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Integrated Deliberation: Reconciling Civil

Societys Dual Role in Deliberative

Democracy

Carolyn M. Hendriks

University of Amsterdam

Among the growing literature on deliberative democracy there are two diverging streams of thought, each

implying a different role for civil society. Micro deliberative theorists, with their focus on the procedural

conditions for structured fora, encourage civil society to engage in collaborative practices, usually with the

state. In contrast, macro deliberative democrats, who are interested in the messy and informal deliberation

in the public sphere, advocate that civil society should work discursively outside and against the state.This

article explores some of the implications of these conflicting roles, taking into account two observationsfrom deliberative practice: first, that all micro deliberative fora are surrounded and impacted by their

macro discursive context, and second, that some actors in civil society are more willing and capable of

deliberating than others.To conceive of deliberative democracy as an entirely micro or macro enterprise

is not only unrealistic, but potentially exclusive. The article advocates for a more viable and inclusivedeliberative theory; one that integrates all kinds of deliberation from the micro to the macro.To this end,

public deliberation is best conceptualised as an activity occurring in a range of discursive spheres that

collectively engage a diversity of civil society actors.

Civil society is one of those amorphous terms that float around with multiple

meanings, each carrying different political connotations. It has been described as

the chicken soup of social sciences ... the locus of what there is of utopianism

in contemporary political thought (Post and Rosenblum, 2002, p. 23).The recent

surge of comparative literature on civil society highlights the breadth of inter-

pretations that the term can take on across theories of politics (see for example,

Chambers and Kymlicka, 2002). Even within a given political theory, consensus

on what civil society encompasses does not appear any easier to attain.The field

of deliberative democracy is as guilty as any of using the term with limited critical

exploration of whom it includes,and what its normative role entails. In this article

I open up this discussion and reveal that when it comes to civil society delib-

erative democrats are ambiguous, and possibly divided.

Deliberative democracy has become a booming area of political thought. But, like

any appealing normative theory, it runs the risk of becoming estranged from the

very political practice it seeks to inform.This is particularly so in relation to what

deliberative democracy has to say (or does not say) on civil society. Within the

growing literature on deliberative democracy there are two diverging streams ofthought, which I label as micro and macro. Micro deliberative theorists concen-

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trate on defining the ideal conditions of a deliberative procedure (e.g. Bessette,

1994; Cohen, 1997; Elster, 1997).This stream of theory provides only a limited

discussion on who should deliberate and does not refer to civil society per se. In

contrast, macro deliberative theorists emphasise informal discursive forms of delib-

eration, which take place in the public sphere (Benhabib, 1996; Dryzek, 1990;2000a; Habermas, 1996a).1 Their primary focus is on the unstructured and open

conversations outside formal decision-making institutions.2

These two streams of deliberative democratic theory prescribe very different roles

for civil society, particularly with respect to how citizens and groups should relate

to the state and whether they should take on a communicative or strategic role

in deliberative politics. Micro theories of deliberative democracy suggest that civil

society actors should engage in deliberative politics to the extent that they are

willing and capable of participating in structured deliberative fora. In this sense,

civil society is implicitly called to take on communicative forms of action throughcollaborating with the state. Conversely, macro theories of deliberative democracy

emphasise the informal and unstructured nature of public discussion. Under this

conception, civil society plays a role in informal political activities both outside

and against the state.These activities presumably require both communicative and

strategic behaviour.

There is increasing empirical evidence that when these two deliberative worlds

come together, tensions arise. For in deliberative practice, fora based on micro

deliberative norms operate in a broader macro context. But this is not to say theyare always compatible. Empirical research reveals that some active publics and

strategic groups resist the norms and intentions of micro deliberative fora because

they fear co-option or loss of power (Hendriks, 2002; Sagoff, 1999; Thomas,

2003). Others have found that civil society actors are often forced to make hard

choices on whether to work with or against the state and, in doing so, whether

to take on the role of the deliberator or the activist (Barnes, 2002; Montpetitet al.,

2004).

These tensions highlight the need for deliberative democrats to take a more

critical look at how their theories and institutional designs relate to civilsociety. In this article, I take on this task, first, by unpacking what the concept

of civil society might mean for deliberative democracy and how this definition

accommodates different actors such as interest groups, social movements, net-

works and everyday citizens. Secondly, I further explore the potential tensions

between the roles assigned to civil society by micro and macro versions of

deliberative democracy. Next, I critique some theoretical attempts to bridge the

macro and micro divide, acknowledging that some groups and actors will be

more capable and willing to deliberate, both in the micro and macro sense, than

others. I conclude by arguing for an integrated deliberative system one thataccommodates the diversity of civil society by fostering deliberation in a

variety of public spaces.

I N T E G R A T E D D E L I B E R A T I O N 487


POLITICAL STUDIES: 2006, 54(3)


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What is this Thing Called Civil Society?

Civil society is a highly contested concept. Social theorists and philosophers have

debated the virtues and boundaries of civil society at least since its early modern

usage in the late seventeenth century in Western Europe.3

Scottish moralists, forexample, conceived of civil society as a source of ethics a place where norms

emerged from the people rather than from external institutions such as the

monarch or the church (Seligman, 2002, pp. 145).Subsequent philosophers from

Hume to Hegel to Marx have critiqued this romantic conception of civil society,

each for different reasons. Hume, for instance, challenged the notion of univer-

salistic social norms, while Hegel argued that civil society should be embedded in

institutions of the state, including corporations.4

In contemporary debates, there are two broad uses of the term.The first, which

stemmed from the rise of anti-communist movements in Eastern Europe, viewscivil society as a source of state opposition (Seligman, 2002).This position grew

out of the experiences in both Eastern Europe and Latin America over the past

30 years where grass-roots groups gained wide public momentum to overthrow

repressive regimes (see Havel et al., 1996; Smolar, 1996).The second use of civil

society emerged primarily out of North America as a backlash to liberal indi-

vidualism. In this context, the concept refers to the communal and associational

spaces of social life, which, it is argued, are necessary for a well-functioning

democracy (Putnam, 1993; 1995; Walzer, 1995).

