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PENTAGON PAPERS 3

BOOK: ___ _

PART: __ I_V_._B_.

w ~ It . it crir FILE SUBJ

SUB-CAT

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SECTION: _3_-_PART TWO

HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR 1961-67

U.S. Military Advisory Effort - Part Two

[Advent of U.S. combat forces, 1965]

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[:~ . C. U. S. Cmbe.t I·'orces and the Possibility -Of:' l~c;i1icfi,:t"IOi1Sh:i:'j)iJi965)... ..'

T".t!B ABORTIVE mJlfITED J::XPAI;SION OF ARVN

During the spring of 1965 Genel'al Westmorell1nd' s staff prepared a f'ull-blO1'lll "Cornme.nder's EstlRate of' the Situation." The estimate," ,,",,: delhered to Hp,shington at the beginning of' April, eX(l.mined three courses of' action f'or deal:ing l;ith the crisis in South Vietn{),m.· ·Among

· these ~las an accelcxs,tec1 Rv,<AF build-up.

Even by accelerating the rate of' ARVN exp~msion, COYlUS£fJACV co~'l­cluded, the ratio of AllVl'[ toVe be.ttalions '~vould decline by the end of 1965 from 1.7:1 to 1.6:1. General l'lestmorele,nd rejected this alterna­tive on the grounds tht.t it could not prevent a VO victory. It 110uld take too long toaccompl:ish the build-up and there l-JaS little assurance that ARVH p="'forJ:!!l.nce ~iOuldm'.'/Gch that of a constantly improving enemy. (His lack of' confidence in ARVH is further :reflected in his argll.,"ent for U.S. forces, in 1·,h1ch he est~r'?,ted tho,t one U.S. Army battalion is the figh'oing equivd.lentof t"o luTvr: b!l.tta.lions and one }:arineBLT the eClui valent ot threeARVH b"ttl1lions.) 134/

These reservations nC?Gl-liths>cend:lng,· vlest.r:loreland hadreCluested autho.riza.tion on 20 March to. inpl'Sl>ellt the Alternative 2 RVltllF s>,rength increasespropo!3ed by him the previous November. Af'ter the April 1-2 conference in Kashington a.nd a rev).e\·, of the "Co!!'l~9,nder' sEstimate," the JCS reCOll'Jllendedapproval !\,nd Secretary Mcnamara agreed on 1'2 April to eXl'and RVNAF by an a.ddi tioDe,l 17,247 spaces. An addi tione,l 160 u. S. advj.so:cs v'ere approved at the se,;::" tme. 135/ In l~"te r:ay, the JCS asked the Secretary cf Dei'er-se toauthoriZe--!$Ap SUppOl't fOl' .another 2,369 ARVN spp,eesto f'atten but division bases for the eventualcreat:i.on of a tenth ARVN divisj.onout of' ex).sting separate regj-iD<;:nts.136/ This request was El.p:proved on 4 June .137/ .. ... . .

Thus, while it was decided not to. continue to depend ex.clusive1y cn · larger Vie.tnamese :fcrces ldthU.S. air andnave.l support, the plan I'Tas · to conduct a modest ex:pa.nsionof A ... WNln conjunction .~,i th. the dep10ynent of U.S. forces. In the event, even the modest plans~,ent d01'lll the drain i.n the aftermath of'. the heav.v casualties sustained in combat during late May and early June. On·7 June, General westmoreland informed CINCPAC a.nd the·JCS that a moratorium on RVNiU'build-up Vias unavoidable because trainees inthepipe1ine woUld have tobe used as fillers for eXisting. units. 138/ . .. .. t .

. The U.S. build-up continued during the spring and early summer, · particularly as a resUlt of ARVN reverses in combat •. By the end of July

there were 18 US/Fril ccmbat maneuver battalions deployed in South Viet­nam. In the same messa.ge in l,.hich he advised of the palt. in ARVN

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. , three alternative encadrement poss:lbHi ties: (1) as surc;pt~.on o:fo:fficer and senior NCO eODlJUand :POsi.tions by U. S. personnel l'li thin the des:i.gnll.ted ARVN battalions; (2) assienment of U.S. personnel as st3.ff officers, and in technical and specialist positions lvith:in the battalj.ons; and (3) the employment of U. S. troops as f'ire s\l.pport elements ,Ti thin ARVN-co::wanded battalions. Two critic"-l difficulties appl:LcabJ.e to all of tllese schemes were identified: the la!lgll.<"ee barrier and the exp3,nded support require­ment th'.ct "(ould be ge!lera~'ed f'or U. S. persolmel. Another neeative f'actor l·ms the e)."pGctcd adverse eff'ect of B.ny such st.ep on South Vietne,mese morale. These fonned tlw be,sis for Genere,l Throckrr,ortol1' s recoramen:iat:i.'" that encadremont be rejected. COlf:U8i1ACV endorsed h.:1s d~puty' s recommend"" tion and the general ence,drcL~cnt ide8, 1,,,-S officie.l1y )):conou.'lced dead dudng the 18 Ap:cil Honolulu Conference. 141/ Only three days had elapsed from the b:lr-th of thepro))osal to its burial. . . .

But l·,hUe general encB,drerlent 1·7~.S ef'fectively killed by CO;1UBr·:4.CV a spe cif'j.c, . lim:l ted e:r.:psrjJ;,ent in encadl'emcnt ,·,as beGun later ill the yee,r almost off'-h",ndedly by the U. S. 1<:a1':1nc3 near Phu B',i. Since the Me,rine units had been f.ss.1.gned TAORs J.arger thr,n. the;>' could seC1.U'e, :innovative comlr2,nders sOll:;ht 1'1i:'Ys to r.·,a.x:i.m1.zelou.J. security resourc€s. In June, a comp?ny COlfl";-",,"crof the 3d Battalj.on, 4th 1:;8,1'ines nee.r P11U Hai ass:igned a f'ev )·:",rin8s to the villages in his te.ct:Lcr,l area to work with the Popular Forces platoons. Marine lee,dcrship, traininG, and access to p01'lerfUl fire supDort. brought mea.su:.~ab1e il;:prOY€.l":lent in the PF tini ts-. As e;'''resultthe CO:;l'"~l1di;lg Ge;:,ereJ., 1st ARV~! DiviSion, placed six PF :p1e.toons under tbe operr-t:lon"l control of the 1!;5.rine be.ttD.lion. BY November, the effort k.:l e,chieved such results that i t ~le.s brought to the attention of' theCG III MP.F. La.tel' that r,oClth e,n agreement ~las reached bet1'leen the I Corps Co:mnallder and the CG III ~!AF permitting the integra.tion of' Marine sg.ue,ds into PE' platoons in the Dal/2,ng area to improve their effectiveness and stiff'en their co;r,bat pel'formance. The . basic unit Of the nel'l venture was the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) formed by adding a' Marine Rifle S'luad of' 14 men plus a r.:a.vy corpsman to a PF' pla.toon (32-38 authorized strength). The PF platoon retained its mm organization and the integrated Marines advised the entire unit, ~iving with it, sharing its foqd, conducting combined patrols, and training cot1nterparts. At the end of 1965, there were seven such Combined Action Platoons, but the success of' the experiment in enhancing PF perf'ormance and extending securitY' prompted a rapid expansion durin!S the n,ext year, The ~~ines have continued to press for expansion of' this program and to see in it an effective methodby lihich to produce increased performance in PF units. Critics have noted that the Marine advisors quickly became . de facto leaders of the CAPs and argued that a higher level of .current performance is purchased at the cost of' stultifying the development ot: South Vietnamese leadership. No general consensus h~s developed on the relative merits ·of this assumed trade-o:ff'. "

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~ exp,,(1sion, Gconeral tlestl!!or~land had re(luest.cd D. Si&,l1:L:ficant increo.se in the number of'· U.S. troops for Vietn:-'ln (tho :famed "4)+-B~.ttalion" reCluest). A:fter more thr,n a month of' dcliberc:.t.iorl, tJ-Je Pl:'csidcnt finally appx'oved the requedt sometime in mid-July. lIis historic announcement of the exps.nded U. S. ef'f'ort cmae on 28 J·uly. ¥.. Under­standa bly, this' momentous ex:pe,nsion of the U. S • involvement in the ~mr completely oversha.do;;ed the advisory progre.m ~.nd the growth of. RV1'llU' during the remainder of 1965.

But the deployment of U.S. forces to South Vietnam did, hOi-leVer, open up a nevI re.p..ge of' possible relationships ;:hic11 "lou1d not have been possible without the presence of EUbst~.ntial U. S. co~ribat forces. Each of these relationshipsm:i.ght. concei v8.bly pro~:,otc one or all of the severr.l purposes "lhich this study has rep.soned to be behind the U.S~ military advisory err'ort: the devclop,nent of ilaproved tactici1.l .' and technical competence in RVI'1!'.F,the gcnerr,t:lon of better intelligence (both friendly F.ndenemy), and increased U. S. influence.

TI·ro categories of ne','1 relationsh:i.ps "ere considered: the enca.dre-· ment of U. S. and. ARVIf twits (inseverc.l forms) a.nd the es'tia.blismEent of a joint comms.nd to conduct the ~lar. Both of these courses were I'ejected by CO~:US!·''l.CV. In their place General \·;entmorelt.rld attempted to crea.te aJoir.tUS-RVNAF staff' to coo!'dinate independent ns.tione,l efforts. The bas:lc arrallgerr,enten!lbling te.ctical ipdepcndence--i'li tl1in limits--,:as the creation of mutually exclusive Tactic2.1 Areas of Responsibility (V.ORs) for each combatrr$..'1euver force.

Defic:lendesin ARVIf leadership had long been recognized by U.S,,, milite.ry advisors i;l.S one.of the key impediments to increased ARVl, performance. In April, llhen' the first n~aj or impu.t of U. S. combat troops took place, consideration "as 'given to the encadrement of U.S. officers in ARW units a~ a lW,y of solving this problem. The proposal ~las touched off by i;l. DoD request on. 15 ApriLfor CO~1lJSMA.CV' 8 opinion about the 1"ea8i­hili t. Y .0. f. uSin~ .• -s. ,c.lJ.dreS to improve effectiveness in the-ten ARvN ... divisions. '}32J . The . .se.me day, McGeorge Bundy sent a personal NODIS message to Ambassa.dor Taylor stating among other things, that "The President has repeatedly emphasized his personal desire for a strong experiement iii the encadrement of U.S. troops with the Vietne.mese." 140/ Generi;l.l Westmoreland turned the issue over to his deputy, Gene:ra.1 . Throckmorton, for. a recommendation.. Throckmorton's study considered

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* See Task Force. Pa.perIV.C.6., Phase One in the Build-Up of U.S. Forces: The Deba.te, Ma.rch-July 1265.

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expc,l1sion, General Westmoreland had request.ed 0, sj.gn:ifico,nt increase in the number of U. S. troops for Vietn::cm (the famed "41+-B~,ttalitm" re<J.uest). After more thr,n a month of dclibeY.'2.tio!T, the President finally appl'Oved .the request somet:uue in mid-July. jjj.s historic announcement of the expanded U. S. effort Cf,me on 28 July • .r,- Under­stando,bly, this momentous expansion of the U.S. involvement in the ~;ar completely oVer-shado-,led the advisory progre.m and the growth of RV1'IAF' during the remainder of 1965.

But the deployment of U~S. forces to South Vietnam did, hm'level', open up a ne\'/ range of possible relaU.onsh:i.ps 'lhicl1 ,1Ould 110t have been possiblewithou.t the presence of su.bste.nt1.al U. S. combat fOl'Ce$. Each of these relatio118hi1'8 might conceivably pro,;:ote one or all of the sever2.1 purposes \·rhich this study has rep.soned to be behind the U. S. mili te,ry advisory effort: the development of improved tactic(l.l .. and' tcchnicalcompetellce in RVI'!."Ji', the generation of be'Gter intelligence (buth friendly f"ndenemy), and increased U. S. influence.

1'1'/0 cateGories ofnel'l relationsh:ipsl;ere considered: the enca.dre­ment of U. S. and ARyn u.ni ts (in ·sever:;.l forms) s,nd the esi<a.blisrnroent of a jo:int comms,nd to conduct the war. Both of these co,11'88s were I'ejected by CO;C~uS!U\'CV. In their:place General 1':cGtmorel"nd atte:mpted to crea.te a Jo:i.r.t US-RVNAF staff to coordinate j.ndepcndent ne,tione,l efforts, The basic arrangerr.enten!l.bling tactical 1I'dcpendcnce--l1i tl1in limits--l1as the creation of mutu?lly exclusive Tacti.cal Areas of Responsibility (TIl.ORs) for each comba tma..l1euver force.

ENCADR!;.IENT CONSIDF!,CSD AEDRE~~

Defic:lcncies .in ARVN leadership had long been recognized by U.S. militaryauvisors a.s one .. of the key irnpediments to .increased ARYli :performc.nce. .111 April, "then' the first major imput of U. S.combat troops· took place, cOl1s.ideration lQaS 'given to theencadrelllent of U.S. officers in ARVN units as away of solving this problem. Tbeproposal~las touched off bya lJOlJrequest on. 15 April for COMUSI4ll.CV' $ opinion e,boutthe feasi­bility of usin~.·S~ca.dres to improve effectiveness in the-ten ARVN divisions. 139/ The same day, McGeorge Bundy sent a personal NODIS message to Aroba,ssador Taylor stating among other things, that "The . President has repea.tedlyemphasized his personal. desire for a strong experiement in the encadrement of ·U.S. troops 1dththe Vietnamese." 140/. General Westmoreland turned the issue over to his deputy, GeneraJ, . Throckmorton, fora recommendation.. Throckmorton's stugy considered

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Tbe Debate, March-J~ 1965.

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thre'.e alternative ence.drel~ent poss:tbili ties: (1) ass=pUon of officer , and senior NCO cOD1llland lX's:i.tiol1s by U. S. personnel vii thin the des:ignl1.ted ARVN battalions; (2) s.ssienment of U.S. personnel as staff officers, and in technical and s:peclalist positions \qith:i.n t.he bo.ttal:Lons; and (3) the employment of U. S. troops as fire support elements "Ii thin. ARVN-co:2l!3.nded battalions. Two critice,l difficulties appUce.ble to all of these schemes were identified: the langu·".ee barrier and the exp3.nded support require­ment that vloll.ld be genera~'cd for U.S. persolmel. Anothsr negative i"actor \·ms the e)..--pcctcd adverse effect of any such step Oil South Vietne.mese morale. These forraed' th~ be;sis for Genera.l ThrockiDorton l s recormnenda.t:i\;:, that encadremcnt be rejected. CO),lUS;·\ACV endorsed. his deputy's rccO::fJll!end'.·, t:!,on and the general enco.drement idC8, \'7&.8 officie.lly pronoun,ced dead dur:i.ng the 18 April Honoblu Conference. 141/ Only three days had elapsed from the birth of t.heproposal t.o -its burial. . " .

But \'Thile general encB,drement \ms effectively ki.lled by CO;,1USf.:.'J.CV a speciflc, . limited e:r-periJ"ent in encadl'er'lent \·:as begun later in the ye(l,r almost off-handedly by the U. S. lcar:lnes near Phu B?"i. Since t..l:!e Marine units had been f.s3),gned TAORs larger the.n 'obey could secure, innovative COYl!n:.3.l1ders sOti,:.sht 't7f'yYS to ni&.xi:mize 10(:[;.1 sectu'ity resources. In June , a comp?ny corr""~.'ldcr of the 3d BattaUon, 4th H8.rines near Phu Be,i ass:igned a f'e,T ),:ari!'_csto t.he vlllagcs in his tact.ical area to .. Iork ~lith the Popular Forces platoons. J.'j"rine le0.derBhip, traj.ninG, and aCCeSS to pOl-lerful fire support brought measu::o.ble improv6!:lent in the PF 14"li ts. As a'result the C01,·tT£.nding Genere1,lst AHVN Division, placed six PF platoons under the. opere.t:lon!l.l control of the l·;e.:r.ine bs.ttalion.

By November, the effort h",,j ~.chjeved such l'CSUltS th2.t it ~18.S brought to the attention of the CG III HAF. Later that n'.oYlth a'l a.greement ~Tas reached betvTeen the I Corps Cormnander and the CG III NAF permittip.g the integra.tion of Narine squads into PE' platoons in the Dal';2.ng area to improve their effectiveness and stiffen their cO;Tcbat pel'formance. The basic unit of the nel'T venture we.s the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) formed by adding a Marine Rifle Squad of 14 men plus a I{ayY corpsman to a PF plr"toon (32-38 authorized strength). The PB' platoon retained its o,m organization and the integrated Marines advised the entire unit, living with it, sharing its food, conducting combined patrols, and training counterparts. At. the end of 1965, there were seven such Combined Action Platoons, but the success of the experiment in enhancing PF performance and extending security prompted a rapid explmsion dUring the. n,extyea.r, The Marines have continued to press for expansion of this program and to see in it an effective methodb,nvhich to produce increased performance in PF units. Critics have noted that the Marine advisors quickly becOIrie de facto leaders of the CAPS and argued that a higher level .01' current performance is purchased at the cost of stultifying the development o~ South Vietnamese leadership. No general consensus h~s developed on the relative merits of this assumed trade-off. "

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mid-1965 beCiT'_l1i)'.e; the cOlJl.mitltient of major ground forces to South Viet-. nam. Thedeploj'1!lerit of these forces marked the end of a Ir.!l.jor phase in "advisory '·Tarfe.re." From this time fOrl'lard the role of U.S. military and poHtice.l:'militaryadvisors would be determined and practiced in a radically. Cl:;~.nsedenvironment. .. .

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The 1965 ccmr.litll!8nt of U. S. forces also prompted a high level U.S, debate on the advisabDj.ty of creatine some form of unified combined c.czc:::,.nd. The questl.on ~Ias first rr~ised in Hashington in mtd-!!;~rch 1-lhen Genere,l H. K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, returned ,from a vis it to Vietnam ,7ith the recommende.tJ.on for deployment of U.S. cOlllbat forces. 142/ The idea. he.d the sp.r:,e conceptus.l origins as the enc:r.c1re" "llt propose.lr;, namely tl1e.t if ;Wj'Y\.F could be co=.anded

. by or B.sSOc:La ted ,dtb U.S. troups it might be molded at last into an effec:t:i.ve fighting force. In additJ.on, such So unified allied cot'lmand vlould hs.ve Given the senior cOT!~fl.8.ndcI'-·<presny::s-bly COi·lUSE;'CV--f'ar gre~,ter 1'1'08(10:·. to deploy' forces and fiGht the HB.r in the straight­fori·t2.:::-c1 purs1.::5 t of uD£'.wbienous objectives, rt/cher the.n restricting him to ccO::cdj_EC',t:l.on 'i'7ith Vietr!0J:1cse COUll"G'2~:CP:'2~ts "Those motive.tions a.t all tj.mes ,·:sre a cOr"pos'Lte of politj.cal f.nd personal O.S vlell as mili­tar;)" consid·3ro.t.ions.

'Then queried on the m9.tter, GeneI'al \';estncreland opposed e .. !·lY forj~3.1 lLe:cgiDg of cor~;rl9.,nds, l1ref'erring instead the maintene.nce of infor!':~~~l C001):;x'atj.on and coorc1inc ... tion tOB(~t!:ler l:it,h e, lird.ted cc!~bined staff vndel" eXl ArLeItics.n chj.ef "lit,h a Victnc.;~€:se deptlty. 'This arre .. nge-mcnt ,",ould l:.lctter ass\1.8.gc the GVn l s sensitivities to Q.uest.ions of sovereiChl.,J nnd "nne ne'c·:')·jc:,l·j(;O",·,,] II l'ull ;'1t~(fl'''''!''ion nL

' C(~'tw>;)'''Irl (':!nY'lcoro·l v~sLr'c)··'el""",,·l ~.. ...:; - ..... -"- ... __ ;"' __ >.-~... ...... ~~ .t::: o .. c" " ......... .L ' ••...• ::..., __ ..... , ,:; .... ~ .. ..; <;,ow ""'" lJ..... CO'.:..:. .....

adv':i.s(~c1, shoi;.ld be defc1'7Ced U11til so:-r,~ 19.:t,'2!.~ t:i.r:"l-2 1'Then the in:lux of U. s. forces l::ight require it and GVH sens:~,1)ilitj.:.;s T:1~.ght be mOl~e disJ:osed to its e,ccepte.nce. 143/ In l'.:e .. y, S~cret,?,ry ;·:C::~';~:~~.l'a authoriz."2Q the creation of 8.. fo:r-/".l cc:::bined authori'GY in Vi 8tneX(c , lUff But sine8 both Ky ana. Thicu 118,d just publicly C01Kl'::';~::rJ.0d &'n~r j o:lntCo!·:-~j:::0..nd idc~8, in :pl~ess inter­v:i.eHs, both A:~:bD..ss2.dor Taylor 8,ncl GenBral 1·~est!;:orelfl.nd recoF~;!en:i-2d agu,in;~"

the Pl'oposcd action. 11l5/ CIllCPAC bac)'.sd up CO;,iUSE"CV's conc"rn about alienating the South Vietne.Tllese:

Refs A and B f!Jaigon meSS2.ge 3855, 24 l,~ay; and CO:·:US:·~!i.CV messe.ge 17292, 240603Z )·'0.;.'7 age.:Ln point out the f'ormidabJ.e disadvantages 'Ihich obstruct ec.rly este.blishment of' any formal con:bined cOJr=nd authori.ty in South Vietnam. I am fully in accord ,·:ith the vieus of the Ambassador z.nd General Hestmorele.nd in this regard.

