(DRAFT)

GRENADA: NON-CAPITALIST PATH AND THE DERAILMENT OF A POPULIST

REVOLUTION

Hilbourne A. WatsonDepartment of Political Science

Howard University

Washington, D.C.

Prepared for Presentation at the Caribbean Studies Association9th Annual Meeting - St. Kitts, West Indies, May 29th - June 2nd(Not to be quoted without the author's consent)

I. Introduction

This is a study of the Grenada Revolution otherwise known as the

New Jewel Revolution. The study seeks to explain the development, crisis

and derailment of the Revolution in October 1983. The conditions which

enabled the New Jewel Movement (NJM) to overthrow the extremist authoritarian

regime of Eric Gairy in an insurrectionary seizure of power are traceable

to the period of 1973 to 1979 or earlier. (IIR 1973; Jacobs and Jacobs

1980, Ambursley 1983).

Certain basic epistemological, theoretical and methodological

principles inform the conceptual structure which I will employ in this

investigation. Epistemologically, the study proceeds from the perspective

of the Critique of. Political Economy: it adopts the world view of historical

materialism by asserting the primacy of production relations which are

articulated within modes of production and social formations. It avoids

mechanicism and economic reductionism by situating the fundamental elements

of base and superstructure in a dialectical relationship.

It adopts the principle that the class struggle is the primary

articulating factor in the socio-historical process and holds that the

working class has an historic role to play in the process of social change,

particularly through the agent of the revolutionary vanguard party. It

is recognized that while the instrumentalist concept of the state tends to

be reductionist, the state's fundamental social role and function is to

guarantee the reproduction of the economic, political, ideological and

technical conditions and requirements for the survival of the mode of

production and the social formation. This means that the state must

integrate and mediate the antagonistic projects of the contending social

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classes into a set of programs that reflect the dominance of the particular

ruling class(es), depending upon the situation in the class struggle.

Ideology serves as aninterpellated articulating principle employed by social

classes or fractions in their intra-class and inter-class discourse. In

the broadest sense, ideology serves to promote and legitimate the interests

of a class in its quest to obtain or maintain its hegemony. Theory exists

to explain reality but sometimes political expediency overcomes the

vigorous requirements of scientific activity and reducestheory to its mere

ideological features.

In this study I will argue (1) that the New Jewel Revolution was

essentially a popular "democratic" revolution that unfolded within Grenada's

"backward capitalism"; and (2) that it was essentially the popular/populist

character of the revolution itself and its strategy and tactics of social

transformation which provided both the conditions and environment for the

tragic derailment of the Revolution. This means that the internal condi-

tions inside Grenadian society, and within the institutions and organs of

the Revolution are the precise starting point for analyzing the revolutionary

process, its crisis and derailment.

External factors are significant and may, from time to time,

play a decisive role in influencing the trajectory of a revolution but, in

the final analysis,these are intervening and mediating factors which may

not be substituted for the primacy of internal factors. To conclude that

external factors are primary in the so-called anti-imperialist stage of

the revolution is to relegate the class struggle, exploitation and class

dominance, to the status of epiphenomena. The New Jewel Movement (NJM)

became a victim of this tendency to externalize the primary contradictions.

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I will attempt to show that those who argue that the so-called "Coard

faction" in the NJM delivered the Revolution to U.S. imperialism are

substituting ideological explanations for scientific analysis.

While such a view may be understandable it is not acceptable.

Several factors which I will also analyze have contributed to the populariza-

tion of this perspective: (1) U.S. imperialism has adopted an increasingly

right-wing, militaristic and interventionist posture toward the revolutions

in the Caribbean Basin area. (2) The U.S. invaded Grenada in the wake of

the execution of some of the NJM leaders thereby derailing the Revolution.

(3) Both of these aspects, that is the executions and the invasion

traumatized the supporters of the Revolution. (4) Cuban reaction to the

events of October 12th to 19th, 1983, further polarized and isolated the

Caribbean left movement which has suffered a severe frontal attack by

imperialism and the neocolonial states in the Caribbean. (5) The

notion of the anti-imperialist stage of the revolution has been removed

from its proper historical and theoretical context and generalized to a

contemporary theory of revolution in the neocolonies.

These five points will be discussed when I test the basic

hypothesis of this study. I will do this by analyzing the following

concrete issues. (1) The nature of the mode of production in Grenada and

the social class structure that developed upon it; (2) the operation of

the law of value under conditions of backward capitalism, particularly

with respect to the reproduction of labor power, value and capital accumu-

lation on an expanded scale; (3) the class nature, role and social trans-

formation strategy of the NJM leadership (i.e. the so-called non-capitalist

path); (4) the role of politics and ideology in the relationship between

the party, masses, classes and the state; (5) the domestic and foreign

policies of the NJM/PRG state; (6) the development of the revolutionary

crisis and how the NJM/PRG regime handled it bearing in mind that,

historically, backward capitalism and radical populism have combined to

produce economic and political disaster; and (7) the role and impact of

external forces upon the revolutionary crisis.

II. The Mode of Production and the Social Formation

The political economy of Grenada has been operating according

to the laws of motion of capitalism for a long time. Jacobs and Jacobs

(1980: 45-71) have shown that Grenada has had a capitalist political economy

based upon a capitalist mode of production. This is corroborated by other

studies by Watson (197,1981) and Ambursley (1983: 193-199). Grenada's

capitalism is backward. This means that (1) on the whole there is a dis-

tinctive pre-industrial level of economic development; (2) merchant capital

and commercial capital dominate the production and circulation of commodi-

ties; (3) the dominant agricultural sector utilizes.preindustrial (and

Primitive) techniques of production and surplus extraction; (4) trade and

the exploitation of market-imperfections are the principle means employed

by the comprador sections of capital for the realization of surplus value

and profits; (5) landed property is heavily skewed in favor of the agrarian

bourgeoisie; (6) the rural proletariat is characteristically landless and

exhibits a structural differentiation in which it simultaneously appears to be

both peasant and proletarian; (7) fragmentation, and parcellization of land

is widespread among the small farmers, a situation that results directly

from the monopolization of land by the big capitalists; (8) labor produc-

tivity is low on the average and stems from fragmentation, parcellization,

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monopolization and the proliferation of primitive techniques of production

throughout agriculture, and the ability to the capitalist class to dictate

the political and economic conditions of superexploitation over the workers;

(9) production and export activity is dominated by primary agricultural

commodities that incorporate large amounts of labor of low value, and

circulation is based mainly upon the importation and exchange of finished

goods incorporating smaller quantities of labor of higher value; and (10)

largely as a result of this general predicament Grenada has consistently

experienced relatively low export prices and much higher import prices, the

lack of a capital market, foreign exchange and balance of payments problems.

This situation was compounded by the capricibus policies of Eric

Gairy and combined with political repression and imperialist crises to

produce a revolutionary situation between 1973-79, which the NJM successfully

exploited in an insurrectionary seizure of power in March 1979. During

much of the colonial period absentee landlords dominated the agrarian

economy and much of the productive lands were kept out of production

(Jacobs and Jacobs 1980). Between 1946 and 1951, the following reality

prevailed in the agricultural sector which was also the mainstay of the

island's economic life: in 1946, a total of 103 estates with 34,703 acres

accounted for 45.6 per cent of all land which amounted to some 77,000 acres.

Farm holdings of up to 5 acres each made up 88.7 per cent of all farms and

accounted for 45 per cent or 34,650 acres of the land. What this all says

is that 0.5 per cent of all agricultural holdings made up 49.2 per cent of

the land. By 1972, concentration of land property had increased by 3.6

per cent in favor of the capitalists who held 49.2 per cent compared with

45.6 per cent in 1946 (Jacobs and Jacobs 1980: 45-48, 103). This also

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means that the actual share of land owned and worked by the medium and

small farmers actually decreased from 54.4 per cent in 1946 to approximately

50.8 per cent. The techniques of production available to the small farmers

also remained primitive1

(Jacobs and Jacobs 1980: 43, 143).

Large scale holdings characterize the capitalist

sector and small scale, fragmented and parcellized holdings that suffer from

all the effects of wastage and inefficiency associated with fencing footpaths

and low productivity, and lack of credit facilities, plague the small

farmers (Ambursley 1983: 196). The economic class structure in agriculture

bears and reflectsthis contrasting situation: a small number of big capitalists

and a large mass of small scale inefficient producers. The big capitalists

control output, purchasing, marketing and income distribution. The

agroproletariat is typified by landlessless, chronic insecurity, seasonal

employment and a lack of reliable alternative means of livelihood. The

so-called peasants2

or small farmers have been responsible for the produc-

tion of at least 60 per cent of Grenada's nutmeg, 50 per cent of the cocoa,

85 per cent of food crops, 30 per cent of the bananas, and 93 per cent of

sugar cane (Ambursley 1983: 196). In this sense they have been the backbone

of the agricultural sector. In 1969, agriculture accounted for 82 per cent

of total export sales.

After 1960, partly as a result of the expansion of foreign

capital into the Caribbean, the class structure underwent a modest degree

of change. Gairy's capricious and destablizing policies also played a role

by victimizing certain capitalists and alienating a share of their property

and surplus value. Tourism expanded and led to new developments in the

construction and real estate sectors. At the same time the public sector

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grew and increased the scope of its activities, while manufacturing activity

remained largely stagnant. Between 1960-1978, the manufacturing sector

contributed about 4 per cent of the GDP compared with 14-16 per cent by

services (mainly tourism), 15 per cent by the distributive sector, and 18

per cent by the public sector (Ambursley 1983: 193-198). Grenada's capitalist

political economy has rested upon agricluture, tourism, construction and

real estate, distribution and light manufacturing activities. But it is

agriculture, tourism and distribution which dominate all economic acitivty,

and it is this which gives Grenadian capitalism its distinctive comprador

character. The bourgeoisie is therefore of a distinctively agro-commercial

orientation. 3 This is why it is important to understand the role of

merchant and commercial capital in the reproduction of labor power and

value in this backward capitalism.

Outside of agriculture the Grenadian proletariat in structurally

atomized, fluid and fragmented. The urban working class consists of state

sector workers and those employed by the private sector in services and

small scale manufacturing. Recent estimates indicate that agriculture

employs 31 per cent of the labor force, while manufacturing and tourism

together contributed 33 per cent of employment4

at the end of the 1960's.

In 1977, there were about 170 small manufacturing operations in Grenada:

about 50 per cent of these were cottage industries that employed less than

five persons each. A brewery which employed seventy six (76) permanent

employees was the largest manufacturing establishment. Outside of agricul-

ture the dock workers were the largest single group within the proletariat

(Ambursley 1983: 199).

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Capitalists and proletarians are the main classes. In spite of

the "proliferation of new occupational groups," the entry of the black

petty bourgeoisie into commerce, and the penetration by foreign capital

into tourism and light manufacturing, the class structure has remained

largely unaltered (Jacobs and Jacobs 1980: 46-47). Up until 1974, the

"landed aristocracy remained landed and dominant," the state was firmly

under the control of the capitalist class and "non-elected capitalist

elements maintained undue influence over the political system." Gairy

became a capitalist: he held membership in the Chamber of Commerce and

was'bwner of a vast array of self-owned businesses." The basic legal,

juridical, bureaucratic and political party structures were bourgeois in

by orientation and design. The agro-commercial bourgeoisie was tied to

imperialism by class interests, outlook, and participation in the inter-

national division of labor (Jacobs and Jacobs 1980: 47-50). The essentially

capitalist structure of Grenada's economy is proof that the non-capitalist

path strategy which the NJM/PRG regime claimed to implement during 1979-

83, was not a non-capitalist strategy but one which was designed to

rationalize and modernize capitalism under the auspices of the state for the

petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie.

III. Merchant - Commercial Capital and the Law of Value: Reproducing Labor Power and Capital Accumulation in Backward Capitalism

The persistence of merchant and commercial capital in Grenada's

political economy has to be explained as a basic feature of the "solidity

and internal articulation" of that country's preindustrial capitalist

mode of production and not as a force external to it. "Modes of Production imply

production relations; these in turn presuppose classes with different social positions"

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(Procacci 1978: 135). It is misleading and unscientific to attempt to

explain the articulation of the mode of production purely , as an extension

of imperialism. It has to be explained through the mechanisms of the

class practices and capacities of the dominant class and the class struggle

as a whole. Grenada's agro-commercial bourgeoisie is the result of the

fusion of merchant-commercial capital and agrarian capital. As a whole

this class has relied upon the application of preindustrial techniques

in production and circulation of commodities in order to realize surplus

value.

Why has this agro-commercial capital adopted backward approach

to production and surplus extraction? Firstly, it resulted from the .

international division of labor which colonialism and imperialism had

imposed on the colonies. Secondly, the virtual economic and political

monopoly which this class achieved over all aspects of national life under

the auspices of the plantation hadmadeits use acceptable to capital.

Thirdly, this very phenomenon of total control enabled capital to

super-exploit the masses of laborers by keeping wages below the actual

reproduction cost of labor power. Lewis (1951) amply criticized this

class for its ideological world view, its attitude toward risk-bearing

ventures, and its practices in terms of the actual utilization of the

means of production under conditions of what he called surplus labour

(unlimited supplies of labor). Access to foreign markets in which to

sell primary commodities was alsoa contributing factor.

Charcteristically, capitalism is based upon the operation of

the law of value: the means of production become capital; labor power

is a commodity; capital and labor are combined according to a given

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organic composition of capital to produce commodities; labor power,as

the source of value produces a value that is greater than the subsistence

wage it receives; and capitalists extract, in the form of surplus value,

the difference between the total value produced and subsistence wage

that is paid to the workers.

