helg 2003_simón bolívar and the spectre of pardocracia

Simon Bolvar and the Spectre ofPardocracia : Jose Padilla inPost-Independence Cartagena

ALINE HELG

Abstract. This article examines the tensions between the Gran Colombian repub-lican constitution of 1821 and Simon Bolvars fear of a mulatto takeover. It focuseson Cartagena in the 1820s, where the mulatto general Jose Padilla challenged thesocio-racial hierarchy and accepted notions of equality of the city, heading a three-day coup in 1828 against Bolvars attempt to impose a new authoritarian con-stitution. Padilla failed to rally the mostly African-derived population of Cartagenabehind the republican views of Francisco de Paula Santander and was promptlyexecuted. Using the protagonists correspondence, manifestos, criminal investi-gations, consular reports and censuses, the article analyses the factors in the citysdemography, political leadership and culture, and in the composition of its militaryforces, that explain Padillas failure. It highlights the role played by race and byBolvars views of mulattos in the process.

From 1810 to 1831 New Granada experienced extraordinary changes as it

evolved from a colonial caste society ruled by a distant Spanish monarch to

a multiracial republic of free and equal citizens, rst in the union of Gran

Colombia and later as an independent nation. The 1820s, in particular, was

a decade during which the military leaders who had just defeated Spain

confronted elected legislators often themselves former military men over

the new nations form of government and its citizens rights and duties. In

broad terms, from 1826 the civilians supported the establishment of a con-

stitutional republic embodied by the man of letters and vice-president of

Gran Colombia, Gen. Francisco de Paula Santander, against the attempts

Aline Helg is an Associate Professor in the Department of History at the University ofTexas at Austin.

The following abbreviations have been used: AHNC (Archivo Historico Nacional deColombia, Bogota), RE (Seccion Republica), AR (Archivo Historico Restrepo), GM(Fondo Guerra y Marina), HI (Fondo Historia) ; BNC (Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia,Bogota), SM (Sala Manuscritos) ; MAE-Paris (Ministe`re des Aaires Etrange`res, Paris),CCC (Correspondance Consulaire, Colombie, Carthage`ne) ; NA (National Archives of theUnited States, Washington, D.C.), DCC (Dispatches from the United States Consuls inCartagena, Colombia, 18221906 [Microcopy]) ; PRO (Public Record Oce, London), FO(Foreign Oce Papers).

J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 35, 447471 f 2003 Cambridge University Press 447DOI: 10.1017/S0022216X03006849 Printed in the United Kingdom

by the Liberator and president, Gen. Simon Bolvar, and several military

leaders to keep Gran Colombia together by imposing authoritarian regimes

on Venezuela, New Granada and Ecuador under Bolvars centralised super-

vision. By the end of 1830 Bolvar had died and Gran Colombia had sep-

arated into the three nations. In New Granada the supporters of Santander

triumphed over the bolivaristas by mid-1831 and proceeded to restore a re-

publican government, but the fact that they achieved their victory on the

battleelds rather than at the polls instituted a bipartisan political system

(Liberals versus Conservatives) in which it was often military triumph that

secured political change.

By focusing on the scarcely studied relationship between Bolvar, San-

tander, the pardo (mulatto) General Jose Padilla, and their respective con-

stituencies in the predominantly Afro-Caribbean port city of Cartagena, this

article analyses how the socio-racial structures of the colonial past, the

spectre of the Haitian Revolution, and contradictory visions of the future

shaped these leaders trajectories in the early republic.1 Whereas fear of

people of African descent and the need to keep the lower classes in check

dominated Bolvars thinking, the urge for controlling the military, regardless

of race, guided Santander. Padilla, who routinely experienced the racism of

Cartagenas aristocrats, oscillated between the old scare tactic of mobilising

his pardo class and a modern discourse of democracy and equality. In

a political culture based on clientelism, in which many white elites under-

stood references to blackness and its mixtures as threats of another Haiti,

such ambivalence limited Padillas regional leadership. Moreover, unable to

choose between military discipline and political beliefs, Padilla cultivated

the dual patronage of Bolvar and Santander even after the two leaders had

clashed and Bolvars authoritarianism began to clearly contradict his own

socio-racial interests. When in early 1828 Padilla eventually chose Santander

and launched a coup in favour of the latters constitutionalist views, the

1 For brief mentions of Padilla in Bolvars trajectory, see I. Lievano Aguirre, Bolvar (1950;reprint, Caracas, 1988), p. 501 ; G. Masur, Simon Bolvar (2nd ed., Albuquerque, 1968),p. 447 ; John Lynch, Bolvar and the Caudillos, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 63,no. 1 (1983), pp. 301; D. Bushnell, The Last Dictatorship : Betrayal or Consummation?, ibid., p. 78. The most complete military biography of Padilla is J. C. Torres Almeyda, ElAlmirante Jose Padilla (epopeya y martirio) (1983 ; reprint, Bogota, 1990). See also E. UribeWhite, Padilla : homenaje de la armada colombiana al heroe de la batalla del lago de Maracaibo(Bogota, 1973) ; E. Otero DCosta, Vida del Almirante Jose Padilla (17781828 ) (1921 ; reprint,Bogota, 1973). For a novelised narrative, see J. Zapata Olivella, Piar, Petion y Padilla : tresmulatos de la revolucion (Barranquilla, 1986), pp. 31106. For an innovative discussion of theevents in Cartagena in 1828, see J. Conde Calderon, Provincias, ciudadana y clase en elCaribe colombiano, 18211855, unpubl. thesis, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Programade Doctorado Las mascaras del poder en el imaginario latinoamericano, Seville, 2001),pp. 1037.

448 Aline Helg

santanderistas gave him little support. Bolvar could easily accuse him of in-

itiating a race war and have him executed.

In 1821 Gran Colombia achieved independence from Spain, and the

Congress of Cucuta adopted the new nations rst constitution. As other

republican constitutions in the 1820s, this document stressed its protection

of Colombians liberty, security, property, and equality . It established a

system of indirect representation that limited surage to adult men with real

property or independent trade, but in practice unqualied military men were

allowed to vote until 1827.2 Simultaneously, all references to the colonial

racial categories other than Indians and slaves disappeared from laws, cen-

suses, and legal documents.3 This reected not only the principles of equality

promoted by the French Revolution but also the fact that the armies that

liberated Gran Colombias territories were racially integrated and made up

principally of men of mixed African and Indian ancestry. Although con-

gressmen and military leaders tacitly accepted the abolition of the colonial

racial privileges as a natural outcome of independence, a few elite native

whites worried that constitutional racial equality and the example of the

Haitian Revolution could inspire mulattos and blacks into taking power in

the regions where they were in the majority, notably Venezuela and New

Granadas Magdalena department.

Gran Colombias uneasy relations with Haiti added to the governments

preoccupation. In 1816, after Spain temporarily reconquered the region,

Simon Bolvar had welcomed Haitian money, arms and ammunitions to

revive the struggle for independence, in return for the abolition of slavery

in the territories he would liberate. However, he only partially fullled his

promise, as the 1821 manumission law did not free the slaves, but only the

children of slave mothers born after 1821.4 In 1823, unfounded rumours

spread that Haiti attempted to destabilise Venezuela and the Magdalena de-

partment and that pardos conspired to exterminate whites. The following

year the independent government in Bogota refused to establish diplomatic

relations with Haiti, on the pretext that it might dissuade the European

nations from recognising Gran Colombia.5 Moreover, Haiti was the only

2 D. Uribe Vargas (ed.), Las Constituciones de Colombia, vol. 2 (Madrid, 1977), pp. 71213;D. Bushnell, The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia (Newark, 1954), pp. 1314.

3 For a British praise of the measure, see F. Hall, Colombia, Its Present State, in Respect ofClimate, Soil, Productions, Population, Government, Commerce, Revenue, Manufactures, Arts, Litera-ture, Manners, Education and Inducements to Emigration (London, 1825), p. 14.

4 Ley , 21 Oct. 1821, in Republica de Colombia, Sala de Negocios Generales del Consejode Estado, Codicacion nacional de todas las leyes de Colombia desde el ano de 1821, hecha conforme a laley 13 de 1912 (Bogota, 192433), vol. 1, pp. 1417.

5 Consejo extraordinario de gobierno del jueves 8 de julio de 1824, in Acuerdos del consejo degobierno de la republica de Colombia, 18211824 (1892 ; reprint, Bogota, 1988), pp. 2356.

Simon Bolvar and the Spectre of Pardocracia 449

American nation neither President Bolvar nor Vice-President Santander

invited to the Inter-American Congress held in Panama in mid-1826.6

No leader was more concerned with mulatto power than Simon Bolvar.