The long~range.nature of the actions directed by Ref e pes msg 3159, 142228z 1.\ai! is recognized. At the sarne time it i.s apparent that we should anticipate continued public· speeulatiou as to the purpose and motive of any consolidBrtion of multi-national forces into a single command if we pursue even the most limited measures. Altllough a combined com.=nd might generate an outward illusion of unity, many divisive influ-. ences will remain at workbenea'Gh the surface to exacerbate claims of American neo-colonialism and self-assumed leadership.

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ConvEntional opcX'c,tions of C01'l,s-level magnitude, in CQDtl'D.st to COllnteX':Lnf3Urcclley 01)cre ... tions, ''lould of' course reg,nire closer coordinaU.on ".nd possibly some form of inter­nat:i,o!:!e.l cOlmnand mechanism. Until a combined cOlm~and is cle2.l'ly in our best interests ",e should continue to stimulate RVil resolve to. fiGht a countcr1ns'C.rgency Wllr which is and must rf:Le,in their :pr:l!'!~8.ry respolls:t"bility. Premature exp-:;ri­n:entation Hi th ne,·! corm:l2.nd 6.rl'e,ngc,;::2nts Hould bG counter­prochi.ct.ive S110u.ld it. \'le2,.]:cn ni:;,.tj.o:.121 It''li ty l'lithin th~ R~'.TtrAF or p,'o~:ote a feeling of D.pa thy in the countryside. 146/

TflGSe ex(;hanges ef'fectively e~ded th'S question of ul1i:fj:ed c·olYLl:8,nd. In the absence of unity of cOJl:)na.nd, GeLeral l'lestmoreland had already accepted the concept of thc Tc.cticc,l Ares, of ResponsibHitO' (TAOR), an exp-2d:~cnt coordin(J.ting meeh3,l1isr(~ ol~icir:.ally "lorked out bett'reen the local A::::V~J cOL'::.c,nde:rs and the J.1C'~rines dei'endil1g the D? .. :ra..ng perimeter. ~'he co~,cspt 1;as a pr!'ctic8,1 one for 2. i:"r in ,:hich there a:te no front 1i118S e,nd in l;-h:;':ch milit8,ry units oJl·:;:rc:t.e throuGhout the coantry. Specific geoZ:t'p"ph5.c ~rep"s 1\'ere BJss:iEnecl. to specific u~its ,·:110 then had exclusive e .. v:tnority o;n.d respol1s:i.bi1itJr to opero,te -v:ithill them. l,;ilita~'y ·units could not enter or::';;:ce into e.!.other unit's TAOI( vlithout the pe:('~~·.issicn of its COl1lr.!.andcr. du1:--se=2.u:::.ntly, the conceJ.)t l"lould l"8,ise some p:coblolY.s as the requirement fer r8,pid redeployment and the extensive use of' E:.i:r tlcbility made such f'orr:£',l, f'j.xcd e.rrangerr.ents e.";·;~1t';U'd ~ But in 1965 "Ghe TACH provided a simple and effective solution to t.he coor(\ina·· tion proble:n rais'ed by uni,ts under. c.1ifferer.l. t CO!lTv2 .. nds oP'=!'t:·;ting throv.t:;hout the c01;.~t:ey. Its adopt:iou n:ay be vie .. :cd as an e.tter;~pt to p!"cvide lir::itf~ <~ ~ terri torial lU1ity of com~!and in the ~"bSC!1c.e of an overo.ll, national .,,". l' un:Ll,y:l.ng mec.1anlSln.

General i'iestmorel~"nd attempted to co:rpensate for this absence of unity ("lhieh he had endorsed for non-r.::i.l:i.t!J.ry reasons) by the creation of a corr,bj.ned coordinating ste.ff at .the !le.tiOl~al level and by rraki.ng the senior U. S. mtlitary commanders clso the senior mi.lite.rO' advisor 1-rit),in their respective D,rer.S of concel'll. In April he decided to raise 1'lith the GVN the question of a combined 1,:'.CV-JGS staff. (He had already extended the tour in ItvN of the general officer he had chosen to head this staff.) Such a staff mi.ght have permitted the develoJl'llent of agreed operational plans based upon agreed priorities. It ,'rould have been a possible intermediate step to'irard unity of effort. But the GVN (represented by Generals Thieu and "Little" Minh) resisted any. I!uggestion for an integrating mechanism of this kind. . The proposal was quietly dropped. 147/

.

,

· COllYCOlltional OPCI'C,tiollS of Corps-level magnitude, in cont:CD.st to countel':i nsurccriey 01)Cl'at:1.ons, 1'lould of' course re(J.uire closer coordi.naU.ol1 [end possibly some form of inter­ne;t;:i,o~e,l cOl!Jlnand mechn,nism. Until a combined com ":land is cle8.rly in our best interests '-70 should continue to stimulate RVn resolve to. fieht ,a counterinsurgency 1-1'11' which is and must :rer:,_a5.n their l?ri!!:B.ry :respollsi'bility. Prcmfl.ture exp-~ri­ment?tion 1'li th ne,-, comnecnd &.rl'2.ng(o",cnts ,lOuld be counter­proQ\\ct,ive sl!ould it 1;reeJ:cll ne.:t:i.o:1Ctl uY}ity vlithin the RVNAF or p::'or:;ote a feeling of D,pe.thy in the countryside. 146/

TilO"s, 8:::';:10" ADVISORS. AND II cO!:-;mV~D S'r!\FF -_.- -. ---- -,,----_._-_. These ex(;hanges effectively enc18cl th", (lUestion of unified c·omrr.8,nd.

In the absence of unity of cOlHrk'md, Gen.'eral l'lestmore18,nd had already accepted the co!!cept of the T~.ctical Are 8. of Responsibility (TAOR), an expedient coordinating me e118.ni Sf!', oricil!a.lly \lorked out bet\'Jeen the local A?V;; CO!,_-:o.!l.ders and the j,le.1'Ines defending the D~.l:ang perimeter. The co:,cspt 1':as a p1'actice.l one for f, i':,,1' in ,:h:ich thsre are no front lines and in 1-:hich milit".ry units op·crat.e throuehout the cOQ'ltry. Specific geozraph5:c are(!..s l\Tere assigned to specific u:1its r:ho then heJd exclusive E'4uthority I;l.nd responsi.oi15 . .ty to operate w~·;'"ithill them. Eilita~'Y units could not enter orfh'c into 8,:.o'o11er unit's TAOH ,d'ohout the pc:r:-:-_issioll of' its conlr.<r~ndcr. ..:)l..l0Se~usntly, the concept \-Tould r8,ise some prcblen:s as the 1'c(J.ui:cement fer l'B.pid redeployment <,.nd the extensi v€ use of air l!!obility made such forl~!~.l, fixed e.rre,ngerr,cnts a ... ·.wk~·.w~rd, But in 1965 the TAORprovided a simple B.r,d effective solution to t.he coordina-­tion problem raised by unit.s under. differerJ.t coriT'!ands Op'3!,p.ti;'1g thrc-tJ.c:;11olrt the co'c.::'';l'Y. Its adopt:ion ll:ay be vic .. :cd as un 8.tter.ljJ'C to provide lirc,lte", terri torie.l lU1ity of com':'flo.nd in· the abss:::l(!e of' an overn.l1, nationa,l unifying meche-.nism.

General i-!estmoreland attempted to co;r"pensatefor this absence of u.!'lity (1-;l1ich he had endorsed for non-Eili.t!,ry reasons) by the c1'ea.tion of a corr,bined coordinating ste,ff at .t.he !lational level and by ma!cj.ng the senior U. S. mtli tary commanders also the Senior mj.li tp,ry advisor ,-rit!,5n their resl'ccti ve v,reo,s of concel'll. In April he decided to raise ~Iith the GVN the question of a combined ]--J\CV -JGS staff. (He ha.d already extended the tour in RVN of the general officer he had chosen to head this staff.) Such a staff might have permitted the develop:nent of agreed operational plans based upon agreed priorities. It would have been a possible intermediate step toward unity of effort. But the GVN (represented by Generals Thieu and "Little" Minh) resisted any_ suggestion for an' integrating mechanism of this kind. ·The proposal was quietly dropped. 147/

6.2

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The 1965 ccrlt",itment of U.S. forces also prompted a high level U. S. dcbo,te on the advisabD-i.ty of creatinG somc form of unified cOH!bined cc:~c:.::,nd. The questl.on ~/aS first raised in HE\shington in mi.d-l'3,rch Vlhen Geners,l H. K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, returned from a visit to Vietr.am 1d.th the recommendat).on for deployment of U.S. cOlcbe.t forces. 142/ The ideo, he,d the sP.r:,e conccptual origins as the encc,c1l'e"cllt proposals, namely trmt if IWRII.F could be co=e.nded

. by or associated ,d.th U.S. troops it might be l~olded at last into an effec!t:i.ve i'ighti.ng force. In addi tj.on, such e, unified alHed cOl:'!!!',(md "TQuld hs.ve [;iY,2::J th·:;! senior con:!nandcr-~:pTe.s\~/::c.bly co~·mS:··L';'CV--f·ar greater frecdc::l to deploy fO~'ces and fiGht the liar in the straight­fori':£i.:::-c1 JftJ.:cst"dt of une.mb:ieno't).s objectives, re:'cher the,n restricting him to coo:cdj.!!.·:;,tion ,·~ith V:!.etr!f..tlCSe c01).n:Gel'p::'l~ts ""1hose lYlotive.tions at all tiKCS \':5r8 a cOf.}):loslte of politJ.cal o,nd personal D,S "lell as mili-tary consid,::X'&:'0:Lons. .

1'men queried on the m9.tter, Gcnere,l \':estT:loreland opposed e .. !'ly forr23.1 1~"el'GiD3 of corr .. ':l;t,nds, preferring instee.d the m3..intcne.nce of infol"':'::~"l COo})2:catio21 and cooi.~din2.,tion togE:t11er ,d.th a lird.ted cCr.1bined staff uYider f.n j\ .. tcel"ican ch:tef 1'Ji th a. Victn[::,~:~ se deputy. This arre .. nge-m'2nt "lould "Detter aSS\.1.~Ge the GVN ' s son.:i t:tvitics to quest.ions of sovereicntJ and "neo-~olo·"'·i!:,'·iC'·", 1t -r:~l\ll ;n+e~'t~~~'!"ion of' C'"''''-''''~l,,.l f!.e1"lClrr,_1 T·:.::.str'ore1aVld

.. ..... .... ~ .. ----..... -.. .[. ~~ v o. ~'''''-''. - '-' ..... ,.""--""'" "" .. ~ .... ..., .. - -. ---a(h)':tsr~c1, shot:.ld be def'cl'Y.'cd tll1til so:r~c lat.e!~ t:Lr:e \'ihen the in~lux of U. s. forces I:2.:tgbt reCluirc it. a.nd GVH sel1s:~bi15.ti~s n)·sht be more disposed to <ts "ccep.t.<:. ........... ·-:. lh-'/ In 1',?f;)Y S~cre'-pry ··:c"'n""':::',,~ !:'lu"hor-l nnd th" cre"'+i 0'1 .. .." l,c.';'J,\.. .... ,4 . .,) _ .~~ ... , _ l'" l .... ,~",. ,_'-" ....... V._ .... ~.~ __ .... o.v_.,

of a. fOl'!::[.l cc~:bined authority in Vict"?,,,). It,I;/ But since both Ky and. Thiem he,d ju.st publicly conck~~D"d any join'GCc2:,:,c,nd idse, l.n Jl,cess inte1'­vieHs, both A:~;bn.ssadol" T·aylor 8.ncl Gen..:::ral l,"est1;:orelp"nd recor~.r:-!end:2d agc:..in~;

the P"'oposcd action. Ilt5/ CIlICPAC be.cked up co;WSl{I\.CV's concern about e.lien&.tin8 thG South Vietnahlese:

Refs A and B f!3aigon l1'~ssr'Ge 3855, 24 !,;ay; Rnd Co;,?JS:,~!;,CV message 17292, 2406o3Z ).'o;;I..7 age.:en point. out the formj,dable disadvante,ges ~rh:!.ch obstruct ec,x-ly este,blishment of any formal con:bined cOll'mc.nd authority in South Vietnam. I am fully in accord ~rith the Vie\'IS of the Ambassador e,nd Gener",l 1'lestmoreland in this rega.rd.

The long-range.nature of the actions directed by Ref e pes msg 3159, 142228z Mail is recognized. At the same time it is apparent that we should Rnticipate continued public, speculation as to the purpose and motive of any consolid!l,tion of multi-national forces into a single command if we pursue even the most l,imited measures. Although a combined cOTllllland might generate an outward illusion of unity, many divisive influ-. ences will remain at work beneath the surf'ace to exacerbate claims of American neo-colonialism and self-assumed leadership.

61

• , ,On tbe U. S. side, ,:bere hjs sUGGestions had the force of orders, General Viestr.,orelarrd took one step to integrate the U.S. combat 6.nd advisory flmctions. The Cor:;rr!(mding General, III Narine Amphibious Force, the senior U.S. officer in the a.rea, ,las designated on 7 August as the Senior Ld-visor to the ARVN I CTZ Cor~c"[).nder. The former U. Fl, Senior Ac1viso::, becf!"''' the DSJmty Sellior Ac1visor lmc1er CG, III JC!'.F, although ,no i'llrther integr8,t:lol1 of the advisory strncture into the U. S. cha.in of co;:r:;::a.~1c1 ",C.B attcn-:ptcd. This p~;ttern \'70.S soon exte!ided to the other h:o C0:C-pS e.}.'fP"S 1:11e1'e me.jor U. S. units ,:ore operating. The latter cLLnges \':ere 1",'.c1" ?t the insiste'lce of the ARVrl Coros Com!m!.nc1crs ",-ho felt th3/C they· ,·!mIld suffer a loss of prestige if they 'were ",;,dv:i.seo." by Ex~yone ot11e:c tho,n the s(!nior U.S. officer in the zone. ThuD > o~:. 21 O(;t.ober, the COT:lYL&.nde:c of Bq" Field Force, Vi.etna..m (FFOrtCr;V), 1:itll OP21'8;~:t0112.l cOl1trol of 6.11 U. S. units in II Corps, ~ms also n,~,,:"'cl II Corps Senior Adv:\.so!'. On 1 December, CG, 1st Infantry Division \':0.S re.",ed III Corps S8nio1' Ac1vJso}:, follol'ling the pa.ttern already cBtr;:,l,l:1 shed. No such u.r::cr.:.ngcrr.lcnt, i·~G,S T;:'),clC, hOvlGVer, in IV Corps since the U. S. h~.d ]')0 rr:,.j 01' tJJ1:Lts c1C})Ioycd then,. )):8/ Later, ",hen U. S. force dE.plo:~lrle~l"t~s' ba3. led to the cst;;,blis};.:~~~nt of a.nether FYORCEV hcadq.v.8,rtGrS~ each L::~Vn Co::cps Co;':.:r~:~nder i',~8,S e,d\tised by a U. S. Li€:utenant Gencre..ll'i'ith c('luivE.l'::1t ~jeS. r-sspon.sibilitie.s [',~1d r .. U.S. genere,lofficer _1'las appoir:.t.c;d S(:nior Advisor in the D-31tf), Q,l'e:;" I'Tb,ich bo.d no U.S. cor:.:bat. mo.~euv€;r u.ni ts.

LEVl:-:Rt .. G?: 'I'~~~ }-IIDD:'~-; ISS7JE -.--~------,----------

It is rele-.rant to e.sl~ ,,;h~r CO:;·:lTS:-·J:..CV (be,(·.ksd up 1-;i thout exc€p'.:.ion by the Pxioe .. $ s?dor aile} CIE8F;~C) unifoI'lrily o?Tosed integre.ti ve !:;eas'tn'es desie:ned to provide that \-:-h:Lch \';as Q,nd is e,l!":ost an e~!'ticle of fe.:i.th in the militB-ry pro:fession--tm.ity of co:',::c::,nd. U. s. tl'OOPS in both

. vlorld vl0.rs and in Ko:!'.ea he .. d f'crv.sht unc1e):- e.t lec.st. nominal cG!;r.?"nd 'U.nity. There had been reser'va.tions for national integrity, to be sure, but the principle of unified CO):,:),~nd ,iE,S both est~.blished and generally accepted. Why then did the U.S. lliilite.ry CO!lllilander in Vietnam recolY'::·,end against its adoption?

The ans\'rer to this question is. not to be found by an exa'!'.ination of military factors. The issue, rather, ~Tas a political one, as CIl'lCPAC'S message quoted above makes clear. The U.S. military leaders fee.red the exacerbations of US-SVN differences which they thought vlOuld accomJ?>-9.ny an overt Americanization of the war. They wished to increase U.S. influ­ence in the conduct of the war but only as a result of persuasion and example. They tended to eschew the use of leverage. A unified command arrangement would baveprovided--assuming that a U.S. officer ,Tould have been the overall commanc1er--an open and obvious means by 'Thich to . exercise leverage. The U.S. leaders in Saigon rejected its adoption for this reason.

,-----_.

The rejection of' £l. unif'ied military command is only one example of' the tendency in 1965 to renounce leverage oriented mechanisms at the verI! time tl1at the U.S. I';as cO!:"nitting major land forces to the I'iar. It vias as though the U.S. increo,sed its determi.nation to avoid e,rrangements vrhleb smacked bf direct., open levere,ge at the same time that the inadequacy of' earlier, indi.rect measures 11as ln2,de obvious by tlle deplo~1nent to South Viet.m;!l! of' U.S. ground combo,t forces.

This me,y, in fact" be l'lllat rappened. Some sporadic ea,rlier attemptE: e,t lever"Ee bt,d not borne the desired :fruit. Amba.ss(',dor Taylor had bad a disv,st.rons eX,])8rience in tr;,-ing to use the U. S. decl.sl.on to COI,,-",';6nce bo:;;bJng ;,ol'th Vietnam as a lever to get GVN ref'orm in December 1964. TlJe !let outcome was a violent reaction by General K1lo,nh, IdlO very nearly hE,d Tp.ylor thro;-m out of' the cOl;:>tr;\r as ;perso£l~'2: ~ K£.":!:~' In the end, it vias Kna,nh vTllo went, but the poUtical turmoil th2.t this produced in the first months of' 1965, ,when the course of' the ,'rar vw.s taking a dr&"natic turn aSc,:lnst the GVN, comrlnccd Taylor that such atte;;;:pts should not be v.2"dc e'3c.:in (,,,t the nz;,c,iona.l level. * Concurrently, one of the rr,ost direct.'U.S. tools for influencing policy j.!:lplclr.enta.tion rot 10;'1er levels, th" joint sign-of'f for releas8 of piaster fu'lds for p',cifica;~io", ,·:as also being abar,doned. Tr.edecision ~:f),S made in Dccerr,ber 1964 by the lJSO:·l Director, J'2'. Killen. Early in 1965, AID stopped bu:r:tng pi.asters for the U. S. -controlled sector f\mds and, in June, agreement 'le.S reached id~;h the GVN for. province chief's to begin reCluisiticn:lng and releasing AID (!o:::;~oditie8 on their. O~'ln authority. 1~2/ Thus, the "troika si.gn-of'f''' Cf.~:e to an end. l-Ihile elv,borate arranGen'.'~nt" ~:ere m,;,(]o f'or getting reports of 1.l. S. a,dvisor concurrence or, non-concnrrcn:. the PrB,ctj.cal ef'fect VIas to rer:.oYC the advisor' s leverage and restrict his inf'l'0.8nce. In October, UW;·; begal! to ha.ve second tlloughtson the 1'/isdom of abandoning control of' its resources in the f'i.eld and proposed a restoration of' the "troike. sien-off'." The Mission Council endorsed the plan and had already launched disc;J.ssions I~ith the GVl'l I'Then the State Department objected to the idea, in:,isting that it ,Tould undermine our ef'f'orts to make the Vietnamese more independent and ef'fective. 150/ There the matter died.

In a' somevlhat related effort to overcome the delays in the Vietnamese pacif'ication system, M~CV acceded to its advisors' recommendations and, on 1 October, created a separate contingency fund of' 50,000 piasters f'or each subsector( district) advisor to be used for urgent proj ects. l?ector advisors were also given access to special f'unds. TlJe ,program was highly successf'ul and .toward the end of' the year Coilsideration I,as given to permanent establishment of'such revolving f'unds. 151/ The plan was

I' ' .X- See Task Force Paper IV.C., Evolution of' the 1¥ar: US/GVrI Relations, 1963-67; Part! .pp. 54-59.

64

._-_._--' \

, .

The rejection of a lU1ified military COllllllal'ld is only oneexarnple of the tendency in 1965 to renounce leverage oriented mechanisms at the very time that theU. S. m:.s co,""nitting major land forces to the 1',"":C. It Has ['s though the U.S. incrcG-sed its dctermj,m,tion to avoid arrangements ,lhich smacked of direct, open leverage at the same time that the inadcC].nacy of earlier, indj,rect meas'ures 1,as !n2.de obvious by the deplo~'1llent to South Vietm;!ll of U.S. grotmd combo,t forces.