The transition to capitalism in Western Europe followed two

paths. The first path was that of the small producer capitalist who

advanced necessar Y industrial capital and hired wage labor to produce

commodities. It was through this direct exploitation of wage labor that

value was produced and surplus value and profits were realized. Reproduc-

tion of the process facilitated the ongonig reproduction of labor power,

value and capital accumulation on an expanded scale. The second path

was the path of the merchant capitalist who was essentially a trader who

lived by buying goods cheap and selling them dear, thereby exploiting

market imperfection and/or his monopoly position. He operated according

to the dictates imposed by the very limits of his activity within the

economy. Historically, whenever inudstrial capital fails to break into

and transform this arena for whatever reason the merchant capitalist

tends to reproduce the economic and extra-economic barriers to economic

transformation,and this has the effect of preserving the status quo.

On the other hand, the path of the industrial capitalist leads to the

dismantling of all such barriers (Procacci 1978: 138).

Procacci (1978: 139) summarized the argument in these terms:

the first (path) way of the producer capitalist was

"Characterized by the subordination of commercial toindustrial capital, of the market to production;conversely (the second path) is characterized by the

persistent dependence of production on the market,of industry on commercial gain. (The first path)necessarily leads to a definitive break with —(backwardness), way No. 2 to an accommodation withthese (backward) relations, in so far as - to useMarx's phrase - 'it cannot by itself' contributeto the overthrow of the old mode of production, buttends rather to preserve and retain it as itspreconditions."

Grenada's bourgeoisie came out of agriculture and fused with merchant

and commercial interests which it invariably created. It did not look to

industry or industrialization for the imperialist policy and the international

division of labor militated against such a development. Petty commodity

production, commodity production, primitive agriculture and the absence

of modern industry are common features where domestic industry fails to

develop. Mandel (1968: 113) argues that

"Domestic industry is the logical culmination of thesubordination of petty commodity production to moneycapital in a money economy in which _production for dis-tant markets has destroyed all possibility of givinga stable foundation to the existence of the small producer."

Clearly, then, the coexistence in Grenada of agro-commercial

capital with a large landless agricultural proletariat, a small urban

proletariat that is confined largely to services, a relatively large

stratum of small rural producers who appear to manifest a structural dualism

of peasants and proletarians, is essentially a product of this backward

capitalism. Wage labor has been consistently reproduced as unskilled

wage labor whose production price had been kept consistently at or below

the subsistence wage. Marx's own representation of the problem and its

implications for economies dominated by merchant capital are instructive

and revealing:

"Thus hand in hand with expropriation of the self-supporting peasants, with their separation from their

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means of production, goes the destruction of ruraldomestic industry, the process of separation betweenmanufacture and agriculture. And only the destruc-tion of rural domestic industry can give the internalmarket of a country the extension and consistence whichthe capitalist mode of production requires ----

Modern industry alone and finally, supplies in machinerythe lasting basis of capitalistic agriculture, expropriatesradically the enormous majority of the agriculturalpopulation and completes the separation between agricul-ture and rural and domestic industry whose roots ---it tears up. It therefore also, for the first time,conquers for industrial capital the entire home market."

Modern industry has not developed in Grenada. Production and

exchange are still dominated by agro-commercial capital. The home market

has not been conquered for or by industrial capital. The sphere of the

operation of the law of value is restricted and this means that the reproduc-

tion of labor power and the growth of capital on an expanded scale are

also restricted. That is why agricultural capitalism in Grenada appears

to reproduce the peasantry, the semi- proletariat,and the proletariat

simultaneously. Agro-commercial capital represents a blockage: 6 its domain

is the sphere of absolute surplus value as opposed to the sphere of relative

surplus value. Any rational attempt to increase the social productiveness

of labor power comes up against the structural limits of the low organic

composition of capital within this type of capitalism.

Accommodation with this capital is always dangerous for the

consolidation of a revolution. The revolutionary situation which the

NJM inherited and exploited in March 1979, was born of this backward

capitalism and compounded by the excesses of Gairyism. 7 The NJM had a

plan for the modernization of this backward capitalism under the auspices

of the state and capital. In order to effectuate this modernization

process, the NJM began by coming to terms with agro-commercial capital

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on the latter's own terms. This had a great deal to do with the failure

of the NJM to systematically win .over the rural masses from the legacy

of the past.

IV. The NJM: Class Nature and Revolutionary Strategy

The crisis of the colonial and neocolonial order in Grenada had

its roots in the inability of agro-commercial capitalism to reproduce itself

in a rational manner. For example, by 1974,male agricultural workers were

being paid $4.00 per day, and female agriculturalworkers received $3.00

per day. Workers- in the manufacturing sector in apparel and textile goods

received $50.00 per month (supervisors) and $15.00 per month (apprentices).

The minimum wage for commercial workers in the city of St. Georges was

$70.00 per month for shop assistants and clerks, and $50.00 per month in

other towns including Saulters, Victoria, Gouyave and Hillsborough. Else-

where the monthly pay for similar work was $45.00. Hotel workers (waiters

and maids) received $100.00 - $150.00 per month. (Jacobs and Jacobs 1980:appendix)

Gairy's excesses combined with this chronic state of economic

depression to produce large scale popular disaffection and alienation.

The NJM emerged as a petty bourgeois movement of the most disaffected,

alienated and radicalized elements of the intelligentsia. The NJM leader-

ship may be classified as petty bourgeois in terms of its social origins,

aims, objectives, class practices and capacities and the revolutionary

program which it presented in 1973, and implemented in 1979-83.

Objectively, the social origins of the NJM's leadership were predominantly

in the professions, the bureaucracy (civil and military), small businesses,

(merchants and shopkeepers) and medium and small scale agriculture.

In this sense the petty bourgeoisie is like the bourgeoisie because it

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owns some property and engages in a modest degree of production. For the

most part, however, the petty bourgeoisie realizes surplus through services

in the circulation process. Generally it does not employ wage labor.

Like the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie provides its own labor for

the production of goods and services and is therefore directly involved

in production. The NJM leadership met all these criteria.

The leaders of the NJM were radicalized by a series of developments

inside and outside of Grenada. Gairy's runing down of the economy, his

political victimization and repression and his capricious approach to the

running of the government generated a set of contradictions that severely

affected members and strata from all social classes in the society. These

contradictions contributed immensely to the disaffection, alienation and

radicalization of petty bourgeois elements. Anti-Gairyism and nationalistic

anti-imperialism became central elements in the program of the groups from

which the NJM emerged. Jacobs and Jacobs (1980:75) argue that the NJM

"Emerged as a coherent reality in March 1973." Other factors such as

the social upheavals that rocked Trinidad and Tobago in 1970, and the

radicalizing and nationalistic influences of the U.S. and Caribbean Black

Power Movements also contributed to the development of the progressive

political consciousness within the petty bourgeoisie.

NJM members participated in the founding and activities of

pre-party formations such as Forum (1970), 8 the movement for the Advance-

ment of Community Effort (MACE), 9 the Movement for the Assembly of Peoples

(MAP)," and the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education and Liberation

(JEWEL), 11 (1972). The MACE formation identified the need for a mass

based organization to serve as a vehicle for promoting social change.

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Partly as a result of this recognition by MACE, a decision was reached

to merge with MAP which then superseded MACE. The JEWEL formation,

which had its roots in the rural area of St. David's parish under the

leadership of Unison Whiteman, had as one of its basic objectives the

mobilization

"Of the peasantry and the agroproletariat in orderto undermine Gairy's agro-proletarian base by opposingthe contradictions of the Gairy personality, the gapbetween his words and actions, while at the same timeproviding through the co-operative, an alternativeto the programme of patronage that Gairy had beenusing to ensure support from the underprivileged,underemployed class." (Jacobs and Jacobs 1980: 77)

After one year JEWEL proved that it was an effective mobilizer

of the rural masses. MAP became openly political and placed the question

of state power on its political agenda. Its political commitment was

"to transform the Westminister type state apparatus into one based on

more popular control through"assemblies of the people" (Jacobs and

Jacobs 1980: 76). The merger of MAP and JEWEL in March 1973, to form the

NJM12

was a logical development of the conscientization and radicaliza-

tion process within these groupings which became increasingly populist

and anti-imperialist by ideological persuasion.13

MAP had raised ques-

tion of state power as a political objective,and JEWEL had put the ques-

tion of the peasantry and agro-proletariat as political bases on the agenda.

However,when the NJM was formed it continued to relate to the workers,

"peasants" and other groups as "the masses" and "people" rather than as

classes. And even if some of the leaders were, in principle, committed to

the idea of challenging private property it was their social class

origins and objectives which "inhibited an unequivocal commitment to

scientific socialism" (Jacobs and Jacobs 1980: 82).

-16-

As such there was no monolithic view within the NJM at its

inception, nor was there a single political line to which all of the

leaders were totally committed throughout the ten and a half (101) years

of its operation. The admixture of radical social democratic and socialist

oriented measures that were incorporated into its manifesto in 1973 reflec-

ted the diversity and the associated politico-ideological tension within

this radicalized stratum of the intelligentsia. The main planks in the

1973 Manifesto rested upon radical social democratic measures including

social welfare programs which emphasized redistributive social justice,

and state participation in and/or ownership of selected resources. The

socialist oriented measure revolved around the political principle of

democratic centralism within the movement/party and anti-imperialism. 14

The NJM consistently strengthened its links with the masses and it soon

became "an uncompromising champion of the workers and,for the first time,

a reliable institutional link to the organized working class" (Jacobs

and Jacobs 1980: 116-117).

The 1973 Manifesto also reflected the level of polarization

that was developing in the society around the class struggle. The NJM

was leading the progressive movement and the working class as part of the

mass movement since there were no independent working class organizations

to assume this leadership. It was able to exploit the contradictions

within the unfolding revolutionary situation by demonstrating that

Gairy was becoming increasingly incapable of ruling,and by suggesting a

potentially viable and progressive alternative to Gairy. As the rural

masses, rentiers, workers, intelligentsia,petty bourgeoisie, other middle

strata elements and members of the big bourgeoisie became increasingly

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disaffected Gairy's isolation grew and so did his repressive rule.

It became increasingly difficult for most groups to remain on the political

sidelines. At the same time both domestic agro-commercial capitalism and

the state sector were experiencing the effects of both the economic and

financial ravages of Gairyism and the crisis of imperialism. The status

quo had become nonviable and the NJM was being pushed to the left limits

of petty bourgeois radicalism.

The Non-Capitalist Path Option

The decision to opt for the so-called non-capitalist path of

development does not seem to have been clearly articulated within the NJM

prior to the insurrectionary seizure of state power in March 1979, in

spite of the overall progressive thrust of the organization's 1973 Manifesto.

The study by Richard and Ian Jacobs - Grenada: The Route to Revolution

appears to be an attempt to formalize the revolutionary program of the

party and provide it with a rational and coherent theoretical and philosophical

framework.15

In essence, as it turns out, neither the non-capitalist path

theory nor the form in which it was appropriated by the NJM was non-capita-

list after all. A lively theoretical and epistemological debate has been

enjoined on the status of non-capitalist path theory which was developed

and advanced by recent Soviet social science scholarship on the "Third

World".

Caribbean scholarship has contributed to this debate on the

historical, theoretical and empirical merits of the theory as applied to the

Commonwealth Caribbean (Thomas 1976; Watson 1979, 1980, 1981; Jacobs and

Jacobs 1980; Jagan 1976; WPA 1979; Ambursley 1983). The statement by

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Jacobs and Jacobs amounts to a weak justification and defense of the non-

capitalist path strategy as Grenada's route to revolution. 16 Jagan (1980),WPA

(1979), and WPJ (1977) have also provided theoretical justifications of the

strategy to support the internal needs of their parties, and to search for

popular support for their political strategies. In this sense all of

them enter into a populist discourse with the masses that understates class

struggle and suggests that the particular societies about which they write

and where they have their political base are not ready for the transition

to socialism. They suggest the need for a period of transition between

capitalism and socialism, which is neither capitalist nor socialist,

but which is said to possess a "socialist oriented" content.

Jacobs and Jacobs (1980: 78) insist that the NJ% objectives

which are contained in the 1973 Manifesto are very similar to the ones

outlined by Solodivonikov and Bogoslovsky in their 1975 study entitled

Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline, (Moscow: Progress

Publishers). Both documents, according to Jacobs and Jacobs, stress anti-

imperialism, agrarian reform to benefit the peasantry, progressive legis-

lation to benefit the working people, social welfare measures, develop-

ment of the influence of the masses in state policy, regulation of

small and medium scale private enterprises, a dynamic state sector and

co-operation with the socialist countries.17

I have already indicated in earlier research (Watson 1979, 1981)

that the non-capitalist path model is historically and politically

inappropriate for Commonwealth Caribbean societies including Grenada. The

historical and intellectual premises of the theory and model assume

the existence of largely precapitalist societies and the Commonwealth

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Caribbean does not satisfy this criterion. Ambursley and Cohen (1983: 6-9)

have also established this fact. It seems that the Grenadian bourgeoisie,

and the petty bourgeoisie in particular supported the NJM strategy precisely

because it posed no real threat to private property. In other words, .

the non-capitalist strategy was the lesser evil when compared with

socialism.