Bolvars apprehension dated back to his rst-hand experience of the racial

violence of the troops of pardos as well as manumitted and fugitive slaves

under the royalist Jose Tomas Boves against the Venezuelan white creoles

in 1814, during the rst phase of the anticolonial struggle, often referred to

as a race war.7 The following year, in two open letters aimed from Jamaica

at British readers and seeking European support for the cause of Spanish

American independence, Bolvar reected on the future of multiracial

America. Only through threat and violence, he explained, had Venezuelas

people of colour taken arms against the white creoles, but now that Spain

had restored its domination on the colony, the same freedmen and slaves

had joined the white creoles in their struggle for independence.

Yet, Bolvar expressed his condence that in Venezuela, as in all indepen-

dent Spanish America, the white race, despite being a demographic minority,

possessed intellectual capacities that gives it a relative equality with the

majority made up of Indians, blacks and the racially mixed.8 Moreover, he

already foresaw the union of New Granada and Venezuela in a nation called

Colombia, under a British-inspired political system halfway between dema-

gogic anarchies and monocratic tyrannies , similar to the semi-monarchical

republic he would propose in 1826.9 Despite these arguments, in 1815

Bolvar failed to obtain British help. Only poor and ostracised independent

Haiti, which he visited in 1816 and where President Alexandre Petion ex-

emplied mulatto military and political leadership, responded to his request

6 D. Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia : A Nation in Spite of Itself (Berkeley, 1993), p. 58.7 See, for example, Simon Bolvar to [ Jefe de las Fuerzas de Tierra de S. M. B.], 17 June1814, in S. Bolvar, Obras completas, V. Lecuna (ed.) (La Habana, 1947), vol. 1, pp. 979.

8 El Americano [Bolvar] to Senor redactor o editor de la Gaceta Real de Jamaica ,Kingston, [ ?] Sep. 1815, in Bolvar, Obras completas, vol. 1, pp. 17881. Although manyhistorians have analysed this letter and the Letter from Jamaica, few have taken intoaccount that their addressees were British and that one of their main goals was to showthat Central and South Americans longed for peace but, as their North American pre-decessors, they could not win the war against their colonial oppressors without the helpof other European powers (see, for example, Ernesto Archiga Cordoba, Una nuevapropuesta de discusion en torno a la Carta de Jamaica , Cuadernos Americanos, vol. 58,Nueva epoca [ JulyAug. 1996], pp. 2745).

9 Bolvar, Contestacion de un americano meridional a un caballero de esta isla [Carta deJamaica], 6 Sep. 1815, in Bolvar, Obras completas, vol. 1, pp. 15974. On Colombia, Bolvarwrote : Its government could imitate the English government ; with the dierence thatinstead of a king, there will be an elective executive power, at the most for life, but neverhereditary, if one wants a republic ; a hereditary legislative house or senate, which willmediate between the popular waves and the governments thunderbolts during the pol-itical storms, and a legislative body, of free election, without other restrictions than thoseof the lower house of England (p. 171).

450 Aline Helg

for material support.10 Petions help did not appease Bolvars racial con-

cerns. He realised that only with the full support of the lower classes, which

in Venezuela and in large regions of New Granada were made up of people

of African descent, could the independence envisaged by members of the

native white elite be achieved. At the same time, however, both the Haitian

Revolution and his experience in Venezuela made him doubt the nal mo-

tives of the pardos and freedmen ghting under the banner of independence;

he believed that for many of them race was more important than the nation.

This doubt, added to Bolvars desire for absolute leadership, could be deadly

for those who stood in his way. As early as 1817, Bolvar had the upper-class

pardo Manuel Piar executed for challenging his supremacy and allegedly

mobilising blacks against whites, but he used rapid military advancement

to tame his two other challengers, the aristocrat Santiago Marino and the

lower-class but white llanero Jose Antonio Paez.11

From March 1821 to August 1826 Bolvar was in Ecuador, Peru and

Bolivia, but he continued to express his concerns about what he called

pardocracia (the rule of the pardos) to his correspondents in Venezuela and

New Granada. One of the principal objects of his concern was Cartagena,

capital of Magdalena department, where Jose Padilla, the popular pardo

general, was committed to making racial equality a practical reality not only

in law, but also in the public and private sphere.

Born to a lower-class family in Riohacha in 1778, Jose Padilla had acquired

a broad experience as a sailor on the Caribbean Sea and while spending

three years in a penitentiary in England following his capture at the battle of

Trafalgar. In November 1811, after his return to Caribbean New Granada,

he joined Cartagenas radical movement. Comprised of the popular classes of

predominantly African descent led by the elite creoles Gabriel and German

Gutierrez de Pineres, this movement forced the proclamation of the prov-

inces independence on the more reformist and aristocratic faction in

power. From 1812 to 1814, as the radicals controlled Cartagena, Padilla par-

ticipated in the war against the royalists, supporting Bolvar against the

reformist commander of the regional troops. When in early 1815 the reform-

ists regained power in Cartagena, Padilla continued to follow Bolvars

leadership, which led to his imprisonment by the Venezuelan aristocrat, Gen.

Mariano Montilla, then among Bolvars foes. After Spains reconquest,

Padilla took refuge in Haiti. He joined Bolvars expedition from Les Cayes

and fought in Venezuela, reportedly witnessing the execution of the pardo

10 P. M. McKinley, Pre-Revolutionary Caracas : Politics, Economy, and Society, 17771811(Cambridge, 1985), pp. 1714.

11 Bolvar, A los pueblos de Venezuela, 5 Aug. 1817, in Bolvar, Obras completas, vol. 2,pp. 11016; J. E. Rodrguez O., The Independence of Spanish America (Cambridge, 1998),pp. 1878.


Piar. He became a hero in Cartagena for his decisive role in liberating it from

Spain in 1821. In the next two years, together with the newly committed

Montilla, Padilla brought independence to Gran Colombias Caribbean

Coast, including Santa Marta. His military career culminated at Maracaibo

Bay in 1823, when he won the naval battle against Spain that sealed the

independence of Venezuela. As a result, Padilla gained broad popularity in

Caribbean New Granada. However, in a decision due partly to the fear of

pardocracia, the government promoted Montilla, not Padilla, to the position

of commander-in-chief of the department of Magdalena, despite the formers

previous opposition to Bolvar. The personal rivalry between the two men

dating back to Padillas imprisonment in 1815 increased, and was exacer-

bated by race and class dierences.12

Montilla suspected pardos and radical patriots of stirring up the issue of

race and repeatedly asked Vice-President Santander to remove Padilla from

Cartagena for purportedly threatening public order.13 Simultaneously, the

citys white aristocracy did not miss an opportunity to humiliate Padilla,

notably by neglecting to invite him to private balls. They alleged that his

separation from his legal wife and cohabitation with a mulatto woman ex-

cluded him from the category of respectable paterfamilias. To aggravate

matters, in 1824 the government in Bogota rewarded Padilla for his triumph

at Maracaibo only with a promotion to general and an annual pension of

3,000 pesos. Not fooled, Padilla bitterly compared the high position other

military men had obtained as reward for their services with his own rec-

ompense, which he qualied as the pay of a mercenary . As an ocer, he

wanted to conclude his career with honour , not with a pension.14 In the

end, he was appointed to commander of the navy in Cartagena, a position

below his expectations and in which he was doomed to clash with Montilla.

In November 1824, in response to defamation by an anonymous

paterfamilias , General Padilla issued an incendiary broadside, To the

Respectable Public of Cartagena, in which he denounced

[the white aristocrats] who each day shamelessly increase their attacks and under-mine the holy edice of the peoples freedom and equality in order to build on itsruins the foundation of ambition and replace the republican ways with their old

12 Uribe White, Padilla, pp. 65133, 194278, 306 ; Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, pp. 2568,31924. For vivid descriptions of Padillas popularity in Cartagena, see Uribe White,Padilla, pp. 1812; and among the population of the Magdalena River, see C. A. Gossel-man,Viaje por Colombia, 1825 y 1826, trans. Ann Christien Pereira (Bogota, 1987), pp. 98100.The full name of Padilla was Jose Prudencio Padilla, but he signed his correspondence Jose Padilla . He is sometimes referred to as a zambo rather than a pardo.

13 Montilla to Santander, 10 and 30 April 1822, 20 Aug. 1822, 20 Feb. 1823, in M. Montilla,General de division Mariano Montilla : homenaje en el bicentenario de su nacimiento, 17821982(Caracas, 1982), vol. 2, pp. 9223, 927, 943, 969.

14 Padilla to Santander, 30 Aug. 1824, in Uribe White, Padilla, pp. 3013.

452 Aline Helg

privileges and the exclusive domination of a small and miserable portion of familiesover the great majority of the peoples.

