henry vii and the treaty of redon (1489): plantagenet ambitions and early tudor foreign policy

Henry VII and the Treaty of Redon (1489): Plantagenet Ambitions and Early Tudor Foreign Policy

JOHN M. CURRIN University of Minnesota

t is generally maintained by historians of Tudor foreign policy that the reign of Henry VII marked the transition from the policy I pursued by the Plantagenets, of acquiring and holding territories in

France, to a more defensive, anglocentric policy.’ In Before the Armada - still the standard survey of early Tudor foreign policy - R. B. Wernham states that Henry’s ‘manifest reluctance to revive the Lancastrian tradition of continental conquest’ remained the ‘keystone’ of his foreign policy.2 Henry VII remained neutral during the so-called guerre folle, after French troops invaded Brittany in May 1487. This invasion was intended to destroy the new feudal league led by Louis of Orlians (the future Louis XII), who, along with the league’s other leaders, had taken refuge at the Breton court of Duke Francis 11. At the same time, however, the French crown was asserting against the reigning Montfort duke, whose dynasty had been installed and protected by the

I am grateful to Dr C. S. L. Davies for reading and commenting on a draft of this article.

James Gairdner, Henry the Seventh (New York, 1889) [hereafter Gairdner, Henry the Seventh], pp. 62-119, 132-48, 164-207,214-15; Wilhelm Busch, England under the Tudors: King Henry VII (1485-1509), trans. A. M. Todd (1895) [hereafter Busch, England under the Tudors], pp. 40-68, 122-47, 169-228; A. F. Pollard, ‘Introduction’, in The Reign of Henry VII from Contemporary Sources (3 vols., 1913-14), i. li-lx; Gladys Temperley, Henry VI1 (Boston, 1914) [hereafter Temperley, Henry VII], pp. 70-1 11; J. D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558 (Oxford, 1952) [hereafter Mackie, Earlier Tudors], pp. 81-111; R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485-1588 (New York, 1966) [hereafter Wernham, Before the Armada], pp. 27-61; R. L. Storey, The Reign of Henry VII (New York) [hereafter Storey, Henry VIII, pp. 68-91; Roger Lockyer, Henry VII (London and New York, 1968) [hereafter Lockyer, Henry VII], pp. 82-93; S . B. Chrimes, Henry VII (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972) [hereafter Chrimes, Henry VII], pp. 272-97; P. S . Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy (New York, 1973) [hereafter Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy], pp. 47-66; Michael Van Cleave Alexander, The First of the Tudors: A Study of Henry VII and his Reign (Totowa, NJ, 1980) [hereafter Alexander, First of the Tudors], pp. 69-122; Alexander Grant, Henry VII (1985), pp. 36-41; Susan Doran, England and Europe, 1485-1603 (London and New York, 1986) [hereafter Doran, England and Europe], pp. 15-22.

Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 37.

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344 HENRY VII AND THE TREATY OF REDON

Plantagenets, the Penthievre claim to the duchy that had been ceded to Louis XI and, once again in October 1485, to Charles V I I I . 3 At first, Henry, enjoying a truce with France, declined to provide military pro- tection for the house of Montfort. He not only refused Duke Francis’s request for aid, but also disavowed Sir Edward Wydeville, Lord Scales

Henry tried in vain to mediate between the king of France and the duke of Brittany to bring about a peace. After the death of Duke Francis in September 1488, the duchy fell to the twelve-year-old Anne. Henry then intervened militarily in defence of the young duchess and her duchy; but he did so, according to most Tudor historians, reluctantly, and for the limited purpose of preventing Breton ports from falling to the French.

The treaty of Redon, which set the terms of England’s intervention in Brittany, has received little attention from Tudor historians. Many mention only the article whereby Henry promised to provide 6,000 troops to aid the beleaguered duchess on condition that the Bretons pay all expense^.^ Wernham, for example, regards this treaty as an example of Henry’s anglocentric policy, arguing that ‘by limiting his Breton expeditionary force to 6,000 men and by confining his military plans and operations strictly to the defence of Brittany, he made clear that he was fighting only to protect England’s essential interest.’6 Other historians, however, have recognized that the treaty of Redon involved more than just the aid of troops; that it included articles on commerce, on the marriage of the duchess of Brittany, on her other alliances, and on the future recovery of English possessions in F r a n ~ e . ~ Some of these historians, such as Gladys Temperley and D. L. Potter, trying to discern

who took over an unauthorized expedition to help defend the duchy. 4

On the guerre folle and the war in Brittany, see Antonie Dupuy, Histoire de la rkunion de la Bretagne 6 la France ( 2 vols., Paris, 1880) [hereafter Dupuy, Histoire de la rkunion], ii. 82-150; J. S. C. Bridge, A History of Francefrom the Death of Louis XI ( 5 vols., Oxford, 1921-36) [hereafter Bridge, History of France], i. 133-77; Yvonne Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIIIet son milieu (1470- 1498): La jeunesse nu pouvoir (Paris, 1975) bereafter Labande-Mailfert, Charles VZZZI, pp. 55-80.

On Lord Scales’s expedition, see Adelstan, marquis de Beauchesne, ‘Exp6dition d’Edouard Wydeville’, Revue de Bretagne, de V e d e et d’Anjou, xlvi (1911), 185-214.

Wernham, Before the Armah, p. 35; Storey, Henry VIZ, p. 77; Lockyer, Henry VIZ, p. 83; Chrimes, Henry VZI, p. 281; Crowson, Tudor Foreign Policy, p. 61; Alexander, First of the Tudors, p. 91; Doran, England and Europe, p. 16; Charles Giry-Deloison, ‘Henri VII et la Bretagne: aspects politiques et diplomatiques’, La Bretagne: terre dEurope, ed. Jean Kerhervk (Brest, 1992) [hereafter Giry-Deloison, ‘Henri VII et la Bretagne’], p. 236.

Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 35. Gairdner, Henry the Seventh, p. 67; Busch, England under the Tudors, p. 46; Temperley, Henry

VZI, pp. 84-5; Bridge, History of France, i. 180; Mackie, Earlier Tudors, pp. 91-2; D. L. Potter, ‘Redon, Treaty of (1489)’, Historical Dictionary of Tudor England, I485-1603, ed. Ronald H. Fritze (Westport, Conn., 1991) [hereafter Potter, ‘Redon’], pp. 415-16. More thorough summaries of the treaty of Redon can be found in Breton histories, starting with Bertrand d’Argentrt, L ’histoire de Bretagne jusques au temps de Madame Anne, dernihre duchesse (Paris, 16 18) [hereafter Argentrk, Histoire de Bretagne], pp. 676-7, whose summation is repeated in Guy-Alexis Lobineau, Histoire de Bretagne composie sur les titres et les auteurs originaux (2 vols., Pans, 1707), i. 794-5. An enumerated summary of the principal articles is given in Dom Pierre-Hyacinthe Morice and Charles Taillandier, Histoire ecclisiastique et civil de Bretagne (20 vols., Guingamp, 1835-7), x. 199-204. A shorter summary is given in Dupuy, Histoire de la rimion, ii. 165-6.

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JOHN M. CURRIN 345

the significance of the treaty, have argued that it was the ‘foundation’ or ‘centerpiece’ of the triple alliance between Henry, Maximilian of Austria, and Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain.* This seems exaggerated, however, for the military commitment of the treaty was of short duration, and the emerging confederation between Henry and Maxi- milian was disrupted, albeit temporarily, when Maximilian, striving to suppress rebellion in the Low Countries, accepted a peace with France that included Anne of Brittany, despite the treaty of Redon, and had as an objective the withdrawal of the English troops from Brittany? As for the triple alliance of Henry, Maximilian, and Ferdinand and Isabella, its rickety diplomatic structure was not erected until the treaties of Woking of September 1490. Yvonne Labande-Mailfert, mistakenly referring to the treaty of Redon as the Anglo-Breton accord signed at Rennes, set the treaty in the context of the wider struggle against France conducted by Spain, and did not examine how the treaty was shaped by Henry’s own political objectives.l0 The significance of the treaty of Redon is in fact to be found in its definition of Anglo-Breton relations, in its strategic dimensions, and in what it suggests about the direction in which Henry was taking his policy early in 1489, which appears to have been towards the recovery of Guyenne and other lost Plantagenet claims in France.

The treaty of Redon, concluded by indenture on 10 February 1489, was ratified by Henry VII on 1 April and by Anne of Brittany on 19 May.” It was first of all a renewal of the amity and league between England and Brittany and a reciprocal security agreement. The treaty has three main parts. The first contains articles putting forth general principles of mutual security and a statement on the obligation of each signatory to assist the other in the recovery of their rights in France at some time in the future; the second part, making up the bulk of the treaty, comprises the specific military obligations undertaken by Henry and the Bretons with respect to the English expedition of 1489; and the third includes articles renewing and amending the Anglo-Breton commercial treaty of 1486. The treaty does not appear well organized, however. Parts of it are repetitious, and it contains additions making modifications and amendments to terms stated earlier.

* Temperley, Henry VII, p. 85; Potter, ‘Redon’, p. 415. Joseph Marie Bruno Constantin Kervyn de Lettenhove, Histoire de Flandre (6 vols., Brussels,

1847-50), v. 470-2; Dupuy, Histoire de la riunion, ii. 184-91; Hennann Wiesflecker, Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Osterreich und Europa an der Wende zur Neuzeit (5 vols., Munich, 1971-86), i. 224. lo Labande-Mailfert, Charles VIII, p. 88. I ’ Henry’s letters patent of ratification are in the Archives Dbpartementales de Loire-Atlantique [hereafter ADLA], E 123/12, and are reproduced in Dom Pierre-Hyacinthe Monce, Mimoirespour servir a2 preuves a I’histoire ecclisiastique et civile de Bretagne (3 vols., Pans, 1742-6) fiereafter Morice, Preuves], iii. mls. 617-27. The text of Henry’s letters, from the Treaty Rolls, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], C76/173, nun. 6-9, is printed in Thomas Rymer, Foedera, conventiones, litterae, et cujuscumque generb acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios imperatores, reges. pontifices. principes vel communitates etc. (20 vols., 1727-35) [hereafter Rymer, Foedera], xii. 362-72. Anne’s ratification is in the Archives Nationales, J 648, no. 14.



Re-establishment of the Anglo-Breton alliance in the face of French aggression had eluded Duke Francis, who was able to obtain from Henry only treaties of truce and commerce.12 The treaty of Redon revived this alliance, and provided that should Anne or her heirs and successors or her country ‘be oppressed, molested, invaded or attacked’ by any king, prince, noble or any other power, then the king of England and his heirs and successors ‘will oppose and resist’ such menacing force by giving to the duchess and her land succour and aid. Anne, of course, had the reciprocal obligation of aiding Henry should he and his realm come under attack. It is well known that Henry used his diplomacy to help secure his dynasty, and the treaty of Redon accordingly contained an article stating that neither party would give aid, counsel or favour to each other’s rebels.I3

The article concerning France seems to cut against Wernham’s thesis that Henry had abandoned the idea of recovering the Plantagenet lands in France. It is worth quoting in its entirety.

And if it should happen in the future that the said king of England be moved to arms, or to make, induce or initiate war, for his right or those of his progenitors or ancestors, either for Normandy, Gascony or for any other part of France, or for the Crown of France itself, the said duchess will provide and her heirs and successors will provide to the same king and to the same successors, for the rights of the said king and his ancestors and for the recovery thereof, equally favour, counsel, aid, auxiliary troops, succour and subsidy; and she will assist and succour and they [i.e. the duchess’s heirs and successors] will assist and succour the same king and his heirs and successors up to the final and successful expedition; and she will help and they will help the same king and his heirs according to their abil i t~.’~

For the sake of reciprocity, England was to do the same should the Montfort duchess seek to recover her rights in France; but it was the crown of England that had substantial historical claims there, not the Montforts.

