holland -an argument in plato's theaetetus 184-6.pdf

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An Argument in Plato's Theaetetus: 184-6Author(s): A. J. HollandSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 91 (Apr., 1973), pp. 97-116Published by: Wiley for The Philosophical QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2217483 .

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THEPHLOSOPQUARTERVOL. 23 No. 91 APRIL 1973

AN ARGUMENT IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS: 184-6BY A. J. HOLLAND

The argument which I wish to discuss constitutes Plato's final refutation,in the Theaetetus,of the thesis that knowledge is nothing other than percep-tion (cao6'yLg). I shall first say something in defence of Plato's handling ofthis thesis (section I). There follows an analysis of the argument (sectionII). Finally (section III) I try to show how certain features of the argumentshed light on other aspects of Plato's philosophical thought.

INeither the assertion nor the denial that knowledge is perception is, asit stands, very perspicuous. One might raise the question, for example,(though I shall not) whether it is intended as an empirical thesis or as aconceptual one. But however one interprets it, there seems on the face ofit little chance of hitting on an interpretation that would render it evenplausible, let alone acceptable. And this calls into question Plato's handlingof the thesis. For he discusses it at length and with the utmost seriousness,eventually disposing of it with a difficult and obscure refutation. At theend of it all, one is likely to feel far more certain that the thesis is falsethan that the premisses of the refutation are true.Professor Geach has given voice to this sort of doubt, incidentally to hisdiscussion of the Euthyphro.l He notes how, early in the Theaetetus 146C-E),Socrates is presented with examples of different kinds or branches of know-ledge-geometry, shoemaking and so forth, to which he objects that theyare examples only and fail to indicate what knowledge itself is. Geach urgesthat such rejection of examples is harmful, and remarks : " The definition'Knowledge is sense-perception' could have been dismissed at once bylooking to Theaetetus' examples of knowledge."

1" Plato's Euthyphro : An Analysis and Commentary ", The Monist 50, 1966, p. 372.

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98 A. J. HOLLAND

Again, during one episode of the subsequent discussion of the thesis(163A-165E), a number of objections to it are raised which might similarlybe thought conclusive. But they are not pressed home. Thus, there is theproblem of how the thesis is going to accommodate our awareness of thesignificance of language (163A-C), or again, the knowledge exhibited inmemory (163C-164B). On top of this, Socrates says to Theaetetus, who isadvancing the thesis (165D):And perhaps, my fine friend, you would have encountered moredifficulties of the same sort if someone had asked you whether it ispossible to know a thing keenly or dimly, at close quarters but not ata distance, intensely or faintly. A nimble mercenary, fighting a battleof words, might have ambushed you with countless other questions

once you identified knowledge with perception.He is here highlighting the difficulty of " transferring epithets " from per-ception to knowledge, a symptom of their distinct logical type or category.Yet none of these objections, it seems, satisfies Plato. They are cursorilydiscussed or ignored. Socrates then restates and elaborates the originalthesis, brushingaside the objections as being based merely on the " customaryuse of words and phrases " (168C).Plato's procedure here can, I think, be defended. For the thesis thatknowledge is perception (KP) is not presented in isolation, as the " short "objections appear to assume, but as part of a broader body of theory em-bracing at least two other major theses. These are the Heraclitean thesis offlux (FL), which states that everything is always changing, and the Protag-orean thesis that man is the measure (MM),which is to say that what appearsto be the case is the case for him to whom it so appears. It is unfortunatethat the exact relation which holds between these theses, or which Platointended should hold, is unclear, although it is undoubtedly a conceptualone.2 According to a recent suggestion from Professor Sayre,3FL should beinterpreted as a consequence of KP, in the sense that it is requiredto renderthe latter consistent with various other generally accepted beliefs. ThusPlato's treatment of these theses is seen to be in accordance with the so-called " method of hypothesis " alluded to in other works, especially Phaedo100A and 101D. Certainly an understanding of the aim and rationale of themethod of hypothesis is necessary for an appreciation of Plato's procedurein the Theaetetus. It may be that commitment to FL is thought of by Platoas a consequence of commitment to KP, or it may be-as I prefer to think-that KP (and also MM)is thought of as derived from FL, as a lower froma higher hypothesis. On either view the important point is this. Platopresents KP as a thesis which one might sustain if one is preparedto sustain,among other things, FL. It is thus part of a broadertheory which challengesa substantial body of generally held beliefs.In that case the " short " objections do not seem adequate. Anyone

2See, e.g., 160D-E.8Plato'8 Analytic Method (Chicago, 1969), p. 73.



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THEAETETUS 184-6 99who adopted the broader theory would hardly flinch from questioning thebasis upon which geometry and shoemaking are classified as branches ofknowledge. And Plato himself shows how the memory problem might bedealt with if one adopts also a representative view of memory of the kindespoused by the British empiricists. On this view remembering is thoughtof as a kind of perceiving, but of objects which are representative of, andtherefore distinct from, the objects of sense-perception. Thus memory canbe classed as perception without it following that in memory we both knowand do not know (because we do not perceive with our senses) one and thesame thing (166B). Finally, more than one strategy is available over thedifficulty of transferring epithets. The boldest course is simply to questionthe absurdity of speaking of knowledge that is dim, faint and so forth.This could be done on the grounds that the criteria for judgements aboutwhat it does or does not make sense to say are at best obscure,4or on thegrounds that such judgements are, in part, a function of various presupposi-tions, some of which are in the process of being challenged. But in any casethe requirement that one should be able to substitute the analysans for theanalysandum in any context with semantic impunity is surely too strong, ifonly because the semantic force of something of the form ' a = b ' is boundto differ from that of something of the form ' a = a '. If this is agreed thenthe case, for example, of perceiving something dimly, might be dealt within the following way. 'A perceives x dimly' is to be explained in terms ofsomething of the form 'A perceives that p, does not perceive that q, . . .',and this in turn is equivalent to 'A knows that p, does not know that q,. . '. Thus it is that, with Heraclitus for opponent, the " short " objectionswill result in stalemate.