Furthermore, he warned that the sword that I brandished against the king

of Spain, this sword with which I gave days of glory to the fatherland, this

same sword will support me against anyone who tries to lower my class and

degrade my person.15

This declaration oers a rare insight into Padillas vision of equality. To

him, if the republic had banned privileges of birth and race, only service to

the fatherland should matter in the new social hierarchy. And because of

his outstanding military achievements, he deserved his superior rank and

the respect due to it, regardless of his lower-class origin and pardo race.

However, even if he considered himself superior to his fellow citizens, in

his view he was not only an individual of republican merits but also part of

a colonial socio-racial category the pardo class. Any aront to him was an

aront to all pardos and, by extension, to the republic they had helped

to build more than had the white elite. With this argument, Padilla openly

deed the socio-racial hierarchy inherited from Spanish colonialism and

threatened to rally the entire pardo class, regardless of economic or military

standing, behind him.

Padillas vision of equality clashed with the position of the cartagenero

aristocrats surrounding Montilla, who perceived further demands by pardos,

such as equal advancement with whites and equality in private relations, as

proofs of arrogance and violations of the private sphere. Padilla was also out

of line with many free men of African descent who accepted the ocial

egalitarian discourse. By using the colonial racial category of pardos to make

democratic claims, he could fairly have been criticised for being a man of

the past who clung to the Spanish caste system. Moreover, by announcing

that he would use his sword to defend the equal rights and full integration

of his pardo class at all levels, Padilla formulated the very scenario that, since

the late 1790s, colonial and early independent authorities had predicted

would transform Caribbean New Granada into another Haiti. In other

words, when Padilla began to use race as a mobilising idea, his detractors

could easily raise the spectre of the Haitian Revolution and accuse him of

preparing a race war. Indeed, the legal equality contained in the constitution

and the scarecrow of pardocracia prohibited people of African descent in

general from making demands as pardos.

Padillas broadside sent shock waves as far away as Santander in Bogota

and Bolvar, still at war in Peru, prompting an exchange of letters in 1825

15 General Jose Padilla, Al respectable publico de Cartagena, 15 Nov. 1824, in AHNC, RE, AR,fondo XI, caja 88, vol. 170, fols. 12526.


between the two white generals about the threat of pardocracia. Bolvar saw

Padillas protest as representative of

the disposition that [Padilla] has toward the government and the system_ I thinkthat this aair very much deserves the attention of the government, not to thrashbut to take measures that spare in the future the horrible disasters that Padillahimself foresees. Legal equality is not enough for the spirit the people have, as theywant absolute equality, in the public and the domestic areas alike ; and next theywill want pardocracia, which is their natural and unique propensity, in order to thenexterminate the privileged class.16

Bolvar did not dene the measures he estimated to be necessary then but

he expressed his conviction that equality and by extension, the power of

prominent pardos should have limits, otherwise people of African descent

would dominate and massacre whites. Far less critical of Padilla, Santander

responded to Bolvar : I dont know how the germ of pardocracia could be

destroyed. Nothing pleases [the pardos] and everything annoys them. They

want everything exclusively ; and I must be fair with Padilla, who until now

is among those who least spread scandal .17

Nevertheless, Padillas declaration of November 1824 failed to mobilise

Cartagenas free population of colour. Moreover, it did not diminish his

popularity among the enfranchised citizens who in February 1825 elected

him a senator of the republic for the department of Magdalena. In August, as

a member of Cartagenas electoral council, Padilla took part in Gran Co-

lombias presidential election. Like almost all electors in the nation, he

re-elected Bolvar to the presidency. But unlike most of Magdalenas electors,

who voted for the native cartagenero, Finance Secretary Jose Mara Castillo y

Rada, Padilla also cast his vote for Santander, and so helped to secure the

vice-presidents more contested re-election.18 As a result, Santander and

Bolvar expressed to each other their renewed condence in the pardo leader.

Santander wrote to Bolvar that Padilla was one of the most enthusiastic

friends of the government, who idolises me but you above all .19 Bolvar did

not hesitate to characterise Padilla as the most important man of Colombia

and added, I like him very much for his record of service and his adhesion

to me. May God keep him in this feeling. 20

However, Bolvars optimism was shortlived. In January 1826, Gen. Jose

Antonio Paez used troops to enforce enlistment in the militia among the

male inhabitants of Caracas. A majority in Gran Colombias senate promptly

16 Bolvar to Santander, 7 April 1825, in Bolvar, Obras completas, vol. 1, p. 1076.17 Santander to Bolvar, 21 July 1825, in F. de Paula Santander, Cartas SantanderBolvar

(Bogota, 1990), vol. 5, p. 16.18 Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, p. 155 ; Bushnell, Santander Regime, pp. 31921.19 Santander to Bolvar, 6 Oct. and 6 Nov. 1825, in ibid., pp. 60, 1012.20 Bolvar to Santander, 27 Oct. 1825, in Bolvar, Obras completas, vol. 1, p. 1222.

454 Aline Helg

voted to summon Paez to stand trial in Bogota, which Padilla and some

others opposed. In April, Paez deed Santanders government and launched

a massive rebellion in Venezuela. From Peru, Bolvar began to fear that

Padilla would emulate him in Cartagena and became convinced that in

Venezuela and Caribbean New Granada the root of the problem was that

pardocracia was gaining ground.21 Increasingly, race, conated with class,

dominated Bolvars social thinking. He lamented the abominable com-

posite of these hunting tigers who came to America to spill her blood and

breed with the victims before slaughtering them, to later mix the bastard

fruits of these unions with the fruits of the slaves uprooted from Africa. With

such physical mixes, with such moral elements , one could not establish

laws and principles, but only prepare the beautiful ideal of Haiti , he as-

serted. However, it was impossible to return to the order Spain had main-

tained for so long or to build a new order through more laws, and it was

dangerous to entrust it only to the army. We will have Guinea and more

Guinea ; and I am not joking, those who will escape with their white faces

will be very lucky .22

The Liberator also had growing doubts about the success of a republican

government in Gran Colombia and the civil administration of Santander. In

his view, only strong military leaders caudillos could prevent the end of

Gran Colombia and the rise of new Haitis. But this presented him with an

irreconcilable dilemma, as he believed that the African-descended lower

class would only obey a leader born into their own class, but he refused to

put any mulatto or black in high positions of power, for fear of pardocracia.23

Thus, to the surprise of many, he perceived Paez as Venezuelas lesser evil :

although he was a rough lower-class llanero, he was white, popular, and

supported by a portion of the aristocracy. However, Bolvar could not nd

an adequate leader for Caribbean New Granada : Montilla was from the

white elite but without a massive following; Padilla, a lower-class pardo with

broad popularity who agitated for racial equality. As Bolvar wrote to San-

tander, Both seem very devoted to me: the rst one cannot [do] anything;

the second can [do] everything. 24 As a result, Bolvar began to profess that

only by adopting the semi-monarchical constitution he had designed for

Bolivia, would Gran Colombia and Peru cure themselves from all the ills

typical of the young, multiracial and mostly illiterate Spanish-American

nations. Bolvars pan-Andean constitutional project consisted of a feder-

ation of authoritarian republics placed under the supreme authority of

21 Bolvar to Antonio Jose Sucre, 12 May 1826, and Bolvar to Santander, 7 June 1826, inibid., pp. 1323, 1365. 22 Bolvar to Santander, 8 July 1826, in ibid., pp. 13901.

23 Bolvar to Santander, 7, 13, and 23 June 1826, in ibid., pp. 1365, 1371, 1379.24 Bolvar to Santander, 7 May 1826, in ibid., p. 1322.


a president for life (himself) who was to choose his successor, as sketched

from Jamaica in 1815. The project guaranteed equality and banned all privi-

leges as well as slavery, but limited surage to those who were literate, paid

taxes, and had an occupation.25 It violated the 1821 constitution, which

authorised no revision before 1831.

Bolvar sent from Lima the caraqueno Antonio Leocadio Guzman, well

known for his role in Paezs rebellion and his anti-Santander feelings, with

the mission of rallying the military and civic leaders of several cities behind

his project of semi-monarchical constitution.26 Not surprisingly, Guzman

carried two letters of instructions from Bolvar to Cartagena: one for Padilla,

the other for Montilla. In eect, as Bolvar increasingly suspected Padilla of

promoting pardocracia and being in sympathy with Paez, he began to consider

Montilla, for whom he previously had little esteem, as his most dependable

ally in the region.27

Despite the profound enmity between Montilla and Padilla, both facili-

tated the task of Guzman when he arrived in Cartagena in September 1826.

