HEGEL'S TELEOLOGY AND THE RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND BRAIN Crawford L. Elder The University of Connecticut

Faced with the question what is living and what is dead in Hegel's philosophy, Croce contended that the Philosophy of Nature and the Logic belonged in the latter category. I wish in this paper to raise doubt whether Croce was right in either judgement. I argue that certain very fundamental intuitions which we have about the relation between mind and brain can be upheld only if a teleological model, which Hegel set forth in the Philosophy of Nature and sketched in the Logic, has application to the brain; and I indicate, more briefly, that an understanding of how the brain could really be thus teleological is provided by the ontology which Hegel offers in the Logic. The intuitions I mention have motivated acceptance of various philosophical positions, but most recently of contemporary physicalism; hence the role which this paper will ascribe to the Philosophy of Nature and the Logic is a role squarely within contemporary philosophy.

Croce's dismissals could, indeed, be disputed on other accounts as well. The Logic, in particular, has much to say about the place which must be held, in a sound conceptual economy, by the concepts through which we designate "merely physical" objects and behavior: these comments reverse the very approach of contemporary "reductions," and thus qualify for contemporary interest. This paper, however, will indicate the contribution which Hegel has to make to just a single issue within contemporary philosophy of mind, an issue on which, moreover, a number of positions have already been staked out. I take this approach in order to express the conviction that the positions which Hegel takes in the Logic, and in parts of the Philosophy of Nature, can be stated with enough precision and enough plausibility to qualify directly as distinct, unnoticed options within existing contemporary inquiry; no special appeal need be made to the aims of a different "epoch" of philosophy.

The intuitions which 1 mention are these: first, that every mental state is necessarily "embodied" or "realized" in some physical state of brain (though the intuition seems readily to permit extension to possible "thinking organs" other than brains, as well); second, that these physical "embodiments" are, in principle, discoverable and specifiable.

My contention is that such specification can reasonably be thought possible, even "in principle," only if the neural configurations (etc.) which we specify will be such as to operate in accord with a Hegeliin teleological model. Neural configurations (etc.) which operate in accord

Crowford L. Elder is Assistont Professor of Philosophy ot The University of Connecticut. He received both his B. A . and his Ph. D. from Yole. His research interests center on Hegelian altemotives to duolism in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ond social philosophy.

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with only non-teleological models, e.g., models of neurophysics, cannot be shown to meet the requirements for qualifying as “embodiments” of particular mental states; hence neural cofifigurations that operate teleologically must be found, or else no neural configurations can be specified as “embodiments.”

In what follows I shall first give a clear statement of the intuition that mental states are “embodied,” and hence of what an “embodiment” is. Next I shall discuss the reasons why no neural items could be specified as embodiments if the only models that could be applied to neural items were non-teleological ones. Finally I shall explain how the application of a Hegelian teleological model can render such specification possible.

I

Let me begin with a rough formulation of the intuition about “embodiment”: we feel that for any individual mental state, there is some brain state without which that mental state could not make any real “dint” or difference in the world at all, could not perform any real “work”; and that this brain state by itselfproduces (or could produce) all of the work which that mental state performs (or could perform) in the world. In particular, we feel that there is some brain state which does (or could) produce all the “work” which that mental state, in virtue of its nature or type, is such as characteristically to do. For we do feel that mental states of any given type characteristically do “make themselves felt” in certain definite ways, i.e., do characteristically perform “work” of a certain definite type.

What needs to be made clear here is, primarily, the nature of the “work” which mental states characteristically perform, “work” which our intuition assigns to neural embodiments. Behaviorists and Wittgensteinians used to offer, for specific types of mental states, partial accounts of the specific behavioral “work” which token states of that type were characteristically such as to perform. Recent criticisms of behaviorism by functionalists have made it clear that the behavioral “work,” characteristic of mental states of agiven type, cannot reliably be described if we speak only of “such-and-such motions [or utterances] when such-and-such circumstances occur.“ We must speak, instead, of “such-and-such motions [or utterances] when such-and-such cir- cumstances are taken to occur”; in fact, we must also specify the intention with which the motions or utterances in question are produced.’ Now these very points have on occasion led to doubts whether the “work” characteristic of a given mental state could, indeed, be assigned to some neural embodiment. For how could some neural configuration be such as to function in certain ways depending on the occurrence of some intention, etc.? Such doubts are, however, misplaced. Provided that the intention in question itself has some neural embodiment-also, that the “taking such-and-such circumstances to occur” has some neural embodiment-then we need only be able to

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predict that some one neural configuration will interact with those neural configurations so as to produce the appropriate motions and utterances, and the embodiment-thesis will be pre2served. And such a prediction would seem in principle to be possible.

A second point made by functionalists against behaviorism is that the "work," which mental states of a given type characteristically do, is not strictly behavioral "work": it can be characteristic of mental states of a certain type to give way, in certain preceived circumstances, to mental states of a different type, etc.' This point too is quite consistent with the intuition about "embodiment." For one neural configuration can certainly cause, in certain circumstances, the occurrence of a different neural configuration; and even if physicalism itself should be untenable, it still would be plausible to say that, given the actual laws of the actual world, the occurrence of the latter neural configuration is a physically sufficient condition for the occurrence of a new mental state of the appropriate type. Moreover we do, pre-philosophically, assign "internal" "work" to physical states: we say that memories operate through "traces" which they leave, emotional experiences through "scars," etc.