The specific military aid to be rendered by Henry was expressed in the language of affective affinity common in many of the diplomatic instru- ments of that era: ‘Whereas by natural right all princes, especially those who are nearest of blood and of mutual obligation, being bound by necessity, ought to defend and protect each other, by mutual inter- change, from wrong and unjust inva~ion.”~ The treaty recognized that the duchess and her duchy had suffered the injury of invasion by a host of her enemies, who occupied certain places within the duchy ‘de facto

Rymer, Foedera, xii. 303-12; Barthelemy-Anatole Pocquet du H a u t - J d , Franfois ZZ, duc de Bretagne et I’Angleterre (1458-1488) (Paris, 1929) bereafter Pocquet du Haut-Jusd, Frmpis 11],

l 3 Rymer, Foedera, xii. 363. All translations are the present author’s. l4 Ibid., xii. 363. Is Ibid., xii. 364.


pp. 212-4.

JOHN M. CURRIN 347

and not at all by right’, and who had undertaken an iinvasion anew; and therefore the king of England obliged himself to put into Brittany 6,000 armed men, at the expense of Brittany and paid through the king, to serve the duchess ‘as much for the defence of her person as of the country of the same’. A proviso was added requiring that ‘a sufficient number’ of troops from the 6,000 be reserved for the towns and castles that were to be delivered to the English; but it was stipulated that the number of troops reserved for these towns could not exceed 500 men.16

Whereas Wernham sees this as representing an attempt by Henry to limit his involvement in Brittany, it may have been instead a Breton attempt to limit the number of English troops in the duchy. Henry, in fact, had wanted to put in a larger force, and about the time the treaty of Redon was concluded obtained from parliament a disme and subsidies for the support of 10,000 archers for a year.17 Indeed, in the text of the treaty, to the article specifying the duchess’s financial obligation there was added an amendment stating that the English army would not exceed 10,000 rnen.l8 While the Bretons acutely needed English help, they had reason for wanting to limit English strength. The Montfort dukes had maintained their autonomy by effecting a balance between England and France, playing the mutually hostile powers off against each other.19 Moreover, the Bretons well remembered how the English, contrary to their duke’s wishes, had continued their occupation of Brest and how they had been responsible for the seizure of Fougeres in 1449.20

Philippe de Montauban, chancellor of Brittany and one of the commissioners who negotiated the treaty of Redon, had a further motive for limiting the size of the English army. A bitter dispute involving the efforts of Jean de Rieux, marshal of Brittany and the duchess’s guardian, to marry Anne to Alain, sire d’Albret, erupted into a power struggle between two rival camps, and Montauban was one of the leaders opposing Rieux. In this dispute Henry supported Rieux, and thus

I6 Ibid. l7 Rotuli Parliamentorum ut et Petitiones e f Placita in Parliamento (6 vols., London, 176771832), vi. 418-23.

l9 Michael Jones, Ducal Brittany, 1364-1399: Relations with England and France during the Reign of Duke John IV (Oxford, 1970) [hereafter Jones, Ducal Brittany], passim; Patrick Galliou and Michael Jones, The Bretons (Oxford, 1991), pp. 234-39; George Akenhead Knowlson, Jean V , due & Erefagne ef I’Angleterre (1399-1442) (Cambridge and Rennes, 1964) [hereafter Knowlson, Jean Vl, passim; Pocquet du Haut-Jussk, FranFois II, passim; Yann Berkilien, Histoire de la Bretagne (Pans, 1985), pp. 164-90; Yannick Pelletier and Pierre le Treut, Histoire gPnPrale de la Bretagne et &s Erefons (2 vols., Paris, 1990), i . 65-72. This ‘politique de bascule’ is the theme of Marie-Hklkne Santrot, Entre France et Angleferre: le duchP de Bretagne, essai d’iconographie des dues de Bretagne (Nantes, 1988), which is the catalogue for an exhibit held in 1988, sponsored by the Conseil Gtntral de Loire-Atlantique and the Archives Dtpartementales, commemorating the 500th anniversary of the battle of St-Aubin-du-Cormier. 2o On the English occupation of Brest and the tension it caused in Anglo-Breton relations, see Jones, Ducal Brittany, esp. ch. 6, and Knowlson, Jean V, pp. 26-9. For the English role in the capture of Fougeres, see M. H. Keen and M. J. Daniel, ‘English Diplomacy and the Sack of Fougkres in 1449’, History, lix (1974), 375-91.

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Rymer, Foedera, xii. 364.


Montauban had reason to fear that the English army might involve itself in Breton politics on Rieux’s behalf. Nor was his fear without foundation, for during the summer of 1489 there was an attempt to use the English army to enforce Rieux’s plans for the duchess’s marriage.21 The stipulation restricting the number of English troops in the towns may have been intended not solely to limit their power and presence in Brittany’s principal ports, but also to ensure that the bulk of Henry’s army was in fact used for its stated purpose, and not for seizing and holding key Breton ports.

From the time the English expedition arrived in Brittany until the feast of All Saints (1 November), when the indenture for English military service expired, Duchess Anne was to be held financially responsible for the cost of transporting the English troops to Brittany and back again to England; for the daily wages of the soldiers and their captains from the moment of their conveyance to Brittany to the moment of their return to England; and for the expense of their maintenance while in Brittany. As security and pledge for meeting this financial obligation, the duchess was to hand over certain towns and castles to the English. She was further obligated to make reimbursement to the king of England for all his expenses at some place within the kingdom of England, and until that was done the English were entitled to keep possession of the surrendered towns.22 The accounting of the expenses of the English army was to be done jointly by English and Breton controllers, and an article was inserted in the treaty stating that any aid given by the duchess in support of the recovery of Henry’s rights in France was to be computed and deducted from the obligation she owed to Henry.23

The Bretons were to provide the ships for the conveyance of the English army into Brittany, and the army was to be embarked from Portsmouth. A specific time for embarkation of the army was not stipulated in the treaty, for at the time of the negotiations the main English force had yet to be fully assembled. Only an approximate schedule was established: around the middle of February, or at the end of the month at the latest, ‘or however soon it can aptly be done’.”

The treaty stipulated that upon the landing of the English army, the Bretons were to surrender to the assigned deputies of the king of England two of five named towns, including their castles; but it was Henry’s pleasure ‘to elect, choose, solicit, accept and demand from the said duchess’ the two towns. Five towns were named from which Henry could select: Concarneau, Hennebont, Vannes, Auray and Gukrande. Within the two selected towns, the English were to enjoy, without any hindrance on the part of the duchess or her subjects, complete control of the whole civil administration; and they were to receive all the revenues

2’ Dupuy, Histoire de la rimion, ii. 167-70, 180-3. 22 Rymer, Foedera, xii. 364-5. 23 Ibid., xii. 366. 24 Ibid., xii. 364.