This me.y, in fact" be \<lhat r.e,pp<med. Some sporadic e8,rlier attempt£: e,'!; lever"Ee hred not bornc the desired fruit. Amhasse,dor Taylor had b2.d a disB.strOl1s exp;:!rience in t!'yir!b to· use the U.S. dec5.sj.on to corrJ~~ence bo~,b:ing HOl'tll Vietnam as a 10v81' to get GVN reform in December 1964. The net OUtC0!18 was a violent reaction by General Kho,nh, 1':ho very nearly h<,d Taylor thrown out of the CN~:ltry as perllEg!'E: ~ £~.ta. In the end, 1t vias Khanh 1'1ho went, but the political turmoil that this produced in the first months of 1965, 1'lhen the course of the 'var 'T8.S taking a dre2natic turn as,,:lnst the GVH, corrdnccd Ta;v'lor tlJat such attelJpts should not be r.'?dc 8{~ain ~.t the n~tioll9,l level. * Concurrently, one of the ]Cost direct U.S. tools for influencing pOlicy j.!nplclr-entation e"t 10';:er levels, thc jOint sign-off for release of piaster funds for po.dficatio;-" ','las also be:tng abaEdoned. Tr,e decision was made j,n D8cerr,ber ,1964 by the USC:,l Director, /J:r. Killen. Earl;)' in 1965, AID stopped bUJ':tng pi,asters for the U. S. -controlled sector f\mds and, in June, a£reen~ent 1'lii.S reached l:i tli the GVn for province chieI"s to begin x'equisii:,icn.:tng e.nd relea,si!lg AID co::;~~!odities on their O~'ln authority. 149/ Thus, the "troil:a si,gn-off" ce.7,e to an end. l'ihile elaborate arrangen.znE~ 1'lere mG,de for getting reports of U.S. advisor concurrence or non-concnrrc",,' the pr8,ctj.cal effect vIas to rer;,oYe the advisor's lcverc.ge and restr:i,ct his innc,enee. In October, usa;,; began to have second thoughts em the 1'lisdon! of abandoning control of its resources in the field and proposed a restoration of the "troika, sign-off." The Mission Council endorsed the ple,n and had already launched disc"J.ssions "i th the GVl'l "Ihen the State Department objected to the idea, insisting tbat it ",ould undermine our efforts to make the Vietnamese more independent and effective. J.5a/ There the matter died.

In a·somewhat related effort to overcome the delays in the Vietnamese pacification system, MACV acceded to its advisors' recommendations and, on 1 October, created a sep~rate contingency flU1d of 50,000 piasters for each subsector( district) advisor to be used for urgent proj ects. Sector advisors were also given access to special funds. The ,program was highly successful and .tOl~ard the end of the year consideration ",as given to permanent establishment of ,such revolving funds. 151/ The plan was

I ' . . ,x- See Task Force Paper IV.C., Evolution of the vial': US/GVU Rela.tions, 1963-67; Part!. pp. 54-59.

64

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Del'~rk",nt had launched an ill-fated ef:Cort to have U.S. Army civil, affairs officers· introduced in tlJe pro'T~llces to aSSlU'e cor:petent, . corruption-free civil r.dministration in the combat-zones. 157/ Ambassa­dor Taylor's stout opposition had killed the propose,l, but the Secretl.',ry continued to push for stronger U.S. action 1rith the GVH. Mter his July visit to SaigOn he sent a memorandum to the Pres1dent .urging the U. S. to lay d01'1n terlQsfor its continuing assistance before the intro"' duction of more U.S. 1'orces. He suggested that ,1e exercise leverage tbrouc:-, our control of rice policy and g8-:tn P. "veto on major GVN cO!r;r",nders, statements about invading NV;1, and so op." 1,;8/

AgaJ.n in £rovember, l-lcKarnara recorded his 1Jnpatience Kith the GVIl and his belief that IlC should give a la~'ger and mo-.ce active role to our advisors at the province and district level. 1521 But the overall. U.S, approach to the GVli in 1965 1'las domi!1ll.ted by 011.1' felt need :for a..~ kind of goverr~1,ente,1 stcbil:i ty v1hich l'1Ould provide a b?sc fro::: ,;hich to cond'uct the ';ar. Proposals :f:ort"king a tough line were 1ddely regarded as Ngs that ii'pulled out fro1" lmder the GVN 1,muld bring it crashiJ;g dC1m, ):e,ther than as .levers th",t miglltbring ef:t'ect:lve cl:,e.nge.

\,;ith leverage-oriented arranger-lents effectively ruled out, U.S. adviso).'sin South Vietnam \'lere left I'rith the ?ltern3.t:l'fcs of p.dvisiclg their co'..~r-t.e:cce,rts only- on hOi'! best to conduct a. decided course or ot' - -eX1)-~d;'·'~ th'"ir r.dviee to emb' "ce "'hot o""l1t to be U'l('QrL<~'en Th~ .... --•. .:. -· .. ·6 -_...." . r", ~ ""0' -, - ~'- (,. __ l.... .... tendency \'71i'.S to follov1the latter course, to urge .upon Gv:-r p).allS and :progra!'.~_s P:.'.'2riean in concept and design for executio!1 bJr t.he South Viet­ne."l,?se. T'he Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms" for VC '1ho return volu.."l.tari1y to GVI": cO:ltrol) program ·'"las one exr: .. !T..ple of th..is tendency. The Hop Ta.c ("coopero:Lio!1," in V-ietnamer:e) pro~'!"e,m, to clear and told the iF.ll'lediate al'ea around Saigon, is another. Hop Tac' s slgnific&.nce ',:.ithrespect. to U.S. advisory activities resides in the fact that it ,,;as the most concerted attet~pt to apply the "oil blot" concept to rural pacification since the der.;ise of the Strategic HaT:'~et Program. Its failure can be attributed j.n large measure to GVN lack of .interest in and support for what 1'las ~Iidely regarded as an "American" program.

The idea ofa specj,a1 combined US/GVi'! effort to secure the critical area ringing Saigon was first advanced by Alnbassador Lodge in July 1964, at the HO!lOlulu Conference. His concern ~1ith the problem ~7ellt back to late 1963 ,lhen there-appraisals of thevrar following Diem's overthrol'1 revealed a dangerous deterioration in the III Corps area. A special US014 report on Long An Province had particularly troubled the Ambassador. In July 1964, as he. was returning :from his first tour in Vietnam, he proposed a special effort in eight provinces (Tay Ninh, Binh ~Qong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Vinh Long, and QuangNgia),allbut one of which wab near Saigon. The proposal was picked up by Ambassador ~aylorand the program set in motion during the summer o:f 1.964. The. -, :

66

--... _-----------_._--' I

aba(lQOned, h01'lever, after the four-month trial period due to the strong opposUj.on of the GVIl' Ninister i'or RD, General Tllang, ,qho contellded that such funds "lere undermin:i,n{S the legitj.ma.te ei'forts of his organization to meet urg(;ll'G province needs; it Vlould encourage Vietnamese dependence on the U. s. 1527 ,

But USO", did 'Use SUCCGssfully a i'orln of' direct, selective leverage in the late SU!l:mer of 1965. The Province Chj.ei' of Binh Tuy Province, I,t Colonel Cl1i,rlas accused of mic.neins sorce $250,000 in AID funds. \l!Jen USO;'; pressure on the GVW for h::.,s remo\'al produced no results, aid 'c\ the pl'ovince "las St'.sI'endcd on 23 Sept'C,~bGr, and USO/.l field :pGrsonnel 'Ier" vii t.hc1:CD;Kl1. In sp:i.te of Chi I s f)~iend2:-li:p i·~i"('h the Defense l.:illister and Dep:"lt.y .Pre;yj.er~ General Co, Prem5.cr K~T rG!{ioved h:iJn six ".;ee}::s l~ter. Aid to the province then resurced, but A;c:1nss"Jor Lode€: )Lad", it clear to thc l.:issIo" Co-~1cil th?t he dis",pp:covcd of' the action and did not want it rcp~"'ted (p!l.rticularly the press coveya.ge).. 153/

As alree,dy j,ndicated, both An;b?,ste.c10YIJ T",ylor (after his nee.r­dise,straus exp.oricnee in D2cer.:ber 1961;) and I,ouge preferred !10t to force the GV!, .01' att.cr"ptto usc l1iCh-l""T81 p:ccss','.:ce 'vo rea,ell solutions we felt necessf;,ry. The frr.,gility 61 ths :polit~Lcs,l e"rrr:1.ngeY:".ents in Saigon B,t any :point. in title seBx-sd to d5ct~.te f;.Ee,j,:':!r::t any U. S. act.ion -tha.t might p:recipite.te .coups or disrl~Tt1.o;.1 fr01T. elel:"ents eV8T'i leSS di.sposed to be coop5ratlve thc.n the cu:rrcn'L g:co·c.J)~ \,;Yos"'rE.:i:' they fr.1.Cht be. In this vie,,/, the successive Amb~,ssadors "Tere stro::Gly supported by tl1e St~te De:P~,rtr::ent. Thus, "lhile '·re rescnt(;d t11e Ky coup in J-ur:e, 1-:e did riot.hi!~g to exacerbe:Le our delicate relatioT!s .\':~-t.! . .l Ky. In July, dttring Secretary l~cl':5)._<,rs.·s visit, the GVN re'luest"d 1'. uc/c,lm:,tJon oi' the pi~.ster and a hefty increase in a.id'~ 15':!J Ra,th8T t1~?n \lse ·the request e...e an op'por­t1.'Ll1ity to pr'ess the_ GVl'I for action on r-.c.tters of U.S, concerYl, Am'bassador Taylor preferred to restrict our cou:lter~de:"?,nds in the il:'terest 'of' 'luic."­agree]';",ent:

Vie ~Iould avoid g:LYl,ng the kpression of asking for nel, agreements or imposing conditio:1s l~or cur increase AID •••• \ole do not ~iant to re,ise conMtioll.s in terms Ukely to be rejected or to re'luire prolonged debate. 155/

Cons e'luehtly , agreement ~/as reached bet,leen the two gov8'.cllJ!l"nts on ~8 July, provicling only for "joint discussions to precede :poliCY decisions ••• for control,of inflation," and scarcely mentioning GVN obligations. 156/. . . ..

McNAMARA' S MINORITY POSITION ON LEVERAGE

The only consistent supporter of increasing and exercising. U.S. leverage with .the GVN during 1965 ~/as Secretary NcNamara. As previously noted, he ~/as one of the :principal proponents of the joint cODll!land idea and a sU:Pl?orter of the encadrement proposals. In April, the Defense

"', '

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I i

I

On tbe IT. S. side, "bere his suggesticJl1s had the force of orders, . General Viestr.",oreland took one step to i.ntegre,te the U.S. combat D...l1d advisory flmctions. The COLDrl:>.nding General, III Marine Amphibious lPorce, the senior U.S. officer in the a,rea, ,las designated on 7 August as the Senior Ldvisor to trw ARVN I C~'Z Co"",,ander. The former U. fl. S('mior Advisor becf,,,e trle Deputy Senior Advisor lmder CG, III 1r.p.F, although no further integre,t.:lon of tile advisory strllcture into the U.S. chpoin of co:r::::a~1d \'/e,s attcLpted. Thj.s l,attern \'19,S soon extem1ed to the other tl;O C(;l:"]?S c.!.'ef.:.s \,;-hel'c rno..jor U. S. units \'~ere opera.ting. The latter ct",l1ges I':sre IT""de 8,'0 the insiste'1ee of the ARVN Corps CommEJ,ndr]rs 'd~o felt th?"t they vlould suffer a loss of prestige if they "lere "f.:,.dv5.sed1T by f.r.~yone otbe:c tl1~n the senior U.S. officer in the zone. Thu.n) o!:. 21 O(;'Gober, th~ comrr.ande:c of HQ., Field Force, Vi,etnam (F'FOHCEV), ,lith op2x'a'<;:to:12,1 co"trol of all U. S. units in II Corps, ,ms also nr-,~~·:cl II Corps Scnio)~ Adv:\.so)~. 011 1 December, CG, 1st Infantry D:tvision lI0,S re.>::ed III Corps S8nior Adviso:r., fol101'Ting the :pattern already e8tf~,1~1:1shed. no su('.ll £;.rl'r;,ngcEicnt "iO,S rc),dc, hm'lever, in IV Corps since the U.S. lmd l"0 r.::,jOl' UJl:i.tS d8})loycd thel"e. )):8/ Later, "hen U. S. force dE;.ployr.h=;~l"t:;s h8.:l led to the cst~;;,'bl:Ls};~~:ent of e.nother ITORCE'V hcadqul;~,!'tGrs, each rI:-c.nr Co:!:'ps Co;';.:Y~~~nde:c \·:r~8 p,d-·.r:i. sed by aU. S. LiE;'li.tenant Gene!'e,;l,·;it.}:' erJ.ivc..l'::!1t ~T.S. rcsJ?onsibilitie.:::; [;'.~1d a U.S. genere,lo.fficer

_"las D..I)poir.:.t.sd Senior Advi.sor in the D'31tf), 6,:ce~, "ir!.ich b?d no U.S. cor.:bat ma~euYcr urJ.i ts.

It is rele-vant to e,sl<: ,-;hy CO~·:US~,,:t:..CV (t.e,('-ked up lii thout except.ion by the P.xi'02 ... ss?'.dor t;.nc1 CIl:8F;~C) v.nifol'n1.y O?:I.;~sed integre.ti ve r:;ee.sn:!:"es desiEl1ed to provide that ,·;h:Lch ,,;as 6,nd :is ~.l!·:o£t ['I.n article oi" f~.ith in the militf.ry :profession--UJ'Jity of cc;·::c.:,nd, U. S. troops in both

. Horld \'ls.rs e,nd in KO!'~a he.d fcnJD1"G undE!:c p,t lcc.st nominal co::r.!" ... nd unity .. 1'here had bec.n reser've,tions for national integrity, to be sure, but the principle of unified co:r,:;,g,no1 '[2,S both est8.blished o,no1 generally accepted. Hhy then did the U.S. military comr,'8.uder in Vietnam recorr,y"end. against its adoption?

The anS1'1er to this question is not to be found by an examination of military factors. The issue, rather, VIas a political one, as CINCPAC's message quoted above makes clear. The U. S. military leaders fea:r.ed the exacerbations of' US-SVN diff'e:r.ences whi.ch they thought ,lOuld accompany an overt Americanization of-the 'Iar. They Vlished to increase U.S. influ­ence in the conduct of' the war but only as a result of :persuasion and exam:ple. They tended to eschew the use of leverage. A unified command arrangement lwuldhave 'provided--assuming that a U.S. of'ficer ,Iould have been the overall commander--an open and obvious means by which to exercise leverage. The U.S. leaders in Saigon rejected its ado:ption for this reason.

,

63

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II

'Del?:;;rtt:~nt had launched an ill-fated effort to have U.S. Army civil 'ai'fa.i~s officers· introduced in the prov:inces to allsure cor:petent, ' corruption-fi'ce civil administration in the combe.t. zones. 157/ Ambassa­dor Taylor's stout opposition lUl.d killed the propose.l, but the Secretr.ry continued. to push for stronger U.S, actiO!1 ,~ith the GVH. Arter his JulY visit to Saigon he sent a memorandum to the Presldent urging the U. S. t.') lay dOl'ln tenasfor its continuing assistance before the intro..; duction of more U.S, forces. He suggested that ;re exercise leverage

. throuGh our control of rice policy and g::;.i.n a. "veto on major GVN COl7;:",·,n:1ers, statements about invading ]\TV,,[, and so O,!." 158/

AgaJ,ll in l!ovenlber, l~cN!l..ma.ra re(;orded his impa:i;ience ldth the GVIl ~d his belief thatl'le should give a la~'ger and more active role to our a.dvisors at the province and dj,stric'c level. 15.J./ But the overall U, S. approach to the GVI~ in 1965 "las dominated by OilI'felt need for atry kind of goverr"1,ente,lstabil:i i;y ~lhich !'lould provide a base fr= Khich to cond'Qct i;he \"p.r. Proposals for taking e. tough line 1-7ere l:ide1y regarded as rugs thai; Hpulle d out i'l'Olj, under the GVN would bring it .crashing dOl·;n, l'f.ther than as levers that might bring effect:tve che.nge.

\'::1 tll leverage~oriented arrangements effectiveJy ruled out, U. S. a-:'lvisol'zin'South Vietnarn "lere left 1-lith the a1ternati'Tes of' !'.dvisbg their cO'.,!!t.el'p:".rts only on hem best to conduct a decided COllI'Se or of eX'(\9.~1di:lg their '-r"dv1ce to embrace ":h~t o'.;.ght to h~ unc1ert.5.:~~en. The teildency Vle.s to f'ollovTt.he latter "CuU:rse, to urge .upon GV:-r pla!!S a!!d pl'ogra::,s P:.,,:;rica11 in concept and design ror executioh by the South Viet­na:,!"se. The Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms" for VC ~lho return voluntarily to GV,: cO!1trol) prOgraml'iD.S one exe.rr.:ple of this tendencjr. The Hop Tac ("coopera{io!1, "in Vietnamese) progre,l'l, to clear and Lold the ir.m'.ediate area aronnd Saigon, is another. Hop Tao's significance ,,:ithrespect to U,S.adyisory e..ctivities resides in thef'act that it ,las the most conceJ:'ted atter;:pt to apply the "oil blot" concept to rural pacification since the der.;ise of' the Strategic Harrlet Progra'll. Its failure can be attributed in large measure to GVN lack of .interest in and support for what 1-ras ;Tid'ely regarded as an "AJnerican" program. '

The idea of a speda.l combined UShVN effort ,. to secure the critical area ringing· Saigon was first advanced by AmbassadoJ:' Lodge in July 1964, at the Honolulu Conference. His concern ~Tith the problem Vlentbackto late 1963 "hen the re.,.appraisals of the~lar following Diem's overth:!'o"T revealed a dangerous deterioration in the III Corps area. A special USOr.! report on Long An Province had particula.rly troubled the Ambassador. In July 1964, as he. was returning from his first tour in Vietnam, he proposed a specialeff'ort in eight provinces (TayNinh, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An,Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Vinh Long,and Quang Ngia), 'all but one of~Thich wab near Saigon. The proposal was picked up by Ambassac;!o;t" Taylor and the program set in motion during the summer of' 1964. The,

66

abandoned, hOi'1ever, after the four-month trial period due to the strong opposi.ti.on of the GVr.; Min:tster for RD, General Thang, l~hb conter..ded that such i'llnds l'1ere undermining the legiti.m'l.te efforts of his organization to meet urgent province needs; it would encourage Vietnamese dependence on the U.S. 1527 .

But uso;': did use successfully a. form of direct, selective leverage in the late SlJ.Y,;:ner of 1965. The Province Chi.ef of Binh Tuy P.cO'vi.nce, I,t Colonel Chi, ~Ias e.ccuscd of micHsins SO:l:e $250,000 in AID funds. l~llen usmc pressure on the GVi{ for h:Ls removal produced no results, aid ,,;( the pl'ovince \-las s1Jspended on 23 Sept0~"0Gr, and USOI! field p~rsoIlIlel 'lOX"

,Ii t.l1d1'0.;1n. In spi.te of Chi's fdeno2!1ip ,-:it}] t.he Defense l-:inister and Dep'..\t~'P!'e:~,ier, General Co, 1'1'eL1;.er I:y removed hhn six ~1ee)cs later. Aid to the pl'ovincethen resurced, ont .A:~.bc.ss"Jor Lodge I:";;;d", it clear to thc j·:issJo:: Co\mcil the.t he diso.pp:COVCcl of the action and did not Tlant it rcpss.ted (ps.rticularly the press co-rerage). 153/

As alrea.dy j.ndicated, both An:o?snclors Tr,.ylor (after his nee.r­dise.straus eX'LY.;rience in Decer;~ber 19G~) f;"!,nu TJod.ge preferred not to force' the GVrior attcr;,pt to UISC hich-1evc.l :press;1.re 'vo rea,ch solutions \le felt necessf::..r~~. Tn.e frt~gility 6f ths :polit:tcs,l arrangm-:-.ents. in Saigon B.t al1Y 'PO'iEt. in time seej~-c:·d to c1j.c·cs,te ~[:;P.:,5:'''tBt any u. s. e.ction tha.t m~;ght p!'eci:pi tc.te eot1ps or disrl:F':'~l 0;.1 fron: eler!":ents even less dj_,sposed to be coop-3ra'tive theXL the current grO' .. l})~ 'r;l-!o~ver thc:.y rdEht be. In this vie;'" the succcssi-...·e Ambcl,ssa.dors i':rel'C stro:'Gly supported by tl'le Stete De:p~,rtr;.ent. Thus, .",hile \,[e resents.:! 't!1e Ky coup in Jt1.1:e" t-:e did notl1ing to exacerbe.te our delicate rE:lf:\:tio~·;.s \':2_th Ky. In July, duri.!!g Secreta:cy Mcl1:,'r.1'.ra t s visit, the GVNrcquestcd f" dCfaluat10n of the piaster and a hefty increase ill aid. 15'::/ ·Rc.th8T tb.n use the request afl an O}Tpor-

. tlLl1ity to. pr'ess the GVN for act.ion on ru.:.tters of U.S. concer71, Am'hassad.or Taylor preferred to restrict our cOl'.::ter-de'"?nds in the interest 'of quick agreen:ent:

vie l-JOuld avoid gJ.VJ.ng the hpression of asking for new agreerrents or imposing conditions for cur inc~ease AID •••• vie do not ~iant to re,ise condHioEs in terms 1i.kely to be rejected or to requireproloEE;ed debate. 155/ .