I now can offer a more precise formulation of the intuition on "embodiment." I will phrase it so as to allow for the possibility-which our intuitions seem readily to countenance-that there should be (genuinely) mental states "embodied" in physical states of non-neural hardware. Hence I will speak, not of "brain states," but of "hardware states."

For any individual mental state M which actually obtains, there is some class of hardware states H', and some members HI . . . H. of H', such that 1) HI . . . H. obtain successively during the time that M obtains, and in the same physical subject as M obtains in, 2) any member of H which obtains when M obtains, and in the same subject, is such that, for all those pieces of behavior and mental states which M characteristically produces, when and if certain specific circumstances obtain, that member of H' is causally sufficient to produce those same pieces of behavior and mental events, when and if those specific circumstances obtain. and 3) it is a necessary truth that M obtains only if some member of H' obtains when M does, and in the same subject.

Two points still call for comment. The first is connected with the mention of a class of hardware states, rather than of a singre hardware state. Our intuition about embodiment amounts only to the position that mental states are such as to do their characteristic "work," thanks wholly to the fact that brain (or hardware) states occur which are such as to cause performance of that same "work": our intuition is nor the more specific position that, for each singl? mental state, some single brain state occurs which physically can cause performance of all the

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appropriate “work.” So long as some brain state(s) do all the “work“ of each mental state, our intuition is satisfied. It might well be, so far as our intuition goes, that some series of successive brain states does the “work” of this or that single mental state. Hence 1 have, above, allowed for this possibility; that is, n 2 l.4

The second point is that if a given mental state should in fact be embodied in a series of distinct neural configurations, still each of these neural configurations would have itself to be such as to cause performance of all those pieces of “work” which that mental state is characteristically such as to do (clause 2, above). Or more precisely, each would have to be such as to cause performance of at least most. This small-sounding point is crucial, as the next section will show, for the question of specifying particular embodiments for particular mental states; hence I wish to give a rather close explanation of it. First, it seems clear that at any moment at which a token mental state of some type obtains, that mental state must be such as to perform at least most of those pieces of “work” which are characteristic of states of that type. For while a token mental state may fail, or be such as would fail, to perform some of the “work” which is characteristic of its type-such failure occurs wherever there is a case of “irrationality” or “neurosis,” etc.-the token mental state cannot be such as would fail to perform most of the “work” characteristic of its type, without failing to belong to that type at all, i.e., to be itself. Now what our intuition about “embodiment” basically claims is that the “work”-capacities of a given mental state are always “work”capacities of some concomitant brain state (or hardware state). But then it follows that at any given moment at which a token mental state exists, there exists a brain state (or hardware state) which is such as to cause performance of at least most of the “work” characteristic of that type of mental state. Otherwise the intuition on “embodiment” will simply be false. But this result may seem stronger than it really is. It is not required that each of the brain states HI . . . Hn be such as directly, “in person,” to produce all the “work” characteristic of M’s type; instead, HZ (for example) might be such as to produce some other brain state, and thus indirectly to cause performance of certain pieces of the characteristic “work.” Directly or indirectly, however, each of HI . . . Hn must be sufficient to cause performance of at least most of the “work” characteristic of mental states belonging to M’s type. Above I state that each of HI . . . Hn must be sufficient to cause performance of all of this work. The difference between “all” and “most” here stems from the possibility of irrationality; but since that topic involves some complexity, and the difference between “all” and “most” is in any case immaterial to the present argument, let us simply say, with deliberate simplification, “all.”

I1

Let us now ask just how we might go about determining which particular neural (or hardware) arrangement is the “embodiment” of

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some particular mental state. My contention at present is that if the neural arrangements among which we are to choose are neural arrangements that operate in accord with only non-teleological models-specifically, with models of neurophysics--then we cannot reasonably hope to succeed in determining “embodiments.” Next I will argue that if the neural arrangements among which we choose obey a teleological model, we can hope to succeed in determining “em- bodiments.”

The first step in locating some particular “embodiment” would be to spell out the various pieces of “work” which the mental state, that is thereby embodied, is characteristically such as to perform. The “embodiment” would then be located once we had shown, of some particular neural configuration, that it were causally sufficient to effect (under the appropriate circumstances) all those pieces of “work.” But if the neural configuration of which we show this is to be one which operates in accord with only some neurophysical model, then we must show that it is sufficient to effect all these pieces of “work” according to certain neurophysical laws; and to show this, we must characterize the pieces of “work” themselves in neurophysical terms.

This would evidently be no small task. The reason why is not that the pieces of “work,” which any given mental state is characteristically such as to perform, are indefinitely numerous-though such a claim would seem to be true. The reason is instead that the pieces of “work,” characteristic of any given mental state, cannot be assumed to have significant neurophysical features in common. Hence a neurophysical account of the pieces of “work” characteristic of some mental state would have to be constructed case-bycase; we could not rely on such an account to be representative until we had considered, individually, many specific forms of “work,” and in fact many possible instances of each form of “work.” To see this, let us consider, as a specific example of a mental state, a belief in some proposition; say, the belief that poison sumac often grows in the midst of regular sumac. Such a belief is characteristically such as to perform a whole host of varied pieces of “work”: it is such as to produce (under certain circumstances) bodily motions of avoidance or of cautious approach; or to produce utterances such as “Watch out!”; or to produce certain feelings, e.g., irritation or dismay when the subject finds sumac growing on his property; or even to produce certain facial expressions. Now prima facie, it would seem that what in neurophysical terms happens, when a subject experiences such irritation, may very well be quite different from what in neurophysical terms happens, when a subject utters “Watch out!”; and that the latter may again be quite different from what happens when the subject utters “I know where to find poison sumac”; etc. In fact, what happens neurophysically when a subject makes motions of cautious approach may even differ (for all we know) from what happens neurophysically when (on some distinct possible occasion) a subject makes motions of cautious approach: for different skeletal motions can both amount to

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cases of “cautious approach,” and different skeletal motions may well have different neurophysical causes. Hence a neurophysical characterization of some of the “work” of a given mental state cannot reasonably be assumed to hold true of much of the “work” characteristic of that mental state; indeed, it can reasonably be assumed to hold true only of those individual pieces of behavior actually studied in constructing it.

