadiamond and gemstone trading network. He hasbeen in custody since 20 September 1998.

Ahmed Khalfan GhailaniGhailani is a Tanzaniannational He was indicted inthe Southern District ofNew York, on 6 December1998, for his involvement inthe 7 August 1998 bombingsin the US embassies in Dar es Salaam,Tanzania and Nairobi. He is presently

at large. He was involved in the Sierra Leone andLiberia diamond buying operation.

Fazul Abdullah MohammedWas indicted for his involvementin the 1998 African embassybombing. He was a senior aid toWadih El Hage. He preparedreports for Bin Laden. He laterappeared in Sierra Leone andLiberia as part of the al Qaedadiamond buying team.

Aziz NassourLebanese diamond and armsdealer currently in Beirutinstrumental in facilitating alQaeda diamond operations inLiberia and Sierra Leone.

Samih OssailyLebanese diamond dealer,currently on trial in Antwerp,Belgium for conflict diamonddealing, money laundering andarms dealing. Second cousin ofAziz Nassour.

Ibrahim Bah –aka IbrahimTraore, Ibrahim Balde,AbrahimBalde, Balde Ibrahima –confidante to Charles Taylor.Diamond and arms smuggler.Born in 1957 in Senegal Bahtrained in Libya in the 80s,became a radical Islamicist andfought in Afghanistan andLebanon in the 80s and 90s. He

came under the influence of al Qaeda. He went on tofight with Charles Taylor’s NPFL from 1991-97.

Ali Darwish Sierra Leonean born Lebanese diamond dealer.Intimately involved with Liberian operations of AzizNassour whom he introduced to Ibrahim Bah.Currently based in US.

Nassour

El Hage

Abdullah Mohammed

Ghailani

Bah

Ossaily


Executive Summary

This report seeks to examine whether theterrorist group, al Qaeda, is used, and iscontinuing to use, rough diamonds.a GlobalWitness presents evidence that confirms that alQaeda has been involved in the rough diamondtrade since the 1990s. Firstly in Kenya andTanzania and then in Sierra Leone and Liberia,where they began to show an interest in diamondtrading in 1998, following the crackdown ontheir financial activities in the wake of the USembassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Itargues that there are several reasons why alQaeda has used rough diamonds:

● As a means of raising funds for al Qaeda cells;

● To hide money targeted by financialsanctions;

● To launder the profits of criminal activity;● To convert cash into a commodity that

holds its value and is easily transportable.

The report also briefly discusses the use ofother high-value commodities, such as gold andtanzanite, by al Qaeda, and the precedent set byHizbullah of using diamonds to fund theiroperations. In doing so, it reveals that the tradenetworks and routes used by al Qaeda to gainaccess to rough diamonds are the same as thoseused for trading conflict and illicit diamonds. Italso notes that such diamond trading routesoverlap with illicit arms trading, and informalsupport and trading networks between terrorists,rebel groups as well as regional insecurity andoutright conflict. To help illustrate thesediamond-trading routes the report looks in somedetail at the trading networks and operations of akey player involved in the al Qaeda tradingstructure in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Itconcludes that the only way for the internationalcommunity to prevent the trade in conflict andterror diamonds is to ensure that the KimberleyProcess Certification Scheme is effectivelyimplemented. This means establishing acredible, independent monitoring mechanismcovering all aspects of the diamond pipeline,

from the first point of extraction to the finished product. This report seeks to act as awake up call to those who believe that theproblem of conflict diamonds has beenadequately addressed.

Part One provides background detail on alQaeda’s history, cell structure, and hierarchy.Significantly, evidence gathered by GlobalWitness shows that al Qaeda’s cell structure andgeographical scope are replicated in theirdiamond-trading operations. It also provides anoverview of al Qaeda’s penetration into Africa,highlighting how the group’s area of operationsoverlapped with key illicit diamond tradingareas. It then outlines al Qaeda’s use of otherhigh-value commodities such as gold andtanzanite, arguing that, as with diamonds, alQaeda’s use of these commodities was a strategicresponse to blocks placed upon their previousrevenue streams.

Part Two briefly examines the past record ofdiamond use by Hizbullah in funding theiroperations and for money laundering.b It showsthere was a clear historical precedent for alQaeda’s use of rough diamonds by governmentsand the diamond industry. Thus, it argues thatboth governments and industry were forewarnedof the danger of diamonds being targeted by alQaeda, and that both governments and industryfailed to respond adequately to this threat.

Part Three looks in more depth at allegationsof al Qaeda’s past and present diamond-tradingoperations. Evidence from the trials of al Qaedamembers in the United States in 2001 shows that,between 1993 and 1997, senior members of alQaeda’s Kenyan and Tanzanian cells establishedboth diamond and gem mining companies andan international trading network. This sectionreveals evidence which confirms press reportsthat, following the 1998 crackdown on al Qaeda’sfinances after the US embassy bombings in EastAfrica, significant quantities of al Qaeda fundswere laundered in 2000-2001 through the illicitdiamond trade in Sierra Leone and Liberia. PartThree also provides a detailed chronologicalbreakdown of how al Qaeda expanded their

a A number of regional and international political bodies such as the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League and theUnited Nations have issued definitions of ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’. The definitions of ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ used in this report arethose endorsed by the UN General Assembly (UNGA), as Global Witness regards these as having the most universal currency. UNGAResolution 54/110 of 9 December 1999 defines terrorism as ‘criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in thegeneral public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes’ and such acts are condemned as ‘in any circumstanceunjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may beinvoked to justify them’. For further information on definitions of terrorism by other multilateral bodies, see Annex 6.

b The Lebanese paramilitary organisation Hizbullah is designated as a terrorist group by the United States State Department (theEuropean Union does not consider Hizbullah to be a terrorist entity). Global Witness believes that the actions of rebel groupssuch as the RUF in Sierra Leone and UNITA in Angola fit the definition of terrorist acts outlined in Annex 6.

operations into the two countries, and shows howa supposedly legitimate trader played a centralrole in the development of al Qaeda’s diamondtrading activities, and how these were connectedwith arms trading to Liberia and on to the RUFin Sierra Leone.

Part Four provides a brief overview of theinternational response to al Qaeda in theaftermath of September 11. It outlines thevarious ways governments, the internationalfinance system and other economic actorsattempted to block the (potential) supply offunds to terrorist groups, and to combat thetransfer, storing and moving of terrorist assets. Itfurther highlights how this targeting of thesources of terrorist financing has ignoreddiamond trading.

The report concludes that the internationalcommunity still faces considerable challenges toprevent the trade in illicit and conflict diamonds. Itrecognises that the KPCS of import and exportcontrols does represent a significant step forwardin combating conflict diamonds. However, it arguesthat the Kimberley Process has consistently failed toaddress the key issue of the need for independentoversight to make any system of controls effective.Without independent monitoring and withouteffective controls over alluvial mining, the KPCShas little credibility and, more importantly, will notstop the illicit diamond trade, an important sourceof funding for al Qaeda amongst others. Thereport calls for the diamond industry and therelevant governments to fully accept the urgentnature of the problem and to take practicalmeasures to combat it.


Attempts to Define Conflict Diamonds

‘CONFLICT DIAMONDS means rough diamondsused by rebel movements or their allies to financeconflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments,as described in relevant United Nations SecurityCouncil (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain ineffect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions whichmay be adopted in the future, and as understood andrecognised in United Nations General Assembly(UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGAresolutions which may be adopted in future.’

Kimberley Process Certification Schemeas adopted at Interlaken Kimberley ProcessPlenary Meeting on 5 November 2002:

‘Understanding conflict diamonds to be roughdiamonds which are used by rebel movements tofinance their military activities, including attempts toundermine or overthrow legitimate Governments,’

UN General Assembly Resolution 55/56,1 December 2000, Adopted by the 55thSession of UNGA:

‘Recognising that the trade in conflict diamonds is amatter of serious international concern, which can bedirectly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, theactivities of rebel movements aimed at underminingor overthrowing legitimate Governments and the illicittraffic in and proliferation of armaments, especiallysmall arms and light weapons,’

UN General Assembly Resolution 56/263, 13 March 2002, Adopted at 56thSession of UNGA:

‘Noting with deep concern the linkage between the illicit trade in rough diamonds fromcertain regions of the world and the fuelling of armedconflicts that affect international peace and security,’

UN Security Council Chapter 6 Resolutionadopted by Security Council at its 4694meeting on 28 January 2003.

Artisanal alluvial diamond mining Angola 2002


Introduction

Conflict or blood diamonds have been a subjectof international outrage and concern sinceDecember 1998, when Global Witness publishedits report A Rough Trade: The Role of Companiesand Governments in the Angolan Conflict .2 The termconflict diamonds is commonly used to refer torough diamonds that finance and prolongviolent armed conflict in Africa.c Diamonds havebeen used by rebel groups in a strategic,systematic and consistent way to fund some ofthe most protracted and devastating civil wars inAfrica,3 wars that have cost an estimated 3.7 million lives4 Even today, diamonds continueto pay for illicit weapons purchases in conflict-torn Liberia and the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC).

Having brought the issue of conflictdiamonds to the world’s attention, aninternational coalition of civil societyorganisations forced a reluctant diamondindustry and key diamond producing andtrading governments to accept responsibility forhaving allowed the multi-million dollar trade inconflict diamonds to go unchecked.d In May2000, the diamond industry, fearing a negativeconsumer reaction, joined with concernedgovernments and civil society organisations tocreate the Kimberley Process. This consisted of aseries of intergovernmental meetings mandatedby the UN to design a system of import andexport controls for rough diamonds, with theaim of eliminating the trade in conflictdiamonds.e Fourteen meetings later, inNovember 2002 at Interlaken in Switzerland,participating governments together with thediamond industry and civil society groups agreedon a system of import and export controls for the rough diamond trade; as of April 2003 there are 69 participant governments in theKimberley Process.f

On 11 September 2001, the devastatingattacks by al Qaeda on the World Trade Centreand the Pentagon took place. This gave addedfocus to the need to identify and dismantle allforms of terrorist financing and moneylaundering networks, as UNSC 1373 recognised.5

Almost immediately after the attacks, details

emerged of al Qaeda’s global financialarchitecture.6 Court transcripts from the 2001trial of al Qaeda operatives in the United Statesshowed that the trade in rough diamonds andhigh value gemstones from Kenya and Tanzaniahad been an important part of al Qaeda’sfinancial structures.7 In November 2001,evidence was uncovered by The Washington Postwhich revealed that operatives from the same alQaeda cells involved in the Kenyan andTanzanian diamond trading operation hadbegun a massive diamond buying operation inSierra Leone and Liberia.8 Recently questionshave emerged concerning investments indiamond mining and exploration companies byprominent Saudi financiers with previousconvictions for terrorist financing activities andpossible links to al Qaeda. Global Witness hasnot included any discussion of these activities inthis report.

Global Witness decided to carry out its owninvestigations to determine whether there was abasis to these claims of diamond trading. Whatemerged was a complex economic and politicalnexus of diamond trading, involvingrelationships between governments,businessmen, African rebel leaders and thediamond industry. These investigations haveconfirmed the diamond-dealing operations of alQaeda in Sierra Leone and Liberia as firstoutlined by The Washington Post on 2 November2001 and 29 December 2002. The reportpresents detailed information of how thesetrading structures were developed by al Qaeda.

Global Witness details evidence of al Qaeda’sdevelopment and implementation of asophisticated financial strategy, managed byhigh-level al Qaeda operatives, aimed atharnessing the rough diamond trade to fund itsoperations. The use of diamonds, gold andtanzanite, and other high-value commodities, asa form of revenue generation and assetlaundering by al Qaeda has already receivedmedia coverage. However, what Global Witness ishighlighting for the first time is the strategicnature of al Qaeda’s decision to begin trading inthese commodities, and in the light of this, isquestioning the reluctance of governments andintelligence agencies to accord this issue theimportance it deserves.

c There are in fact at least three different definitions. See page 7.d Current coalition partners include: ActionAid, Amnesty International, Catholic Relief Services, CENADEP, Fatal Transactions,

Global Witness, Medico International, One Sky – the Canadian Institute of Sustainable Living, Oxfam International, PartnershipAfrica Canada, Physicians for Human Rights, World Vision, Network Movement for Justice and Development, 11.11.11.

e The Kimberley Process was so named because the first meeting was held in Kimberley, South Africa, in May 2000.f Interlaken meeting agreement and Kimberley Process document. It should be noted that the civil society groups present

accepted the certification scheme with reservations, particularly over the lack of any independent monitoring of the nationalcontrol systems.

Governments and the intelligencecommunity consistently cite the lack of hardevidence as their reason for not taking action.Global Witness will argue that the consequenceof their reluctance to pursue this line ofinvestigation has enabled the illicit diamond tradeto be used by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.

In fact, it should come as no surprise that alQaeda made a strategic decision to use diamondsto fund its operations. Rebel armies, drugdealers, organised crime outfits and rogue stateshave all recognised that rough diamonds can beput to covert or illicit uses. Easy to transport andconceal, and with an ability to maintain theirprice, they are already the favoured method ofpayment or bribe in many illegal transactions. Arecent report by the Financial Action Task Force(FATF) on Money Laundering states:

‘The ease with which diamonds can behidden and transported and the very highvalue per gram for some stones makediamonds particularly vulnerable to illegaldiversion from the legitimate channels forthe exploitation and profit of criminals’.9

Global Witness believes that an accurateunderstanding of the role played by diamonds interrorist financing systems is overdue. It is also ofgrave concern concerned that the legitimatediamond industry has to date not conducted itsown investigations into this issue. What makestheir negligence even more remarkable is thefact that there is already widespreadunderstanding within the diamond industry and among governments that groups such as Hizbullah – who wield considerable influence over certain sectors of the diamondtrading community – use the diamond trade to obtain funds.

There is a tragic and unacceptable sense ofhistory repeating itself on this issue. Thediamond industry has not learnt the key lessonon conflict diamonds which is the failure to takefull responsibility for the problems in its ownindustry sector. It continues to resolutely avoidresponsibility for collective action, insisting thatgovernments bear the sole responsibility. Thishas been very clearly, and repeatedly

demonstrated in recent history. Sales ofdiamonds have played a role in funding UNITAin Angola, the RUF in Sierra Leone, variousrebel factions in the DRC; President CharlesTaylor in Liberia, Hizbullah and AMAL militiasin Lebanon and a number of other regimes andconflicts. This is not to say that diamonds are thecausal factor in all of these conflicts; although inAngola and Sierra Leone control of the diamondfields was a major factor in the extension of thefighting, but what is clear is that diamondrevenue has been central to much of the conflict.The issue of the link between diamonds andterrorism is a major test of the claims thediamond industry has made that it has reformedand is serious about the need to protect societyfrom the negative impacts of its trade. Theindustry has a serious challenge before it. If ittakes the same approach as it did with conflictdiamonds it will be risking the entire future ofthe trade in a way that civil society organisationshave never done. Civil society has shownremarkable restraint despite the fears ofgovernments and industry that it would call forboycotts. The trade, through its public voice theWorld Diamond Council (WDC), could dosomething completely new. It could move swiftlyto put in place measures to combat this source ofterrorist finance. Global Witness fully acceptsthat this is not a simple matter, and that theindustry is not a united one, however, the usualexcuses are no longer credible.

Governments must also accept that they havea responsibility to tackle this issue. There hasbeen a distinct lack of willingness within theKimberley Process negotiations towards thedesigning and setting up of credible andindependent monitoring mechanisms. Thefailure to tackle what many governments saw asthe ‘potentially’ difficult subject of monitoringhas lead to a significant weakness in the system.Now that the Kimberley Process is deemed to beup and running, certain governments, such asSouth Africa and the United Kingdom havepublicly accepted the need for developingeffective and independent monitoring controls .g

As this report will show, this weakness must beaddressed in the next phase of the KimberleyProcess if it is to maintain any credibility.


g Letter from P. Mlambo-Ngcuka, South African Minister of Minerals and Energy to Global Witness, 20 January 2003 ‘The chairman of the Kimberley Process, in his notice dated 12 December 2002, noted that in Windhoek in 2001 Participants tooka conscious decision to break the process of monitoring into two main components: the establishment of national monitoring andcontrol systems and the question of international monitoring. As this latter question was thought to be particularly sensitive it wasdecided that the Kimberley Process would proceed with the establishment of national certification schemes and then to examinehow best to tackle the question of international monitoring. I trust that this will be tackled at the next plenary meeting.’


Part One: al Qaeda � Structure and HistoryThis section of the report briefly outlines theoperational structure of al Qaeda in order tobetter understand the significance of theorganisation’s growing use of diamonds. It isimportant to understand that al Qaeda’sinvolvement in diamonds is not a one-offoccurrence, but mirrors its growth across thecontinent and clearly fits with its other businessactivities, and plays a role in its strategicdevelopment.

Global Witness is not claiming expertise on alQaeda and refers readers to Rohan Gunaratna’sdetailed and authoritative book on theorganisation ‘Inside al Qaeda: Global Network ofTerror’, 2002.h Much of the information in thissection is drawn from his work.

Al Qaeda: A brief historyThe early development of al QaedaThe origins of al Qaeda can be traced back to1979 and two events of immense regional andinternational impact: the Islamic revolutionwhich led to the downfall of the Shah in Iran,and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Thesetwo events marked both the beginning ofcontemporary regional and global Islamistmovements, and the eventual political, if notmilitary defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan,one of the endgames of the Cold War.

The rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeni inIran was paralleled by the creation of Islamistmovements globally.i Gunaratna estimates thereare approximately one hundred such movementsin the Middle East, Africa, Asia, the Caucasus,and the Balkans and in Western Europe. AlQaeda grew out of the ranks of the Islamicmujahidin of both Afghan and foreign originwho fought the Soviet-backed regime inAfghanistan during the 1980s.

Gunaratna describes how the intellectualorigins of al Qaeda derive from the Palestinian-Jordanian Abdullah Azzam, who in 1987 and1988 envisaged al Qaeda as an organisation thatwould ‘channel the energies of the mujahidininto fighting on behalf of oppressed Muslimsworldwide’, that is, as a form of Islamic ‘rapidreaction force’, ready to spring to the defence oftheir fellow believers at short notice.’10

Apart from being the intellectual originator

of al Qaeda, Azzam was also Osama bin Laden’smentor. Both men headed the Maktab al KhidmatLil Mujahidin al-Arab or MAK (also known as theAfghan Service Bureau) in Peshawar, Pakistan,out of which al Qaeda evolved. Disagreementsbetween Azzam and bin Laden over the futurestrategy of MAK in 1988 and 1989 led to Azzam’sassassination by a car bomb in Peshawar.11 BinLaden was one of the few surviving seniormujahidin fighters who had been involved in thestrategic leadership of the anti-Soviet militarycampaign, and as a result he assumed theleadership of al Qaeda. Bin Laden’s aim was tofashion MAK and al Qaeda in his own image, asan ‘unflinchingly hostile global terrorist force,established with the aim of destroying Americaand Israel and re-establishing the Caliphate bymeans of a worldwide jihad.’12

Following the murder of Azzam in 1989, whilebin Laden became al Qaeda’s operational head,the mantle of al Qaeda’s spiritual leadership wasassumed by the leader of the Egyptian IslamicGroup, Umar Abd al-Rahman (also known as the‘Blind Sheikh’). Following al-Rahman’s arrest bythe US authorities in 1993 in the wake of alQaeda’s first attempt to blow up the World TradeCentre, Dr Ayman Muhammad Rabi’al Zawahiri,another radical Egyptian Islamist leader, steppedin to fill the ideological void left by Azzam. Aymanal-Zawahiri also provided al Qaeda with much-needed organisational skills and beganpositioning his fellow Egyptian loyalists as binLaden’s key aides. As the organisation began togrow, an Egyptian named Ali al-Rashidi (who isbetter known as Abu Ubadiah al-Banshiri) wasnominated as al Qaeda’s first militarycommander. From 1993 until his death in 1996, asis described in more detail in Part Three, al-Banshiri became intimately involved inestablishing al Qaeda’s diamond smuggling andmoney laundering operations as the leader of theKenyan and Tanzanian cells.