Consequently, .agreement vias reached bet,\leen the two gover=ents on g8 July, providing only for "joint discussions to precede policy decisions ••• forcontrol·of inflation," and scarcely mentioning GVN obligations. 156/.

McNANARA'S MINORITY' POSITION ON LEVERAGE

The only consistent supporter of increasing and exercising U.S. leverage with the GVN duril;lg 1965 vias Secretary McNamara. As previously noted, he vias one of the principal pl'oponents of the joint command idea and a supporter bf the encadrement proposals. In April, the Defense

'., '

65

~: ~---------' ----1·---- 1----'----

ini'~ia1 objective was to ste.blli7.e the s:Ltue;i:.ion around Ss.igon and . protect the capit~.1, then extend the zone: of securit.;), in an ever ~rideni.l1g ring around the city. W,CV ('p>,ointed Colonel Jas1'2r J. tillson to hea.d the ef'fort and by September 1964 a l,lan had been pl'oduced a.nd the Vietnamese reluctantly induced to set up a special council to coo:cjir.:ate the .l".'j'J.ltiple cornrnands operatinG in the arcc.. The pla.n cr"::f. ted fow" roughly concentr:lc zones arotLi1d tJ'J.0 capite.I, each to be successivel;r cleared .aDd secu"t'ed, ~10rk:i.!)g fro!:! the "inside of the doughnut out. 11 Conc0ptually, three :phases 1·.rere involyed j,n e~ch zone first, sc~,rc}l &.nd destroy missions to elj]:-.:.inL~te main force units; tber: a cle2,rinz p~:,:; . .se using ))rimarily squ::-.d and :platoon size f'orccs in :p:;;,.tl'o:~ e.;:-,a c..r;io-";.S:l'~S; e.nd fir:.e.lly, the seClJ.ri!1g p1"utse in l';-hich AHV1,T turned over r~spo!~sibilities for secu::city in a Eone to RF/PF and nr;.tio;;18.l :police and in ,·:hic)} heav;! c7,phasis ~:e.s to be laid on posHive rural economic and . soci.8.1 develoF:ent efforts.

Hop Te.c 'TB.S le.unched on 12 Septe::lber 1904, with e. s,:eep through Gi.a Dir:!h Province to the 1vest and south\':est of Saigon by the ARVN 51st Regi::£nt. The mission 1(9.S aborted the follo;;ing day, ho\,-over, by III th .. dra1·;~1 of the forces to -p;l.l"tieip;o .. te in (-. coup. Nevert.hel-ess) orge,nize,t5.C"f<: effol'ts continrt(::d and ·rr..ore ARVl] f'oi:.'ces vle:ce eO!1cent~(J,ted in the Hop 'I'ac e.l'C8.. A special survey of the area by USO:,!, USIS, and EACV i..'10ctoocr reVee,l£o. ·tr!~,t little rce,l progress ".;o..s be:l.ng F.~:.de. 1::1 sri te of the la.ck of' f.:t!..~r visible evidence of genu.ine ~~'.Olil·3';'1.tlt.·"'1; the Arilb.:.::.ss(:l.J.or and J:.1ACV contin1J.sd to be encou.ra.ged by the r!odest stf.tistical -progress of Hop Tee e.ta ti:~;e 1-:he;! nee.rly every other a.ctivity in the coul:try loo!:ed blacker all:> bl<:.cl'.cr. The 1964 ]·:ACV Co:,.r"G.nd Histor,f reflects t.he official vim'l: "At the end ct· 1904., Hop l'ac ~Je.s one of the fei' p"cification E:reas that sho~·:ed so::-,e S\.lccess and grea.ter pror"dse. n 160/

l{nether in re1:ponse to HopTac or not, the VC sl:bst.&.!:tially increa.sc: tr..ei:rforces in tile Hop .Tac area in the first six r,,021ths of 1965. 1'~\CV estL,,,ted the grO\·rth at 65 percent B.nd also noted tha.t, the ne;'1 troops ~;el:'e frequently equipped ~1ith Chinese ~leapOnS. This gro;,'th in enemy strength in tUrn prompted som.e :redeplo~n'::ent of RVl':'E\.F to strey:· [;then ca ra­bilities in the Capital Hilita.ry Region. In Feb.ual'Y, 1965, jU/it. at the tirr:e the U. S. W!l.S initiating the sustained bombing of r;orth Vietnam anq beginning the first Marine combat deployments in the South, COfliUS;f;ACV asked the I· and IV Corps senior advisors to revievr current programs and to develop Hop Tac-likeplans for their respective areas as a basis for discussion l1ith their counterparts. General vlestmoreland hoped to concentrate the.availab1e resources of each Corps into its most critical areas at a time vrhen VC activity and successes were continually mounting and enerny control of the country increasing dangerously. Agaih, the operative concept was to be the oil blot. By April General Viestmoreland bad convinced· Minister of the Armed Forces Minh to ask each of the ARVN Corps COlJl.rna.nder s (except III Corps, in whose area Hep Tac "las being . conducted) to drll.W up similar plans for their own areas of responsibility.

67

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The U. S. effol't 1I'<:'oS clearly aimed at spurring the practic"l applicat:lon of the "oil blot" a.nalogy. l~le effects, however, "Iere to demo!lstrate h01'l difficult it. was to translate simple counterinsurgent theol'y into practice" hO"11 convoluted and personal "ere the ARVN lines of influence, and hOl'l frustrat:i.ng it was under these circumstances to excrd Je influence by .persuasion.

In Ko.y, the Pl'ir."le j.!inister proposed organizational changes in Hop Tac to rcturn Inuch of it to the operational control of' the III Corps cot!lrc<J.nder. These che.nges ~Tere rej ected by COl.\uSMACV, but he did agree th,,-t the III Corps commmder mighJG be n~led c..lJairman of the Hop Te.c COQ'1ci 1. In JlL'1e, before anyth).ng could be done on this pro­pos".l, B. COD.p ldth General Ky at its head returned the military to p01'/er. By the Sl1;2",'6r of 1965, Hop Te.c ~:t'oS being completely over­she.dol·led by the build -up of U. S. forces.

In Septe:y,Oel', LodGe returned to Vietnam for hi~ second stint as Amba.ssador. He irrcnedJ.f.tely I'osl,ed a U.S. 1-1iss.:\on ofi'icer for a private asseSS1""nt of the Hop Tac progr~.m. The rcpOl't frankly described Hop Tac as a fe.ilu:ce a!ld stressed as l'caSOllS the· u.nreB.listic 80als of the' program, the irrclsYf.,nce of t'he cOncent:!'ic circle cor,cept to actual areas of GVli and VC strength, the fo.ct that it lias an A..':1crice.l1 plan never re&.lly given first priority by the V1.etnar."2se, the area's pol:i.tical vulnerability to fallout fro:1 Saigon pol:i.tice.l chan[!es, B.nd General Ky's lack of support. for it. The report recc~;:melldcd letting Hop 'I'f:C sl~lly die. On September 15, the Mission Council deliberated inconclusively 011 the fate of the progra:L:

Genera.l l'iestmoreland srdd that 1fhile Hop Tac could be said only to have been abont 50'% successf\ll, it he.d undoubtedly averted aVe seige of Saigon. Amb~.ssador Lodge then briefly rev1.e~·Jcd the original reasons for "Glle €!',p:lasis placed on the area surroQ'1dingSs.igon Eond said that they l're1'e st:tll valid, prime.rily be.cause of the heavy de~ls:t ty of population. He noted, h01rever, le.c'~ of a clear COlrJr:i tment to Hop Tac on the part of the GVN, possibly due to the fact that the Vietnamese consider the program e.n American scheme. TIle viErl'1 1'Ias also expressed that the trouble '{J!.!J,Y also lie in US/GV!:! differences over some fundamental concepts in Hop Tac. 161/ .

By the end of 1965, the proposal for Hop Te.c programs in I, II, and IV Corps had refined itself into the scheme for National Priority Areas that became the focus of.attention in 1966. Hop Tac itself, ~n the Saigon vicinity, continued on into 1966 to be finally phased out at the end of the year and replaced by th.e III Corps R/D Council and. a U.S. military effort to protect the capital knbwn as Operation FAIRFAX •

. 68

.. __ ._----_ .. __ ... -------'--

,The U. S. effort was clearly aimed at spurring the practical applicat:Lon of. the "oil blot" analogy. 'Il1e effects, however, ~Tere to aemorlstrate ho'o" difficult it was to translate simple counter insurgent theory into prf.ctice, hO':I convoluted and pel'sonal ~Terethe ARVN lines of influence, and hw frustrating it was under these circumstances to excrcj::;e influence by persuasion.

In Ko,y, the Pdr:te Hinister proposed organiza.tional changes in Hop Tac to rctlU'll much of it to the operational control of the III Corps con;ly,1J.nder. These che,nges ~Tere rejected by COMUSloiI\.CV, but he did agree tn:l.t the III Corps commmder might. be n"~led chairman of the Hop To,c CourlCn. In J,L'1e, before anything could be done on this pro­pose.l, a coup 1'1i'0h General Ky at its hef.d returned the military to pOlIer. By the SU':l:OY:Cl' of 1965, Hop Te,c ,,:e.s being completely over­shad01'led by the build-up of U.S. forces.

In Septely,be!', Lodge returned to Vietnam for his second stint as Amba.ssa/lor. He irr::n~dic,tely asked a U.S. 1,1iss.:ion offic:er for a private aSseSSlu::nt of the Hop Tac program. 'I11e report frankly described Hop Tac as a failu:ce a::d stress\3das reasonl'; thelL'1re!;'.liStic goals of the prograJfl, the irrclsvF.;nce of t'he concent:!:'ic circle cor,ccpt to actu6.l areas of GVrT and VC strength, the fe,ct ths.t it ",as an A.':lerican pla,n never ree,lly given first p:!:'iority by the Vj.etnanl·2se, the. area's politica.lvulnera'bility t.o fallout fro~1 Saigon politics,1 ch:;.n[Jes, 8.111 Genere.l Ky's lack of snp:port. for it. The r\3pClrt recC::;"'11endcJ letting Hop T"c slcl\'Tly die. On September 15, the ).I:i.ssion Council deliberated l.ncollclusi vely on the fate of the progra:r.:

General l'lestmo:!:'eland said that 1,hile Hop Tac could be sa:Ld only to have .been about 50% succeSSful, it he.d undoubtedly averted a VC seige of SaiGon. Am'be.ssado:!:'. Lodge then briefly reyJ.e~'TCd the o1'iginal reasons for the emp~le,sis placed on the area surrcu.'1dingS"'igon e,nd said that they 1'Tere stHl valid, pr:imarily be.cause of the heavy density of popule.tion. He noted, h01Iever, lac;: of a clear corr.noitment to Hop Tac on th.epa.rt of the GVN,possibly due to the fe.ct that the Vietnamese cO:1sider the program e,n American scheme. The viE!1'I ~Tas also expressed that the trouble Inay also lie inUS/GV1~ differences over some fundamental concepts in Hop Tac. 161/

By the end of 1965, the proposal for Hop Tac programs in I, II, and IV Corps had refined itself into the scheme for National Priority Areas that became the focus of attention in 1966. Hop Tac itself, ~n the Saigon vicinity, continued on into 1966 to 'be finally phased out at the end of the year and replaced by the III Corps R/D Council and a U.S. military effort to protect. the capital knOl1n as Operation FAIRFAX.

68

---- -_ .. _------

initial objective was to ste.bilize the situe.tion around S~iGon and ' pl'otect the capital, then e~:tcnd the zone of securit.J• in "-11 ever ,-ridenj,ng ring around the cit~·. WICV L\:Pl10inted Colonel Jasp2r J. ~lilson to hes.d the effort s.nd by September 1964 a l,lan had been produced v.nd the Vietnamese reluctantly induced to set up a special council to coo:cd.ir~ate the .r./ultiple comrnB.nds operat.ing in the arc[;,. The plf'"n Cr0[, ted four roughlJr concentric zones around t}'lG capite.l, each to be successively cle~>red and secm'ed, ~lork:i.ng £'ron the "inside of the doughnut out." ConcE:ptually, three phf.ses ",ere invo)xed j,n each zom: first, sCe,:r~ch cZld der.itroy niissibn,s to elir.:i!lt'.te mail1 force units; ther; a cle3,ri:'13 pl:.ase using prim~rily squ?d a.nd platoon size i'o:!'CCS in :p3.tro:~ e.!"id B.r~O·i.: . .s:}·:;s; &.nd fin2J~y, the securi!1B phs,se in ,·:hich AP·:'Ji":J turned over rcspo:'-lsib5.1ities :for secm-'ity in E'" zone to RP/PF and n:;.tio~lB.l police and in \'i'hici"l heo.vJ er.-~phe .. sis ,,;e.s to be laid on posj.tive rural economic and soda.l dGveloF:e::tt efforts.

Hop Tb.c ,,"'s le.unched on 12 Septenber 1961r, "li th e. s\':eep throu&1J. Gj.a Dir!h }>covinee to the "IGst and sonttn·:est of Saigon by the ARVN 51st RGgi=:ler/G. Tne mission vas aborted the follO',;lng day, hm·:eyer, by vrHh­dra1'7a.l o~ the forces to ps.rtie:ipe-.. te in eo coup. Nevert,heless, orge.!}:i.ze,t:iJ'f<: .~,

effol'ts contin"LJ.ed and 'rr.ore ARVn fo:('ces "'6i:e cOll('.e:nt~(;,ted in the Hop Tac e.2'es.. A special survey of the G.rea by USO:1, USIS, and lfACV in .Octobcr rev E::?,le. J. 'tb~,t- little :ree.l progress \';as being rr:~~c1e. 1:1 srite of the 'lacl: of' ('.,r::;;r visibla, evidence of genuine :'lom·3Dttt.'::1, the Amb-:;.ss:.;~do:c anll l-1ACV contin~j.ed to be encolJraged by the l!'lod€st ste.tistice .. l prog".l"ess of Hop Te.c e.ta ti:'::e 1'lhe:'l neea-ly every other activity in the cOlEltry lool:ed blacker all:1 b18.cl'_cr. The. 1964 J.1l.CV CW;f;Oo,nd Fiisto!"J reflects t.J-"e official viml: fiAt the e;ld cf' 196~·,. Hop 'I!ac ,re.s one of the fe1'J pacifica.tion e.reas that sbo~':ed so::',e S',lCCeSS and greater prordse." 160/

l-Tnetber in reEponse to RopTac or not, the VC Sl:bst0.Y/cially increase: tr..ej.!, .forc(ls in the Rop .Tac area in the first six r.,o;:ths of 1965. I'~\CV estir,:ated the grmrth at 65 percent e.nd also noted that t),e ne,'r troops v:ere £'re'luently e'luipped vrith Chinese 1'le"-pons. This gro"th in enemy strength in turn prompted some rech=ploy;'::ent of Rvr:!~F to strc;:.sthen ce.:pa­bilitics in the Capita.l Military Region. In February, 1965, just. at the tiru3 the U.S. wp.s initiat:lng the sustained bombing of r:orth Vietnam and beginYling the first Marine combat deployments in the Sonth, CO?.\USl.\ACV a.sked the I, and IV Corps senior advisors to r(lVievl current programs and to develop Hop Tac-like plans for their respective areas as a basis for discussion l'1ith their eounterparts. General Vlestmoreland hoped to concentrate the available resources of each Corps into its most critical areas at a time when VC activity and successes wer.e continually mounting and enemy eontro~of the country increasing dangerously. Agaih, the operative concept was to be the oil blot. By April General vlestmoreland had convinced' Minister of the Armed Forees Minh to ask each of the ARVN Corps Commanders (except III Corps, in whose area Hop Tac l'1as being . conducted) to dr'3.W up similar plans for their own areas of responsibi~ity.

67

" As a test case for t!1C ever popular oil blot tlleory of pacifica-tion; lJop Tae left m\C:h 'Go bE! de8il'ed. It did, ho',rever, point up some of the di.fficulties to be encouIrtered in any attempt to implement this appeaUne;ly s:lmple--and perhaps simpl1.stie--eoncep'c. The oil blot theory, like all abstr8,ct almlo(;ie8, emph8.sizes the shnilarity between phenomena and ienores the! differences. The i)!'portp.nt similar:i.ty of the pacification prolllcm to the oil blot is t.he expressed goal of proGress:tve~ extendj.ne; the secure zone until it eJ~brll,ces the entire country. Unlike a blank p:tece of paper, bOl!Cver, the cl1viromncnt in 1'1bic11 p~,cifice,tion must t:';'·' place is ne:t thor neutral nor passive; and unlike the oil blot, the :pacifico/cion forces are not irripervious. Moreover, implicit in the theol' is the notion that the sec'cU'e e,reo" like the oil blot, vJi.ll e:l>:pa,nd in all directions S:Llfiulte,neotJ.sl:l, e..,t roughly the sC.m~ speed, and that expe.noion is irreversible and irrevocc.:ble. Further, the e.r~aloEY i'ails to ta.ke i?1'~'-_"; account tlnique J)l~obler.ls of tsrra:'l!1 or variances in governmen..l" and insurgc;rc,: strength in (Ufferent are8.s. One need not belabor the point; the concept is fine as e. theory, but not e.s " program desie;n. In fairness, it must be sa:td the,t the idee. does focus the need for concentration of resources in px'iori ty areas. All this not',-;lthste.nding,. III Corps ~;asless th:m the opt:i.mu:", ple,ee to test such a proCl't.m. It conto,Ins several longt:i~e Viet Cong stl'on[;bolc1s and be . .se e.:c~g,S c.~!d is extrc"o:r.-'d:iTr~ .. r:ily sensitive to pol:Lt,· ieal chG.!1Ges in Saie;on (28 0.:" 31 district chiefs \7ere replaced during the lifet:lme of Hop Tac).

~'be most importt.nt ree,so:} ror the failure of Hop Tac, hovle,or, "las the lack of South Vietn8.1'leSe support for :i.t. Frol~ its inception to its dewise, it \'las an Americs,:} idea, ple,n, and program. \·;hi1e the GViI adopted it, estl'..bl:tshed a h2ch-level council to supervise it, e,nd comaitted some troops a~1d other resources to it, this "las seen as a "iay of alYJ?e~.si!1g the Arnerict.ns. The Sout·h Vie.t?"!~,,~·~.·=se 'never o.ccorded Hop Tac 'a hig..~ priority in their 01'111 thinking. Koreover, its 101'1 status ,19.8 f\lrther emphasized by the massive U.S. force builii,·,up. As this U.S. build-up becat'.e rela­tively routinized, however, the issue of pacification reasserted itself.* vlhen it did so, the primary U.S. concern came to focus on the issue of hOYI best to ore;anize the nilite.r~·, p3.ro.!~D.ite.ry, and ci.vilie.n advisory efforts. Since even the civilian 8.dvisors in the field ,lere military personnel on loan in many instances, the LccolLrrt' of the military advisory build-up decisions became essenti8,11y an account of organizing advice for p9.cifica­tion.

* See Task Force Paper, Vol. IV.C.B., Reemphasis on Pacificat: .1: 1966-1967.

69

._-- ._ .. --------

D. Org:;,n:izat5011 as t.he Key t.o Effectiveness in -i;;;:cIT]'Co;Ftoll(19b6-:i967)

!!:!"l2, BASIS 1'01< ORGA.NI~I\L PREOCCUPATION

Several factors cont.ributed to t.he persistent U.S. pr.eoccu:re,tion in 1966 and 1967 with reorr.;(>,n5.zi.ng the advisory effort in order better to support pacif'iC<\tion e,ct:LvitiGs. F:lrst, it had be(!n c,n article of' f;;l,ith for several ;,-eo,rs ,·;:It.hin U. S. policyrr'aking circles that only by uiE'ling the "other 1-:,1,1'" oj' p(wificatioll could the U. S. hope to realize its obj ect:L ves :tn South V:Lctm~·"L. Secondly, the p:wific8,tion struggle was sti 11 reg~ .. rded essentie,lly as a task to be perfony,ed by the GVN -­e,s the tlmain force "~D.r" no lo~-!ger 1-:O.S ~fter the j.l1troc1nction of !UJ,jor U. S. combe t forces. ReJ.rLl"o:c'c:Lng this beli.ef vras a third factor, the .. :icl81y held cor:.victioll tb;t U. S. fox'ces could best concentrate on the me.in force ,var while RVNiU' focused on pacification.