Within a couple of days, the town council and male heads of families had

been pressured into signing the resolution against the legal government of

Santander concocted by Guzman, who proudly reported to Bolvar the citys

complete adherence to his dictatorship.28 However, the correspondence

of several cartageneros to Santander illustrates the deep divisions within the

native elite. It also shows the limits of Padillas popularity and how the fear

of being accused of promoting pardocracia restricted him. In Padillas own

words, the letter from Bolvar left him no choice but to listen to the ideas

and to trust the Liberator .29 He told Santander : If I had not taken this

step, maybe Montilla would have been the cause of the spilling of many

torrents of blood, because should he have sought to launch [a rebellion] like

Paez in Caracas, I would not have allowed it, and you can see how the action

25 Bolvar to Santander, 27 Dec. 1825 and 13 June 1826, in ibid., pp. 12524, 1371; Bolvar toSucre, 12 May 1826, in ibid., pp. 13234; Lievano, Bolvar, p. 462. See also note 9.

26 Bolvar to Rafael Urdaneta, Cristobal Mendoza, Francisco Javier Yanes, Jose Padilla,Mariano Montilla, Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, Juan Paz del Castillo, and Pedro BricenoMendez, 68 Aug. 1826, in Bolvar, Obras completas, vol. 1, pp. 140815. See also Bolvar toPaez, 4 Aug. 1826, in ibid., pp. 14068. On Antonio Leocadio Guzman and his appreci-ation of Bolvars constitutional project, see Jaime Duarte French, Poder y poltica : Colombia,18101827 (Bogota, 1980), pp. 46872, 4805.

27 See Montillas correspondence with Bolvar, in Montilla, General de division, vol. 1,pp. 21749, 56577; Padilla to Santander, 20 Aug. 1826, and Padilla to Paez, 29 July 1826,in Archivo Santander, ed. Ernesto Restrepo Tirado (Bogota, 191332), vol. 15, pp. 12529.

28 Antonio L. Guzman to Bolvar, 1 Oct. 1826, in D. F. OLeary, Memorias del General OLearypublicadas por su hijo, Simon B. OLeary, por orden del gobierno de Venezuela y bajo los auspicios de supresidente, general Guzman Blanco (Caracas, 18741914), vol. 2, pp. 35455.

29 Padilla to Santander, 2 Oct. 1826, in Archivo Santander, vol. 15, pp. 22932.

456 Aline Helg

would have gone.30 Yet, the ideas contained in the public act Padilla

supported in September 1826 sharply contradicted his 1824 broadside. The

act made no references to equality and democracy but stressed the central

role of Bolvar as the father of the Fatherland. Implicitly reassuming the

position of king of Spain, Bolvar was the common centre that united all

interests, neutralised all oppositions, and irradiated all virtues. To be national

was to follow him.31

In September 1826 Bolvar left Peru and arrived in Bogota two months

later to assume the special powers reserved by the constitution to the presi-

dent in case of a national crisis. He promulgated extended legislation to rell

the treasury and reduce the public service and the armed forces. Most

unpopular among these measures was his decision to restore the colonial

alcabala (sale tax) and head tax, which he xed at three pesos on every male

over the age of fourteen, regardless of status. Discontent grew, and violence

broke out in Venezuela, prompting Bolvars departure to negotiate with

General Paez. In many regions, federalism was on the rise, and rumours of

secession multiplied.32 In Andean New Granada, many cities mobilised

against Bolvars constitutional project and issued acts supporting Vice-

President Santander and the 1821 constitution. In Bogota, the conict be-

tween Bolvars supporters and those of Santander escalated.

Thus, Cartagenas unconditional support for the Liberator was increas-

ingly at odds with most of New Granada. The citys bolivarista publications

and polemics turned more and more aggressive against Santander and

his factious followers.33 Despite the vigilance of Montilla, there too pro-

Santander sentiments were gaining ground among some ocers and

cartageneros. In March 1827, the British consul, a rm advocate of Bolvar,

worried about some intrigues to seduce the 4,000 undernourished and un-

paid troops garrisoned in the city to favour views which are called consti-

tutional .34 Nevertheless, Cartagenas unity behind the Liberator lasted

through most of 1827. When in July Bolvar stopped in Cartagena on his way

back from Venezuela, the Army and the population welcomed him warmly.

30 Cited in Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, p. 189.31 Acta de la municipalidad de Cartagena , 29 Sep. 1826, in Efemerides y anales del estado de

Bolvar [ed. Manuel Ezequiel Corrales], (Bogota, 1889), vol. 2, pp. 3368. See also Fiestasnacionales en diciembre de 1826 , Gaceta de Cartagena de Colombia, 31 Dec. 1826, in ibid.,pp. 3434; La Lanza Llanera (Cartagena), 1826 (n.d.), AHNC, RE, AR, fondo XI, caja 88,vol. 170, fols. 14142.

32 J. M. Macpherson to Henry Clay, 24 March 1827, NA, DCC, roll 1 ; Bushnell, SantanderRegime, pp. 33843.

33 For examples of anti-Santander publications in Cartagena, see AHNC, RE, AR, fondo XI,caja 88, vol. 170, fols. 14459.

34 Edward Watts to George Canning, 27 March 1827, and Watts to John Bidwell, 29 March1827, in PRO, FO 1845.


Bolvar boasted to Paez : I have met a very enthusiastic people [and] two

excellent friends in Generals Montilla and Padilla.35 The navy, despite

Bolvars attempts to reduce it, hosted a sumptuous banquet for him at

Padillas cramped home.36

Ceding to the bolivarista pressure, in August 1827 the national congress,

controlled by the santanderistas, agreed to hold a convention in Ocana on

2 March 1828 to revise the 1821 constitution. The election of the delegates to

the convention was set for November, but the congress, in order to weaken

the bolivaristas, decided strictly to enforce the surage requirements imposed

by the 1821 constitution, disenfranchising soldiers and lower-ranking ocers

in active service who until then had been discreetly allowed to vote. As a

result, the election produced a minority of delegates in favour of Bolvar,

prompting rumours that he would launch a coup detat.37

By late 1827 support for democratic institutions became vocal even in

Cartagena. Generals Padilla and Montilla resumed their dispute, despite the

Liberators call for order.38 The bolivaristas showed increasing nervousness,

particularly after Montilla, their candidate to the convention, failed to be

elected. By early February 1828, for Padilla, the salvation of the Fatherland

had ceased to depend on Bolvar and his authoritarian constitution. To

Santanders great satisfaction, Padilla now backed the santanderista delegates

to the convention who would defend a freedom guaranteed by a popular

representative system.39 In response, the pro-Bolvar sectors led by Montilla

had the military chiefs and many ocers in the ground units issue an Ex-

posicion to the convention in Ocana that blamed the misery and shrinking

prerogatives of the army on the civilian government of Santander and backed

Bolvars strong power.40 Some ocers who refused to sign the document

were threatened with transfer to remote posts. Padilla stood up for them and,

as the commander of the navy, prohibited the ocers under his authority to

sign the manifesto. On 29 February 1828 the two parties clashed in a tavern ;

the defenders of the civil government called the champions of Bolvar

servile , and the latter called the advocates of Santander factious . Padilla

oered to defend those who had refused to sign with his sword if necessary.

35 Bolvar to Paez, 11 July 1827, in Bolvar, Obras completas, vol. 2, p. 141.36 For a description of the banquet at Padillas home, see Aurora de Colombia (Cartagena),

2 Aug. 1827. On Bolvars policy toward the Navy in 182627, see Torres, Almirante JosePadilla, pp. 1613, 1802, 188.

37 Ley , 29 Aug. 1827, in Colombia, Codicacion nacional, vol. 3, p. 307 ; P. Moreno de Angel,Santander : Biografa (Bogota, 1989), pp. 393408 ; Bushnell, Santander Regime, pp. 26970.

38 Bolvar to Montilla, 6 Nov. 1827, in Bolvar, Obras completas, vol. 2, p. 194.39 Padilla to Santander, 9 Feb. 1828, in Archivo Santander, vol. 17, pp. 2456; Santander to

Juan Madiedo, 10 and 17 March 1828, in ibid., pp. 260, 286.40 Exposicion dirigida a la Gran Convencion por la division del Magdalena, 25 Feb. 1828,

AHNC, RE, AR, fondo XI, caja 88, vol. 170, fols. 16167.