JOHN M. CURRIN 349

from customs, tolls, gabelle and taille, and the profits of all rights and obventions ‘accordingly as Lord Francis, late duke of Brittany, of famous memory, possessed, occupied and received at any time during the life of the same’. The English promised to allow the markets and fairs to continue as they had in the past, but English merchants were to be given the right to participate in these markets and fairs as long as they paid or took nothing beyond a ‘just and reasonable price’. Of course, with the towns under English administration, what constituted just and reasonable would be determined by English authori ties.25

The treaty further specified that those towns to be delivered to the English were to be stocked with victuals for fifteen days and sufficiently fortified and provided with artillery, bombards, munitions and gun- powder, and all other weapons necessary for the defence of the town. It was left to the king’s deputy to decide what constituted sufficient provision and fortification. Any ordnance removed or diminished, at the request of the king or his deputy, had to be restored within twenty days. It was explicitly stated that once the sums owed the king of England had been paid, these towns, including all ordnance, were to revert to the control of the duchess. An inventory of all ordnance within the towns and castles was to be drawn up by English and Breton commissioners when these towns were delivered to the English.26 On the issue of the towns, the treaty hints at a lingering mistrust between Brittany and England. The English insisted that when their army landed, certain Breton nobles were to be sent over to England in English ships and remain on these ships as hostages until the two towns had been delivered to the English in full conformity with the terms of the treaty.27

25 Ibid., xii. 365-6. 26 Ibid., xii. 366-7. The dukes of Brittany had a substantial arsenal, under the command of a mitre de Ihrtillerie, and proportionally, Francis I1 spent as much on ordnance as did Louis XI: Michael Jones, ‘L‘armke bretonne 1449-1491: Structures et carrieres’, Ln France de Iujin du XYF sipcle: renouveuu et upogie. ed. Bernard Chevalier and Philippe Contamine (Paris, 1985), pp. 158- 60. I have not located an inventory of such ordnance taken at the time of the English arrival in Brittany in 1489, but there is preserved in the Trksor des Chartes of Brittany an inventory of Breton artillery compiled in 1495 that may give some idea of the ordnance maintained in the five towns named in the treaty of Redon (ADLA, E 216113, reproduced in Le co)mplor Breton de M . CCCC. XCII, ed. Arthur de la Borderie, Archives de Bretagne, no. 2 (Nantes, 1884), no. 53). The royal commissioner making the inventory found in Concarneau five iron culverins; one long iron culverin with the head of a serpent; a ‘great culverin’; a small broken iron cannon; a great cannon; a mortar; two falcons; and two arquebus, plus a store of shot and powder. The commissioner found no artillery at Hennebont, and was told by local officials ‘que durant les guerres derrenikres, les cappitaines et gens de guerre dud. seigneur [i.e. the king of France] avoient tout emportk’. The story was the same at Auray, except that ‘les murailles [sont] dilacerh et rompues.’ At Vannes, the commissioner found one great iron cannon and two falcons, each weighing 400 Ib. At Gukrande, he found six damaged culverins and six damaged serpentines; two non-serviceable iron cannons; five falcons, each weighing 200 Ib; one small falcon of 100 Ib; one falcon of 60 Ib; an arquebus weighing 25 Ib; four broken arquebus each weighing 20 Ib; and one non-serviceable courtaud. 27 Rymer, Foedera, xii. 367. The designated hostages were the sires de Maure, du Bois, de la Motte, de Kaer, d‘Acignk, de Quebriac, de Brennes, de la Bouvardiere, du Timeur, du Faouet, d‘Oudon, du Ust, du Pordo, and de Vieille-Vigne.



The port of Brest was the strategic prize in Brittany, and Henry, like Edward I11 before him, wanted to have possession of it. Well before the English expedition of 6,000 was ready for Brittany, Henry had assembled and dispatched an advance force of about 683 men, under the command of Sir John Turbevile, Sir Robert Clifford and John Moton.28 Their mission, it seems, was to secure a Breton port for the English, preferably Brest. Earlier, Anne’s ambassadors in England promised that Brest would be turned over to the English.29 Henry wrote to Anne in early January 1489, reminding her of the promise and demanding that the castle of Brest be surrendered to Turbevile ‘en toute diligence’.sO By this time, however, Brest had already fallen to the vicomte de Rohan, an ally of France, and thus was under French control. Still, Henry clung to the possibility of holding it as one of the two ports. A clause was thus inserted into the treaty that if any of the towns held by the French or by one of the duchess’s rebels fell to the Anglo-Breton forces, then the king of England could request one of them in exchange for one of the five designated towns. But the Bretons did not want the English holding two of the duchy’s most strategic ports, so they added a proviso that the English could not hold Brest and Concarneau at the same time.3’

In the treaty of Redon, the Breton government gave Henry final say over the duchess’s marriage and over her right to make truce and peace. Anne was not to contract matrimony either per verba de futuro or per verba de presenti without Henry’s expressed advice ‘and equally assent and consent’.32 It was further stipulated that Anne would neither take, procure nor consent to any peace, friendship, confederation, alliance or understanding with any king, prince, noble or community without the consent of the king of England, except for the king of the Romans and the king and queen of Spain, and only then if they expressly reserved and comprehended the king of England. The treaty required the duchess, Marshal Rieux and three or four other Breton officials ‘who are constituted in greater authority’ to swear an oath in the presence of Henry’s ambassadors promising to honour these articles.33 Similarly, the Bretons were not to make a truce or abstinence of war for more than two months with any king, prince or other power without Henry’s consent; and any

28 PRO, E404/80/1, 20 Dec. 4 Henry VII; E405/75, mm. 38, 42; Rymer, Foedera, xii. 355-7; Calendar of Patent Rolls, Henry VII, 1485-1494 (1914) [hereafter CPR, 148.5-94, p. 282; Giry- Deloison, ‘Henry VII et la Bretagne’, p. 237. 29 Anne’s ambassadors to England in late 1488 were her two ducal secretaries, Franpis du Pou and Jean le Pr6ter; Olivier de Coetmen, the governor of Auxerre; Jean de Bouteiller, seigneur de Maupertuis; and Olivier de Cdtlogon, the procurator-general of Brittany (PRO, E405/75, mm. 32, 38-9; E404/80/1, 3 Sept. 4 Henry VII; William Campbell, Materials for a History of the Reign of Henry VII (2 vols., Rolls Series no. 60, 1873-7) [hereafter Campbell, Materials], ii. 346. 30 Henry VII, king of England, to Anne, duchess of Brittany, 5 Jan. 1489, in Morice, Preuves, iii. col. 616; Giry-Deloison, ‘Henry VII et la Bretagne’, p. 235. 3’ Rymer, Foedera, xii. 366. ’* Ibid., xii. 367. 33 Ibid.