Against this it will be urged that it is no defence of an uncouth pro-position that it can be supported on the basis of propositions which are evenmore uncouth. To this the reply is that if these propositions are uncouththen there ought to be a way of showing it other than by reiterating pro-positions from that area of one's beliefs which has been called in question.Short of a less than rigorous appeal to a sense of reality, the way is the waythat Plato here attempts, namely to show that the key theses are incom-patible with other assumptions which can be presumedto be held in commonor at least held by the proponent of the thesis. The general theory whichPlato sets up for attack is after all a structured affair, not an ad hoc or per-verse denial of inconvenient truths. It is in fact, as will emerge, an imagina-tive construction attempting to lay bare the presuppositions of a form ofempiricism. I concede5 that Plato cannot have recognised empiricism assuch. Also that the term itself has little explanatory force. Its use here isintended to underline two points. The first is that the position under attackis a theory or general standpoint about the nature and scope of knowledge

4See, e.g., J. Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning (London, 1961), ch. 7.5To Professor Gilbert Ryle, who has commented helpfully on this and other matters.



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100 A. J. HOLLANDwhich is, and is recognised by Plato to be, a serious competitor to his owntheory. The second is that there are affinities between the position Plato isattacking and theories which in later times have been called empiricist,whether ancient (Bishop Berkeley), or modern (the logical positivists). Totake one example, it is surely not fanciful to see a link between the ideawhich Plato attributes to his opponents, that genuine empirical knowledgeis only available in the moment of perception, and the importance whichsome positivists attached to the " constatations " which they held to reportsuch moments.There remains the point that, with regard to the particular refutationof KP which Plato advances, his premisses lack the conviction one mayotherwise have that KP is false. Further, it is unclear what reason a Hera-clitus would have to be more friendly to those premisses than to otherpropositions which, we have claimed, he could cheerfully eschew. However,these are, I think, criticisms of the particularrefutation rather than criticismsof Plato's general procedure. Let us examine that refutation.

III intend to show that the passage 184B-186E contains, with digressions,a continuous argument, in two stages. I shall concentrate almost exclusivelyon the first stage of this argument, adding the second mainly for complete-ness' sake. One reason is this. The problems and implications attaching tothe second stage are fairly well canvassed, whereas the very nature of thefirst stage has not, to my mind, been fully recognised.6The main business of the first stage is conducted, as we shall see, from184E-185B, reaching to the following conclusion at 185B: " What is com-mon to them both [sc. sound and colour] cannot be apprehended eitherthrough hearing or through sight ". The common features alluded to hereare existence, identity, difference, similarity and the like (185C), whilsthearing and sight do duty for any of the senses, and sound and colour forany of their respective objects. Thus the claim at this point can be generalizedas follows: 'Existence and similar features which belong in common toobjects of sense-perception are not themselves objects of sense-perception'.This, the conclusion of stage one of the argument, provides the startingpoint for the second stage, which uses the further claim that awareness ofexistence is involved in any kind of knowledge to gain the final conclusionthat all knowledge involves a non-sensory component. One interest of thisconclusion is that it not only more than answers the particular thesis underattack (KP), but in doing so constitutes a denial of some, if not all, forms ofempiricism.

6An exception is the recent article by J. M. Cooper, " Plato on Sense Perceptionand Knowledge: Theaetetus 184 to 186 ", Phronesis 15, 1970, pp. 127-8.7I use ' apprehending existence ', and similar phrases, for simplicity. It may cover,or even mean, ' apprehending that x exists', depending on how sensitive one thinksPlato is to such matters. It may also cover ' apprehending that x is F '.



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THEAETETUS 184-6 101What is profoundly unsatisfactory about most interpretations of thispassage is that they leave the central claim 'Existence is not an object ofsense-perception' virtually unargued. He would be an obliging empiricist

indeed who would, without question, concede the point. To take some recentexamples, Crombie writes :8 " These additional facts concerning existence,identity, number, similarity and so on are not the objects of any particularsense but are noticed by the mind without the aid of the senses ". He givesno indication of how this claim is justified unless we find it in his referenceto the " calculations " (presumed non-sensory) which the mind has to makewhen concerned with questions of " existence and utility " (p. 14). This iscertainly Bondeson's view :9" Perception . .. cannot be knowledge becausein perception simply are none of the XoLv&c.These become a factor onlywhen we make comparisons between the things which are perceived . . .The point is that these [sc. the common features] are not involved until thesoul starts to make comparisons between its sensations or perceptions ".However, Plato cannot be arguingthat the common features are not graspedthrough the senses because such a grasp requires non-sensory calculationsand comparisons, for a simple textual reason. The first reference to suchcalculations or comparisons is at 186A-B, whereas the point that the com-mon features are not objects of sense-perception was established at 185B.A proof of this is that Theaetetus and Socrates have since had time to agreethe further point that the common features are grasped directly without theaid of any bodily organs at all (185D-E). Nor is it clear, incidentally, whyPlato should assume that calculation or comparison is necessarily a non-sensory process. Finally, Gulley writes :10". .. 'being' is an instance ofa ' common' characteristic [' common = ' applicable to the objects of morethan one sense'] and hence, by definition, not given in perception ". Thusfor Gulley, the crucial claim in Plato's refutation is a matter of definition.But, it seems to me, Plato can do better than that.On perusing the discussion which precedes this claim we find at 184E-185A the following remark : " Now will you also agree that the objects youperceive through one sense cannot be perceived through another-objectsof hearing, for instance, through sight, or objects of sight through hearing ? ".On inspection this appears to be nothing less than an assertion of the properobject doctrine of perception, a favoured tenet of empiricists. According tothis tenet we see colours, not trees and sky; we hear sounds, not coachesand steam engines. Or rather, if in seeing a colour we are thereby seeing atree, this is necessarily a different feature of the tree from what we couldhear, or again, touch. The objects of sense-perception are not shared be-tween the senses : they are in their very nature private to just one sense.

8I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, Vol. 2 (London, 1963), p. 13.9William Bondeson, "Perception, True Opinion and Knowledge in Plato's Theae-tetus ", Phronesis 14, 1969, p. 112.10N. Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1962), p. 85.