458 Aline Helg

Cartagenas acting commander-in-chief, Jose Montes, found the situation

explosive enough to ask for intervention from Montilla, who was in his

hacienda in Turbaco, fteen miles from Cartagena, but whom Bolvar had

authorised to assume unlimited power whenever necessary. Instead, Montilla

chose to let the conict grow.41 By late February, when Bolvar had taken

the rst steps of his dictatorship, suspicions among santanderistas that he

would cancel the convention had escalated.42

On 2 March 1828 Padilla rallied some ocers of African descent and told

them that he was leading the people to protect their freedom and the

convention because if the crown [i.e., Bolvars constitution] was to be-

come reality , they would kick us for being pardos.43 Padilla also attempted

to mobilise a lower-ranking pardo ocer by asking him whether he could

not see that he had not advanced with so many years of service and that

tomorrow they would put above him any little white candidate as ocer,

as it was happening .44 Rumours began to spread that Padilla was arming

a large number of individuals in Getseman, Cartagenas predominantly

black and mulatto suburb. On 5 March some ocers in the pro-Bolvar

artillery shouted Death to General Santander ! Padilla devised with Montes

a way to stop the crisis. Montes resigned, and a commission nominated

Juan Antonio Gutierrez as the commander-in-chief. The acting intendant of

Magdalena, Vicente Ucros, remained in his post. Simultaneously, still from

Turbaco, Montilla assumed the extraordinary faculties given to him by

Bolvar to restore the public tranquillity threatened by a spirit of faction.45

In order to precipitate the downfall of Padilla, Montilla ordered all the mili-

tary units to pull out of Cartagena at 2:00 a.m. on 6 March and to transfer

to Turbaco. By so doing, he lured Padilla into taking charge with the intent

of accusing him of launching a coup and promoting the long-awaited race

war in the Caribbean Coast.46

41 Montilla to secretario de estado del despacho del interior, 7 March 1828, in Efemerides [ed.Corrales], vol. 2, pp. 35961 ; Padilla to director de la comision de la Gran Convencion,12 March 1828, in Gaceta de Colombia (Bogota), no. 342, 1 May 1828, facsimile edition(Bogota, 1973). 42 Decretos del Libertador (Caracas, 1961), vol. 3, pp. 2732.

43 Proceso por los tumultos de Cartagena levantado por el general Mariano Mon-tilla_ contra el general Padilla y los ociales que se negaron a rmar la representacionmilitar contra la convencion de Ocana , 12 March 1828, in Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla,p. 331. 44 Proceso por los tumultos , p. 334.

45 Montilla to secretario de estado, in Efemerides [ed. Corrales], vol. 2, pp. 3612. See alsoPadilla to director de la comision, 12 March 1828 ; Apelacion a la razon (Bogota, 1828),in Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, p. 348 ; Jose Montes to Montilla, n.d., in Montilla, General dedivision, vol. 1, pp. 38890.

46 La Cotorra (Cartagena), 23 April 1828 ; Apelacion a la razon , pp. 34551; Manifestacionque Manuel Perez de Recuero hace a sus conciudadanos, Cartagena, 20 July 1831, BNC,SP, no. 573; Otero, Vida del Almirante, pp. 918; Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, p. 209.


As expected by Montilla, Padilla immediately mobilised the navy and the

soldiers who were left in the city and assigned them to key guard posts.

Allegedly responding to popular pressure, he then assumed the military

command of the department, a decision he knew was illegal but he thought

necessary to bring the besieging general [Montilla] to reason.47 According

to Cartagenas municipal council and the British consul, Padilla acted only

to secure the citys tranquillity, and there were no thefts or disorders on

6 March and the following days.48

On 6 March all cartageneromen were called to a meeting in which the issues

of liberty and equality were at the forefront. Padilla declared that Montillas

goal was to destroy the 1821 constitution and to dissolve the Ocana con-

vention, and he committed himself to defend the peoples freedom with

his sword.49 However, he said nothing in favour of slave emancipation or

the Haitian Revolution. As recognised by a pro-Bolvar newspaper, Padilla

never accepted various propositions of plundering, contributions, and ex-

termination made to him.50 In fact, according to all the declarants in the

investigation opened by Montilla a few days later, the most vocal activist

and Padillas guide was Ignacio Munoz, a radical white lawyer who had

played a leading role during the province of Cartagenas First Independence

(181015).51 Munoz told the assembled men that he wished for the death of

Montilla because the latter wanted to subjugate the rest of the Colombian

population by tyranny, principally by the Bolivian Charter ; that the latter

would be of no advantage for the second class [the pardos], because they

were the ones who had fought on the battleelds to suppress the tyranny ;

that Munoz harangued General Padilla that in no way should he yield but

carry on the ght until the ultimatum. One witness declared that Munoz

had asked the militiamen whether they did not recognise [Padilla] as general

commander and intendant, whether they wanted to be slave or free .52 Not

a single declarant stated that Padilla had mobilised the population of colour

against the whites. But two whites testied that on 6 March the pardo Captain

Damian Berro had told them that Jose Ignacio Ibarra, a stranger_ ofAfrican colour , stirred up the racial question, even saying that one should

47 Padilla to director de la comision, 12 March 1828.48 Apelacion a la razon , p. 350. See also Watts to Earl of Dudley, 7 March 1828, PRO, FO

1857, 11318; El Calamar (Cartagena), 13 March 1828, in AHNC, RE, AR, fondo XI,caja 77, vol. 5.

49 Proceso por los tumultos , pp. 329, 333, 334. 50 El Amanuense, 16 March 1828.51 On Cartagenas First Independence, see A. Munera, El fracaso de la nacion. Region, clase y raza

en el Caribe colombiano (17171810) (Bogota, 1998) ; A. Helg, The Limits of Equality : FreePeople of Color and Slaves during the First Independence of Cartagena, Colombia(181015) , Slavery and Abolition, vol. 20, no. 2 (1999), pp. 130.

52 Proceso por los tumultos , pp. 333, 337, 338.

460 Aline Helg

give the signal to behead the whites . However, when Berro gave his

deposition, he said that Ibarra had only expressed his fear of a war against

whites, which would force him to escape for being at risk as a foreigner.53

On 7 March the municipal council of Cartagena refused to declare Padilla

Magdalenas new intendant. It was decided to send two emissaries to nego-

tiate a settlement with Montilla : the santanderista Munoz and the bolivarista

Juan de Francisco Martn, a rich merchant of Spanish descent who had been

a royalist during the First Independence and in 1824 had humiliated Padilla.54

The mission, however, was to no avail. Montilla restated that he had assumed

extraordinary powers and began to redirect the troops to Cartagena.55 The

next day, tensions in the city reportedly escalated to the point that some

men of African descent were talking about killing whites.56 Simultaneously,

Padilla realised that his supporters had abandoned him. He returned the

military command of Cartagena to Jose Antonio Pineres and left with Munoz

and a few others for Mompox, on the Magdalena River.57 In a letter to the

US consul, Padilla declared that he had left Cartagena in order to prevent

the spilling of blood that Montilla would have prompted if he had attacked

him.58 When the troops under Montilla re-entered Cartagena, the supporters

of Padilla oered no resistance. Several ed; others were arrested and

imprisoned.59

As soon as he reached Mompox, Padilla wrote to Bolvar, blaming Car-

tagenas events on Montilla.60 In the same breath, however, he denounced

Montillas misuse of power to the president of the convention in Ocana,

oering to help defend the convention against any attack by bolivaristas.61

Padilla also sent an insulting letter to Montilla that instructed him to leave

Cartagena in peace and return to his native Venezuela.62 Nevertheless, once

he arrived in Ocana Padilla only obtained passive support from the pro-

Santander delegates. He also failed to get practical advice from those who

backed Bolvar. Quite disillusioned, he returned to Mompox, but the tight

security ordered in the city by Montilla forced him to continue to Cartagena,

where he arrived on 1 April 1828. He was immediately arrested, accused of

planning a race war in the city, and imprisoned in Bogota. There he was

53 Ibid., pp. 32730. 54 Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla, pp. 1458.55 El Amanuense o Rejistro poltico y militar (Cartagena), 16 March 1828, in NA, DCC, roll 1.56 Proceso por los tumultos , pp. 331, 333.57 Padilla to director de la comision, 12 March 1828 ; Vicente Ucros, Al publico, Cartagena,

19 May 1832, BNC, SS, Sala 1, no. 12881, pieza 32.58 Padilla to consul de los Estados Unidos de la America del Norte, 9 March 1828, in NA,

DCC, roll 1. 59 Otero, Vida del Almirante, pp. 978.60 Padillas 12 March 1828 letter to Bolvar is partly cited in Torres, Almirante Jose Padilla,

pp. 21415. See also J. Posada Gutierrez, Memorias historico-polticas (Bogota, 1929), vol. 1,p. 128. 61 Padilla to director de la comision, 12 March 1828.

62 Padilla to Montilla, 13 March 1828, in Montilla, General de division, vol. 1, pp. 3945.


fatally entangled in a santanderista conspiracy against Bolvar. On 25 Sep-

tember 1828, the night of the attempted murder of the Liberator, con-

spirators entered Padillas jail, killed his guard, gave him the latters sword,

and ran away with him. After turning himself in, Padilla was swiftly tried

and sentenced to death, with thirteen other defendants, for a conspiracy he

did not plan and a murder he did not commit. The next day, on 2 October,

a deant General Padilla was publicly stripped of his rank and shot, and his

body displayed hanging from the gallows. The presumed leader of the con-

spiracy, the white creole Santander, was reprieved and exiled.63 The tragic

conclusion of the life of Jose Padilla illustrates again the double standard

that guided the Liberator. From 1826 to 1828 Bolvar pardoned and nego-

tiated with the white llanero Jose Antonio Paez, despite the fact that the latter

headed a full-edged rebellion of Venezuela against the legal government

in Bogota, but he executed the pardo Padilla for a three-day bloodless coup in

Cartagena.