The concept of civil society has surfaced in a breadth of literature spanningcommunitarianism, social movements, social capital, associative democracy, delib-

erative democracy and more recently in the work on the democratic deficit. Its

prolific usage has given civil society an ambiguous character. It is often used

interchangeably with terms such as the public sphere and the community.

Those definitions that do exist prefer to avoid clarifying civil society using known

concepts such as social movements and interest groups. This terminological

swamp makes navigating the territories of civil society a difficult endeavour, and

sourcing an agreed-upon definition near impossible.

It is probably safe to say that civil society broadly refers to the formal and informalassociations and networks in society, which exist outside the state. Some defini-

tions limit civil society to the domain of voluntary association, encompassing

everything from loose apolitical social networks to sporting clubs through to

organised and politically motivated interest groups. Others go further and dis-

tinguish civil society from not just the state, but from the economy (Cohen and

Arato, 1992, p. 20; Dryzek, 2000a, p. 23; Young, 2000, pp. 15860). Civil society

as distinct from the state and the economy include[s] all institutions and asso-

ciational forms that require communicative interaction for their reproduction and

that rely primarily on processes of social integration for coordinating actionwithin their boundaries (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 429). But definitions that

differentiate civil society from the state and economy are always unclear with

488 C A R O L Y N M . H E N D R I K S




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respect to boundaries.That diverse interpretations of civil society exist across so

many different political theories and religious traditions is due to the slippery

boundaries between the state, economy and society. The complex interaction

between all three domains has meant that much disagreement remains, for

example as to what extent civil society should encompass the commercial andprivate spheres of society.

Civil society is best conceptualised in spatial terms as an arena where distinct

kinds of activities occur across a range of private, political and civic associations

and networks (Young, 2000, p. 160).5 One of civil societys defining features is its

capacity to self-organise, that is, to develop communicative interactions that

support identities, expand participatory possibilities and create networks of soli-

darity (Young, 2000, p. 163).6 Under this definition civil society encompasses the

private sphere of families as well as associations, social movements and other forms

of public communication, such as the media. However, it excludes state-boundedinstitutions such as political parties, parliament and the bureaucracy, as well as

organisations centred wholly on the market and economic production.

We must also acknowledge that civil society is a heterogeneous space. Some

arenas are more oriented towards influencing the state or economy than others.

Some foster progressive ideas, others more conservative ones, and then there are

those that support fundamentalist positions. Civil society is also heterogeneous

with respect to resources, power and influence. Social and economic inequalities

in civil society provide certain groups with privileged access to information,labour and finance. These resources enable certain groups to organise more

effectively, which in turn assists their access to the state (Olson, 1965). From a

democratic perspective, this simply means that powerful groups with sophisticated

political strategies have more capacity to influence policy than smaller semi-

organised community-based groups (Fung, 2003a; Warren, 2001).

In order to make this heterogeneity more explicit in our spatial definition of civil

society, it is useful to differentiate arenas in terms of their orientation towards the

state and the kinds of actors they attract (see Figure 1).7 The more politicised

arenas in civil society, often referred to as public spheres (Dryzek, 2000a, p. 23),are located closest to the state. Public spheres provide spaces where various

discourses and ideas in civil society can be voiced and made politically effica-

cious (Chambers, 2002, p. 96). Actors in these venues, such as interest groups,

social movements and individual activists seek to influence public affairs by acting

as networks of public opinion, which communicate information and points of

view (Habermas, 1996a, p. 360).8 Different public spheres emerge out of civil

society, often in response to failures in the economy and the state.9 Some are more

organised (e.g. interest groups) than others (e.g. social movements, networks);

some work locally, others internationally. In addition, civil society is composed ofeveryday citizens who engage with the state mostly as individuals when they can,

and in ways they can (Bang, 2003; OToole et al., 2003).





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Civil Society and Democracy

With respect to democracy, civil society is generally hailed as a positive force.Yet,

the reasons for why this is so vary significantly across theories of politics. Classical

liberals such as Locke and Hume broadly take the position that civil society is

good for democracy because it enables autonomous individuals to move freely

between voluntary associations, thus providing a counterbalance to the powers of

the state (see Lomasky, 2002; Scalet and Schmidtz, 2002). Modern liberals,

however, are more sceptical of civil societys potential for democracy. They

caution against the anti-liberal, anti-market and potentially anti-democratic ten-

dencies of the more communitarian advocates of civil society. In response,communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni (1995) and Michael Sandel (1996) argue

that civil society is positive for democracy because it provides a site where

communities, not self-interested individuals or the state, co-determine their own

destinies.Along similar lines, neo-Tocquevilleans argue that civil society is the site

where citizens are schooled in democracy. For example, Robert Putnam (1993;

1995) claims that civic virtues such as trust and reciprocity are fostered by the

activities of largely apolitical associations, which cut across social cleavages.

These contrasting positions highlight that different political theories call on

particular kinds of actors within civil society to promote democracy fromindividuals, to oppositional groups and social movements, to apolitical associa-

tions. The roles attributed to these actors do not appear to be consistent or

Figure 1: Civil Society and Public Spheres in Relation to the State

The State

political parties

interest groups

social movements &networks

individual activists

everyday citizens

public spheres

politically orientated

arenas of civil society

civil society





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compatible (Foley and Edwards, 1996). Theories of deliberative democracy are

also ambiguous about civil societys role in democracy. The following section

discusses how this ambiguity stems from two contrasting ideas of what delibera-

tion entails and who it should involve.

The Mapping of Deliberative Democracy

The importance of deliberation in collective decision-making can be traced back

to Aristotle, but it has received particular attention over the past two decades

under the labels of deliberative democracy (Bessette, 1994) and discursive

democracy (Dryzek, 1990).The contemporary revival of deliberation stems from

a rejection of decision procedures based on the aggregation of votes or the

competition of interests, which often result in irrational and arbitrary outcomes.