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truce they might conclude for less than two months had expressly to include the king of England. In turn, Henry promised that, beyond his current truce with France, he would make no new truce with the king of France for more than two months without the consent of the duchess, nor make a truce for less than two months without explicitly including the duchess of Brittany. Henry also promised not to make any treaty of peace with any prince or power without expressly reserving and compre- hending the duchess. The treaty, however, said nothing about Henry swearing before Breton ambassadors to observe these promises.34

All articles of the commercial portion of the earlier 1486 treaty were renewed in perpetuity, but with two additional clauses. The first required the posting of a bond by the owners, masters or bursars of Breton and English ships guaranteeing the good behaviour of their sailors at sea and in the towns of the other ruler; and the second set the value of new English coins circulating in Brittany. The noble of England, called the angelot, was assigned the value of 80d of England; the English groat in Brittany was to be worth 4d of England; the half-groat was to be worth 2d; and 20 groats were to equal an angelot. Fluctuation in the value of English money was tied to similar fluctuations in Breton money, and these values were to be proclaimed throughout the duchy of Brittany. This article on English coinage was important not only for commerce but also for the payment of the English troops. Henry made sure that he would not suffer from a fall in the rate of exchange: the treaty stipulated that in the repayment of the money owed for the troops, the king of England would ‘take and receive the said money of England before laid out by his subjects in Brittany’.35

A consideration of the treaty of Redon, particularly the article on France, set in conjunction with the better known Anglo-Spanish treaty of Medina del Campo of March 1489 and with the Anglo-Habsburg alliance treaty of Dordrecht of February 1489, indicates something more than a limited, defensive policy on Henry’s part. There was a shift in Henry’s Breton policy in the autumn and winter of 1488, from neutrality over the French invasion of Brittany to active intervention against it; and this shift appears to have been brought about by the death of Duke Francis I1 in September. Henry remained neutral until then, not so much out of gratitude to France, but because, it seems, that in exchange for the French help that put him on the English throne, he took an oath not to assist Francis against Charles VIII, and this is why the French were confident in the summer of 1488 that Duke Francis would not get from Henry the military aid he But with Francis’s death, Henry may

34 Ibid., xii. 367-8. 35 Ibid., xii. 368. On the depreciation of Breton currency at this time, see Henri Touchard, Le commerce maritime breton afin du moyen ige, Annales littkaires de l’universitk de Nantes, no. 1 (Pans, 1967), pp. 294-300.

My source for this is the memoirs of Guillaume de Jaligny, who, as secretary to Pierre de Beaujeu, had knowledge of the dealings at the French court. Jaligny wrote that the embassy sent by

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have believed that this oath was moot. He was, however, bound to respect the truce with France that, in July 1488, he had extended to 17 January 1490.37

During the period of his neutrality, Henry was approached by Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, who wanted to involve him in their alliance network as a means of putting pressure on France to surrender to them the counties of Roussillon and Cerdagr~e.~~ Henry was interested in forming a dynastic alliance by marriage with Spain, but he did not want to make an explicit commitment to an anti-French league. The English commissioners thus proposed that articles of alliance be framed omitting any direct reference to France; but there would be the implicit understanding that as a result of the Anglo-Spanish marriage and greater affinity between the two monarchies Henry would be obliged to do as Ferdinand and Isabella wished. Furthermore, to reassure the Spanish ambassadors, the English swore before a crucifix that it was Henry’s intention to make war on France according to the will of the Spanish sovereign^.^^

This initial Anglo-Spanish indenture was rejected by the Consejo Real of Castile.40 The Spanish sovereigns then sent to their ambassadors in England the draft of a secret article that they insisted was the price for the dynastic match. This article required Henry to promise that after the establishment of the marriage alliance, he would, when requested, demand from the king of France the return of Roussillon and Cerdagne to Spain; and that, if the king of France failed to comply after a period of time, then Henry would make war on France at the will of Ferdinand and

Duke Francis to England in the summer of 1488 to plead for aid from Henry failed because ‘le Roy d’Angleterre ne vouloit & ne pouvoit point sans ingratitude, romp le sement qu’il avoit avec le Roy, considerant bien qu’aprks Dieu il ne tenoit son Royaume d’Angleterre, que par la faveur & I’assistance que le Roy luy avoit faite’: Guillaume de Jaligny, ‘Histoire de plusieurs chose memorables advenues du regne de Charles VIII, roy de France, Cs annCs 1486, 1487, 1489’, Histoire de Charles VIII, roy de France, etc., ed. ThCodore Godefroy (Paris, 1684), p. 51. For the French support in making Henry Tudor king, see A. V. Antonovics, ‘Henry VII, King of England, “By the Grace of Charles VIII of France’”, Kings and Nobles in the Later Middle Ages, ed. Ralph A. Griffiths and James Sherborne (Gloucester and New York, 1986), pp. 169-84; C. S. L. Davies, ‘Richard 111, Brittany, and Henry Tudor, 1483- 148S, Notringham Medieval Studies, xxxvii (1993),

37 Rymer, Foedera, xii. 344. 38 Joseph Calmette, ‘La politique espanole dans la crise de I’indkpendance bretonne (1488-1492)’, Revue historque, cxvii (1914), 168-82; idem, La question des PyrPnSes et la marche dEspagne au moyen bge (Paris, 1947), pp. 239-45; Luis Suarez Fernindez, Polirica internacional de Isabel la Cardlica (5 vols., Valladolid, 1965-72) [hereafter Sdrez Fernhndez, Politica inrernacional], ii. 151 - 79; idem, Los Reyes Catdlicos: el tiempo de la guerra de Granada (Madrid, 1989) [hereafter Suarez Fernandez, Los Reyes Catdlicos], pp. 214-29. 39 Rodrigo Gonsilez de Puebla and Juan de Sepulveda, Spanish ambassadors in England, to Ferdinand and Isabella, 15 July 1488, Suarez Fernandez, Politica internacional, ii. no. 138; Calendar of Letters. Despatches and State Papers Relating to the Negotiatiom between England and Spain, Preserved in the Archives at Simancas and Elsewhere, ed. G. A. Bergenroth et al. (15 vols. in 20, 1862-1954) [hereafter CSP Spain], i. no. 21.