Still, Padillas fate also raises important questions. The most immediate

one is about the leading role played by Ignacio Munoz, of dubious pro-

Santander credentials, in the radicalisation of Padillas brief coup and ensuing

downfall, which has puzzled witnesses of the events, contemporaries and

historians alike. 1828 was not the rst time that Munoz had distinguished

himself as a popular leader. During the First Independence of Cartagena, he

had mobilised on several occasions large numbers of Cartagenas free men

of colour behind the radical Gutierrez de Pineres brothers. After the Spanish

reconquest in 1815 he took refuge in Les Cayes, Haiti, from where he par-

ticipated with Padilla in an expedition to re-liberate Venezuela. He was a

skilful manipulator of crowds, whom he harangued like a preacher .64 That

he seized the opportunity to act again in 1828 behind or perhaps against

Padilla is not surprising. Less understandable is the fact that Padilla ac-

cepted Munozs support, when the two men had a long history of petty

denunciation and physical aggression against each other, which Montilla had

used to denigrate Padilla. Simultaneously, Padilla had repeatedly asked San-

tander to remove Munoz, this very evil man, from Cartagena.65 As late as

February 1827 Padilla had warned Santander that Munoz was in jail for

having attempted to incite Cartagenas troops to rebel against himself and

63 E. Ortega Ricaurte (ed.), Documentos sobre el proceso de la conspiracion del 25 de Septiembre de 1828(Bogota, 1942), pp. 1315, 249. See also J. M. Cordovez Moure, Reminiscencias de Santafe deBogota, ed. Elisa Mujica (Madrid, 1957), pp. 7323, 741.

64 Proceso por los tumultos , p. 337 ; D. Bossa Herazo, La vida novelesca e infortunada del doctorIgnacio Munoz , paladn de la libertad (Cartagena, 1961), p. 9.

65 Padilla to Santander, 10 May 1825, in Archivo Santander, vol. 11, pp. 3556; Montillato Santander, 20 Sep. 1825, in Montilla, General de division, vol. 2, pp. 99192 ; Torres,Almirante Jose Padilla, pp. 14950.

462 Aline Helg

Montilla but that he probably would not be properly punished.66 In March

1828, Munoz not only radicalised and racialised Padillas movement in

Cartagena, he also represented him at the meeting with Montilla, where,

according to a pro-Bolvar newspaper, he sold out Padilla .67 Furthermore,

although eeing with Padilla, when Munoz was caught in June 1828 he made

a sworn declaration that provided the principal piece of evidence against

Padilla until the latters entanglement in the attempted murder of Bolvar.

He accused Padilla of being the leader, together with several delegates to

the convention, of a broad armed conspiracy to prevent the adoption of the

Bolivian constitution and to separate New Granada from Gran Colombia.

Padillas intention upon leaving Ocana, Munoz claimed, was to stir up rst

Mompox then Getseman and the navy in Cartagena, but he failed to nd

backing.68

Indeed, a more fundamental question is why the popular Padilla failed

to mobilise Cartagena in early March 1828. Why was the disliked General

Montilla able to restore his control over the city and to arrest Padilla there?

According to the British consul, Padilla plotted to overthrow all the sup-

porters of Bolvar in Magdalena, conding in the strength of his own party

among the people of colour, los Pardos as he terms them. But they

deserted him.69 Other sources conrm that as early as 7 March Padilla ac-

cused of apathy the people he could not move, and of treason the ocers

who misleadingly had oered him the cooperation of their units .70 As a

close associate wrote to Bolvar after meeting with Padilla in Ocana, Re-

garding Cartagena, I will say that Your Excellency has formed a very exag-

gerated idea of the event. Padillas steps in this city and the behaviour he

observed with me show, without any doubt, that he has no party at all.71

In fact, only a close examination of Cartagenas society and economy in

the 1820s allows for an understanding of the isolation of Padilla in 1828. In

the late 1820s, Cartagena still suered from the eects of the wars of inde-

pendence and the deadly siege imposed by the Spanish general Pablo Morillo

in 1815, which left the city partly destroyed with the loss of about one-

third of its inhabitants.72 According to the census of 1835, Cartagenas total

66 Padilla to Santander, 25 Feb. 1827, in Archivo Santander, vol. 16, pp. 2456.67 La Cotorra, 23 April 1828. For a later conrmation of this accusation, see Ucros, Al

publico, BNC, SS, Sala 1, no. 12881, pieza 32.68 Urdaneta to Montilla, 28 July 1828, in Archivo Santander, vol. 17, p. 374 ; Declaracion del

senor doctor Ignacio Munoz , 7 June 1828, in OLeary,Memorias del General OLeary, vol. 26,pp. 2923. 69 Watts to Earl of Dudley, 8 March 1828, PRO, FO 1857, 11819.

70 El Amanuense, 16 March 1828.71 Daniel OLeary to Bolvar, 5 April 1828, in Cordovez, Reminiscencias de Santafe, p. 693.72 Reminiscencias del sitio de Cartagena, hechas por el esclarecido ciudadano Lino de

Pombo, 8 April 1862, in [M. E. Corrales, ed.], Documentos para la historia de la provincia


population reached only 11,929, in contrast to an estimated 17,600 in 1809.73

For many residents in 1828 the memory of the horrors of the 1815 siege

and Spanish reconquest still served as a deterrent to any risky movement.

Cartagena also had lost the privileged military status and budget it enjoyed

during Spanish colonialism. The port citys monopoly of the foreign trade

of Colombia came to an end with independence. All attempts by cartagenero

authorities and merchants to restore Cartagenas predominant trade rights

were hampered by their inability to repair the canal that linked it to the

Magdalena River, New Granadas main waterway. As a result, few boats

anchored in Cartagena, and trade was low.74 No doubt, Cartagena continued

to be the most important city in the Caribbean Coast, and therefore became

the capital of the department of Magdalena. However, due to the lack of good

communications, it remained quite isolated from its departments vast terri-

tory and from Bogota.

Nevertheless, Cartagena retained some of its colonial characteristics. As in

the eighteenth century, it was mostly inhabited by people of African descent.

In 1825 the rst impression of the Swedish traveller Carl August Gosselman

at landing on the esplanade between the citys entrance and Getseman

was that of a multicolour human anthill. The major part were blacks, ac-

companied by other colours forming a sample of tones that went from the

African black, passing by the American yellow-brown, and ending in the

European white .75 Whites still held most positions of economic and political

power, but Spaniards had been replaced by British, North Americans,

French and other foreigners in trade, and several Venezuelans served in the

administration.76 As before independence complex, networks of patronage

and kinship linked individuals across class and race. Another lasting colonial

characteristic was the high ratio of females among Cartagenas popular

classes of African descent (according to the 1835 census, the city counted an

average of 154.4 women over sixteen years of age for every 100.0 men, due to

female overrepresentation in the most popular neighbourhoods). As other

de Cartagena de Indias, hoy estado soberano de Bolvar en la Union colombiana (Bogota, 1883), vol. 2,pp. 16774.

73 F. Gomez, Los censos en Colombia antes de 1905, in M. Urrutia and M. Arrubla (eds.),Compendio de estadsticas historicas de Colombia (Bogota, 1970), p. 20, table 3. Historians preferto use the 1835 census rather than the rst postcolonial census of 1825, which seriouslyundercounted the population (ibid., pp. 1314, 18).

74 Manuel Rodrguez Becerra and Jorge Restrepo Restrepo, Los empresarios extranjeros deBarranquilla, 18201900, in Gustavo Bell Lemus (ed.), El Caribe colombiano : Seleccion detextos historicos (Barranquilla, 1988), pp. 1423.

75 Gosselman, Viaje por Colombia, p. 33.76 G. Colmenares, El transito a sociedades campesinas de dos sociedades esclavistas en la

Nueva Granada, Cartagena y Popayan, 17801850 , Huellas (Barranquilla), vol. 29 (1990),p. 23.