While the contemporary non-capitliast path theory attempts to

anchor its theoretical premises in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin,

it arrives at conclusions that are not supported by their analyses. The

intermediate stage of so-called "socialist orientation" which falls between

capitalism and socialism by avoiding both systems is still expected to

lay the foundations for the transition to socialism based upon a "long

term strategic alliance with the bourgeoisie" (Ambursley and Cohen 1983:6).

The absence of strong internal economic ties to imperialism left the

Grenedian bourgeoisie relatively isolated in - the face of the popular anti-

Gairy upsurge. At the same time the non-capitalist path strategy did not

call for massive nationalization or expropriations. The promise made by

the NJM to abolish the excesses of Gairyism also implied the rationalization

of production and surplus extraction techniques, the end of political

victimization against recalcitrant capitalists and, thereby, the restora-

tion of conditions for normal capital accumulation.18

The state was to

serve as the main rationalizing vehicle for the process. Agro-commercial

capitalism was being presented with an opportunity similar to the ones

which the neo-colonial state had already provided to the capitalists-

local and foreign - in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados.

The restoration of political stability, economic order, the

return of alientated property, the strengthening of the productive base

-20-

through infrastructure development, the diversification of production,

better access to foreign markets, and the reclamation of Grenada's

international image from the low level to which it had sunk under Gairy

were all part and parcel of the overall economic, political, technical

and ideological functions which the state performs in order to guarantee

the reproduction of the mode of production. What bothered the capitalist

class about the non-capitalist strategy was the emphasis on the state

sector, the influence of the masses in state policy and close cooperation

with the socialist countries. This concern was allayed when the NJM came

to power and proceeded to implement a reformist domestic policy based

upon power sharing between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, and

a radical anti-imperialist foreign policy which any strong nationalist

could defend. To a large extent the capitalist class had achieved the

best of both worlds. It had gotten rid of Gairy and it was still in

control of the economy and sharing state power with the petty bourgeoisie.

V. Politics and Ideology: The NJM, Masses, Classes and the State

Populism became the main ideological mechanism which the NJM

employed in commicating with the social classes in Grenada. In this

sense populism was used as a cementing force to solidify a

popular base for the party's leadership. This approach is typical

of the radicalized and revolutionary democratic petty bourgeoisie which

is bent on neutralizing or dissoliving the class struggle by stressing

the role of the "people" and "masses" over classes in historical

processes. The insertion of populism into the political and ideological

discourse of the petty bourgeoisie simultaneously reflects its class

-21-

interests and the structural limits of its class capacities.

In social democratic and radical movements

"Populism consists in the presentation of populardomestic interpellationaS a synthetic - antagonisticcomplex with respect to the dominant ideology ....Populism starts at the point where popular-democratic elements are presented as an antagonistlpoption against the ideology of the dominant bloc."'(Laclau 1977: 172-73).

Now, clearly, Gairy had also employed populist discourse especially

in the early years of his regime. But the fact is that he never embraced

a leftist, radicalizing, populism. His was a conservative populism which

was used to manipulate the masses and keep the system tied to the tradi-

tional colonial political economy. The NJM's populism was radical and

was intended to reconstitute the ruling power bloc under the leadership

of the petty bourgeoisie. This shows that populism is not a specific

class ideology, per se, but an ideological mechanism which may be shaped

and employed by a class or class fraction on the left, center or the

right. The NUM adopted "the ideological complex of which populism is a

moment in the articulation of this antagonistic movement within (the)

divergent class discourse."(Laclau 1977: 175)

In the final analysis the sucess of populism depends on the

overall situation and the specific conditions An the class struggle.

What was distinctive about the NJM's populism is what Ambursley (1983: 201)

calls its Jamesian orientation which emphasizes the role of the pouplar

assemblies of the people, workers councils and other popular structures.20

This is a carryover from the Trotskyism of CLR James whose concept of

popular power holds that "the vanguard party has been superseded by

historical events and ... the proletariat could, acting through workers

-22-

councils, spontaneously transform society" (Ambursley 1983: 201).

The NJM had proposed a new form of government based upon"People's

Assembliesilthat would involve the people all the time and assure them of

"Both their political and their economic rights to....bring true democracy (under the leadership of) a crosssection of society.... without regard to favour -GULP, GNP, JEWEL, alike ... It will be made up ofrepresentatives of workers and unions, farmers,police, civil servants, nurses, teachers, businessmenand students. These groups will be consulted in advanceand they will choose their own representatives on thegovernment." 21

There were to be four levels of the peoples assemblies' structure: Village

Assemblies, Parish Assemblies, Workers Assemblies and the National Assembly.22

This approach was promoted in the 1973 Manifesto and a version

of it was implemented after March 1979. It was intended to reconstitute

the old ruling power bloc. This also explains why the NJM did not at

anytime attempt "to transform the crisis into a proletarian offensive

against the dominant class as a wholef(Ambursley 1983: 201). Revolutionary

petty bourgeois class interest and ideology, and related conceptions of power,

the state and leadership limited the capacity of the party of transform

populist objectives into proletarian objectives. This notion of a govern-

ment of a cross section of the people is nothing less than the idea of

the power bloc consisting of four classes: the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie,

workers and peasants, under the governing directorate of the petty bourgeoisie.

This ruling power bloc made up of four classes was one of the NJM's declara-

tions in the 1973 Manifesto but it was never actualized in the post 1979

state.

The NUM assumed state power as the PRG. Berberoglu (1983: 326)

classified the state under the PRG as left-wing national state-capitalist

-23-

under the leadership of"petty bourgeois revolutionary democrats," in

pursuit of non-capitalist objectives. This classification captures some

aspects of the reality of the state under the NJM/PRG but is also over-

states the situation in some respects. On theoretical and empirical

grounds the national state capitalist characterization is misleading. The

NJM/PRG never challenged the capitalist economic structure between 1979-83;

on the contrary it encouraged its expansion in substantive terms and at

the expense of the achievement of a dynamic state sector in agriculture,

manufacturing and other areas of activity. The growth of the state sector

followed more or less the typical path that leads to the hypertrophy

of the state.23

The state bureaucracy was not transformed partly because

of administrative and technical obstacles but also because of the lack

of political commitment to the proletarianization process. This was a part

of the class question that faced the PRG throughout its tenure. The class

question leads ultimately to the mode of production and to the class forces

that exercise power.(Berberoglu 1983: 339)

The limits of the class objectives and capacities of the revolu-

tionary democratic petty bourgeoisie are also clearly revealed at the level

of the state. Petras (1976) and Berberoglu (1983: 332) have noted that

when the petty bourgeoisie has acquired

"Firm control of the statemachine these regimes havedeveloped various schemes to advance (their) classinterests ... as well as (their) closest ally, thenational bourgeoisie. Although these regimes borrowsocialist forms in the political and economic spheres(one party state,socialist rhetoric, state ownership,planning, etc.) these are done to accomplish capitalistends: the realization of profits within classsociety. The main objective of the petty bourgeoisstate is to provide the necessary capital to develop andexpand the national economy where a national bourgeoisiehas not developed sufficiently . . . to assume ownership

-24-of the major sectors of the economy. Hence, the statein these formations plays a major role in the realizationof the long term interests of the developmentAl agencyin capitalist accumulation in the periphery." 44

This is precisely the issue which I raised in the section on merchant -

commercial capital and the law of value. The idea that the capitalist

class is not sufficiently developed tends to beg the question. The fact

of the matter is that the reproduction of merchant, commercial and pre-

industrial agrarian capital is a process peculiar to the formations in

which neither the rural nor urban sectors come under the sway of modern

industry. On the other hand, it is true that the PRG satisfied all the

requisite functions of the petty bourgeois capitalist state, as the sub-

sequent analysis will show.

VI. The PRG In Power: Outlook and Practices, 1979-83

(1) Outlook and Policies

Although the broad unity which had characterized the NJM from

1973-79 was not shattered upon the seizure of state power certain politico-

ideological differences began to be reflected in the statements of different

party and government leaders. Here I will contrast the political statements

of Maurice Bishop with those of Selwyn Strachan in order to substantiate

my argument. Bishop (1982: 35) declared that the Revolution was at "the

national democratic stage, the anti-imperialist stage of the process we

are trying to build." In his judgement the national democratic stage and

the so-called anti-imperialist stage were one and the same. In an

attempt to clarify the meaning and content of this national democratic

stage Bishop stated that it was related to "the question of democracy

a new grassrootspeople-oriented democracy ... from the village level

right up to the national level". Again he emphasized "people's

-25-

needs and lives,"a "revolutionary democracy" (Bishop 1982: 35).

Bishop did not elaborate upon the class basis of this

democarcy for it was to be a people's democarcy, a populist democracy,

above classes and economic interests and power. He protested against those

in Grenada who seemed bent on exploiting the objective differences between

people of different social classes:

... these people deliberately link revolution with anattempt to promote warfare and violence between peopleof different classes even though they cannot help butbe aware of the firm and constant attempts by thePeople's Revolutionary Government to promote unity,harmony and peace among all the people of our country,at all cost" (emphasis added).

These are political and ideological statements and they must be evaluated

in terms of whether or not they constitute "postulates of identity" or

"statementsof fact" (Arrighi 1978). As"postualtes of identity"they are

like faith and religious dogma. As"statements of fact' they must be tested

against the concrete reality found in Grenada society. As a populist,

Bishop seemed to believe thatuall-classflunity was realizable in a system

based upon class exploitation. In reality this was not the case. That

is why his statement was politically and ideologically motivated.

The view of the so-called anti-imperialist stage of the revolution

being identical to the national democratic stage is also theoretically and

empirically sterile. In fact the concept of the national democratic stage

as it appeared in Lenin's writings was applied to a specific historical

stage in the transiton from precapitalism to bourgeois democracy. The

idea of an anti-imperialist stage is misleading. It seems to me that

the concept of anti-imperialist tasks of the revolution is more appropriate.

Anti-imperialism and national democracy are tasks which the emerging

socialist revolution must carry out. Dialectically, these are not

-26-

discrete historical stages. The very reality of imperialism which generates

anti-imperialist and democratic tasks requires that the proletarianiza-

tion process be consolidated.

In contrast with Bishop's perspective Strachan(1982: 21) inter_

preted the NJM's development this way:

"(The NJM) started off as ... a revolutionary ...democratic party. We never called ourselves socialistat the beginning. The New Jewel Movement was engagedin revolutionary politics in a clearly developing revo-lutionary situation (emphasis added), attacking thesystem, trying to raise the consciousness of the people,and ... raising democratic issues among the masses andtrying to get them to struggle with us for democraticrights and freedoms... As we got more ... mature wewere able to work out a clearer ideological position...."

Under concrete conditions of political repression the destruction

of the minimum democratic gains which the anti-colonial struggles of the

masses had achieved had been effectively destroyed by Gairyism. The ques-

tion of democracy was put on the political agenda by the NJM to demonstrate

to the people the nature of Gary's regime, and to - win their support.

It was not a national democratic stage per se. Strachan also observed

that as the ideological position became clearer the question of the

revolutionary project was also clarified. Hence, he could say that the

course of the Revolution would be "more or less the same as the Cuban

Revolution" since all Caribbean countries had "been underdeveloped by the

imperialist world ...." The scientific laws of historical development

would dictate a generally similar path "if we are moving to socialism"

(Strachan 1982: 21). Even where Bishop (1982: 94) praised the achieve-

ment of the Cuban Revolution as evidence of what socialism could do in a

small country, he seemed unmindful of the fundamental political and economic

choices which Cuba made between 1959-60 in order to strengthen the working

-27-

class base of the Revolution.24

It was this same unevenness in theoretical

and political development between Bishop and Strachan which was reflected

at a much deeper and far more serious level within the NJM as early as

the summer of 1982.

The concrete programs of the PRG state were identified around

the state, economy and foreign policy. As far as the state was concerned

the main priorities were to transform the apparatus of the state

by reorganizing the army, creating a people's militia, restructuring and

democratising the police force, and reorganizing the state bureaucracy.

The project in the army, militia and police force was intended to produce

a people's defensive force to replace the inherited repressive class

force (Bishop 1982: 37). The bureaucracy was never transformed because

the production relations remained basically unaltered. To this extent

it can also be said that the state apparatus was not completely transformed.

The state has to do with class power and the capitalistsremained as the

undisputed economic power in the soicety.

The economic tasks of the PRG revolved around the construction

of a strong productive and dynamic state sector. This was to be supported

by a set of new state organizations to strengthen export capabilities and

open up new vistas in agriculture and industry. The private sector was

to be stimulated to boost production and profits. An agriculturally

based co-operative sector was planned to provide land to the landless.

Grenada was to try to disengage from imperialism as rapidly as possible

by maintaining links with its traditional trading partners while

strengthening ties with the socialist countries. The petty bourgeoisie

is historically committed to having its cake and eating it at the same

time.

-28-

The state sector consisted of government-owned farms, a coffee

plant, an agro-industrial plant, fishing and fisheries development

facilities, tourism facilities, the Marketing and National Importing

Board (MNIB) and the National Commercial Bank (NCB). Several other

projects were either in operation or were at the planning or the near comple-

tion stage. The new airport at Point Salines was a case in point. The

production and profits from the state sector were to aid "the people".

Bishop declared that the state sector could not 'go it alone" because

of technical, personnel, and capital related problems such as low

technology, limited "human resources," lack of capital, and expertise

in marketing and promotional capabilities. These technical, personnel and

capital constraints were to be removed by the PRG's stimulation of the

private sector to boost production in business and agriculture.