In contrast, collective decisions under the deliberative model are determined

through reflective public reasoning. Although theorists are divided on the finerdetails of what deliberation exactly entails a theme I take up below most agree

that it is a particular form of communication centred on reasoned argument.

Proponents of deliberative democracy, including myself, value deliberation

because it encourages more informed rational decisions, fairer, more publicly

oriented outcomes and improved civic skills.

Deliberative democracy, like the term civil society is a debated concept. One

consequence of the recent interest in deliberative democracy has been that many

democratic varieties now claim to sail under the deliberative banner (Dryzek,

2000a, p. 2). Broad attempts to map this growing field of political thought haveessentially concluded that deliberative democracy comes in many shapes and sizes

(Bohman, 1998; Chambers, 2003; Saward, 2001). These mapping exercises typi-

cally divide the field of deliberative democracy in terms of the origins of different

deliberative turns one in liberalism and the other in critical theory.10 Ricardo

Blaug (2002), for example, suggests that the theory of deliberative democracy be

likened to an object with two connected but opposing lobes. One lobe represents

the more incumbent strand of deliberative democracy which others, such as

Dryzek (2000b) refer to as liberal constitutional varieties. This interpretation

contrasts with the second lobe or strand of deliberative democracy, which takes amore critical and discursive perspective.

This article takes a slightly different approach by recognising that theories of

deliberative democracy diverge in different directions when it comes to the

scale and formality of deliberation. Here, the theory seems to be divided into

two streams: micro (deliberative) and macro (discursive) accounts of delibera-

tive democracy.11 As outlined in the introduction, micro theories of

deliberative democracy concentrate on defining and discussing the nature of a

deliberative procedure and its ideal conditions. In contrast, macro accounts are

concerned with the messy forms of deliberation that take place in the publicsphere. Here the focus is on how informal, open and unstructured deliberation in

civil society can shape public opinion and, in turn, political institutions.12





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Deliberative Democracy and Civil Society

Micro and macro strands of deliberative democracy also differ with respect to

how they relate to civil society. Each account places a different emphasis on what

deliberation entails, which in turn influences who in civil society participates andhow.

Micro Conceptions of Deliberative Democracy

Recall that for micro deliberative democrats deliberation is an activity that takes

place in structured fora where free and equal participants come together to decide

on an agenda, reason and argue together and settle on an outcome (Bessette,1994;

Cohen, 1997; Elster, 1997).The key emphasis in micro accounts is that partici-

pants are relatively impartial, willing to listen to each other and committed to

reaching a mutual understanding in view of the collective good (Bickford, 1996,p. 149; Cohen,1997).Micro deliberative theorists focus on providing ideal models

for deliberation in public institutions. For this reason their theories are mostly

associated with existing political institutions of Western democracies such as

legislatures (Bessette, 1994; Uhr, 1998). A few micro theorists, however, take a

more Athenian view of the deliberative forum by extending participation beyond

elected representatives. Joshua Cohen (1997, p. 85) for example, defines delibera-

tive procedures as arenas in which citizens can propose issues for the political

agenda and participate in debate about those issues. Accordingly, a forum is

democratic and deliberative if the participants are free and equal to decide on theagenda, propose solutions to the problems set for discussion and aim to settle on

an alternative (Cohen, 1997).Although this literature provides a useful normative

framework for deliberation, there is much disagreement on the democratic part

of the equation.That is, who should be involved and how? Consequently, these

micro accounts pay little attention to civil society, and leave us to infer its role

from discussions on legitimacy or the procedural conditions for deliberation.

I turn first to the legitimacy argument.According to Jon Elster (1998, p. 8), most

democrats agree that the democratic part of deliberative democracy refers to

collective decision making with the participation of all who will be affected bythe decision or their representatives. But this seems implausible given the diffi-

culties of involving everyone in decisions in modern plural societies. In order to

achieve the communicative ideals of micro deliberation, the number of partici-

pants in any given deliberative forum is necessarily small hence, the micro

label. In this sense micro deliberation is inevitably exclusive because it tends to

privilege deliberation over participation.13 One way around this scale issue would

be to accept that representatives can deliberate on behalf of others, but then we

need to question how this is substantially different from elitist versions of

democracy. Even if we accept that micro theories of deliberative democracypropose ideal conditions for deliberation, the legitimacy argument remains vague

on civil societys normative role within this ideal.





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Another way to unpack civil societys role in micro deliberation is to examine

which actors are likely to engage in a structured process of collective reasoning.

For example, in a deliberative forum participants are expected to communicate

openly, seek mutual understanding and reflect on the ideas and perspectives of

others. Ideally, micro deliberators have adaptive and accommodating preferencesin order to consider the arguments of others, and are ready to readjust their own

positions in view of what they have heard and what others can accept.14 Partici-

pants need to be autonomous and open-minded, and willing to allow the power

of reason to shift their preferences towards the common good (Cohen, 1997, pp.

756; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 174; Miller, 1992, p. 62). Micro theories

seem to imply that only those that are willing and capable of upholding these

deliberative norms should participate in a deliberative forum. This leads some

theorists such as John Rawls (1971) in the direction of the courts. But, with

respect to civil society, micro theories implicitly seem to exclude those actors in

public life who are more interested in pursuing their own agenda than expanding

their perspectives.Taken to its extreme this suggests that many partisans, such as

interest groups, social movements and activists are unlikely to make useful micro

deliberators (see Young, 2001).15

This exclusionary aspect of micro deliberation has been the source of much

criticism. Difference democrats, for example, worry that structured deliberation

can ostracise those unfamiliar with formal debate or poised speech (Sanders,

1997; Young, 1996, pp. 1225) or oppressed groups who may need to assert their

self-interest (Mansbridge, 2003, pp. 17988).

16

Other democrats such as MarkWarren (1992) are concerned that theories of deliberation based around the idea

of preference shifts rely on a conception of self which is oversocialised and

overly discursive. Such a self, he argues (p. 13),would be autonomous yet social,

individuated yet defined by nonconflicting interests, rational but embodied in

numerous different social relations, expressive of individuality yet public in

orientation.