Al Qaeda and bin Laden were initially basedin Afghanistan, before re-locating to SaudiArabia in 1989. Bin Laden was then forced by theSaudi authorities to move to Sudan in 1991 andwas based there for the next five years. It wasduring this time that al Qaeda developed theirdiversified business interests. In parallel to thisactivity al Qaeda were involved in a series offailed assassination attempts on a number ofworld leaders, including President Mubarak ofEgypt, and President Clinton, and other attacks

h Rohan Gunaratna. ‘Inside al Qaeda. Global Network of Terror’, publ. C. Hurst and Company, London, 2002.i Islamist: ‘Group of ideologies in Islam that want to use the Sharia to its full extent, meaning that secular forms of governments

and institutions are considered foreign to a true Muslim society. Islamism is not one ideology. Inside the same society, severaldirections of Islamism can be found, and these are seldom cooperating. People belonging to an Islamist group, call themselves,and are called by others ‘islaamiyy’ for men and ‘islaamiyya’ for women. Both men and women are called Islamists in English.’

that are briefly detailed in the section ‘al Qaeda and Africa’. These activities resulted in the international community pressuring theSudanese who were hosting the organisation,and as a result al Qaeda returned to Afghanistan in 1996.

Organisational structureAl Qaeda uses a network of cells and affiliateorganisations through which to pursue its aims.The relationship between these various affiliatescan be described as resembling a modernmanagement structure. Al Qaeda and its memberorganisations are distinct enterprises, each withtheir own particular struggle, aims andoperational methods, yet they maintain close linkswith one another.13 Gunaratna describes thestructure of al Qaeda as being led by the shuramajlis, or consultative council, which isimmediately below bin Laden who is the EmirGeneral. He notes:

‘Immediately below the shura majlis andreporting to it, are four operationalcommittees: military, finance andbusiness; fatwa and Islamic study; andmedia and publicity, which ensure thesmooth day-to-day running of al Qaeda,each being headed by an Emir. While theEmir and Deputy Emir have responsibilityfor each committee, its members alsoform compartmentalised working groupsfor special assignments…some membersserve on more than one committee or arerotated between them.’14

Each of the four committees controls aspecific set of functions:15

The Military committee is responsible forrecruitment, training, procurement, and forsupport and military operations. It instructsteams to plan attacks, including intelligencegathering on intended targets via surveillance orreconnaissance missions and conductingrehearsals through attack training. It can alsoallocate special instructors, weapons, and otherresources to directly and indirectly assistcampaigns by al Qaeda’s affiliate groups. Inaddition, it oversees more clandestine andsensitive operations such as the procurement,forgery, or alteration of identity documentsincluding passports and entry visas.15

The Finance committee is responsible fordeveloping the financial resources needed by alQaeda members on its payroll, as well as fundingoperations and the activities of its affiliates. Thisinvolves institutional methods of financing, usingfront businesses and charities. Al Qaeda controlsbranches of both MAK and the International

Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), twoimportant sources of funds.

The Religious and Legal committee isresponsible for sustaining al Qaeda’s ideologicalcommitment and its membership, in particularfor the propagation of the al Qaeda model ofIslam. The Religious and Legal Committee worksclosely with the Media Committee.

The Media committee is responsible fordisseminating news and information in supportof al Qaeda’s political and military activities. Itcontrols the dissemination of al Qaeda’s externalpolitical and religious message rather than itsinternal communications between cells andaffiliate groups.

Al Qaeda makes use of geographic divisionsto manage its structure. For example, heads ofregions usually reported to Abu Zubaydah, Headof External Operations, who sat on the Militarycommittee. This means that individuals at theapex of a cell report directly to an operationhandler, or to the head of the relevant region.The regional heads report to an individual onthe relevant committee. Hand picked membersof these committees – especially representativesfrom the military committee – also conductspecial assignments for bin Laden and hisoperational commanders. To preserve operationaleffectiveness at all levels, compartmentalisationand secrecy are paramount.16

Al Qaeda also operates across its variouscommand structures. This makes it very flexibleand able to adapt to changing externalconditions, such as having to relocate itscommand structure to new countries in responseto political pressure. This adaptability was animportant factor in its survival after the fall ofthe Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001.

Al Qaeda relies on familial and socialrelationships within its cellular network tosustain ideological cohesion and obedience.Members often recruit from among their ownfamilies, friends and nationalities.17 This canmean that an entire taskforce for a particularoperation in a particular country will be peoplewho know one other and who may be of thesame nationality. For example, its Algerianmembers ran fraudulent credit card operationsin Europe; and the Egyptian section looked aftertraining facilities worldwide.18 In certain cases,the individuals who are to carry out a particularattack or operation will be known to the localcell simply as the ‘person responsible’, with aminimum number of cell members knowing theidentity of the operative.

Development of networksAl Qaeda’s strategy has been to build a diverserange of supporters, thus it campaigned for a



joint Shia-Sunni platform and attempted to uniteall extremists in the common fight for a globaljihad. In so doing, al Qaeda made allies amongkey religious constituencies and also gainedpopular support, thus increasing both its politicalpower and its material support. It also soughtsupport globally, by providing ‘seed money’ andmilitary training to key movements around theworld, in the process persuading them to becomepart of its umbrella movement.

Al Qaeda now has a wide network of supportthrough which to finance, plan and execute itsoperations. It has direct control over its owncells, administrative control over its affiliates and consultative control over more looselyaffiliated groups.

Al Qaeda and HizbullahFor a number of years, investigators have beentrying to prove a link between the Lebanesemilitia group Hizbullah and al Qaeda. WhileGlobal Witness has not uncovered any evidenceto confirm a relationship between the twoorganisations, a brief analysis of the informationavailable to date does go some way to showingthat they have begun to coordinate theirideological programmes and strategies including,Global Witness believes, adopting parallelfinancial strategies. Part Two explains in moredepth Hizbullah’s involvement in the diamondindustry. Global Witness sees clear lines ofconvergence between the use of diamond-trading operations by both groups as a source ofrevenue and asset storage and transfer.

According to evidence from trials of al Qaedamembers in the United States in 2001, while binLaden was in Sudan he began forging a workingrelationship between Sunni and Shia terrorgroups. A meeting was held between bin Laden,the Sudanese religious scholar Ahmed AbdelRahman Hamadabi, and Sheikh Nomani whorepresented the Iranian Shias. Nomani occupiedan office in Khartoum paid for by the IranianGovernment and had access to the highest ranksof the political elite in Tehran. This meeting,chaired by bin Laden was apparently the first of aseries that took place between al Qaeda,Hizbullah, and Iranian representatives.19

According to Gunaratna, these meetings alsoserved to give al Qaeda technical advice on itsoperations. The failure of the February 1993attack on the World Trade Centre showed that alQaeda did not yet have the technical know-howto bomb large structures. Within a few weeks ofthe Khartoum meeting, the Iranians consultedHizbullah and al Qaeda was invited to send ateam to Lebanon.20 According to Gunaratna, theteam included key al Qaeda personnel, who hadbeen given training by Hizbullah and had made

propaganda videos with the intention of passingon their knowledge to other al Qaeda groups.20

Cooperation between the two terrorist groupswas cemented by a meeting between bin Ladenand Hizbullah security chief Imad Mughniyeh,according to the testimony of Ali Muhammadbefore the court of the Southern District of NewYork on 20 October 2000.20 In addition, Gunaratnanotes that Hizbullah trainers and experts fromIran’s Ministry of Information and Security trainedal Qaeda fighters in existing al Qaeda camps inSudan, in Hizbullah camps in Lebanon andgovernment bases in Iran.21 On 6 December 2002,the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon claimedthat al Qaeda had several operatives in Lebanonand had entered Israel via the Gaza strip, butprovided no proof to substantiate these claims.Lebanon’s defence minister, Khalil Hrawi,admitted that some al Qaeda members hadinfiltrated Lebanon but that Lebanon ‘dealt withtheir people and operations through coordinationwith the Americans, France, Germany, the Arabcountries and, of course, Syria’.22

Gunaratna’s view is that:

‘The Hizbullah, al Qaeda relationship was astrategic partnership, indicative of a majorshift in terrorist thinking. Throughout the1990s, ethno nationalist Muslim groupswere supplanted by, or fell under theinfluence of, Islamist groups, thereby pavingthe way for further ideological toleranceand inter-group cohesion as a means ofconfronting a common enemy.’23

This relationship was not confined to theMiddle East. Shia and Sunni groups in Asia alsocooperated. Gunaratna notes that the discoveryof a Hizbullah cell in Singapore in 1998, and thearrest of Hizbullah operatives in 1999 and 2000in the Philippines are possible evidence of thisnew spirit and practice of cooperation24.

Al Qaeda and AfricaThis section briefly details some of al Qaeda’sactivity across the African continent as it is highlypertinent to an understanding of the way in whichit was able to gain access to diamond tradingnetworks, move high profile operatives aroundthe continent with relative ease, and has becometied into the regional instability in West Africa.

Al Qaeda has not restricted its sphere ofoperations to those African countries that havean obvious religious, cultural or politicalsympathy with Islam. The simultaneous attacks byal Qaeda operatives against the Americanembassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, inwhich 224 people were killed and over 4,500injured are well known. However, al Qaeda has

also been involved for over a decade in a widerange of attacks throughout Africa, and hasdeveloped networks involving extremist Islamistorganisations in many African countries.Gunaratna lists the operations and attacks insome detail. It is very clear that al Qaeda’sinvolvement in diamond trading is part of asustained, ever expanding and long-termcommitment to activity in Africa. In other wordsthis is an issue that the diamond trade and thegovernments participating in the KimberleyProcess must face up to. Gunaratna notes:

‘Immediately after the attacks, the USsuspended diplomatic and businessoperations in some other Africancountries where al Qaeda was known tohave a presence: Somalia, Sudan, Congo,and Guinea-Bissau. Osama was thinkingbeyond his traditional African base, theHorn, wishing to make inroads among theMuslims of Central and West Africa. Planswere set in motion for further attacksagainst US embassies as a means ofpoliticising and radicalising AfricanMuslims, in the hope of provoking anti-Muslim backlashes in the countriesconcerned. However, the NationalSecurity Agency’s monitoring of satellitephone conversations between Afghanistanand sub-Saharan Africa alerted it to, andhelped thwart, al Qaeda’s plans to bombat least twelve US embassies, including theUS mission in Abidjan, capital of the IvoryCoast. Since 9/11 the CIA has withdrawnsome of its best operatives from Asia andelsewhere who are familiar withmonitoring Islamist movements. Theyhave now been deployed in many Africancountries where previously this issue wasnot regarded as a priority. There is alsostrong circumstantial evidence of thegrowing popularity of Osama and alQaeda in Northern Nigeria, apredominantly Muslim area, and otherparts of West Africa’s Sudanic belt. Whilein Sudan, al Qaeda and the NationalIslamic Front (NIF) played an importantrole in supporting Ugandan Islamistsdirectly and though NGOs. In 1994, SalafiFoundation of Uganda was supported byal Qaeda/NIF to develop the UgandanMujahidin Freedom Fighters (UMFF). Inaddition to training in Juba, Nesitu,Jebellin in the south of Sudan, campswere established in Buseruka, Hoima,near Lake Albert. Sheikh Jamil moved toKenya where he coordinated UMFFactivities. By joining other opposition

forces, UMFF evolved into the AlliedDemocratic Forces (ADF), whichrelocated to the Democratic Republic ofCongo to challenge the Kampalagovernment. After al Qaeda moved toAfghanistan in 1996, handpicked ADFmembers were trained in Afghanistan asexplosives experts. While Sudansupported the Lord’s Resistance Army,Uganda aided the Sudanese People’sLiberation Army. In 1995, when Ugandaclosed down the Sudanese embassy inKampala, the Sudanese intelligenceofficers were transferred to Kenya tocontinue their work. Even after Osama’sdeparture from Sudan, Khartoumsupported the Ugandan Islamistsincluding the West Nile Bank Frontoperating from Zaire along the Zaire-Ugandan border. According to aCanadian intelligence source, al Qaedaplanned to assassinate President Museveniand another African leader visitingKampala in 1999. Khartoum’s support forUgandan Islamists did not cease until thesigning of a peace agreement betweenSudan and Uganda in December 1999.’25

This extensive quotation from Gunaratna’sbook shows that al Qaeda have a long history ofoperating across many countries in Africa andthat they are not just limited to the countries thatare publicly known about, such as Kenya andTanzania. Virtually all the countries listed aboveare either producers of diamonds or have anextensive illicit trade in diamonds.

Al Qaeda funding Al Qaeda have utilised many different options toraise and move funds. This section briefly looksat some of these and includes a case history onits use of gold.

‘Intelligence and security servicesworldwide, including the CIA and MI6,have never before encountered a globalterrorist financial network as sophisticatedas al Qaeda’s. Comparisons with othersuch networks reveal that al Qaeda hasbuilt the most complex, robust andresilient money generating and moneymoving network yet seen. No networkresembles al Qaeda’s, although it sharessome features with the now defunct Bankof Credit and Commerce International….The resilience of al Qaeda’s financialinfrastructure is primarily due to thecompartmentalised structure it hasadhered to since its inception. It assigns a



high priority to financial training andmanagement as well as the sustainedgeneration and investment of funds. AlQaeda’s finance and business committee –comprising professional bankers,accountants and financiers – manages thegroup’s funds across four continents.’26

Bin Laden is widely reported to haveinherited US$300 million at the age of ten on thedeath of his father, as part of his inheritance fromBinladin Group International (BGI).27 HoweverGunaratna states that intelligence sources believeit was closer to US$25-30 million which wasinvested.28 In Afghanistan during the 1980s, binLaden financed the military campaign against theRussian occupation with US$25,000 a month.27

Experts believe that at that rate his inheritedfortune would have quickly dried up, and that theal Qaeda network would thus have had to seekout new sources of revenue. It is estimated that byearly 1999 bin Laden was receiving up to 10% ofthe Taliban-controlled drug trade, estimated tobe worth nearly US$1 billion a year.27 In addition,al Qaeda received funding from Islamistorganisations estimated to be able to draw uponUS$5 billion to US$16 billion a year. However,Simon Reeve, who has written on al Qaeda,believed that by late 1998 to early 1999 ‘the sizeof bin Laden’s bank balance had become almostan irrelevance’.27 The reason given for this is thatmany of al Qaeda’s cells were ‘virtually self-sufficient’ and were working ‘for reward fromAllah, not for financial gain’.27

Development of business activityWhilst in Sudan (1991 –1996), bin Ladendeveloped wide-ranging business interests. Heinvested in over 30 companies, ranging from hi-tech laboratories engaged in genetic research tocivil engineering firms, and in the process lostnearly all of his inherited wealth. No evidencehas yet been uncovered that al Qaeda attemptedto establish any diamond mining or tradingcompanies in Sudan. However during the 2001US trial of al Qaeda members, court testimonyincluded reference to two Sudanese brothers,based in Bangkok, being involved in diamondtrading with bin Laden’s former personal

assistant, Wadih El Hage.j This was backed up bydetails of one of the brothers that appeared inthe address book of El Hage; this address bookwas included in court evidence.29

Bin Laden also cultivated business interestsand ties with Sudan’s political and business elites.He developed relationships with the president,ministers, and the heads of governmentdepartments. As will be discussed in more depthbelow, bin Laden’s personal secretary El Hagefollowed a similar strategy of cultivating thepolitical and economic leadership in Kenya in1996, persuading the deputy minister ofagriculture to become a director of his diamondmining company.

Al Qaeda’s use of gemstones and gold as asource of financeAl Qaeda has used the trade in gemstones andgold to generate revenue. Members of al Qaedacould have gained valuable knowledge ofgemstone trading networks during the ten-yearfight against the Soviets in Afghanistan.30 Thecountry has large deposits of lapis lazuli,k

emeralds, rubies, sapphires and tourmaline,which were traded by all sides in the conflict.31

The Northern Alliance’s five-year war against theTaliban was funded, in part, by income fromgemstones. In a good year the Northern Alliancewould have collected up to US$60 million fromthe hundreds of gem mines in the northeasterncorner of Afghanistan, the 10% of the countrythat they controlled.32 The stones were smuggledout of Afghanistan to Pakistan and Tajikistan andthen sold on the open market. The hardcurrency generated by the sale of gems was usedto buy ‘guns, ammunition, rocket launchers, andsecond-hand helicopters’.33 More specifically,Ahmad Shah Massoud, the former leader of theNorthern Alliance assassinated in September2001, funded his army by selling emeralds fromhis heartland in Panjsher province to a Polishfirm, Inter Commerce.30

Global Witness has identified three stages ofal Qaeda’s involvement in the mining andtrading of precious gemstones and gold. Firstly,from 1993 to the present day, diamonds,tanzanite, gold and precious stonesl have beenused as a source of revenue for the operations of

j Wadih El Hage was the former personal secretary to Osama Bin Laden. He is currently serving a life sentence in the US for hisinvolvement in the 1998 embassy bombings and for perjury before a US Grand Jury investigation into al Qaeda.

k Lapis lazuli has been mined in Afghanistan for centuries. Afghanistan sits on the world’s richest lode of the gemstone, and thelargest, richest veins are found in the Hindu Kush Mountains, in the Sar-e-Sang mines. The stone sells for anywhere from US$1 acarat to US$150 a carat (retail price). The Northern Alliance warlords are believed to have made between US$2 million and US$5million a year from the blue stone. Soon after the Taliban collapsed in 2001, Afghanistan’s new government discovered that tentonnes of lapis lazuli, valued at around US$1 million, had vanished from vaults at the old Presidential Palace. The prime suspectsfor the theft are the Taliban commanders who fled Kabul in November 2001, and the Northern Alliance warlords who swept intothe capital ahead of US ground troops.

l Al Qaeda have also shown an interest in amethyst, rubies, saphires and emeralds.

local al Qaeda cells. Secondly, post theSeptember 1998 financial crackdown on alQaeda’s financing networks, it has attempted tolaunder significant amounts of money bytransferring it into gold, tanzanite anddiamonds. Thirdly, this asset laundering hasevolved into a more intensive effort to hidetargeted assets.

Global Witness believes it is highly probablethat after al Qaeda’s financial resources weretargeted following the 1998 US embassy attacks,that it would have carried out risk analysis on itsfinancial networks and resources. Al Qaedawould have been able to predict the assault on itssources of revenues that another major attackwould inevitably invoke. It is in this context thatthe unregulated diamond trade was, andremains, highly attractive to al Qaeda as a meansof safeguarding its assets. Publicly accessibleinformation on these commodities and their linkto al Qaeda is still very limited. Therefore,information on tanzanite and gold is largelytaken from press reports due to the limitedavailability of material. The detailed informationpresented on al Qaeda’s diamond tradingactivities in Part Three is based on interviewswith individuals who were involved in the trade.This is corroborated with documentationobtained from interviews with individuals.

Al Qaeda and goldAl Qaeda’s recent mastery of the gold-tradingroutes that have been in operation for decades,between Pakistan and several Middle Easterncountries has provided it with significantamounts of untraceable revenue. Moreover, it has immeasurably aided al Qaeda’s efforts to hide its assets in the wake of theSeptember 11 attacks.

Gold has traditionally been a preferredcommodity for the accumulation and transfer ofwealth in Central Asia, the Arab Peninsula andnorthern Africa for generations. It is also anextremely attractive commodity to internationalcriminal networks, drug traffickers and terroristorganisations as has been pointed out by theFATF Report on Money Laundering; Report onMoney Laundering Typologies 2002-2003.