In the area of foreign policy the PRG embarked on a radical

Third World oriented program of support for the objectives of the NIEO,

the national liberation movements, non-alignment, peace and disarmament

and other anti-imperialist objectives. It had planned to bring about

greater control over national resources, finances and financial institu-

tions, and work closely with the socialist countries. Essentially, the

general program ,though essentially radical and reformist was revolutionary

by Commonwealth Caribbean standards.

Although major social and economic benefits and psychological

gains were registered by the Revolution between 1979-82, the major

problems identified above continued to plague the regime three years

after the Revolution. In 1982 the PRG registered that it was still

facing acute problems with the development of the productive forces,

-29-

capital shortages, appropriate technology, a skilled and productive labor

force and the effects of the international division of labor, foreign

exchange and imported inflation. These combined to wreak havoc upon the

standard of living of the "masses" and upon the economic health of the

nation.25

The economic blackmail and the destabilization strategy of

U.S. imperialism compounded the problem. 26 For example,the Reagan

Administration had devoted a great deal of energy to obstruct Grenada's access.

to development assistance from the World Bank Group, the EEC, and the CDB.

To a great extent it was these problems that influenced Bishop to

conclude that imperialism was the primary contradiction. But as I have

arleady indicated this conclusion has a great deal to do with the class and

ideological outlook of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie which forces

it to externalize the class struggle by asserting the primacy of imperialism

and the concocted • anti-imperialist stage of the revolution.

It is not my intention to underestithateimperialism's control

over the international division of labor, production, circulation, capital

markets, etc. in the capitalist world economy. These activities constrain

the practices and optionsof regimes,especially the progressive and revolu-

tionary ones. But these regimes make political choices that are a func-

tion first and foremost of the balance and alignment of class forces in

society. When Bishop declared that the success of the PRG must be

measured by how much they were able to break imperialism's stranglehold

and immunize the economy from capitalist recessions and crises by adopting

economic self-reliance,he was expressing his hostility to the oppressive

practices of imperialism. He should also have been looking at Grenada's

economic structure and the agro-commercial bourgeoisie's links with

imperialism.

-30-

(2) Practices: Reproduction of Capitalist Production Relations under the PRG 27

(A) The Capitalist Sector

While the PRG was busy stimulating the capitalist sector of the

economy it was also exhorting the workers to increase their productivity

and the nation's productivity. They were to work "Harder, Produce More

and Build Grenada". At the same time the government had been asking the workers

to accept wage restraints in the state sector and ultimately in the

private sector in order to guarantee business confidence, good labor

relations and a positive and stable investment climate. The economy was

described as a mixed economy resting on the three pillars of the private

sector, the state sector and the co-operative sector. This section of

the work will demonstrate that there was nothing non-capitalist about the

mixed economy. Between 1979-82 the PRG adopted and implemented a number

of measures to increase state revenues. It rationalized the fiscal

system by imposing licensing fees on traders and implementing a withholding

tax on expatriated profits. These actions were not intended to undermine

capitalism because the idea was to increase public sector recurrent revenues

which in fact expanded from EC $53 million in 1979 to EC $59 million in

1980, and EC $54 million in the first two months of 1981. 28

The Report on National Economy for 1982 and The Budget Plan for

1983 and Beyond, which was presented to the National Conference of Delegates

of Mass Organizations, describes in glowing terms of approval the contri-

butions of the state and the proletariat to the growth of the capitalist

sector:

"Because the government is doing so much more workthan before, it is also spending a great deal more,and a lot of this money goes to private businesses."

-32-

In April 1983 the PRG promulgated a New Investment Code (NIC)

to promote economic growth: an appropriate private investment climate

to attract private foreign capital to Grenada based upon adequate

investment in infrastructure, wage restraints, improved labor relations,

higher public sector savings accompanied by reductions in public sector

deficits in relation to the GDP, and the stronger debt-serving capability.

It was noted that renewed private sector confidence would depend upon

how well these measures were implemented. The local and foreign capitalists

were to be provided with fiscal incentives similar to those offered through-

out the Caribbean. Finally, it had taken a revolutionary democratic

regime to bring Grenada to the Puerto Rican model. The state assured

capital that it was opposed in principle to the compulsory confiscation of

private property;. any acquisition of private property by the state

would be based on consultation, negotiation and adequate compensation

according to the prevailing market value of such properties.

But this was not enough for capital. There was deep concern

over the role of the state in the distributive sector, the hallowed

domain of the parasitic comprador bourgeoisie. The MNIB had, through

its purchasing of foreign goods, broken the monopoly of the compradors.

The protest of the capitalists was met by a near capitulalation by the

-34-

was dominant in the economy and the petty bourgeoisie was dominant in the

state. They were sharing state power. The petty bourgeoisie had to make

certain concessions to the workers and rural small and medium farmers.

The class struggle dictated against any attempt at wholesale political

concessions to the bourgeoisie. The workers and their allies were still

the political base of the petty bourgeoisie but cracks and fissures were

beginning to appear in the foundations of this support.

(B) The State Sector

The state sector included properties which the PRG had inherited

from the Gairy regime and those it created after 1979. At the time of the

presentation of the Report on the National Economy, there were about thirty-

two (32) state sector enterprises and project at various stages of develop-

ment,and a considerable volume of public investment capital had been

allocated to them.29

The PRG had declared that the state sector was going

to become the leading engine of growth. The truth is that the state

was being used to strengthen private sector capitalism and Grenada did

not become a country with a concrete state capitalist orientation.

Between 1979-83 the PRG raised most the capital for public

sector projects from external sources as indicated. The airport project

was the center-piece of the PRG's economic modernization program. This

project absorbed 42 percent of the public investment outlays during the

1979-83 period; productive infrastructure in roads, etc. absorbed another

20 per cent and other projects accounted for 38 per cent. External grants

provided 53 per cent, net foreign concessional loans yeilded 18 per cent ;

and institutional sources (IMF) and loans from local banks and insurance

-35-

companies contributed 27 per cent:30

Public Investment Outlays (%) Allocation of Investment Outlays (%)

External Grants 53Net Foreign Concessional

Loans 18Other:

Local Bank LoansInsurance CompaniesInternationalMonetary Fund

International AirportProductive Infrastructure:RoadsWaterElectricity TelephonePort FacilitiesOther

27

42

20

38

Source: IMF

The early success which the PRG achieved in rationalizing the fiscal

system and increasing public sector revenues was buttressed by its ability

to raise relatively large amounts of grants and concessional capital

from abroad. This enabled it to finance both the potentially productive

infrastructure projects such as the airport and a range of social welfare

measures including those in education, housing, rural development, etc.

that brought considerable initial benefits to the workers, small farmers

capitalistsand others. The PRG was riding of the crest of initial success,

But it is a fact that it is fundamentally through the acquisition of

directly productive property (farms, industry, etc.) that recurrent and

sustainable surpluses for reproducing labor power, value and state capital

can be assured. In qualitative terms this was not the path the PRG adopted.

Grants and loans from Cuba and Arab sources in 1981 financed

the Point Salines airport project. The Report on the National Economy

(p. 22) shows that EC $37.9 million out of the EC $38.7 million which

was spent on the airport project came from these sources. Less than EC

$1. million was raised locally. Grants amounted to EC $27.1 million as

-36-

follows: Algeria ($0.9m), Syria ($3.2m), Cuba ($9.2 m in materials,

and $14.0 million in labor). Libya provided $10.8m in loans. As already

stated the airport project was to strengthen air access infrastructure

and revolutionize Grenada's ability to boost its exports of non-traditional

goods such as tourism services, agro-industrial products, light manufactured

goods, etc. The PRG did not focus exclusively on tourism per se. It is

true that in 1981, for example, the tourist sector provided 50 per cent

of Grenada's foreign exchange earnings, 6 percent of total employment, and

contributed 10 per cent of the GDP. In terms of employment and contribu-

tion to GDP, agriculture yielded 33 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.

It is resonable to argue that the development of the state as

envisaged by the PRG could have had no more than a modest effect upon the

overall private character of the economy. Just as Eric Williams had

used the state in Trinidad to finance capitalist expansion after 1972,

(Watson 1975: 583-605) the PRG had embarked on a somewhat similar projectbut under the auspices of a radicalized petty bourgeoisie unlike Trinidad's

conservative petty bourgeoisLbourgeois alliance. The PRG state was not,

as Berberoglu (1983: 336) asserts, national state-capitalist. As Table I

indicates the PRG incorporated features of the neo-colonial state -

particularly the comprador capitalist economic aspect - and the national

state-capitalist state - the left-wing political features. Table I shows

how the various social classes, strata and groups were affected by PRG

policies. The capitalists and petty bourgeoisie consistently benefited

while the proletariat, small farmers, women and other groups received bene-

fits under the redistributive social justice strategy of the PRG. The

1982-83 crisis indicate that these same groups and classes were begining

(2)+/-

(3)- *

+ / -

+/-- +- +

+/-

-37-

TABLE I

Effects of Policies of Different Types of Third World States on Various Social Classesand Groups

Neo-Colonial Nat'l State Cap. Socialist GrenadaSocial Classes/

GroupsSemi-Feudal/ Comprador/ Right- Left-Semi-Capital. Capitalist Wing Wing

LandlordsCompradorBourgeoisieImperialistBourgeoisieNationalBourgeoisiePettyBourgeoisieUpper RichPeasantsMiddlePeasantsPoor PeasantsShopkeepersIntellectualsProletariatLumpenpro_LetariatNational MinoritiesWomenTrade Unions

1

Combines features of (2) and (4). Seeks to be everything to all classes while infact ruling class alliance is, based on the agro-commercial bourgeoisie and thepetty bourgeoisie. In the end exploited classes lose more than they initiallygained.

+ Positive Effect: Class/Group benefits from policies of the state

- Negative Effect: Class/Group loses from policies of the state

R Ruling class(es)

* Indecisiveness in fighting landlords, compradors and imperialism later forcesthese regimes to move in a neo-colonial direction

** Occasional accommodation with the national bourgeoisie (e.g. China 1949-1966)

SOURCE: Berberoglu 1983: 336 (Table 7)

-38-

to lose major benefits and respect. This corresponded with the weakening of

the economy and the declining contribution of grants in the capitalization

process.

Ambursley's characterization of the NJM as "a revolutionary

petty bourgeois workers party (representing) a new Grenadian Bonapartism...

of the petty bourgeoisie (i.e.) a mediated form of oligarchic rule,"

(1983: 205) captures the comprador-economic and the revolutionary-political

feature of the state and revolution under the NJM/PRG.

(C) The Co-operative Sector

One year after the 1979 Revolution, the PRG created the National

Co-operative Development Agency (NACDA) in order to implement the "idle

lands for idle hands" programme. The sum of EC $1 million was allocated

to support the program. Eighteen months (18) later, in October 1981, the

Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Cooperatives reported that

twelve (12) agricultural co-ops had been set up along with eleven in fishing

and handicrafts. A total of 146 acres of land and 160 youths were involved

(Ambursley 1983: 210). The PRG noted, in passing, in the Report on the

National Economy (p. 31) that the co-ops had been growing slowly because

the "youth were more interested in working with government than in joining

co-operatives."

The co-ops were failing primarily because the PRG had failed to

resolve the land question in Grenada. This was a political issue and, as

long as the agro-commercial bourgeoisie continued to dominate landed

property and agriculture, and determine the conditions under which rural

labor power and value were reprdduced with the commitants of rural

unemployment, inefficiency, parcellization, praedial larceny, labor

-39-

shortage,etc., the co-ops had little chance of succeeding. The disillusion-

ment of the rural youth with the Revolution was a product of this contra-

dictory process and other associated technical problems.

In the end organizations such as the MNIB remained in the control

of the compradors; more than 50 per cent of the economy was still in capita..

list hands; grants and loans were used to finance social welfare measures

and infrastructure projects. The NJM/PRG regime could not transform the

class nature of the state or economy because it never came to grips with

the prevailing capitalist relations of production.

VII. The 1982-83 Revolutionary Crisis and the Incapacitation of the NJM/PRG

A. The Setting of the Stage

What remains is to explain the revolutionary crisis of 1982-83,

which incapacitated the NJM/PRG regime and led to the overthrow of the

revolution. The accomplishments of the Revolution were inpressive by

Caribbean standards, and they were visible in many of the basic areas

of national life. The regime had reduced unemployment from 50 per cent

under Gairy to 15 per cent in four years. The Point Salines airport

project was near completion; major benefits were anticipated in tourism,

modern agro-industrial production, energy from the biogas facilities,

the impressive construction boom, the expansion of commercial activities,

the benefits from the activities of the MNIB and the NCB. The Revolution

had seemed to be in high gear.

The overall economic picture had been clouded by the effects

of natural disasters between 1979-81. The estimated total financial

loss to the economy from natural disasters was U.S. $31 million as follows:

$6 million in 1979; $20 million in 1980, and $5 million in 1981. During

-40-

1980-81, about 27 percent of the nutmeg crop; 40 per cent of banana

production, and 19 per cent of cocoa output was destroyed and roads and

bridges were severely damaged (Bishop 1982: 231). Agricultural output,

employment, foriegn exchange and economic growth rates were affected as

indicated in the Report on the National Economy (p. 6).

It was the availability of foreign grants, concessional and

other loans that enabled the regime to provide workers, small farmers and

other exploited strate and groups with some benefits. Considerable

social benefits were realized by these groups. Income tax was abolished

for 30 per cent of the lowest paid workers. Free public education was

introduced and scholarships were provided for university level students.