Macro Conceptions of Deliberative Democracy

An alternate conception of deliberative democracy takes the macro perspective.Democrats of this ilk view deliberation in less structured terms where people

engage in open public discourse via associations, social movements, networks and

the media (Benhabib, 1996; Dryzek, 1990; 2000a; Habermas, 1996a).17 Whereas

micro deliberation is typically oriented towards decision-making, macro delib-

eration is aimed at opinion formation.What macro deliberation produces, accord-

ing to Seyla Benhabib (1996, p. 74) is a public conversation of mutually interlocking

and overlapping networks and associations of deliberation, contestation and argumentation

(emphasis in original). For John Dryzek, macro deliberation is about the contes-

tation of overlapping discourses. Discourses can be likened to coherent storylines,which build upon facts, values, myths and opinions. They represent a shared

means of making sense of the world embedded in language (Dryzek, 2000a, p.





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18). Macro or discursive deliberation takes place in the informal and wild spaces

in society where communication is unconstrained and spontaneous (Habermas,

1996a, p. 307). It encompasses a range of communicative spaces from small

face-to-face discussions through to action by social movements and the media.

Highly unpredictable, discursive deliberation does not necessarily exclude morestrategic forms of action such as protest, boycott and radical activism.

The very fact that macro deliberation is based on less stringent communicative

norms renders it a more inclusive version of deliberative democracy.18 It over-

comes the scale problem that faces micro deliberation by locating deliberation in

the public sphere. For this reason civil society plays a predominant role in macro

accounts of deliberative democracy. Macro theorists call on different kinds of

actors in civil society, such as social movements and empowered citizens, to stand

up and actively engage in public discourse.Under macro deliberation,civil society

is called on to play an unconstrained and even oppositional role against the stateby engaging in acts of communication (Dryzek, 2000a; Habermas, 1996b).

On first assessment, macro deliberation might appear more inclusive and thus

potentially more legitimate, but it carries with it some deliberative dangers. On

the whole, macro democrats remain highly optimistic that broad-scale delibera-

tion within the public sphere, with its openness forunrestricted communication,

is rigorous enough to counter illegitimate claims and attempts to distort com-

munication. In particular, they rely on indigenous actors in the public sphere,

such as social movements, to stimulate counter-knowledge and ask criticalquestions (Dryzek, 2000a, ch. 4; Habermas, 1996a; 1996b).19 But, when the weak

and marginalised fail to muster enough discursive potential, macro deliberation

can easily collapse into the very kind of adversarial interest group politics

that deliberative democrats reject (e.g. Bessette, 1994, pp. 5663; Rawls, 1971,

pp. 3601).20

Some macro theorists acknowledge the potential communicative distortions

within the public sphere. For example, in Between Facts and Norms, Jrgen

Habermas acknowledges that On account of its anarchic structure, the general

public sphere is ... more vulnerable to the repressive and exclusionary effects ofunequally distributed social power, structural violence, and systematically dis-

torted communication than are institutionalized public spheres of parliamentary

bodies (Habermas, 1996a, pp. 3078).21 In order to correct these distortions,

Habermas firstly proposes a set of legal and constitutional safeguards (Chambers,

2002). Secondly, he calls on specific liberating actors in civil society to ensure that

communication is not distorted.These actors can be distinguished by their dual

orientation of political engagement. On the one hand they seek to influence the

political system but on the other hand they also seek to empower and enlarge civil

societys capacity to take action (Habermas, 1996a, p. 370).The kinds of groupswho might take on this anti-distortion role are certain social movements who

pursue issues both at the grass-roots and at the policy level.





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Critics of Habermass proposal argue that he does not go far enough in acknowl-

edging the inequalities which exist within the public sphere and the potential

communication distortions that result from this (Eley, 1992; Fraser, 1992). For

example, Nancy Fraser (1992) argues that rather than conceiving of one large

public sphere, we should acknowledge that modern late-capitalist societiescontain multiple diverse publics which are differentially equipped to partake in

politics. Social and economic inequalities often mean that it is the more privileged

actors in the public sphere who dominate discussion and debate.

Habermass account is also problematic because it does not seem to acknowl-

edge the problems of bad civil society (Chambers, 2002, pp. 1005), and thus

grossly overestimates the capacity of the public sphere to self-rectify. A more

critical look at social movements might reveal that they do not always provide

the potential for democracy that Habermas claims. For example, some groups

can be internally anti-democratic and may not respect progressive liberal anddemocratic ideals (Levi, 1996; Young, 2000, p. 180). Habermass account is also

vague on how exactly specific actors in civil society, such as social movements,

prevent communication distortions. In practice, social movements, like other

interest groups, seek to distort or reframe an issue in order to sell their message

to the public. How is the communication from social movements any less

susceptible to distortion then the agendas pushed by powerful interest groups

and commercial organisations?

Contrasting Roles and their Democratic Implications

The article thus far has argued that deliberative democracy presents two different

and potentially conflicting roles for civil society. In its extreme interpretation,

micro theorists call on elected representatives and those actors in civil society who

are willing and capable of deliberating (i.e. those with open preferences) to

engage in rational deliberation in a structured forum. In contrast, macro theorists

advocate that civil societys role is embedded in a form of democratic emanci-

pation. Civil society is the venue where ideas and discourses are formed, shaped

and contested. Rather than engage in formal deliberation, civil societys role is tomobilise discourses outside the state in unconstrained and perhaps even in

strategic ways.