Suirez Fernhndez, Los Reyes Catdlicos, p. 227. The indenture, dated 7 July 1488, is reproduced in Suarez Fernandez, Politica internacional, ii. no. 137, and summarized in CSP Spain, i. no. 20.


110-26.

JOHN M. CURRIN 353

Isabella.4’ Henry, of course, refused this article.42 But in October 1488, on the heels of the news of Duke Francis’s death, he sent to Ferdinand and Isabella through their ambassador a different formulation, in which he would oblige himself to start war against France when requested and make no truce or peace unless the king of France restored to him ‘realmente’ the duchies of Guyenne and Normandy; and similarly, Ferdinand and Isabella would start a war against France, and make no truce or peace unless the king of France restored to them Roussillon and C e r d a ~ e . ~ ~ This formulation would have commif ted Ferdinand and Isabella to a possible war to force France to surrender the lost Plant- agenet territories ‘realmente’; but there was no stipulation compelling Henry to continue the war until Roussillon and Cerdagne were actually restored. This clause was not included in the treaty of Medina del Campo. Instead, Henry was obliged to go to war against France whenever Ferdinand and Isabella did, and Ferdinand and Isabella were obliged to do likewise when Henry went to war against France; and neither would be allowed to make truce or peace with France without the consent of the other, unless Henry had received Guyenne and Normandy, or Ferdinand and Isabella had received Roussillon and Cerdagne.44 The inclusion of Guyenne and Normandy in the Anglo- Spanish alliance and the article in the treaty of Redon requiring Anne’s future support of Henry’s quest for his rights in France suggest that Henry was reserving the option of renewing the ancient quarrel with France at his convenience, and was making diplomatic preparations for a future campaign for the recovery of Guyenne and Normandy.

In support of this campaign, Henry revived the old Anglo-Burgundian alliance. In December 1488 he sent Sir John Riseley and John Balteswell on embassy to Maximilian with powers to conclude an alliance;45 and with them he sent undated letters patent confirming articles for the treaty of alliance.& Maximilian’s ratification of these articles on 14 February constituted the so-called treaty of D ~ r d r e c h t . ~ ~ An old veteran of

41 Ferdinand and Isabella to Puebla, c.1488, Suarez Fernandez, Politics internacional, ii. no. 140; CSP Spain, i. no. 22. 42 Extract of a letter from Puebla to Ferdinand and Isabella, 21 Dec. 1488, CSP Spain, i. no. 31. 43 Ferdinand and Isabella to Puebla, 17 Dec. 1488, Suirez Fernandez, Politica infernacional, ii. no. 147; CSP Spain, i. no. 29. 44 Rymer, Foeakra, xii. 423; Suarez Fernandez, Politica internmiom/, iii. no. 12; CSP Spain, i. no. 34. ” PRO, E404/80/1,26 Dec. 4 Henry VII; Campbell, Materials, ii. 387. The ambassadors’ powers, dated 11 Dec. 1488, are in the Bibliothkque Nationale (hereafter BN), Mtlanges Colbert 381, no. 542. The Chancery copy, PRO, C76/173, m. 3, is reproduced in Rymer, Foedera, xii. 350-1, and summarized in Campbell, Materials, ii. 377. ” PRO, E30/593; Rymer, Foedera, xii. 359-60. Rymer printed Henry’s undated letters with the articles of alliance after the text of Maximilian’s ratification. But in the ‘Treaty Rolls, the original is enrolled just before the enrolment of the powers of Riseley and Balteswell, indicating that the articles in Henry’s letters patent were drawn up in December and conveyed to Maximilian by Henry’s ambassadors.


PRO, C76/173, m. 3; Rymer, Foedera, xii. 361-2.


France’s wars with Burgundy, Philippe de Crhecoeur, sire d’Esquerdes and governor of Picardy, warned of the danger to France in west Flanders, in Artois and in Picardy that would arise from this alliance between Henry and Maximilian!8

Henry’s future campaign for the recovery of Guyenne and Normandy depended in the first instance on keeping Brittany beyond French control and ruled by someone under the political influence of the king of England. Right from the start Henry exerted political control over the Anglo-Breton negotiations. The powers he issued on 1 1 December 1488 to Sir Richard Edgecumbe and Henry Aynesworth were quite specific, and set the agenda and the outline for the treaty of R e d ~ n . ~ ~ Like most such powers, they contained the generally worded authority to negotiate a firm perpetual peace; a truce and abstinence of war; an amity, affinity, understanding, alliance and confederation; the rendering of mutual aid; and mercantile intercourse. But to this was added authority to treat on more particular items: on proroguing the Anglo-Breton truce and commercial agreement of 1486; on the number of armed men to be sent into Brittany; on their term of service; on the repayment of Henry’s expenses; on the surrendering of Breton towns and castles as security; on the taking of oaths from appropriate Breton authorities for the promised repayment; and on the promise that Anne would not contract marriage nor make a truce with any other prince or power without Henry’s consent. The commission to the Breton negotiators, issued on 8 February 1489, duplicated the terms of the English powers.50

By insisting that the duchess must not contract marriage without his consent, Henry was directly challenging the seigniorial rights that the king of France claimed over Brittany; and in an era when much of the politics of Europe, domestic and international, was still viewed in terms of feudal relationship^,^' this was a challenge that the king of France had to answer, for to the French it appeared as nothing less than a bid by the English king to assert lordship over Brittany.52 Polydore Vergil records that French ambassadors demanded of Henry respect for the rights of

48 Philippe de Crevecoeur, sire d’Esquerdes, to Charles VIII, 17 March 1489, BN, MS Franpis 15541, fo. 4Y-’. 49 The original letters patent of the powers, but with Henry’s Great Seal removed, are ADLA, E 123/11. The Chancery copy, PRO, C76/173, m. 4, is reproduced in Rymer, Foedera, xii. 349-50, and s u m m a d in Campbell, Materials, ii. 378. ” These powers were copied into the text of the treaty, and are reproduced in Rymer, Foedera, xii.