464 Aline Helg

cities in the Americas, Cartagena oered women greater security, autonomy,

and economic opportunity in domestic service and the markets than did

small towns and villages. Although by 1835 slavery had declined to 5.0 per

cent of the citys total population (in contrast to 15.7 per cent in 1777), the

wealthy barrio of La Catedral showed the highest ratio of urban slavery

in Caribbean New Granada, with still one inhabitant out of ten being a slave,

a majority of them female.77

In brief, if General Padilla lived among a population of predominantly

African descent, this population was also largely female, thus disenfran-

chised. No source mentions the presence of women in the events of

FebruaryMarch 1828, probably because women had little to do with the

issues that mobilised the rival parties, such as military pay, benets, and

surage, the Ocana convention, and the dispute between Bolvar and San-

tander. This is not to say that women were not active in Cartagena. On the

contrary, aside from those working in domestic service, many women sold

goods in the streets and the markets, did laundry, ran inns, taverns and small

shops, and drove goods between the city and its surroundings. They often

were single heads of household. Thus, quite likely women would have

participated in a movement of broader appeal, such as a protest against

Bolvars recent reestablishment of colonial taxes, which aected most of

them. Surely, such a movement would also have rallied more men among

the citys jewellers, tailors, shoemakers, those who worked in construction

and small industries, as well as sailors, stevedores, porters, muleteers, sher-

men and daylabourers.78 Yet, the focus of the dispute on military and

political matters made Padillas appeal most relevant to soldiers and ocers,

reputedly loyal to Montilla and whose number shrank after the latter with-

drew most of them from the city.79

Moreover, the troops stationed in Cartagena generally comprised black,

zambo (of mixed indigenous and African ancestry), mulatto and Indian

peasants and labourers who had been dragged away from their homes and

had little interest in the disputes of the citys leadership. With the exception

of a mutiny for food and clothes in the artillery, swiftly repressed by Montilla

in 1823, according to a British ocer, the troops in Cartagena showed

patient endurance_ under their many privations .80 As already mentioned,

77 AHNC, RE, Censos, Censo de 1835. For example, J. Kinsbruner, Not of Pure Blood : TheFree People of Color and Racial Prejudice in Nineteenth-Century Puerto Rico (Durham, 1996),pp. 8284.

78 G. Mollien, Voyage dans la republique de Colombia, en 1823 (Paris, 1824), vol. 1, p. 16 ;Macpherson to Clay, 24 March 1827, NA, DCC, roll 1. 79 Ibid., 30 March 1827.

80 Watts to Bidwell, 3 Feb. 1827, in PRO, FO 1845, 69. On the 1823 mutiny, see Watts toCol. P. Campbell, 19 April 1825, PRO, FO 1353.


in early 1827 Ignacio Munoz failed to instigate them to rebel against Padilla

and Montilla. Later that year Montilla encountered little opposition when he

had the ocers of all the citys military corps issue manifestoes supporting

Bolvar against the faction of Bogota embodied by Santander.81 Not sur-

prisingly, in February 1828, few resisted his demand that they sign the anti-

Santander Exposicion to the convention in Ocana, which protested the forced

conscription without pay, the exclusion of soldiers from surage, and the

lengthening of the military career through the creation of new intermediate

ranks, all issues stressing the inequality between citizens duties and rights.82

In March the troops went along when Montilla pulled them out of Cartagena

in the middle of the night only to return them two days later.

Like the ground troops, most men in the navy left in Cartagena in early

March 1828 had been brutally enlisted. As noted by the US consul when he

observed the manning of ships in 1826, people resented the navy for bring-

ing men from the most distant parts, tied or handcued together , because

with little or no pay , seamen are out of question.83 Moreover, the navys

practice of forcing Cartagenas artisans to abandon their shops and perform

unpaid work on ships alienated many, as exemplied by the carpenter Jose

Francisco Escudero. Since 1822, the navy had enlisted Escudero by bodily

force and mistreated him repeatedly. In the words of his protest to the

intendant, he was ready to full his duties as a citizen, but I will not consent

that, because they need my skills, they want to_ reduce me to a Slaverymore unbearable than the one the Government is trying to extinguish in

the territory of the Republic . Although the intendant defended Escudero,

in 1824 Padilla ordered his arrest for disobedience and his allocation to

a warship, where he still served one year later.84 Such experiences were un-

likely to prompt men in the navy to stand up and risk their lives in the

defence of their commander, Padilla, who until 1827 had sided with Montilla

and supported Bolvars authoritarianism.

In addition, in 1828 Cartagena lacked the powerful native leadership it

had in 1810, when a reformist elite of creole hacendados, merchants, lawyers

and priests had organised the free population of colour against Spains rule.

Many had died during the war or been executed by Spain in 1816. Now the

most outstanding members of the elite born in the region tended to pur-

sue their careers in Bogota, such as JoseMara Castillo y Rada, whowas nance

secretary. Whites still held the highest positions of power, but some of

81 Manifestos publicos de los ociales de los cuerpos militares de Cartagena en favor deBolvar, 1618 June 1827, in PRO, FO 1845.

82 Exposicion dirigida a la Gran Convencion, 25 Feb. 1828.83 Macpherson to Clay, 6 May 1826, NA, DCC, roll 1.84 Jose Francisco Escudero to intendente del Magdalena, 11 Sep. 1823, and Padilla to

intendente, 20 March 1825, in AHNC, RE, GM, tomo 373, fols. 3069, 347.

466 Aline Helg

them, such as Montilla, were Venezuelan. Others, such as Juan de Francisco

Martn, had a royalist past. The native survivors of the First Independence

of some signicance, such as Ignacio Munoz and the rich merchant

Manuel Marcelino Nunez, were unable to oer a viable project for the de-

partment of Magdalena and to undermine the domination of Montilla. As

for Padilla, despite Bolvars assertion that he was the most important

man of Colombia , he could not transcend the limits imposed upon him

by his race and class. Because he had often boasted of his pardo identity and

his determination to defend his pardo class, he had exposed himself to ac-

cusations of pardocracia and of envisaging a revolution on the Haitian

model in the Caribbean region. As a result, in a political culture that banned

references to blackness and its mixtures (but not whiteness), Padilla had

excluded himself from the possibility of becoming a regional caudillo.

Unlike the uneducated but white Paez, whose boldness and resolution

had gained the support of Bolvar against Santander and had progressively

united Venezuelans regardless of race and class against New Granadans,

Padilla simultaneously alienated the local aristocracy and courted the national

hierarchy.85

Moreover, by attempting to reconcile Bolvar and Santander after Bolvar

initiated his campaign for a semi-monarchical constitution, Padilla distanced

himself from the native leaders, such as Nunez, who backed Santander.86

Some even accused him of having absolutely sold out to the faction [of

Bolvar] and of using seduction and intimidation to silence the lower classes

into obedience.87 When in February 1828 Padilla eventually abandoned his

attempts to reunite Bolvar and Santander and stood up in defence of the

latter, no doubt many cartageneros still remembered his role in the celebration

of Bolvars visit eight months earlier and did not take him seriously. More

importantly, the pro-Santander delegates in Ocana acknowledged Padillas

oer to defend the convention but did little to save him. Clearly, though

popular in Caribbean New Granada, Padilla lacked national stature and

political constancy, which explains the cartageneros reluctance to follow him.

All these factors strengthened the bolivaristas condence that the elimin-

ation of Padilla would not ignite a protest. Indeed, when in April 1828 his

sister, Magdalena Padilla, asked fteen political and religious notables in

85 On Paezs leadership, see A. Gomez Picon, Paez : Fundador del estado venezolano (Bogota,1978), pp. 182298 ; V. Hebrard, Pueblos y actores municipales en la estructuracion de laregion venezolana, 18211830, Anuario de Historia Regional y de las Fronteras (Bucaramanga)vol. 5 (2000), pp. 99149.

86 Padilla to Santander, 18 March, 2 April, and 18 Aug. 1827, in Archivo Santander, vol. 16,pp. 299, 32223, vol. 17, p. 154.

87 Bonifacio Rodrguez to Santander, 31 March and 16 April 1827, in ibid., vol. 16, pp.319, 333.


Cartagena to declare that he had not disturbed the public order in March,

all declined.88 Similarly, the broadside she issued then to refute the horrible

accusations with which they attempt to vilify the glorious prowess of my

brother, the general of division Jose Padilla , failed to mobilise cartageneros.89

In addition, the dynamics of race, class and power in the city had changed

since 181011, when the reformist elite had empowered and armed militia-

men of African descent because it knew that it could only secure indepen-

dence from Spain by building an alliance with the free population of colour.

By the 1820s a conservative elite under Montilla dominated Cartagena and

sought to keep the lower class of colour in check, not to organise them.

Evidently, race still overlapped with class. As observed by a French diplomat,

the young men in the upper class tried to nd a government job or studied

law, and the mechanical professions were left to the foreigners and the

men of colour .90 Yet racial boundaries were loosening. Among the pro-

gressive elite opposed to Montilla, a few white men were married to mulatas.91

More generally, given the gender imbalance in Cartagenas population, sev-

eral women of African descent were involved in relationships with white

men, which tended to blur racial identity, especially for their children.

Among the lower classes, the introduction of legal equality, the end of racial

divisions in the armed forces and of the mention of race in state (but not

church) records had led people to refer to themselves more as citizens or

el pueblo than as los pardos , los negros or los zambos . Whereas race con-

tinued to be meaningful and inuential to individuals, it was less so collec-

tively. Thus, when in March 1828 Ignacio Munoz attempted to revive the

rhetoric of 1811 and 1815 and to mobilise the lower classes of colour on

racial grounds, he had limited success.