‘The advantages that gold provides arealso attractive to the money launderer, thatis, the high intrinsic value, convertibility,and potential anonymity in transfers. It isused, according to the FATF experts, bothas a source of illegal funds to be laundered(through smuggling or illegal trade ingold) and as an actual vehicle forlaundering (through the outrightpurchase of gold with illegal funds).’34

In late December 2001, British forces inAfghanistan found an al Qaeda training manual,showing not only how to build explosives andhandle weapons, but also how to smuggle gold onsmall boats and how to conceal it on the body. AlQaeda has penetrated existing gold smugglingnetworks in a similar fashion to the way in which ithas infiltrated many radical Islamist organisations.However, unlike al Qaeda’s diamond trafficking,the importance of its gold trafficking to itsterrorist operations has been recognised by theUS government. A former US law enforcementofficial investigating gold transactions said:

‘Gold is a huge factor in the moving ofterrorist money because you can melt it,smelt it or deposit it on account with noquestions asked.’35

Patrick Jost, a former senior financial officerin the Treasury Department’s Financial CrimesEnforcement Network investigating al Qaeda’sgold transactions has noted that:

‘There can be no doubt that al-Qaida hasplaced a large share of its assets in gold.This metal is indeed the best means oftransferring secret funds. Jewellers in theMiddle East and Indian subcontinent actas virtual bankers [and] due to its secretand archaic nature, this trade isparticularly difficult to track down andinfiltrate. Transfers are anonymous.Jewellers who help terrorists are oftenhidden behind a diverse business frontoffering financial services, a travel agency,video sales, and telephone cards’.35

In Afghanistan most of the Taliban’s staterevenues were kept in gold and Taliban officialscollected taxes in gold from the heads of Pakistaniand Indian trucking companies that shipped goodsthrough Afghanistan. In addition, the Taliban usedgold in transactions involving the sale of Afghan-grown opium and heroin.36 One Pakistanibusinessman referred to these transactions as a‘commodity for commodity exchange’ and claimedthat the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)had information that al Qaeda and the Taliban wereshipping large amounts of gold from Karachi aspayment for large quantities of heroin and opium.

Trusted Taliban and al Qaeda officials wouldsmuggle gold taken from Afghan banks intoKarachi, Pakistan. Once in Pakistan the goldwould be smuggled to Dubai and Iran, ortransferred further afield via the hawala moneytransfer system.35 Once in Dubai or Iran, thegold was mixed with other goods and sent byplane to Khartoum, Sudan.



Pakistani and US officials estimate that,during one three-week period in late Novemberto early December 2001, al Qaeda transferredUS$10 million in cash and gold out ofAfghanistan.36 The Taliban Consul-General inKarachi, Kaka Zada, is also known to have takenat least one shipment of cash and gold worthapproximately US$600,000 to Dubai in the lastweek of November 2001.36 European terrorismexperts have also expressed concern that Iranianintelligence officials were involved in moving alQaeda gold. According to The Washington Postthere are credible reports that some of the goldwas flown on Iranian aeroplanes to Sudan, andsome of these chartered planes have been linkedto Victor Bout, a Russian arms dealer whomaintains more than 50 aircraft in the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE).36 Bout has beenrepeatedly named by the UN as being involved inthe illicit trading of diamonds, gold, tanzaniteand other high value commodities in central,southern and West Africa in exchange for arms.m

Al Qaeda’s knowledge of gold smugglingroutes has also been used for other purposes. Inlate 2002, Pakistani intelligence officials raided avillage used by smugglers near Karachi inPakistan. The evidence they uncovered there, ledthem to believe that al Qaeda had movedlaboratory equipment used in the manufactureof chemical weapons to other countries in theregion, with the help of gold smugglers.37

The Role of DubaiIt is worth focusing briefly on the role played byDubai, the political and financial capital of theUAE, in al Qaeda’s gold smuggling and moneylaundering operations. Compared to otherfinancial centres there is very little oversight inDubai’s banking system. Once the gold reachesDubai, it is sold and melted into jewellery ordeposited into bank vaults. Since the September11 attacks, the US government has begun to takea greater interest in Dubai’s gold market. As aresult, investigators have found unusualshipments of gold entering the United Statesfrom Dubai, most of which have been tracedback to prestigious brokers in Dubai.35

Investigators have also pointed to the recentconstruction of four gold refineries in Dubai’snew international gold centre. This is significant

when placed in the context of recent remarks bya London precious metals expert quoted in LeMonde as saying that:

‘The refining market is suffering fromovercapacity and profit margins areridiculously low. The only way to makemoney in this sector is to recycle gold ofdubious origin.’38

In conclusion, the strategic use of gold andgold-trading networks has served a multitude ofuses for the terrorist organisation, and presents aconsiderable challenge to law enforcementofficials seeking to block this source of financingfor al Qaeda. The global gold-trading system iswell-established and introducing tighterregulation and financial reporting procedureswill meet with stiff opposition from entrenchedinterests. However, Global Witness believes thatintroducing measures to ensure greatertransparency in the gold trading system is key topreventing terrorist groups continuing to use thesystem as a way to transfer and hide assets.

m Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of theDemocratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146, 8 October 2002; Additional Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctionsagainst UNITA, 9 April 2002, S/2002/XXXX; S/2001/966, Supplementary Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on SanctionsAgainst Unita, 8 October 2001; Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions Against Unita, 18 December 2000;Report of the Panel of Experts in relation to Sierra Leone, December 2000; Expert Panel report S/2002/470 (April 2002), Reportof the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1395 (2002), paragraph 4, in relation to Liberia; ExpertPanel report S/2001/1015 (October 2001): Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council resolution 1343 (2001),paragraph 19, concerning Liberia.

Moving CashAnother form of terrorist financing occurs throughhawala, which is practised throughout the world.AlQaeda has made extensive use of this system. Hawalais an alternative remittance system that existsindependently of banking channels.43 Money istransferred through a network of hawala dealers, andtransactions are agreed between parties.Alltransactions are based on trust, and almost always takeplace within a day of the transaction being agreed.Millions of dollars can cross the globe in a matter ofhours tracked only by a secret code, which makestracking hawala transfers virtually impossible.43

Hawala has long been linked to money-laundering,and recently to terrorist organisations, including alQaeda.44 In the wake of September 11, Pakistan and USofficials estimate that the Taliban and al Qaedaremoved the equivalent of US$10 million fromAfghanistan.The money was taken across the Pakistan-Afghan border and was transferred from Pakistan toDubai using the hawala system.44


Tanzanite is only found in a five-mile square radius ofMerelani, in northeastern Tanzania, an area borderingKenya. Its value can vary from hundreds to tens ofthousands of US dollars a carat. In 1997, the UnitedStates Agency for International Development, (USAID)estimated that smuggled stones constituted nearly 90%of the tanzanite in circulation in the United States,39

and in 1998, the US Ministry of Commerce estimatedthat the unofficial world market in tanzanite was wortharound US$300 million.

KENYA

TANZANIA

RWANDA

BURUNDI

DRC

ZAMBIA

IndianOcean

Lake Nyasa

LakeEyasi

LakeNatron

LakeManyara

Lake Tangayika

Arusha

Kondoa

Al Qaeda and TanzaniteThe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) firstuncovered evidence of al Qaeda’s interest intanzanite when they raided the home of El Hagein August 1997 in Nairobi, Kenya. As a resultdetails emerged of the trade in tanzanite (andother precious stones including diamonds)during the 1998 US Grand Jury investigation intoal Qaeda in which El Hage gave evidence.Further evidence emerged in the US embassybombing trials in February 2001 when a selfconfessed former al Qaeda member, L’HoussaineKherchtou, revealed that El Hage hadcorresponded with another al Qaeda memberabout the use of various commodities as a sourceof funding for the organisation, includingtanzanite40. The court also heard testimony andwas shown documentation that showed that ElHage was involved in setting up tradingcompanies for the purchase and sale of tanzaniteand other gemstones. Documents taken from theAugust 1997 raid were entered as evidence.These were mainly notebooks and business cardsbelonging to El Hage. Global Witness hasexamined the notebooks and they containmultiple entries and references to tanzanite (andmany other precious stones) deals. Theseinclude numerous lists of quantities sold andprofits made. The notebooks also mention salestrips to the Far East, Europe and North America.The fact that this information has been in thepossession of US government agencies since1997, and the lack of concrete action on theissue subsequently is a worrying indictment ofthe failure to recognise how terroristorganisations are financed.

Al Qaeda’s tanzanite trading network wasexposed when the Wall Street Journal ran anarticle on 16 November 2001 about a radicalMuslim Imam, Sheik Omari, based in Merarani,in the tanzanite-producing area of Tanzania.41

According to the Journal Omari was openlypropagating radical Islamist ideas and had issuededicts from his mosque, that Muslim tanzaniteminers should only sell their stones to fellowMuslims. After prayers, the mosque acted as agemstone trading area. Sheik Omari alsodeclared that the mosque was being built withthe proceeds of tanzanite sales:

‘This mosque is being built with tanzanite,our Islam is stronger with our efforts tocreate a Muslim force in this gemstone’.41

Following the publication of the article in theWall Street Journal al Qaeda’s links with thetanzanite trade received worldwide presscoverage. In the immediate aftermath of theattacks of September 11, this provoked a negative

consumer reaction in the United States, where80% of tanzanite is sold. Sales of tanzanitedropped by nearly 50%, and retail outletsresponded by withdrawing any tanzanitemerchandise from their shelves.

Tanzanitestone

El Hage�s notebook listing tanzanite deals

Tanzaniteproduction


The Tuscon Tanzanite ProtocolIn response to this public concern, theTanzanian government, the US StateDepartment and tanzanite dealers andwholesalers developed the Tuscon TanzaniteProtocol. However due to the voluntary nature ofthe Protocol and the complete lack of anygovernment monitoring provisions GlobalWitness believe the Protocol to be seriouslyflawed. Following the establishment of theProtocol and after an investigation USgovernment officials hurriedly stated that therewas no link to al Qaeda and tanzanite trading.

However former US government officialshave not been so quick to discount the probablelink between the largely unregulated trade intanzanite and al Qaeda. William Wechsler, a

former counter terrorismexpert under the Clintonadministration, called the2001 trial evidence about ElHage’s tanzanite trading: ‘aclarion call for the USGovernment to look veryclosely at this business’.42

Global Witness believesthere is considerable evidenceto suggest that al Qaeda wereintimately involved in tradingtanzanite. By failing toregulate the trade in tanzanitemore stringently, governments and the tanzanite trade have been guilty ofastonishing complacency.

El Hage notebooks listingtanzanite sales, numbers of stones and carats andprices received

El Hage notes on diamond and gemstone trip to London andAntwerp December 1995


Pages from El Hage�s telephoneaddress book showing contactdetails for several diamond andgemstone dealers

Notes El Hage made after aDecember 1995 tanzanite-selling

trip to London and California

Global Witness does not imply that the jewellers mentionedabove were conscious of El Hage�s true identity when he wasapproaching them


Part Two: Diamonds andTerrorism � PrecedentsDiamonds and Terrorism: PrecedentsThis section outlines the past and current use ofdiamonds by Hizbullah as a source of revenueand a mechanism for asset transfer. It begins byexamining the alleged links between a networkof Lebanese diamond traders and theirassociated companies, and Lebanese terroristgroup Hizbullah, before briefly considering theevidence of the past and recent involvement ofHizbullah and AMAL in raising funds fromdiamond trading in West Africa. It is widelyaccepted that Hizbullah has been using therough diamond trade throughout the 1980s and90s to raise funds, and that it continues to derivefinancial support from it.n Given that Hizbullah’sinvolvement in the diamond trade was an opensecret in the diamond trade and intelligenceagencies for over a decade, Global Witness

believes that governments and the industryshould have recognised the significance of this,and the clear precedent it set for the use ofdiamonds by al Qaeda, and taken appropriatemeasures to curb the conflict and illicit diamondtrading networks. In July 2000 a Belgian militaryintelligence report about diamond smugglingfrom Angola into Antwerp and the part played byBelgium in this illegal trade concluded with thefollowing statement: 53/o

‘There are indications that certain persons,the ‘Lebanese connection’, mentioned inthe diamond smuggling file, also put in anappearance in files on money laundering,the drugs trade and the financing ofLebanese ‘terrorist’ organisations such asAMAL and HIZBOLLAH. This finding givesa whole new dimension to the issue ofdiamond smuggling, we are NO longerdealing simply with white-collar crime.’53

Hizbullah and AMAL are Lebanese militias that have been rivals and during the 1980s outright enemies. During the 1980sAMAL fought against pro-Arafat Palestinians in South Lebanon and then against Hizbullah before reaching a Syrian brokeredceasefire with the latter in 1987.Their historical provenance is interconnected but complicated.To simplify, Hizbullah could besaid to have grown out of AMAL45.There are conflicting accounts as to which governments support which group, and how thesupport is given, although it does seem clear that they have in the past both been, and may still be, financed by the Syrian andIranian governments. Syria currently has over 35,000 troops in Lebanon and controls the top levels of every major politicalinstitution in the country45.

More recently, both groups have taken on a new political role and since 1995 it has become apparent that Syria is intenton elevating Hizbullah to new political heights. Indeed, the two organisations’ historical antipathy does not preclude otherstrategic alliances and Damascus decided to give them equal representation in Lebanon’s parliament through the selection oftheir joint candidate lists. In the 2000-2005 legislature AMAL holds only eight seats, while Hizbullah has eleven, but accordingto commentators ‘Hizbullah and AMAL southern representatives agreed […] to intensify cooperation and coordination’under the sponsorship of the Syrians.’ 46/47

AMAL is the acronym for Afwaj al Muqawamah al Lubnaniyyah, which translates as ‘Lebanese ResistanceDetachments’.AMAL also means ‘hope’ in Arabic.The group was established in 1975 as the military arm of theLebanese based pro-Shi’ite ‘Movement of the Disinherited’, set up the previous year48.AMAL turned to Syria forsponsorship and sought to change the terms of power in Lebanon in favour of the Shi’ite Muslims, setting aside

the 1946 ‘national covenant’ between Lebanon’s Christian and Sunnite Muslim populations.Accordingly,AMAL was initiallyconsidered a revolutionary party. By 1980 it had become the most powerful militia group within the Shia community inLebanon. Its secular leader was Nabih Berri. However, Berri lost credibility amongst the poorer Shia community both withinLebanon and overseas, and has been described as ‘corrupt and corrupting’. 46 This led the Shia community to transfer theirsupport to Hizbullah, an organisation they believed to be more financially ascetic and ideologically honest. In 1992, Berri won arigged election boycotted by 87% of the Lebanese people to become the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament.46

Hizbullah means ‘Party of God’ and was created in 1982. Its founders included Shia clerics, military leaders,political figures inside the Iranian government, and disenfranchised Lebanese supporters of AMAL. By 1987,Hizbullah had become the second most important Shia movement in Lebanon after AMAL. Its short-term goalis to establish Islamic rule in Lebanon, modelled on the Iranian regime, and to expel all ‘infidels’ from Lebanesesoil. It advocates armed struggle and rejects any compromise with Lebanese Christians, Israel and the United

States. Hizbullah’s heartlands are South Lebanon and West Beirut, where its hard-line approach appeals in particular to theyoung, radical and disenfranchised. It receives most of its funding and arms supplies from Iran and Syria49.

n It is an open secret within the diamond industry that during the 1980’s Hizbullah and AMAL raised significant amounts of moneyfrom trading in diamonds in West and Central Africa. This was carried out in Angola, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia,South Africa, Tanzania, Congo- Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

o The report was leaked to the international press in March 2001 before a meeting of the Kimberley Process in Brussels.


UNITA, diamonds and HizbullahFrom 1992 to March 2002, UNITA ran theworld’s largest known and most highly organiseddiamond and arms smuggling operation.50

Despite UN sanctions, UNITA’s diamond tradingactivity continued relatively unhindered. Itshould be noted that the illegal trafficking ofdiamonds allowed UNITA to continuously re-armand re-equip, and prolonged the civil war inAngola significantly. Until May 1997, the mainroute for UNITA’s diamond exports and armsprocurement was the DRC.51 The trafficking hadthe full backing and cooperation of the thenPresident, Mobutu Sese Seko, whose son MobutuKongulo (Head of the Presidential Guard) andclosest Generals, Honore N’Gbanda, (Head ofthe Special Presidential Division) and KapamaBaramoto (Head of the Special Council onSecurity Matters) worked closely with UNITAleader Jonas Savimbi.52

The Belgian military intelligence reportinto the diamond trade in Belgium identifiedseveral Lebanese diamond traders as havinglinks with Hizbullah and as having boughtdiamonds from UNITA before and after theimposition of the UN diamond embargo in July1998.53 The same report details these diamondtraders and several companies associated withthem, of having links to organised crime and of being involved in money laundering anddrugs trafficking. Similarly, from 2000 – 02during the UN investigation into the violation of Angolan sanctions, five Westernand African intelligence sources pointed to theinvolvement of a Lebanese diamond tradingnetwork that was buying diamonds fromUNITA before and after the imposition ofsanctions in July 1998.p

The five Western and African intelligenceagencies specifically named the Ahmad familyand two Antwerp-based companies called TripleA Diamonds and Sierra Gem Diamonds ashaving bought diamonds from UNITA. Triple ADiamonds was also named in March 2000 in theReport of the Panel of Experts on Violations ofSecurity Council Sanctions Against UNITA,otherwise and hereafter known as the ‘FowlerReport’ as one of the companies violating theUN diamond sanctions on Angola.54 Thisallegation was never refuted by the company,however Sierra Gem Diamonds strenuouslydenied the allegations levied against them.

To summarise, according to the Belgianmilitary intelligence report:

● Triple A Diamonds was connected in 1993with the trade in diamonds from UNITA;

● The company is apparently controlled bythe Nassour family and is closely connectedto Sierra Gem Diamonds (see Annex 2 forcorporate information);

● Triple A Diamonds sold large numbers ofdiamonds and resulting monies wereapparently transferred via Switzerland toLebanon, Iran and Syria;

● The Nassour family has family ties (throughmarriage) with the Ahmad family;

● According to the report, the Ahmadsmanage monies for AMAL and NabihBerri,q some of which is apparently investedin the diamond trade at Antwerp.

Ali Said Ahmad, a director of ASA Diam, hasrepeatedly denied that the family has any linkswith AMAL or Nabih Beri, the Sierra Leonean-born speaker of the Lebanese parliament. In aninterview with Belgian newspaper, Le Soir, on 8 November 2002, Ali Said Ahmad denied anylink with AMAL:

‘we have no connection to the AMALgroup; we have no ties to Nabih Berri. Iwish I did, because then I would be a richman. It is also rubbish to say we managedtheir money.’

Imad Bakri, UNITA and arms traffickingAnother Lebanese diamond trader who hasbeen particularly active in Africa and who hasreported ties to Hizbullah is Imad Bakri.53 Bakrihad close ties with President Mobutu in theformer Zaire, working closely with Zairiangenerals to arm UNITA.54 The Fowler Reportnotes that from 1995-96, until the fall ofUNITA’s stronghold of Andulo in October 1999,Bakri served as the Angolan rebels’ primarybroker for importing arms and militaryequipment. According to the Fowler Report,General Jacinto Bandua testified that in January1996 he was given responsibility for UNITA’sstrategic procurement, and travelled to Kinshasawhere he was met on arrival by one of Mobutu’sofficials.55 Contact was then arranged withGeneral Nzimbi Wale Kongo Wabase(commander of the ‘Division SpecialePresidentialle’) and, on Savimbi’s specificinstructions, Bandua also made contact with aLebanese arms merchant who was known asImad Kabir (believed also to be known as

p Information supplied to Global Witness by UN Expert Panel member stated that the five intelligence agencies had passed oninformation that confirmed the companies UNITA diamond buying activity.

q Nabih Berri is the current speaker of the Lebanese parliament and the head of AMAL.