At this point it is important to acknowledge that these roles will appeal variously

to different actors in civil society. Theoretically, macro deliberation is likely to

attract groups and activists interested in advocating a particular outcome. As

discussed earlier, the market-like functioning of ideas in the public domain makes

macro deliberation more accessible to the louder, well-organised and well-

resourced actors in civil society (Christiano, 1996). In contrast, micro deliberation

is likely to find more appeal among open and non-partisan actors in civil society(Warren, 2001; Young, 2001). Many group representatives, for example, are likely

to make poor micro deliberators because they have been delegated by their





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organisation and members to pursue a specific policy position. Similarly, some

public intellectuals and experts might reject a micro deliberative forum because

their reputations or world views restrict their capacity to reconsider their own

preferences. Micro deliberation might also be resisted by actors in civil society,

especially partisans, because they fear co-option and further marginalisation(Kohn, 2000; Sanders, 1997; Young, 1996) or because they prefer to pursue their

agendas using power and interest politics (Shapiro, 1999; Simon, 1999). Recent

empirical research supports these speculations, finding that partisans and activists

are often highly sceptical of structured deliberative fora, whether organised within

or outside the state (Hendriks, 2002; 2004; Levine and Nierras, 2005).

Since different actors in civil society will tend to prefer one form of deliberation

to another, there are some serious democratic implications in conceiving of

deliberative democracy entirely as either a micro or macro enterprise. If we were

to place all our deliberative eggs in the micro basket, then this would be to excludethose actors with rigid or group-bound preferences. Alternatively, if we were to

place all our deliberative eggs into the macro basket, this would privilege those

actors in civil society with the resources to articulate, organise and mobilise their

ideas in the public sphere.

Given the limitations of a purely micro deliberative system (potentially elitist

and exclusive) or a purely macro deliberative system (potentially populist and

undemocratic), what would a more integrated system look like? I explore this

question by first critiquing three different proposals for integrating micro and

macro deliberation, after which I introduce an alternative of my own.

Attempts to Resolve the Deliberative Divide

Perhaps the most elaborate attempt to incorporate micro and macro forms of

deliberation is Habermass (1996a) two-track model of democracy. Deliberation

under this model proceeds on two levels: opinions are formed in the public sphere

and then transmitted via currents of public communication to the state where

more formal deliberation takes place in courts and parliaments for the purposes

of will formation (lawmaking) (Habermas, 1996a, pp. 3078).22 Elections and the

media are the main transmission mechanisms between the macro and the micro,

but it is unclear what makes this transfer especially deliberative. For all its

elaboration, Habermass model is also particularly vague on the role of specific

kinds of civil society actors, such as interest groups and activists, in this transfer

process.23 He leaves us wondering: how do the resource and deliberative inequali-

ties in the public sphere affect the way in which opinion is transferred to the state?

Associative democrats propose another means to connect micro fora with the

macro deliberative world.They prefer to assign specific actors in civil society (inparticular, associations) a greater role in formal deliberation with the state (Cohen

and Rogers, 1995a; Hirst, 1994). In essence this is a liberal and democratic version





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of institutional pluralism, where competing associations provide different services

for their members (Bader, 2001, p. 5). Some associative democrats envisage

traditional state-run services being conducted by a range of associations that

emerge freely from within civil society (Hirst, 1994). In contrast, Cohen and

Rogers (1995a) associative democracy involves uncorrupted state intervention tocentralise and stimulate the right kinds of association.Their version reflects a form

of hyper-corporatism in which certain select groups in civil society are given

access to the state.

The associative democrats strategy has both democratic and deliberative prob-

lems.24 First, it assumes that society is neatly composed into associative groupings,

which are capable of representing the diversity of all citizens. Second, it assumes

that such groups are capable of deliberating. Yet, as pointed out above, micro

theories of deliberative democracy suggest that participants with free, open

preferences are more capable of deliberating than representatives of groups whohold rigid preferences.Third, as pointed out by Dryzek (2000a, p. 92), there are

very few successful examples reflecting Cohen and Rogers theoretical form of

state-sponsored associationalism. Finally, the associative strategy is limited to the

extent that there will always be a tension between engaging civil society in state

institutions and preserving civil societys role outside the state (Montpetit et al.,

2004; Young, 2000).

The practice of corporatism also reminds us that Cohen and Rogers (1995a)

associative democracy could essentially lead to the inclusion of a select elite orprivileged groups in civil society at the exclusion of others. In the end, such

exclusion could paradoxically stimulate macro deliberation, as demonstrated by

the rise of the green movement in Germany in the 1970s and 80s after years of

exclusion from corporatist arrangements between the state, labour and business

(Dryzek et al., 2003).25 But, in the end the associative democracy scenario is likely

to suffer from some of the problems that face Habermass two-track model. For

example, formal deliberative structures (which under the associative vision would

include both the state and associations) would operate more or less in a separate

realm from active public spheres. Again, there is the question of how these two

forms of deliberation should productively interrelate.

Rather than attempting to connect two distinct forms of deliberation, Jane

Mansbridge (1999) suggests that we consider a deliberative system composed of

multiple venues for deliberation. At one end of the deliberative system is the

informal everyday talk among citizens and social movements, and at the other

end is the formal decision-making that takes place in public assemblies and

parliament.This is a more promising and realistic account of the heterogeneous

and eclectic world of deliberation observed in practice (Fung and Wright, 2003;

Gastil and Levine, 2005). It recognises that public deliberation is not an activityrestricted to either micro or macro venues, but something that takes place in all

sorts of institutions, arenas and spaces in social life.





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Although the deliberative system seems to capture well how public deliberation

proceeds in practice, it suffers, I believe, from two limitations. First, the system as

proposed by Mansbridge (1999) seems to neglect that not all forms of delibera-

tion along the deliberative spectrum are likely to be mutually supportive. In her

proposal, Mansbridge (1999, p. 213) describes how different parts of the delib-erative system mutually influence one another in ways that are not easy to parse

out. In particular, she cites how the media and social movements shape and are

shaped by political debate, and how the intentionally political talk of activists

influences and is influenced by the everyday talk of nonactivists. Mansbridges

proposal implicitly assumes that the more informal public conversations will work

in unison with, and mutually reinforce, the micro deliberation in structured fora.26

In making this assumption, however, she overlooks a major challenge facing

deliberative practice: that structured deliberative fora do not always interface well

with their broader discursive context (see Hendriks, 2002; 2004; Sagoff, 1999;

Thomas, 2003).