Such a U.S.-RVH,lF division of effort, it "ras re,',so!1ed, would permit U. S. forces to take e,clve.rl-:;r ... r;e of the:ir greater tacticallwbility and fire support i'T:lthout endt.:;ger:tng c:i.vilie.n life and property, e!!lploY,RV1{.\F in a r;;8.nrlcr cG,lculatecl to rl:t.ninize the adverse effects of its :persistent in?.bili ty to gener<~.te 8J'l offensiv~,~·~inded .~2'.~:.~, and avoid the cultural acclirlHiz~,tion p.!ld lang""ze diff'ic-dti.es 1'111ich ";ould fe,ce U.S. forces in ,\;lJe p3,cil"icr.tion role. It sce:l'ed, in short,that RV::AF concentration O~ pacific~.tion v.nd U. s. conc€:l~trr:,tion on the me-in force eneMY 1·1OUld COll­stitnte the optiJr.al use of e,vr,ib.blc resources.

This division of effol't 1!1~a.nt the.t most U. S. military advisors l'Tould be directly involved in :p3,cj,fico,tio~ -- at least periodically if not con .. · tinuously. Advisors to regular .A~"Vn \L'1i ts CO\Lld expect to spend a c011sic1 .. -erable portion of their tir.-_e secv.riq; pacificatIon procre,~::s. Those advisors 17hose counterparts had pol:tt1c<1,1 e.nd aclrninistre.'Give responsibil­ities (e.g., province and district e.dvisors) and par8.!:lil:i.tary advisors (RF and PF) could expect pacification to be their major concern.

But while trie majority of U.S. military advisors Hould be engaged in paci.f'ica tion acti vi ties they lvould not be the only U. S. advisory personnel lfhose responsibilities focused on pacification programs. Advisors from USOM, CAS, and USIS had overlapping and in some instances competing responsibilities. Thus it "as logical for the U.S. to attempt to devise an organizational framm'10rk "hich "ould serve to coordinate adequately the activities of the large and diverse body of ad~isors and which "ould be capable to integrate their overlapping, functions.

70

--_ .• ---------_._-- J

D. Orw"nizatioll. 8,S t.he Key to Effectiveness ini;a:crr!:cO:t:toli]l"9b6-1967 )

TH~ BJ\I?IS l'OB ORGAJI!I:qlTJONAL PREOCCUPATION

Several factors contributed to the persistent U.S. preoccupe.tion in 1966 and 1967 with reore;(',n5.zing t.headvisory effort in order better to support pacification act:Lvities. First, H had been 2,n article of' fai til for several~ears \·,:lthin U. S. POlicYif>a,king circles that ouly by \'7iJ;~ling t.he "other ,:e,1'" oi' l,ac.ification could tl1e U. S. hope to realize its objeet:L ves in South V:cc:tn(:}~,. Secondly, the p9,cification strnggle \',as still reg"rded esscn~cj.&.lly as a task to be perfox'med by the GVW -­as the "r~R .. in force '\"D.:o:-" no lo:;-,ger ,,;o.s e,fter the introc1l.lction o~ lW.jor U. S. CO)o,(-.'/(. forces. ReJ.rLfol'(;ing this belief Vias a third factor, the widely held cor..viction tl1""t U. S. forces could best concentrate on the me.in force ,Iar l\'hile RVl'YAI' focused on pacification.

Such aU. S. -RVJ:YAF division of effort, it "as rev,soned, l'IOuld permit U. S. forces to te.ke e,dye,!l'~;q:;eof theh gx'eater t&.ctical lOObility and i'm, SUI)port ,'rithout end~',:1gering civilian life and pf"operty, e!!1:ploY,RVR4.F in a l;,e,nncr co,lculated to m:'.niHize the adver.ee effects of its :persistent im,bility to generr"te 8,11 ol'fensive··;,:indccl. !.?:P.l"j:~, 8.nd avoid the cultural acclir'dtiz~.tion 8.nd J.e ... ngl).:;~,,2:~ difficl"..lties whi('.h 1'l'.ouJ.d fe.ce U.S. forces in tJle p3.ciI'ication role. It seemed, in short, that RV;:';lF concentration on pacific<;,tion and U. S. conCc11tr2;tion on the r>11),in force enemy ;lould C011-

.stitute the optiJral use of o,v~,il"blc resources.

This division of effol't meant that most U. S. military advisors ;;ouJ.d be directly involved in p3.cif'icati.o:l -- at least periodically if not con'· tinuously. Advisors to regular ARVH u!lits could expect to spend a cons iii."· ere,ble portion of their tl.F..c securing pacification proer~ .. ,"s. Those . advisors l1hose counterparts he,d political and adlninistrative responsibil-· Hies (e.g., province and distr.ict e,dvisors) and parex~ilitary advisors (RF and PF) could expect pacification to be their major concern.

But 'Ihile the majority of U.S. military advisors \wuld be engaged in pacification activities they \,ould not be the only U.S. advisory personnel \'/hose responsibilities focused on pacification progr8..'llS. Advisors :('rom USOM, CAS, and USIS had overlapping and in some instances competing responsibilities. Thus it "as logical i'or the U.S. to attempt to devise an organizational frame1'lOrk which would serve to coordinate adequately the activities of the large and diverse body oi' adv,isors and which \lOuld be capable to integrate their overlapping. functions.

70

As a test case for t!le ever popular oil blot tlJeory of pacifica-tion; lJop Tac left J);u(:h to be desired. It did, however, pOint up some of the difnculties to be encoulltered in any attempt to implement this appeaUnGly simple--and perhaps sililpl:istic--concept. The oil blot theory, like all abstl'3.ct ana,10g1es, emphasizes the sjmilarity betlveen phenomena and iGnores the diff·erences. The importp.nt similar:lty of the pacification problem to the oil blot is t.he c):pressed goal of pl'OGress:L vely ext.ending the secure zone until it el~bra.ces the entire cOllntr;)'. Unlike a blanl: p:lece of pap'or, hOlwver, the cnviromncnt in 1-7hich p:o.cificB.tion EuSt tn"··, place is neUher neutral no:;:- pe.ssive; ~,nd unlike the oil blot, the pacificr,tion forces are not iYr(per'dous. Moreover, implicit in the theol' is the notion that the sec'cU'e areo" J,ike the oil blot, "d.ll e:l>.,]?a.J.ld in a,ll directions s:'LlrL1J.l:'L:e,neousl:·r, f::-t' roughly -the S[;.l'~~~ speeD., and that expansion is irrevers:i.ble and irrevocc,1)le. Further, the e.na1ogy rails to take iyl'~o $.CCOlU-lt l.ulique p:.:'obler.ls o'E terra..:L!1 or variances in government and insurgcn ;~, st2'ength in d!.ff'erent aree.s. One need not belabor the point; the concept is fine p.s a theory, but not e.s f, program design. In fairness, it must be se,id the,t the idea. does fo~us the need for concentration of resources in priority areas. All this not\·;lthstanding, I II Corps "as less thm the opt:i.mLl!f! plp"cG t.o test such e. 1?roD~CJn. It cont&.ins several longtiY.:.e Viet Cong stl"o!.tgbolc1s and be.se £.:::"29.$ a~ld is extre,o:cd:i.r~,~,rily sensitiv-e ,to polit.~ i(:8.1 cha~lges in Saigon (28 of 31 district chiefs .,ere replaced during the lifct:llae of Hop Ta,c).

~'he most important reG.son for the failure of Hop Tac~ hO~leY=r, ",as the lack of South Vietna:~esc su:;:rport for it. Fro:~ j.ts inception to its demise, it Has an k,lerice,n idea, p1e.ll, and progl'an,. v:lli1e the GVi'! adoloted it, est1..bl:ished a h::gh-le've1 council to supuv:i.se it, B,nd cor~Jnitted some troops a:ld other resources to :it, thIs ,·ras seen 8,S a ,'ra,,' of appee.si!!g the Americe,ns. The Sout.h VietY:?,::,'ose never p,ccorded Hop Tao a hig11 priority in tbeir own thinking. r,:oreover, it.s 101'/ st.atus ,ras further ern};hasized by the m?ss:ive U.S. force builc.-·up. As this U.S. build-up becat',e rela­tively routinized,hm·rever, the issue of pacification reasserted itself. * \omen it did so, the prirrcary U.S. concern came t.o f'ocus on the issue of hO'I'/ best t.o organize the nilitar,,-, p3.ro.nU.1:l.ary, s,nd ci.vilie.n advisory ef'f'orts. Since even the civilian advisors in the f'ield 1'7ere military personnel on loan in many instances, the f.CCOU.'lt· of the military advisory build-up decisions became essentie,lly an account of' organizing advice for p!l.cifica­tion.

* See Task Force Paper, Vol. Iv.c.8., Reem;pha.sis on Pacificat:',1: 1966-1967.

69

At the bq;inning of 1966, three ll~portant issues concerning the pe.cii'ic:).'cion effort vJere unresolved. Each of these issues ",as tenta­tively re301ved durinc; late 1966 or in 1967 -- in the sense that decisiu~lS l-lere r.'Lde rather than the.t these decisions Here final. The re,,_:;.inder of 1967 e.nd eo.rly 1968 (until the Tet offensive) constituted a :p~Tiod of' consolide.tion e~nd refine~::0nt bc~sed on liJrdt.ed experi:mentat:ion~ T1'8 shock ce;,'_sed b>' the ~'ct offensive then brought to thG fOl'e ne~J qucs­tio:1s of RVi:':,l' effectiVeness 8_nd of U.S.-RVl';.I\.I' roles and missions.

The first of the ll..l1resolved issues 1n 1966 v/o.s that of vThich U.S. agency or gro'l-),) should tt.ke the lead in coordinating p9..8ii'ication progre.r::s, j:~:e ro2.e \ihicl1 RYiYiF should aSSUJYle in support of p9.cification ,las the S8cc1rl li..Y1..resolvcd iSSUE;" Finally} the extent to llhich the U.S. should b~ ·\,;illing to exert leverage in order to influence -pacifice.tion activities 1·;as also u!1resolved at the beginrJ.~.ng of' 1966.

The follo\,:ing account of the dec:i.sions e..ddresscd to tl1ese three iSS1.i.SS Le,y S(;2:::1 to sUGgest th9..t a.m:::.ster list of probl'2::t~s ... ·ras someho;;l app:coe.ched a,s p3..rt of an orderly ~ .co:r:])rebcl"!sive, logical pl'·ocess. This is l'.!.C)t, of con~~2e, the \\~c~:r it ht .. ~o:pe;~cd. 'Ine :policy p:!:'CC(;SS ~:as confusing e.~::.d the polic~;;:·;BJ:ers 'i"ere occasion?-.~_ly confused. Decisio!:.s "\'rere m? .. d€ in the reflecti0:l of both U. S. e,nd SOU';.,~l Vietl:£,~ese domestic pressures and ill t:1e S!Je..dCi': of an on':'going '·n~ .. r. They 'i'~ere affected by l>.='X'sonalities on c,ll sides e,nd involved no sF.~all e,~·:.O"'Jllt of bureaucrati~ in-:fightinb. Ti1C aCCOU!1t the.t 1'ollo,-:s atter:pts to reord-2r 8,!ld to e}"--plai.!1 this evolu­tien, not to recreate it.

The "reer::phasis on pe.cif:i.cation," as another study in this series aptly na.J~es it, m.ay conveniently be dD,ted from the Honolulu Conference of February 1966. ~- vlith the build~up of U.S. combat forces proceedir-g rapidly a!ld ,-rith expeete.tions high that 1966 ~rould see the U. S. take the offensive, policy attention returned to address the "other ,-rar" in "hieh the obj ect vre.s to provide rurp,l secUl'i ty follol-/ed by steps to ilnproye living levels and establish a link betvreen the GVN and its popula.ce. President Johnson made it clee,r in his informal remarks to the con1'erees at Honolulu that he ~Ianted concrete results to follolf the splendid phrases of the U .S. -GVi~ communique:

Preserve this communique, because it is one we don't want to forget. It will be a kind of bible that we are gOing to follow. When we come back here 90 days 1'rom now, or six months from now, we are going to start out to the

. . * Task Force Paper,. Evolution 01' the Har: Reemphasis on PaCification, 1965-1967, Part II.

71

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the announcements that the President_. the Chief of State and the PrIme lHnister wade .••• You r:en ",ho are responsible 1'or these dep:!.rtment.s, you r.dnis"\.-erz ar~:l -the sta.ffs associated "~i th them in both goverll'"",nts, bear in mind "le are going to give you an exp~:lill!::tion and the "fi::als" 1rill be on just what you have done •

• . . Hoi'T have you bu:i.l t democrac~: j.n the rural areas? How' much of it have you built, when an: :-,-he1'e? Give us dates, times, numbers •

•• • L~rger outP1J:ts, filore efI'icie::t productio!l to impl'ove credl t, handier-6.ft, 15gl1t :i.ndust1'Y, 1'\'.1'a1 electri flca t:Lon are those just p!:t!'[·.SSG, high-sm_::.ndi~-.g ~1·;o!"d2., or have you II coonskins on the ~lal1?" 162/

All p8.rties reGarded it a.s ncccssa~:, fer scrc,e mecllanism to coordinate the U. S. advisory acti vi ties ,·rhich \'Joulci hel:9 the Victm.unese to turn promises into solid 6.ccc-c:,~J.jsh!~ents. B,:': they diel not agree on ho-,'1 broad \ should be the lL"lit of the coo:cdi.nD,tor. ;-:",8 be, or his office, to be :erimt~'2._?;.l}_!.£!-.l?~_~ or a single me ... nc.cer? D;i.d effective coordination requi:ce policy p!'it:r~cy 0:( opcratio?::.l s·~·.:::C:J.'-'iisio~l -- or both? Above· all, the }Jarticip.~rlt.s did not ag:cee on ·\':~'~~~(;b :~nJJvidi)al or agenc;y- should exercis(! vrhtArtevcr stlpra-depS,,!'tt1ental alr~:~orlt.y 'ie.S needed.

Arflbassador T..,odsc,- ld"Jo had consiste:c~ly stressed the centrality of' the "other 1-lar," bcgs.n by e,sdgning res:;:;:::1sibiHty for all civil support 1'or Revolutionary Development (n"d "ps.c~fi(;c,ti(;!1") to his deputy, Amba.ssP.dor Porter. The latter desc::cibu: h:i.s cc,"cept of his duties in traditionalist Foreign S-orvice Officer te:::1"s:

Ambassador Porter described bri.ef'ly his ne~l responsi-bili ties as he sees them in the pacif5_ ca'cio!1/rural develop­ment e,rea. He pointed out tho,t ths basic idea is to place total responsibility on one senior individue.l to pull together all of the civil e,spects of revolutiona!'y development. He sees this prir.:s,rily as e~ coordinati~:.~ e:,~an~ does not intend to get in~o the middle of i)",oi.,v~dual ~€\.ency activities and responsibilities. As he and his sta.ff perceive areas which require attention and action by a responsible agency, he will call this to the attention of that agency for the purpose of emphasis; he intends to suggest rather than to cri ticize. 163/ - .

Porter's "coordination by suggestion" approach was not only an example or extremely limited effective authority, H was also restricted explicitly

72

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'the announcements tlw.t the President, the Chief of State 'and the Prime J.;:Lnister leade •••. You ::en 17ho are responsible :for these department,s, you l::dnis-'uerz aLi the staffs assoc:i.ated ~li th them in both goverJlt:.cnts, beB.r in mind 1-le are going to give you an eX?Jnim:.t:lon and the "nc,alG" ,·rill be on just 1rhat you have done •

• • • Hovi have you built democracy in the rural areas? HOir much of it have you built, uhen an~ ,·;h,,"'e? Give us dates, times, numbers •

.. . L:lrger outputs, m,ore eff:icie~:t production to improve credl t, h8J1dicrf),ft, l.ight industry, l'Y,:cal el.ectri flea tion arc those just p'lr£',ssG, high-scund:'.::g \':o!'as, or heNe you "coons};ins on the wall.?" 162/

All p:trties reGarded it e.s neecsss,:r;." fcr sc;;-,e mcc11anism to coordina.te the U. S. advisory ac'~ivities 'fhich "JOulei he1:.o tL·o Vietnamese to turn promises into solid 8,ceo;::;')lj.Ghr~ents. B'c:: tLey diel not agree on hOl'l broad should be the unit of the ccol'di.ns;Lor. ;':a8 he, or his office, to be Erimt'.~_~~l!:!er-p~~ or a single IT:.e.nLcer? Did effective coordination requ:i.re policy pri1;:?.cy or OIlerati.o~~,l S·:.?::1'"lisio~1 -- or both? Above· all, the particil>~n:t.s did not c..gl~E:e on ":;;-/l.ch :tn~ljvidl1e.l or agerlcy should exercisC:: vlhu.tever sllpra-dep3.!'tr.iental aut~~or:~t.y \ie,S needed.

Ambassador Lodse, Kho had consistCl:':ly stressed the centrality of the "other "Iar," b~Gan by e,ssigning resj:~nsrbilHy for all civil support :for Revolutionary DevelcF,en'c (re8,a "p?c::;'i·ie:stio!l") to his deputy, Ambas.s1'dor Porter. The latter described his cc:-,cept of his duties in traditionalist 1"o1'ei2;.'1. Service Officer tS!IC:S:

Ambassador Porter described briefly his ne .... l responsi-bili ties as he sees. them in the pa,cifi ca tion/rureJ. develop­ment !",rea. He pointed out th~.t the basic idea is to place total responsibility on one'senior individu9.1 to pull together all of the civil e,spects of revolutiona!'Y development. lIe sees this prirne,rily as a coordinati:'f$. c:'fo:rt and does not intend to get into the middle of ir:5~.v~.dual ~s.ency activities and responsibilities. As he and his staH' perceive areas which re~~ire attention and action by a responsible agency, he will call this to the attention of that agency for the purpose of emphasis; he intends to suggest rather than to . criticize. 163/ . . ~

Porter I s "coordination by suggestion" approach was not only an example of extremely limited effective authority, it was also restricted explicitly

72

.,~--.. -,--- -_ .. _--------_.

At the beginning of 1966, three importe,nt issues concerning the pa.cii'ication effort vlere unresolved. Each of these issues "las tenta­t:ivcly re301ved durinc: late 1966 or in 1967 -- in the sense that decisiu:1s l'lero r.-,ade rather than the,t theee decisions l'lere final. The rel~_?inder of 1967 lind eo,rly 1968 (lmtil the Tet offensive) constituted a :period oi' consolid2.tion and refine,::.snt bz.sed on liJf!lted experimentat.Jon. T),e shock caHsed by the ~l'ct offensive then brought to the fore nevT 'lues" tions of RVl:l,j<' effectiveness and of U.S.-RVKD.F roles and r.lissions.

The first of the 11..11resol ved issues :tn 1966 'Vlas th9.. t of 'Vrhich U. s. ase21cy or gl'O"J.}? should te.ke the lead in coordinating -pacification progr2.!::s" 'J:~~e TO:!..e \711ich RVEA.F should assume in support of }j~,cification "Tas the S8C0'1r] lL'11'esolvcd issue. l'inally, the extent to 'lhich the U.S. should be i':illing to exert leverage in order to influence pacification act:tvi ties l':as also unresolved at the beginnJ_ng of 1966.

The follo;ling account of the dsci,sions addressed to tbese three issu,:;s r:r::,y s(;er:l to sUGGest that a m~ster list of :probl'2~,~~s i,';-as someho1;1

aplxc-oe,ched e,S P9..xt of sn orderly; _co~r:J)rebe~1sbfe, logice.1 pl"ocess. This is rl~t, of c0n~"ze, the \\"C'<:r it h[' .. p:pe!""~ca. r~P:!le policy :p2:'cc'Z,ss l:."B.S confusing e,~:.d the })olic~ri-(;akers lTere Occ(-1,sionp,,~_ly ceni\l.Bcd. Decisi.o!:s '\-rere m?"de in the refl€:cti0~ of' both U. S. e,nd SOU~}l V5.etr;.[;.mese do;rrestic p!'essuxes a!1d in t~1e S!J~dC'f; of an on-going "icr. They \';ere: affected b~r p~rsonalities on e .. ll sides e,nd involved 110 SF.!e.l1 [~.:·:;O'X.lt of bnrcaucra.tic in-fightinb . T(,e aCCOU!lt that follous atter-,pt$ to reord'2r ~nd to e)""j)lai.!l tbis evolu­tion, not to recreate it.

The tlreer:''Phasis on pacifica.tion,1I as anotner study in this series aptly nar.-.es it, may conveniently be dD,ted fror.l the Honolulu Conference of February 1966. i(- 1-1ith the build-D.p 01' U.S. combat forces proceeding rapidly and,'lith expectations high that 1966 ~Iould see the U.S. take the offensive, policy attention returned to e,ddress the "other 1'1ar" in ~rhich the obj ect ~ras to provide rure,l security followed by steps to improve living levels and establish a link betvreen the GVN and its populace. President Johnson made it cleB,r in his informal remarks to tbe conferees at Honolulu that he wanted concrete resuUs to follol. the splendid phrases of the.U.S.-GVN communique:

Preserve this communique, because it is one we don't want to forget. It will be a kind ()f bible that we are going to follow; .Vhen we come back here 90 days frOID now, or six months from now, we are going to start out to the

• * Task Force Paper, Evolution of the War: Reemphasis on Pd.cifica.tion, 1965-1967, Pext II.

71.