The section of the Belgian intelligence report which names Bakri and Triple A Diamonds has been translated below. [The original

version of the relevant section is reproduced below and in complete form on page 89.]

(y) TRIPLE A DIAMONDS NV

Connected in 1993 with the trade in diamonds from UNITA.This company is established at ANTWERP, Schupstraat 20,

PO Box 16. Deputy director is AHMAD,Ali Ahmad148.The directors are AHMAD, Hassan149, AHMAD Afif and

RUSTOM KARIM,Ali.TRIPLE A DIAMONDS is apparently a branch of “SOLEMAN” SIERRA GEMS DIAMONDS150.

TRIPLE A is apparently controlled by the Lebanese NASSOUR family151 which is mentioned in files about laundering

drugs money and the financing of terrorist organisations in the MIDDLE EAST.Apparently, large numbers of diamonds

were bought in AFRICA and sold with non existing profit margins in ANTWERP.The money was apparently transferred

via SWITZERLAND to LEBANON, IRAN and SYRIA.

The NASSOUR family has family ties (through marriage) with the AHMAD family. Both families are, together with the

Lebanese KANAFFER, connected with the printing of false money.

The AHMAD family apparently has large facilities available in LEBANON, through their contacts with AMAL.They are

apparently active in real estate and own an oil refinery.

In compensation, they manage monies for AMAL and Nabih BERRI, some apparently invested in the diamond trade at

ANTWERP.TWO members of the AHMAD clan, Said Ali and Suleiman Ali, were victims of an attack by BOUHOUCHE

Madani on the 2nd of September 1989. Said Ali was seriously injured and Suleiman Ali was killed.

147 BAKRI, Imad headed the firm ‘BYBLOS’ in ZAIRE, which was directly tied to MOBUTU’S entourage. BAKRI apparently

multiplied his activities after the then prime minister KENGO had expelled the Lebanese. He worked together with the

generals NZIMBI and BARAMOTO.

148 AHMAD ALI SAID is regarded as the Godfather. He apparently has an excellent relationship with AMAL leader

Nabir BERRI.

149 Also Deputy Director of ALPHA ALPHA, BETA ALPHA,AMIRA AYA and manager of ANAR BELGIUM. He is

generally known as a very wealthy person who was apparently trained in engineering in the US.

150 Deputy Director is AHMAD Nazem.The managers are AHMAD HASSAN, Said, AHMAD SAID, Ali and AKRAM,

Salioum.

151 NASSOUR Hassan is apparently active in NAMIBIA without a work or residential permit. He apparently took over a

firm on the border with ANGOLA. Other members of the NASSOUR clan reside in KISANGANI (CONGO),

particularly (H) Ikmat (Belgian, born in LEBANON on the 11th of May 1965) and his brother RADWAN (British

passport).After the incidents from the 5th-7th May 2000 between Ugandan and Rwandan troops at KISANGANI the

NASSOUR brothers tried to leave the city.They apparently had a large consignment of diamonds which they tried to get

out by any means possible.They attempted to charter an AN-8 plane with a Russian crew, but because of safety fears the

pilots refused to fly to KISANGANI.


Emad/Emat Bakir). Kabir was part of Mobutu’sentourage and had been introduced to Savimbiby Mobutu in 1995. Bandua learned that Kabirhad been purchasing weapons for Savimbi thatwere being delivered to Kinshasa. Banduapersonally met Bakri, known to UNITA as‘Imad’, on several occasions when Bakri visitedAndulo to meet Savimbi to discuss arms deals.55

According to Bandua, Bakri had enteredinto UNITA’s diamond trading network whenhe arrived in Luzamba in mid-1995 as adiamond buyer. By late 1996, he had become asupplier of arms to UNITA and at the end of1996 weapons were moved into Kinshasa.Bandua personally inspected the weapons inthe warehouse of Mobutu’s Presidential Guard,near Ndili Airport .54/55 Bandua has confirmedthat it was Bakri who first involved thenotorious Russian arms dealer Victor Bout intothe arms trafficking operation using ZairianEUCs.r Bakri would offer UNITA an inclusivepackage, which would include the air transportcosts and the weapons. However, Savimbibecame suspicious that not all the weapons thatUNITA had paid for were being delivered, andSavimbi asked Bakri to bring Bout into Angolaso that UNITA could deal directly with him,which they first did in February 1998, withBandua meeting Bout in Andulo. Following thefall of Mobutu in May 1997, UNITA began to re-source its arms via Togo and after May 1997 Bakri acted as intermediary for thedelivery of arms.54/53

Press reports after the assassination ofPresident Laurent Kabila in the DRC in January2000 stated that the brother of Imad Bakri,Yousef Bakri, was one of 11 Lebanese nationals,all diamond dealers, executed for alleged

involvement in the assassination, and reportedthat Hizbullah had pressured for the return oftheir bodies to Lebanon.56 Enquiries by GlobalWitness appear to confirm this story.

Current links between Hizbullah and AngolaA recent press report has suggested that Hizbullahmay have established an operational base inAngola. On 28 October 2002, an investigation bythe New Yorker magazine into the activities ofHizbullah in the notoriously lawless Tri-borderregion of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil quoted aregional investigator as saying that a Hizbullahcell leader, Karim Diab, based in Incarnación,Paraguay had been ‘sent to Angola to start aHizbullah cell there’.57 Similarly the FinancialTimes reported on the activities of Hizbullah inthe Tri-border region and named a Hizbullahfundraiser Abbas Abdallah who it was stated wasalso now in Angola.58

Although these reports present onlycircumstantial evidence, Global Witness believesthat what it highlights is the fact that failed statessuch as Sierra Leone, DRC and Angola witheasily accessible high-value resources, such asdiamonds, are bound to be highly attractive tocriminal and terrorist organisations. DuringAngola’s long-running civil war, many differentindividuals and organisations gained access toUNITA and their considerable diamondresources. With the death of Savimbi and theadvance of peace throughout the country, it willbe important to ensure that those elements ofthe diamond trade that have known links toHizbullah or any other terrorist group areprevented from consolidating their existingfoothold in the Angolan diamond industry.

r An end-use certificate is a trade security control document. It is used by supplier governments for (certain) arms and othertransfers to (certain) recipients. They generally verify, by signatures from the supplying and recipient companies and/orgovernments, the final destination of the transfer (end-user). The document in most cases assures that further transfer withoutthe approval of the original supplier government is unlawful.


Hizbullah in Sierra LeoneIt should be emphasised that the aim of thissection is not to stigmatise the Lebanesecommunity in Central and West Africa. Themajority are not involved in supporting theextremist activities of Hizbullah. There are,however, individuals within the community whoare sympathetic to the aims and ambitions ofHizbullah, and some of these individuals arediamond traders. We also note, below, that some,‘support’ is obtained by force.

The Lebanese community in Sierra Leone hasa long history of interaction and involvement withthe diamond trade. The majority of the Lebanesecommunity are Muslims and around 90% of themare Shi’ite, from Tyre and South Lebanon.

Lebanese businessmen control many keybusinesses in Sierra Leone, such as buildingmaterials, foodstuffs and, in particular, diamonds.In some diamond towns, such as Bo and Kenema,virtually all businesses are owned and run byLebanese traders. During the 1980s the share ofSierra Leonean diamond dealing licences held byLebanese traders increased from 15% to 78%.65

AMAL and Hizbullah have used various tacticsto gain financial support from some individualswithin the Lebanese community in Sierra Leone.Tactics have included appealing to their religiousconvictions, appealing to their Lebanese identityor using threats and even outright violence. A1999 Ph.d thesis by anthropologist Casper Fithenexplores how both AMAL and Hizbullahexploited their position in Lebanon to tax theLebanese communities abroad.66 Although theten-year war in Sierra Leone (1991–2001) and theimprovements in conditions in Lebanon haveprompted many Lebanese to return to Lebanon,for those who have stayed, political divisionswithin the Shia community have not dramaticallychanged. According to Fithen‚ in 1996-97 it wasnot uncommon to see AMAL calendars andpennants hanging in Shi’ite-owned shops in Konodistrict.67 These political divisions and how theyimpact on the diaspora community in Africa,particularly West Africa, are examined in moredetail below.

In 2000, a EU official tracking the movementof conflict diamonds by Lebanese organisationsnoted: ‘Hizbullah is active and deeply involved inmany businesses across the region. It is only asmall part of the Lebanese community that issympathetic, but many people contribute tothem just to keep Hizbullah off their backs’.68

On 13 February 2002 Joseph Melrose, theformer US ambassador to Sierra Leone, testifiedbefore the US Senate Committee onGovernment Affairs that he was almost certainthat diamond traders in Sierra Leone havetraded with groups such as Hizbullah and al

Qaeda: ‘In the case of Hizbullah a connectionhas existed for years through various Lebanesegroups [in Sierra Leone]’.69 John E. Leigh,ambassador of Sierra Leone to the United Statesalso testified at the same hearing that: ‘It is notsurprising that al Qaeda and Hizbullahoperatives are busy in West Africa buying under-priced, looted Sierra Leone diamonds andfencing them in Europe and elsewhere’.70

Lebanese politics and Sierra Leone�s diamond tradeThere has been an interesting interplay betweenLebanese domestic politics during the successivewars in Lebanon, and the Lebanese communityin Sierra Leone, in particular in relation to thediamond trade. This section will explore howelements of the war in Lebanon began to beplayed out in Sierra Leone and how its influenceis still being felt today across the region.71

According to a Lebanese Shi’ite resident inKenema who was interviewed by Fithen, AMALrepresentatives used to raise funds fromLebanese diamond traders.

‘Maybe every two or three months or so, [aKenema community leader] would callsmall groups of us round to his house.Firstly, he would give us a report on howthings were going for Amal back inLebanon, you know, what Berri was doingand whether ground was being lost orgained. Then we would all sit down andtalk about contributions – everyone prettywell knows how everyone is doing – so [thecommunity leader] knew how mucheveryone could afford. It was just a smallpercentage of monthly earnings – if peoplewere in the shit they didn’t have to pay – itwas no problem. You know, nobody evercomplained, in fact everyone I knew washappy to help – it was for our people backin Lebanon and we all wanted them lookedafter. I just used to send parcels [of roughdiamonds], what happened to them I don’tknow – either they were sold for cash inAntwerp or Lebanon or Israel or whatever,it wasn’t my problem – I knew that thematter was in good hands. It’s just the samenow – we get a visit and we make acontribution, or they could make troublefor us. The only difference is none of uswant to give money to these assholes .’72

According to Fithen, however, while it waspossible to find out about AMAL’s fundraisingactivities, information about Hizbullah’s activitiesin West Africa was much harder to come by forthe following reasons:


Jamil Sa’id Mohamed

Jamil Sa’id Mohamed was a prominent Lebaneseand Sierra Leonean citizen who died in London in1999.Through his powerful network of business,political and personal contacts he became a majorplayer in fundraising efforts for AMAL in SierraLeone and Lebanon.

Born to a Shi’ite Lebanese father and SierraLeonean mother, Mohamed was an influentialbusinessman who made his money in diamonds.His business, the National Diamond Company(NDC) controlled a large part of the diamondproduction and trading in Sierra Leone underPresidents Siaka Stevens ( 1971-85) and JosephMomoh (1985-92). Mohamed’s prominence in thetrade was of great interest to Israel ‘not leastbecause part of the Sierra Leonean Shi’itecommunity actively supported the AMAL faction,who on the one hand fought against Israel’sgreatest enemy, Hizbullah, and on the other wasSyria’s main ally against Israel’.71

Mohamed also had business interests in oil,fisheries and rice trading. Mohamed was achildhood friend of AMAL co-founder and thecurrent speaker of the Lebanese Parliament NabihBerri, another Sierra Leonean-born Lebanese.Thisfortuitous relationship proved pivotal inMohamed’s rise to power in Sierra Leone and hissurvival when events conspired against him. In a1988 article, Stephen Ellis states that Berri helpedMohamed to establish contact with leaders in thepost revolutionary Iranian government, whichsupported Hizbullah.77 This contact was later tohelp him to build his power base in Sierra Leoneby providing crucial financial and material supportto the Government of Sierra Leone when it wason the verge of bankruptcy.

Mohamed’s pivotal role in supplying SierraLeone with oil meant his influence in governmentdramatically increased. Mohamed was nicknamedthe ‘White President’ of Sierra Leone because ofhis powerful influence over President Stevens andthis influence enabled Mohamed ‘to play a keyrole in the installation of an Iranian diplomaticmission in Sierra Leone in 1983’.77 When the firstIranian Ambassador arrived, it was Mohamed whowelcomed him at the airport. Ellis believes thatthe purpose of the new mission was not just thedevelopment of diplomatic relations between thetwo countries: ‘In a short time, the Iranianembassy in Freetown acquired the reputation ofbeing the centre of Iran’s spy network for all WestAfrica’.77 An Iranian ‘cultural centre’ was also setup in Freetown but its doors were never openedto the public. 78

Mohamed was not the only Lebanese businessman togain power during Stevens’ presidency.As other Lebanesetraders gained wealth they maintained a range of contactswith Lebanon. Many diamond dealers recruitedmercenaries from Beirut to build their own private securityforces and Mohamed controlled the largest of theseprivate militias, a 500-man strong force consistingpredominantly of Palestinian fighters.79 One by-product ofthis was that the many internecine conflicts and alliancesfrom Lebanon’s wars were transported to Sierra Leone.

In 1985 Stevens, by then in his 80s and in failing health,chose General Joseph Saidu Momoh to be his successor.Momoh was wary of Mohamed’s influence over Stevensand chose instead to deal with Shabtai Kalmanovitch, whohad opened a branch of his company, LIAT Finance andConstruction, in Freetown in 1985. Born in Russia,Kalmanovitch had emigrated to Israel, and was laterbelieved to be in the service of Israel’s intelligence agency,Mossad, and the KGB. Kalmanovitch became a ‘funding’partner of Momoh’s and gained diamond concessions thataccounted for the majority of the mining areas. In exchangefor these LIAT, was required to expel the illicit traders andinstall a private monopoly answerable to the president,boosting revenues under his control.80

Mohamed sought to recover his financial and politicalposition by extreme means. He first tried to set up afunding deal between Momoh and the chairman of thePalestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO),Yasser Arafat,with a US$10 million proposal for the rights to use a smallSierra Leonean island as a PLO training base. Despite apersonal visit to Freetown by Arafat in 1985, Momohrejected the offer. In March 1987, Mohamed attempted tostage a coup against Momoh.The coup failed andMohamed fled to London, where he remained in exile formost of the early 1990s.

President Momoh 1985 - 1992

President SiakaStevens 1971-1985


‘Support for Hizbullah does exist withinthe Sierra Leonean Shi’ite community, butany radical religio-political extremismremains shrouded by the Shi’ite doctrine oftaqiya, the ‘concealment’ so central toShi’ite orthodoxy. Informants prepared todiscuss diaspora support for AMAL werevery reluctant to discuss community linkswith Hizbullah. The two groups had beenin bitter fighting until a Syrian-brokeredpeace deal was signed in 1990. This intra-Shi’ite schism is a delicate matter indiaspora politics73.’

It is extremely difficult to find evidence of overt support for Hizbullah and, as will be seen below, the development of militiagroups in Lebanon as the various conflictsprogressed divided the diaspora community inWest Africa. According to one personinterviewed by Fithen:

‘We Shi’a [in Sierra Leone] have nothingin common with these crazies [Hizbullah][....] we drink whisky, gamble and enjoylife. It’s just a few young idiots and somedealmakers who should know better’.74

However, Fithen believes that some Shi’itebusinessmen were arranging favourablecontracts (in oil, rice and fish) throughFreetown’s Iranian embassy. In return, they were expected to perform some pro-Hizbullahproselytising and provide some financialsupport. Indeed, rumours of connectionsbetween Hizbullah and the West Africandiamond trade, in particular the Sierra Leoneantrade, remain strong today.u There are stories ofHizbullah delegations visiting West Africa onfund-raising missions and even using the Côted’Ivoire as a protected tourist destination fortheir families.75

Deep-rooted political differences betweenIsrael and Lebanon have not prevented diamondtraders from these countries from doing businesswith each other. One Lebanese traderinterviewed by Fithen commented:

‘Why should we want to fight the Jews?Because Tehran tells us to? Who the helldo they think we’re selling our diamondsto? Last week I had two Hassidim fromAntwerp stay here in my house, and I treatthem as my friends!’76

The text box on page 25 outlines in moredetail the history of Jamil Sa’id Mohamed, one of

the key Lebanese figures in the Sierra Leoneandiamond trade. His activities exemplify thecomplicated links between Lebanese politics andthe business activities of the Lebanese diasporain Sierra Leone.

The Lebanese presence in Côte d�IvoireCôte d’Ivoire, which borders Liberia, was untilthe recent outbreak of the civil war inSeptember 2002, West Africa’s leading economicsuccess story and a stabilising force in theregion. Côte d’Ivoire is also home to acommunity of several thousand Lebanese, manyof whom fled the devastating civil war inLebanon which began in 1975. Lebaneseimmigration further increased after theLebanese-Israeli war of 1982.

Again, as academic commentators havenoted, the politics of the wars in Lebanon, whichhave continued from 1975 up to the recent past,were, and continue to be, replicated in theLebanese diaspora communities around theworld. In particular, the development of armedmilitias in Lebanon left a distinct mark on theAfrican Lebanese community, dividing the Shi’iafrom other Lebanese in West Africa, as alsooccurred in the case of the Lebanese diaspora inSierra Leone. With regard to Côte d’Ivoire,according to Didier Bigo:

‘[f]inding work within one’s villages ordistrict is far less a matter of religiousdenomination than [of] whether one’s politicalallegiances are to the Christian Phalange, theDruze militia, to AMAL or Hizballa, or whetherone subscribes to pro-Syrian or pro-Palestinianideologies’.81

Furthermore Bigo states that:

‘Individuals are required to support the wareffort in Lebanon. Much as in Beirut itself, theyoungest members of the community are

u A range of diplomatic sources in West Africa and regional investigators; 2000 –2003.

Diamond dealers advertising hoarding, Kenema, Sierra Leone, 2001,Global Witness ©


recruited to collect these dues while recentarrivals are continuously having the goodfortune of their immunity from the warimpressed on them, and their moral obligationto make at least a financial contribution tonational liberation or to the new Lebanon.’82

Bigo claims that on occasion this pressuredevelops into an outright racket, in whichorganised gangs supporting the militia groupsattack commercial premises. However, theseattacks tend to be concealed within thecommunity to avoid a negative image.

As with Sierra Leone, divisions alongideological lines within the Lebanese communitymade room for the militias to provide structuresthat replaced traditional authorities. Perhaps thegroup with the most direct militia connection toCôte d’Ivoire, and the one with the strongestcontrol over its members, is AMAL, which evenset up its own police force to carry outsurveillance on new Lebanese arrivals in Côted’Ivoire. Nevertheless, as Bigo notes, it isimportant not to see the whole Lebanesecommunity as providing funding for andsupporting Lebanon’s various militias:

‘The most credible hypothesis is that of aLebanese jihad network which, unknown to therest of the Lebanese community, has takenadvantage of conditions in Côte d’Ivoire and ofthe structure of the diaspora to enable thepassage through Abidjan of members of theorganisation who have relatives there. Far from

recruiting on the spot, this network wouldcontinue to operate anonymously and thisincludes family connections that are notinformed of the undercover activities ofLebanese immigrants.’83

Conclusion: The worldwide diamondindustry and terrorist fundraisingFor over 20 years the diamond industry andgovernments have maintained a worryingsilence over the diamond-trading and fundraising activities of groups such as Hizbullahand AMAL, despite the fact that, as this reportshows, AMAL and Hizbullah’s past and currentlinks with, and involvement in, the Africandiamond trade are well-known. This failure toact has ensured that the entrenched illicitdiamond trading networks in Africa have beenable to flourish, creating the blueprint for alQaeda’s subsequent infiltration of thediamond trade.