In reality all micro fora operate in a macro deliberative setting. Deliberative

practitioners work tirelessly to ensure that fora interface smoothly and produc-

tively with their broader discursive context. In an ideal scenario, a dialectic is

established between the macro and the micro: public discourse informs the

deliberations within the forum, and the forum informs public discussion. But

numerous studies report how this ideal is not easy to obtain in practice. In

some cases, structured deliberative fora fuel antagonism and polarisation, rather

than fostering broader community debate (Hendriks, 2002; Sagoff, 1999; van

den Daele et al., 1997).The reverse also occurs where a deliberative process has

little impact on public discourse because it is overshadowed or undermined by

dominant voices. This was exactly what happened to a citizens conference

(brgerkonferenz) held in Germany in 2001 on genetic diagnostics (Schicktanz

and Naumann, 2003). The conference took place at a time when there was an

abundance of political and public discussion around the controversial issue of

applying gene technology for medical and insurance purposes. Relevant policy

actors congregated and debated the benefits and costs of genetic diagnostics in

various arenas, for example advisory committees, conferences and public hear-

ings. Alongside these formal often expert-dominated fora, there were alsoa series of informal discursive spaces such as church seminars and the media,

where different groups could inject their views into the debate (Hendriks,

2004, ch. 7). In many respects the citizens conference operated against the

backdrop of a well-functioning public sphere, with all its messy and active

macro deliberation. Yet, against this almost hyperactive discursive setting, the

citizens conference struggled to gain any attention in the political and public

domain. In addition, the conference was not well placed to work with, or have

an impact on, prominent expert advisory committees. This case highlights that

when there are so many opportunities for public discourse it is difficult for aone-off deliberative forum to influence a policy debate either directly, by pro-

viding substantive policy input, or indirectly, by stimulating public discussion. It





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reveals that unless a micro forum is closely connected to its macro discursive

setting, then it risks drowning in a sea of other public conversations.

It is possible that one-off incidents such as these may not concern Mansbridge

(1999, p. 224), since she argues that the criterion for good deliberation should be

not that every interaction in the system exhibit mutual respect, consistency,

acknowledgement, openmindedness and moral economy, but that the larger

system reflect those goals. But it is plausible for an entire deliberative system to

lose sight of these goals, for instance when public discourse and everyday talk

consistently undermine efforts to create formal deliberative arenas, or vice versa.

Another limitation of the deliberative system as envisaged by Mansbridge relates

to the spectrum metaphor. There is a suggestion that public deliberation is

something that occurs in discrete and unconnected sites of formal and informal

deliberation.This is certainly more implicit than explicit, as demonstrated by thefollowing quote (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 212, emphasis added):Often everyday talk

produces collective results the way a market produces collective results, through

the combined and interactive effects ofrelatively isolated individual actions. But, as

argued previously, deliberative practice reminds us that different kinds of delib-

eration are inextricably linked (see also Hendriks, 2005; Montpetit et al., 2004).

As the citizens conference discussed above demonstrated, the macro discursive

context can be very influential on the workings of a micro deliberative forum.

The political significance of a micro forum and the way it is received by policy

actors are both shaped by where it is situated in the broader discursive scheme of

things.

Promoting an Integrated System of Public Deliberation

The limitations of the models critiqued above suggest that a more integrated

deliberative system would (1) celebrate the multiplicity of deliberative venues and

(2) foster connections between these venues. To this end, it is useful, I believe, to

conceptualise public deliberation along similar lines to the spatial definition of

civil society, introduced above. Like civil society, a deliberative system encom-

passes a series of arenas where particular kinds of activities take place; in this case,

communicative practices that foster critical, public reflection. In contrast to

Habermass two-track model, the integrateddeliberative system I put forward here

recognises that deliberation occurs in a variety of public venues, which I label as

discursive spheres.27 A discursive sphere is a site where public discourse occurs

through the exposition and discussion of different viewpoints.They include, for

example, parliaments, committee meetings, party rooms, stakeholder round tables,

expert committees, community fora, public seminars, church events and so on.

A healthy deliberative system contains a multitude of discursive spheres; someformal, some informal and some fostering mixed modes of deliberation.28 Most

spheres have a predominant form of communication, for example scientific





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inquiry, contestation, negotiation, consensus or deliberation. Some spheres are far

more structured than others, some more public and inclusive, some are initiated

by the state and others emerge from civil society. Although most actors locate

themselves in one primary discursive sphere, they are by no means mutually

exclusive. Some actors prefer to work in several spheres in order to utilise different

forms of communication and engage with different kinds of actors. In contrast, an

ailing deliberative system would foster conditions that undermine deliberation,

for example, by promoting enclaves of like-minded actors who become more

extreme in their opinions and less tolerant over time (Sunstein, 2000).

Conceptualising the deliberative system as a series of discursive spheres, as I have

done in Figure 2, helps to depict how micro and mixed deliberative arenas are

embedded in a broader, informal (macro), discursive context. The dashed lines

indicate the porosity of the spheres with respect to alternative or marginalised

interests.As shown in Figure 2, macro and mixed discursive spheres are more open

(porous) than the micro (formal) spheres.

The integrateddeliberative system proposed here differs from Mansbridges (1999)

continuum in that it considers agency, diversity and interconnectivity.The discursive

sphere concept provokes us to think about who participates in different delibera-tive spaces. As argued above, different actors in civil society such as activists,

interest groups and individual citizens all vary in their willingness and capacity to

Figure 2: The IntegratedDeliberative System

e.g. mobilisation of discourses, activism,

protests, boycotts

Typical actors = social movements,

networks, NGOs, activists, interest groups,

corporations, the media, opinion leaders

e.g. deliberative designs, facilitated town meetings,

public seminars

Typical actors = mix of individual citizens, interest

groups representatives, activists, experts, the media,

government officials, parliamentarians

Mixed discursive spheres

Informal and formal

e.g. expert committees,

conferences, commissions of

inquiry

Typical actors =

parliamentarians, government

officials, experts, judges,

arbitrators

Micro discursive spheres

Formal

Macro discursive spheres

Informal





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engage in different kinds of discursive spheres. For example, activists and interest

groups are more likely to engage in more informal discursive spheres, as there are

fewer rules and constraints (Young, 2001). Many citizens, however, might be less

likely to participate fully in these looser forms of deliberation for a range of

structural, power and resourcing impediments. In the more formal spheres, forexample, experts and parliamentarians will engage in specialised and structured

fora.