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102 A. J. HOLLANDMoreover, the doctrine is, apparently, asserted in its strongest form. Thatis to say, Plato does not imply merely that there are some objects of sense-perception which are private to just one sense. What he says, apparently,is that any object of sense-perception is private to just one sense. It isdifficult to prove conclusively that this is really what he intends to say, butwe shall assume that it is, in default of any evidence to the contrary. Suchscattered remarks on the matter as occur elsewhere in Plato's writingscertainly point in the same direction. Thus the account of the sensibleaffections (tc06PiOTcXa[CLy0TLx&)ndertaken at Timaeus 61D if. is conductedin terms of items which can plausibly be regardedas properobjects-" hot "," soft ", " harsh ", " bitter " and so forth. There are even indications, a littleearlier, of an account of the relation of proper objects to everyday thingssuch as would be required in a fully articulated theory involving the properobject doctrine, of the kind propounded by Bishop Berkeley. We find thefollowing observations at Timaeus 60A, for example: " That which iswarming to the soul as well as to the body is called 'wine', and that whichis smooth and divisive of the vision and therefore dazzling to look at, gleam-ing and glistening in appearance, is called 'oil', including pitch, castor oiland olive oil . . .". Again, at Republic 477C, when Plato is drawing hisdistinction between knowledge and belief, the senses are appealed to asmodels of " faculties " or "powers" (8uvdLczq)which, according to Plato,are differentiated by their " objects and effects" ((cp' 4 rS `aL xao 607tEPpYox OCXL).Let us take it, then, that the proper object doctrine in its strong form(hereafterPOD) is to be found here. As we shall see, it is in fact one premissin the first stage of Plato's refutation of KP. But before analysing theargument further there is a point to be noticed in connection with Plato'sgeneral theory of perception. There has always been a problem about whattheory of perception, if any, Plato held. Earlier in the Theaetetus(156A ff.)and also in the Timaeus (45B ff.) he outlines something approachinga causaltheory of perception, but in contexts which leave it uncertain whether hehimself is committed to that theory. In consideringthe present passage ofthe Theaetetus Crombiell recognises " two possible interpretations of thetheory of sensory awareness which Socrates relies on in order to distinguishthe latter from judgement ". These are " a Realist theory " and " a theorywhich is compatible with Phenomenalism or with a Lockeian Causal theoryof perception ". He explains the former option in observing that when Platospeaks of our seeing colours he may mean, not sense-data, but "parts ofthe surfaces of material objects ". Crombie himself comes out against therealist interpretation, without, however, any special enthusiasm.The point to be made here is simply that POD and Realism (R) are infact incompatible. Hence, if Plato espoused POD he can only have espousedR at the cost of inconsistency. This can be shown as follows. The conjunction

lOp. cit., pp. 16-7.



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THEAETETUS 184-6 103of POD with R produces the view that we perceive features of physicalobjects through the various senses, though different features through differentsenses. But the case of spatial features such as shape and distance presentsdifficulties for such a view. It will have to say that the shapes we see andthe distances between them are quite distinct from the shapes we feel andthe distances between them (by POD), and yet that both are actual andpermanent features of physical objects (by R). It will then have to explainhow one physical object can have two shapes and two sets of spatial relation-ships. Which would appear an impossible task. Conceivably a realist mightsettle for two-if not more-spaces, and maintain in a Humean fashionthat the idea of one space is merely a convenience. But on the more usualrealist view it would seem that physical objects are necessarily inspectableby more than one sense, except for those, like rainbows, which might havelegitimate business not to be.To revert now to the argument, our task is to ascertain the link betweenPOD and the claim that existence is not an object of sense-perception. Thenext step is a difficult one and requirescareful scrutiny. From POD Socratesdraws the following inference (185A, rendered literally): "So if you thinksomething about both [sc. objects of both senses], you would not be per-ceiving [it] about both either through one sense-organor through the other ".The clumsy expression "think something about both " is preserved as aforetaste of Socrates' next remark, which is an assertion of the protasis ofthis conditional, and runs (again literally): "Now as regards sound andcolour you do, firstly, think this thing about both of them, that they bothexist ". The point of being fastidious here is to counter the initial impressionwhich might be gained that the object of thought in question is the wholecomplex state of affairs "that sound and colour exist ", rather than one ofits components, namely "the existence " (of sound and colour), or " that. . .and . . . exist ". Certainly the component alone is suggested by thelater talk at 185B of " grasping what is common " and at 185D of " contem-plating the common features ". It is suggested even more strongly by theper impossibile but analogous example at 185B of investigating through thetongue alone whether sound and colour are bitter. It is only the bitternessthat we could thus investigate.The problem is this. How is it possible to infer from POD that any termapplicable to objects of more than one sense denotes something which isnot itself an object of (any) sense ? It is easy enough to see why we cannot,for example, hear the whole complex state of affairs-colour and soundexisting : the reason is that we cannot hear colour. For a similar reason wecannot see colour and sound existing. But the conclusion Plato wants,apparently, is that a feature common to both the sound and the colour-their existence, for example-cannot itself be seen or heard. But why isthis particular component of the state of affairs held to be necessarily un-available to either sense ?



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104 A. J. HOLLANDAt this point there might be a temptation to cling to the idea that theobject of thought in question is, after all, the complex state of affairs.Assuming that a grasp of this state of affairs is the work of one faculty,