The indifference shown to this issue bygovernments may partly be due to difficulties ingathering evidence suitable for criminalprosecutions. Nevertheless, if the internationalcommunity and the diamond trade are genuinein their stated desire to tackle the problem ofconflict diamonds, they have to address the easewith which terrorists like Hizbullah have accessedthe diamond trade and used it to finance theiractivities. The logical forum for this is theKimberley Process.


Part Three: al Qaeda and Diamonds

Global Witness’ research and investigations todate have uncovered a systematic and well-established use of diamonds by al Qaeda.Diamonds are used in four ways:

● As a means of raising funds for al Qaeda cells;

● To hide money targeted by financial sanctions;

● To launder the profits of criminal activity;● To convert cash into a commodity that

holds its value and is easily transportable.

As yet it has not been possible to ascertainwith any certainty the values and quantities ofdiamonds traded and moved. However, it is veryclear that al Qaeda has sought to develop tradingroutes throughout Africa and that some of thesediamonds are entering world supply. Theactivities of al Qaeda operatives in Sierra Leoneand Liberia that came to light in late 2001 arenot an isolated example. In fact as al Qaeda hasdeveloped and built networks across Africa, so itsdiamond trading has developed. Those leadingreform in the diamond trade and thosegovernments active in the Kimberley Process,should note with alarm that three of theoperatives involved in the attacks on the USembassies in Kenya and Tanzania, were animportant and active part of al Qaeda’s diamondtrading activities. They traded, with apparentease, across Africa; countries where they wereactive included, Angola, Central AfricanRepublic, the DRC, Guinea,v Liberia, Kenya, andTanzania.

In order to better understand how al Qaedabecame involved in diamonds and developed itstrading networks, Global Witness has focused ontwo case studies: firstly, the early development oftrading in Kenya and Tanzania between 1993-97;and secondly, the large operation in SierraLeone and Liberia between 1998-2001. Thesetwo case studies help to illustrate the way inwhich al Qaeda was able to take advantage ofexisting diamond smuggling routes to build theirown diamond-trading structure.

Al Qaeda’s involvement in diamond tradingin Liberia is also of great interest and concernbecause it points to a linkage between shadowstates, regional instability and terrorism. AlQaeda was able to benefit from existing

structures set up by President Taylor to launderRUF diamonds through Liberia and topersonally profit in the process. In addition alQaeda was able to move personnel betweencountries and to hide them when necessary. Thiscombination of profit and operational advantageis an issue that the international communitymust tackle if there is to be any serious attemptto address long-term regional instability.

Kenya and Tanzania 1993 �1997This section examines evidence that, between1993-97, two senior al Qaeda members, AbuUbadiah al-Banshiri, an alleged co-founder of alQaeda, and El Hage, bin Laden’s personalsecretary, masterminded the trading of roughdiamonds and other gemstones from Kenya andTanzania and the establishment of diamond,gold and tanzanite mining companies there. Inaddition, it presents evidence that three alQaeda operatives, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah,Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and Fazul AbdullahMohammed went on to use the knowledge thatthey gained from al Qaeda‘s diamond-tradingoperations in East Africa to establish a diamond-buying and laundering operation in Liberia andSierra Leone in 2000-2001.

The evidence presented in the first sectionincludes testimony given during the trial of alQaeda operatives for the 1998 embassy bombings,which was held in the United States in 2001.Documentation presented to the trial has alsobeen examined by Global Witness to reveal apattern of diamond and gemstone trading farlarger than previously known. A Grand Juryinvestigation into al Qaeda was held in September1998 and transcripts of that investigation havebeen examined too. A close reading of the trialtranscripts shows that the use of diamonds as ameans of revenue generation was part of aconcerted effort and a deliberate strategy by alQaeda. What emerges during the trial is that fromearly 1993 onwards, the year when al Qaeda was infinancial difficulty after the Sudanese governmenthad failed to honour contracts to bin Laden, acoordinated attempt was made by al-Banshiri andEl Hage, through the Kenyan and Tanzanian alQaeda cells, to use diamonds, tanzanite and rubieswith the aim of making the cells financially self-sufficient. Court transcripts reveal the following:

● al Qaeda and individuals connected to theorganisation bought property in Tanzania inorder to mine diamonds;● al Qaeda established diamond and gemmining and trading companies in Kenya and Tanzania;

v Information has recently surfaced that suggests the same al Qaeda operatives were active in buying diamonds in Guinea from late1998 to early 2000. Global Witness are attempting to confirm these allegations.


● al Qaeda sold diamonds (and other highvalue gemstones) through middlemen andoperatives in Belgium, China, Cyprus, HongKong, Jordan, Japan, Korea, Senegal, Sudan,Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdomand the United States;● an al Qaeda member had connections with an individual or individuals in thediamond trading and producing countriesLiberia and Angola.

The financial self-sufficiency of its cells is ofgreat strategic importance to al Qaeda. Cellswhich have no need for direct financial supportfrom the al Qaeda supreme command areparticularly difficult to infiltrate and monitor,and can operate for years without notice, asthere is no papertrail or electroniccommunication (SIGINT) for intelligenceagencies to track back to the commandstructures. Terrorist groups, and particularly alQaeda, have learned to keep ahead of attemptsby law enforcement agencies to cut off theirfunding by diversifying their sources of revenueand financing networks. Since the September 11attacks, the use of informal money transfersystems such as hawala by terrorists is becomingincreasingly monitored, thus making the use oflegitimate business sectors, which are not well-regulated and where there is a high profitmargin, extremely attractive to them. As thissection will show, the diamond trade falls firmlyinto this category.

Kenya and TanzaniaOn 7 August 1998, at 10.30 am, bombs weredetonated simultaneously at the US embassies inNairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.Two hundred and twenty four people were killedand over 4,500 people injured in the attacks.Several suspects were immediately arrested andcharged in the United States and Tanzania. AFederal Grand Jury in New York returned a 238-count indictment on 4 November 1998, charging

Ashif Mohamed Juma � al-Banshiri�s brother-in-lawQ. Did you ever work with Jalal [aka al-

Banshiri] in any kind of a business?A. Yes, we had started a mining business in

Tanzania.Q. And approximately when did you start

this mining business in Tanzania?A. Early ’93.Q. And what was this mining business

going to mine?A. Sorry?Q. This was a mining business, what was it

going to mine?A. Diamond and gold.Q. What was going to be your role in this

business?A. I was one of the directors.Q. Was there anything else you were going

to do for the business?A. Well, my role was mostly that I was

processing the paperwork all aboutlicense and to go all around the placebecause I knew Tanzania very well, andthe Tanzanian government, it says thatyou have to be -- a foreigner can’t work,do any business in Tanzania without anylocal person in Tanzania. And since Iwas Tanzanian, so it was easier for me togo around.

Q. Do you recall what the name of thatmining business was?

A. Taheer Limited.Q. And who provided the money to start

up this mining business?A. Mr. Jalal.Q. Did you ever invest any of you personal

money in this business?A. No sir.Q. Did any members of your family invest

any money in this business?A. No sir.Q. Were you paid a salary by this business

for the work you did?A. Yes. In the starting I was paid US$200 a

month.Q. Who paid you that US$200 a month?A. Mr Jalal, and he paid me for about five

months, six months.Q. At the time do you know where Jalal

was getting the money to pay you thisUS$200 a month?

A. No sir.Q. Did this mining business ever actually

operate?A. No sir.

Tanzanian embassy bombing


bin Laden and hisassociates with theembassy bombingsand other acts ofterrorism againstUS nationalsoverseas, and thedetainees werecharged with beingkey al Qaedaoperatives. The FBIindicted manyother individualsfor involvement inthe operation tobomb the USembassy inNairobi, amongthem El Hage,Abdullah AhmedAbdullah, AhmedKhalfan Ghailaniand Fazul Abdullah Mohammed.85 The latterthree suspects were later to re-emerge in SierraLeone and Liberia buying diamonds from theRUF in 1998,1999 and 2001.

The FBI investigation into the US Embassybombings alleged that Abdullah AhmedAbdullah was the mastermind behind bothattacks. The day before the bombings, 6 August1998, Abdullah fled with Fazul AbdullahMohammed to Pakistan and both were latersighted in Liberia. Based on telephoneintercepts, European intelligence analysts believethat, as of late 2002, he had relocated toLebanon. Global Witness believes Abdullah is akey figure in the al Qaeda diamond-tradingnetwork. Also convicted of involvement in theTanzanian bomb attack were Ahmed KhalfanGhailani and al Qaeda computer expert FazulAbdullah Mohammed. Mohammed and Ghailaniboth went to Burkina Faso, Liberia and SierraLeone to buy diamonds.

The transcripts from the US trial in 2001reveal that in early 1993 al-Banshiri established adiamond and gold mining company calledTaheer Ltd in Tanzania. Global Witness believesthis may have been a front company used tolaunder illicit diamonds, possibly from theeastern region of the DRC, which shares a longborder with Tanzania along Lake Tanganyika,and which has a history of diamond smugglingactivity. Al-Banshiri’s fellow al Qaeda operative,El Hage, sold diamonds for al-Banshiri in Kenyaand in 1994 followed al-Banshiri’s example andset up a gemstone mining and trading companyin Tanzania called Tanzanite King. Al-Banshiri’sdeath in a ferry disaster on Lake Victoria in May1996 forced El Hage to find a new trading

Ashif Mohamed JumaQ. Are you familiar with a company

known as T-A-H-E-E-R Limited?A. Yes.Q. Why don’t you tell the Grand Jury what

Taheer Ltd is?A. It’s a company that was formed by this

person here.Q. And you’re pointing to the person

depicted in Grand Jury Exhibit 2, withtoday’s date, correct?

A. Right.Q. Who else was involved in the company

known as Taheer Ltd.?A. Adel Habib [aka al-Banshiri]Q. Abdel Habib.Q The person you identified in the photo

depicted as Grand Jury Exhibit 6 withtoday’s date?

A. That’s true.Q. So those two gentlemen, the person

from Grand Jury Exhibit 2 and theperson from Grand Jury Exhibit 6, werein business together at Taheer Ltd.?

A. Yes.Q. What kind of business?A. I think mining.Q. Mining?A. Yes.Q. Where?A. In Tanzania

L�Houssaine Kherchtou � former al Qaeda memberQ. Did you ever see Wadih El Hage with

Abu Ubaidah Al Banshir in Kenya?A. Yes.Q. Was that on one occasion or more than

one occasion?A. More than one occasion.Q. Did Wadih El Hage ever discuss

whether or not he was involved inbusiness with Abu Ubaidah AlBanshiri?

A. Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri was bringingin some diamonds, but it was only once,I think, from Tanzania, so as Wadia, hecan sell them for him.

Q. Do you recall where this occurred?A. I have never seen Abu Ubaidah giving

diamonds to Wadih directly, but Wadihtold me that he used to give him somediamonds so as to sell them for him.

Q. Do you know if Abu Ubaidah AlBanhsiri owned any property inTanzania?

A. Yes.

US embassy bombing in Kenya


partner, a vacancy filled by an apparentlyunwitting Jordanian gemstone trader calledMohamed Ali Muraweh Saleh Odeh, who wasbased in Nairobi. When the FBI raided El Hage’shouse in August 1997, they found detailedevidence indicating his wide involvement in theinternational diamond and gemstone trade.

Al-Banshiri was a senior member of the Majlisal Shura (Consultative Council) of al Qaeda. Hewas also the emir or head of al Qaeda’s militarycommittee. According to Hasan al-Seraihi, al-Banshiri was present at the meeting thatestablished al Qaeda and the idea of creating aninternational army to fight for the Islamistcause.w/89 Because the Kenyan and Tanzanianoperations were deemed important, al-Banshiriwas given leadership of the Kenyan cell.

During the 2001 US trial of the embassybombings suspects, al-Banshiri’s brother-in-law,Ashif Mohamed Juma, (who called al-Banshiri‘Mr Jalal’) testified for the prosecution as to al-Banshiri’s diamond mining interests.87 GlobalWitness believes, al Qaeda was using the firm’smining licence for another covert reason, tolaunder diamonds. As with many small-scalediamond mining operations in Africa, diamondsare often smuggled into mines and passed-off asthe mine’s own production often to evade tax.National export and sales tax regimes varyconsiderably: even a 1%-2% difference can meana substantial cost saving for mining companies.The prosecution at the trial also alleged that themining company was being used as a cover tobuy dynamite.

In addition, during a Grand Juryinvestigation into bin Laden’s activities held in1997 and 1998, L’Houssaine Kherchtou, a 36-year old Moroccan member of al Qaeda whotestified for the US government, outlined furtherexamples of al-Banshiri’s diamond dealingactivity. He told the Grand Jury in 1998 that hehad joined al Qaeda in 1991 and had workedwith the Kenyan cell, which between 1994 and1995 had been led by El Hage. During cross-examination by defence attorneys for El Hage,Kherchtou alleged that El Hage met al-Banshiriin Kenya and that both were involved in miningand dealing in diamonds. El Hage alsoconfirmed al-Banshiri’s diamond mining interestin Taheer Ltd before the Grand Jury

w Hassan Al-Seraihi is a former Saudi member of al Qaedawho claims he was one of four people present at a secretmeeting in which al Qaeda was founded. Present was Abu Ubaida al-Banshiri (real name Ali al Rashidi).

Q. Do you know what kind of property heowned there?

A. It was land.Q. Did you ever learn what the purpose of

the land was in Tanzania?A. He said that they wanted to bring some

excavators and some other machineryso as to dig and look for diamonds.

Q. Do you know if Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri ever obtained theexcavators or machinery to look forand dig up the diamonds?

A. No.

Odeh � Wadih El Hage�s business partnerHere Odeh is being is being questionedby the prosecution of his relationship withEl Hage.Q. Did you become friendly with Wadih?A. YesQ Did you visit his home?A. Sometime, yes.Q. Did any other family members become

friendly?A. Yes.Q. Could you explain that to us.A. We start talking about business and he

told me that he also dealing ingemstone and sometimes exporting toAmerica. For that he suggested if wecan do business with each other.

Q. The business that you described thetype of business that you were doing atthat time?

A. At that time I was doing gemstonebusiness.

Q. What type of gemstone?A. Sometimes amethyst, ruby, sapphire,

white chrysoprase.

Getting into business togetherOdeh went onto describe how Wadih ElHage and he decided to go into businesstogether for the purposes of buying andexporting diamonds and gemstones.Q. Did you start doing business or try to

discuss becoming a partner with Mr. ElHage?

A. Yes. We plan to start some business inthe same field which is I am interested,gemstone business.

Q. Did you learn at the beginning of yourrelationship with Wadih whatgemstones he was mostly dealing with?

A. What he told me, tanzanite and somediamonds to America.


investigation into bin Laden’sactivities in 1998.90

Another prosecutionwitness at the 2001 USembassy bombings trial wasMohamed Ali Muraweh SalehOdeh, El Hage’s businesspartner. Odeh attested to ElHage’s involvement in theTanzanian diamond tradeusing a Swiss based diamonddealer, Sheik Sill as a buyerand financier, and explainedhow he and El Hagemanaged the export ofprecious stones from Kenya,highlighting once again howal Qaeda used legitimatecompanies and routes.91

Odeh also testified that heand El Hage had tradeddiamonds and gemstonesextensively in the Far East.This was confirmed bytranscripts and recordings ofintercepted phoneconversations presented atthe trial, which showed thatOdeh had previously workedwith two Sudanese brothers,Samir and Ezaladen Abdel Rahman Mohamed,primarily based in Bangkok but with affiliateoffices in Senegal and China.91 Odeh states thatthe sale of diamonds and gemstones from hisjoint venture with El Hage over a six-monthperiod amounted to US$500,000. From theavailable evidence, it has not been possible toascertain how much of the profits went to ElHage. Finally, Odeh revealed the extent of hisand El Hage’s future plans in Kenya. He claimsthat he, El Hage and the then Kenyan assistantminister for agriculture, Dr Misoi, had set aboutincorporating a company called Black GiantMining. Although the company apparently nevergot off the ground, it appears from the available evidence that,rather than using the company as a front to launder diamonds, El Hage and Odehgenuinely intended the mining company tobecome fully operational.

Abdullah

Mohammed

Ghailani

Exports of diamonds and gemstonesfrom KenyaA. Mr. Mburuti has an office and

dealing – register office and authorisedto export gemstones, semiprecious and gem.

Q. Anyone who exports stones, do theydeal with Mr.Mburuti?

A. No, there is a few offices, but myself Ilike to deal with Mr.Mburuti.

Q. Who is the director – excuse me, thechairman that was referred to?

A. There is one called Joseph – I couldn’tremember the second name. He is thesmall-scale mining chairman. His firstname is Joseph.

Q. Why would you be talking to Joseph?A. What do you mean?Q. Why would you need to talk to Joseph?A. Yes, because also I need him when we

are exporting sometimes the stones.

Sales of Diamonds and Gemstones:OdehA. It is half million, not one half.Q. Half million, OK.A. Yes.Q. Were the sales, did the sales end up

between December 17 and June to beone half million dollars or was that anoverestimate?

A. No, within six months, because theplan which I was making to sell a lot ofgem quality stones.

Q. Were you able to sell gem qualitystones over that period of time?

A. Korea, Singapore to Japan and --Q. Did you end up selling all those stones?A. What do you mean?Q. Were you successful in selling those

stones?A. Yes, when we plan to success, yes.Q. If I may interrupt, what does he mean

by the shipping policy? What is meantby the shipping policy?

A. The method of the shipping, because Iwas not the one who send them. Samirsupposed to send them, the brother ofMr. Moaz he ought to send them. Forthat, I do not know how we have tosend. You remember I said by DHL.Then I did not, because I was in Korea

Q. What were you going to do with themoonstone?


A. You know, moonstone is semipreciousstone.

Q. What kind of stone?A. Semiprecious stone. It is not gem

quality. It is coming for craft usually,not for jewellery. Handicraft, usuallydone for handicraft.

Q. Where were you and Wadih going tosend it to?

A. I have what is stone maybe five yearswith me. It is 20 kilos. I want to showthe samples. For that DHL will need alot of money, US$350.

Q. So when you want to send a containerevery month to China, whom are yougoing to send it to?

A. Me.115

Odeh also gave evidence stating thatWadih utilised one of his old clients, adiamond evaluator based in Switzerlandby the name of Sheik Sill. Sheik Sill wasalso used by Wadih to evaluate and helpbuy diamonds in Tanzania as is indicatedlater by Odeh.Q. If I may interrupt now, who is Sheik

Sill?A. He is one of the diamond specialists.

I know him 1988 [sic].Q. And is he also known by another

name?A. Sheik Suleiman Sill.Q. And have you dealt with him previously

concerning diamonds?A. Yes. From time to time, I deal with him

and he is my consultant for diamondand some other stones. He is veryexpert on that stuff .115

Diamond buying in TanzaniaOdeh attested to Wadih El Hage’sinvolvement in the Tanzanian diamondtrade using Sheik Sill as a buyer andfinancier.Q. Now you were talking to Wadih about

Wadih going with Sheik Suleiman Sillto Mwanza; is that correct?

A. What I was meaning on that, actually Imeant to go because if you notice whatI say, Sheik Suleiman knows where hecan buy the stones. But maybe when Italking I make some miss.

Q. Now, where is Mwanza, what country?A. Mwanza, it is a part in the south maybe

of Tanzania. It is near the Lake Victoriaand this is the region of diamond inthat country.