School uniforms and books were given free of charge to the children of the

poorest families. Health and mental health care facilities were strengthened,

broadened and provided free of charge.Cuban doctors and nurses provided

these services without charge. The housing repair and construction program

led to improved housing for many. Literacy and adult education programs and

a teacher in-service training program were implemented. There was a

virtual unionization of the workforce and equal pay for women became the

law. The army was to become directly involved in the production of its

own food crops. Under the new code of People's Laws, the politico- juridicalwas

basis of exploitation/abolished while private property was strengthened

(Bishop 1982: 148).

As already indicated the state apparatus was partially trans-

formed and politico-juridical structures of popular power (people's

assemblies) were introduced. The National Conference of Delegates of

Mass Organizations on the Economy served as the basic vehicle for mass

-41-

expression of popular power. -There was a rapid growth of mass organiza-

tions such as the National Women's Organization (NWO), the National Youth

Organization, the trade unions, and the GFC (Bishop 1982: 238, 264). The

new'third worldistuanti-imperialist foreign policy raised the conscious-

ness of the masses about international issues relating to national libera-

tion struggles, aparthied, disarmament and the peace movement, the NIEO

proposals, nonalignment, and peaceful co-existence. The PRG denounced U.S. inter-

ventionist foreign policy and related practices and called for the trans-

formation of the Caribbean Basin area into a zone of peace free of all

nuclear weapons and militaristic displays of power. The regime

consistently stressed the connection between peace and 'development and

exposed the Caribbean Basin Initiative for what it is in essence: a component

of the U.S. military strategic security plan for controlling the region

while paying lip service to democracy, development and mutual interdepen-

dence. (Bishop 1982: 272, 275, Watson 1982a, 1982b). On the whole it was

an impressive record and yet the social order began to weaken and became

virtually paralyzed. Why?

Popular mobilization and organization were promoted to.strengthen

the regimet political base. It was not intended to promote independent

proletarian structures or institutions. The popular structures could

not advance independently because they lacked proletarian leadership and

because the petty bourgeois revolutionaries were bent on sharing power only

with the capitalists. The argument according to which the people were not

ready for socialism is largely vacuous. No amount of prattling which

emphasizes the rural origins of the population, the retarding influence

of religion, the effects of rural fragmentation, the small size of the

-42-

proletariat, Gairyism, petty bourgeois subjectivism, etc., will suffice to

explain the failures of the NJM/PRG. These factors are necessary imputs

but they are insufficient to explain the problems.

The NJM/PRG project was a capitalist project under the auspices

of the radicalized petty bourgeoisie, and it was clear that the petty bour-

geois trend had consistently won out until the late summer of 1982. Up

until that time it seemed clear the party had failed to realize "that the

growth of class consciousness is a dialectical interaction between an

objective maturation of proletarian and plebian disquiet and the conscious

intervention of a political vanguard" (Ambursley 1983: 216).

The debate within the Central Committee (CC) 'after the summer of

1982 began to indicate that such a realization was developing. It was the

dominant petty bourgeois trend in the party that had consistently overstated

the so-called peasant characteristics of the society partly to buttress the

appeals of the not so non-capitalist strategy. If class consciousness

was very low it was precisely because the party had done little to develop

it because populism acts as a dissolvent on class consciousness. I accept

Ambursley's contention that

"The NJM... never organized a popular campaign againstthe big property owning class as a whole and... itsanti-imperialist mobilizations (were) confined todemunications of U.S. foreign policy and expressionsof solidarity with national liberation movements...The NJM used the pretext of Gairyism to create anideological prop for its deification of private owner-ship of the means of production" (Ambursley 1983: 216).

The way in which the regime dealt with the River Antoine Estate

Affair and the Coco Cola Bottling plant crisis in 1979, clearly demonstrated

its attitude toward the expropriation of private property.31

The crisis

of which I speak was essentially a rupture in the structural and substantive

-43-

elements of the social order and the institutional mechanisms of the party

and government. This meant the internal adjustment within the petty

bourgeois framework would not suffice=to save the party. The party had

to be transformed because the petty bourgeois state and the agro-commercial

economy had reached their limits in the face of the class struggle. It

should be understood that the call for party transformation - putting the

party on a "Leninist" footing - within the central committee and the

general party membership was for the purpose of enabling the party to

respond to the developing crisis that was engulfing the party, the working

class, the mass organizations, the economy, and the state.

The NJM had three options available to it. The option which was

most likely to succeed would depend upon which trend became victorious

in the party and the terms of its success. The first choice was to educate

the workers and their allies on the dialectical unity between the anti-

imperialist and socialist tasks of the revolutionby building the revolu-

tion from below (the socialist revolution). The second choice was to over-

come the petty bourgeois trend by resolving the problem at the level of

the party and enabling the Marxist-Leninists to take firm control of the

party with the support of the PRAF which,by this time, (1982-83) had already

come out in support of the 1982 resolutions of the party on the need for

putting the party on the Marxist-Leninist path: this would have amounted to

a version of socialism from above. The third option consisted in reimposing

the discredited neo-colonial path which the alliance of the petty bourgeoisie

and bourgeoisie was destined to return to as the class struggle gathered

momentum.

I believe the following analysis of the debates that occurred

within the Central Committee between October 1982 -.October 1983, support

-44-

my contention. It becomes clear that both the clarification of the issues

within the CC and its paralysis and incapacitation were inextricably bound

up.

(B) The Central Committee and the Crisis 32

"In the October 1982 plenary meeting which considered ...comrade Bernard's resignation the Central Committee

leveled criticism at itself criticised the weak functioningof the C.C. and P.B. and the weak chairmanship and leader-ship of Comrade Maurice Bishop. The C.C. plenary at thetime stated 'The party stood at the crossroads: two routesare open to the party. The first route is the pettybourgeois route which would seek and try to make ComradeBernard's resignation the issue. This would only lead totemporary relief, but will surely lead to the deteriorationof the party into a social democratic party and hence thedegeneration of the revolution. This road is an easy oneto follow .... The second route is the communist route.The route of Leninist standards and functioning. Theroute of criticism and collective leadership. The CentralCommittee reaffirmed the position taken by the generalmeeting of September 12th and 13th. The party must be puton a Leninist footing.'"33

One year after that meeting the Central Committee had failed

to implement the party's decision on party transformation. The August 26th,

1983 meeting was covened to discuss the developing crisis. "The revolution

(was) facing its worst crisis ever and most serious danger in 4f years"

(p. 1). The organizations were "disintegrating," the working class was

exhibiting "ideological backwardness and economism", and "ideological

infiltration" and "destabilization" had become characteristic features of

the offensive launched by the Church. The "militia was almost a thing of

the past;" demoralization was growing fast in the ranks of the PRA and the

"conditions for a general upsurge of counterrevolutionary activity" were

maturing (p. 3). The disintegration of the party seemed imminent and the

revolution was given less than a year to survive (p. 4). The Central

Committee agreed that it had taken the "Right Opportunist path by hiding

-45-

from the membership the truth and absolving itself of criticism ... while

pretending all (was) well (p. 5).

Bishop's leadership of the party and the C.C. was criticized.

His strengths were in the area of "inspiring the people," "uniting the

masses," and holding "high the banner and prestige of the Revolution...."

(p. 9). However, it was concluded that these were not the "precise quali-

ties and strengths ... required to carry the process forward in these

most difficult times and to transform the party into a Leninist one...."

(p. 9). The C.C. then presented the "Joint Leadership of the Party"

proposal to marry "the strengths of Cdes. Maurice and Bernard" (p. 10).

Bishop was to become responsible for (1) propaganda work among the masses;

(2) mobilization of the militia, and (3) regional and international work.

Coard's duties were to include (1) party organization, (2) cadre develop-

ment, and (3) ideological work,strategy and tractics (pp. 9-10). Bishop

would chair the meetings of the Central Committee and Coard the Political

Bureau. Quarterly reports were to be submitted to C.C. by both chairmen,

and all major propsals sought by either of them were to be discussed and

ratified by the PB and CC, thereby "guaranteeing the Leninist principle

of collective leadership" 34 (p. 10).

The Central Committee convened an Extraordinary Meeting ... 14-16

September, 1983, at which thirteen of fifteen members were present. Those who

were absent were Hudson Austin, who was out of the country, and Ian St..

Bernard who was sick. The main issues and problems of the party and

revolution were discussed and Bishop made a plea forDindividual and

collective leadership of the C.C.," ways the deepen the "links with the

masses" and "a perspective based on Marxist-Leninist criterion to guide

the work in the coming period" (pp. 13-14).

-46-

This was the meeting at which criticism and self-criticism

was openly practiced, apparently for the first time (pp. 14-37). Phyllis

Coard (pp. 16-17), Fitzroy Bain (p. 17) and George Louison (p. 17) all

pointed to various aspects of the Central Committee's handling of the

leadership problem and accepted that Bishop's leadership was the main

problem facing the Central Committee. Louison thanked Liam James and

Leon Cornwall for clarifying the problem which had to be resolved. It

was Selwyn Strachan who reiterated that Bishop's leadership qualities

were inadequate "to carry the process forward and to build a serious M-L

party" (p. 18). Unison Whiteman corroborated Strachan's arguments by

agreeing "that the weakness mentioned of the Cde. Leader (were) correct"

(p. 18).

Bishop accepted the criticism that he lacked the required

qualities and agreed that

"He had several problems over the years especially thestyle that entails consensus and unity at all costs whichcan result in blunting class struggle ... He also ques-tioned his approach ... to collective leadership ...too(Many) decisions are taken by smaller and smaller organswhich affects collective leadership" (pp. 18-19).

Later on in the same meeting Bishop expressed strong concerns about the

implementation of joint leadership, the image of his leadership, the

revolutionary crisis and what appeared to him to be a power struggle (p. 29).

He concluded that the position of the Central Committee regarding his

performance within the Central Committee and party was indicative of a

lack of confidence whichinterfered with his ability to lead. The other

comrades expressed surprise and indicated that the criticisms were

political and not personal. Bishop agreed to Coard's return to the

Central Committee but he was already backing away from the principle

-47-

of joint leadership which the party and Central Committee had adopted and

which decision had the force of law (i.e. was binding) on members.

The results of the vote on joint leadership were: 9 (in favor),

1 (against) and 3 (abstentions) (p. 34) The vote on how to inform the

membership and the masses produced the following results: (1) notify the

membership through the minutes:10 (in favor), 1 (against), 2 (abstentions);

(2) notify the entire membership in a single meeting: 11 (against), 2

(abstentions); (3) notify different categories of members in separate

meetings:. -9 (in favor), 2 (against), 2 (abstentions); (4) notify the

masses:• 9 (against), 3 (abstentions). Louison did not vote on the question.

Once more the Central Committee decided to hide the facts from the people.

This same problem plagued the Revolutionary Military Council between

'October 19th - 25th, 1983,

Coard was in attendance at the Extraordinary Meeting of the Central

Committee which was convened on. Saturday, 17th September. Originally, Bishop

had declared that he would not attend the meeting at which Coard was to be

present. On the 17th September, Bishop, Louison and Whiteman were out of

the country. Tan Bartholomew, Fitzroy Bain, and Ian St. Bernard were

absent because of sickness (p. 38). Previous discussions from the Extra-

ordinary meeting of September 14-16, were reviewed. Coard reviewed the

minutes and was told of Bishop's unreadiness to accept joint leadership

in fact. Coard declined to return to the Central Committee and Political

Bureau and indicated that he had been "seriously affected by the accusa-

tion of wanting to undermine the leadership." He observed that the

comrade leader had been "vacillating between the M-L trend and the petty

bourgeois trend in the party." He thought the party and revolution were

-48-

facing imminent collapse and he felt that"it had reached a stage where

he realized that his ability to influence the process was no longer

possible" (p. 44). He concluded that the party had failed to overcome

the petty bourgeois characteristics within the movement and the party

for ten years.

The Sixth, Seventh, and Eight Sittings of the Central Committee

were held from September 20th - 22nd, 1983.35

Once more all the pressing

problems and issues affecting the party's relationship with the masses,

the workers, etc. were reviewed. The conclusions from the September

22nd plenary indicated that before the Revolution the party had done very

little work among the working class and had concentrated most of its

efforts among the "peasants." The party had stepped up its work among the

workers after the Revolution but, in terms of both classes, it had sought

to mobilize them as rural villagers and urban dwellers (p. 12). This is

an indication of the populist thrust of the party's dominant ideological

orientation.

It becomes clear that when class question began to rise to the

forefront in the class struggle the political and ideological practices and

capacities of the party were inadequate for the task.

By the end of September it had become clear tt the Central

Committee that Bishop was obstructing the work and development of the

party. The perception was that the party and revolution had to be

defended over any single individual. Soon after Bishop's return from

Eastern Europe via Havana, the rumor began to be circulated that the Coards

were plotting to kill him. The rumor and his refusal to be guided by the

decision of the Central Committee and the Party were interpreted by party

-49-

members as a sign of his contempt for the party. At a party meeting

fifty-one (51) members voted to remove him from the party. 36

In the Report on the meeting of the Political Bureau and Central

Committee of October 12, 1983, Bishop's stand on joint leadership was

again presented. The meeting was apparently charged by accusations and a

high level of acrimony. Reports had reached some Central Committee members

the rumors were being circulated to the effect that Coard and others on

the Central Committee who had come out of the Organization for Revolutionary

Education and Liberation (OREL) were plotting to capture the party and the

state. Bishop was being accused of fostering dissent and the possibility

of violence and bloodshed. Louison was branded as a "right opportunist"

and Fitzroy Bain was denounced for threatening to mobilize the agricultural

workers against the position of the Central Committee. His position was

likened to Gairyism and against the working class. Bishop's expulsion from

the party was discussed and it was reasoned that such an act would be

difficult to explain to the masses. Bishop also understood this and that

is why he went over the party's head to the masses as a last resort. It

was concluded that "egoism", "cultism" and "one-manism" had won out in

the NJM (p. 10).