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to the civil side of support for pacific[,tion. l-1hethnr the coordinator­in-chief E;Jr.ergec1 as a persuader or a dIrector i t,:as clear that bis charge he.d to embrace both military s_nd civil advisors. (In this respect "civil" is more aCCllra,te than "civilian", for a sizeable number of the civil advisory duties bad devolved upon active duty military officers who were "loaned" to other agE;f1cies for this purpose.)

It is not surprising thatMACV Vie1ved itself as preelJ1..inent in this area. It 1-:as, as Gener"-l vlestmoreland rightly claimed, the only U.S. organi z9.tion advising the GVl'l Cot a] 1 levels and -- in one v7ay or anoth,,,­in all functions. It ,-,e.s to !·:',CV that Gener,,1 Thane;, the l1inister of RUJ:'e.l Constrnction (read "p9.cification") loo::ed for s.cJ.vice and assist­ance. 2611/ It is e'l.uaJ.ly unsnrprising th",t A.rr,bB,ssacJ.or Lodge uas of a diffel'el1.tpel'L1li],sion, as he explaj.ned clearly in a memo setting forth h:t8 ViC1-lS to General Lansdl',1e in D<oce!r,ber 1965:

I consider the governcccnt of V5.etnam' s effort in this do~,",:'-n (s,pal't from the nD.J.i t~.l'Y cleo,l'ing php.se) to be prilrarily civilian,· economic, Bodal e.nd poli_ti.cal in nature and in its aims. Consequently, on the lunerican side, it is preferable that the t','lO c:tvilie~n Etgencief] most directly concerned.., i.e., USAID and CAS, be theopcrf~ting suppO"'t e.:;encie;:; upon whor:t you should r"ly for the implcY::!ent!:"tich of tlJ(~ nec-ossary pro[;I'a'tls as they develop. Other sectio:ls of the 1-:i£8io<1, including I~CV,

-JUSPAO ••• should consider the,nselves associated llith ••• US.UD and CAS, but riot as e.gencies directly responsible for operations.

The foregolne; is intencled to insure t!1at the nUll!.ryer of per~ons an:1 agencies contactinG the GVE a!l:'l I):1rticule.rly the Ministry of Rural Construction, on the subject of paCification a9d developuent is reduced, and in fact is limited to yourself or your representative, plus the repl'escnte,t:bres of the tvlO

operating agencies, US/\.ID and CAS. 165/

Operational and coordinative rcsponsibiHties rerr.ained on this pa.rticu­lar vlicket. tbroughout most of 1966 'lhile 1-;a,shl.ngton fumed over the slo-t'T pace .01' pacification. These months saw the development of slLi'ficient frus­tration in Washington to permit the gr01-1th and final acceptance of the propose,l that all U.S. advice for pacification be placed under Iq.CV. An account of this development is treated more fully in another document in this series and 'Till only be summa.rized here. *

President Johnson.' s Washington coordinator for pacification, Robert W. Komer set forth in August 1966 three alternative organizational approaches; , " ,

'* Task Force Paper, Evolution of the vial': Reemphasis. on Pacification, - 1965--1967.

-------------- ._--_._-------_.

AJj;errf,tive}l2.: 2 -- Retain t~resentseparate civil and IdE t();~;y cO~J'"and channels but strsngt.ben the management Rtr~'t\'I2._Of· bo~b.J.?,CV and the U. S. l:ission ....

Mr. Komer I s catq,ori"ation ,laS prescient. p.J!lbassador Lodge's personal preference a!1d t..l}e fB,ct ·that most l'~.cificv,tio!! advisors ,lere military see7Led to rule out the first course of' a.c'(·,io!!. 167/ The second alter­ne,tive descl.'ibed essentially the orgf,niz~,t.ion f'ollO'tled under the Of'i'ice of' CivHOpC:l.'s,tio:::ts (oeo) i'ro:;-, ~Toveniber 1966 11.."l.t11 June 1%7. By this late date tbe U.S. decided to :rollo\-, the t.hird of'Kotler's alterne,tives.

The first of t.l1ece rcol.'Ge.!1:lzatio!'ls, tha;t ,·;hic..l} created OCO, ,-,as quite liter<:.11y fO~'ced upon Jlcbo,ssador Lodge. Particularly in vie" of' the f'e.ct that oeo \.;,,0, to be Ci ven only a 9~-120 day trial to produce identifiable results, he i';C"i.S not ee.ze:c to undergo. the turmoil and -lost_ mot:i.on o:r one rc.jor reo1.';:;:o:;).i;,=/.;ion only e.s a prelude to yet another reorce.n:tza t:iCl1.. He 1·;antej to retai.n [1,$ T.'iv.ch nOl1-~il:i.te~ry f"1a.v9l'" to the pacifi,cs.t:i..on effort a.s p·),ss:ible. -- reCax-ding ,it e~s cOj:;})lemente.ry to militpry pl~ogre;r:B, yet se}:{-'.l"e;Le :from t.hc:.1. I·:ilite.ry se'curity_ e.ct,ivities "1€:re, ill h:1..s vie"';':, ess€l1ticJ.ly the rlCga:ciye, precondition to pacif.:tcation activities lillie:l "Tere the posi"G:lve acts ler:.:3.inS the GVN to vit8~lize . itself' at the ScZ;le tiLe th"t it developed real ties to its Dim 1'80ple.163/

Thus 0:::0 entered the world i'orcdoo,!:ed by the combim:.tion o:r too shori a pJ.'escribed life sp2,n and the tenc1enc-.f of sene of' its unl-lilling partners to do more than suWOr.t it tacitly 1'il,ile they maneuvered to get their blue chips into another basl:et. Secretary Mc~raI:lara he,d recom­mended in October 1966 that l·~I\.CV take responsibility f'or pacification. Undersecretary of' ste,te Katzenbach he,d m?,rshalled a strong. case aGainst this step at least until embassy leadership of' civil operations vias given a chance. The upshot l'las that it was given half' a chance --which may . have been worse than none at all.

OCO did, however, accomplish the creation and selection of' Regional Directors andOCO Province Representatives. One :lndividual ~TaS made responsible for all civil operations in each Corps Tactical ZOne (CT2;) and in each province. The U.S. military chain of cO)lllll!l.nd had already adapted itself' to parallel the RVNAF organi7..ation, but below Corps leve'l it was more cOlllplex. Each division within ARVNvras advised py a senior . advisor (a colonel) 1.ho wa.s given supervisory authority over themili- . tary Sector (Province) Advisors V/ithin the .Divisionai Tactica.l Area. (DTA)

74

__________ J _ ... _--..... __ .. _----

Alt~rr~G,tiv.£..po.2.:.::...B.etain th~resent separate c.ivil and w; ll.te.!.'Y co~}"":md channels but str~£;,then the management Btrnct\~:r.e _~~)2.J0.CV and the U. s. J-~i~si on· • •••

Mr. Komer's catcgorh;atiol1 vIas prescient. P..mbassador Lodge's personal preference and the fe,ct that most p~,cificaticn advisors "ere military seexcd to rule out the first course of !!.c'd.on. 167/ l'he .second al.ter­ne,tive dcscri.bed essentially the orge,niz~,tion foll"'Ned under the Office of CiVUOPC'"'9,tions (oeo) fro", r:ovember 1966 li...'1til June 1967. By this late date the U.S. decided to follol'l the 'Ghird of Kotler's altern2,tives.

The first oi' these reorGanizations, the.t I'lhich created OCO, 1'1as quite li terglly :fo!'ced upon h·bo,ss8.c10r I,od{;e. P8,rticular~ in viel" of the i'e.ct that OCO \""8 to be Liven only a 9:)-120 day trial to produce identii'i(lble results, he I'ms not eager to 1L1'ldergo the turmoil and lost mot:i.on of oner-l'jor rcor;;c.ni::~/cion only f,S a prelude to yet ('.nother· reorcanizat:icl1'. He 1':e.ntej to retaj.n 1J.$ nucl1 non-rrd11.te~ry fla.vor to the pacification effort P ... S p':JDBible -- recarding ,it. as- CO):'::l)lementary to militery pl'cgra:r:s, yet E';.;}):'>.rc::t:,e frorn. ther:l.. I·:ilitary se'cttrity, e.c-'c-ivities "1ere, ib. his vie"';':, ,essenticJ.ly the rlegc;;cive. precond:ition to ~a.c5_f:lcation activities i":hj.ch 1-lCre the posit.ive, acts le~~::'i!iS the, GVN to vi'ta.lize , itseli' at 1;he se.!'"e t:iJ~,e that it developed real ties to j.ts Oim people. 163/

Thus 0:::0 entered the Iwrld i'orcdoor"ed by the combim:.tion of too short a prescribed lii'e spc.!1~md the tendenc-.l' Of sc:~e of' its u!1\dlling partners to do more than support it tacitly ,'il,ile they m9,neuvered to get their blue chips into s,Llot.her basket. Secretary Mc~rcr.;ara he,d recom­mended in October 1966 that MAOV take responsi'oility for pacif'ication. Unders.ecretary of StB,te Katzenbach he,d me.rshalled a strong case against this step at least until emba.ssy lea.dership of civil operations ~las given a chance. The upshot \'las that it \'las given half'. a chance -- Vlhich may

. have been Worse than none at all.

OCO did, however, accomplish the creation and selection of Regional Directors andOCO Province Representatives. One individual ~las made responsible for all civil operations in each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and in es.ch province. The U.S. military chain of command had already adapted itseli' to parallel the. RVNAF organi7..ation, but below Corps leve"l it Vias more complex. Each division lli thin ARVN)las advised by a senior , advisor (a Colonel) who )las given supervisory authority over the niili· ' tary Sector (Province) Advisors within the Divisional Tactical Area (D:rA)

74

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to thc civil side of support for pacification. l'1hethnr the coordinator­in-chief ",merged as a perst1('.dcr or a director i t ~Ias clear that bis charge had to embrace both m:i.litary e,nd civil advisors. (In this respect "civil" is more accurate than "civilian" ,for a sizeable number of the civil advisor~'.duties had devolved upon active duty military officers who were "loaned" to other agencies for this pUTpose.)

It is not surprising tbat }fJACV vim'red itself as preelninent in this area. It ,'ras, as Gener~l v]estmore1and ri.ghtly claimed, the only U. S. organiz'l.tion advising the GVN e.t all levels and -- in one "lay or anot11e;' in all functions. It "ie,s to KllCV that Gener"l Thane, the J.linister of RUJ:'"l Construction (read "pe.cifice.tion") loo~:ed for s.dvice and e.ssist­anee. }f0i It is eque.lly unsnrprising tho.t ArrJx:.ssador Lodge lIas of a different pel'sll~.sion, as he explajned Clearly in a memo setting fortb b:ls Vie"lS to General w.nsde.le in Dsee!y,ber 1965:

I consider the goverm~ent of V5.etnam's effort in this dor,e.in (&.ps.rt from the mili t!'.rycleCl'ing phasc) to be prin:2.rily civilj,an, economic, sode.l e,nd political in nature and in its ams. Consequently, on the tunerican side, it is preferable that the two c:Lvili".n agenci'eD most directly conccrncj., i.e., USAID ana CAS, be the ,0p:1:'f,tin(; support e.o;cl1CiC3 upon wuom you should rely for the implor:!entp,tion 0:(' the nec'2ssary pr0o.,&"'-s as they develop, Other sectio:~s of thel,:issio;1, including V!A.CV, JUSPAO •••. should consider the:m;elves associe.ted 1-lith ••• U8.UD and CAS, but not ase.gencies directly responsible for operations.

The foregoing is intended to insure tha.t the num.':>er of . per80ns an::! agendes cont"etinc; the GVE a:ld ps.rticule.rly the Ministry of Rural Construct:lon, on the subject of pacification a~d develo~uent is reduced, and in fact is limited to yourself or your representative, plus the represcntatives of the tr10 operating agencies, U&\ID and CAS. 165/

Operational and coordinative responsibiUtic$ remained on this ps.rticu­lar ~licket. throughout most of 1966 ~ibile ':a.shi,ngtonfumed over the Slmi

pace .01' pacification. These months Sal" the development of slLi"ficient frus­tration in Washington to permit tbe gr01'lth and final acceptance of. tbe propose.l tbat all U,S. advice for pacification be placed under lfACV. An account of this development is treated more 1'1l.l1y in anotber document in this series and ~lill only be. summarized bere. *

President Johnson's Wasbington coordinator for pacification, Robert W. Komer, set forth in August 1966 three alternative organizational approacbes;

* Task Force Paper, Evolution of the vlar: Reemphasis. on Pacification,' 1965-· ~.

for ',~Ihj.ch his divi~ion had l'esponsibill ty. Thus,~lhi1c civil lines ' of authority ~Tcnt. direct.ly from corps level (the reglon)to province, the. mIlito,t·y e,dvisory dnin added an e.dditions.l Unk at division. Sector advisors \u1der this al'l'o.ngement found themselves ~Iorking under a milite.ry officer .whose e,dvisoryresponsibilities were aetually mili­tary ~Thereo.s theirs l'lere only Inrt1y (and someti,r.cs only nominally) milite.ry.

OCO Etttemptcd to h~.Yc the ARV!; dhi~:i.ons re;;10ved f'rompacifiea'c'011 l'esponDlb:l11ties, but \dthout sUCc!css. 1'lhen t.he Office of Civil OpeI'$" tions a.nd Revolutione.ry Dcvelop:r,ent Support (CORDS) IW.S established unc, . lIJ\.CV in m:i.d-1967 as t.he sIl-,gle rr.c.ns.r;c,r for 0.11 p?cifice.tion advisors, tb., issue cO'.lld nc,,~ be arGued \dththe E?'!i'3 force. For by the time CO)·ruSl'!ACV assumed respojlsibility fOl' pacificf/don (throueh a civilian deputy -­Aml)8.ssp,dor Ko:c,,"r), ARVn ked also crp:'.nd.ed its role in thepacii'icp.tion effort. The ARV;:, division, it could ber,.rgueu, vms c.S much a. part of the p9.cl.fication el'i'ort as ~:ere tbe progreJJl8 supported by the U.S. civil' Q,gcmcies.

But aithough the- "e.reW:1ent for removing tt.,~ SeniOT- Division Advisor frolu the U. S. c})2,i!J of CC;~l:,i.!'d oVcl'provinc:i.B.l advisors lost theoretic vl(:j.ght \d,'i;h the creation of COl'J)S, the ne\,T civilie.n dcpnty toCO:·ruS!·~\CV .secured G8nel:'D.l l;estr~orcland' s aPl'l'oval to re~~ove the division· advisors from the l'acifice/doll che.in of CO".~':9,nd and to \·:ork to get ARVl!. to take parallel action. This s'vcp illustl'a.tes the.e>:t2nt to which civil influ­ences were able to -ope'rate \'lithin,·this 'nC1'1 section of !'-i(\.CV. CORDS ,vIas of such size -that .it becc.,:~~e quz.s:i.-:Ll1d(;I)en~ler~t. One ,,,ould have to carry an issue in dizptite all the \·:ay tocO;.;JS'·IACV before it moved outside of CORDS. channels.

The comprehensiveness 01' this reorgal1:i.z9.·~iojl may b'e seen in the follovTing NACV Directive, reproclncd in its entirety, and especially :i.n the schem9.tic d:iD;gr~~ lc.ying out the nC\'T U~ s .. COlYi1!:e,nd structure for a Corps area:

.75

----_.

MACV Dir 1.0-12

I:E}~:C~UAlrr£HS UNIT':;!;D ST1 .... 'l'ES kHIJT.Al~,Y .AESI$'f.:\NCE CO?vf;\'lAND, vn~TNAl\f

APe) S~n !"l'a::cisco £> 6222

NU1~}3ER 1(;, .. 12* 28 May 1967 (l"'1!~ccormS) .

1. I J1JPI)OSE. 'fo p!.~oy:ice f01' the 'intc<~:raU6;1- of Ci"n O"02rations ~nd nevolutlon~~rJr D.:ve1-o'pn~(;14t Suppc:,t aclf.\"it~·c:s within }/iACV:

a. To pro~IC!c for single nw.mt:;er c:i!'CCtiO:l of all US civil/mili': tary Revoh.tiomtry r:-2vclo~)njent activities in t::B Republic of Victn~n), re-sponsibilIty h~.s b0en ,p.£.sigr~ed to CO}';;US:-..:l:LCV. .

Co. "...11 activitjes a!lc! fi:r~cacrls 0: f:>: fO~'mer C~f5.ce of Civil O?0ra .. lions (OCO) ar~d the :.l'llo.CV D:.rcctoi'<:.tB lor R(:v()1t~tior~a<!'Y D2:V01o:):1je:~t (RD) Support axe con1hil1~d ill the (·.f:f;ce of H:e' ASBIs~:-a!:t Chief of StJif for Civil • Operations :Inc! Rcyoluticmary D~vcloj):l1cnt S"P:;Ol'( (Co::mS).

d. The Assistant Chief of Streff for eiv:l Ouerations r.nd nevo-l\ltionary':n'ava!bl)me~t Support iS2.ssignadful1caons a~ follows: '

. . . (1) Advises COMUSI\~.ACV, :MACV staff 'elements and alI US civili8.11 Rgencies 011 ~J1 aSllects of UScivll/milii:<J.ry s\\pport for. the Govern­ment 9f Vietnam's RD Program.

.' "

76

._----_._--

MACV bir lO~12

EE.c,\r;~UAj"{'fJ?HS.

U:\1:C~D ,STf .. TES I\lrrIJTA1~Y l~SSlsir_·\NCE CO?v!::\lAN'D, VIETN ... -\!\1 .. - APG S:ln Fra~cisco 96222

NU1~BER 10.-12* 28 May 1967 (l',1/~cconj)S) .

1. J'UP:OOS3. To D!'oviC:e for' the ·int",':ratio:l of. Civil Oneration$ ~ ... nd nevoJ.uf,on£~ry D.:velo;'l;~c:nt Suppc~:t aco.YitI0S within IlI.ACV.'" .

2. ~~:SRAL.

a.. rro pro~iC:.~ fOl~ singla m'~.na.~0r (:i~:0ctio:l of all- US civil/miH':' -ta~'Y 'RevohiUonary ])zvclopn1cnt 2cti\itlcs in L':..;e Republic of Vjctn~rJ1, rc-spol's'h"l·'y "os 'D"en ~-~k~ed to ""O·"us'·""" ..... J. ... , l •• ~.. _.;. r.::.. ....... .; •• -' v ,;.,~ •. J..,:,,;).v ~.

b. Thc-positioa c·: D~~uti [O?' Civil Ol)2r2~~io!'!.s ·?.~d nc.voluUon~~ty D3velopmcntSl!l'PO:-t to CO:,:US),LCViscsi?::>]j,,:·:8(; a;;d carries the per.o .

sor"ll'(l"'I~ c,f ! "!'b"'<s~('o''''' "; .... 'hn l"\-;, .. ~ .. }y 'J·O·- C~~r.q O~'J~':";lons ond Rc\-o'u"o":"l"ry ",- ••. ' ......... ,;,) ~' ••• ' • ... ,I. ................ ~v" ... J..~~ ;~v ........ '"""~, \ "'~ '-,l.~

. DcvBlol)rnc~t St:!)poj,""\ to CO?:US~·"~}_CV assists CO:'.:USi·.:ACV in ciischc,rgi:lg hl's ro<pr °l<{"O,o'lo.o" in" '-i"'l ,.< ·,-1'""·' - .~ , Ci--"i' ~ ,- "t,t t'-' G\"-'s· • 1.:: ..... Ui ~ .. ;'Jl ... lL. '\..:~ l.f'lC .1. .• ,; .. (. C.:. L.J.." ... :.~ . .J,~· .. ~~ .. c "' .. J,.J~,tn , ..... uDJ.):)... 0 l't; '':'''.

Hevol'Jtio:1H:ry D2.vi!lopr~:ect }?rC~;l'~:rJ. Sp2cEie;~Ey, he is charge(; by CO:.HJS­MA.CV with sl.!,3rvisiI:Z the .f(;l"r;~~:latic:1 and c;;'':<:~:~o:1 c.: aU plans, poUclps and progr;:;.rns,. ·rrdlitRry and ciylIi2.n, \"'~lic;l s'..'>})c:rt the GVX's ne\'olu~5.onary Davolo;)r.:1cl",t pl'cJr~m ~_nd r.;latcd p~CZ1·;1l:~S,.

c.. }...11 actl'liUes n:lc ft:r:CUCfJS 0: C~'2 fo:~:ner C[f5.ce of Civil 0;--31"a­lions (OeO) -:u:d the !SACV, D':rcctoi~~tB fo~~ R~:voh~tior~:?<.-~~y D2v01ci:):·tje:~t (RD) Support aJ.~e con'1hil1&d iI1 the (.fiice of tj:e ,;.~_ssis~·a::t Chief of StZiif for Civil

• Opzrations :\nd Revolutionary D~vclopalcnt Se?;:;o,-t (CO:'!D":;),

d, The -Asslst-'tnt Chicf of BtaH for Civ:l 01)3raUOns rend nevo-l\1tiom\ly;])avalbl)me~i: Support isassignadfunciions a; follows: .