Wadih El Hage

El Hage was born to Lebanese Christian parents inSidon, Lebanon in 1960. He moved to the UnitedStates in 1978 but then went to Pakistan in 1979 toenrol in mujahidin training programs.92 He returnedfrom Afghanistan to the United States in 1985,becoming a naturalised American citizen in 1989.He lived with his family in Tuscon,Arizona, andDallas,Texas until 1991, when they moved to Sudan.During the 2001 trial of those suspected of the USembassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, El Hageadmitted he worked for bin Laden, but he claimed itwas only in legitimate businesses. He also claims tohave had no contact with bin Laden after 1994.93

According to his own testimony El Hageappears to have played an important role as a rawmaterials procurement official for bin Laden and alQaeda, sourcing the supply of many vital andneeded products such as fertiliser for al Qaedafarms in Sudan also building materials, andchemicals. Global Witness believes that diamondsand gemstones were another commodity whoseprocurement he was entrusted with by bin Laden.During the 2001 US trial of the embassy bombingssuspects, al-Banshiri’s brother-in-law,Ashif MohamedJuma, testified for the prosecution that El Hage wasa particularly valued employee of bin Laden’sbecause his American citizenship gave him license totravel freely.According to the prosecution:

Business cards of diamond dealers found in ElHage�s house in Kenya


Q. Now, were you working in some kind offinancial arrangement with Mr. ElHage for this deal?

A. No, what I say that I want to arrangethe finance. I said that clearly. I say thatI will send the US$3,000 to buy thestones.

Q. Would Mr. El Hage benefit in any wayif it was a successful deal?

A. Of course. If it had been a successfuldeal, everyone will benefit. Wadih willbenefit, Sheik Suleiman Sill will benefit,everyone will benefit. This isbusiness115.

Setting up the mining company in KenyaQ. What was Black Giant? What’s the basic

business that Black Giant was going toget involved in?

A. Mining for semi-precious stone andprecious stone. This is a major

Q. What kind of stone was it?A. Semi-precious stone.A. Semi-precious stone and precious

stone, in general….”Q. Whose idea was it to come up with

forming a Kenyan company for thepurpose of mining?

Q. Going back to the individual who wasgoing back to America, the Pakistanigoing back to America, does this relateto a conversation we just heard earlier?

A. According to what I heard, yes, he wasarranging a financier, and you hear, Ithink everybody hear that I say it is notnecessary because we want to make ourmoney and finance our own efforts.

Q. As to the machines needed for Nairobiin March, what kind of machines areyou talking about?

A. Air compressor.Q. What was the purpose of air

compressors?A. For mining.Q. Where were you going to be mining?A. We plan in Bokot, we plan in area Voi.

We have a lot of plan. Of Kenya. I amtalking about Kenya, because also Iwant to try to develop that area where Iam.

Q. Was this part of the plan concerningBlack Giant?

A. Yes.115

‘Mr El Hage served as a front man for the binLaden organisation for years. His role was to set uplogistics, engage in codedcorrespondence, movemoney, and give falsestories. By his ownadmission, he waschosen by bin Laden towork for him, becausehe had a United Statespassport and couldtravel more freely. Mr ElHage made trips toTanzania, Somalia, Italy, Slovakia, Russia,Afghanistan,Pakistan and England.’94

El Hage first moved into mining gemstones in1994 when he set up Tanzanite King in Tanzania forthe purpose of exporting tanzanite .95 In June1996, he met Mohamed Ali Muraweh Saleh Odeh,who had been in the diamond and gemstonebusiness in Kenya since 1988 and had an extensivenetwork of industry contacts.The two becamepartners, trading and exporting diamonds andother high value gemstones from Nairobi, and asnoted previously were planning to incorporate amining company called Black Giant Mining.Evidence presented during the US trial in April2001 by Odeh, shows El Hage’s extensiveinvolvement in the diamond trade.The excerptsfrom the trial reveal that El Hage befriendedMohamed Odeh in order to utilise hisinternational gem trading contacts and his politicaland business contacts in Kenya and Tanzania.

In August 1997, El Hage’s house in Nairobi wasraided by the FBI who confiscated a wide range ofmaterials and information.96 Several personalnotebooks, three business card books and hiscomputer were taken away for analysis, and in the2001 trial in the US these notebooks were enteredas evidence. Global Witness has examined theinformation in the notebooks and business carddirectories and a clear picture emerges of thesignificance played by the trade in diamonds andprecious stones in El Hage’s activities. El Hage’spassport and other evidence of his extensive travelswere also seized. Entries in his notebook also confirmevidence given in court that El Hage was attemptingto set up a diamond mining company, and there arenumerous entries relating to the sale of diamonds,tanzanite, rubies, sapphires, emeralds and red garnet.

Wadih El Hage


The NotebooksA summary of El Hage’s notebooks and businesscards is given below:

An entry lists precious and semi preciousstones: green tourmaline, amethyst and ruby arementioned along with prices and weights.101

In the same entry, El Hage wrote down somebasic measurements for precious stones,presumably as an aide memoir.102

A further notebook, listed as governmentexhibit 636C, also contains many references toprecious stones, selling trips to Europe, the FarEast and North America and also indicates thathe developed plans to move into the actualmining of diamonds and precious stones.

Notes show that El Hage had costed for asecond hand excavator priced at US$50,000, twoair compressors at US$2,000, a generator atUSUS$5,000 and had also costed for 20 peopleto work on the mine site at 200 Kenyan shillingsa day for every 30 days.103

This seems to confirm information that waspresented by Juma in the 2001 trial that El Hagehad intentions to get into the actual productionof diamonds in Tanzania and Kenya. El Hagealso makes a reference to the company that theywished to establish, Black Giant Mining, in which

he appears to nominate himself as the financialdirector and the corporate secretary.104

The Liberian/Angolan link?One of the most interesting entries in relation todiamonds appears to be a reference to someonewho was based in Angola and then Liberia. Thisadds weight to the later link between Liberia andal Qaeda’s strategy to move into the diamondtrade, as both Angola and Liberia are diamondproducers. In this page of El Hage’s notebookthe entry lists four names and four telephonenumbers. This suggests that the alQaeda connection with thediamond trade in Liberiabegan much earlier than is previously thought, asthis notebook was seizedin August 1997 and thefirst date for al Qaedavisiting Liberia isSeptember 1998.105

97

98

100

99


Another entry contains a list of key diamondand precious stone trading centres and noteswhat types of stones the different centres favour.Countries listed include: Thailand, Hong Kong,Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Israel, Switzerland(see below) and the United States.106 Thenotebook goes on to refer to a trip to Kampala,Uganda on 9 December 1996.107 The referenceto Kampala is interesting as this is a knowncentre for illicit diamond trading.108

A third notebook, Government Exhibit 636 E,has more listings for precious stones, this timesapphires and emeralds are mentioned. Thenotebook also contains four pages listingtransactions in tanzanite, red rhodolite and greengarnet from April to May (year unknown) andlisting the number of pieces, the weight and theprice received and the profit made109 (see page 18).

The fourth notebook contains references tothe types of cuts for precious stones – oval cut,triangle cut, rectangle, drop cut etc.110 A Londonjewellery business is mentioned.111 Thisnotebook also contains financial accounts forselling trips to London, Brussels, Los Angeles,San Jose and Tuscon.112/113

A filofax contains a reference to ‘Rwanda:Goma’ This is significant as Goma is wellestablished as a transit point for the export of anumber of high-value commodities includingdiamonds, smuggled from the DRC.114 Thefollowing page contains basic calculationsregarding the rental of either a 727 or a DC8plane for 120 hours. The name Air East Africaappears on the same page. It is not known why El Hage would have wanted to rent such a largeaircraft and for such a long time.

Travels abroad1993-95A filofax mentions atrip to Cyprus andTurkey in August 1993,with visits to Larnica,Limassol and Nicossia.El Hage also madenotes indicating thathe was interested insetting up an office inthe country and alsohad in his possessionthe business card of adiamond dealer basedin Cyprus (see page33). A further trip toCyprus on 2 March1994 is mentioned.The notebook showsthat on 28 June 1994 ElHage bought afluorescent lamp forUS$175, which iscommonly used fordiamond identificationpurposes. A diamondand gemstones sellingtrip in December 1995is mentioned in thenotebook, duringwhich El Hage visitednumerous jewellersand dealers inAntwerp, Brussels,London, Los Angelesand San Jose.

ConclusionGlobal Witness believes that al Qaeda cells in East Africainitially explored whether the diamond and gemstonebusiness could, at a time of financial difficulty for theorganisation, provide a means of revenue and securityfor its cells in Kenya and Tanzania. While not providinghuge financial returns, al Qaeda’s early businessventures in the diamond trade were successful enoughto contribute to making the cells financially self-sufficient. More significantly – and what should be amatter of greater concern to governments and thediamond industry – al Qaeda’s apprenticeship in thetrade in Kenya and Tanzania gave it the basic knowledgeand expertise required to take its involvement in thediamond trade to another level. They were also able tosee how relatively few controls existed in the trade. Asthe next section will show, al Qaeda operatives put whatthey had learned to good use in setting up a significantdiamond buying operation in Sierra Leone and Liberia.


The UN Investigates Tanzaniandiamond exports:

On 19 April 2002, an additional report by the UNMonitoring Mechanism on Sanctions againstUNITA116 found that there is a ‘degree ofprobability’ that illicit diamonds find their way intoTanzania.This analysis was based on the growth ofexports from Tanzania during 2000 and 2001.Acase study conducted in Tanzania by theMonitoring Mechanism team highlighted the factthat despite the low value declared on export, thereal value of the diamonds exported revealed itwas unlikely the diamonds could have originated inTanzania.There are two nearby sources for thesehigher value diamonds:Angola and the EquateurProvince in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC). Global Witness have reproduced the casestudy in its entirety to give an illustration of how itis possible to launder diamonds from aneighbouring country and disguise their origin onimport into a processing or trading country. It hasalso been included, as Global Witness believes thatthis type of monitoring activity should be continuedby the Kimberley Process and the United Nationsin order to combat conflict diamond trading.

Excerpt From The Supplementary Report of theMonitoring Mechanism on Sanctions AgainstUNITA, 12 October 2001, pp. 37-39.The case study relating to the United Republic ofTanzania shows the problems of tracking informationon parcels of UNITA diamonds back to their source,where the available information is simply that aparcel of diamonds was sold by UNITA to aparticular company, with an approximate date.TheMechanism has detailed and credible informationfrom three sources on this particular operation, yetit is still not possible to prove that this sale tookplace and was in fact a UNITA trade.

Case study: a study of anomaliesAt the outset, the Mechanism wishes to express itsdeep appreciation to the Government of theUnited Republic of Tanzania for its invaluablecooperation and assistance, without which thecase study would not have been possible.TheUnited Republic of Tanzania was chosen for a casestudy rather than the Democratic Republic of theCongo, because the majority of diamonds areexported legally, so that there is a paper trail andrecent data on diamond deposits, making checkingof information possible. However, the study showsthat it is difficult to isolate laundering of diamondsfrom general malpractice of diamond dealers.

The key generic indicators used by analysts of

the laundering of embargoed diamonds through thirdparty countries are the following:

● The country has an existing diamond market;● The average carat value of exported diamonds

matches or exceeds the average carat value ofAngolan gems, US$250 per carat, and is not theexpected average carat value for that country;

● An unexplained rise in the volume of exportsfrom a particular country;

● Controls on diamond exports are relativelyweak or can easily be circumvented.

The Mechanism examined information indicatingthat UNITA diamonds may be laundered through theUnited Republic of Tanzania.That country fits all theabove criteria, and in particular exports very high valuediamonds to Antwerp.As in Angola today, when thebetter quality, larger stones are being smuggled therecorded values are higher than the normal averagecarat value for that country.

Company A is a diamond trading company basedin Antwerp. It has a history of working with UNITAprior to the imposition of sanctions. It has a subsidiarycompany, trading in general goods, not diamonds.Thatsubsidiary shares a name with two diamond buyingoffices, one based in the Democratic Republic of theCongo and one in the United Republic of Tanzania,both of which trade diamonds to company A.

The Mechanism was informed that company A hadbought a parcel of diamonds worth US$250,000 fromUNITA in February 2001.Two countries wereproposed as the route out of Angola for this sale, theDemocratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic ofTanzania.The Mechanism was able to trace to theUnited Republic of Tanzania one legitimate parcel ofvery similar value during the period in question, but notto establish whether it came from UNITA sources.Theparcel was traded through what seems to be asubsidiary company, registered in the United Republic ofTanzania, established to buy locally produced roughdiamonds. (Information about the ownership of thecompany is awaited.) There are also indications that asecond parcel of diamonds of similar value wassmuggled out of the United Republic of Tanzania by thesame company during the same period.

During the Mechanism’s visit to the UnitedRepublic of Tanzania to try to track this parcel, itbecame clear that there were huge discrepanciesbetween the values of diamond imports into Antwerpfrom that country and Tanzanian records of exports;indeed it was not possible to find a single export fromthe United Republic of Tanzania of the value inquestion. It became clear that every exporter ofdiamonds from the United Republic of Tanzania wassystematically under-declaring the value of diamonds,on export, to produce the vast difference in value.The


global value of diamonds exported from the United Republic of Tanzania in 2000(the most recent complete year forstatistics) was 15 per cent of the valuedeclared on import into Antwerp.Thisraised the question whether thosediamonds in fact all originated in the UnitedRepublic of Tanzania.

Legitimate exports to Belgium by dealersin the United Republic of Tanzania during2000 were recorded at the Ministry of Minesin Dar es Salaam as 25,875.85 carats, worthUS$1,682,059.A further 16,001.59 caratswere exported, principally to India (mainlyindustrial diamonds), Cyprus and South Africa.

These diamonds are not checked forvalue on export from the United Republicof Tanzania, since the expertise to do so isnot available, but are weighed and checkedfor value on entry into Antwerp.The valueon import into Antwerp represents the realmarket value of the diamonds.The figurefrom Dar es Salaam represents the amountdeclared to the Government on invoicesfor export, on which tax is paid.TheCommissioner of the Ministry of Minesprovided detailed information on thecountry’s diamond deposits and aided theMechanism in checking records of exports,to determine whether the United Republic of Tanzania had become a “laundering” country forembargoed diamonds.

Imports from the United Republic of Tanzania intoBelgium are recorded in Belgium2 as follows:

Year Carats Value US$ Average value US$per carat*

1999 6,909.08 2,524,008.23 819.492000 26,702.35 11,528,916.20 596.932001 9,171.60 2,946,266.19 565.74(to end June)

* Calculated by the Mechanism.2 Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs

These figures are very significant, in particular theaverage carat value. First of all,Tanzanian diamondsderive mainly from kimberlite mines in the north-eastof the country.There is one large-scale mine atMwadui, the Williamson Diamond mine, which ismined in a joint venture by De Beers (75%shareholding) and the Government of the UnitedRepublic of Tanzania (25% shareholding).Thisproduced 312,511 carats of diamonds during 2000,worth US$43.75 million, according to the Ministry of Mines.These diamonds have an average carat value of US$139.99.

The United Republic of Tanzania has a system oflicensing diamond dealers to buy the artisan productionfrom the surface digging of kimberlite pipes in theShinyanga region, in the north-east of the country. Recordsof diamond exports from Dar es Salaam showed that anaverage carat value of US$65.28 was declared, in line withthe values that might be expected from such sources.

The real average carat values shown in the table paintan entirely different picture of the diamonds exported,with average carat values of US$596.93 recorded for 2000.On the face of it, the values are too high for the sourcesclaimed, although they may simply represent theft of thebest stones from the Williamson mine.The miningauthorities informed the Mechanism that the increase inexports in 2000 was in fact due to a “diamond rush” whichbegan late in 1999 and ended in August 2000, whichmeans that these high values are not necessarily to beexplained by dramatically increased leakage from the mine.

In the case of the United Republic of Tanzania, it is in theory possible to determine whether exporteddiamonds are genuinely mined there, since it is possiblefor experts to say whether diamonds come fromkimberlite or alluvial sources. Belgian diamond expertsmay be able to verify this on import into Belgium, but do not have information on the nature of diamonddeposits worldwide and are not expected to undertakesuch work at present.

NorthAtlanticOcean

SouthAtlanticOcean

Indian Ocean

IndianOcean

ALGERIA

ANTWERP

LIBYAEGYPT

MAURITANIA

BURKINAFASO

LIBERIA

NIGER

NIGERIA

MALI

CÔTED’IVOIRE

DEM REPOF THE

CONGO

CHADSUDAN

EHIOPIA

TANZANIA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

LESOTHO

SOMALIA

KENYA

MADAGASCAR

ANGOLA

SOUTHAFRICA

NAMIBIA

BOTSWANA

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

MOZAMBIQUE

CAMEROON

EQUATORIALGUINEA

GABON

CONGOCABINDA

GHANASIERRALEONE

GUINEA

GUINEABISSAU

SENEGAL

WESTERNSAHARA

MOROCCO

GAMBIA

SWAZILAND

ERITREA

MALAWI

BURUNDIRWANDA

UGANDA

DJIBOUTI

Map showing diamond flows into Tanzania from Angola and the DRC andmovement of al Qaeda diamond trading operatives, post August 1998

Keyal Qaeda movementsDiamond smuggling routeDiamond smuggling route to Israel


The information provided in this section islargely based on interviews with: Aziz Nassour, aLebanese diamond dealer with extensiveconnections in Antwerp and a history ofdiamond-dealing in conflict zones in Africa, Ali Darwish, who worked for Nassour in Liberiaand Sierra Leone, an anonymous source who isa member of President Charles Taylor’s innercircle, Belgian government officials, USgovernment officials and European intelligenceanalysts. Information is also based on GlobalWitness’ investigations, carried out in Africa andEurope. Global Witness has obtained evidencein the form of documentation and originaltestimony from individuals involved in this tradethat confirm the events as originally describedby The Washington Post.

Liberia and Sierra Leone: Failed StatesIn a survey of the views of counter-terrorismanalysts on al Qaeda undertaken by Jane’sIntelligence Review in July and August 2002, asignificant number of the respondentsmentioned the link between terrorism andorganised crime. They also highlighted thatunstable states and corrupt regimes arebreeding grounds and safe havens for terrorism;and that parts of Africa, Central Asia and SouthAmerica were particularly susceptible. Jane’sIntelligence Review summarised the findings ofthe survey as follows:

‘regions with grey or black marketpolitical economies facilitate terroristmovement and act as the network throughwhich terrorist actors infiltrate andmanipulate diasporas or underdevelopedareas to create safe havens and shadowstate systems’.117

Liberia and Sierra Leone are two suchcountries with shadow state systems and blackmarket political economies that have providedoptimal operational conditions for al Qaeda.Liberia has been responsible for spreadinginstability throughout West Africa for over adecade and is under various UN sanctionsregimes. An arms embargo was placed on Liberiain 1993 under UNSC 866. The export ofdiamonds was banned in 2001 under UNSC 1343and the same resolution carried a travel ban onPresident Taylor, his close associates andgovernment officials. All of these have had alimited effect on President Taylor’s ability toprocure weapons and financing.x

Political repression, including summaryexecutions, and rampant corruption typify thedespotic regime of President Taylor, an ex-warlord turned President. Reports on the

Sierra Leone And Liberia: al Qaeda, Aziz Nassour, Diamonds And GunsThis section details the latest and mostdeveloped phase in al Qaeda’s diamond-tradingoperation. Credible information indicates thatal Qaeda operatives have been trading in anumber of diamond producing countries,including Angola, the CAR and the DRC.Global Witness is carrying out further researchto confirm this.

As mentioned previously al Qaeda’sinvolvement in diamond trading in Liberia is alsoof great interest and concern because it points to alinkage between shadow states, regional instabilityand terrorism. Al Qaeda was able to benefit fromexisting structures set up by President CharlesTaylor to launder RUF diamonds through Liberiaand to profit in the process. In addition al Qaedawas able to move personnel between countries andto hide them when necessary. This combination ofprofit and operational advantage is an issue thatthe international community must tackle if there isto be any serious attempt to address long-termregional instability.