then the point will be that this grasp cannot be the work of hearing or ofsight since the state of affairs contains components accessible to neither.(Notice that the assumption of one faculty would be necessary for Plato'spurposes since otherwise there is nothing to prevent our grasping the stateof affairs by means of hearing and sight in conjunction, which is not thesolution to which Plato wishes to direct us.)However, the attractions of this idea are superficial. Besides the pointalready noted about the analogy between the existence of sound and colourand the bitterness of sound and colour, there is a further objection. Theconclusion of the argument would be, according to this idea, that the wholecomplex state of affairs is something which the mind grasps on its own.But this cannot be what Plato means to say, for surely sight is required fora grasp of colour, and hearing for a grasp of sound.There is just one supposition that will save the idea. That is, to supposethat when Socrates refers to the thought that sound and colour exist hehas in mind the abstract qualities of sound and colourrather than particularperceived sounds and colours.l2 The objection to this resort is threefold.(i) If this is Plato's point then the introduction of POD would be quiteotiose. If he is saying that a grasp of the existence of sound and colour,as abstractqualities, is the work of the mind itself, without the senses, hecould have made his point without a whisper of proper objects, without, infact, saying anything at all about the nature of sense-perception.(ii) The "impossible" question of whether sound and colour are bitteror not is supposed to be investigated by means of the tongue. But this issurely quite the wrong sort of means for investigating the properties ofabstract qualities (unless we develop a taste for mathematics !).(iii) If Plato is concerned with the existence of abstract qualities only,his point is useless as a basis for objecting to the thesis that we know onlyin so far as we perceive. An empiricist defending the thesis will scarcely bediscomfited to learn that if his thesis is true it will be impossible to know ofthe existence of abstract qualities. He probably rejects such things anyway.The refutation only works if it can show the empiricist that if his thesis istrue then we cannot even attain the very simplest form of knowledge-knowledge of the existence of immediate objects of perception-to which,

presumably, he would wish to lay claim.If despite these objections, there is any residual doubt, it may be overthe fact that Socrates talks always in terms of sound and colour, ratherthan in terms of particular sounds and colours. This need not be taken asa reference to the abstract qualities of sound and colour, however, but as ageneral reference to particular sounds and colours. Plato's point may be

12Cf.W. G. Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge, 1962), p. 24.



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THEAETETUS 184-6 105paraphrased in this way: the existence of what we hear and what we seeis not itself something that we see or hear.The question remains, " What justifies this conclusion? ". A solutioncan best be approachedby consideringwhat objections there are to inferringthe point from POD. There appear to be two objections, one of which isthis. It is quite feasible to suggest that our grasp of the existence of soundand colour together is the work of both hearing and sight. That is, perhapswe grasp the existence of sound through hearing, and the existence of colourthrough sight. Plato is hardly in a position to complain about the fragment-ation of judgement which results, since his own view involves the stitchingtogether of three components-what we see, what we hear, and what themind grasps by itself. As it happens, though, Plato is well preparedfor thisobjection. Clearly, given POD, existence cannot be grasped by both hearingand sight, since hearing and sight cannot enjoy the same objects. Butequally, the present suggestion, which involves splitting up existence intoseen existence, heard existence and so forth, falls foul of what we might callPlato's presumption of unity (POU). Existence is one and the same thing,whatever it applies to. That is part of the force of calling it a commonfeature. Iere then is another premiss of the argument.We have reached the limit of what can legitimately be extracted fromthe text, and Plato probably thought that at this point he had establishedthe conclusion of the first stage of his refutation. His likely reasoning maybe presented informally as follows : " It is possible to be aware of theexistence of, say, both a sound and a colour. Now, bearing in mind thesetwo points,(a) that it is impossible to see and hear the same thing (POD),(b) that the existence which belongs to a sound is the very same as theexistence which belongs to a colour (POU),explain, if you can, how our awareness of this existence could be the workof sense-perception. You can hardly say that you hear the existence of thesound when it is the very same existence which attaches to the colour. Thisargument can be generalized to cover all the senses. So existence is not anobject of sense-perception ".As it stands the argument is not valid. A second objection to inferringthe conclusion from POD, even together with POU, is still to be met. Itappears theoretically possible, if not very plausible, that we see, for example,existence, even though this existence attaches to sounds and objects of theother senses as well as to colours. Thus it appears theoretically possiblethat existence is the object of just one sense-say the sense of sight.Perhaps Plato overlooked this possibility or, if he considered it, thoughtit obviously false. Though he does, as we have seen, envisage an analogoussituation involving the bitterness of sounds and colours. However, withinthe terms of the argument, the possibility cannot be so easily dismissed. IfPlato dismissed it on the grounds that as a matter of fact we just do not



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106 A. J. HOLLANDsee (hear or smell) existence, then his grounds are bad ones. For an appealto experience is quite inappropriate at this stage. On just such grounds hecould have asserted that existence is not an object of sense-perception tobegin with, and done away with the pretence of argument. It might beurged, though, that one could conduct a series of tests of the following kindto prove the point. Switch on a Beethoven quartet, close one's eyes, andfind out if one is aware of the existence of any sound. But the objection tosuch a procedure is two fold. First, the tests would only prove the point" as a matter of fact ", whereas Plato presumably wishes to show thatexistence cannot, for conceptual reasons, be an object of sense-perception.Second, the tests would only prove the point for as many common featuresas one cared to experiment with. They would not prove it for the class ofcommon features.It is more likely that Plato dismissed this possibility on the vague groundsthat the existence of, say, a sound must somehow be infected by the " soundi-ness " of that sound, and hence be unavailable as an object of any othersense. J. M. Cooperl3appears to suggest as much when he says, interpretingPlato's thought: ". . . existence cannot be either an auditory or a visualproperty, since it belongs equally to the sound and to the colour . . .But if these are Plato's grounds they too are bad ones. For his reasoningitself then becomes infected by an internal contradiction. To suppose thatexistence, because it attaches to sound, takes on the properties of sound, isprecisely to run counter to the conclusion at which Plato is driving-thatexistence, though it attaches to objects of sense, is not itself an object of sense.What premiss does Plato require to block this objection ? An exampleof the kind of possibility which has to be ruled out is that in our experienceof a sound, whilst hearing the sound, we see its existence. A general ban onthis type of case might be framed as follows :A1 Whatever is applicable to an object of a given sense cannot begrasped by another sense.Now if we sought a justification for this ban we might find it in the factthat, for Plato, were it true that something applicable to an object of agiven sense was grasped by another sense, the thing applied would be aproper object of that other sense, with the result that a proper object ofsense Sxwould be applicable to a proper object of sense S2. And this mightbe thought impossible. Accordingly, the required premiss can be framedmore accurately as follows:

A2 Whatever both is an object of just one sense and is applicableto an object which is an object of just one sense, is an object ofthe same sense as the object to which it is applicable.Not only is this the required premiss but it seems on reflection to be true.The immediate reaction, however, may be to wonder whether it has anyapplication. In fact it does have application to a sub-class of properobjects,130p. cit., p. 128.