Yet might certain research findings manage to overturn this assumption, initially reasonable, that there will be a neurophysical diversity among the pieces of “work” characteristic of the belief about sumac (or of some other mental state)? What if prolonged research showed that all observed cases of bodily avoidance, of uttering “Watch out!”, etc., had in fact had certain significant neurophysical features in common: would this render it reasonable to expect that all further characteristic expressions of this belief will also possess these neurophysical features as well? The right answer to this question would seem to be one parallel to an answer offered, in an analogous context, by Fodor. We, in the present context, are considering what happens when events, classed together as “characteristic expressions” of a certain mental event, are reclassified under the predicates of neurophysics. Fodor is concerned with what happens when brain states, classed together as being (or as embodying, in our terms) mental states of a single mental-state type, are reclassified under the predicates of neurophysics. He argues that we cannot reasonably assume that the brain states, thus grouped together, will have significant neurophysical features in common. (He compares the case with one in which states of affairs grouped together as being tokens of a certain economic type, e.g., of an inflated economy, are redescribed under predicates of physics: here, evidently, we cannot reasonably assume that the states of affairs thus grouped together will belong to a single physical type; and so, analogously, in the case of the brain states grouped together.) And Fodor adds that even if a prolonged research into such a group of brain states should (amazingly) reveal that in all such brain states observed, some significant neurophysical feature were held in common, still we could not reasonably infer that that neurophysical feature were common to the whole group. It might indeed be the case that some neurophysical feature were, as a matter of brute fact, coextensive with just this group of brain states; but “nothing but brute enumeration could convince us of this brute coextensi~ity.”~ Just so, in the present case, it is right to say that only a brute enumeration of all those events which belong to the characteristic “work” of a given mental state M could persuade us of a coextensivity between “is a characteristic expression of M” and “has neurophysical feature P.”

Yet just what does the argument thus far show? It may seem to show only that determining “embodiments” is hard work, if we must work with neural materials that obey only neurophysical models. For we could, with labor, give a neurophysical description of a large sample of

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those pieces of “work“ characteristic of some given mental state. And we might then pick out some complex neural configuration within the subject’s brain which were, according to laws of neurophysics, capable (under appropriate circumstances) of effecting all those pieces of work. One could therefore wonder: wouldn’t this be enough? One might feel, that is, that since the neural configuration thus picked out--call it “n c 12”--would have proved able to effect quite a number of those pieces of “work” characteristic of the given mental state, it would then be reasonable to infer that that neural configuration were able to effect all the pieces of “work” characteristic of that mental state. In other words, that it would then be reasonable to conclude that n c 12 were the “embodiment” of that mental state.

Closer examination of such a situation will reveal that this argument could not in fact be made; and that selecting an “embodiment” from neurophysical materials is not just hard work, but impossible. Suppose, to use our earlier example, that a neurophysical account has actually been given of many of the pieces of “work” characteristic of the belief about sumac, and that some neural configuration (say, “n c 12”) has been picked out within the subject’s brain, which neurophysically is able to effect all those pieces of “work.” Suppose too that this subject does really hold this belief about sumac. Then we can, given the latter, reasonably assume that for each piece of “work” which this belief characteristically is such as to perform, there is some neural arrangement in the subject’s brain causally able to effect that piece of “work.” But just how good a warrant do we have for assuming that for all these pieces of “work” there is the same neural arrangement serving as physical “spring”? Further, how good a warrant do we have for assuming that this single neural arrangement (if there is some such single neural arrangement) is the very neural arrangement--n c 12--which we earlier picked out; why might not this neural arrangement be a more complex neural configuration which contains n c 12 as part? A moment ago we found reason to endorse extreme scepticism as to any coextensivity between “is ‘work’ characteristically effected by mental state M and “is an event involving neurophysical property P,” for any P; we said that only a brute enumeration could persuade us of such a coextensivity. Surely it is right to hold an equal scepticism about a coextensivity between “is a characteristic action by mental state M and “is an event involving neurophysical property P’,” where P’ is the property of being a neurophysical performance by some single neural configuration N. That is, if it is unreasonable to assume that any single neurophysical property (however complex) will hold true of all the pieces of “work” characteristically effected by M, it also is unreasonable to assume that any neurophysical property (however complex) will hold true of all the individual neurophysical causes of all the pieces of that “work.” But just such an assumption is made by the argument which we are considering. This argument assumes that “is a characteristic action by M will be coextensive with “is a neurophysical performance by n c

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N,” for some N definable by a finite physical description; what it argues is only that N is, in fact, 12. The latter argument is, as 1 have just suggested, weak. But for the assumption, there is no warrant at all.