This section shows how al Qaeda potentiallylaundered millions of dollars by buying illegaldiamonds from rebels through Liberiangovernment officials, including PresidentCharles Taylor and through corruptbusinessmen in Sierra Leone and Liberia fromDecember 2000 to November 2001. By usingexisting criminal networks and structures in thediamond and arms industry, al Qaedaoperatives, who had gained an understandingof the diamond trade from senior al Qaedapersonnel based in Kenya and Tanzania andthen on buying trips to Angola, CAR and DRC,took control of an existing diamond-tradingnetwork with access to the legitimate market.This indicates that al Qaeda had a clearlydefined strategy with regard to the acquisitionand use of rough diamonds.

The events surrounding the diamond-buyingand laundering scheme, as examined by GlobalWitness, have many of the hallmarks of an alQaeda operation, namely:

● The operation began by establishing arelationship with another terrorist entity(RUF);

● The existing network was consumed by amore powerful and financially-viable entity;

● Operatives reported to a higher commandstructure;

● The operation took advantage of shadowand disintegrating states;

● The business was also used as a cover for moving between countries in Africa and elsewhere.


numerous violations of the UN sanctionsregime, and the complicity of Liberiangovernment ministers and corruptbusinessmen in the illegal trade in diamonds,

timber and arms, have been issued by a rangeof international organisations including GlobalWitness, Human Rights Watch, AmnestyInternational, and the UN Panel of Expertsappointed pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1408(2002), concerning Liberia. (An example ofone such violation is detailed below.) Corruptnetworks fuelled regional instability,exacerbating the devastating war inneighbouring Sierra Leone from 1991-99 andstill threatens the country’s fragile peaceprocess. The Liberian regime was alsoresponsible for causing a refugee crisis inGuinea in 2001 and now stands accused ofsending mercenaries to inflame tensions inCôte d’Ivoire, once held up as West Africa’seconomic success story.118

Arms Smuggling to Liberia

In October 2001, the UN Panelof Experts on Liberia reportedon an arms-smuggling operationto Liberia that had taken place in2000119. A Moscow based aircargo company called Aviatrend,operated by former Soviet testpilot Valery Cherny delivered afirst shipment of 113 tons ofammunition from the Ukraine toCôte d’Ivoire on 14 July 2000 .y West Africa AirServices, a company set up by a Kenyan national,Sanjivan Ruprah, later shipped most of theammunition on to Liberia.The EUC for theammunition and weapons was issued by GeneralRobert Guëi, the then president of Côte d’Ivoire.Mohamed Salamé, the Liberian ambassador inAbidjan, obtained the EUC from Guëi.When Cherny’spartner, Ukrainian arms, diamond and timber dealerLeonid Minin was arrested in Monza, Italy in August2000, Cherny put the remaining arms in storage.119

Samih Ossaily, second cousin and employee of AzizNassour, was arrested in Belgium on 12 April 2002.When searching Ossaily’s apartment Belgian policefound an original Côte d’Ivoire EUC dated 8 January2001 (see Annex 7).The EUC was for the delivery ofammunition and arms by a Bulgarian company,NATACO Holding Plc.120 The arms listed on theNATACO certificate exactly matched the items thatCherny was attempting to deliver to Liberia beforeMinin’s arrest. Furthermore the NATACO certificatehad official Côte d’Ivoire stamps and the envelope wasfrom the Ivorian Ministry of Defence, and addressed toMohamed Salamé the Liberian ambassador in Côted’Ivoire. It appears that the weapons put in storage byCherny were to be the subject of a secondtransaction.121

Logging revenue and weapons

The Liberian government’s continued access tothe international arms and mercenary marketis largely dependent on the Liberian timberindustry, and the financial and logistical supportit provides.The omission of timber sanctionsfrom UNSC Resolutions 1343 (2001) and1408 (2002), has allowed Liberia to maintainregular imports of arms and cash to pay bothits domestic security forces and themercenaries recruited for incursions into Côted’Ivoire and Sierra Leone.These illegal armsimports are often organised by loggingcompanies.While arms are delivered by planeto Robertsfield International Airport, regulardeliveries of weapons arrive every few weeksby ship into ports controlled by loggingcompanies OTC and MWPI. Moreover, OTCand MWPI and other logging companies areactive participants in national and regionaldestabilisation. OTC organises arms importsinto Buchanan port and builds up large pro-government militia forces, and MWPI overseesthe arrival and transhipment of weapons tothe Liberian government and Ivorian rebelforces via Harper port.

In order to restrict the Liberiangovernment’s aggressive, cross-border activitiesin Côte d’Ivoire and planned destabilisation ofSierra Leone, Global Witness calls upon theUN to recognise the facilitative role the timberindustry plays with this regard, mandate anyfurther Panel of Exerts on Liberia to conductdetailed investigations into the role of theLiberian logging industry, and impose sanctionson timber exports.x

x The United Nations has consistently failed to address theissue of how President Taylor receives considerablefunding and illicit arms shipments from the timber trade.For a full account of President Taylor’s and Liberia’stimber for arms trade see Global Witness reports, ‘Taylor-made: The Pivotal Role of Liberia’s Forests and Flag ofConvenience in Regional Conflict’, September 2001;‘Logging Off: How the Liberian Timber Industry FuelsLiberia’s Humanitarian Disaster and Threatens SierraLeone’, September 2002; ‘The Usual Suspects: Liberia’sWeapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and SierraLeone’, March 2003.

y Valery Cherny was an arms dealing partner of LeonidMinin who ran the Moscow based air transport companyAviatrend.

Leonid Minin


September 1998 � March 1999: al Qaeda�sinitial dealings with the RUFThis section describes in detail how an al Qaedaoperative arrived in Liberia in September 1998to set up a diamonds-for-arms deal meeting withPresident Taylor and senior RUF commanders.In March 1999 two other al Qaeda operativeswith diamond trading knowledge travelled toLiberia. Despite an apparently successfulmeeting, the promised arms did not arrive andthe deal fell through.

Al Qaeda’s presence in Liberia dates from 22 September 1998, when Abdullah AhmedAbdullah, a senior operative arrived inMonrovia.137 Abdullah, who used the nameMoustafa whilst in Liberia, is a member of alQaeda’s powerful finance committee and wassuspected by the FBI of having mastermindedthe Kenyan and Tanzanian US embassybombings. The purpose of Abdullah’s trip was toarrange a diamonds-for-arms deal with the RUF.His introduction to President Taylor and theRUF was through Ibrahim Bah (for moreinformation on Bah see box opposite) who was asenior commander and adviser to the RUF at thetime. Bah had previously met Abdullah in thelate 1980s during military training in Libya. Thefact that al Qaeda had entrusted the negotiationsto one of its most senior operatives shows aserious interest in developing diamond-tradingactivity. At a meeting with RUF officials Abdullahpaid US$100,000 to RUF commander Sam‘Masquita’ Bockarie as an introductory ‘fee’ andwas given a token parcel of diamonds in returnz.This indicates al Qaeda’s intent to establish along-term relationship with the RUF. His trip wasnot intended as a normal profit-making diamondbuying trip hence he was not accompanied byanyone with diamond buying expertise.137

After Abdullah met President Taylor inMonrovia, he flew on a Liberian Anti TerroristUnit (ATU) helicopter to Foya, a town on theSierra Leonean border. Here he met with IssaHassan Sesay and other RUF militarycommanders to discuss the practical details ofsetting up a supply of diamonds. Abdullahagreed to send supplies to the RUF, and sixmonths later, in March 1999, two other al Qaedamembers arrived in Liberia to finalise theagreement. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and FazulAbdullah Mohammed, both of whom were keymembers of al Qaeda’s Kenyan and Tanzaniancells, were familiar with the diamond and

gemstone dealings of al-Banshiri and El Hageand had extensive diamond knowledge fromdiamond buying trips to Angola, CAR and theDRC (see Part Two). Bypassing all immigrationprocedures at Robertsfield airport they arrived inLiberia and were taken to meet with PresidentTaylor. This indicates the status and importanceaccorded to the visit by the Liberians. Despitethis second visit the promised material was notdelivered, and al Qaeda’s first attempt to developa diamond trading network in Sierra Leone andLiberia fell through. Al Qaeda’s failure to deliveralso caused Bah embarrassment and difficultywith Taylor. From April 1999 to late 2000 theRUF and President Taylor continued to seek other sources for weapons and new buyers fortheir diamonds.137

Abdullah AhmedAbdullah

Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah hasseveral pseudonyms. He is alsoknown as Abu Mohammed alMasri/y, Saleh,Abu Marium, andAbu Mohammed el Masri Saad alSharif.Whilst in Liberia he was alsoknown as Moustafa. He joined theEgyptian group Islamic Jihad and travelled to Afghanistanin the late 1980s, where he trained soldiers in the use ofexplosives at the Jihad Wal camp in Khost122. He wasamong the 480 Arab combatants who joined bin Ladenwhen bin Laden moved to Sudan in 1991. From Sudan, hemoved to Somalia, where he was involved in the trainingof Somali militia. In 1998, he moved to Kenya, where hearranged and paid for the travel of the al Qaedaoperatives who planned the 7 August 1988 embassybombings in Kenya and Tanzania. He fled Nairobi on 6August 1988 and went to Karachi, Pakistan.Analystscurrently believe he is a top-ranking member of alQaeda’s finance committee and the organisation’s chieffinancial officer in Pakistan and Afghanistan.123 Intelligencesources believe that, as of late 2002, he was in Beirut .124

Like many other Egyptian al Qaeda members, he holdsother senior positions of authority within the organisation.He is a member of al Qaeda’s Consultative Council and ison its religious and fatwa committee.122 The USgovernment is currently offering a US$25 million rewardfor information leading to his arrest.

Abdullah AhmedAbdullah

z An introductory downpayment of between US$50,000 to100,000 was the standard price for access to the relevantRUF officials.This has been confirmed by reports of othermeetings known to have taken place to arrangeprospective diamonds for arms swaps.

‘Al Qaeda also use smuggling and trafficking in drugs,diamonds, and precious metals to fund themselves’

Ronald Noble, Secretary General Interpol.


Ibrahim Bah

Ibrahim Bah is a key player in theal Qaeda diamond operation. Hewas a senior commander andadviser to the RUF on behalf ofPresident Taylor, eventuallybecoming a leading negotiator atthe 1999 UN Lomé PeaceAccords, where he first came to the attention ofWestern authorities, describing himself as an RUF‘senior military advisor’. He is intimately involved in theillegal importation of weapons and diamonds in WestAfrica, and for this reason is subject to the Liberian UNtravel ban.145

He is Senegalese by birth and a devout Muslim.Bah uses a number of aliases of which the mostcommon are: Ibrahim Traore, Ibrahim Balde, AbrahimBalde and Balde Ibrahima 71/125. He was born on 31March 1957, and began his rebel career as part of theCassamance separatist movement in Senegal in the1970s.8 When recently interviewed by the UN Panelof Experts, Bah claimed his birth date was 1969.126

Bah is a close confidante of President Taylor, both menhaving undergone training at Benghazi, Libya in theearly 1980s under the patronage of ColonelGhadafi.127 Both Bah and Taylor are members of the‘Massawa’, a special African group trained in Libya. Inan interview with members of the UN Panel ofExperts on Liberia, Bah admitted to having been oneof Ghadafi’s personal bodyguards in Libya.126 AtBenghazi he also met other future West Africanleaders, including RUF leader Foday Sankoh and BlaiseCompaore, the current President of Burkina Faso. In1981, he was involved in an ill-fated coup attemptagainst the Gambia’s president Dauda Jawara.71

In the 1980s, Bah’s radical Islamic beliefs becamestronger and for several years he fought and trainedalongside Hizbullah in the Beeka Valley in Lebanon. In1987 and 1988, Bah was in Afghanistan fighting theRussian invasion with the mujahidin, where he cameunder the influence of al Qaeda.According to aWestern intelligence official interviewed by GlobalWitness in 2002, the Defence Intelligence Agency(DIA) of the Pentagon has obtained documentationshowing that Bah attended one of the mujahidintraining camps near Khost,Afghanistan and evidence ofhis time in Lebanon.128/129 Following his training inAfghanistan he returned to Africa to fight for PresidentTaylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), risingto the rank of Commander during the civil war inLiberia from 1991-97 where he made a name forhimself as a fierce fighter during the NPFL ‘OperationOctopus’ to take Monrovia.

Ibrahim Bah

Samih Ossaily

Samih Ossaily was bornin Sefadu, Sierra Leone.He is a second cousin ofNassour and has workedextensively in thediamond trade in Africafor a number ofcompanies. He hasworked for companies associated with Nassourin Angola, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone andTanzania. In 1997, in Sierra Leone, he enteredinto business with the junta leader MajorJohnny Paul Koroma, who was sharing powerwith the RUF after its bloody coup. In exchangefor supplying four containers of army uniformsand other military hardware for the Koromajunta, he received an unspecified quantity ofdiamonds.71 The Ossaily family are close toNassour. Samih’s sister Najla Ossaily works inthe ASA Diam office and is the widow of oneof Nassour’s brothers.148

Samih Ossaily


Aziz Nassour

Aziz Nassour was born on 30 March 1961 inSefadu, Sierra Leone.The Nassour family hasextensive interests in the diamond industry,owning diamond and commodity tradingcompanies in Antwerp, as well as diamond-buying and trading companies operating inAngola, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC,Guinea, Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra Leone andTanzania.148 Nassour claims that while thefamily business is diamonds, his personalbusiness interests lie in food distribution andhis business activity has a turnover of nearlyUS$100 million per year.148 He is stilltechnically the director of the Belgian diamondcompany Echogem, although the company isconsidered to be inactive.130

From 1980, he worked in the diamondtrade in Congo Brazzaville, and from 1985 to1986 operated a gold and diamond buyingoffice in Liberia. In Zaire (now DRC) hebecame very close to the dictator MobutuSese Seko, earning the nickname ‘Aziz Mobutu’.Nassour left Zaire in 1994, and in 1996 wentto Lebanon for the first time, and for the next18 months divided his time between there andEgypt. During this time he claims to haveworked for a US owned company calledContinental Grain, based in Switzerland.Continental Grain’s main business was theimport of rice from Pakistan, India, China andflour from France, mainly for export to Russiaand Angola. Nassour claims the exportbusiness was unsuccessful in both countries,but it enabled him to develop numerouscontacts in Africa and Russia, and throughoutthe shipping industry.

Belgian bank fraudDue to Nassour’s brother’s allegedinvolvement in a fraud at ABN Amro Bank, oneof the largest credit providers to the diamondindustry, Nassour’s reported US$6-7 millionoverdraft facility was withdrawn in 1996,forcing him to use an account at Paribas Bank.It was Nassour’s relationship with ASA Diam,headed by his brother-in-law,Ali Said Ahmadthat enabled him to access this financingdespite the alleged involvement of theNassour family in the ABN Amro scandal.aa

From 1997 to 1998, Nassour was involvedin food importation to Angola, claiming to havebeen made the Lebanese honorary consul to

the country. However, he wasexpelled from Angola in 1998having reportedly been accused ofhelping UNITA leader Jonas Savimbiwhom he met through Mobutu.148

In 1999, Nassour moved toMarbella, and he claims to havestayed in Spain for one and a halfyears where he was involved with analleged member of AMAL,Mohammed Derbah.148 Derbah wasarrested in late 2001 by the Spanishauthorities for involvement in armstrafficking and financing Hizbullah andAMAL. He was re-arrested inFebruary 2003 money launderingoffenses. [see below for more detail.]From Marbella Nassour claims hemoved to Antwerp in 2000, wherehe made contact with Ali Darwish who introduced himto Bah.148

In the footsteps of Mr Nassour (in the DRC):As is detailed below the UN has accused Nassour ofillicit diamond dealing in the DRC:131

‘34.The Panel has documents showing that three“clans” of Lebanese origin, who operate licenseddiamond businesses in Antwerp, purchased diamondsfrom the Democratic Republic of the Congo worthUS$150 million in 2001, either directly throughKinshasa or through comptoirs in the Republic of theCongo.The three “clans” – Ahmad, Nassour andKhanafer – are distinct criminal organisations thatoperate internationally.Their activities, known tointelligence services and police organisations, includecounterfeiting, money laundering and diamondsmuggling. Several credible sources have reported thatthe clans also have ties with Amal and Hezbollah. Somebusinesses associated with the clans are Sierra GemDiamonds,Asa Diam,Triple A Diamonds and Echogem.A group linked to the clans operations is providingcounterfeit United States dollars to former generalsfrom the time of President Mobutu, who are trying tooverthrow the Government of the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo.’

‘84.The Congo Desk gave Aziz Nassour the firstmonopoly.Aziz Nassour fell out of favour with theCongo Desk and was replaced by an Israeli diamonddealer, Philippe Surowicz. Diamond traders in Kisanganiremember the Surowicz period as a “reign of terror”.Diamond sellers frequently reported entering “MonsieurPhilippe’s” comptoir only to be confronted with RPAmilitary who named a derisory price and took thediamonds.The Congo Desk replaced Mr. Surowicz inOctober 2001 with a Lebanese, Hamad Khalil, whoworked through the Bakayoko comptoir in Kisangani.’

aa Khalil Nassour was not convicted in the ABNAMRO scandal.

Khalil Nassour

Aziz Nassour


Nassour returned to conflict-torn easternDRC, arriving in Kisangani in late 1999, shortlyafter Rwanda had expelled Ugandan troops. ByJuly 2000, he had outmanoeuvred hiscompetitors, including other Lebanese nationals,and was awarded a monopoly on diamondexports from the Rwandan backed rebels fromLe Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie(RCD-Goma).With military support he was ableto exclude other foreign diamond buyers, butlost his monopoly in October or November2000. According to a competitor, Nassour hadfailed to deliver on his promises to the RCD-Goma, and tension between RCD-Goma andRwanda over the profits from the diamond tradeled to the demise of the monopoly severalmonths later.121 As has been shown above hewas also identified by the report of ‘The Panel ofExperts on the Illegal Exploitation of NaturalResources and Other Forms of Wealth of theDemocratic Republic of the Congo’, on 8October 2002 which confirmed that he held thediamond buying and exporting monopoly in thearea of eastern DRC controlled by RCD-Goma.131/148 The UN report states that Nassourprovided over US$2 million in taxes to RCD-Goma during the six-month period of his licence.However Ossaily has stated that substantialvolumes of diamonds passed through othernetworks that continued to operate despiteNassour’s supposed monopoly.132

Ossaily has admitted working for Nassour inDRC for approximately two months during thisperiod. He has confirmed that the operationspurchased approximately US$500,000 ofdiamonds from the RCD-Goma every ten days,and that the licence cost US$200,000 per twomonths. Half of the licence fee was paid to RCD-Goma and half to the Rwandan government,which tried to maintain full control of thediamond trade in Kisangani. Nassour used thelicence of ASA Diam, a company owned by hisbrother-in-law Ali Said Ahmed, to import thediamonds into Belgium. During 2000 he importeddiamonds worth approximately US$14 millionfrom the DRC, mostly from Kisangani.