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THEAETETUS 184-6 107which we might call " proper qualities ", namely such qualities as buzzing,shrill, glistening and dark. Of these it appears to be true. Colours do notbuzz and sounds do not glisten. And the reason appears to be a conceptualone. Certainly we call both tastes and sounds sweet, or sharp, but one isinclined to follow Aristotle here and find such concepts ambiguous, thoughanalogous. No doubt there is the beginning of an explanation to be foundin the point (Aristotelian again) that the qualities in question contain theirrespective subjects in their very definitions.This is an appropriate moment at which to reconstruct the whole of thefirst stage of the refutation.

1. It is impossible to grasp through one sense what one grasps throughanother (POD).2. Existence is one and the same thing, whatever it applies to (POU).. 3. Existence, if it is an object of sense, is an object of just one sense(from 1 and 2).4. Existence is applicable to all objects of sense.5. Whatever both is an object of just one sense and is applicable to anobject which is an object of just one sense is an object of the same senseas the object to which it is applicable (A2)..-. 6. Existence, if it is an object of sense, is an object of all the senses(from 3, 4 and 5)... 7. Existence is not an object of sense (from 3 and 6).For completeness' sake, and with a minimum of comment, the secondstage of the refutation, found at 186C-D, can now be added. The resultappears to be a valid argument.8. If one cannot grasp existence, one cannot grasp truth.9. If one cannot grasp truth, one cannot have knowledge..'.10. One cannot have knowledge through the senses alone (from7, 8 and 9).It was remarked earlier that where we have spoken of " apprehending" or" grasping existence " Plato may have in mind "apprehending that xexists " or even " apprehending that x is F ". I am not confident that wecan speak of his having one or other of these definitely in mind. If this lastsense were in question then a justification for premiss 8 would be easier tofind. A grasp of what is the case arguably involves a grasp of somethingof the form 'x is F '. If, on the other hand, the argument is taken to beconcerned, literally, with existence, we may need to suppose that, for Plato,every statement involves an assertion of existence. Not so much that'Socrates is ugly' implies ' Socrates is '-a fallacy which can only be called"forgetting the predicate"-but rather that 'Socrates is ugly' implies, oris equivalent to, 'There is an ugly Socrates'. The ontological commitmentis thought of as carriedby the verb and not, say, by the subject expression.Concerning premiss 9 we may further suppose that Plato has not securelydiscriminated the various forms of knowledge, so that the properties of



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108 A. J. HOLLANDfactual knowledge are extended to all knowledge. So interpreted and ex-plained neither proposition looks very defensible. Plato could, however,settle for a weaker claim in each case which looks easier to defend. Thushe could argue (i) that a grasp of the truth of something presupposesa graspof the existence of something (not necessarily the same thing), and also(ii) that knowledge presupposesa grasp of the truth of something (perhapson the grounds that all knowledge presupposes factual knowledge).To sum up this section, I hope to have shown that Plato's final refutationof the thesis that knowledge is perception is a more rigorous affair than hasusually been allowed, and can, by the addition of one premiss, be renderedvalid. Whether it is sound or not is quite another matter. Russell,14forexample, thought that the argument was vitiated by conceiving of existenceas a property, as " one of the things that the mind is aware of in objects ".Perhaps Plato did conceive of existence in this way, but it is hard to seein what way the argument actually trades on this conception. That thingsexist is one sort of fact that we can get to know and on this assumptionalone the argument can go forward. The question " Do we get to know suchfacts by sense-perception or by some other means ? " is no doubt difficultto construe. But if a question appears straightforward which is in factdifficult, if not impossible, to construe, this is due, I think, to the theory ofperception which is operating (includingPOD) and the accompanying theoryof the relationship between perception and knowledge. Even so the argu-ment may have the makings of an ad hominemrefutation of an empiricist,such as Berkeley, who accepted such a theory.Aside from such questions, however, the argument has implicationsfurther afield in Plato's philosophy. It is to these implications alone thatthe remainder of the paper is devoted.

IIIA. What the argument purports to show is that perception is not know-ledge. What it also implies is that perception is not belief either. For astate of mind involving mere grasp of existence, identity, differenceand therest is agreed by Theaetetus and Socrates to be not knowledge but belief15(or opinion, or judgement-187A), and we have just seen that sense-percep-tion is incapable of putting us in touch with such things. Presumably thegrasp must be of some special sort or involve some special context to qualifyas knowledge. Furthermore, these features which we are unable to graspby means of sense-perception are just the ones of which Plato is soon tospeak as " permeating all things " (Sophist 260B, cf. Theaetetus186A). Bymeans of sense-perception, then, we are unable to grasp features whichpermeate all things. It is a likely enough consequence, I think, that sense-

14B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London, 1946), pp. 176-7.15This is the usual way of translating 60ooc.But in this context, and elsewhere, itis doubtful whether Plato wants to be interpreted so narrowly.