What follows is that if we must deal with neural configurations that obey only rules of neurophysics, we cannot justifiably specify any specific neural configuration as being any one particular “embodiment.” How then can we rescue our intuition that mental states have specifiable neural “embodiments”? We must assume that the neural configurations, which will get specified as “embodiments,” operate in accord with non- neurophysical models. For what is needed, in order to specify some particular “embodiment,” is to show that some particular neural configuration is causally able to effect certain pieces of “work.” And if the neural configuration in question operates in accord with a non- neurophysical model, then we can show it able to effect all these pieces of “work,” while characterizing those pieces of “work,” and the producings of them, by use of non-neurophysical predicates. And if non- neurophysical predicates can be used, we can reasonably hope to find some predicates, by which to characterize the set of these pieces of “work,” and the set of these producings, which can reasonably be assumed to be coextensive with those sets. That is, we can hope to find predicates reasonably assumed to be coextensive with “is ‘work‘ characteristically effected by mental state M” and “is a characteristic action by mental state M.” And if such predicates are found, we can reasonably expect to specify “embodiments”: we would only need to show, empirically, that some particular neural configuration had been responsible for all observed events having the former predicate, and had itself performed ali observed events having the latter predicate, and we could then ground an induction that that particular neural configura- tion were the “embodiment” of M. 1 argue that such predicates are provided, and &h an argument made possible, when the neural configurations in question are seen as operating in accord with a Hegelian teleological model.

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1 would like at this point to forestall one possible objection; 1 will return to my main argument in the next section. The argument thus far has assumed that we can know, prior to any investigation of neural “embodiments,” that mental states of this or that type characteristically perform certain pieces of “work,” in fact, an indefinite number of different pieces of “work.” The argument has also assumed that the pieces of “work” thus known of will be “characteristic” in a strong sense: that is, that they will be pieces of “work” which, necessarily, mental states of the type in question tend to perform. And it has been implied that the way in which we can know of such “characteristic” pieces of work is by reflecting on the very concept of the type of mental state in question. Thus it was implied that part of the very “meaning” of having

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the belief about sumac was the performance, when standard intentions and abilities obtain, of motions of avoidance. Similar implications as to characteristic pieces of “work” could, of course, be drawn from the very concept of anger, of fear, etc.

Yet epistemological assumptions much like these have recently been rejected by proponents of the “causal theory of reference.” Proponents of this theory have argued that an inspection of (what we might call) “our concept” of this or that kind of physical object may fail to reveal necessary properties of physical objects of that kind; in fact, such “concept”-inspection may even ascribe to those physical objects properties which they do not truly possess at The positive theory which underlies these conclusions is, first, that intension does determine extension; but, secondly, that intension--at least for terms that designate physical kinds-- is not itself fixed by “concepts“ “in the head.” Instead, the intension of such terms is fixed at least in part, by some indexically-located sample of physical stuff. Whatever properties the stuff in this sample may prove to have, those properties will make up the intension of the physical-kind term in question, and will also fix its extension. And common sense, with its “concepts,” will be neither an infallible nor an especially accurate guide to the physical properties of the stuff within the sample. Empirical science, specifically physics, will be the best guide to the necessary, i.e., definitory, properties of any given physical kind.

Does it follow that an inspection of the “concept” of this or that type of mental state might be similarly untrustworthy: that is, that it might lead us to hold that states of that type “characteristically” do certain pieces of work which they do not do characteristically, nor at all? If we ask what warrant there is for the above claim about the intension of physical-kind terms, a negative answer to this question emerges. That claim is warranted just because it accurately mirrors the way in which we actually use physical-kind terms. We do defer, in moot cases--‘% it really gold?“--to expert comparison with stuff in a socially-indexed sample. But we do not use terms for kinds of mental state in an analogous way. In the first place there are no socially-recognized samples of the requisite sort: paradigms of anger, fear, etc., exist in literature, but these get recognized as paradigms not through indexical ostension, but rather by being seen to match well with certain descriptions (descriptions, in particular, of “work” that is characteristic of anger, fear, etc.). And secondly, even if we did somehow defer in moot cases--‘% it anger, or something else, that he’s feeling?”--to com- parisons with some sample, the comparisons would be of a different kind from those on which we rely in the case of a term like “gold.” In the case of “gold” we rely on expert comparison as to micro-physical features which do notfigure at all in our ordinary “concept” of gold. In so doing, we “let ourselves in” for having to recognize various objects as being gold, about which our ordinary “concept” gives us no clue that they are gold. But in the case of terms like “anger,” we would rely on

t

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comparison as to features of just the same sort as figure within our ordinary “concept” of anger. A moot case of anger would be judged to be anger, after all, because it proved to perform some “jobs” characteristic of anger, many of which we already “know.” What follows is that we do not “let ourselves in” for radical surprises in the case of mental states. The only way in which a token mental state can properly earn the title of “anger,” or of some other type, is by being found to perform a weighted majority (at least) of the “jobs” which our concept of anger indicates as being characteristic of anger.

So the new theories on knowledge of necessary properties do not touch the argument thus far.

IV

Let us now turn to the positive side of the present argument: ifthe neural items with which we deal, in seeking to locate specific uembodiments,” are items that behave in accord with a certain teleological model, then we can hope to succeed.

The teleological model which I mean can best be set forth by beginning with Hegel’s own formulation of it as a model within the realm of biology; I next will add, to this model, some modifications offered by later “organismic” biologists, and will then turn to the question of applying this model to the neural embodiments of mental states. But for simplicity, I will speak only of the neural embodiments of beliefs, and will deal only implicitly with other mental states.