Bishop's relationship with the "key opinion makers," that is the

bourgeoisie, was interpreted in the following manner in the Octoher 12th

Report on the Meeting of the Political Bureau and Central Committee:

"He (Bishop) spoke of key opinion makers, Maurice Bishop ispersonally responsible for spreading the rumor as a pre-condition for mending the Central Committee and chasingthe party off the street... this shows that the bourg(eoisie)knows where Maurice Bishop is coming from. They see himas the chosen one to defend the capitalists against the workers (p. 3) (emphasisis added).

-50-

Once more Louison, like Bain before him, was linked to the group that wanted

to like the issue to the masses and decide the outcome in the streets.

Bishop also clearly favored this option.

On the other hand the PRAF is identified in the Report of October

12th as having taken a principled stand to guarantee "the security of the

Central Committee Comrades" (p. 9). The polarization within the party

around the petty bourgeois tendency of Bishop, Louison, Bain and others

on the one hand and the Marxist-Leninist trend on the other is clearly

reflected in the previous passage on "key opinion makers" and in the

following passage which takes off from the implications of Bishop's stance

vis a vis the Central Committee, the similarities with Gairyism and the

position of the People's Revolutionary Army. According to the Report:

"It tells a lot about those who like to maintain their rulebased on ignorance. He is vexed that the PRAF knows aboutcultism, the role of the Central Committee, just as aboutGairy. We have lived for 28 years under Gairy's cultism, andwe are not prepared to tolerate one single day more (...)we won't tolerate it even with a Bishop face (...) Ifyou want to rule with a minority go to South Africa (...)Based upon these, especially honesty and love for themasses he does not qualify as an applicant. Those whowant to turn guns and bourgeois elements have no righteven close to the party ... he has to be expelled fromthe party, dimissed from every state position he holds (..This is a hard position and if we can take this decisionwe can go forward even further.... If Maurice Bishop isnot dismissed we would have departed from socialism ....Let us not be fooled by those who could make prettyspeech and talk revolutionary because Gairy did this in1951. The only question then is whether he be allowed tooperate as a private citizen or arrested and courtmartialed for stirring up counter(revolution) againstthe revo(lution)".

As the polarization developed Bishop's position became increasingly

difficult for the party to accept. The PRA was put on alert because threats

were also being made against the lives of other Central Committee members.

-51-

The Central Committee decided to inform the Central Committee of the

Communist Party Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Central Committee (CC) of the

Communist Party of Cuba (CPC). On October 12th, 1983, the Peoples Revolu-

tionary Armed Forces branch of the NJM issued a resolution which stressed

the following four major points: (1) "unswerving support for the analysis

and conclusions of the C.C." regarding the decision on "joint leadership"

and putting the party on a Marxist-Leninist path; (2) grave concern over

the crisis which was threatening the country and the party; (3) acceptance

of the "Leninist principle of democratic centralism" which gave party

decisions the force of law; and (4) opposition to"cultism, egoism, individualism

and minority rule". The PRAF called upon the "CC and the party to expel

from the Party's ranks all elements who (did) not submit to, uphold and

implement in practice the decisions of the Central Committee and party

membership." 37

On October 12th, Bishop was placed under "House Arrest". The state

apparatus was attempting to accomplish what the party itself had failed to

do over 101 years, namely overcome the petty bourgeois tendency in the

party and in the government. The Revolution "had crossed its own Rubicon."

This was not, as all the anti-communists have declared, a sinister communist

plot that was hatched by ultraleftists and extremists. It was pure and

simple class struggle and communist revolutionaries and petty bourgeois

revolutionaires had drawn swords. All the contradictions of the petty-

bourgeois route had come to the fore in the forms of alienation and dis-

affection within the proletariat,small farmers, youth organizations, women's

organization, student councils, intelligentsia, PRA,militia, etc. The

agricultural program and the co-op program were at a stand still. Every-

-52-

thing was being attributed to technical, financial and administrative

problems. At no point did the PRG demonstrate what was clear to the

disillusioned exploited classes: namely that the failure to resolve the

land question and to squarely face the production relations question as

a whole was the real problem.

As I have already indicated the Revolution had reached the

limits of its internal structural capacities: it had failed "to break

through the bourgeois framework or organically develop its proletarian

and socialist character" (Lowy 1981: 146-147). A revolution's primary

project is to transform the inhereted production relations and give them

a new content. The capacity of the PRA and the People's Militia to stand

firm on the class question was stymied by the reproduction of capitalist

relations of production. A partially transformed state apparatus co-

existing with preserved capitalist economic structures is a contradiction

which the Bishop directed PRG wanted to preserite. -

Granted the NJM had not, for historical reasons arising from

Grenada's objective reality and its own class origins, developed a large

number of revolutionary cadres. There was no history of armed struggle

for national liberation . in the country, and the party had, for the most,

discoursed with the "people" along populist lines as opposed to class lines.

This is precisely why the class question within the CC and the party at

large "appeared" to be a question of power struggle but this was nothing

more than the external features of the substantive elements of the class

question in an environment where class issues had been hidden from the

party and the "masses". A subjective reaction was the most that one could

expect at the popular level and that is exactly what happened. The decision

-53-

of Radix, Louison, Bain, Whiteman, Creft, and ultimately Bishop, to go

the streets was very much in keeping the petty bourgeois subjectivism that

characterized that line in the party.

It is not even very useful to argue that the Bishop group was

shrewd. They knew the limits of their own class project and capacities.

They did exactly what was to be expected. They did not see themselves

jeopardizing the Revolution, but preserving it - that is the petty

bourgeois revolution. What they might have recognized but could neither

understand nor accept was that the proletarian tide had come in. At that

juncture all partly principles had to be swept aside by the petty bourgeoise.

The "conspiracy theory," according to which the "Coard group"

attempted to subvert the Revolution, represents the official position of

the U.S. Government and all the anti-communist forces. It is a theory

that elevates individuals over classes to the status of the real makers

of history. It is an established fact that one of the main ideological

and intellectual weaknesses of anti-communism is the basic inability to

deal objectively with the intellectual, political, and practical issues

of Marxism-Leninism and communism. In the final analysis,the populist

line of Bishop according to which the "bloc of four classes" - the bour-

geoisie, petty bourgeoisie, workers and peasants - could jointly sustain

themselves as equals in the state was disproven. The bourgeoisie has been and

continues to be the "classic betrayer of all national movements for

true emancipation" (Lowy 1981: 191).

The Tragic Period: October 12th - Present

Bishop's detention was the result of his failure to abide by party

norms. He had violated the rules of the party and had helped to jeopardize

-54-

the revolution by the use of "delaying tactics", spreading rumors, going

to the key bourgeois opinion makers, and taking the class struggle issue

to the streets. His detention was a cruel necessity but it was done in

defense of the revolution. The PRG had vitrually called for his removal

from the party. Bishop had been doing everything he could to exploit the

weaknesses of the party and, thereby, the Revolution by exploiting his

subjective attributes such as his popularity and charismatic characteristics.

His practice seemed to indicate that a modified neo-colonial solution was

the extent to which he would go. This meant that the neutralization or

ultimate liquidation of the Marxist-Leninist tendency in the NJM would

become a necessity. When he went to the streets and to Fort Rupert it was

to have a showdown to settle this question. At the same time this meant

that he was exploiting any anti-communist sentiment within the population.

Those who argue that Bishop was the symbol of the New Jewel

Revolution are correct, but there is also a "blind - spot" in their reasoning:

they extend the argument to justify his right to act over the party and

to support the claim that the society was not ready for socialism. I am

not persuaded by the commonplace technicist arguments about how the under-

development of the productive forces, petty bourgeois outlook in the

population, the small size of the proletariat and other economistic explan-

ations about the economy, predetermined the unreadiness of Grenada for

socialism. These factors should not be ignored but, in the final analysis,

the readiness of the class is a political question. Grenada's productive

forces and the size of its proletariat are functions of backward capitalism,

large scale emigration and its place in the capitalist world economy.

When the situation was taken to the streets by Louison, Bain,

Whiteman, Bishop and his supporters, the resources of the party and the

-55-

coercive apparatus of the state were strained to the, very limit. EPICA

(1984) and Covert Action (1984) concur that U.S. intelligence played the

key roles from that stage onward. The Fort Rupert incidents seemed beyond

the control of the party and the army. The deaths of Bishop et. al. do

not appear to me to have been a cold blooded premeditated act. All the

problems of the Revolution was momentarily crystallized in those tragic

minutes. The Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) inherited all the

problems of the NJM and the PRG. The RMC may have felt that the "petty

bourgeois counterrevolutionaries" had been liquidated but it had not re-

solved the contradictions. Just as the NJM had consistently hidden the

fact from the people the RMC repeated those mistakes between October 19th -

25th.

The following statement which the RMC issued on the Fort Rupert

incident may have reflected the ascendancy of the revolutionary line in

the party but it was clearly not the kind of discourse the people had

had with the party. It may have deepened their sense of traumatization.

I doubt that it could have given them relief though it was accurate:

"Maurice Bishop and his other petty bourgeois andupper bourgeois friends had deserted the workingclass and working people of Grenada. He instead pushedthem in front to cause trouble and bloodshed ... Noman who has love for the working class and worklpgpeople would push them into causing bloodshed."J°

By that time the neocolonial regimes in the Commonwealth

Caribbean under the directorate of rulers George Lamming calls the "Black

Plantation Mongrels"39

were chanting under the banner of U.S. imperialism.

They wanted blood. The actualization of "Ocean Venture 81" was imminent. Fidel

Castro publicly chided the Grenada revolutionaries and called for exemplary

punishment which neither Cuba nor Grenada's neocolonial sister states could exact.

-56-

The left movement in the Caribbean became divided and traumatized.

It seemed that Hsocialisd'had resolved its internal differences in an

unacceptably violent and tragic way.

The RMC was desperate. Contacts with Sally Shelton, Robert

Pastor, and Dr. Bourne from the St. Georges Medical School seemed to

have been designed to lobby support in the U.S. against Reagan's plan

of attack. I do not think that RMC consciously decided to act in consort

with U.S. intelligence. It seems to me that there were no easy choices

available to it at the time. While the RMC may have calculated that it

could win against an invasion from the Commonwealth Caribbean such as

Tom Adams had carried out against Union Island (St. VincentLthey (RMC) seemed

to have underestimated that U.S. imperialism would be the invader. The

contacts with Pastor, Shelton and others do not weaken the last argument.

The very factors which apparently gave the RMC some degree

of confidence in its potential to save the Revolution were precisely the

ones which convinced the U.S. and the Commonwealth Caribbean neocolonial

regimes to liquidate the Revolution: namely, the fact that the state

structures and apparatuses had been partially transformed and mobilized,

(despite the RMC's neutralization of contingents of the People's Militia

on security grounds) and the military was in firm support of transforming

the revolution into a socialist revolution. The invasion was about

precisely this point. It had nothing to do with a rescue mission or

democracy in substance, the rhetoric of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)

notwithstanding. This CBI rhetoric is essentially the ideological veneer

of right wing capitalism and crisis-ridden imperialism which now relies on

military solutions to the political and economic problems of neocolonialism.

-57-

Bishop's PRG had been a potential .security threat to U.S.

imperialism primarily at the level of the revolutionary foreign policy

that had been pursued. The RMC became a real threat to the self-styled

'security interests" of U.S. imperialism because it was about to link the

anti-imperialist tasks of the Revolution abroad with its socialist

imperatives at home. The removal of Bishop also meant the neutralization

of support for the regime from the local capitalists, the large numbers of

American retirees on Grenada, the St. Georges Medical School leadership,

and the considerable amount of Congressional opposition to direct interven-

tion in Grenada. The RMC real blunder was in the executions. It was a

"catch 22"situation. But I am not sure that the Central Committee gave the

orders to execute Bishop et al. The answer to this question may be U.S.

intelligence best kept secret about the Grenada issue. Reagan's determina-

tion was reinforced as soon as he had obtained the "birthright" and the

unconditional support of the neocolonies in the region. Clearly, this

enabled him to regionalize the problem by fronting Eugenia Charles to

present the case for invasion. In other words, Caribbean peace-loving

"democracies" were being threatened, and that was interpreted as a

threat to U.S. "security interests." That is why Eugenia Charles came

to Washington in a hurry to appear with Reagan before the American public.

In terms of strict patriarchal symbolism, here was the woman, the symbol of

"weakness and frailty," threathened by the potentially consolidated

Grenada - Cuba - U.S.S.R. axis. Point Salines was clearly on the minds

of all in terms of its alleged strategic, military expanionist role.

The Cuban Response

A few observations are in order about the Cuban response to the events

from October 12th up to the invasion by the U.S. For some time Cuban foreign

-58-

policy began to shift toward an embracement of the non-capitalist path

power-sharing strategy. Cuba was also seeking to overcome the relative

isolation which U.S. imperialism had imposed upon its Revolution in the

Western Hemisphere. Its role in Africa, its overtures to the Commonwealth

Caribbean neocolonies, and its rapproachment with the Western Hemisphere

Communist Parties especially those in Latin America,support this contention.