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THEAETETUS 184-6 109perception alone is unable to found a coherent picture of reality. Belief, atleast, is required to furnish the all-pervasive features.If we may suppose that Plato, in the Theaetetus,was alive to this implica-tion, then we have a pointer to the solution of one of the problems of thatdialogue, the problem of Plato's attitude to the theory of flux. The questionhas often been mooted whether, and if so in what way, Plato himself espousedthis theory. Thus Cornford16hought that Plato accepted the applicationof the flux doctrine to sensible things. According to Crombie,l7 Plato'spoint against the Heracliteans is precisely that physical things must manifeststable sense-properties over a period of time, this proviso being a necessarycondition of the describability of physical things and of there being such athing as perception.One answer to the question is that for Plato, the sensible world, if wemean by this the world as revealed to us through the senses alone, wouldhave very much the incoherent quality of the world of flux which is describedin his refutation of the flux theory (Theaetetus180-183). It would not evenexhibit stable sense-properties, since recognition of a property as stableimplies recognition that it is the same property over a period of time, andrecognition of sameness is the work not of sense-perception but of belief.The point is strikingly borne out, and rather attractively, in the Timaeus,at the point where Timaeus is describingthe experiences of the original souls(43A ff.). An original soul was at first governed entirely by sensation. Itsprogress was " disorderly and irrational ", being subject to all six motions,including those which rush through the body and impinge on the soul, andare termed " sensations " (43B-C: this tallies with Theaetetus186B, whereall animals are said to have perception from the moment of birth). Hence" now as in the beginning " a newborn soul is at first witless (&vouq), nlygaining intelligence ("cppovo yLyv6pvov)when it begins to detect correctlyidentity and difference(44B).However, despite his many aspersions on the sensible world, Plato rarelyif ever pronounces it completely unintelligible. If what we have surmisedfrom the Theaetetus s correct, the reason for this will be that in speakingof the sensible world he usually has in mind the world as we appreciate itby means of our senses supplemented by a grasp of such basic features asidentity and difference. And this is just what we find to be the case. Inthe Timaeus, for example, when Timaeus first introduces the world of every-day things-the world of " becoming "-he describes it as being " graspedby belief (86ooc)with perception which gives no account" (28A). There isno mistaking the deliberateness of this description for it is repeated almostimmediately: "It is visible and tangible and possessed of body. All suchthings are objects of perception, and objects of perception, being grasped bybelief with perception, come into being" (28B-C). Added to the passage

16F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935), p. 101.170p. cit., p. 27.



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110 A. J. HOLLANDcited in the previous paragraph the inference is irresistible that the role ofbelief is to detect the all-pervasive features such as identity and difference.Thus there is a sense in which Cornford and Crombieis each right in hisaccount of Plato's attitude to the sensible world. For in the light of theTheaetetuswe have to recognise a twofold application for terms such as'sensible world' and 'physical world'. There is:(1) the world of pure perception, i.e., the world of properobjects, and(2) the everyday or common-sense world, referred to in the Timaeusas the world of " becoming ".With the Timaeus in mind we can in fact add a third:

(3) the physical or scientific world of micro-processeswhich give riseto our experience, concerning which the greater part of theTimaeus offers us a " plausible conjecture ". (We might call thisthe world of sophisticated belief.)In general both the Theaetetusand the Timaeus make it clear that, for Plato,perceived properties do not exhaust the properties which can be attributedto the physical world.Whereas the world of pure perception may properly be called a world offlux, both the common-sense and the scientific worlds will exhibit a measureof coherence. They will do so inasmuch as a grasp of these worlds involvesbelief and belief is capable of putting us in touch with the basic features-existence, identity, difference and the rest. Whether Plato was prepared atthis stage to allow us knowledge of the sensible world, I would not care tosay. Professor Owenl8is right to stress that in the argument we have beenexploring Plato attributes existence to sensible things. It does not followfrom this, however, that we can have knowledge about sensible things. Foralthough a grasp of existence is a necessary condition of knowledge it isnot a sufficient condition. Hence the fact that sensibles exist is not neces-sarily something we can know.B. In the Republic also, when Plato is speaking of our appreciation of thecommon-sense world, we find the same distinctive and close associationbetween perception and belief, most notably in the similes of the centralbooks. Both the lower segment of the Line and the interior of the Caverepresent the " sensible world " in some sense of that expression, but themental state correlated with it is in fact belief. This already indicates apresumption on Plato's part that a relatively coherent appreciation of thesensible world necessarily involves belief.

Furthermore, I wish to suggest that there is also in the Republica thesisabout the limitations of sense-perception of just the kind to explain such apresumption. This, with its supporting argument, is found most clearlyexpressed at Republic523-4, but it is found also at Republic479 and Phaedo74. In each case an appeal is made to the phenomenon of " compresent18G.E. L. Owen, " The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues ", Classical Quar-terly, N.S 3 (1953), p. 86.



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THEAETETUS 184-6 111

opposites" which allegedly vitiate our common-sense world, an appealwhich is distinctive enough to make it reasonably certain that a similarpoint underlies all three passages. It is a point which bears close comparisonwith the point of the argument from the Theaetetuswhich we have analysed.The argument at Republic 523-4 is that sight and the other senses givean inadequate report (or an inadequate basis for report) of a whole range of" opposite " qualities-big and little, hard and soft, light and heavy, andso forth. For they report the same thing to be hard and also soft, light andalso heavy. They perceive big and little, hard and soft, and the rest, not asseparate qualities but "fused together " (524C). It is the mind by itselfwhich has to recognise the opposites in each case as distinct entities. Theconclusion is that " we must distinguish on the one hand what is thoughtand on the other what is seen [or otherwise perceived] ".The conclusion is in effect the conclusion of the Theaetetusargument-that sense-perception is incapable of putting us in touch with everythingthere is and that we must accordingly recognise a category over and abovethe category 'what is perceived'. The nature and content of this categorymay not be the same in the two argumentsbut this is, I suggest, a corollaryofthe fact that POD does not play the part in the Republicargument that itdoes in the Theaetetus. It does not follow, of course, that he did not holdthe doctrine at the time of the Republic : he simply may not have seen anyway of putting it to work.However, the claim that the argument found in the Republic and thePhaedo embodies a claim about the limitations of perception, and therebyan attack on empiricism, is hardly agreed on all sides, and must be defended.Schematically the argument, on this epistemological interpretation, exhibitsthe following form (assuming suitable values of F) :1. Perceived Fness is indistinguishable from its opposite.2. Fness is quite distinct from its opposite.. 3. Perceived Fness is not the same as Fness.It is on the question of how to understand the first premiss that inter-pretations differ crucially. Let us list some examples of what Plato actuallysays :" Perception calls the same thing hard and soft ... it tells of the heavyas light and of the light as heavy " (Republic524A);"Sight sees big and little as something fused together " (Republic 5240);"Of all these many beautifuls . . . is there any that will not appearugly or of the many justs any that will not appear unjust, or of the holiesany that will not appear unholy ?" (Republic479A);" Is it not true that equal stones and sticks sometimes, without changingin themselves, appear equal to one person [or " in one setting "] and un-equal to another [or " in another setting "] ? " (Phaedo 74B).Some typical ways of interpreting this first premiss are as follows (againassuming suitable values of F) :