In 2000, the UN Panel of Experts on SierraLeone identified Nassour as dealing with theRUF and placed him under the first UN travelban. However, in practice this did little torestrict his ability to set up extensive diamondand arms trading networks across Africa andhe continued to travel widely. Following TheWashington Post exposé in 2001 Nassourreturned to Beirut and as of March 2003, hewas still based there. He has finally been forcedto surrender his numerous passports to the

Lebanese authorities. It remains to be seen if that willmake travel difficult for him.bb

Nassour and Mohammed Derbah Nassour has an extensive network of arms procurementand criminal contacts. One example is Mohammed JamilDerbah. Darwish has told Global Witness that he wassent by Nassour to meet with Derbah in Spain to buy a30,000-carat parcel of diamonds in November 2001.139

However Derbah was arrested on the day the meetingwas supposed to take place.133

On 20 November 2001, it was widely reportedthat Spanish authorities had broken a fraud ring basedin the Canary Islands with alleged links to Hizbullah andAMAL.133 A two-year investigation led by JudgeBaltasar Garzon culminated in the arrest of 18 people,including Derbah.According to Garzon, Derbah wasinvolved in arms trafficking and financing for Hizbullahand AMAL. Hizbullah spokesmen in Beirut denied anyknowledge of ‘such a ring or group’.133 Garzon hadimpounded two planes at Madrid’sBarajas airport allegedly owned by acompany run by Derbah and an asyet unidentified Russian citizen.134

Police said the criminal organisation,the most powerful in the CanaryIslands, netted about US$10.6million a year, mainly throughtimeshare fraud affecting British andGerman citizens.The gang wasinvolved in fraud, money laundering, forgery, extortion and corruption.133

Previously, on 2 November 1999, the Spanishpolice and Civil Guard intelligence services uncoveredan illegal arms trafficking ring established by the RussianMafia in southern Tenerife, which was using the CanaryIslands as a base to export weaponry from the formerUSSR to Angola and Sierra Leone.135 The police reporton the incident stated that in June 1999 the Derbahbrothers, Mohamed and Hussein Jamil, were theringleaders of the Lebanese Mafia in Tenerife, and hadtransported a shipment comprising automatic rifles,assault rifles, sub-machine guns, an indeterminatenumber of pistols and revolvers and boxes ofammunition from the south of the island to the capital,Santa Cruz, in June 1999.The majority of armsshipments that arrived on-board Russian fishing boatsin the Canary Islands were dispatched to countriessuch as Angola, Sierra Leone and Congo Brazzaville, orsupplied guerrilla groups in other countries of sub-Saharan Africa.136 It is worth noting that MohammedDerbah had previously operated in Liberia, where hewas known as ‘Carlos’ and supplied arms and radioequipment to President Taylor.137

bbNassour also holds a diplomatic passport from CoteD’Ivoire and a British passport from Sierra Leone.

Derbah akaCarlos


November 2000 � January 2001: Aziz Nassour, guns, gems and al Qaeda.This section goes into the detail of how, after itsinitial failure, al Qaeda was able to re-enter intodiamond dealing negotiations with the RUF,through the networks of Aziz Nassour a wellestablished diamond and arms trader. Itdescribes how the diamond buying operation was set up in Monrovia.

In December 2000 two al Qaeda operativesreappeared in Liberia.137 Global Witness believesthis was due to the diamond negotiations that hadbeen opened in November by the trader AzizNassour. The operatives, who had knowledge ofthe diamond business, travelled with peopleworking for Nassour. They travelled together intoRUF territory in Sierra Leone and were jointlyinvolved in negotiations with RUF commanders.137

Nassour has claimed he did not trade in diamondsor weapons despite evidence to the contrarydetailed elsewhere in this report.148 GlobalWitness believes that Nassour entered into adiamond-buying arrangement in conjunction withal Qaeda operatives through Bah.cc

As a result of the power vacuum within the RUF,after the arrest of its leader Foday Sankoh, therebels needed diamond buyers. Bah began seekingtraders. He reintroduced al Qaeda to the RUF butunlike the situation in 1998-99 the operatives wereworking alongside a well-established diamondtrader who operated throughout Africa. Ali Darwishbrought Nassour into the deal.139 Darwish was based in Antwerp and had met Nassour there.Darwish’s nephew, Yousef Ouedrago introducedhim to Bah. Ouedrago was a business partner ofBah’s and was based in Ouagadougou, BurkinaFaso.139 Darwish was sent by Nassour to hold anexploratory meeting with Bah. They met on 10November 2000 in Burkina Faso. Darwish states thatNassour paid him a US$50,000 finders fee for thework; Bah also received a payment, of US$100,000from Nassour.137/139

Despite these payments, Bah failed to deliverdiamonds at the meeting, but he persuadedDarwish to travel to a second meeting, which tookplace in Monrovia on 29 November 2000. Again,no significant amount of diamonds wasforthcoming, but it was arranged that Darwishwould return to Liberia with his colleague, SamihOssaily, a more experienced diamond buyer whohad worked for Nassour in DRC and Tanzania.139

Ossaily was Nassour’s second cousin and both

were born in Sierra Leone. Nassour admits toproviding Ossaily with US$40,000 for the trip.148

On 9 December 2000 Darwish and Ossaily flew toMonrovia.dd/138 On arrival they were met by aconfidante of President Taylor who escortedthem through customs. Bah had briefedPresident Taylor about the visit of Darwish andOssaily but Taylor did not meet with them.137 Thetwo stayed at the Boulevard Hotel in Monroviawhere they met with Bah to discuss their trip.

In December 2000 the two al Qaeda operatives,Ghailani and Mohammed, arrived in Liberia fromBurkina Faso146. On 26 December, they joinedDarwish and Ossaily at the Boulevard Hotel and allfour then travelled to Kono.137/139 During twoseparate conversations with Global Witness,Darwish has confirmed the identities of the alQaeda operatives. He has also confirmed that Bahasked him to help them buy boots suitable for themuddy conditions in Kono, and that he helpedthem buy medicine.137/139 Darwish was also filmedin December 2002 by the BBC, confirming theidentities of the al Qaeda operatives.

All the men drove to Foya and from therecrossed into Sierra Leone. They met with theRUF interim field commander Issa Hassan Sesay,and stayed in his house for three days, which wascalled ‘Small Lebanon’. On this trip they alsomet with RUF commanders Maurice Kallon,Gibril Massaquoi, Eddie Kannah, Mamou Rogersand Dennis ‘Superman’ Mingo (nowdeceased).139/ee During this time Ossaily calledNassour in Antwerp to update him on what washappening.137 Ossaily gave Sesay a satellite phoneso that he could stay in contact with Nassour.Ossaily also gave the RUF a list of names they

cc Global Witness has not been able to confirm whether Nassour, Ossaily or Darwish were conscious of the true identities of the alQaeda men during their dealings with them. However Ossaily and Darwish have both positively identified the men since November2001.

ddThey flew to Abidjan on Sabena flight number 689 and then onto Monrovia.ee Those indicted: 1. Foday Sankoh: head of RUF. 2. Johnny Paul Koroma – former head of the Armed Forces Revolutionary

Council ARFC. 3. Sam Bockarie – former associate of Johnny Paul Koroma. 4. Issa Hassan Sesay – former Interim Head of theRUF. 5. Alex Tamba Brima – former leader of AFRC. 6. Morris Kallon – former leader of AFRC. 7. Sam Hinga Norman.

Hotel Boulevard, Monrovia, Liberia, where Bah and Ossaily stayed


were to use on the satellite phones to avoidarousing suspicion of the authorities monitoringtheir conversations. Ossaily was to be known asSierra Oscar, Nassour as Alpha Zulu and Bah(known to many in the RUF as Abrahim Bah) asAlpha Bravo.137/139/148 Nassour has also admittedto Global Witness that he left approximately sixsatellite phones for various RUF commanders andwas paying significant sums for their phone bills.148

During the trip, Ossaily took digitalphotographs of the mining areas for Nassour toview in Antwerp to ensure that the mining areaswere in control of the RUF.137/139 Global Witnesshas seen these photographs, which were labelled‘sammy.kono’ on Ossaily’s computer.140 Severalof the pictures clearly show diamond-miningareas and mining activity. One also shows Ossaily seated in a chair with an AK-47, which,according to Darwish, he was given by the RUFfor his own protection whilst in Kono. Thepictures were later seized in Antwerp during theBelgian police investigation into Ossaily’sdiamond trading activities.140

Hanging on the telephone

ASA Diam phone records show that from January 2001to May 2001, a considerable number of telephone callswere made to Liberia and to RUF members in SierraLeone. From January to June people from ASA Diam’soffice spent a total of 31 hours calling Liberia.Themajority of these calls were to the Hotel Boulevard.

In January 2001, Ibrahim Bah was called a total ofnine times totalling over an hour.

Issa Hassan Sesay was called a known total of 17times, totalling nearly two hours.

Calls were also made to Belgium, Burkina Faso,Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea,Lebanon, Senegal, Sierra Leone,Togo, UK and the USA.

After May 2001, phone records show thatAfghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq were called fromASA Diam’s office. Global Witness have not seen theserecords but the calls have been confirmed by Belgianand UN investigators.

Asa Diam phone record for February 2001 (partial copy), showing extensive calls to Hotel Boulevard, Liberia.


Darwish has confirmed to Global Witness thatOssaily began to buy as many diamonds from theRUF as possible and also offered to supply a largearray of weapons to the RUF.139/ff The tradingrelationship was not without problems. On oneoccasion, Sesay showed Ossaily a high quality 34-carat diamond. Ossaily asked whether he couldpay for the diamond at a later date. A few dayslater, Sesay provided Ossaily with a parcelcontaining 2,000 carats of diamonds.139/gg Howevertheir cash courier, Ly Samba, was delayed incoming from Antwerp and Sesay kept the two menhostage until his arrival in Liberia with thepayment. They were only allowed to depart afteragreeing to leave US$50,000 as a partial-paymentfor the diamonds they were taking.139

Ghailani and Mohammed, the al Qaedaoperatives, remained in Kono for a further threeweeks before returning to Monrovia. Darwish hasdescribed in detail to Global Witness the journeythat Ossaily and he took back to Foya andLiberia.hh When they returned to Monrovia, theymet with Samba who handed US$300,000 in cashto Ossaily. Samba immediately returned toAntwerp with the diamonds, and after a few daysDarwish and Ossaily briefly returned to Antwerpin early January for a week.139

Ossaily returned to Liberia later in January2001 with his Belgian girlfriend, NoraVlasselearts and US$200,000 in cash. They stayedin the Boulevard Hotel, where he set up adiamond office in room 306.137/ii

A farewell to arms? After the establishment of the diamond deal,Nassour turned his attention to procuring the requested weapons for President Taylor and the RUF.

During December 2000 and January 2001Nassour and Ossaily, having established that theycould ensure a supply of rough diamonds, turnedtheir attention to procuring weapons forPresident Taylor and the RUF. This was part of thediamond deal. Detailed below is a complicatedand ultimately unsuccessful attempt to sourceweapons from Latin America. It is included as an

illustration of methodologies employed in later,and more successful, arms deliveries.

Documents obtained by Global Witness andevidence contained in a report by the GeneralSecretariat of the Organisation of AmericanStates (OAS) shows one route used by Nassourand Ossaily for supplying arms to Liberia.141 Itshould be noted that Nassour claims the dealdetailed below collapsed.148 Ossaily was latercharged with arms dealing by the Belgianauthorities, and a Côte d’Ivoirian EUC relatingto the deal was found at his home in Belgium140.

In late 2000, Nassour had contacted an oldIsraeli friend of his from the DRC, Shimon Yelenik,who was an arms dealer based in Panama. Yelenikwas the former head of security for the Zairiandictator Mobutu Sese Seko.142 In turn, Yelenikcontacted a colleague of his, Ori Zoller, the ownerof a private Guatemalan arms dealership, Grupode Representaciones Internationales (GIR SA).Zoller, also an Israeli citizen, was a representativeof a company called Israeli Military Industries(IMI), and a former member of the Israeli militaryspecial forces and intelligence.141 Documents andemails show how the complicated arms shipmentswere to be arranged:

ff Darwish has also confirmed this to the former USAmbassador to Sierra Leone, Joe Melrose.

ggAccording to Dawish, Bah arranged a charter flight for Samba on the Liberian air service Weswau Air, asairport closures were slowing down the delivery of cashfor the deal139.

hhAfter trekking for several days through the bush theywere picked up by the Liberian ATU helicopter andtaken to the house of the Director of the SpecialSecurity Service (SSS), Benjamin Yeaten, in Monroviaon 1 January 2001.

ii During the first week of this trip, Darwish rang Nassourin Antwerp to complain about Ossaily, who was spendingtoo much money and drinking heavily.

Emails between Yelenik and Zoller regarding arms deal to Liberia


On 2 January 2001 at 6.04 a.m., Yelenikemailed to Zoller:

‘Dear Ori,This is an order that our friend in Africa

need. Please send me your price list and if it isavailable in your stock. Please call me – theyneed it very urgent’

At the bottom of this email is a previousmessage from ‘guy/alfa’. Alfa could be a referenceto Nassour, whose codename was‘Alfa Zulu’.148 Theforwarded email states that the weapons aredestined for Liberia, and that they need a quote forthe weapons with and without an EUC. Afterreceiving the price list for the weapons from Zoller,Yelenik emailed ‘guy/alfa, on 3 January, to say thatthe weapons were available, in good condition andgiving the prices. Yelenik also offered to arrangetransport of the weapons to Liberia.

Following Yelenik’s enquiry Zoller sent a faxto the Inspector General of the NicaraguanArmy, General Roberto Calderón, on 5 January2001, requesting prices and availability of thearms and ammunition needed. The list included:twin and four-barrel anti-aircraft guns; surface-to-air missiles; rocket-propelled grenades; anti-tanklaunchers and small arms.jj

A Latin American EUC was needed tolegitimise the export of arms. Nassour and Ossailyalready had an Ivorian EUC, dated 8 January2001, to cover the import of the weapons. GlobalWitness has obtained a fax detailing how to writethe EUC. This handwritten fax was sent to Bah inLiberia on 16 January 2001.143 Yelenik received atyped version of the EUC on the same day in theMarriott hotel in Miami.

On 17 January 2001 Bah, Darwish, andOssaily were in Monrovia for a meeting with RUFcommander Sesay to discuss what weapons andmedical supplies to buy and how to bring theminto Liberia. A handwritten note, written by Bahshows rudimentary sums for arms purchases andtransportation costs for a range of weapons.According to sources present at the meetingNassour was to procure the weapons.137/139

Ossaily was also attempting to procure a list ofessential medical supplies for the RUF; this was faxed to Yelenik on 17 January 2001 (seeAnnex 7 page 84).

jj Evidence of these transactions was revealed in 2002 when investigators from the General Secretariat of the OAS wereinvestigating the illegal diversion of over 5000 AK-47s and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition from Nicaraguan Governmentstocks to the Colombian paramilitary group, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) or United Self Defense Forces ofColombia, in 2000 and 2001. The investigation found that Ori Zoller had bought the AK-47s and ammunition legally from theNicaraguan National Police, and that Yelenik had offered to buy the arms from Zoller. In meetings Yelenik had claimed torepresent the Panamanian National Police and presented GIR and Zoller with forged Panamanian Police purchase orders forthe arms. After the original AK-47s were found by Yelenik to be unserviceable, the order was changed to 3,117 serviceable armsfrom the Nicaraguan Army inventory. The arms were then legally shipped by sea to Panama aboard the Panamanian registeredship, The Otterloo. However the ship’s real destination was Turbo in Colombia, where the arms were delivered to the AUC,apparently unbeknown to either the Nicaraguan, Panamanian or Columbian authorities. A further arms shipment was thenarranged involving GIR, the Nicaraguan Army and Yelenik141.

Transcription of Guatamalan EUC

Email negotiations between Yelenik and Zoller

Hand written instructions for Guatamalan EUC sent to Bah in Liberia

On 18 January 2001 Nassourvisited Bah in Ouagadougou.Nassour has confirmed that thismeeting took place and has provideda copy of his airline ticket to GlobalWitness.148 However he claims themeeting was was only about adiamond deal.kk Subsequently afterbeing shown a copy of the IvorianEUC and the handwritten fax headmitted to Global Witness that hehad attempted to arrange theweapons deal on the basis of a 20%commission through an old friend ofhis from the DRC, a ‘Mr Simon.’148

This turned out to be ShimonYelenik.140 Nassour further sought tojustify his involvement in the deal bysaying that the EUC supplied to himstated that the final destination forthe arms was the Côte d’Ivoire,ll andthat he had no idea that the armswould be diverted to President Taylorand the RUF.

However the discovery of thedocumentation in Panama showsthat Nassour is intimately involvedin the attempted illegal armsshipments to Liberia. The emails inGlobal Witness’ possession clearlystate that the arms are destined forLiberia and ask for prices with andwithout a EUC, showing a clearintent to break the UN armsembargo on Liberia. GlobalWitness believes, given the availableevidence, that Nassour was theinstigator of the weapons deals andknew exactly the destination of the weapons and whom they werefor and as a result should hefurther investigated by lawenforcement agencies.


kkNassour claimed to Global Witness that Bah had telephoned him offering to sell him a parcel of 30,000 carats of diamonds148. ll At the time the Côte d’Ivoire was not under a UN arms embargo.

Bah�s list for arms and ammunition from 17 January meeting

Bah�s handwritten notes detailing arms needed and prices of arms

Nassour�s ticket from Brussels to Ouagadougou 18 January 2001

Late January 2001: Safe house establishedfor diamond trading.The diamond trading activity continued duringthe attempted arms procurement phase. Darwishhas confirmed to Global Witness that Nassourgave instructions that the operation must notattract unwanted attention and it was agreed thathe and Ossaily should move from the BoulevardHotel to a non-descript house in Monrovia.139 On22 January, Darwish signed a rental contract on ahouse in Monrovia. The house was located atWarrant Avenue, between 14 and 15 Streets,Sinkor. The three-year lease was to take effectfrom 1 February 2001.

The length of the lease shows Nassour’s long-term commitment to the diamond-buyingoperation and Darwish has confirmed that he,rather than the others, was obliged to sign hisname on the documents in order not to attractany attention from investigating authorities.

February 2001During February various attempts were made tosource weapons for President Taylor and theRUF. Receipts from the Hotel Boulevard showthat on 6 February 2001, Bah and Darwishchecked out of the hotel.144 On 9 FebruaryDarwish returned to Antwerp with a Gambianand an Ivorian EUC, obtained through BabaJobe, a Gambian politician, which were to beused to legitimise the arms deal detailedabove.139 Three months later on 7 May 2001,Jobe was placed on the UN Liberia travel ban145

being described as an arms dealer and directorof Gambia Millenium Airline.mm

On arrival back in Antwerp, Nassour madearrangements for Darwish to go to Bulgaria andthen to Russia to attempt to procure more armsthere.nn However the trips were not made andDarwish claims that he began to have secondthoughts about the illegal arms deal. He decidedto inform the US authorities of the plan and hada meeting at the US embassy in Brussels, inFebruary 2001, at which the embassy personneladvised him not to return to Monrovia. They alsotook a copy of the Ivorian EUC.

According to Darwish, he ended his


mmJobe had been trained by President Taylor and was amember of the Gambian Special Forces. At the time ofthe travel ban Jobe was Assistant Secretary at the Officeof the [Gambian] President, and is currently theMajority leader in the Gambian Parliament. Source: ‘UNSlaps Ban on Baba Jobe; Charles Taylor Aides AlsoPunished’, The Independent, Banjul, June 8 2001 and‘Opposition Swipe at Baba Jobe’ The Independent,Banjul, 22 November 2002.

nnBelgian investigators have confirmed to Global Witnessthat telephone records from ASA Diam show anincrease in the number of calls to Russia at this time140.

involvement by moving to Portugal, where he hadpreviously owned a business. Darwish did howeverkeep the original Ivorian EUC until Bahdemanded its return in March 2001, at whichpoint Darwish handed the original documentover to Ly Samba, who had been courieringmoney for Nassour.

Nassour made his first trip to Liberia on 15 February 2001 to meet President Taylor.Hotel bills dating from 15 February to 2 Marchshow that he stayed at the Hotel Boulevard.When Nassour was contacted by The WashingtonPost about this trip, he denied being in Liberiaon those dates, claiming that someone must haveused his name (although he has not been able toexplain why anyone should do so.148)

Lease document for safe house in Monrovia signed byDarwish, 22 January 2001

Partial copy of Ivorian EUC