In this regard the anti-imperialist tasks of the revolution were stressed

by Hanava - non-alignment, NIEO, peace movement, etc. The close ties with

Bishop, Manley and Burnham had created serious problems for the official

communist parties in these countries and had, in my judgment, neutralized

their criticism of those regimes and had led them into "tailing" those

neo-colonial regimes by giving "critical" support for anti-impdrialtst issues.

It is for these reasons that I believe that Fidel Castro had a

restraining influence on Bishop which may have reassured him (Bishop) in

his petty bourgeois anti-imperialist convictions. It is instructive that

one of Cuba's leading publishing houses, Casa De Las Americas, published

the study, Grenada's Route to Revolution, by Richard and Ian Jacobs (1980).

This study set forth the rationalization for the non-capitalist path under

the NJM/PRG regime. Castro's political support for Bishop was beyond

question. He also fully supported the Grenada Revolution up until Bishop's

death. He rushed to judgement by suggesting that Bishop's death had

practically destroyed the Revolution although he was not prepared to

forsake the "Grenadian people by stopping ... cooperation and halting

the work of (their) construction crews, doctors, teachers and other

specialists .;" Nor had Cuba recalled the "military and security advisors"

who were stationed in Greanad.40

•59-

In the October 21st, 1983, analysis of Cuba's response to the

crisis in Grenada the RMC issued several points. It was surprised to learn

of the Cuban reaction from the press rather than through the "Cuban

Embassy as was the norm" (p. 1). The RMC concluded that Fidel's deep

and personal friendship with Bishop had influenced him so deeply that he

took a personal and subjective approach (as opposed to a class analysis)

to the problem. The idea which Havana communicated that personal and per-

sonality differences had precipated the crisis was also disputed by the

RMC which argued that the NJM and the PRAF had united around the C.C.

decision. It was also stressed that Cuba had gone public on the crisis

while simultaneously declaring that it lacked adequate information. In turn

the RMC accused Cuba of taking a position which created "an atmosphere

for speedy imperialist invervention" (p. 2). The minutes of the Extraordinary

Meeting of the NJM Central Committee of August 26, 1983 indicate that Cuban

Comrades in Grenada, notably Carlos Diaz and Pinei.O,had expressed strong

concerns about the state of the party and the level of its work (p. 1).

Other concerns had been raised back as early as August by the Cubans about

the state of the youth organizations, the militia, etc. As late as October

12th, the NJM Central Committee had decided to officically notify the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba of the crisis. It was not suffi-

cient for Bishop to have developed close ties with Fidel or with the Cuban

Communist Party. The record is clear that petty bourgeois revolutionaries

who are not communists have also taken this route as part of their foreign

policy of anti-imperialism. Castro seemed to have blundered on this score

or, if there was not blunder, then, he was accepting the power sharing

strategy of the non-capitalist path of socialist orientation as a fact

-60-

of life. If so,he too, even if for tactical reasons, seemed to be influenced

by the concept of the primacy of anti-imperialism as a distinctive stage

of the revolution. Fidel apparently believed it was better to save

Bishop and the petty bourgeois oriented state than to risk everything.

But this was not what he did in the case of the Cuban Revolution. Of course

the times were different. The Grenadian Revoultion had to make choices.

In a more recent view on the Grenada crisis Castro suggested that the NJM party

rules were properly employed by the Central Committee in its decision.

Castro made the following statement to Patricia Sethi of Newsweek:

"I made an appeal [to the Coard group] to be broad-mindedand generous. What took place in Grenada was that Coard'sgroup was in the majority. This was apparently clean,it was legal even according to democratic norms. Youhave to accept such a situation even if you realize it isa mistake. We could not do more than we did. We are veryrespectful of the internal affairs of parties and organiza-tions" (Newsweek, January 9, 1984: 8).

Whatever may be said, while I regret Castro's statement about the

need for "exemplary punishment", etc., I do not believe Cuba could have

done anything to prevent the invasion of Grenada. The U.S. was looking at

(I) the Middle East where its Lebanon policy had been in shambles; (2) central

America where the national liberation struggle is still on the offensive; (3)

Mexico with its developing revolutionary situation; (4) the CONTADORA group

which has been criticizing the military solutions proposed by Reagan,

and, thereby, the refusal of Mexico and Venezuela in particular to play

"sub-imperialist" surrogate roles for the U.S. in the Caribbean Basin area; (5)

the Organization of American States (OAS) which is not presently marching

in line behind Washington; and.b(6) the North Atlantic social democratic

parties which have openly criticized American policy in the region. The

support of Caribbean neocolonies was the best that Reagan was able

-61-

to muster in order to give America the one chance it needed so badly to

come back and "stand tall." Castro could not forestall this. For

Washington it did not matter that the target was a small, weak and vulner-

able country. It was a blow against the Caribbean revolutionaries

and the prospects for building the socialist revolution in the area. The

tragedy is that the internal crisis in the Grenada Revolution facilitated

its own derailment.

Summary

The main argument made throughout this paper has been that the

real causes of the crisis and derailment of the Grenada Revolution were in -

ternal to the society and the revolutionary institutions and organizations.

I traced the economic basis of the crisis to the backward agro-commercial

based capitalist mode of production. I analyzed the political and social

origins, ideology and transformation strategy of the NJM to its petty bour-

geois roots, and demonstrated the theoretical and practical limits and capa-

cities of the group which adopted a revolutionary democratic strategy.

showed that, far from being socialist or communist, the NJM was, up until

1982,a pro-capitalist even if anti-imperialist formation within which

there were at least two emerging political lines - the revolutionary petty

bourgeois line and the Marxist-Leninist line. The petty bourgeois line

had consistently won out; and the adoption of the so-called non-capitalist

strategy was inbued with a radical populist ideology which tended to hide

the class struggle and the real question of property relations in Grenada.

The NJM had begun, as the PRG, to ultilize its partially trans-

formed state to modernize and rationalize backward capitalism and this

strategy strengthened the conditions for sharing state power between the

-62-

bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie with legitimization from the

proletariat and other strata. The situation began to deteriorate in

1982, and the party proved unable to resolve the problem which developed

into a crisis. Class struggle became open around the two lines in the

party. The NJM/PRG regime represented a conflation of neocolonial and

revolutionary democratic principles. The inability of the party and regime

to resolve the crisis was a function of internal problems in the first

instance and the intervention of external mediating factors.

Conclusions

The failure of the NJM to build a principled relationship withworking

the/class and working people proved to be very costly.' The failure of the

regime to resolve the production relations problem stemmed from its own

class objectives but also from the absence to independent working class

institutions that could push the revolution forward. Power sharing with

backward capitalism is not the strategy of the proletariat but of the petty

bourgeoisie and,historically,it has proven to be very costly. The so-

called non-capitalist path was not anti-capitalist but at least anti-

imperialist. The elevation of anti-imperialism to a discrete historical

stage of the revolution was also the result of ideological misjudgement

and vacillation. The primary contradiction remained the internal class

contradictions in spite of attempts to supplant class struggle by

anti-imperialist rhetoric. The petty bourgeoisie proved,through the limits

of its capacities, that it cannot lead the proletariat to socialism without

transforming production relations. Grenada proved that it is possible

for the military apparatus of the state to be transformed and incorporated

into the revolution as defender of non-capitalist interests. 41 This was

-63-

clearly demonstrated by the PRA during the crisis. The invasion of Grenada

by U.S. imperialism was largely designed to prevent the revolutionization

of the military and its - transformation into an - instrument of socialist

power. This threatened both U.S. imperialism and the neo-colonies in the

Commonwealth Caribbean. The rise of the "Radical Right" to state power in

the U.S. is an indication of the severeity of the general crisis of imperialism.

The invasion of Grenada resulted from the implications of the crisis for

imperialism and which it was bent on forestalling. Imperialism did not cause

the NJM's crisis: Imperialism exploited the contradictions of the crisis, for in

the end,the crisis was first and foremost, a matter of internal class struggle.

-64-

Appendix 1

• Grenada: Principal Parameters

***********************************************************************Average Prel. Est. 1/1979-80 1981 1982 1982/83

***********************************************************************

Real GDPNominal GDPNominal Domestic ExpenditureConsumer prices (Average)

(Percentage changes)

3.011.412.17.5

2.516.124.420.6

3.4 3.311.5 12.215.7 18.718.8 7.8

(Ratios to GDP)

Balance of PaymentsCurrent account deficit -11.2 -24.2 -33.2 -30.7Official grants 12.1 13.5 15.5 14.9Overall balance -1.6 -7.9- 0.1 -0.6

National AccountsConsumption 104.2 99.7 102.6 100.3

Public Sector (24.7) (24.5) (22.0) (18.7)Private Sector (79.5) (75.2) (80.6) (81.6)

Investment 19.0 33.5 38.3 37.9Public Sector (14.4) (30.3) (34.8) (35.6)Private Sector (4.6) (3.2) (3.5) (2.3)

Gross Domestic Savings -4.2 0.3 -2.6 -0.3

Public Sector FinancesGeneral gov't current surplus -0.22 -0.4 2.3 2.6

Current revenue (25.9) (24.2) (25.5) (26.8)Current expenditure (26.1) (24.7) (23.2) (24.2)

Current surplus of the restof public sector 0.2 -0.3 0.4 0.3

Public sector current surplus -0.7 2.7 2.9Public sector capital

expenditures 15.2 30.1 36.1 35.7Overall deficit -15.0 -30.7 -33.4 -32.7Overall deficit (after grants) -3.0 -17.2 -17.9 -17.8Nonconcessional financing 0.7 9.5 12.9 11.5***********************************************************************

Sources: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Trade; and Fund staffestimates.

1/ Refers to year beginning July 1.

-65-

Appendix 2

Grenada: Summary Public Sector Operations**********************************************************************

Prel. Est.1/1979 1980 1981 1932 1982/83

**********************************************************************

(In millions of East Caribbean dollars)

9.0Current balance 0.9 -0.8 -1.9 7.7Central Government 1.0

Current revenue (54.9)Current expenditure (53.9)

National Insurance SchemeNonfinancial public

enterprise -0.1

-2.1(57.5)(59.6)

1.3

-1.1(62.7)(63.8)

-0.8

7.7(74.2)(67.5)

1.0

8.0(81.9)(73.9)

1. 0

Capital receipts 0.2 0.2 0.3

Capital expenditures 27.6 38.7 77.9_ 104.8 109.0Of which: airport (10.1) (21.0) (34.3) (46.2) (64.6)

contingency fund (--) (--) (--) (--) (--)

Overall balance -26.5 -39.3 -79.5 -97.1 -100.0

External grants 18.6 34.4 34.9 45.0 45.5

Overall balance aftergrants -7.9 -4.9 -44.6 -52.1 -54.5

External concessionaryloans (net) 6.4 3.5 19.9 14.7 19.4

Overall balance after grantsand concessionary loans -1.5 -1.4 -24.7 -37.4 -35.1

Nonconcessional financing 1.5 1.4 24.7 37.4 35.1Commercial loans (external) -- -- 4.4 21.9Change in foreign assets -0.2 -1.1 2.7SDR allocation 1.1 1.1 1.1Net IMF purchases 1.2 15.6 -2.4 -2.0Net ECCA borrowing 1.0 0.9 2.2 2.2 2.2Net domestic borrowing -1.6 0.5 3.1 33.2 13.0

Commercial banks (-2.8) (-4.8) (3.7) (29.9) (5.0)Nonbanks (2.2) (1.8) (3.4) (3.9) (7.5)Residual (-1.0) (3.5) (-4.0) (-0.6) (0.5)

**********************************************************************

Sources: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Trade; and Fund staffestimates.

1/ Year ending in June.

-66-

Appendix 3

STATE SECTOR ECONOMY--GROSS PRODUCTION IN 1981-1982

BY ECONOMIC SECTORS AND SUB-SECTORS

1982

(ECLahausind):_

82/81SECTORALSTRUCTURE1981

Actual Estim. (%) 1981 1982

GROSS PRODUCTION TOTAL 54386.6 72930.8 134 100 100

Agriculture 3168.2 2823.2 83 6 4

Permanent Agric. Crops 1118.4 1,065.0 95

Temporary Agric. Crops 10.3 13.9 135

Sugar Cane --

Livestock 11.5 51.3 446

Agricultural Services 2028.0 1693.0 83

Forestry 65.2 46.0 71Forestry 65.2 46.0 71

Industry 7441.9 10035.4 135 14 14

Sugar Industry 1104.2 1229.8 111

Beverages Industry 1046.7 1659.0 158

Saw Milling 14.8 46.5 314

Agro-Industry 326.2 804.9 247""

Food Processing Industry 85.6 250.0 292

Electric Energy 4238.0 4807.0 113

Graphics Industry 626.4 731.7 117

Construction Materials Industry 506.0

Fisheries 179.2 175.2 98

Extractive Fishing 155.2 119.2 77

Fish Processing 24.0 56.0 233

Transport 381.0 2122.0 557 1 3

Motor Vehicle -... 978.0

Maritime Transport 381.0 1144.0 300

Construction 28035.4 35909.8 128 52 49

Construction and Installation 28035.4 35909.8 128

Communications 5120.0 5257.0 103 9 7

Telephone 2702.0 3174.0 117

Postal Services 2418.0 2083.0 86

Tourism 1386.5 1487.6 107 3 2

Tourism 1386.5 1487.6 107

Commerce 6560.7 12751.6 194 12 18

Wholesale Trade 6459.0 12200.0 186

Retail Trade 101.7 551.6 542

Community Services 1827.5 2200.0 120 '3 3

Water Supply 1827.5 2200.0 120

Other Productive Activities 221.0 123.0 56 ** **

Other Productive Activities 221.0 123.0 56*****************************************************************************

** Refers to less than 1.

Source: Report on the National Economy (1982) pp. 39-40.