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112 A. J. HOLLAND(i) Any physical thing which appears F to one person is capable ofappearing not-F to another.l9(ii) Any physical thing which is F is also not-F at some other time,

in some other way, or at some other place.20(iii) Any physical thing which is F in one setting (in relation to onething) is not-F in another setting (in relation to another thing).21A drawback with each of these interpretations is that none of them rendersthe argument plausible. Against the first Murphy22observed long ago thatthe obvious solution to such an apparent paradox would be to suppose thatthere is something amiss with one or both observers, rather than with whatthey are observing. In answer to Murphy,Mills suggests that we can restoreboth point and validity to the argument if we are careful to preserve thereference to " appearing " in the second premiss of the argument also where,on the Phaedo version, it certainly occurs. Plato's thought will then bethat whereas a physical particular which appears F is capable of appearingnot-F, something truly F is not capable of appearing anything but truly F.This establishes something true of physical Fness which is not true of Fnessproper. Hence their distinctness is proved. It seems to me, however, thaton this interpretation the sense in which it is plausible to assert the secondpremiss is different from the sense in which it is plausible to assert the first.Hence the impression of validity is only apparent. The only basis that Ican see for the claim that something truly F (or true Fness) is not capableof appearing anything but truly F is the point that no one in his right mindwill suppose that Fness is its opposite. Of course no one will suppose thatFness is its opposite. But in that sense they will not suppose that physicalFness is its opposite either. What might be true is that a particular whichappears F to one person appears not-F to another. But it might equally betrue that what appears to be true Fness to one person appears not to betrue Fness to another. People disagree about the nature of Fness as muchas about its application.It might seem that the reference to " appearing " in thc Phaedo argu-ment militates against our assumption that it is a version of the same argu-ment as is found at Republic 523-4, where no reference to " appearing "occurs. However, this is not a serious obstacle, for the Greek word usuallytranslated ' appears ' can readily be taken to mean something like 'presentsitself as '. Mills23himself allows that one of its regular uses is to mean ' isobviously the case that'. A good illustration of the point is to be found at

19E.g., K. W. Mills, " Plato's Phaedo 74B7-C6, Part 2 ", Phronesis 3 (1958), p. 50.I omit features of his interpretation designed to deal with the specific problems of thePhaedo argument. His account is, of course, only intended to apply to that argument.20E.g., G. Vlastos, " Degrees of Reality in Plato ", New Essays on Plato and Aristotle,ed. R. Bambrough (London, 1965), pp. 10-1.21E.g., G. E. L. Owen, " A Proof in the ' Peri Ide6n ' ", The Journal of HellenicStudies 77 (1957), pp. 108-9.22N. R. Murphy, The Interpretation of Plato's Republic (Oxford, 1951), p. 111 n. 1.280p. cit., Part I, Phronesis 2 (1957), p. 131.



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THEAETETUS 184-6 113Theaetetus152C, where Socrates says: " For something to appear to some-one is the same as for him to perceive that thing, in the case of what is hotor anything of that kind [i.e. in a perceptual context] ". In my view thisis just what ' appears' means in the Phaedo argument.The second interpretation, that of Vlastos, fails, I think, to provide aconvincing reason for effecting a divorce between Fness proper and theFness of physical things. Because sensible particulars are F at one timebut not at another, F in one respect but not in another and so forth, theirF nature, declares Vlastos, "is adulterated by contrary characters ".24But in this he is misled-or is supposing Plato to be misled-by the meta-phor. The fact that a thing is not-F at some other time or in some otherrespect can do nothing to impugn the purity of the Fness which belongs toit at some given time or in some given respect. Vlastos has it that underthese conditions " we could only get a confused and uncertain idea of whatit is to be F, one that would be subject to constant fluctuations ". But thiswould be so only if we beg the question at issue and assume that sensibleFs do not adequately represent Fness.The third interpretation, that of Owen, wears a more promising aspectif we take the point to be that a thing which is F in one setting, while re-taining those eaturesin virtueof whichit is F, is, in some other setting, not-F.The qualification is crucial (cf. " without changing in themselves " in thequotation from Phaedo 74B), since it is only this which begins to make thesituation confusing or puzzling. There is a close parallel here with the puzzlecases discussed at Theaetetus154. The six dice which are less than twelvebecome more than four, even while themselves staying the same. Again,Socrates becomes shorter than Theaetetus over a period of time, whilehimself remaining the same height. The nature of the puzzle lies in theappearance of something's changing and yet not changing, or being differentand yet the same. (It is interesting to note that the " Protagorean thesis "i.e., the body of theory including the flux theory which Plato discusses inthe first part of the Theaetetus,offers a " solution " to such puzzles, whichconsists in denying the propriety of any proposition which " brings thingsto a standstill ". By means of such a " solution " an empiricist might hopeto evade the Platonic " solution " of drawing a distinction between what issensed and what is thought. It is important to Plato that he should nailthis alternative.)This third interpretation, however, still leaves a gap in the argument.It is possible, as Owen suggests, that the need for qualificationin attributingFness to sensible particulars gives a sense to the claim that such Fness isadulterated or imperfect. But this does not explain why the adulterationshould be put at the door of the fact that the Fness in question is an objectof sense. To meet the point an interpretation of the first premiss along thefollowing lines appears to be required :

240p. cit., p. 6.



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114 A. J. HOLLAND(iv) Any physical thing which is F on an account of being F whichis given entirely in terms of objects of sense is capable of beingnot-F by virtue of those very same objects of sense.