Hegel held that a teleological model could both predict, and also genuinely explain, both the external behavior and the internal physiology of the living organism;’ but by this he did not mean that either process should be seen as “guided” or “elicited” by some one specijic telos or end, nor yet by a series of specific ends. Such usual forms of teleological explanation Hegel regarded as conceptually weak, just on internal grounds: for designation of any one specific end as the explanatory factor, underlying some behavioral or physiological occurrence, would inevitably be more or less ar-bitrary, Hegel felt, inasmuch as one could always argue that the organism had secured this particular end just by way of securing some further end, andthat further end just by way of securing some further end still, etc. The usual teleological explanations were also weak, Hegel felt, in that they dealt only with the fact that organisms secured various ends or needs which they had, and did not also deal with the fact that organisms characteristically create for themselves fresh ends or needs.” The teleology which Hegel did endorse appealed, instead, to what one might call a “second-order” end. That is, the organism was said to be “moved” by the end of pursuing some specific (or “first-order”) ends or other, by the pursuit of specific ends in general.” Just which specific ends one discerned in the organism’s particular operations was to an extent an arbitrary matter; what was sure was that the organism would pursue

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some such ends, and would not "fix" on one specific end or another, but would pass from pursuing one to pursuing another to pursuing another; and would even create for itself fresh ends, yet unattained, so as to promote this second-order pursuit. Now it might perhaps seem that any appeals to so abstract an "end" as this would yield no specific predictions, nor specific explanations, of particular physiological and behavioral performances by the organism; so that Hegel's teleology would not be arbitrary, as usual teleology is, but would be empty instead. Yet, as the development of "organismic" biology later helped to show, Hegel's position here is in fact a substantive claim. To say that an organism secures specific behavioral and physiological ends "so as" to secure the second-order end of securing-specific-ends-as-such, is to say, first, that the organism secures the specific ends in order to secure the second-order end, but it's also to say, second, that the organism secures the specific ends in just such a manner as to secure the second-order end. Thus, it's to say that a given organ within the organism will perform its specific "functions"-the supplying of an enzyme, the removal of a waste, etc.-in just such a manner as to maintain health in the systemas a whole, and hence maintain continued performance of specific- physiological-functions-in-general. And this claim can be given specific content. It's an empirical question, with a definite answer, just what operation a given organ must perform at a given time, if the health (or stability) of the system as a whole is to be maintained.

Implications such as this one were stated more distinctly, and the model as a whole was put forth in a stronger form, when "organismic" biologists such as J. S. Haldane later put the teleological model to serious empirical use. Haldane held, following Claude Bernard, that a given organ will reliably perform whatever operation is needed by the organism as a whole, and in this respect Haldane's position coincided with Hegel's.'' But Haldane provided, in effect, a clarification of Hegel's position by recognizing that the operations possible for any given organ were limited by that organ's physical composition and chemical state; so that the central principle of the teleological model was, more precisely, that a given organ will perform whatever operation is most needed from among those that lie within its physical repertoire at all. (Physico- chemical conditions were, in other words, one necessary condition for an organ's operation; the occurrence of a need in the organism was another, which together with the physicochemical conditions con- stituted a sufficient condition for the organ's ~peration.) '~ Haldane also put forth Hegel's model in a stronger form than Hegel had: he held that sufficient conditions could be specified for the operations of organs only if these operations were regarded as contributions to the (second-order) end of ongoing organic 0perati0n.l~

Haldane thus held that the operatians of any given organ could not be predicted on any non-teleological model; in particular, not on any biochemical model. He held this for two main reasons. In the first place, Haldane felt that when the contributions which any given organ

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characteristically makes, within the organism as a whole, are described under biochemical (or “physical”) predicates, a variability emerges which defies capture by any general biochemical formulae. In other words, he doubted that any biochemical predicate, however complex, were reliably coextensive with “is work characteristically effected by organ 0,” for any 0. In the second place, Haldane held that organs frequently pass from effecting one piece of work, one contribution, to effecting a different piece of work, without undergoing significant changes in physical composition or chemical state; such changes were correlated with changes in the needs which the organism as a whole had, but not with changing biochemical conditions within the organ itself. To put the point in more contemporary terms, Haldane doubted that such changes in “output” were caused chemically, by items such as messenger molecules. He therefore held, in effect, that no coextensivity could be expected between “is a characteristic action by organ 0 and “is a biochemical performance by an organ having thus-and-such physical and chemical make-ub.”

A teleological model could, in contrast, reliably predict the operations characteristic of a given organ, Haldane felt. The teleological model made it reasonable to assume-what proved empirically to be true-that “is work characteristically effected by organ 0 is reliably coextensive with “is, in the circumstances, that operation within 0 ’ s physical repertoire which best promotes ongoing organic operation.” And the teleological model also rendered intelligible the correlation, which empirical research seemed “puzzlingly” to indicate, between “is a characteristic action by organ 0” and “is a teleological (or goal- securing) performance by organ 0.”