. ' . ' .... (1) Advises COM:US,\V,CV, l .... rACY starf'elements and alI US civiJi8Jl Rgencies on l'Jl aspects or UScivU/milii<1.ry support for the Govern-ment 9f Vietnam's RD l'rogrnm. ..,

.. ' ..• ,:.:

76

___ •• __________ 0

for ~Ihj.ch his dlvillion had l'~spons;lbil1ty. Thus,~lhilc civilllnes' of authority Vlcnt. directly from corps level (the region) to province, the militn.ry advisOl~.Y ch~in added an additione.lllnlc at d1.vision. Sector advisors \u1del; this arrangement found themselves ~lOrlting under a. mili t~.ry officcr .~lhose advis01'yrEeSPQnsibilities were .actua.lly mili­tary ~Ihereo.s theirs werc 0111y p'1.l'tly (and sometimes only nomina.lly) . military.

oeo attempted to have the ARVl; dhid.ons rel:lOved from pacif'ica'o < 0n responGib:t1ities, but ,dU,.out s·"ccess. When the O:f:fice of' Civil OpeNl' tions and Revolutionary Dcve10p:r,ent Support (Co:nDS) 1'10.8 cstablished u116, W,CV in m:i.d-l967 as the sj r;gle IT.c,n3.cer for all p?cif'ice.tioll advisors, the issue cO\lld not be argued l'1ith the "".m';) force. }'or by thetilne COi-illS/;lI\.CV e.ssmned responsibilit.y for pacifice/cion (thl'ough a civilian qe:pu;;y -­Aml)8,ssador KOle",r ),ARVIr ktd also eX'p~'.ndcd its role in the p:;.cifiCe.tion effort. The ARV:1division, it eonlc1ber',rgueu, \:~.s e.s much a part of the pacl.fieatiol1 effort e,g \:e1'e '"be progre.ms supported by the U.S. civil e.gencies.

But although the arg-c ... ':lent i'or removing tt~c Senior Divisi.on., A~visor fl'Ol~ the U. S. chilin of cc::or'2.!ld OYer provinc:te.1 advisors lost .. theoretic \Ic,j.ght ld:'o11 the creation of CORDS, the l1Ei'l civilie.n deputy to CO:·;USI-i\CV ,se_c'ured GcneX'c.l 'l:estmorcland' s appl'oval to re:-:'..ove tbe divisiori:"advisors from the J'acii'ice,tioll che.in of c07:.:·:and and to "cork to get ARV:U to ta.ke pltra1le1 action. Ibis st.ep .illu",tl·a/GCS the eX'G8nt to l·rhich civil influ­ences were able to -operat.e ui thin this 'nCl'l secti,on of' MfiCV. CORDS V:8.S of' such size that it bees.::,,, qu[:'s:i.-i1ldc:pl2ndellt. Onel'lould have to carry an issue in dispute 0.11 'ohe l'ray tciC01:;JSij\CV before it moved outside of CORDS. channels.

The comprehensiveness of this reol'ga.nizo."Gion may be seen in the f'ollo,ling If:ACV Directive, repx'odu::ed in its entirety, and especi~.l1y in the schematic dip,gram 1c.;/ing out the neu U.S.cwD~c,nd structure for a Corps area:

.75

MAGV Dil' 10""12 28 ", '"0 1("'7 J.'I .. ~~y v 10:,

(~) Provides 2..dvic0 2.~ld 2~ssis~::':':ce to tht."'! GO\'Crnnicnt of , ,. J... • l~' J1 ........ .. ,..., '!' ..... 1 't '. '!J • l' lCtn,:;.rD, lnc 1..!(;..ln,J; w1c NJ.lm.St~:y c:.;. ~:\.cvo~.u"t:\Or:2.l'y 1..~~V0 O'!"'J.1cn , Inc J.\.~pUD ... 1C of Victr.:=!':~) A'('fli(:d Forc'os Jo:nt GDTJ.::r?.J. S-~fui :lEd 0::1'::1' GVX agcnc5.es all US cj.vil/r:11lit:~ry s'..:;))0rt for Ravolu~ic~~::~ry r.:8vc}Olj:~lcnt including US advIsory ·and IG~isi-lcal St:;lport. :

(5) D.:!velOl);3· reCil:ircTlic:nts fo::: 1~1ilit:1:;:y and civil assets . (l!S,~nd G\n~) to S'..lp,o:~t R0Voh.ltio~::-~l'Y ~V(:lopl:)2nt.

(6) Sc:rv2s ~~S t!1e C01:t~':.ct point Wit:l f.~::>nsoring ag:~ncics for RD prO~l·~~rns. !~':~i:!t[l,i;:s 1':'2.:50:1 \'.'::~11 S>:)l1so::ir.~:;' l!;;'2;:cfcs in l'epreSCJ'ltillf: tlhe:· ... l····'tr.· .• ~.c·~'.- 1'·j c~"{':l "'o~ PD n .. '·-~·~·0···.,s "")r~ "c"-:"{r"':~"" l"n':l- ~ .:'J"e')cl ",:"?';n 11. J..\\.; ... I.. ...... l>::l J .t~J. . .I. •• .1.-_," ... :"_v;.:,.!,,;,, .• .c ........ <; L.!~;~ .... -::') • '-.lit.:: J.. • ,I.;" .. 4..I.~-'

tains cit::ect orJ.::r<.iio~?.l co!".!!·.alnic:-~L~o;:3 v,'iG-. field (;}ea:ctis for i11CS~ pro­gr:!.lDs.

(7) Is respo:,_~:~bl~ i:y::' !)::,oZ::'~~r~'; CC.O:cJ::l;;,Uon with t~e yc,,:"ioi.\$ 1.Hssion civil ~~~0::c"ies -:in t1:2 p~_:--!.r-i-:"-:!";;; r-~i:·i iri~pIc~~·;"j0'r.:2.i:5.o:1 of non-l\D n.clivl-tIes as th2Y in~::·j.l:~~ U1)0:'1 or ?.ff0Ct Rj)-~·el::.t(·d ::C~~V!ti2D. .

(10) Acts on all ltD S~~:)?o::t pollcy r.",tic~s pertaininz to sub­ordin2"te eChelons.

(11) Directs advlsoq relationE.!ups with GVN on TID and TID­l'~L'1.ted matters,

a. Integration and consolidation of CCO and·TIn Suppo~t activities will be, accomplished at alllcvcls: He~,c':luarters ),,:ll.CV, l"egion/CTZ, prov­inceand ·cli$trict,·

n

(1) Rcgio4cTZ.

MACV Dir 10~lZ 28 May 1967

(&) '£he oeo ;'egio:i:-:.l c:t::'c-::to:; will be cl8slgI~!ed the D~put:y' fo:.~ Civil O;:2raiioDr. and RCVOl'.1-20;:r:.::-y D.:.:vclcpr:1cnt SU[,po!"t to Hie-. fo'''c'' CO"'l ",," '",.-.,' 1<'~"l'Ol' 0(1',..; SO" f> S c'"C'l "'" \,,"1 ,., c'·o-o·ed \,.Hh s""'or-- \,i J. ~··'·~""""""I .. '....... 4. ..•. ... ..... LI ... • J" J." • ..4 ...,C: .0<"' • .1. -.:, I... 'l.<.rl,;

visinz t!~G: fO::'rnulation and eXeCl!iicn of an n::Utary C'.:1d civiUan plan;;, poli­cies ,~.r:d p:'ozran~S \7bich su,port i:h0 GVl\"'S I-{D p:::-ogl'anl to include_ ci,ic a~ttor~ p0:ciol'n1ed br us units.

(b) For 'rJl l:;['.a~:-s l'(-::J.;,,-~ii";~ to R\'XA}" l~-:i1itary support io~~ H,;:voh:tl()n'?:o..~:)· [;.::v(;:lop:Y . .:.n~, t::e c..::p~ty £.~;:: O~~ ctdvLsor will OJJ~1'4te ~nd;;:~' __ the S\:;·,~~r.visi.on 0: the I;;::ptity fer COR.DS.

(d) Evc~n"" ~~ 'c' '~--<c-·l -.. ".-"t'o"s ""'c1 '-bll;"e~c~ .'\. \,; ... I. .1.0 ... .i:"~~ no_v ... ;~ .', O.;.~.;.. .. h ...... , ........... 1 .. 0.;. ..... ~ .L. c:, those clernci1ts 0: t:1C' staffs of the fo:-cc CD;:1~11~_~C~~·/scmor i=l.dvisor fl.nd d2puty senior ac1vif..iOr en~2.E:cd prin1::u:iIJ" i.n RD SU~y)o:~~. activities will be in:c-';?:ratcd

~ ~ . .. -into t:'1'; st,Jf of ti~c J~.ssistant lliputy io~ Civil O;JC~Y':!tior.s and TIcvoh.:.fio:lary D3velo;nnent SU1):>:'Z't or the Assisra::.t ,Chi2i of Staff, CORD? ,At a late::: da.te, ruter on~goil~g s: .... :cl:.0S are co!'nplGte(~, :1.l::.'U";cr guicIa:;cc )'nay be issued if , lleeci=3u for the in:egration of civil and n1il5.;ary intelligence and psyc1101ogical warfare iuncti.o:1s which represent special C?ses.

(2) Province.

(al At province, an integl'ated provincial advisory team composed of tlw cUn'ent OCO proYlncial team :>.nd MACV sector.advisory team will be org~.nizild. .

._----_._--

(1) Region/C'i'Z.

MACV Dir 10~lZ 28 May 1967

(&) The oeo :-egio!1:--J (~lrc,:: to:- will be C:cs5,gnated the .. _ D~put:,r' fo:.~ Civil 0.i.:eraiionr. and Rcvol'J.~io::r:.~y D.::vclcproent SUI'l)O!'t 10 the'. fo···c r • CO"""'1 .. ",,~~,·.~·I,'n""'1·Ol· a('I\~r'O" ~s ~"C'l ... , \·'!'l··~ c·~-:,""""'ed\··!:"h su . ...... ~. ~ •• ,.~~'"" .... ~ I"'';''''' • ~-.-:. ~. ..... ... ... , _ • J' L'", ·f·.:. .... !..It;; 1.1:'.).. ~~ '(..1.11. per-visin;; t!~(! fOl'n1ulation and eXBC\:aon of all11:2lit~n'y f'.~ld civiUan pla.tcl, poli­cles .<.r:c1 p::'oJrc.n~,s y,'hieh Sll,port i.hB GVl\lS RD p::."ogl'an1 to include chic a~t.i.ol~ p~rrorn1ed b:{ ,US units. .

(b) For 'rJl r~1r-.ttz_7'S 1-81:';,.~i';~ to R\'NAF l~-:i1iiary support fo";.' R~'voh;-'do!1':t:'.~y ~.?v~lop;r:'2.1;~, t:;c d~p~ty r,en:o;,,' advi..sor will op~r2.ie un(ler-the sU:··~!J:\'is':'on o~ the D~ptrty fer CORDS. .. "

(d) ~'"Cl":."",,:, ~r~' ...... c-,,·c· o''"' ...... ~C"J O ... ·'''' .. ·-;.tl·O''S " ... ,(1 ';"'';''''l'';''~~r.C~ J:!.; ..... "'}II. J.V ... Y')) n .V.;.;~ ~.. ;.~.;., .. ~~ ... , ........... I .. \;; ... ~~t: • C J

those C10rtlC;1tS 0: the staffs of the fo!"ce CO::1~ii?~c~::,·/sanior i=l.dvisor ?nd d2PUty senior advisor e:::;?.g~~! prin1~_!'i1y in RD Sup;o;"~ :?cHvities willbe in!€'gratcd into the strJf of t1~c Assi.sta:1t :D.3puty fo:::,: Civil Opc:ratior.s and TIcvo!utio:lary Dzvelo;nnent Su!):>:n't or the A.ssisra::.t ,Chi(;,l of Staff, CORDS. At [,l-a.i:e:"',date, ruter on-tioij~g st'o.ldi.cs are cOlnp18tcc:, iu:;.'thcr gui(;a.~cc mly be isscec if neeC:(!G for t11e in:egrattoll of civil and n"dH;ary intcllif;encc and psycJ~ological warfare functi.o:ls vihlch represent special C?ses.

(2) Province.

(a) At pro\rlnce. an Integrated provincial advisory team composed of the eun-cnt OCO provincial team and MACV sector.advisory team will be orgMized. .

MACV Dil' 10··12 2 Bi1:ay 19 G7

(t1) ProvideD ?~(h'ic\:: 2.;H1 2-.SS:S:~:·;ce to the Go\'crnr:::cnt of Victnaln) lIi.ch.!("J.r.~ the ;,/aii5.st~:y c: l-~2voltltl,.or~7.:::y ~2V010,!,;)cntl ihc R~pub!ie of Vicrr:a:n l.:['Ync:cl Forces J0:nt GDr'!e:rpJ. S'~::-ii and Ot:~31' GVN agencies on 'US C'''J'1/r'lJ'11''''l'Y <",~"",-,' '01' """'o'u,Cio''''''y .,..~\".10')'·1- .,', )'n"lUc'l'n" US ~a""so"Y J.«. A .~. v~ "'~: ... J .. ~Vl.l. J. •• .L~\,;,' J. ... ~ ~;.' .... _ J.J .. : 'o;,;~ ~~ .. ";1... :..... t .. ,;;, I. ~ vl ..

-and logistical St:;Jpoi't. :

(6) Scrv2s as t:1e c0r.t~:.ct point W5.~;1 f~:)nsoring agencies for­Rn proz:r;';.n1s. :~-:hi:it~d.::S 13.2.:so:", '.:,<~11 S'IJ()l1so:'ij·.~~ tt~~21:Ci'CS in l'epr~seJjtiq'~ tlh o'r l····t ... ·.~c·:'- ' .. c',·:} n '"'D ~,--~.~.')"" ..... ~,! .... ':·:"r~:!-s· ~~~ • .. ·el] ... e1 J.i..d ... ..: ~:ul;:' 111 1.J.. no.).-.::~ p~ v~;.:. ... J1.5 .", .... ..-~CL; .• ~ ,_,,-:. In .. 11 .... J.l (. ol:".1? .. lU-·

tains dt~~€:ct o[;.::r?iiO~'tl CO!~1!~:1..1nic:;~i~o;~3 Y,'lL"l field 0}Cl·Gcr.is for-tilcs~ pro­gr .... ms.

(8) Provic!3s :,/;'A.CV foce'! poir.t :Gr eco!~o~'n!c 'vnrlr~~e to " includ~ pO~'Jhttloa ctnd reso\~rc~s c('in~:1'ol, ~.r~d for c~v:.:: ~ctlon by US for~cs.

(IO) Acts on aU TIn S~:l)l)Ol't policy r',c,tiers pcrtaininz to sub­orctin?tc cChclons.

(11) Directs advlsOl'Y re)"tions!'Jps wit'l GVN on RD and nD-1'~lat'3d matters.

3. TI.1:PJ...F.;\;ENTATION.

a. InteGration and consolidation of oeo and'UD Support activities will bo. 'accomplished at all levels: He~,c'~iuarters ;V:ACV. region/CTZ. pro\'-inceand 'dietric t." '

77

-----_.

HLC'y D;r 10··12 2.D U:~y 1.9C'l

. (b) 'i"t'~~ .. ·t',- ..... ~,."""~ ..... ,...=~, .1.~ ... _" ";'1 -''"':~''lC t C<'"l" ,.:. . ,£.lJl;.. li..; ... ,;, ... \v.J ....... .:. ... ;. \",,;:.'':''.h. \.,,,.;. Cll':Hl •• \. 0 (~rly Ot.1.

all f\!!~cU.O£}S, Ctlrrently }x!.l';'fOr!t.0( ~.;.t p!'o',ri;;cc. Ho,',~.evcj.", the province rep·· rCscLtatLV(~ )r.ay org~niZCJ \vi~:~ i!:2 ~lJ!:-::ov~:.1 of th2 B2P1.~iy ior Revolutiol~t::·y D8VC:ol)!ncnt Su,~)ort n.l regio:1/C'.i'Z'" r.is ?2:~:son:;,cl r.llC: fur;ctlOl~fj as he sees ~.: ! ~ ..... L.

(e) A sh~~~'12 :G~U~1 cJric:f, (~esig:1?jccl ih:: Senior ProvinCial ~,,..l\'l·cO'· \·rl'l-'~";I. .... 5<:-.;'··11·'(1 '·0 " ..... r.·. r~''''''{l-'''''~ rr' ~ c: .~{" '0~r; 'c'rl"'~ .: .... ... • 4_<....1. .~ .. , ..... ! ,,-I ... or ... .. :;u .... y l. ~.\...~ ...... V .. "' •• I ... \,.:. ~11;:; .... eJ ....... oJ. pl • .1.1. J.lt c.\\.i\·.:. ..... O ...

will be Cho.s8n by the T;cpnty fa:' CG~~:;';3 ?r~d the force c,o~·.ill~)anc1er/scnior ~('\'l·'·~-· \"1"" '1.~ COP"\'l'l"'I'~C r' t'l,~ ""'~"'" CO""" to C~···~lr~·.rI~CV C' {' e c. \ .~v.!. J i l~l lo........ . ...... , c.;...... V.~ ...... ;J.fi:..,:.,J ... ;<.) •• \u-> V~,.;. ...... ;.:.. , h 11

b~sis 0: SBCtlJ.'5.ty i.n ito P:COViLC:C) c:yj.l-r~1~lit~l::·Y b,~lan(:e in the nD effort ar.d cl't::llific(~ tions cu~d eX9'::l'il.?nce c/ t1:e .Cl.:l"r8n: oeo ser.5.o::: rJ;:o\rlneiRl advisor and ?L;'>~CV scctOl~ 2.(lvisor. T:1C ~r. . .::lv;cil!:!l not s0]c~ctcd wi~.l serve as t.he oi11cr's d~~riuty f\,S llli!ll QS beir.; his p:"i:1ci}J2.1 :-!(h'lsor lor civil op3r~dions or n1i1it8.1'), S1..!f,:)Ol't as tbe case r{:.:.·./ b.~.

(<1) The :;:,ro¥.""i~.(~e s2:liG:!.' HC~\'isQr \-lEI re:cCiY8 operat:!o;~21 clircc'jo:1 ix-orn R:xi. r(:l~ort t!:::o:..!~~;·. i::,.::: D~:.Y,lty :0";: CO~D.3 to i}w fOl'CO co!::!·· l"""l':lT!(~-;"'i'/s{\'15cY' ?"\~hO'~ rj"'10' r ... ~1~~· ..... ;,~! Dl~··""1·~, .... ·t c·7 i"i-:e '"V"o'\I:}1('~al te~'r"'" \;'1'11 I.,·~ ~ ,......... .. ..... I~ ~ ...... 4.... ..... •• ".4 • ...... .J c.; .... ~ ....... ~ ..... l'" .J •• -'. '" u .....

rc(·.civi..~ 10~;isLtcal and ?.(;J',,"1i1ii3~··r"~~:h·€~ sU'::·l)..)::t fro:11 ito 6·i\':~.::io;*.: ad·/5.sor~' tc~rl.1.

(c) \Vhcr~ RVX:~3' l:::i:.::. 8..~':: att:-:.ched to the provir~ce chief fo~ (:h'oct 'St1PP01:t of ltD, RC:"':.so::'s to tl1CSB \.!;15.iS wJ.H co;:"lo \lnd~l' t1:&' O1"\,-:;""'<)~iO-'L' co·~·J.o:·o' C' t~,~ c·!:>I,i,..·· .. ·, ...... ~"".:·~'c~· "';:HiSO~ ~{~ .. A. , .... 1.. ••• ~ ... .l I.. ...! J .. ~ 0;)1;;; 4<,V ... ~ ... V I~ .. * \;; a. ...... v ..... ' .••

(f) n.,..,o Cl":! ..... ~ ..... - ')'"\·,·..., ... ·l·:.'''r. · .. 'I"~\'·:sr,·1" \'Inl OOl'\'~ ?,(""O·.n"e VJ.::~!-~ .LJi. ............. ~.v .... ~_ .. \, v .~ ......... ~ ... ~ ... ...... .. .... v.... 0,;,:;.0..;; U~ _ ...

nnrflcse provi:-.:ce cfli~rls priT.c5.l:~~: 2 d'/} SOX'. HO'NCVCl", techrJ cal advice, ll'l'll"l"':l't'v 0" Cl\'l'l s'no"'I"~ c!, .. ,~~.1.~".·~-:' ~'.~, '0=' cr~~·~·'l '0 "l~~ "'""'oo:'oT!!""e c,"",~r:.': C" 'nls I l .... -,J ... _, ..... 1,.: V •• L.~ •• ~ .... <.V .... 0"'\ \..;::, l l.1:; r'~ . ..L........ ll............ .. ..... r bp··'·S'll'·'u····'e bv ·-lob n'oo' (l"c·"~""G' ".''-')''''°00 0' 'l"O P"c"';~c';'l t'-:\I'A In 2'1 ~ ... \;: 0.; l,.:..) ., L;..;:\; . ... ;:)i.. ............ _~.... • .. ~ ..... J.~t.::J. J. ~j\; .. , ... ,. ,_0.. 0,;;. ~... . ......

caS0S, eli; Benin!' p!"ovir:ce advlsc:- !'l ... ·..:::.f b8 a.W2.re of the advice given and will i;c-t tho 'policies to which adv~cc w~ . .ll corJo:"ln. .