5’ Garrett Mattingly, Renaivsmce Diplomacy (Boston, 1955), p. 26. ’* At Vienne in December 1490, a pageant was staged celebrating Charles VIII’s entrke royale. The final scene depicted the garden of Atlas, symbolizing Brittany; enclosed within its walls were a tree with golden apples and three young girls, who signified the daughters of Brittany. Guarding the gates of this garden was a great dragon, which represented Henry VII, who used the dragon of Cadwaladr as one of his heraldic devices. Herecules, the figure for Charles VIII, slew the dragon and freed the girls, and then gave this celebratory oration: ‘Ainsi fera au dragon plain d‘envye, / Qui en Bretaigne veult faire residence / Pour y cuyder acquerir seigneurie; / Charles huitieme et noble roy de France / Les pucelles mectra a delivrance / Pour en faire a son noble vouloir / Des


369-70.

JOHN M. CURRIN 355

lordship that the king of France had over Brittany to determine according to his pleasure the marriage of the duchess 53 Henry, however, considered marrying the young duchess to his minor cousin, Edward Stafford, the third duke of Buckingham, a royal warcl. There was a close affinity between the Staffords, Beauforts and Tudors, and Henry had entrusted the rearing of Duke Edward to his mother, Margaret Beaufort, intending that he should take a prominent place in the service of the Tudor regime.s4 In 1488, this place was in Henry’s foreign policy, since at that time, with Prince Arthur intended for an infanta of Spain, Buck- ingham was the only blood royal available for the international marriage market. Such a marriage between Buckingham and Anne would have drawn Brittany into England’s political orbit.

Nevertheless, Henry dropped this idea and supported Marshal Rieux’s scheme to marry Anne to Alain d’Albret. Henry’s support for this marriage deserves attention, since it had important implications for any future campaign for the recovery of Guyenne. The sires d’Albret had been vassals of the dukes of Gascony and Aquitaine:, that is, vassals of the earlier Plantagenets, and between the tenth imd the thirteenth centuries they had emerged as the most powerful feudal lords in the region of Guyenne. They further enhanced and maintained this position during the Hundred Years War by playing a delicate balancing act between the kings of England and France. Neither sovereign could hold Guyenne without the active support of the house of Albret. The decision of Charles 11, Alain’s grandfather, to give his fealty to France played a large part in the submission of Guyenne to Charles VII and in the expulsion of the English.” Alain d’Albret, now estranged from the king of France, had involved himself in Breton politics. He allied himself to Spain in 1488 and brought into Brittany a Spanish contingent alongside his own men.26 Albret’s assistance would be crucial if Henry was to bring Guyenne once more under the suzerainty of the king of England; as duke of Brittany, he would have been a potent ally in this endeavour; and if Henry helped bring about his marriage to Anne, he would be in the king’s debt.

Any campaign in Guyenne required first that the sea route between Guyenne and England be secured; and this meant that Brittany’s

pommes d’or aura puis joyssance.’ ‘PremiQe entree du roi Charles VIII a Vienne’, Les entrees royalesfrangaises de 1328 a 1515, ed. Bernard Guenk and FranGoise Lehoux (Paris, 1968),

J3 The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil, A.D. 1485-1537, ed. and trans. Denys Hay, Camden New Series no. 74 (1950), pp. 44-5.

Barbara J. Hams, Edward Stafford, Third Duke of Buckingham, 145‘8-1521 (Stanford, 1986),

“For a brief historical sketch of the house of Albret, see Achille Luchaire, AIain le Grand, sire d‘Albret: L’administration royal et la fiodalitP du Midi (1440-1522) (Pans, 1877), pp. 1-15; Mikhael Harsgor. Recherches sur le personnel du Conseil du Roi sous Charles VIII et Louis XII (4 vols., Lille and Paris, 1980), i. 615-37. 56 Suarez Fernandez, Politica internacional, i i . 166-7; Dupuy, Histoire ai? la reunion, ii. 131.


pp. 305-6.

31-5.


Atlantic ports, especially those of Finistere, such as Brest and Concar- neau, would have to be under English control, or at least under a Breton ruler firmly allied with England. The five ports named in the treaty of Redon, from which Henry was to choose the two he would hold as security, were all Atlantic ports, and one of them, Guhrande, was held by Rieux. Controlling these strategic ports had been an objective of Edward I11 during the Hundred Years War, and a major reason why he had involved himself in the Montfort-Penthitivre war of ~uccession.~~

Henry could have been using the treaty of Redon as a means of gaining control of two of these major ports. The arrangement set up in the treaty for the payment of the English soldiers in Brittany is suggest- ive. As previously stated, the duchess, though responsible for the maintenance of the English, did not pay them directly: Henry did that, in a cumbersome process that required loading carts with cash from the Exchequer in London and having them drawn overland to one of the south-western ports for shipment to Brittany.58 Until Henry was reim- bursed for all these expenses by the duchess, he had the right to hold two strategic Breton ports. The war in Brittany had by then taken a toll on the duchy’s finances. Henry may have realized that Brittany would have great difficulty meeting its financial obligation, which offered him a justi- fication for controlling these ports indefinitely, including their revenues.