Haldane, then, employed a certain teleological model because he wished to explain the behavior of certain physical items present before his eyes, and had evidence which suggested-misleadingly-that this behavior could not be explained on a non-teleological (specifically, a biochemical) model. Now in the case of the brain, we obviously have no evidence that is nearly as detailed as what Haldane had, and in particular we have none which suggests-whether misleadingly or not-that the behavior of neural configurations within the brain cannot be explained on a neurophysical model. But no matter. We do have motivation, of a different sort from Haldane’s, for considering the application of a teleological model, like the one which Haldane adapted from Hegel, to neural configurations in the brain. We are not, like Haldane, concerned to explain the behavior of certain material items present “before our eyes.” We are instead concerned to find certain material items-more precisely, to preserve an intuitive conviction that certain material items cun in principle be found-which items could never be recognized us what we are trying to find, if their behavior were explainable on only a neurophysical model. That is, we wish to be able to find those real neural configurations which are the “embodiments” of various mental states; but that a given neural configuration is the

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“embodiment” of some mental state could never be shown, if the behavior of neural configurations could be described, and predicted, by use only of some neurophysical model. We must therefore hope that some non-neurophysical model-for example, a teleological model-can be accurately applied to at least some real neural configurations in the brain; and that this application will permit us to show, of these real neural configurations, that they are “embodiments” of mental states.

Yet to say this is, by itself, to say only that some non-neurophysical model-perhaps the present teleological model, perhaps some other-should be tried out in the case of the brain. What needs still to be shown is that it is in fact possible to specify certain neural configurations as “embodiments,” if the present teleological model, in particular, is accurately applicable to them. We must therefore consider, in some detail, what applicability of the present teleological model to neural configurations in the brain would involve. If (some) neural con- figurations in the brain do operate in accord with this teleological model, then the effects which they characteristically produce, given various circumstances, will consistently be describable as contributions to some second-order end. That is, it will be empirically accurate, and conceptually reasonable, to claim a coextensivity between “is a reaction to impinging circumstances characteristically produced by n c N and “is an operation which, of all those belonging to some repertoire proper to n c N, best subserves, given whatever circumstances obtain, [some second-order end].”

Now if the pieces of “work” characteristically effected by a given mental state can also be regarded as contributions, from a finite repertoire, to some second-order end, then the possibility will be opened of showing that some real neural configuration consistently acts just so as to perform the pieces of “work” Characteristic of some mental state; that is, of showing that some real neural configuration is the “embodiment” of some particular mental state. More fully, the following sort of argument will be possible. “Mental state M characteristically is such as to effect that piece of ‘work‘ which, out of some characteristic repertoire, best subserves [some second-order end], given what circumstances obtain. Now thus far, a complex neural configuration which we will call ‘n c N’ has been causally responsible for all pieces of ‘work’, characteristic of M, that have actually been observed. Moreover, n c N has thus far effected only pieces of ‘work’ characteristic of M. Now we deduce, from our teleological model, that the set of neural effects characteristically produced by n c N, given various impinging circumstances, coincides with some set of maximal contributions, from some finite repertoire, to [some second-order end], given those impinging circumstances. And we infer, from our empirical data, that it coincides with just that set of contributions, out of just that repertoire, which M characteristically is such as to effect. We therefore infer that n c N is such as to do all of M’s characteristic ‘work’. it is M’s

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‘embodiment’.”’5 But is it correct to say that the pieces of “work,” which a given mental

state characteristically is such as to perform, are also describable as contributions, from some repertoire, to some second-order end? This strange-sounding contention would seem, in fact, to be correct. To see this, let us consider--as 1 earlier suggested--one large class of mental states, beliefs. And let us begin with what we might call the “information-processing” “work” which any belief is, characteristically, such as to do. It is, i.e., characteristic of any given belief to respond to various perceptual observations by producing certain new beliefs, both specific and general, and also by cancelling certain old beliefs, both specific and general. For example, my belief that flies of a certain sort spend most of their time bothering rabbits may lead, when 1 observe a swarm of such flies in a field where lions sleep, to the formation of a belief that rabbits frequent that field, or to a cancellation of the belief that rabbits stay clear of lions, etc. Just which new belief is formed, or which old belief is cancelled, will depend (as we now know) not just on the new observation itself, but on a whole complex of background beliefs: in general, that belief-formation or belief-cancellation will occur which best preserves coherence--i.e., simple and perspicuous consisten- cy-with the largest part of this background. But as Quine and Goodman have persuasively argued, there is no belief, however deeply entrenched in this background, that might not in principle get cancelled; and conversely, no belief that might not in principle get formed. Hence, if we consider the various belief-forming and belief-cancelling pieces of “work,” which any given belief is characteristically such as to do, we find that the only general characterization that can be offered is this: each belief works so as to maintain a coherent web of belief as such--the specific contents of which may, in principle, shift without limit.

Now the very generality of this characterization is just what is required if we are to see each belief as doing such “work” as will promote some second-order end of the sort which Hegel stresses. Suppose, for example, that we speak of a second-order end such as “the handling-of- new-pieces-of-information-in-general” (or “the accomodation-ofdata- in-general”). A given belief-embodiment can work so as to promote this end only by working so as to maintain some coherent background of belief or other; for only if there is some such background can there be something in respect to which to “handle” information (or with which to “accommodate” it). Yet for the promotion of this second-order end it is neither necessary nor appropriate that beliefs should “work” so as to maintain oneparticular background of belief or another; and, as we see, neither do they work in that way. I might add that if beliefs are to “work“ so as to promote this second-order end, they must also (somehow) work so as to confront ever new, “raw” information--just as the organs in an organism must also create fresh needs and goals for the system to meet-but that this requirement can, perhaps, also be handled. We need only say (what seems to be true) that specific beliefs characteristically

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produce certain sorts of perceptual exploration, in certain cir- cumstances, thereby causing the reception of “raw” information.