What is being affirmedis that no set of sense objects entails Fness (forsuitable values of Fness) and hence that no set of such objects excludes theopposite of Fness. Our success in distinguishing beauty from ugliness, orhardness from softness, is due to our attending to (being vaguely remindedof) something other than the objects of sense. In this way sensible Fnessfalls short of true Fness. Thus, beauty cannot be accounted for in terms ofcertain combinations of colours (Republic 476B), for those very same coloursare capable of determining something to be ugly. Nor can hardness beaccounted for in terms of a particular sort of tactual quality, since thatvery same quality is capable of determining something to be soft.It is no great defect in an interpretation that it fails to provide Platowith a coherent argument. But equally it is churlish to overlook an inter-pretation which does so provide and which, moreover, produces an argumentwith echoes elsewhere. The advantage of interpreting the argument of theRepublicin the way suggested is that we not only suppose Plato to be arguingcoherently but also find him arguing a point crudely initiated in the Phaedo(65D) and more fully developed in the Theaetetus. It is not being suggestedthat at this stage there is a clearly defined target or that the attack on it isvery securely based. Criticism of the perceptual situation as a basis forknowledge is probably not clearly separated from criticism of the objectsof that situation; and the claim that objects of sense do not give adequaterenderings of a very large class of concepts receives the meagre support ofan empirical appeal to a limited range of cases. What is being suggested isthat the point of the earlier argument is epistemological rather than logical,and that the position adopted in the Theaetetus s basically a clarification ofthe position adopted in the earlier argument.The argument in the Theaetetus s indeed different in both its scope andeffect from the earlier argument, but hardly in such a way as to impugnthis latter judgement. There is, first, the fact that accordingto the Theaetetusargument perception puts us in touch with only a very special range ofentities, the proper objects, whereas the range of such entities allowed bythe earlier argument is both wider and different, embracing apparently allentities that do not have an " opposite " (e.g., finger). This does not meanthat Plato therefore assumed at the earlier stage that perception couldprovide us with concepts of all such entities, since his assumptions mayhave outstripped his ability to produce justifications. And in any case,Plato's point is not so much that the sense/thought distinction is not re-quired in the case of concepts like ' finger ' but that reflection on conceptsinvolving "opposites " more readily leads one to recognise the need forsuch a distinction.

Second, and in some respects more important, there is the difference inthe way in which perception is alleged to fail in the two cases. Whereas thelater argument suggests that perception provides insufficient components,



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THEAETETUS 184-6 115the earlier argument appears to suggest that it provides not just insufficientbut faulty ones.Such differencesare, in large measure, due to the operation of the properobject doctrine in the later argument. But they are in reality less markedthan might appear at first sight. This can be seen by comparing what issaid about one particular example which appears in both arguments. Theexample in question concerns the appreciation of the difference or distinctionbetween hard and soft. It is common to both arguments to assert that thisis the kind of appreciation which perception, by itself, is incapable of. Theparallel is too striking to be ignored and strengthens the case for regardingthese arguments as stages of a single train of thought. The Theaetetusgivesas the reason for this failure of appreciation that although we grasp thehardness and softness through touch, we cannot so grasp their mutualopposition (186A-B). The reasoning behind the assertion in the Republicisless clear. Perception announces the same thing to be hard and soft. Themind is puzzled by this and has to consider, by itself, whether what is an-nounced is one or two. Such remarks are in fact capable of being taken inone of two directions. In one direction lies the point that perceived hard-ness and softness are in reality indistinguishable and hence faulty exemplarsof hardness and softness which are distinct from each other and must there-fore be grasped in some other way-by thought. In the other direction liesa point analogous to that of the Theaetetusargument, that though percep-tion grasps hardness and softness it is incapable of appreciating the dis-tinction between them; mind has to step in and sort them out. Plato doesin fact proceed in the first direction, implying that hard, soft, big and little,etc., as properly distinct qualities, are objects of thought, not sense. Butthis only becomes apparent towards the end of the argument, and is evenunexpected in view of the earlier observation that mind has to decidewhether what is announcedis one or two (524B). This certainly seems toimply that it pronounces on the distinctness or otherwise of what is givenin perception.The conclusion of the Theaetetusargument, then, is a possible inferencefrom the observations adduced by way of premiss to the argument of theRepublic. Moreover,it is possible to argue that such differences as there arebetween the two arguments are differences of presentation rather thansubstance. The major point in both arguments is, surely, that we cannotappreciate by perception such facts as the distinction between hardness andsoftness. Whether one presents this as being because we cannot properlyperceive hardness and softness, or as being because, though we perceivehardness and softness we do not perceive their distinctness, is very much asecondary matter. The point is worth emphasizing since it contradicts acommon view25of Plato's development, which started, I think, as a reaction

25Initiated by G. Ryle, "Plato's ' Parmenides' ", Mind 48 (1939), pp. 129-51,302-25, and carried forward by R. Robinson, " Forms and Error in Plato's Theaetetus "Philosophical Review 59 (1950), pp. 3-30.



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116 A. J. HOLLANDto the views of Cornford, according to which the Theaetetusrepresents avery different outlook from that of the Republic.According to this view the Phaedo and Republic represent the peak ofPlato's optimism, typified by the postulate of transcendent forms. This wasfollowed by a more realistic period, initiated by the Parmenidesand exempli-fied by the Theaetetus, n which transcendent forms and accompanying talkabout two worlds was quietly dropped. The precise nature of this develop-ment depends of course on how terms such as 'transcendent' are under-stood. But it is fairly safe to assume that a major facet of transcendencemust be non-availability to the senses. If this is so, a proper comparison ofthe two arguments we have discussed hardly bears out such a view of Plato'sdevelopment. For, as we have seen, on the score of availability to the senses,the Theaetetusretracts nothing of what is argued or even assumed in theRepublic. It merely shifts the attack on what might be called an empiriciststandpoint in the direction of greater rigour. Such differences as there areare best explained on the hypothesis that the later dialogue carries forwardand renders more precise thoughts which were, in the earlier dialogue,obscurely based and indistinct in content. The claim about the limitationsof objects of sense is hardly tenable without a much cleareraccount of whatthe nature of these objects is supposed to be. The charge that Plato hadnot fully justified his earlier strictures, whether made from within his schoolor from outside, is indeed just the sort of thing to call forth the Theaetetusas we know it. And, as we have seen, in the proper object doctrine of per-ception, Plato found just the theoretical underpinning for his position thathe required.26Universityof Lancaster

26I am grateful to Dr. M. A. Stewart for his comments on an earlier draft of thispaper.

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