A logical strategy can thus be seen lurking behind the treaty of Redon. If France could be weakened by Anglo-Breton forces in Brittany and by attacks from Spain across the Pyrenees into Roussillon and Cerdagne and from Maximilian into Artois and Picardy; if England had the support of Albret in Gascony; and if Brittany’s strategic Atlantic ports remained in English hands, or in the hands of a closely allied ruler of Brittany, the reconquest of Guyenne and possibly of Normandy seemed feasible. Henry or his agents may have even tested the waters in Guyenne at the time he sent his 6,000-man army to Brittany in March and April 1489. The Breton chronicler Bertrand d’Argentrk reports that when Charles VIII learned of Henry’s intention, and of the departure from England of his army, he ordered the mayor of Bordeaux to guard the ports and commanded Admiral Graville to prepare similar defences to prevent the English landing in Normandy.59 And as the English were making their descent on Brittany, the e‘chevins of Bayonne, through a messenger, sent intelligence about England to Charles VIII, who, after expressing his gratitude for their loyalty, promised men-at-arms to help

’’ Jones, Ducal Brittany, pp. 9-13, 143-5. In July 1489, for example, Henry VII sent over wages of E7,000 in cash to Robert, Lord

Willoughby de Broke, the commander of the English expedition in Brittany. Carters and carriages from Bridport and eighteen horses were hired to haul the cash-laden wagons from Westminster, where the money was packed, to the king at Windsor, and then to Dartmouth for shipment across the Channel to Brittany. Two auditors of the Receipt went with the shipment, as did one of the king’s sejeants-at-arms and nine yeomen of the crown (PRO, EAo5/75. mm. 43, 44, 46, 50; E36/130, fos. 47‘, 4Y). 59 Argent&, Histoire de Bretagne, p. 680.


JOHN M. CURRIN 357

them defend their town.60 Hearing that English, Spanish and other foreign troops had landed near Bayonne, Charles ordered the skntchul of Landes, captain of one of the forts around Bayonne, to raise the bun et arrikre-bun and reinforce the garrison. Supplies of corn were brought into Bayonne to equip the citizens and soldiers inside the town for a long siege.61

Henry may have revealed his political intentions’ further in the new coinage he ordered on 28 March 1489, a few days before he ratified the treaty of Redon. According to the letters patent issued to the warden of the mint, the new coins were to be fashioned like the old, except that the new were to have the king’s image on one side, arid on the other the king’s arms of England and France in the middle of a cross.62 The shield of the three Angevin leopards and the threeJleurs-de-lis was the arms of England that normally appeared on the coinage of the realm. Henry’s reference to his arms of England and France may have been to the juxtaposition of the shield of the three leopards arid three Jleurs-de-lis with the shield of the three Jleurs-de-lis, the symbol of the ‘dual monarchy’ of Henry VI, which, placed on the Anglo-Gallic coins of his reign, indicated to French and English alike his legitimate status as the king both of England and of France.63 D. M. Metcalf suggests that the treaty of Medina del Campo inspired the king’s mandate for the new style of coinage, which was meant to imitate the quarterings of the arms of Leon and Castile on Spanish coinage.64 This seems unlikely, however, for news of the treaty’s completion would not have reached England by the date of Henry’s mandate to the mint, the treaty being ratified by Ferdinand and Isabella on that very day. Furthermore, completion of the treaty of Medina del Campo was far from certain. The journal of the herald accompanying the English ambassadors to Spain shows that the negotiations dragged on in contentious debate into the early hours of 28 March;65 and while Ferdinand and Isabella ratified the treaty immedi- ately, Henry did not do so until September 1490, and then only after he had made substantial revisions, which Spain did not accept.% It is more likely that the new style of coinage was inspired by Henry’s imminent ratification of the treaty of Redon, and by the ambition that through it

Charles VIII to the khevins of Bayonne, 7 March 1489, Lettres de Charles VIII, Roi de France, ed. P. Pklicier (5 vols., Paris, 1895-1905), ii. no. 401.

Robin Hams, Valois Guyenne: A Study of Politics, Government m d Society in Late Medieval France (1994), p. 13. 62 CPR, 148-94, pp. 265-6. 63 On the symbols of the ‘dual monarchy’, see J. W. McKenna, ‘Henry VI of England and the Dual Monarchy: Aspects of Royal Political Propaganda, 1422-1432’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, xxviii (1965), 145-62.

D. M. Mctcalf, Sylloge of Coins of the British Isles, 23: Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, Part 111: Coins of Henry VII (1976), pp. xxvi-xxviii; C. E. Challis, The Tudor Coinage (Manchester, 1978),

47. ‘Journals of Roger Machado: Embassy to Spain and Portugal, A.D. 1489’, Memorials of K h g

Henry VII, ed. James Gairdner, Rolls Series no. 10 (London, 1858), p. 352. 66 Rymer, Foedera, xxi. 411-29. @ The Historical AsPociation 1996


he might recapture the lost Plantagenet lands in France, if not the French crown itself; for by displaying the arms of England side by side with the arms of France, by reviving the symbol of the ‘dual monarchy’ of Henry VI, Henry VII seemed to be making a strong iconographic statement that he intended, at least in early 1489, to renew the Plantagenet quarrel.67

67 Henry used the arms of the ‘dual monarchy’ during his 1492 war against France. Richard Pynson, in the printed text of the statutes and ordinances of war, included a woodcut of an angel, surrounded by Tudor heraldic symbols, presenting the juxtaposed arms of France and England. The model for this image appears to have been the angelot of Henry VI. Pynson’s statement made in the colophon, that he received the ordinances directly from the king’s hands, suggests that Henry had approved the design of the woodcut. Fragments of the woodcut and the colophon are preserved in PRO, E163/122/3/3, 15, 22. This woodcut was also used in Wynkyn de Worde’s printed edition of the statutes of 7 Henry VII, which were the statutes enacted in the war parliament of 1491-2, and it appears in two other works printed by Pynson in 1494 and 1496. On the woodcut, see Curt F. Biihler, ‘Notes on a Pynson Volume’, Library, 4th ser., xviii (1937-8), 261-7; D. E. Rhodes, ‘The Statutes and Ordinances of War’, Library, 6th ser., iii (1981). 340-3; Katharine F. Pantzer, ‘The Statutes and Ordinances of War’, Library, 6th ser., v (1983), 64; Pamela Ayers Neville, ‘Richard Pynson, King’s Printer (1 506- 1529): Printing and Propaganda in Early Tudor England’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of London (1990), pp. 73-4. I am grateful to Dr Neville-Sington for information about this woodcut.


henry vii and the treaty of redon (1489): plantagenet ambitions and early tudor foreign policy

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