Furthermore, in 1828 people were unlikely to defend Padilla against

Montilla because Cartagena was not a city where political confrontation of-

ten turned violent. In October 1829, exactly one year after the public ex-

ecution of Padilla, the US consul in Cartagena disagreed with his European

colleagues who still favoured Bolvars authoritarian constitution on the

grounds that Colombians needed a strong executive to prevent rebellions.

To the consul, neither a government of the wealthy nor a president for life

were necessary : All the insurrections that have disturbed the country within

88 Contiene quince cartas dirigidas por mi hermana a sujetos respetables y su contestacion, AHNC, RE, HI, tomo 1, fols. 375411.

89 Magdalena Padilla, A la impostura y la intriga. La justicia y la verdad, AHNC, RE, AR,Documentos varios de Cartagena, rollo 5, fondo 1, vol. 9, fol. 339.

90 Aversenc, Etat commercial, industriel, politique et moral de la province de Carthage`ne, 27 Sep. 1837, MAE-Paris, CCC, no. 1, fol. 236.

91 Notably Jose Mara del Real, Vicente Ucros and Ignacio Munoz were married to pardas(Montilla to Santander, 20 Feb. 1823, in Montilla, General de division, vol. 2, p. 969).

468 Aline Helg

the last two years have been attempts of well informed members of the

community ; and in no one instance are the low and ignorant classes to be

blamed, he claimed.92 In making this comment, the consul certainly had

in mind the events of March 1828, when Cartagenas blacks, mulattos and

zambos did not support Padilla against the unpopular Montilla. Yet this lack

of involvement did not signify that people were indierent to the form of

government that ruled them, as the consul believed.93 In 1828 the lower

classes did not back the Venezuelan aristocrat Montilla either. They simply

did not take part in a dangerous confrontation that was unlikely to yield

much for them.

In reality, cartageneros tended to prefer non-violent political confrontation.

One French observer noted, beyond the customary remarks on Caribbean

peoples alleged idleness, that family bonds, social cohesion, and charity

characterised Cartagenas inhabitants : In their sharpest quarrels, they_never lack a certain dignity, this being in all classes of society, even the

lowest. Literate people tended to express dierences of opinion or protest

in the form of handwritten pasquinades and printed broadsheets directed

against a specic person. This generated responses and counterresponses,

as exemplied by the exchange between Padilla and the aristocratic pater-

familias in 1824, but, as the same Frenchman reported, consequently the

people of the country_ only ght with quills .94 Although few among

the population could read, the content of posters and newspapers reached

the illiterate in the streets, the workplaces, and the taverns through dis-

cussions and improvised speeches. Yet, if erce verbal disputes could arise,

such as the one that opposed Padilla to the supporters of Bolvar in February

1828, they seldom or never led to manslaughter or lynching. By all accounts

no violence was committed during Jose Padillas takeover on 6 and 7 March

1828.

Finally, in March 1828 Padilla was unable to nd support outside

Cartagena, despite strong opposition to Montilla in several towns. In fact,

Padillas takeover had been so brief that Montilla could rapidly step up re-

pression and prevent similar movements elsewhere. Although Mompoxs

santanderistas welcomed Padilla with enthusiasm when he stopped there on

his way to Ocana, when he returned, Montilla had given discretional powers

to the military to prevent any sedition or pardo movement in the city.

Mompoxs militiamen were disarmed and replaced with more reliable forces

from Cartagena ; those suspected of sympathy with Padilla were detained.

92 Macpherson to Clay, 4 Oct. 1829, NA, DCC, roll 1.93 Ibid., 6 May 1826 ; Adolphe Barrot to ministre, 4 May 1832, MAE-Paris, CCC, no. 1, fols.

1516.94 Aversenc, Etat commercial, 27 Sep. 1837, MAE-Paris, CCC, no. 1, fols. 23435.


Padilla was thus forced to leave immediately for Cartagena, where he was

arrested upon his arrival and rapidly transferred to Bogota.95

With the execution of Padilla in October 1828, Bolvar had denitively

exorcised his fear of pardocracia in Cartagena and Caribbean New Granada.

Yet he quickly realised that his racial bias would weigh on his legacy. As he

wrote to Paez one month after Padillas death:

Things have reached a point that keeps me wrestling with myself, with my ideas andwith my glory_ I already repent for the death of Piar, of Padilla and the others whohave died for the same cause ; in the future there will be no justice to punish themost atrocious murderer, because [by saving] the life of Santander [ I have par-doned] the most scandalous impunities_What torments me even more is the justclamour with which those of the class of Piar and Padilla will complain. They willsay with more than enough justice that I have only been weak in favour of thisinfamous white [Santander], who did not have the record of service of those famous[ pardo] servants of the fatherland. This exasperates me, so that I dont know whatto do with myself.96

However, Bolvar did not need to worry about being accused of racism for

the execution of Padilla. In 1831, after the Liberators death from illness

and the victory of Santanders supporters in New Granadas rst post-

independence civil war, one of the rst acts of the constitutional convention

that met in Bogota under santanderista control was the rehabilitation of the

memory of Gen. Jose Padilla, but the delegates carefully avoided to mention

the role of the fear of pardocracia in his execution. They also approved a new

constitution similar to that of 1821 but did nothing to actively promote racial

equality and to end slavery.97

As the santanderistas, under the new name of Liberals, rapidly dominated

the Caribbean region in the spring of 1831, Cartagena remained the only

stronghold of the bolivaristas. The lower classes of African descent did not

mobilise against their rulers, and the city fell to the Liberals only after a one-

month siege. The Liberals, some of them pardo, took leading positions

and banished Gen. Mariano Montilla and his associates. The Liberal press

ourished, celebrating freedom and the restored rights of the people. One

notice entitled To the Manes of Padilla , signed by six thousand cartageneros ,

demanded revenge for his blood and, somewhat forgetful of his loneliness

in 1828, asserted that the people idolise him.98 Moreover, in a symbolic

95 Pedro Rodrguez to Adlercreutz, 21 March 1828, in C. Parra-Perez (ed.), La cartera delcoronel conde de Adlercreutz : documentos ineditos relativos a la historia de Venezuela y de la GranColombia (Paris, 1928), pp. 403; P. Salzedo del Villar, Apuntaciones historiales de Mompox.Edicion conmemorativa de los 450 anos de Mompox (1939 ; reprint, Cartagena, 1987), p. 191.

96 Bolvar to Paez, 16 Nov. 1828, in Bolvar, Obras completas, vol. 2, pp. 5058.97 Moreno de Angel, Santander, pp. 5479, 56770.98 Correo Semanal (Cartagena), 24 June 1831. See also other issues of Correo Semanal ; Cartagenero

Liberal (Cartagena), JuneAug. 1831 ; Hercules (Cartagena).

470 Aline Helg

reversal, in October 1831 Padilla received grandiose obsequies in Cartagenas

cathedral.99 However, as revengeful as they were, the citys Liberals, regard-

less of colour, followed the steps of their peer at the national level and did

not raise the issue of racial equality. They too believed that the elimination of

colonial racial privileges and the legal equality of the free rmly established

with independence suced. No doubt, although never mentioned, the fate

of Padilla reminded pardos, regardless of class, that to mobilise behind a racial

identity was ineective and dangerous. Indeed, Cartagenas First Indepen-

dence had resulted from the cross-class and cross-racial alliances that linked

the white elite to the popular classes of colour without challenging the socio-

racial hierarchy. At the local level, these alliances continued in the movements

attached to Bolvar and Santander in 182631 and in the two-party system

Colombia adopted in the 1840s.100 Long after, Conservative and Liberal

leaders continued to be able to channel lower-class people of African descent

under their respective banner, neutralising the latters autonomous socio-

racial challenge.

Although Simon Bolvars fear that Gran Colombia would disintegrate

did come true in 1830, when Venezuela, New Granada and Ecuador became

separate nations, pardocracia never seriously threatened the region. Initially

conceived in the context of racial violence of the rst phase of Venezuelas

struggle for independence, Bolvars views regarding people of African de-

scent were rooted in the colonial past and the spectre of the Haitian revol-

ution. He was in advance of many of his contemporaries when he opposed

the existence of slavery in republican nations, but his semi-monarchical

project of constitution and his reluctance to see pardos in government pos-

itions showed his inability to transform the racial equalisation required by

the war against Spain into full republican equality.

99 Rejistro Ocial (Cartagena), 13 Oct. 1831.100 O. Fals Borda, El Presidente Nieto, vol. 2 ofHistoria doble de la Costa (Bogota, 1981), pp. 65B,

70B72B.


helg 2003_simón bolívar and the spectre of pardocracia

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