-67-

Appendix 4

COMPLETION OF 1982 PLAN (EC$ THOUSAND)

1981- TiT

1982COMPLETIONESTM.ITT

RELATIONS

PLAN- ITT

(%)3/2 3/1

PRODUCTIVE SPHERE TOTAL 54386.6 78382.1 72930.8 90a/ 134

1. Grenada Farms Corp. 1109.4 2826.0 815.5 37 95

2. Grenada Sugar Factory 2150.9 3370.0 2888.8 86 134

3. Livestock Prdn. and Gen. Cent b/ 37.6 353.0 181.1 51 482

4. Forestry Development Corp. 80.0 304.0 92.5 30 116

5. G'da Agro-Industries (True Blue) 326.2 2417.2 804.9. 33 247

6. Coffee Processing Plant 85.6 127.3 150.0 118 175

7. Spice Processing Plant -- 269.5 78.5 29 --

8. Grencraft 101.7 590.0 326.3 55 321

9. Grenada Electric Company 4238.0 4915.0 4807.0 98 113

10. Grenada Telephone Company 2702.0 3091.0 3174.0 103 117

11. Free West Indian 300.0 247.7 395.3 160 132

12. Central Water Commission 2071.6 2500.0 2931.7 117 142

13. National Fisheries Company 179.2 947.9 7175:2 18 98

14. National Transport Service 720 978.0 136

15. National Housing Authority 1082.0 1750.0 200.0 11 18

16. Ministry of Construction 6751.4 6412.0 7172.2 112 106

17. Port Authority 381.0 1229.8 1144.0 93 300

18. Post Office 2418.0 2823.0 2083.0 74 86

19. Grenada Resorts Corp. 1386.5 2154.6 1487.6 69 107

20. Marketing Natl. Imp. Board 6459.0 18931.0 12200.0 64 189

21. Crucial Factor 228.1 225.3 99

22. Cocoa Project Mangmt. Board 50.0 87.0 35.0 40 70

23. International Airport 19920.3 20000.0 25539.2 128 128

24. Ministry of Agriculture c/ 1978.0 2088.0 3777.8 102 191

25. Mirabeau Farm School d/ 30.8 -- 37.1 120

26. Government Printing and Stat. d/ 326.4 336.4 103

27. Telescope Quarry d/ -- 104.2

28. Queen's Park Asph. Plant d/ 165.0

29. Concrete and Gray. Prod. Unit d/ 237.3

30. Botanical Gardens and Zoo d/ 221.0 75.0 3431. Machine Shop d/ 48.0

32. Grenada Dairies Limited d/ 21.5

a/ Relationship of completion/plan(3/2) of productive sphere total refers tocompletion of those enterprises/institutions which were planned in 1982.

b/ Includes EC th. 152.4 and 146.9 on production of construction in planand completion respectively of 1982.

c/ 1982 includes EC$ th. 2088.0 for production of construction (farm roads)as was planned and a completion of EC th. 2119.9.

d/ Economic activities which ere not included in 1982 plan.

Source: Report on the National Economy (1982) pp. 42-43.

-68-

Appendix 5Grenada: Balance of Payments

****************************************************************************Est. 1/

1979 1980 1981 1982 1982/83****************************************************************************

(In millions of U.S. dollars)-5.2 -13.3 -23.2 -35.7 -34.8

-13.2 -26.1 -37.8 -50.1 -49.1-27.9 -40.1 -44.1 -52.7 -52.9(21.4) (17.4) (19.0) (18.6) (19.5)

( - 49.3) (-57.5) (-63.1) (-71.3) (-72.4)/2.4/ /4.7/ /6.2/ /8.8/ /12.9/14.7 13.4 6.3 2.6 3.8(15.3) (16.5) (13.9) (13.0) (13.7)( - 3.3) ( - 3.2) (-3.9) (-3.3) (-3.4)(-0.4) (-0.4) (-0.6) ( - 0.8) (-1.4)(0.5) (0.7) (0.8) (1.1) (1.1)(2.6) (-0.2) (-3.9) (-7.4) (-6.2)8.0 13.4 14.6 14.4 14.3

6.2 13.7 18.1 33.8 35.36.9 12.7 12.9 16.7 16.92.4 1.3 7.9 7.1 15.3

-1.1 1.1 y -0.8 9.4 3.3-- -- -- 1.9 1.4

-2.0 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3 -1.6

-2.6 -0.8 -2.9 -2.0 -1.20.8 0.5 0.4

-0.8 0.1 -7.6 0.1 -0.7

0.8 -0.1 7.6 -0.1 0.70.5 6.0 -0.9 -0.80.4 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.7

-0.1 -0.4 1.0 0.8

(In per cent of GDP)

-6.9 -15.5 -24.2 -33.2 -30.7(-3.7) (-10.0) (-17.7) (-25.0) (-19.3)-2.0 -1.1 -7.9 0.1 -0.6

14.1 12.5 10.2 9.8 10.32.4 1.9 2.7 2.1 2.42.3 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.7

32.3 29.4 25.1 23.2 24.23.7 3.0 2.7 4.5 4.6

Current account Goods and servicesMerchandise trade

Exports, f.0:11.Imports, c.i.f.Of which: airport related

ServicesTravel receiptsTravel paymentsInterest of public debtECCA profitsOther services (net)

Private transfers (net)2/

Capital account Public sector grantsPublic sector borrowing (net)Commercial banks (net)Private investmentCurrency holdings 3/

Errors and omissions SDR allocations 4/Overall surplus or deficit (-)

FinancingIMF (net)ECCA borrowingGovernment foreign assets

Current balanceExcluding balance

Overall balance

Memorandum items Banana exports ('000 tons)Cocoa exports ('000 tonsNutmeg exports ('000 tons)Stayover visitors ('000)Debt service ratio 5/*******************7********************************************************

Sources: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Trade; Statistical Office; andFund staff estimates.

1/ Refers to year beginning July.2/ Include migrant transfers, workers' remittances, other transfers from

Grenadians living abroad, and medical students transfers for expensesnot covered by payments made abroad to the school. -

3/ East Caribbean dollars in circulation.4/ Includes profits from gold sales.5/ Interest and amortization as per cent of receipts from exports, services,

and private transfers.

-69-

FOOTNOTES

1In 1946 about 45 per cent of Grenada's labor force was concentrated

in agriculture. See Jacobs and Jacobs 1980: 50.

2

The lack of a precise definition still presents major conceptualand theoretical problems for the study of this group which is stillvariously called the peasantry, small farmers, rural villagers, semi-peasants, semi-proletarians, etc. Jacobs and Jacobs (1980) observed that18,450 out of 19,736 small owners owned less than 10 acres each.

3

By 1972 a handfull of merchants, hoteliers and manufacturers wereto be found in the commercial, tourist and light manufacturing sectors, Jacobsand Jacobs (1980: 45-48.)

4

About 7.2 per cent of the working population of approximately30,000 was employed at the administrative and other professional and tech-nical levels at the end of the 1960s. The petty bourgeoisie is includedin these categories. See Jacobs and Jacobs (1980: 45-58.)

5

Merchant and commercial capital came to its own in the period of thetransition from feudalism:to capitalism in much of Western Europe. The"commercial revolution" is associated with the period of explorations, growthof trade, colonization, etc. It layed the foundations of the world marketeconomy: commodity trade, navigation, "discovery" of the New World, preciousmetals, the revolution in money and prices, slavery, creation of industry,rapid expansion of wealth, ascendancy of commercial over merchant capitaland later by industrial capital in Europe, profiteering, war, plunder, thegrowth of monopolies such as the British West India Company, etc. SeeMandel, (1968: 106-110.)

6

Features of the blockage include insecurity, instability, poverty,economic backwardness, low productivity and production based upon absolutesurplus value as opposed to relative surplus value. See Appendices forfigures on Grenada's economic performance, balance of payments, statesector, etc.

7

For a definition of Gairyism see, e.g. Richard Jacobs, The Grenada Revolution at Work. New York: Pathfinder Press 1981: 4, 7.

8Maurice Bishop participated in FORUM in 1970. See Jacobs and

Jacobs (1980: 75-76.)

-70-

9M.A.C.E. was founded in 1972.

°MAP was founded by Maurice Bishop, Kenrick Radix and others.

11Unison Whiteman and others founded JEWEL in 1972

12By early 1973, leading figures in the NJM included Maurice Bishop,

Kenrick Radix, Unison Whiteman, Selwyn Strachan et al. Jacobs and Jacobs1980: 77 argue that the idea of challenging private property rights inconcept was evident in JEWEL's thrust.

13See Watson 1979, 1981.

14See Independence for Grenada: Myth or Reality, University of the

West Indies, St. Augustine 1974. Appendix - "Manifesto of the New JewelMovement; Jacobs and Jacobs 1980: 78-79. The NJM 1973 Manifesto stressed(1) democratic transformation of socioeconomic structures; (2) radicalredistribution of land away from large estates to co-operatives of 40-50acres; (3) free education through secondary level; (4) national healthscheme and realistic minimum wages, unemployment compensation, lifeinsurance, and a workers retirement programme; (5) nationalization ofbanking and insurance; (6) national import-export-board; (7) change in theforeign trade structure; (8) democratic centralism and (9) anti-imperialism.

15The NJM was forced to modify its manifesto in 1976 when it formed

a coalition with the bourgeois parties (the Grenada National Party (GNP)and the United Progressive Party (UPP) to contest the 1976 General Elections.It won 3 of the 6 seats taken by the opposition. It showed it was competitivebut Gairy refused to give the NJM a chance to put forward any of itsprogram in parliament.

160ther critics including Slovo (1974) and Lowy (1981) have presented

appropriate criticisms of the theory. I am only interested in elaboratingon the general theory in this project, See Watson 1979, 1981 for detailsas they pertain to the Commonwealth Caribbean.

17 Jacobs and Jacobs 1980: 78.

-71-

18Gairyfsm contributed to relatively large scale alienation of

surplus and property from the private sector for Gairy's personalaccumulation. His practice also depleted the national treasury anddiminished the country's productive capital stock, widened its grant-in-aid status, and reduced productivity on the whole, increased politicalrepression, victimization,and ruined Grenada's prestige and image as atourist resort.

19

Quoted in Watson 1979: 13-14.

20The NJM ideology as reflected in the 1973 manifesto bears the influence of

CLR James' "Marxian populism" on a part of the Caribbean left at thetime. See Ambursley 1983: 201.

21

See Independence for Grenada: Myth or Reality op. cit., p. 153and Manifesto of the NJM in ibid., pp. 143-156.

2 2Ibid, p. 153.

23Watson 1980.

24Bishop demonstrated general awareness of the informal and external

problems that faced Grenada and which constrained the NJM Revolution. Ampleevidence of this awareness is contained in numerous speeches he made. Fordetails see Forward Ever: Three Years of the Grenada Revolution - Speeches by Maurice Bishop, Sidney, Australia: Pathfinder Press 1982, esp. pp. 29-57; 87-101; 111-133; 187-197; 197-207; 263-283.

25

See Bishop 1982: 264. In 1972, one (1) ton of Grenada nutmeg,bought a typical automobile imported into Grenada; in 1982 it required5 tons of nutmegs to purchase the same automobile. The 1982 purchasing powerof the Grenada dollar (EC) was 1/5 of its 1972 purchasing power.

26Bishop was addressing the activities of particular foreign

companies that were responsible for operating Grenada's electrical facility.Economic blackmail and destabilization were common features of the attackon the country's productivity. See Bishop 1982: 52-53.

--72-

27This entire section draws extensively upon the contents of prepared

document by the Ministry of Finance (PRG) and signed by Minister of Finance,Bernard Coard. It was submitted to the IMF as part of the funding applicationto support the development program.

28

See Report on the National Economy and The Budget Plan for 1983 and Beyond. Presented to the National Conference . of Delegates of Mass Organiza-tions, 1982.

29

See the Appendices on the performance of the state sector (1981-82)and funding of state sector projects for a full listing of the overall statesector projects.

30

See Appendices for data on public sector projects, economic indicators,balance of payments position, etc.

31

Ambursley 1983: 216-217.

32 For the most part the entire discussion in this section drawsheavily upon the available minutes of the Central Committee deliberations,directly and indirectly, for the period from July-October 1983. Theseminutes were seized by the U.S. during the illegal invasion and occupationof the Grenada. Sources in Grenada attest to the authenticity of the minutes.The main reason behind the public distribution of these documents by the U.S.Department of State is to convey the impression to the American publicthat Bishop was a social democrat and Coard was an ultra-leftist communist,partly to support the contention that Cuba and the USSR inspired the situationthat led to the crisis and derailment of the Revolution.

33

See Minutes of the Central Committee of the NJM, Friday, August26, 1983, p. 7. Those reporting to the C. C. at this meeting included, amongothers, Ian St. Barnard, Tan Bartholomew, Liam James, Selwyn Strachan, HudsonAustin, and others.

34

This

also required (1) "A Lennist level of organization and discipline;(2) Great depth in ideological clarity; (3) Brilliance in strategy and tactics;(4) The capacity to exercise Leninist supervision, control and guidance of allareas of work of the party" (p. 9). The point of the C. C. was that Bishop had not demonstrated this ability and he should therefore allow those who did to share the responsibilities of leadership to ensure the party was brought up to this level. The C. C. was not making a call for the immediate collectiviza-tion of the economy. It was a call for the transformation of the party to

-75-

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