(3) District. .,

(a) At district an intBgrat"d t:istdct advisory team composed of the cunent MAQ,V S1.!O-scctor t"am and oeo c'istrict repre-sent?.tive will be org~nized. . ~

(b) The new dlsti.'ict team will be responsible for civil/ military advice to tile GVN disil"ict org';mtzation and for the implementation of all WL<;i..yiJ,J\nd3ni.litary_.su:J.:;o~,t .p:co;;r<~ms at d:strict.

79

MACV Dil' 10-12 ~8 May 1.967

. (c) } •. Eir:~~!2 tCi"' .. :-.; C1JE:l, cesir;n~ted S0!;iol'" District Ac­visor wi.a J)(~ ass!;~:1.::d to C;~(~:i' (~.c;~:·!ct. ·'.t'h0 s8rJ.~r d5.sil·icL ('~dvisOl' will be Cl,c,<":~.,." }Y.1 r'lC SC'·d~J" 1)"OH~r/"'c ·'r··':c·o~· .. ~.;f_.] ",'J'e CO"c·L·l'· ... -:l.n"c or tIle _" ...... ~.~'17 ••• ,". j. J' ... ~\ .... - .... " '"'',''' :.~.' - ~ l'.J.l... • .. I. l.l .... \,.. ~ ~ J.... .... J.;--., ... CCI·~:,T·.~ "'0 "Cll', ("""""c co·· ... ~,··"'··,'~·, .. I·· ., ..... ,.,. "(~":C"'H 0'1 i-~,"\ ·0"'<':'':(, of' C'rl ... ·.··: I· .. 1 I''''

• .-., .. ~ .... l.. ~ \,..; .:.v....... JlJ ... .;·.jH .• .:..~. :"'\.." ••. l •. J~ .;. ~\J_.)\J.;. ' •• ~ •• l.: ,t ... '1.:, • .l J.. .... 1.:\,..U ... J.l.1 ... ~ ·~o (·.;.71·~"~Ct·, C',,!1 n].:1!1"} ..•. " 11 .. ·~·..,.· .... · ... ~ •. 1·1'0 p~ rr"~ ..• ). ~-d ,,,l·~!C~··O'l~ ..... -; liH. l •.• ;.o" ...... , J. '.l~- .. , ... ,J.~ .... .:.J •• '.' ........ , ..... ~ ; .• .:. to. J .... U I..."':''':'U_ .. 4 •• ', Clll .... 1J.J •• ll .I,b, •• nu e:,,!~e'!:iQncc. of th~: curl'cr;i ceo c~ist:tict.1'C!p::~es2nf;'.iivC' ?~nd :i'-trACV sl!b-secto~ :-~d·d50:~. ri'llo inclhi(:~;-J not -se!8cre<1 will ECr\·e as ti:c o~h0r's dCPl!{Y as wT:ll as bcing~his pr.inc5.pal ad\"is..or fo'.!..' civil Ol::21':~tiO::S 01' !l'~i1itary suppo.l"t as ti0 c(~sc lnay be. . .

(d) Vlr.cre no ceo distri.ct re~:::;:es~nu~tivc is pres~nt, the 1'\~.LCV £ub··$cctor tC:l!~1 r,'ii! b'cCO;11G th0 d.~stric'i: Civil OreraUo;~s al:d ~cvoluUo:;iry D3velop:mer~:t s:'?ii and the sl:b .. ·scct·:):, ·::t{hi.so::: ,"d.ll be 'cesi~­lH:.te(! sc,~ior dis~':::ict ~.dvisc:r.

(4) The r.::.r CTZ o:.~g?niz~ .. tlon fo:::- Civ .. n O:)z:ratlons and Revo':' h:'i..io:r:;'l!·Y r..Jvc-lo1nr:(~:~t S:::';)o::'t wIn Cu;;,rOi.~LJ gel.l21~~Jly to eH1 scherJ.1alic <?r~aIi-Z -l'['O-ol (.l'i~~·'~""'''l '"lU~C~·:3~1 .... + ~ ·l.'r~~ <r"'\ ~\.. h'~.j. .... t) ... (" ........... L--:- ~~.r.:: '-<. ~ .... .t~1 ; • ..: ..... l).

(6) Fo!'c(! ccnl:::~.nc!2~£;/se'io::." ?(':\·iS0:~S \V~ll l'eViSG fhe·d!' ol'gar:.~%8.iio~,:; ar~d rcexaft t~c::: S·t..:..t2:.t18!":ts o~ i1.11~\!~.C;:s to CO:~-ll)}.y with the gui(~?~ncc f;:?t Ot~t i:l this ci:;.~(:ctive. rl:1G revls!o!1s v ... ;.ll be lo::'wc ... l'd-2Q to this heaC::::,u? .. l'te~s fo': (-~p:)ro\"=-:l by 15 Jun. 67 •.

a. F01' the tlrne b'3ir{I;, there will be no chanJc in.-a·drninisq-ative . and logisiJ.cs St1;)PO!'t. Civ5.lian e2e!1-::ent5 0: t;:e i::teg::"cded organizaUon v:1!1 continue to be S.l,.1ppo;:-tecl (ru:1ds,. p3rSOlll'."81, ?.~1d o'~i)e'X' rec.!Uil·cll1entF;) by thi:ir t· .. l;' b I: 1D J'USD'" U'H ' OS' l'espec lve agenclcs, 1. C., "'!,m assy, ... ~ ,J. .: ... -.....1, ::i ... ,t ... ana r) .•

b. It is intend~d that a continuing effort be unc].=l'taken toward logistic and administrativG ecor.o;::~y t~ro't~zh ccr~sollc.2.tion and cross­servicinJ of ll.ppropriate support ;,cti.viti.cs. . , 5. RBFERENCE. State D<:pa.rtment MSG DTG 09230·iZ May 1967 (C).

80

11.ACV D5.r 10-12 ~8 May 1967

(c) I ... ,sir':Z!:;: t::!:::-."! chief, c:~si::r:::'_ted SOLiQj.~ Distrlct AcJ.­

visO)- w;,:l 'i)(~ a.ss:[';:1.:!(! to C~;'(~>l (~s::~ict. Jth<3 s8rJ.ol~ d\su'icL ,~civisor will be

C~1(/~·;~'n by the sc;;io::.· p::'·o",'ir.cc a(> .. ~.so;" \:?it:1 tl~o COl~C'~~rl"encc or the D~i~\.!iy

C C)";:'T":~ j.,o 'L·jlr. (,..,·,",c co··"'~'·''''·~''-s·,'''I···.··''!'()··(' ')"~'r!C'''1' O'~ {'h'~ ~O"':C'~(' Of cor:> ... ·'··i'y ,,-, .,~ .. J!" ... _v......... 11 ...... 1.\, ....... ,-'I"..I.l .., ....... \) .• ')v. •• \,.1.; .. ,:),.,,) 1 ... H,;\.-U .. l .... ~

'\.~ (.;.-;I·· .. ;Ct· c~"rl" ~ .. lnl·J"···· .. ·or .. ·; .... ~,. . ." : ... 1.''''0 r.>~ r.r~, ..• J. !)~d "t·'"'li'':c~''o''-''' ""n·l til\" l •.• ;oU,.,. J J.\ .., ......... - l~'':'J " ............. \,; ~.! ll. rl..U ...:.:..':'U ... ~ ~._l, \;. t .... _1..1. ,.Ll lJb'l U

cxre::::icnce. of thc! Ct:Yl'C:t:t ceo (:~stAictrc~::-e.s(:ni:-.. tivC' and ~iL:'~CV s1..!b-secto~~

rl.d\~if;O:~. Tho in(ivi(:~~.J not ZGlscte~ '~'ill scrVB ~~S thQ c:hcr's c1cp\~ty as vt~Yn

as boin~ his pX'inc:.p.a.1 Rd·d.spr- for civil opcr:!.tions or !liilitary support:l.s L10

case Ina:;, b0. . ,

(d) V[f\cre no ceo district" r0}:;res..s-n"U!tive is pres~nt, the kr.ACV £ub·,sccto~ tea:";1 y·,.in bCCOi"::l~ th~ d.;strIct Ci.vil Operaiio:1s ~tl;.d

~cvo!UUO:;~TY D:;:v(;loprnej"~t st?if and t10 s\~h .. ·scct.J:'~ 2.(1\-1501' willl)e Cesi~­

l)~~te(: s0~~:i.or disi·.:'ict ~.dviBcr.

(4) 'I'he TiT CTZ o:~g:>...ni2;.,tlon fo~ Civil O:)eratlorls fUH1 Revo':"

h ... tior~a2'Y DJvl'lo)!r:\'):~t S~::/:>0i .. t w:Jl' c0nrQj.·f~j g(:r!2!'=~ny to the schen1~ .. tic ~r[:ani ...

Z"l'\'O""' (.'i ... ~· ... • .... ~ .. l· ·a:':-:lc~·~~1 .... + J ll·,r .. ~ """" ~t. ..':::".L «.(:..l.;'" h.> ~,L~ •• ~" ~ .... ~~~ ;.~.,~ J.,).

IV CTZ o:-g~ni.zr..lion. h,;)~())'[;()r,~~!,:; i;".h·~:c:U.o::s fcc Lie IV CTZ o::g~';;:Z2.ti('.:'l .

'Cl,' C:"l'j C",o'''''';C)~5 n"jr1 R·O\·O'·'HO~o",,' ""'-010']"""')'· """;-0--" \1'111 b~ P"O"-'-"'C' J... ..f. ...~,"", ... , .. I. ... ~ •• C~J,,~ J • ..... , ... ~ .... _ ......... J J_~ .... \" .... , ............. \,. .... ~I ... i'! ....... "' .... _ .• _ ... ~ .. ,

~tt a lr:.tc;:' dato.

(6) Fo:!.'cc ccn1':-~;,~.nd8~"t;/sc;·;ior 2.c:\'iso:"s will revi.se th(~h'

oxgar' ... ~:.!?.tlor..s 2.Dd rccl-r:?"lt t::c::- S·l: .. t2:, .. 1e:::ts or l1.1;:'CJ.C:";S to cO::~'ll)~.y ,f,'Ith t!"!e

gui(~:~ .. rlcc f;2t Olit i:1 this' C!r'Bcti"'l,"0. ri~1.G reviS!O~'lS \:.::.11 be fo:·-,,~!c.J'd2d to this

heaCquarte:::-s fo::' ~.p~)rov~l by 15 JU;l 67.

a. Fo:r the Urne bzi::g, t~ere will be 110 ('ha.n~o in· a:d.rninisfr,ative.

and Jogi~)U.es Sl,J~)port. Civilian e2e!"l~en~5 0: t:;e i::teg:aled ol.'ganlzation will

continue to be S\'ip~)Ort0cr (fn:iCIs,. p~rsOlu:81, a~~d o·~hcr .rcquil'clnents) by t1j.~h·

respective agencies, 1. e. ,Emb?ssy, AID, JUSP/.8, USIA and OSA.

b. It is intencl0d fuat it continuing cHort be unciertaken to'.'lal'd

logistic and adnlinisirative ecocor;~y t'1ro~!gh ccr.solj(~3.tion and cross-

6el'viclll6 of appropriate s\.\PpOl't ltctivities •. ,

5. !tEFERENCE. State D3partnlcnt MSG DTG 09230,1Z May 1967 (C).

80

-~.--------------------------.---

HLCY D;r 10,·12 r, ~ ;r,y JC> C'l ~"J,.IJ~.. .OJ·

(e) A· SiI~~J0 :G:t!~1 chief, <Zesig:l;.jcc1 U:0 Senior Provincial .l_dvisOT, \vill ·b0: assj:~;ncd to C2.C:: r:::·o\'i!:ec. 'I'he sClliol' l)l'o1'il~cir:.l advisor will be chos8n by the r}2p~lty jo:' CC~L::3 CI.nd 1'h8 force CO;111~1R.nder/scnior 2(1\'1'°0'· V'l"" "1·n con"\'l'l·r'l'~e ,';:.0 "--w"'" cO"'~~ to c~""r"'·.rJ 'CY c' t" e - .;l J. J 'Ll l~....... __ v, ~ .... ' v..: ........... J..~.) ... ,\.J ... \.1.../...... v ... '" I.. '~' .. ; .1... , a 11

b~sis 0: secl.:riiy In ttc p:t'OVi1:C:C l c::~r;.l-!Yl~lit~'!.:'y balanct in the HD effort ar.d Clu:llii'ica tions a!!a eX9,:::ric?IjCe o~ t~:e Cl:r~2nt oeo scr..i.o;.· provincial advisor and ?tA.CV sectol· 2.(1\'i501'. '£:lC iI:.::~v:C:t!21 not sc1cctcd wi!l serve as the other's d~!~uty ~).S wi':ll ns bc5.n~ 1:i5 !.;:. ... incil)~l :-:.dvisor fel' civil op~l'a.tions or ll)ilitary Sl..!l):)Ol"t as the cC::.se r .. ::-.y c.::. '. ,

(d) The ;;:;:-o~'-::"'(:,0 ~,3:1io~~ a(~ViS0r vEl TE:ccivG oper.at!o::21 dircct),O:1 fro:('l) a:~ci ri.:pott t!::.~o:..!:·:;'. t:'>3 ]:;~:::.:.t7 fo~ CO:.::\D3 to the force C01~·· 1-'""1':) :nc~':>·i·/S0'15.(''r' ? "'.''H-;hO"·~ ')"le )" .• ~ 1, ; ....... ~'V ,:;.j.::·· ....... ·:-:.,..·t o·t .,"fj e 0'''0-/: l'e a1 t' \-:-.~' r" "'1'11 J ••. , ~ ........ . •. ,'A ~""1o' .. u.; ... '. # .... ~ ... ~ ... "' .... '-'~40""'" .... <00 .' ...... _ ,... ••• u ....

reeeiv8 10~;!sltcal a.nd ;?~(:l;1in.i.s~·,:,c.:h;£~ su;:)..):~t f:CO:fi Lte. (~.i.v; .. ':;iori advisory ~~. '

(e) "'h ........... ~ "r"'':77,,'''!, .~.' t'''~!~ o:..,.,~. ")/·,;. .... ch ec1 {'O "Ie ·p'eo~~"''''e "("to I".;J. \:! ... ~. _".,. .. _ ....... ~'.) c.~ '" .... L"'..: ... ~ ,,,, L_ J.. \' ............

chief 101.' (:b:cct Sttppo~:t 01 RD, (> .. (:v:.so~'s to t~lGS0 t::1US v,'J.H COl:1C uDckl' the o')~ra.Uo::,al conn'ol cf the scr.ic:~ ·r::,"o,\·5.::ce adv.i.so:::. . "

(f) The se~ic::- 'p;."ovi::cc ·[!.(iviso:-- will S2rve as 'llie Vie!­namese' p:r-ovh:.c-e chief 1s prir.c:::.::.~. c.d·{2so!". Hm1lcvcT" technIcal adv5.cc, lrdlita:!'y 0;- civil, should con~i~.~·~2 to b2 giVI311 to U".B p!'ovi::ce chici cr his rep~"0s~nt2"~tive by the .most qt:::::::i0G 1~~'!cn;~el" 01 the pro-'"liD(~i8.1 te:tril. In all cas r ' .... "''',11:). "'r-.,iO~ ~~OVl'l'CC> ":l~Vi"'''''' .,.,..~."~.t l,.-::> .... \H~l'~ o~ l"n' ~(~"rcp gl'v'n al'" ";'~I ~ t.:: .:> .... 1 ..... _ ').1- ..... " .. \., ~.-}v .......... :')\.. ......... r ...... , ...:.- _ C o.! ...... .1. oi I;::: .. \,.~

will set tho policies to which ad'/:C0 w: . .ll corJol'm, '

(3) District. "

(a) At (lisu'ict an integrated ceistrict advisory team composed of the current MAGV suo-sector team and oeo c'.istrict repre-senj2..tive will be org~ni.zed. ' ,

(1)) The new clisb:ict team will be resIJonsible for civil/ military advice to the GVN dist.":'ict organization and for the implementation of aU V~LQtv~1.J\n,d_1ll:i.litary_st\~).?o~,tp;(,cZl'r; •• 1sat- d~,strict,

79

1·.1ACV D:l" 10-12 28 i:l~y 180'/

t ~ii\~?i;;;;l,'~~~f~:-~~:-~~~-:;-'h-.;o~~11 Co:· ... :',,::.:::>,· I CORDS

-----·--=--=:==·-·-··C==-·-~--CO""J ., <:. .. ;, .----J

.... -" '\ .. C" ,. - Co" -" D • S· \ Foree. (· ... 55" !1:'..e:. 0: v-":;:-.:.. CPlJ ... Y CUlor l

V, "- " for '.I' ',I ! C?,Jr.~.::~!:.. St~;.:f '--/t., -- ..... -I.~ .. -~ .. ~. C~_::~-:>5 __ ' -/".-:-,,- Ac.visor (11il:'tary) 1

. I

[ -----] us .~ v \./'

Un~ ... s ~". -'\ _ .. __ .. -

. ---r--r----I fF:l<-~s t; - I r RC?Or~~] L:..~ogrc:::-:;.s

-x-x-,,- Coordination--Military and CORDS m"Uers. "'0-0-0- _O.p~l':,at~~~t:C9;o.~1:pl_~yh.G:Lt;njJ._a!3.~~gncd on

RD, di!ect cupport missio:l •.

81

-----_._---RVHhF' S ROn~ IN :mCIl'ICA non

It has already been noted trw,t "vh", U. S. gradue.lly came to espouse a division of effort bct\-,een U.S. forces c.,,:} RVFAP in uhich the former 1"lOuld concentrate on defc:j,t:i.ng tl"!e L:J.in :'01';;"S of the ins~u'gents in the unpopulated areas Ii"hile RV1'lAF concentrated 0:1 securing pacification operations in the populcd;ed areas.

General Hestrr,cl·elc.~d first in:f"crrced ~.-~,?sh:i.agton of .his intention to folIo,", t])is general di vi.s:10n of ef'i'ol't 1n 1e."cc f.ug·ust 1966. But his emph~.sis i':as one -of deGree, he D"~~de cJ_e~r, :;--ather tba.n of lr:utually ·exclusive c2.tegories:

.. . Our st!'e:t.eSJ vTill be on:: of e.. gEneral offens i ve Hi th max:tr.'J::r,;. Pl"a.c7.:i ce.l sup~o(,1:'t to area e.~·_:1 :;<>p·..::.12.tion security in f\l:cthel" SU"f'"l"nf't""rt. 0.' f" Revolu+iop~·"y nn·-·"'lr ..... ,'·,·.r:.Y>·I.· - J:':t" .... - - ... - .... --, ... ~-.,- '-'.t!".:....'-'-~J.v.

The esscnti,lltasks of ReV«'-'.1-::.io~,8.ry DevclopT!el1t and n8#t:1on bu11di!::t; c? .. nnot be e#ccc::::plisi::e::' if enemy lna:1.n :forces ce.n ge"n acce;3B to the popule,t~on csnCcers 1',r:d destroy our ef'forts.. US, Free. ~,.TorlJ ForcEs ~ l:i-t\ ~~:'}2ir nobi]J .. ty and in cccrd:ir:e.tion ~:5 .. th :SVI{llF, !flU3t te.':":e- -:':':12 fj.c!~·~ to the. enelty by attc'!..r:k:tng IJis T!'.? .. 1n_ forces e.r:d i~va.di:oD his bs.se [:l,reas.. Our e.bil:i.:cy to do t!::is is ir~:p:rcY:Ll~C Et-c'?:.l:Ll .. :I. :·:a.xi!:.ur!~ er:.J:hasi~ 1-rill h8 given to the use of long ra:-:zs p£ .. trols c~l).d Qth~r r::etl,ns to find the erc.srq· 1'.!ld locate his b',5"'8. l'o;:c'es and 'bases thus discovered "ill be subjected to e:,:;;h'ol' g;:ou31d attac1, or quick rer,ction B-52 ,mil ·cacti(:alair str-i':fCS. ;','hen feasi.ble B-52 stril:cs '-ID.l be foIJ.(l1'Ied by [;rOl1l1d fC"~8s to search the e.ree.. Suste,ined ground CO~lbo,t oper-atio;,s 1-:i11 ros.intain pressure on the enell:Y.

The groidng strength cf US/ir.,,~ 1-)orld forces will prov:i.de the shield that lTi.l.1 perrlit P.T,';, to shift its ueight of effort to e..'l extent not heret.ofc:c~ :'ee,sible to dire~t. sup­port. of Revolutionary .Develo:fT.,ent. Also, I visual:"Lze tha.t a . significant n'Jmber of the US/Free :'7or1j r.:o.neuver battalions will be co=itted to tactical areas of responsibilit.y (TA.03) missions. These missions encc!·~.:pe.ss be,se security and e. t the same time support Revolutionary Developr.1ent by spreadil1..g security radially from the bases to protect more of the popu­lation. Saturation patrolling, civic action, and close associ~. ation lvith ARVN, regional and popular forces to bolster their combat effectiveness are a~Ol1..g the tasks of the ground fqree elements. At the same time ARVN troops ~Iill be available if required to reinforce offensive operations and to serve 80S reaction forces for outlying security posts and government centers under attack. Our strategy '-liIl include opening, constructing and using roads, as well as a start tOTtTard opening

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