Beliefs also are such as to perform a number of what we might call “action-guiding” pieces of “work.” That is, it also is characteristic of a given belief to produce certain actions, when certain observations occur, provided that certain desires obtain; or to produce, in certain circumstances, certain new wishes or desires, both specific and general, or to cancel old wishes and desires, both specific and general; etc. But it would seem that points can be made in connection with these pieces of “work” parallel to those that I’ve just offered concerning the “information-processing” pieces of “work.” A given belief will, for example, lead to some new intention or desire, when certain new information is received, but to just which intention or desire it leads will depend, in general, on which intention or desire best preserves “practical coherence” with a whole system of desires and aims and possibilities of action. Thus it seems arguable that a given belief will, in general, work simply “so as to maintain” some connected system of desire and action as such, the content of which may vary. And then beliefs can be said to work “just so as to promote” the second-order end which we might call “the implementation-ofdesires-and-wishes-in-general.” Promotion of such an end also requires, of course, the confrontation of new facts which complicate the implementation of desires and set challenges to any particular “connected system of desire and action”: but beliefs can, as I’ve said, be counted on to cause confrontations with new facts.

Hence it is not hard, though it is unfamiliar, to see the pieces of “work” which beliefs characteristically perform as contributions to one or another second-order end. It also is not hard to formulate a second- order end which will include within itself both of the two ends that I have mentioned (e.g., very crudely, “the handling-of-practical-and-cogni- tive-challenges-in-general”). And it would seem reasonable to expect that similar points could be made about the pieces of “work” characteristic of mental states other than beliefs, as well. What follows, then, is that ifcertain neural configurations operate in accord with the present teleological model, then those neural configurations, on the one hand, and the class of mental states, on the other, are (in Davidson’s phrase) “made for each other.” There will be no difficulty in assigning, to one mental state, a real neural embodiment. But we have already seen that if neural configurations operate in accord with only neurophysical models, then neural configurations and mental states are nor “made for each other.“

v One important objection might be raised against the whole argument

of this paper: “if, as you argue, we can uphold the intuitive belief in specifiable ‘embodiments’ only at the cost of affirming the existence of neural items that operate teleologically, then that intuitive belief must

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go. For it is impossible to believe that some small neural items, alone among all entities in the world, operate teleologically; and it is sure that all the other entities do not operate teleologically.” 1 want in this closing section to discuss, briefly, the place which teleological phenomena occupy within the world asa whole, according to the general ontological scheme which Hegel sets forth in the Logic.

The central category in Hegel’s ontology--the category which, in its fully-articulated form, is said in fact to be “the absolute and all truth”’6--is the Idea. The Idea, Hegel indicates, “is essentially a process . . . It is the round of movement, in which the notion . . . Fives itself the character of objectivity and of the antithesis thereto.”’ The sense of these remarks can in turn be grasped by turning to two remarks which precede them. In a brief mention of Plato and Aristotle, Hegel contends that Aristotle no less than Plato held the view that only the Idea is actual, but saw further than Plato--so Hegel suggests--in construing the Idea as an energeia, an act or process whose real aim is really its own occurrence.” And in the discussion of Teleology which immediately precedes Hegel’s own discussion of the Idea, Hegel makes clear that the Idea is the concept of an energeia generalized. The Idea, that is, is a purposive process whose real aim is not this or that specific end beyond itself, although the Idea does involve various specific ends: the Idea is instead a process in which various specific ends get pursued in order that there may be the purposive pursuit of ends as such. The telos of this process is the “second-order” end, to use the earlier phrase, of there being purposive work towards ends in gene~a1.l~

In contending, therefore, that the tdea is “the truth”--indeed, the “absolute and all truth”--Hegel is contending that such a project of open purposivity is actually carried out. Let us consider what realization of this project would entail. It entails, first, that there is at any given time some end or ends as yet unrealized, at which specific purposive work can be aimed; second, that there are agents who do the aiming-at, the working-towards, these ends; third, that there are objective materials in and through which these ends may get worked towards.

Now the objective materials on which agents may work towards specific practical ends must be such as to provide room for real work: they must not be such as to realize particular ends “spontaneously,” but only to the extent that work is expended upon them; they must therefore be such, in general, as to behave in a “blind” and “mechanical” fashion. It follows that the standard scientific categories of law, force, cause and effect, etc., will have application in the world, just because the Idea is carried out in the world.20 And the same conclusion emerges if we consider what objective materials are needed to provide place for cognitive projects, in open succession: the events for which we seek to discern explanations must have explanations, must be the mere reflections of (e.g.) antecedent causes, about whose own causes further questions can in turn be asked, etc.

Hence in regarding the world as a realization of the Idea, Hegel

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maintains a teleological view of the world, but one which, unlike other teleological views, permits and even requires that the categories of “mechanistic” science have application to real items within the world. The deeper truth about these items, however, is that us “mechanistic,” they thereby are also teleological; this deeper truth can be ignored by particular empirical sciences, but is of importance for philosophy. What more natural, then, that there should be some physical items in the world whose teleological character is rather more visible, and does become important for even empirical research? Such a thing happens, as we have seen Hegel suggest, in the empirical investigation of living organisms, where teleological models emerge as, at least, valuable heuristics for research. It happens also, on Hegel’s view, in the study of human culture over time; here, indeed, there is room (Hegel feels) for the use of a teleological model that is richer and conceptually sounder than the teleological model used in biology. It would certainly be consistent with all these views to suppose, further, that teleology also emerges conspicuously--i.e., that a teleological model has, at the very least, great heuristic value--in the case of neural configurations within the brain.