Given the varying dispositions and willingness of actors to deliberate in macro or

micro ways, it is essential that the entire system fosters a diversity of deliberative

spaces. Crucial here are mixed discursive spheres that combine formal and

informal modes of deliberation. Mixed spheres also serve to connect the micro

and macro deliberative worlds. They encourage actors who might normally

inhabit macro spaces (e.g. activists, interest groups, corporations) and micro

venues (e.g. parliamentarians, experts, academics, government officials) to comeinto contact with actors who are typically underrepresented in both (e.g.

individual citizens). More fundamentally, mixed venues encourage the cross-

fertilisation of ideas across different kinds of actors, connecting broader public

discourse to the conversations and decisions of the political elite.

Mixed discursive spheres have not attracted much attention in political theory, but

they are abundant in deliberative practice (see Button and Mattson, 2000; Fung,

2003b; Fung and Wright, 2003; Ryfe, 2002). Exemplary in this respect are

deliberative designs, such as citizens juries and planning cells that create spaces

where deliberating lay citizens can hear from and question a range of civil societygroups more accustomed to macro deliberation (see Crosby, 1995; Dienel, 1999;

Hendriks, 2005). Mixed discursive spheres also include the kind of open public

fora and town hall meetings that bring together not only experts, bureaucrats and

interest groups but also individual citizens interested in the issue. Numerous

deliberative success stories of this sort are now emerging, for example the

large-scale twenty-first-century Town Meetings, which have been held across the

United States and in one state in Australia under the guidance of AmericaSpeaks

(see Carson and Hartz-Karp, 2005; Lukensmeyer et al., 2005).

What is unique about these mixed discursive spheres is that they capture thebenefits of micro and macro deliberation without their respective elitist and

populist downfalls. On one level they create micro deliberative spaces where

everyday citizens can interact as equals, learn about an issue, question underlying

assumptions and premises and most importantly work together towards a collec-

tive set of recommendations for decision-makers. But, on another level these

mixed deliberative designs also welcome contributions from actors more accus-

tomed to macro deliberation, for example activists, NGOs, lobby groups as well as

experts and government officials. All these actors are invited to come and share

their perspectives and experiences with the citizens panel.

With such an avid focus on citizen involvement, these deliberative designs have

been labelled by some critics not as mixed venues, but as mock spaces that





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exclude those who have real knowledge, experience or a stake in the issue (see

Harrison and Mort, 1998; Parkinson, 2004). But claims of exclusivity always

depend on where one sees the boundaries. Beyond the panel of citizens is a

broader boundary that wraps around the entire deliberative procedure one that

is much more accessible to macro civil society actors than sceptics acknowledge.One could even go so far as to argue that these mixed deliberative designs are

especially inclusive and diverse because they embody elements of Dryzeks

discursive legitimacy. This is the idea that a deliberative procedure is legitimate

when a collective decision is consistent with the constellation of discourses

present in the public sphere, in the degree to which this constellation is subject

to the reflective control of competent actors (Dryzek, 2001, p. 660). In the

deliberative designs cited above, various discourses associated with the issue under

deliberation are brought to the attention of the citizens via the presenters.While

it is true that not all discourses have a voice or agency, a broad range of

presentations from interest groups and experts can expose deliberators to the

issues diverse discursive landscape. In this way, these procedures are more likely

to reflect the constellation of discourses surrounding a problem than the kinds of

deliberative enclaves found in state institutions and in the public sphere.

Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that deliberative theorists provide contrasting

accounts of civil society.The implicit role of civil society in deliberative democ-

racy varies depending on whether the theory is focusing on the conditions for

micro deliberative fora or on the informal macro discourse in the public sphere. On

the one hand micro theorists advocate for civil society or its representatives to

engage in rational deliberation in structured fora. The emphasis is on engaging

participants from civil society who have relatively unformed and flexible prefer-

ences in a formal deliberative forum. In contrast, macro theories aspire to civil

society playing a role in emancipating democracy through unconstrained com-

munication. Here, civil society is seen as the venue where public opinion is

formed, shaped and contested.

But to conceive of deliberative democracy as an entirely micro or macro enter-

prise is not only unrealistic, but potentially exclusive. For, in practice all micro

deliberative fora are surrounded and impacted by their macro discursive context.

Moreover, civil society is heterogeneous and differentiated, especially in relation

to deliberation. Some actors will be more willing and capable of deliberating

(either formally or discursively) than others. Furthermore, some groups and

citizens might choose to engage with the state in micro deliberative fora, while

others might decide to work against the state via macro deliberative action.

These different orientations of civil society expose a number of questions thatcontinue to haunt the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy. For example,

how can structured deliberative arenas work together with some of the more





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unconstrained, informal modes of deliberation operating in civil society? In

particular, how do structured deliberative fora deal with active public spheres

which may resort to power and strategic action? There have been some attempts

by various theorists to address these questions by bringing the micro and macro

worlds of deliberation together. However, I have argued that these efforts under-estimate variations within civil society regarding who participates in deliberative

democracy both formally and informally. Further, theorists give little recognition

to civil societys heterogeneity, particularly with respect to the inequalities in

deliberative capacity, power and access to resources. Drawing on Mansbridges

(1999) deliberative system, I suggest that a more integrated system of public

deliberation is best conceptualised as an activity occurring in overlapping discur-

sive spheres some structured, some loose, some mixed each attracting different

actors from civil society. Mixed discursive spheres are a crucial component of this

proposal because they encourage diverse actors to come together and cross-

fertilise macro and micro public conversations.