Hegel did not himself discuss any neurological “bases” of the distinctively human mental activities; though he did endorse the use of mechanical models in the conceptualization of memory?’ and though he did also argue that the nerves operate in non-mechanistic (or “non- physical”) ways in the phenomena of sensation and of muscle- activation.22 Consequently the reasons for adopting a teleological approach to the brain, along Hegelian lines, are to some extent extra- Hegelian. They consist in the intuition, which we are likely to hold, that mental states are necessarily “embodied” in recognizable hardware- states, together with the reflection that there can be recognizable “embodiments” only if some teleological model applies. But while the position I propose is to some extent extra-Hegelian in its inspiration, it is by no means anti-Hegelian, or even un-Hegelian, in its content. Hegel did reject materialism; but he did so not because materialism believed in the wrong kind of “stuff,” the wrong Cartesian substance:” he did so, rather, because materialism--alike with various forms of idealism, which Hegel also rejected--applied to this stuff the wrong c ~ t e g o r i e s . ~ ~ 1 am proposing, along similar lines, that we believe in the same “stuff”--the same neural “embodiments”--as we have previously believed in, but try applying to these “embodiments“ different categories. I have supported this proposal by stating that it is a natural extension of the philosophy of Hegel’s Logic: this statement may seem, to many philosophers, scant support: but it is, in my view, high time that the b g i c be re-examined.”

NOTES

’ Jerry A. Fodor, Psychological Explanarion (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 70-7 I ; see also Ned Block, “Troubles with Functionalism,” forthcoming in Minnesora

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Srudies in rhe Philosophy of Science, IX, ed., C . W. Savage (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

These points resemble points made by Fodor, pp. 44-46, ’ Block, “Troubles with Functionalism”; see also Block and Fodor, “What Psyhological States are Not,” Philosophicul Review 81 (I972), 159-181.

Fodor demonstrates the need to consider this possibility in Psychologicul Ex lunurion, pp. 117-18.

‘Fodor, The Longuageof Thoughr (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979, p. 16; for the whole argument, see pp. 9-26. Fodor considers his argument to resemble Davidson’s argument against identities as between mental-state and brain-state types, and in fact the phrase quoted is offered as a paraphrase of one of Davidson’s remarks. See Donald Davidson, “Mental Events,” Experience and Theory, ed., Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970). ’ Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” Minnesoru Studies in rhe Philosophy of

Science, VII: Longuuge, Mind, and KnowIedge, ed., Keith Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), 131-193; or Saul Kripke, “Naming and Necessity,” Semuntics of Nurural Language, ed., Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht: D., Reidel, 1972), pp. 253-355.

Putnam, p. 139 and pp. 164-65. Hegel’s Logic, trans., William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), $$

216-19; compare $218 with $212. See also, in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, trans., A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). $ 335, its Remark, and its Zusatz. Henceforth 1 shall refer to the Encyclopedia Logic, in the Wallace translation, as “EL”; to the Philosophy of Nature, in the Miller translation, as “PN.” ’ EL, $9 205 and 21 I . l o EL, $$204 and 208; and Plv, $ 359, its Remark and its Zusatz. I ’ For Hegel’s general exposition of this form of teleology--called by Hegel ‘infinite

teleology”--see EL, $$204,205, and 212 and its Zusatz. For Hegel’s application of this form of teleology to organisms, see EL, $$21619, or PN,“Section Three”(e.g.,$352and its Zusatz, or the Zusatz to $ 337).

J. S. Haldane, TheSciencesund Philosophy (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1928), ppi,40-60 and 77-78.

Haldane, pp. 70-71, 74-75, and 30. “ Haldane, pp. 88-89 and 13. Hegel would seem to have held a more cautious position:

namely, that while a physical or chemical model could not yield conceptually satisfying explanations in biology, it still might well yield uccurate predictions. See EL, $ 218, read together with $$ 209 and 212; PN, $335 and its Zusatz, the Remark to $365, and the last sentence of the Zusatz to $ 326.

I ’ Note that this argument employs the same observational data as did the argument which was rejected in soction 11; the difference lies in the model which is held applicable to n c N.

I’ EL, $ 236. I ’ EL, $ 215. I s EL, Zusatz to $ 142. I’ EL, $$ 204-212.

EL, $$ 236 and 237. ’’ €L,Zusatz to$ 195; see also Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, trans., William Wallaceand

22 PN, Zusatz to $ 335; $ 350 and Zusatz; see also $353. See Hegels Philosophy of Mind, $ 389 and Zusatz.

’‘ See, e.g., the rejection of Stoic atomism in EL, $$96-98 and Zusatze; or the rejection of Cartesian “matter” as a category involving conce~ruulconfusions, in EL, $$99 and 100 and Zusatze. For rejections of certain forms of idealism, see the rejection of “transcendental idealism” in Hegel’s Science of Logic. trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen and Unwin, and New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 489-90 and pp. 486-87 (and note that the rejection in this latter passage repeats the sume argument as is urged against murerialism in EL, $$96-98); or the rejection of Berkeleyian idealism in The

A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), $ 453, and its Zusatz.

2 1

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Phenomenology of Mind, trans., J. B. Baillie(New Yorli and Evanston: Harper and Row,

Several ideas in this paper wen called forth by conversations with J. N. Findlay and with Michael Simon, to whom 1 owe thanks; and I also owe thanks, for excellent and saving suggestions on organization, to Joel Kupperman and Jerome Shaffer.

19$’7), pp. 272-80.

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