Understandingwhoparticipatesin differentformsofpublicdeliberation andin what

capacity will remain an ongoing challenge in a world where communities of fate

do not neatly correspond to existing polities.Yet,one sure way to improve the quality

andquantityofdeliberationincontemporarypoliticsistopromotevenuesthatbring

together a diversity of voices from across civil society.

(Accepted: 5 September 2005)

About the Author

Carolyn M. Hendriks, Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, O.Z.Achterburgwal

237, 1012 DL Amsterdam,The Netherlands; email: [email protected]

Notes

I would like to thank John Dryzek, Gerry Mackie, John Parkinson,TjitskeAkkerman and Robert van derVeen for theircomments on earlier versions of this article. I am also grateful to three anonymous reviewers for their feedback andsuggestions.

1 In this article I am referring to Habermass (1996a) latter work on deliberation as laid out in Between Facts and

Norms.

2 These represent ideal-types only and there are many theorists who fall in between micro and macro streams, suchas Bohman (1996), Cohen and Rogers (1995a), Gutmann and Thompson (1996) and Mansbridge (1999), some ofwhom I discuss later in this article.

3 According to Cohen and Arato (1992, p.84) the concept of civil society first appeared in Aristotle as politike koinonia(political society/community).

4 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the positions of these and other prominent philosophers with respectto civil society. For a useful discussion, see Cohen and Arato (1992) and Seligman (2002).

5 This spatial conceptualisation of civil society also draws on Deakin (2001, p. 7) and Walzer (1995, p. 7).

6 Young (2000) extends this definition further by limiting civil society to those sectors which focus on influencingand changing policies of governments, organisations and corporations. I find this definition somewhat limitingbecause it excludes citizens and groups engaged in activities which are not state focused, for example the activitiesof a religious or theatre group.

7 There are of course numerous groups in civil society who seek to influence para-governmental activity. Forexample some groups focus on the family, the economy or the international community as a source of change



mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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(Dryzek, 2000a, p. 102). However, for the purposes of this article, I am concentrating on those groups who seek toinfluence the state.

8 In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas (1996a,p. 307, p.314) typically refers to the public sphere in the singular (thegeneral public sphere). Young (2000, p. 171) finds this conception of one public sphere useful because it describesa single continuous process or space wherea diverse, complex, mass society can address social problems throughpublic action. (For a counter-argument see Fraser [1992].)

9 This notion of spheres forming in response to failures in the state and economy is adapted from Jnickes (1996)functional definition of civil society. His definition of civil society corresponds with what I am calling here thepublic sphere. In contrast, my definition of civil society takes on a broader interpretation in that it also includesgroups that form around non-economic and state interests. Thus, it encapsulates many groups in society such asreligious and recreational groups whose identity is not bound by a response to state or economic failures.

10 The expression deliberative turn is borrowed from Dryzek (2000a, p. 1).

11 This distinction between macro and micro theories of deliberative democracy corresponds closely to the circum-scribed and uncircumscribed variants of Saward (2001,pp.3657) and therule governed process and civil societyapproach of Rttil (2000, pp. 401).

12 As acknowledged in note 2, these are ideal-types only.

13 This may not be the case in all micro deliberative fora. For example, there are some exciting developments indeliberative practice where interactive technology is opening up opportunities for more people to engage in microdeliberative fora (see Gastil and Levine, 2005).

14 Gutmann and Thompson (1996, p. 356) refer to this as the capacity to change.

15 Young (2001) raises this issue in relation to activists and their capacity to deliberate. For a counter-argument on thispoint with respect to interest groups, see Mansbridge (1992; 1995).

16 Dryzek (2000a, p. 57) defines difference democrats as political theorists who stress the need for democratic politicsto concern itself first and foremost with the recognition of the legitimacy and validity of the particular perspectivesof historically-oppressed segments of the population.

17 Youngs (1996) communicative democracy is also consistent with macro accounts of deliberative democracy.

18 In this respect, macro deliberation shares elements with the ideals of participatory democracy (see Hauptmann,2001).

19 Habermas (1996a, p. 375) labels entities emerging from the public sphere as indigenous.

20 Kohn (2000, pp. 4234) makes a similar point.

21 Habermas (1996a, p. 375) also distinguishes between indigenous actors in civil society versus those who simplymake use of the public sphere.These users have organisational power, resources and merely enter the public spherefrom, and utilize it for, a specific organization or functional system.

22 Other macro theorists, such as Dr yzek (2000a, p. 51), tend to emphasise transmission through the contestation ofdiscourses.

23 By and large Habermas (1996a, p.364, pp.3759) is not optimistic about the role of interest groups in his two-trackmodel, describing them as strategic actors who are merely interested in using the public sphere for their own ends.

24 For a discussion on the benefits and problems with this version of associative democracy, see the edited volume ofCohen and Roger (1995b).

25 Dryzek et al.s (2003) empirical work demonstrates how the green movement in Germany in the 1970s and 80semerged in response to exclusive corporatist arrangements between the state, labour and business.

26 Mansbridge (1999) acknowledges that certain components of the system may not necessarily reflect the idealdeliberative procedure or that they might exclude certain actors in civil society. However, the key, she argues, is thatthe total system reflects deliberative conditions (p. 211).

27 Discursive spheres refer to a specific kind of public domain.They are,however, different from the public arenas thatHilgartner and Bosk (1988, p. 55) have in mind when they talk of institutions where social problem definitionsevolve. Discursive spheres are concerned with where public conversations on a particular issue take place, ratherthan where issues are defined and framed.

28 There are a handful of theorists who advocate that public deliberation should occur in a variety of venues: forexample Warren (1995, p. 193) talks of multiple public spheres; Bohman (1996, pp. 5965) refers to dialogicalmechanisms; and Mansbridge (1996, p. 57) celebrates different arenas for deliberation.





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